THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  CALIFORNIA 

PRESENTED  BY 

PROF.  CHARLES  A.  KOFOID  AND 
MRS.  PRUDENCE  W.  KOFOID 


THE  AUTHOR 


THE 

FIFTEENTH     OHIO 
VOLUNTEERS 

AND 

ITS  CAMPAIGNS 


WAR    OF     1861-5 


BY 

ALEXIS   COPE 


Private,    Sergeant,   Sergeant  Major,   Second  Lieutenant,   First  Lieutenant,   Adjutant  and 
Captain   in  the   Fifteenth   Ohio  Volunteers,  Acting   Assistant  Adjutant   General 
of    the     First    Brigade    and    of    the    Third    Division,     Fourth     Corps, 
Army    of    the    Cumherland,    and    Acting    Assistant    Inspec 
tor     General     Western     Sub-District     of     Texas. 


COLUMBUS.    OHIO 

PUBLISHED    BY   THE   AUTHOR 

1916 


COPYRIGHT,    1916 

BY     ALEXIS     COPE 


PUBLISHED.    JANUARY,    1916 


kNY.    COLUMBUS.    OHIO 


PREFACE. 

THIS  history  has  been  prepared  at  the  request  of  the  regi 
mental  association  and  aims  to  tell  where  the  regiment  was  and 
how  it  was  employed  every  day  of  its  service,  which  covered 
the  period  from  April  21,  1861  to  Nov.  22,  1865.  The  principal 
authorities  used  have  been  diaries  of  Lieutenant  Andrew  J. 
Gleason,  Sergeant  Nathaniel  Mumuagh,  Sergeant  John  G. 
Gregory,  Frank  L.  Schreiber  and  William  McConnell,  a  partial 
dairy  kept  by  Chaplain  Randall  Ross,  hundreds  of  letters  written 
at  the  time  by  officers  and  men  of  the  regiment  to  relatives  at 
home,  the  official  reports  and  correspondence  printed  in  the  War 
of  the  Rebellion  Records,  official  rosters  and  reports  printed  by 
the  State  of  Ohio,  and  numerous  memoirs  and  articles  published 
by  officers  who  served  in  the  armies  of  the  west. 

The  aim  has  been  not  only  to  tell  the  story  of  the  regiment's 
life  in  camp,  on  the  march  and  in  battle,  but  to  give  from  authentic 
records  a  wider  vision,  wherein  the  movements  of  the  regiment 
are  co-related  to  the  larger  movements  of  the  brigade,  divisio'n, 
corps  and  army  of  which  it  formed  a  part.  In  brief  to  tell  the 
story  of  all  the  campaigns  in  which  the  regiment  was  engaged. 

Special  acknowledgements  are  due  to  Lieutenant  Andrew  J. 
Gleason,  who  a  short  time  before  his  death  in  1910,  placed  in  the 
author's  hands  his  personal  diary,  to  Sergeant  John  G.  Gregory, 
New  Concord,  O.,  for  the  use  of  his  diary;  to  Thomas  W.  Evans 
of  Saint  Joseph,  Mo.,  who  had  the  diary  of  Frank  L.  Schreiber 
transcribed  and  sent  to  the  author,  and  to  Mrs.  Mary  B.  Carroll, 
widow  of  the  late  Captain  Chandler  W.  Carroll,  who  kindly  sent 
her  husbands  letters  written  to  her  during  the  war ;  and  to  the 
comrades  who  by  letter  and  otherwise  have  aided  in  clearing  up, 
or  confirming  incidents  of  the  regiment's  service. 

The  author  is  also  indebted  to  the  Hon.  Thomas  H.  Ricketts, 
12th  Qhio  Cavalry,  and  Major  L.  S.  Sullivant,  113th  Ohio  In 
fantry,  of  Columbus,  Ohio,  who  read  the  manuscript  as  it  was 

3 


written,  made  valuable  suggestions  and  gave  the  author  encour 
agement  when  most  needed.  He  is  also  greatly  indebted  to 
Brigadier  General  James  H.  Wilson,  U.  S.  A.  retired,  the  last 
surviving  corps  commander  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland, 
who  kindly  read  the  manuscript  copy  of  the  chapters  covering 
Hood's  Invasion  of  Tennessee  and  made  very  valuable  sugges 
tions,  and  to  Mrs.  Frances  M.  McClenhan,  who  has  taken  a 
kindly  interest  in  the  work  from  the  beginning  and  whose  letters 
have  been  encouraging  and  helpful.  To  all  others  who  have  aided 
in  any  way  in  the  preparation  of  the  work,  including  the  stenog 
raphers,  Misses  Effie  Merwine,  Anna  M.  Mooar  and  Anna  Rud- 
holzner,  who  have  been  patient  and  helpful,  sincere  acknowl 
edgements  are  tendered. 


CONTENTS 

Chapter  1.— The  Fifteenth  Ohio  in  the  Three  Months'  Service 7 

South  Carolina  Secedes — Arms  Sent  South — Other  States  Secede — Confederacy 
Organized — Fort  Sumter — Lincoln's  Call  for  Troops — Ohio's  Response — Fifteenth 
Ohio  Organized. 

Chapter  2. — Reorganization  for  Three  Years'  Service 19 

Bull  Run  Disaster — 1,000,000  Volunteers — Ohio's  Response — Regiment  Reor 
ganized — Kentucky's  Neutrality — Confederates  Advance — Advance  Into  Kentucky. 

Chapter  3. — Camp  Nevin  and  Six  Months  of  Inaction 38 

Camp  Nevin — Organization  of  Troops — Department  Commanders  Changed — Buell 
in  Command — Movement  to  Green  River — Rowlett's  Station — Capture  of  Fort 
Henry. 

Chapter  4.— Halleck-Buell— Grant  Captures  Henry  and  Donelson 58 

Western  Armies  Reorganize— Buell's  Plans — Relief  of  East  Tennessee — Buell's 
Attitude — Grant's  Movements — Surrender  of  Donelson — Buell's  Advance. 

Chapter  5 — Occupation  of  Bowling  Green  and  Nashville 78 

Advance  on  Bowling  Green  and  Nashville — Nelson  Enters  Nashville — Smith  at 
Nashville — Grant's  Temporary  Suspension — Halleck  and  Buell  Disagree — Halleck 
in  Command. 

Chapter  6. — The  Shiloh  Campaign — First  Day  of  Battle 95 

Expedition  Against  Railroad — Pittsburgh  Landing — Grant  Restored  to  Com 
mand — Enemy  Advances  from  Corinth — -Union  Troops  Begin  Battle — Regiment 
Arrives  at  Savannah. 

Chapter  7.— Second  Day  of  the  Battle  of  Shiloh 120 

Grant's    Position — Arrival    of    Nelson's    Division — Regiment    Embarks     at    Sa 
vannah — Arrival    at    Pittsburgh    Landing — Movements    During    the    Engagement. 
Chapter  8. — Siege  of  Corinth 136 

Demoralization  of  Confederates — Why  Not  Pursued — Grant  Under  Cloud — Pope's 
Army  Arrives — Grant  Retired — Reorganization — Movement  on  Corinth — The 
Siege. 

Chapter  9. — Movement  Against  Chattanooga — Its  Delay  and  Failure.. ..156 
Halleck    Abandons    Pursuit — Mitchell's    Campaign — Enemy    Evacuates     Chatta 
nooga — Buell   Ordered  to  Take  Chattanooga — Delays — Enemy  Reoccupies  Place. 

Chapter  10. — Bragg's  Invasion  of  Kentucky — Retreat  of  Buell's  Army. .175 

Bragg  Commands  Confederates — Threatens  Halleck's  Center — Confederates  Raid 
Buell's  Communications — Expedition  Against  Tennessee  and  Kentucky — Willich 
Brigade  Commander. 

Chapter  11. — Retreat  of  Buell  to  Louisville — Perryville  Campaign.. ..196 

March  to  Louisville— Movements  of  Confederates — Perryville  Campaign  and 
Battle — Pursuit  of  Confederates — Buell  Relieved — Rosecrans  in  Command. 

Chapter  12.— March  to  Nashville— Preparation  for  Murfreesboro 210 

Army    of   the   Cumberland   Ordered   to  Nashville — Arrival — Stone   River. 

Chapter  13. — Campaign  and  Battle  of  Stone  River 229 

Incidents   of  Campaign — Details  of  March  to  Battlefield— The  Battle. 

Chapter  14. — Long  Period  of  Apparent  Inactivity  at  Murfreesboro 260 

Efforts  to  Move  Rosecrans  Against  Enemy — Rosecrans'  Generals  Advise  Against 
Movement — Garfield  Favors  it  and  His  Advice  is  Followed. 

Chapter  15. — Tullahoma  Campaign — March  to  the  Tennessee 286 

Liberty  Gap — March  to  Tullahoma — Lost  Opportunity — March  to  the  Tennessee. 

Chapter  16. — The  Campaign  and  Battle  of  Chickamauga 302 

Crossing  the  Tennessee — Crittenden  Occupies  Chattanooga — Rosecrans'  Pursuit 
of  Flying  Foe — Hurried  Concentration — Chickamauga — Losses. 

Chapter  17. — Siege  of  Chattanooga  and  Opening  of  the  Tennessee 327 

Rosecrans  at  Chattanooga — Confederates  Occupy  Lookout  Mountain  and  Hold 
Lower  River  and  Railroad — Rosecrans  Relieved— Thomas  in  Command — Grant 
arrives  at  Chattanooga. 

Chapter  18. — Lookout  Mountain  and  Missionary  Ridge 354 

Reinforcing  Union  Army— Sherman's  Arrival  at  Chattanooga — Orchard  Knob — 
Lookout  Mountain — Sherman's  Assault— Missionary  Ridge  Stormed — Battle. 


Chapter    19. — Relief   of   Knoxville — Veteran    Volunteers 391 

Granger  to  Relief  of  Burnside — Sherman  in  Command  of  Expedition — Knoxville 
Relieved — Fourth  Corps  in  East  Tennessee — -Veteran  Volunteers — Furlough. 

Chapter  20. — The  Atlanta  Campaign — Rocky  Face  and  Resaca 415 

Preparations — Grant  Commander-in- Chief — Sherman  in   Command  of  Armies   in 
Southwest — Regiment  Assembles  in  Columbus  After  Furlough — Atlanta  Campaign 
Opens. 
Chapter  21. — Atlanta  Campaign — Adairsville — Pickett's  Mill 441 

Sherman  Crosses  the  Oostensula — Adairsville — Cassville — Sherman  Crosses  the 
Etowah  River  and  Cuts  Loose  from  Base — Around  Dallas — Pickett's  Mill. 

Chapter  22. — Atlanta  Campaign — Pickett's  Mill  to  Bald  Knob 475 

Sherman  Regains  Railroad  South  of  Allatona — Kenesaw  Mountain — Bald  Knob. 

Chapter  23. — Atlanta  Campaign — From  Bald  Knob  to  Chattanooga.. ..502 

Kenesaw  Mountain — Criticism  of  Sherman  for  Assault. 
Chapter  24. — Atlanta  Campaign — From  Chattahoochee  to  Atlanta 518 

Sherman  Crosses  the  Chattahooche — Enemy  Retires  to  Atlanta — Sherman  Fol 
lows — Hood  in  Command  of  Confederates — Mcl'herson  Killed — 'Union  Army 
Around  Atlanta. 

Chapter  25. — Atlanta  Campaign — Siege  and  Capture  of  Atlanta 528 

Cavalry  Fails  to  Destroy  Railroad — Cavalry  to  Cut  Enemy's  Communications — 
Movement  to  Enemy's  Left — Jonesboro — Atlanta  Evacuated — Lovejoy  Station — 
Army  Rests  in  Atlanta. 

Chapter  26.— From  Atlanta  to  Gaylesville,  Alabama 560 

Hood  Recrosses  Chattahoochee  and  Strikes  Sherman's  Communications — lurried 
March    to    Marietta    and    Kenesaw — Corse's    Defense    of    Allatoona— To    Gayles 
ville,  Ala. 
Chapter  27. — Hood's   Invasion   of  Tennessee 580 

Sherman    Proposes    March    to    the    Sea — Grant    Consents    if    Thomas    can    Hold 

Line   of  the   Tenessee — Fourth   Corps  to  Pulaski — Hood  Crosses   the   Tennessee. 

Chapter  28. — Hood's  Invasion  of  Tennessee — Pulaski — Franklin 593 

Hood  Moves  Toward  Columbia — Union  Army  Reaches  Columbia  First — Hood 
Marches  on  Spring  Hill — Battle  of  Franklin — Retreat  to  Nashville. 

Chapter  29. — Hood's  Invasion  of  Tennessee — Battle  of  Nashville 622 

Enemy's  Activity  Alarms  North — Grant  Orders  Thomas  to  Attack — Ice  and 
Snow  Cause  Delay — Logan  Sent  to  Supersede  Thomas — Battle  Begins. 

Chapter  30. — Hood's  Invasion  of  Tennessee — Pursuit  of  Hood 660 

Pursuit  of  Confederates — Pontoon  Train   on  Wrong  Road — Hood  Escapes. 

Chapter  31. — March  to  Huntsville — A  M'onth  of  Idleness 677 

Wilson  and  Wood  Urge  Continued  Activity — Fourth  Corps  at  Huntsville — 
Thomas's  Army  Scattered — Fourth  Corps  Sent .  to  Nashville  by  Mistake. 

Chapter  32. — Movement  Up  the  Tennessee 693 

Cavalry  Raid  Into  Virginia — Fourth  Corps  to  Knoxville  Thence  to  Greenville — - 
Lee's  Surrender — Lincoln's  Assassination — Move  to  Nashville. 

Chapter  33.— At  Nashville  Preparing  for  Texas  Campaign 715 

Willich  in  Command  of  Brigade — Fourth  Corps  Ordered  to  Sheridan — Instruc 
tions  for  Texas  Campaign — Embarkation  for  Texas. 

Chapter  34. — Conditions  in  Texas  and  Movement  to  New  Orleans 733 

French  Invasion  in  Mexico  Part  of  Rebellion — Large  Army  for  Texas — Overtures 
of  Confederates  to  Imperialist  Government  of  Mexico — Voyage  to  New  Orleans. 

Chapter  35 — Texas  Campaign — From  New  Orleans  to  San  Antonio... .754 

Mouth  of  Mississippi — Incidents  of  Voyage — Landing — Terrible  Night  March  to 
Green  Lake — Mutinous  Conduct  of  Some  Troops — March  to  San  Antonio. 

Chapter  36. — Texas  Campaign— Conditions  Along  Rio  Grande 769 

Cavalry  March  Across   Texas — Operations  Along  Rio  Grande — Activity   of  Con 
federate     Generals — Grant's     Views     on     Mexican      Situation— Willich     Leaves 
Brigade — Muster  Out. 
Chapter  37. — Journey  from  San  Antonio — Home 788 

March  to  Indianola — Embarks  for  New  Orleans — Arrival — Embarks  for  Cairo — 
Arrival — To  Columbus — Arrival — Final  Discharge. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  IN  THE  THREE  MONTHS'  SERVICE. 

THE  election  of  President  Lincoln  in  November,  1860,  had 
been  preceded  by  threats  of  secession  and  disunion  by  the  political 
leaders  of  the  South,  but  they  were  lightly  regarded  by  the  loyal 
people  of  the  country,  both  north  and  south.  Many  of  them  be 
lieved  that  between  the  election  and  the  inauguration  of  the  new 
President,  there  would  be  time  for  the  passions  aroused  during 
the  political  campaign  to  cool  and  for  reason  to  assert  her  sway. 
In  this,  however,  they  were  mistaken.  These  poltical  leaders, 
maddened  by  their  inevitable  loss  of  power  in  case  Lincoln  should 
be  elected,  deliberately  set  about  preparing  to  carry  their  threats 
into  execution.  In  this  they  were  encouraged  by  the  weak,  vacil 
lating,  out-going  administration,  which  had  declared  that  it  had 
no  power  under  the  constitution  to  coerce  a  seceding  state.  In 
flamed  by  their  leaders,  who  asserted  that  it  was  the  deliberate 
purpose  of  the  incoming  administration  to  destroy  the  institution 
of  slavery  in  the  states  where  it  then  existed,  the  people  of  the 
southern  states  began  to  arm.  These  open  demonstrations  of  in 
tended  violence  did  not  alarm  the  loyal  people  of  the  country  so  as 
to  cause  them  to  do  likewise,  although  they  knew  that  the  Southern 
members  of  President  Buchanan's  cabinet  were  encouraging  the 
revolt  and  transferring  the  arms  and  munitions  of  war  of  the 
United  States  to  points  in  the  South  where  they  could  be  seized 
by  the  secessionists  in  case  war  should  result.  December  20, 

1860,  the  state  convention  of  South  Carolina  adopted  an  ordinance 
seceding  from  the  Union,  and  collected  a  large  body  of  her  state 
troops  at  Charleston  to  maintain  the  position  she  had  taken. 

These  troops  became  such  a  menace  to  the  small  detachment 
of  U.  S.  Troops  then  at  Fort  Moultrie  in  Charleston  Harbor, 
that  for  greater  safety,  Major  Robert  Anderson,  who  was  in 
command,  on  the  night  of  Dec.  26,  quietly  transferred  them  to 
Fort  Sumter.  December  27,  Fort  Moultrie  and  Castle  Pinckney 
were  seized  by  the  South  Carolina  state  troops,  and  the  guns  of 
the  former  were  trained  on  Fort  Sumter.  Dec.  30,  the  United 
States  Arsenal  at  Charleston  was  also  seized  by  the  South  Caro 
lina  state  troops.  January  2,  1861,  Fort  Johnson  was  also  taken 
possession  of  by  the  same  troops.  During  the  month  of  January, 

1861,  following  the  lead  of  South  Carolina,  the  states  of  Missis 
sippi,   Florida,   Alabama,   Georgia   and   Louisiana,   in  the   order 
named,  passed  ordinances  of  secession  and  their  state  troops  took 
possession  of  the  United  States  forts  and  arsenals  within  their 


FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

borders.  The  outgoing  administration  feebly  protested  against 
these  open  manifestations  of  treason,  but  a  number  of  members 
of  the  cabinet  were  secretly  encouraging  them.  Having  openly 
proclaimed  its  lack  of  power  to  prevent  secession,  it  contented  it 
self  with  a  feeble  attempt  to  reinforce  the  garrison  of  Fort 
Sumter.  On  the  5th  day  of  January,  1861,  Lieutenant  Charles  R. 
Woods,  with  200  men  left  Governor's  Island,  New  York,  on  the 
Steamer  Star  of  the  West  and  on  January  8,  at  midnight,  arrived 
off  Charleston  Harbor.  The  next  morning  they  crossed  the  bar 
and  steamed  up  the  main  channel.  When  about  one  and  three- 
fourth  miles  from  Fort  Sumter  they  were  fired  on  by  a  masked 
battery  on  Morris  Island,  and  were  compelled  to  turn  about  and 
get  out  of  the  harbor  before  their  retreat  was  cut  off.1 

During  the  month  of  February  the  State  of  Texas  passed  an 
ordinance  of  secession  and  the  United  States  Arsenal  at  Little 
Rock,  Fort  Smith,  and  ordinance  stores  at  Pine  Bluffs  and  Na 
poleon,  Arkansas,  were  seized  by  the  troops  of  that  state.  During 
the  same  month  the  state  troops  of  Missouri  seized  the  United 
States  Arsenal  at  Liberty  and  the  United  States  ordinance  stores 
at  Kansas  City  in  that  state.  During  this  month,  delegates  from 
the  above  named  seceding  states  met  at  Montgomery,  Alabama, 
and  on  February  8,  1861,  formed  a  provisional  government, 
adopted  the  name  of  The  Confederate  States  of  America,  and  the 
next  day  elected  Jefferson  Davis  as  President  and  Alexander  H. 
Stephens  as  Vice  President.  On  the  first  day  of  March  this 
government  took  control  of  affairs  at  Charleston  and  on  March 
3,  1861,  under  its  authority.  General  G.  T.  Beauregard  assumed 
command  of  the  secession  forces  at  that  place. 

By  this  time  the  entire  country  began  to  realize  the  gravity  of 
the  situation,  but  all  hoped  that  by  compromise  or  in  some  other 
way  the  awful  calamity  of  a  civil  war  would  be  averted.  Amid 
these  hopes,  but  with  doubts  and  fears  on  the  part  of  many,  the 
country  was  rapidly  drifting  into  a  bloody  conflict.  The  newly 
elected  President,  Abraham  Lincoln,  from  his  home  at  Spring 
field,  Illinois,  watched  the  coming  storm,  powerless  to  stem  the 
increasing  tide  of  rebellion.  Indeed,  it  was  feared  by  some  that 
he  would  never  reach  Washington  to  assume  the  duties  of  the 
office  to  which  he  had  been  elected.  It  is  little  wonder  that  when 
leaving  his  home  for  Washington  he  uttered  these  memorable 
words : 

"I  now  leave  not  knowing  when  or  whether  ever  I  may  return, 
with  a  task  before  me  greater  than  that  which  rested  upon  Washing 
ton.  Without  the  assistance  of  that  Divine  Being  who  ever  attended 
him,  I  cannot  succeed.  With  that  assistance  I  cannot  fail.  Trusting 

l     w.  R.  Ji.     1-9-10. 


CAMPAIGN  ix  WEST  VIRGINIA  9 

in  Him,  who  can  go  with  me  and  remain  with  you,  and  be  every  where 
for  good,  let  us  confidently  hope  that  all  will  be  well." 

The  fourth  of  March  came  and  Lincoln  was  inaugurated  as 
President.  His  patriotic  appeal  to  the  people  of  the  South  in  his 
inaugural  address  inspired  the  hope  in  some  breasts  that  they 
would  at  least  pause  and  consider  the  consequences  of  their  mis 
guided  action.  But  the  appeal  was  in  vain.  Inflamed  by  their 
leaders  they  pressed  madly  on.  The  first  three  weeks  of  Presi 
dent  Lincoln's  administration  were  consumed  in  settling  political 
differences  among  members  of  his  cabinet  and  trying  to  fix  upon 
a  plan  of  action  which  would  be  approved  by  them.  Their  coun 
sels  were  divided  and  nothing  was  done.  The  absorbing  question, 
strange  tc  say,  was  whether  or  not  the  garrison  at  Fort  Sumter 
should  be  supplied  with  food  and  reinforced.  On  this  question 
the  cabinet  was  divided.  General  Scott  was  reluctant  to  take 
any  steps  which  in  his  opinion  would  increase  the  anger  of  the 
South.  Lincoln  in  his  inaugural  address  had  clearly  stated  that 
his  power  as  chief  executive  of  the  nation  would  "be  used  to 
hold,  occupy  and  possess  the  property  and  places  belonging  to 
the  government  and  to  collect  the  duties  and  imposts,"  and  he 
never  for  one  moment  wavered  from  this  purpose.  He  was 
probably  only  deferring  action  in  regard  to  Fort  Sumter  until 
his  advisers  were  brought  round  to  his  way  of  thinking.  The 
discussion  went  on  until  the  evening  of  March  28,  when  at  the 
close  of  the  first  state  dinner  he  gave  at  the  White  House,  he  called 
his  cabinet  together  for  a  moment  and  disclosed  to  them  the 
contents  of  a  letter  he  had  just  received  from  General  Scott, 
advising  the  surrender  of  Fort  Sumter  and  Fort  Pickens.  Lin 
coln's  historians,  Nicolay  and  Hay,  state  that  the  members  of 
the  cabinet  were  amazed  at  the  advise  of  General  Scott  and  all 
dissented  from  it,  though  there  was  no  formal  vote,  and  that 
after  being  requested  to  meet  in  counsel  next  day  the  cabinet 
retired.  "That  night",  say  the  same  historians,  "Lincoln's  eyes 
did  not  close  in  sleep.  It  was  apparent  that  the  time  had  come 
when  he  must  meet  the  nation's  crisis.  His  judgment  alone  must 
guide,  his  sole  will  determine,  his  own  lips  utter  the  word  that 
should  save  or  lose  the  most  precious  inheritance  of  humanity, 
the  last  hope  of  free-government  on  the  earth.  Only  the  imagina 
tion  may  picture  that  intense  and  weary  vigil".1 

In  recalling  this  incident  one  thinks  of  the  agony  in  the  gar 
den  of  Gethsemane,  and  the  Master's  sorrowful  words,  "Could 
not  ye  watch  with  me  one  hour?" 

The  next  day  the  cabinet  met  at  noon  to  again  take  up  the 
burning  question.  Two  weeks  before,  a  decided  majority  of  its 

1     Nicolay  and  Hay's  Abraham  Lincoln. 


10  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

members  had  opposed  an  expedition  to  even  provision  the  garri 
son  at  Fort  Sumter.  Now,  a  majority  favored  it.  Probably  they 
were  aware  that  the  President  had  decided  on  this  course.  After 
the  meeting  adjourned  the  President  with  his  own  hand  \vrote  the 
following  order  to  the  Secretary  of  War: 

"Sir: — I  desire  that  an  expedition,  to  move  by  sea,  be  got  ready 
to  sail  as  early  as  the  6th  of  April  next,  the  whole  according  to  mem 
orandum  attached  and  that  you  co-operate  with  the  Secretary  of  the 

"A.  LINCOLN." 

A  duplicate  of  the  order  and  the  memorandum  attached  were 
at  the  same  time  sent  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy.1 

It  is  only  necessary  for  the  purposes  of  this  narrative  to  state 
that  through  a  misunderstanding  and  a  conflict  of  orders  the  ex 
pedition  failed  in  its  object. 

The  hesitancy  on  the  part  of  Lincoln's  cabinet  to  take  this 
decisive  step  and  the  clamors  of  the  faint  hearted  in  the  north 
for  peace  at  any  price,  only  emboldened  and  encouraged  the 
political  leaders  of  the  south  to  greater  activity  in  their  rebellious 
schemes.  On  the  llth  of  January  the  Governor  of  South  Caro 
lina  demanded  the  surrender  of  Fort  Sumter  which  Major  Ander 
son  refused.1  On  the  llth  of  April  General  Beauregard  re 
peated  the  demand,  which  was  again  refused  and  on  the  12th  at 
4:20  A.  M.  the  attack  on  Fort  Sumter  began.  Major  Anderson 
made  a  gallant  but  hopeless  defense,  and  on  the  afternoon  of 
April  13,  1861,  when  the  fort  had  been  battered  to  pieces  and 
the  barracks  were  on  fire,  was  compelled  to  surrender.  Next 
morning,  Sunday  April  14,  1861,  the  noble  little  garrison,  after 
saluting  the  stars  and  stripes  as  they  were  lowered  from  the  staff 
at  Fort  Sumter,  were  transferred  to  the  steamer  Isabel  on 
which  they  were  taken  over  the  bar  to  the  Baltic  which  carried 
them  to  New  York. 

At  the  time  Major  Anderson  and  his  gallant  men  were  evac 
uating  Fort  Sumter,  President  Lincoln  and  his  cabinet,  together 
with  several  military  officers,  were  at  the  Executive  Mansion. 
They  had  heard  of  the  Fort's  surrender  and  were  considering 
details  of  the  action  the  government  had  decided  to  take.  At  this 
meeting  the  President,  again  with  his  own  hand,  drafted  a  proc 
lamation  and  issued  a  call  for  seventy-five  thousand  men  which 
appeared  in  the  newspapers  next  morning. 

The  attack  on  Fort  Sumter,  its  gallant  defense  and  enforced 
surrender  awoke  the  sleeping  lion  of  the  North.  All  talk  of  com 
promise  and  all  peace  parleys  at  once  ceased,  and  it  was  realized 


1     AY.  R.  R.   1 — Note  pag~e  1. 


CAMPAIGN  IN  WEST  VIRGINIA  11 

that  the  bloody  issue  which  had  been  tendered  by  the  secessionists 
of  the  South  must  be  met  and  fought  to  the  bitter  end. 

Lincoln's  call  was  a  National  Reveille.  The  people's  response 
to  it  was  immediate  and  inspiring.  Some  had  been  hoping  and 
fearing,  some  had  doubted,  some  had  faith  that  all  would  yet  be 
well, 

"Till  a  trumpet  voice  proclaiming," 
"Said,  'my  chosen  people  come!'" 

"And  the  great  heart  of  the  nation, 

Throbbing,  answered,  'Lord,  we  come!" 

The  Fifteenth  Ohio  Volunteer  Infantry  was  among  the  first 
troops  to  respond  to  President  Lincoln's  call,  and  was  made  up 
of  the  following  companies,  enrolled  at  the  following  times  and 
places  and  with  the  following  named  officers : 
Company  A. — April  17,  1861,  Zanesville,  O. 

Captain— R.  W.  P.  Muse. 

First  Lieutenant — Victor  S.  Perry. 

Second  Lieutenant — Asa  C.  Cassady. 
Company  B.— April  18,  1861,  Martinsville,  O. 

Captain — William  Wallace. 

First  Lieutenant — James  W.  Clark. 

Second  Lieutenant — Joseph  Frazier. 
Company  C.— April  23,  1861,  Upper  Sandusky,  O. 

Captain — William  T.  Wilson. 

First  Lieutenant — Franklin  W.  Martin. 

Second  Lieutenant — Henry  C.  Miner. 
Company  D.— April  18,  1861,  Shelby,  Ohio. 

Captain — Abraham  C.  Cummins. 

First  Lieutenant — Tilman  H.  Wiggins. 

Second  Lieutenant — Henry  B.  Gaylord. 
Company  E.— April  18,  1861,  Van  Wert,  Ohio. 

Captain — Israel  D.  Clark. 

First  Lieutenant — Charles  B.  Smith. 

Second  Lieutenant — Ralston  Craig. 
Company  F.— April  17,  1861,  Sidney,  Ohio. 

Captain — Abraham  Kaga. 

First  Lieutenant — Warren  Owens. 

Second  Lieutenant — Joel  F.  Skillings. 
Company  G.— April  20,  1861,  Upper  Sandusky,  Ohio. 

Captain — Peter  A.  Tyler. 

First  Lieutenant — William  H.  Kilmer. 

Second  Lieutenant — Frederick  Agerton. 


12  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

Company  H. — April  23,  1861,  Mansfield,  Ohio. 

Captain — Hiram  Miller. 

First  Lieutenant — Andrew  R.  Z.  Dawson. 

Second  Lieutenant — Rufus  L.  Avery. 
Company  I. — April  20,  1861,  Upper  Sandusky,  Ohio. 

Captain — Isaac  M.  Kirby. 

First  Lieutenant — Albert  Spaulding. 

Second  Lieutenant — Samuel  Bachtel. 
Company  K—  April  23,  1861,  Wapakoneta,  Ohio. 

Captain — W.  V.  M.  Layton. 

First  Lieutenant — C.  W.  Cowan. 

Second  Lieutenant — J.  W.  Moody. 

These  companies  assembled  at  Camp  Jackson  (now  Goodale 
Park)  Columbus,  Ohio,  and  were  mustered  into  the  service  of 
the  State  to  date  from  April  27,  1861,  by  Major  Henry  M.  Neil, 
Aide  de  Camp  to  Governor  Dennison.  On  May  -i,  1861,  they 
were  organized  into  a  regiment  with  George  W.  Andrews  as 
Colonel,  Moses  R.  Dickey  as  Lieutenant  Colonel,  Silas  B.  Walker 
as  Major,  Orrin  Ferris  as  Surgeon  and  J.  B.  Mowry  as  Assistant 
Surgeon.  Four  days  later  the  regiment  moved  to  Camp  Goddard 
near  Zanesville,  Ohio,  where  it  spent  several  days  engaged  in 
drill  and  other  preparation  for  service  in  the  field. 

The  Fifteenth  Ohio  was  one  of  ten  regiments  in  excess  of 
Ohio's  quota  under  President  Lincoln's  call  for  seventy-five 
thousand  men,  and  which  it  was  wisely  decided  to  accept  for  the 
defense  of  the  state. 

Whether  such  defense  should  be  made  along  its  own  borders, 
or  in  the  adjoining  states  of  Kentucky  and  Virginia,  was  a  grave 
question,  so  far  as  Kentucky  was  concerned.  Governor  Dennison 
at  first  was  opposed  to  sending  any  troops  under  his  control  into 
that  state,  even  for  the  defense  of  Cincinnati.1  His  contention 
was,  that  Kentucky  was  still  in  the  Union  and  should  be  treated 
as  other  loyal  states  until  her  people  showed  a  disposition  to  be 
hostile  to  the  Union.  Governor  Magofifin  in  response  to  Presi 
dent  Lincoln's  call  for  troops  had  publicly  declared  that  "Ken 
tucky  would  furnish  no  troops  for  the  wicked  purpose  of  sub 
duing  her  sister  states",  and  Governor  Dennison  had  increased 
the  patriotic  ardor  of  the  loyal  people  of  the  country  by  tele 
graphing  to  the  War  Department  at  Washington  that  "if  Ken 
tucky  would  not  fill  her  quota  Ohio  would  fill  it  for  her".2  Not 
withstanding  the  hostile  attitude  of  her  governor,  it  was  believed 
at  the  time  that  the  great  majority  of  the  people  of  Kentucky 
were  loyal  to  the  Union. 

1  Ohio  in  the  "War  Vol.   1,  pag-e   30. 

2  Ohio  in  the  War  Vol.    1,   page   42. 


CAMPAIGN  IN  WEST  VIRGINIA  13 

In  Virginia,  however,  the  situation  was  different.  That  state 
had  not  then  seceded  but  its  people  were  arming  for  an  aggressive 
campaign,  not  only  against  the  Union,  but  to  coerce  the  loyal 
people  of  the  Western  portion  of  the  state,  who  had  called  a  con 
vention  at  Wheeling  to  give  expression  to  their  attachment  to  it. 

General  Henry  B.  Carrington,  then  Adjutant  General  of 
Ohio,  had  suggested,  that  the  Ohio  River  was  not  a  proper  line 
of  defense  against  hostile  action  on  the  part  of  Virginia.  He 
urged  that  it  would  be  better  to  seize  the  mountain  ranges  of 
Western  Virginia  and  rally  the  loyal  inhabitants  to  their  defense, 
lest  the  enemy,  operating  from  Richmond,  should  occupy  the 
passes  and  from  that  base  over  awe  the  loyal  people  of  the  region 
and  move  at  pleasure  against  the  Ohio  border.  The  majority  of 
Governor  Dennison's  advisers  urged  that  neither  the  armies  of 
the  United  States  nor,  much  less,  the  militia  of  Ohio,  could  law 
fully  enter  a  state  not  yet  seceded,  and  that  the  action  of  the 
general  government  had  been  to  this  effect.  They  pointed  to  the 
fact  that  General  Scott,  rather  than  cross  the  Potomac  on  to  the 
soil  of  his  native  state,  was  permitting  rebel  pickets  to  guard  the 
Long  Bridge  and  rebel  patrols  to  pace  their  beats  within  rifle 
range  of  the  White  House.1 

Governor  Dennison  must  have  changed  his  former  views, 
for  during  this  discussion  he  is  reported  as  saying,  "We  can  let 
no  theory  prevent  the  defense  of  Ohio.  I  will  defend  Ohio 
where  it  will  cost  least  and  accomplishes  most.  Above  all  I  will 
defend  Ohio  beyond  rather  than  on  her  borders."2  As  early  as 
April  19,  1861,  he  had  determined  to  protect  exposed  points  along 
the  Ohio  River  bordering  on  Virginia,  especially  the  town  of 
Marietta,  across  the  river  from  Parkersburg,  Virginia,  many  of 
the  inhabitants  of  the  latter  place  being  violent  secessionists. 
Colonel  James  Barnett  of  Cleveland  had  tendered  to  the  state  a 
battery  of  artillery  in  good  condition  and  it  was  at  once  accepted 
and  ordered  to  report  at  Columbus,  where  a  machine  shop  cast 
two  hundred  solid  shot  for  it.  It  was  hurried  thence  to  Love- 
land,  thence  to  Marietta,  and  was  on  the  border  to  defend  the 
town  within  forty-eight  hours  after  the  order  was  issued  and 
before  the  movement  was  known  by  friend  or  foe.3 

On  the  9th  of  May,  1861,  Governor  Dennison  telegraphed  to 
Washington  asking  that  the  boundaries  of  a  department,  which 
on  his  request  had  been  created  and  assigned  to  General  Geo.  B. 
McClellan,  be  extended  so  as  to  include  Western  Virginia.  The 
extension  was  made  and  he  then  wrote  to  General  McClellan, 
enclosing  a  request  from  John  Hall  and  others  of  Parkersburg 

1  Ohio  in  the  War  Vol.  1,  pagre  44. 

2  Ohio  in  the  War  Vol.  1,  page  46. 

3  Ohio    in    the   War     Vol.    1,   page    47. 


14  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

urging  that  Ohio  troops  be  sent  across  the  river  to  occupy  that 
place  and  thwart  the  designs  of  the  secessionists,  which  were 
fully  explained.  In  the  letter  accompanying  this  request,  Gover 
nor  Dennison  urged  that  it  be  at  once  complied  with  and  gave 
reasons  why  the  troops  should  at  once  "enter  Virginia  at 
this  point.1  To  this  request  and  similar  requests  from  Governor 
Dennison,  backed  by  appeals  from  the  loyal  people  of  Virginia, 
General  McClellan  turned  a  deaf  ear,  or  interposed  objections 
and  counselled  delay. 

Finally  on  May  30,  John  S.  Carlisle  of  Virginia  telegraphed 
Governor  Dennison  from  Wheeling,  that  troops  under  order  or 
proclamation  of  Governor  Letcher  of  Virginia  were  marching  on 
Grafton,  Clarksburg  and  Wheeling,  with  the  avowed  purpose  of 
breaking  up  the  loyal  convention  then  in  session  at  the  latter  place, 
and  that  if  Western  Virginia  was  to  be  rescued  from  rebellion 
now  was  the  time  to  do  it.  Governor  Dennison  at  once  telegraphed 
the  substance  of  Mr.  Carlisle's  telegram,  not  only  to  General  Mc 
Clellan,  but  also  to  General  Scott  at  Washington.  As  a  result  of 
this  and  of  representations  made  by  Governor  Dennison  to  the 
Secretary  of  War,  on  May  24,  the  latter  asked  General  McClellan 
if  he  could  not  prevent  the  contemplated  action  of  the  secessionists 
and  save  Wheeling  and  Western  Virginia.  The  General  then 
decided  it  was  time  to  move  and  asked  Governor  Dennison  to 
place  the  ten  regiments  in  excess  of  the  President's  call  which 
had  been  mustered  into  the  service  of  the  state,  under  his  orders. 
Governor  Dennison  lost  no  time  in  complying  with  this  request. 
He  ordered  the  Fourteenth  regiment,  Colonel  James  B.  Steed- 
man,  at  Zanesville,  to  move  at  once  by  river  to  Marietta ;  the 
Seventeenth,  Colonel  John  M.  Council,  at  Lancaster,  to  move  at 
once  by  rail  to  Zanesville  to  support  Colonel  Steedman ;  the 
Fifteenth,  Colonel  George  W.  Andrews,  at  Zanesville,  to  move 
by  rail  to  Bellaire  and  there  await  orders ;  the  Sixteenth,  Colonel 
James  Irvine,  at  Columbus,  to  move  by  rail  to  Bellaire,  to  support 
Colonel  Andrews ;  and  the  Nineteenth,  Colonel  Samuel  Beatty, 
and  the  Twenty-first,  Colonel  Jesse  S.  Norton,  at  Cleveland,  to 
move  at  once  by  rail  to  Columbus  for  further  orders.  The  Twen 
tieth,  Colonel  Charles  Whittlesey,  was  ordered  to  complete  its 
organization  for  immediate  service.  All  were  directed  to  obey 
all  orders  of  General  McClellan.  Within  six  hours  after  General 
McClellan  had  asked  for  them  the  foregoing  state  troops  were 
moving  toward  Virginia. 

While  the  foregoing  events  were  transpiring  the  Fifteenth 
Ohio  Volunteers  was  at  Camp  Goddard,  Zanesville,  Ohio,  being 
disciplined,  uniformed,  armed  and  drilled,  and  otherwise  pre- 

1     Ohio  in  the  War.  Vol.  1,  pages  46-47. 


CAMPAIGN  IN  WEST  VIRGINIA  15 

pared  for  active  service.  When  the  order  came  to  move  to  Bel 
laire  it  was  probably  as  well  prepared  for  such  service  as  most  of 
the  other  volunteer  regiments. 

The  plan  of  the  campaign  was  to  invade  Virginia  at  two 
points :  at  Bellaire  where  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  crosses  the 
Ohio  River,  and  at  Parkersburg  where  another  branch  of  the 
same  railroad  also  crossed  the  same  river, — the  objective  point 
being  the  town  of  Grafton  in  Virginia. 

The  honor  of  first  crossing  the  river  is  due  to  the  14th 
Ohio  under  Colonel  Steedman,  who  on  the  27th  day  of  May,  1861, 
with  his  regiment  and  Barnett's  artillery,  crossed  over,  took  pos 
session  of  Parkersburg,  repressed  with  a  stern  hand  the  rising 
tide  of  secession  and  moved  rapidly  out  along  the  railroad  towards 
Grafton. 

The  16th  Ohio,  Colonel  Irvine,  crossed  the  river  at  Bellaire 

on  the day  of  May,  was  immediately  followed  by  the  15th 

Ohio  and  other  troops,  and  at  once  moved  out  toward  Grafton 
to  form  a  junction  with  Colonel  Stedman's  forces,  which  as 
above  stated  were  moving  toward  the  same  point  from  Parkers 
burg.  The  columns  met  at  Grafton,  the  enemy  having  fled  pre 
cipitately  a  few  hours  before  their  arrival.  The  Union  troops 
pursued  and  came  up  to  the  enemy  at  Philippi  on  June  3,  1861, 
when  the  first  little  skirmish  of  the  war  occurred,  and  Colonel 
Porterfield  and  his  troops  were  driven  from  the  place.  A  por 
tion  of  the  15th  Ohio  took  part  in  this  skirmish  and  also  in  the 
affairs  at  Laurel  Hill,  July  8,  1861,  and  Carrick's  Ford,  July  14, 
1861.  i 

The  service  of  the  loth  Ohio  in  the  foregoing  campaign 
was  not  marked  by  any  unusual  incident  which  distinguishes  it 
above  the  other  regiments  with  which  it  served.  Like  them  it  had 
to  endure  the  hardships  resulting  from  inexperience  and  lack  of 
organization.  The  commissary,  quartermaster  and  medical  de 
partments  were  poorly  organized  and  inefficient.  The  food, 
though  ample  in  quantity,  was  poorly  prepared  and  as  a  result 
there  was  much  suffering  from  camp  diarrhea  and  similar  disor 
ders.  Measles  broke  out  in  the  camp,  there  was  no  adequate  hos 
pital  service,  and  the  men  suffered  for  want  of  proper  shelter  and 
medical  attention.  The  uniforms  issued  to  the  men  turned  out 
to  be  shoddy,  of  the  poorest  kind,  and  were  soon  so  ragged  that 
trousers  and  blouses,  or  jackets,  had  to  be  patched  and  held  to 
gether  by  pieces  of  the  red  flannel  shirts.  Some  of  the  regiments 
in  a  few  weeks  were  as  ragged  as  Falstaff's  tatterdemalions  and 
there  seemed  to  be  no  provision  for  replacing  the  worn  out  uni- 

1     Roster  of  Ohio  Soldiers,  Vol.  1,  page  316. 


16  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

forms.  The  writer,  who  served  in  the  Seventeenth  Ohio  in  this 
campaign,  does  not  recall  that  any  clothing,  other  than  their  first 
uniforms,  was  supplied  to  the  men  during  the  entire  campaign. 
The  men  made  a  joke  of  trying  to  mend  their  worn  out  gray  uni 
forms  with  patches  from  their  red  flannel  shirts,  and  vied  with 
each  other  in  producing  the  most  grotesque  effects.  On  some  of 
the  uniforms  the  patches  were  so  many  and  so  broad  that  in  the 
general  effect  the  red  seemed  to  predominate. 

The  arms  issued  to  the  men  were  mostly  old  flint  lock  mus 
kets  altered  to  percussion  and  the  cartridges  contained  one  large 
round  ball  and  three  buck  shot.  The  men  were  drilled  in  the 
manual  of  arms  and  in  company  and  regimental  movements  ac 
cording  to  the  rules  laid  down  in  Scott's  Tactics.  Lieutenant 
Colonel  Dickey  had  served  in  the  Mexican  war  and  his  experience 
was  valuable  in  getting  the  regiment  into  shape  for  active  duty 
and  in  directing  its  daily  routine  and  movements  while  in  the 
field. 

There  is  no  record  or  diary  to  show  the  regiments  itinerary 
and  how  it  was  employed  each  day  of  its  service  in  Virginia  and 
the  published  official  reports  and  records  are  so  meager  that  little 
help  can  be  obtained  from  them. 

From  these  records  however  we  learn  that  July  12,  1861, 
six  companies  of  the  regiment  were  posted  at  Rowlesburg  and 
thence  five  miles  along  and  up  Cheat  River,1  and  on  the  next  day 
received  orders  to  move  with  General  C.  W.  Hill's  column  to 
intercept  the  Confederates  in  their  flight  from  Laurel  Hill.  The 
six  companies  marched  to  Cheat  River  bridge,  about  four  miles 
south  of  Rowlesburg,  arriving  there  at  8  :30  P.  M.  July  13,  and 
at  10  P.  M.  Colonel  Andrews  sent  out  four  scouts  to  learn  if  pos 
sible  over  what  road  the  enemy  was  retreating.  The  scouts 
found  them  retreating  over  a  road  from  Laurel  Hill  to  the  Red 
House,  on  the  North-western  turnpike,  but  were  so  late  in  report 
ing  that  all  chance  of  intercepting  them  was  lost.  The  six  com 
panies,  however,  the  next  day  at  11  A.  M.  started  for  Red  House, 
about  nineteen  miles  distant,  where  they  arrived  at  4  P.  M.  and 
found  General  Hill,  with  portions  of  the  Eighth,  Sixteenth  and 
Twentieth  Ohio  Regiments  and  two  pieces  of  artillery.  They 
had  been  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy  but  had  not  been  able  to  over 
take  him. 

The  next  day  July  15,  at  8  A.  M.  the  six  companies,  under 
command  of  Colonel  Andrews  marched  eastwardly  from  Red 
House  on  the  Northwestern  Turnpike  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy. 
They  continued  such  pursuit  for  over  two  days  and  finding  it  im- 

1     Colonel  Amlrews's  official  report,  W.  R.  R.   2-233-235. 


CAMPAIGN  ix  WEST  VIRGINIA  17 

possible  to  overtake  the  rapidly  retreating  foe,  about  faced  and 
marched  back  to  Red  House.1 

What  the  other  four  companies  of  the  regiment  were  doing 
at  this  time  and  how  they  were  employed  during  their  service  is 
not  disclosed  in  the  published  official  reports  and  correspondence. 
Mr.  Hiram  K.  Brooks  who  was  a  member  of  one  of  these  com 
panies,  (Company  1>)  made  a  statement  of  their  service  in  1909, 
which  was  taken  down  at  the  time.  He  was  then  in  vigorous 
health  and  seemed  to  have  a  clear  recollection  of  his  experience 
and  to  remember  dates  of  the  important  events  of  such  service. 
In  this  statement  he  says,  that  they  moved  from  Bellaire  to  Graf- 
ton  over  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad  and  thence  to  Webster. 
That  on  the  night  of  June  2,  1861  they  marched  in  a  pouring 
rain  from  that  point  to  Philippi,  and  the  next  day  took  part  in 
the  affair  at  that  place  where  General  Kelly  was  wounded.  That 
on  the  9th  day  of  July,  1861,  they  marched  from  Phillipi  to  Laurel 
Hill  and  took  part  in  the  skirmish  there.  That  they  marched 
thence  to  Carrick's  Ford  where  there  was  another  skirmish  and 
the  Confederate  General  Garnet  was  killed.  That  General  Morris 
was  in  command  of  the  troops  with  which  he  served.  That  they 
marched  from  Carrick's  Ford  back  to  Philippi  and  thence  to 
Buckhannon.  That  from  Buckhannon  the  regiment  marched  to 
Webster.  At  the  latter  point  they  moved  by  rail  to  Parkersburg, 
and  thence  by  way  of  Marietta  to  Camp  Chase  at  Columbus,  Ohio, 
where  they  were  finally  discharged  August  30,  1861,  and  were 
sent  home  without  being  paid.  That  after  they  got  home,  about 
September  4,  1861,  the  paymaster  came  to  their  homes  and  paid 
them,  the  private  soldiers  each  receiving  fifty-four  dollars  in 
gold  and  fifty  cents  in  currency. 

In  the  brief  sketch  of  the  regiment  given  in  Ohio  In  The  War, 
it  is  stated  that  "it  was  employed  for  some  time  in  guard  duty  on 
the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad,  advancing  as  far  as  Grafton :" 
that  "it  was  engaged  in  the  route  of  the  Rebels  under  General 
Porterfield  at  Philippi  on  the  13th  of  June  and  afterward  took 
part  in  the  affairs  of  Laurel  Hill  and  Carricks  Ford:"  that  "the 
regiment  performed  a  large  amount  of  marching  and  guard  duty 
and  rendered  valuable  service  to  the  Government  in  assisting  to 
stay  the  progress  of  the  Rebels  who  were  endeavoring  to  carry 
the  war  into  the  North".2 

The  above  brief  statement  is  practically  repeated  in  Volume 
1,  Roster  of  Ohio  Soldiers,  and  it  is  also  therein  stated,  that  hav- 


1  Colonel  Andrews'  official  report  W.  R.  R.  2,  pages  233-5. 

2  Ohio  In  The  War,  Vol.  2,  page  111. 


18  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

ing  served  its  term  of  enlistment,  the  regiment  returned  to  Co 
lumbus,  Ohio,  and  was  mustered  out  of  service  August  29th  to 
30th,  1861,  by  Captain  E.  Morgan  Wood,  15th  Infantry,  U.  S.  A. 
having  lost  eight  men,  one  killed  and  seven  died  of  disease.  It 
is  also  stated  that  the  official  list  of  battles  in  which  the  regiment 
was  engaged  during  its  three  months  service  had  not  been  pub 
lished  by  the  War  Department  but  that  the  following,  after  care 
ful  research,  was  believed  to  be  a  correct  list : 

Philippi,  West  Virginia,  June  3,  1861. 
Laurel  Hill,  West  Virginia,  June  8,  1861. 
Carrick's  Ford,  West  Virginia,  July  14,  1861. 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE  REORGANIZATION  OF  THE  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  FOR  THE  THREE 
YEARS'  SERVICE  AND  THE  ADVANCE  INTO  KENTUCKY. 

WHILE  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  Volunteers  was  engaged  in  Western 
Virginia  and  the  events  narrated  in  the  preceding  chapter  were 
transpiring,  other  events  of  even  greater  importance  were  occur 
ring  in  other  parts  of  the  country  which  were  portentous  of  a 
long  and  bloody  struggle.  There  were  some  optimists,  like  Mr. 
Seward,  who  predicted  that  the  war  would  be  over  in  sixty  days, 
but  the  secession  of  North  Carolina,  Tennessee  and  Virginia,  the 
increasing  enrollment  of  troops  by  the  seceded  states  and  the 
rapidity  with  which  they  were  organized  and  placed  under  the 
control  of  the  Confederate  States  Government  belied  such  pre 
dictions.  A  Union  Army  of  perhaps  50,000  men  had  been  as 
sembled  at  Washington  for  the  protection  of  the  Capital  and  to 
operate  against  the  Confederate  forces  which  were  assembling 
at  Richmond.  The  Union  people,  impatient  of  delay,  clamored 
for  an  advance  against  the  enemy  confronting  Washington.  The 
newspapers  of  the  country  raised  the  cry  "On  to  Richmond",  and 
in  compliance  with  a  popular  demand  an  advance  was  ordered 
and  on  the  21st  day  of  July,  1861,  and  the  first  battle  of  Bull  Run 
was  fought,  resulting  in  the  defeat  of  the  Union  forces,  the  loss 
of  twenty-eight  pieces  of  artillery,  five  thousand  muskets  and  a 
large  amount  of  camp  equippage  and  other  property.1. 

The  disaster  at  Bull  Run  caused  a  momentary  panic  and  for 
a  time  many  feared  that  Washington  would  soon  be  in  possession 
of  the  enemy.  It  was  soon  learned,  however,  that  the  losses  in 
the  Union  Army  were  not  so  great  as  at  first  supposed.  They 
were  really  not  large  in  proportion  to  the  numbers  engaged.  Ac 
cording  to  the  official  reports,  481  were  killed,  1011  wounded  and 
1216  missing,2  out  of  about  34,000  engaged  in  the  movement.3 
There  would  probably  have  been  less  apprehension  had  it  then 
been  known  that  the  killed  and  wounded  of  the  enemy  were  1867,4 
or  375  more  than  our  own.  The  1216  reported  as  missing  on  the 
Union  side  were  probably  stragglers  who  afterwards  rejoined 
their  commands,  as  General  Johnston  reported  no  capture  of 
prisoners. 

Congress  was  in  session  at  the  time,  and  coolly  and  patriot 
ically  faced  the  situation.  Profiting  by  the  experience  of  the  past, 
the  inefficiency  of  troops  enlisted  for  short  terms  of  service,  it 
pass_ed_on  July  22,  25  and  31,  1861,  a  succession  of  acts  au- 

1  General  Joseph  E.  Johnson's  report,  3     W.  R.  R.  2-309. 

W.  R.  R.  2-477.  4     W.  R.  R.  2-477. 

2  W.  R.  R.  2-327. 


20  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

thorizing  the  President  to  accept  the  services  of  volunteers,  either 
as  cavalry,  infantry  or  artillery,  in  such  numbers,  not  exceeding 
1,000,000,  as  he  might  deem  necessary  for  the  purpose  of  repelling 
invasion  and  suppressing  insurrection,  and  directing  that  the  vol 
unteers  thus  accepted  should  serve  for  not  exceeding  three  years 
nor  less  than  six  months.1  These  acts  of  Congress  were  published 
in  General  Orders  from  the  Adjutant  General's  office  and  the 
people  responded  so  rapidly  and  enthusiastically  to  the  appeals 
of  Congress  and  President  Lincoln  that  no  formal  call  was  is 
sued.  Regiments  and  companies  were  immediately  offered  in 
large  numbers  by  states  and  individuals  and,  as  circumstances 
seemed  to  demand,  requisitions  were  made  on  the  Governors.2 
Ohio  was  among  the  foremost  of  the  states  to  respond  to  the  ap 
peals  above  mentioned.  Of  the  requisition  of  July  22,  1861,  the 
first  made  under  the  acts  of  Congress  above  mentioned,  she 
furnished  8-4,116  men,  nearly  17,000  more  than  her  quota.3 

It  was  in  response  to  this  call  that  the  men  of  the  Fifteenth 
Ohio,  immediately  after  their  discharge  from  the  three  months' 
service,  began  enrolling  for  the  three  years'  service.  As  early  as 
the  middle  of  September,  1861,  they  had  been  formed  into  com 
panies  and  were  reporting  at  Mansfield  where  the  regiment  was 
being  reorganized.  Not  all  the  officers  and  men  who  had  belonged 
'to  it  in  the  three  months'  service  became  members  of  the  new 
organization,  but  enough  of  them  did  so  to  continue  its  former 
number  and  to  intimately  connect  it  with  its  previous  service. 
Moses  R.  Dickey,  who  was  Lieutenant  Colonel  of  the  former 
organization,  became  Colonel  of  the  new  regiment.  William  T. 
Wilson  and  William  Wallace,  who  were  Captains  in  the  three 
months'  organization,  were  made  respectively  Lieutenant  Colonel 
and  Major  of  the  three  years'  organization.  Orrin  Ferris,  who 
was  Surgeon  of  the  old  regiment,  was  continued  as  Surgeon  of 
the  new.  Six  company  officers  in  the  new  organization  had  been 
Commissioned  officers  of  the  old,  while  a  large  number  of 
the  enlisted  men  had  served  in  the  three  months'  organization. 
Some  of  the  company  officers  and  many  of  the  enlisted  men  had 
served  during  the  three  months'  service  in  other  Ohio  regiments. 

The  commissioned  officers  of  the  new  organization  and  the 
counties  where  the  several  companies  were  enrolled  are  as  fol 
lows  :  ~ 

FIELD  AND  STAFF. 

Colonel — Moses  R.  Dickey,  Mansfield,  O. 

Lieutenant  Colonel — William  T.  Wilson,  Upper  Sandusky,  O. 

Major — William  WTallace,  Martins  Ferry,  O. 

Surgeon — Orrin  Ferris. 

1  W.  R.  R.  126-606.  3     Ohio  in  the  War,  Vol.  2,  page  4. 

2  W.  R.  R.  126-607. 


REORGANIZATION.   ADVANCE  INTO  KENTUCKY  21 

Chaplain — Richard  Ganter,  Mansfield,  O. 
Adjutant— Calvin  R.  Taft,  Mansfield,  O. 
Quartermaster — Theodore  C.  Bowles,  Mansfield,  O. 

COMPANY  A — Muskingum  County. 
Captain — James  C.  Cummins. 
First  Lieutenant — Cyrus  Reasoner. 
Second  Lieutenant — Samuel  T.  Storer. 

COMPANY  B — Guernsey  County. 
Captain — John  McClenahan. 
First  Lieutenant — Joshua  K.  Brown. 
Second  Lieutenant — John  R.  Clark. 

COMPANY  C — Morrow  County. 
Captain — Hiram  Miller. 
First  Lieutenant — Jeremiah  C.  Dunn. 
Second  Lieutenant — John  G.  Byrd. 

COMPANY  D — Wyandot  County. 
Captain — Isaac  M.  Kirby. 
First  Lieutenant — David  Culbertson. 
Second  Lieutenant — Samuel  Bachtel. 

COMPANY  E — Belmont  County. 
Captain — Frank  Askew. 
First  Lieutenant — Chandler  W.  Carroll. 
Second  Lieutenant — Lorenzo  Danford. 

COMPANY  F — Belmont  County. 
Captain — Amos  Glover. 
First  Lieutenant — James  Welsh. 
Second  Lieutenant — Nicholas  M.  Fowler. 

COMPANY  G — Richland   County. 
Captain — Andrew  R.  Z.  Dawson. 
First  Lieutenant — Thomas  E.  Douglass. 
Second  Lieutenant — Cyrus  H.  Askew. 

COMPANY  H — Van  Wert  County. 
Captain — Thaddeus  S.  Gilliland. 
First  Lieutenant — William  C.  Scott. 
Second  Lieutenant — Gladwin  B.  Chaffin. 

COMPANY  I — Richland  County. 
Captain — Abraham  C.  Cummins. 
First  Lieutenant — Andrew  M.  Burns. 
Second  Lieutenant — George  W.  Cummins. 

COMPANY  K — Belmont  County. 
Captain — Otho  S.  Holloway. 
First  Lieutenant — Robert  H.  Cochran. 
Second  Lieutenant — Vesper  Dorneck. 


22  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

The  companies  on  their  arrival  at  Mansfield  were  escorted 
to  Camp  Mordecai  Bartley,  about  two  miles  north  of  the  town 
near  the  site  of  the  present  Ohio  Reformatory,  and  by  the  20th 
day  of  September  the  regiment  was  fully  organized.  Officers 
and  men  were  quartered  in  tents  and  the  usual  round  of  camp 
and  guard  duty  was  duly  established  .  The  companies  were  duly 
mustered  into  the  United  States  service  by  Captain  Belknap,  U. 
S.  A.,  September  21,  1861,  and  orders  were  issued  to  be  ready  to 
move  on  Monday,  September  23.  On  Sunday,  the  22nd,  knap 
sacks,  canteens  and  haversacks  were  issued  and  orders  were  given 
to  have  knapsacks  packed  ready  to  march,  if  orders  to  move 
came.  That  evening  there  were  prayer  meetings  in  a  number  of 
the  tents,  notably  in  the  tents  of  Company  F.  where  there  were 
three  preachers  among  the  enlisted  men.  In  other  tents  the  men 
sang  hymns  and  the  sound  of  sacred  music  continued  until  lights 
were  ordered  out.  It  was  no  holiday  affair  in  which  the  men 
were  engaging.  The  glamour  and  the  light  hearted  enthusiasm 
of  the  preceding  April  had  disappeared  and  the  men  were  thought 
ful  and  serious, — realizing  that  they  were  soon  to  face  the  hard 
ships  and  dangers  of  real  war.  This  does  not  mean  that  the  men 
were  oppressed  by  a  sense  of  coming  trials.  They  were  mostly 
boys — their  average  age  being  about  19  years, — and  they  went 
about  their  duties  with  boyish  ardor  and  when  off  duty  amused 
themselves  in  the  various  ways  customary  in  the  regimental 
camps.  In  the  evenings  there  were  stag  dances  to  the  music  of 
violins  which  some  of  the  men  had  brought  from  their  homes. 

The  evening  of  the  2 1st  Andrew  J.  Gleason  of  Company  H, 
organized  a  singing  club.1  of  which  more  will  be  heard  as  this 
narrative  progresses.  There  was  an  immediate  demand  for  the 
services  of  all  the  troops  which  could  be  organized  and  armed  and 
placed  in  the  field.  The  war  clouds  hung  low  all  along  the 
Southern  horizon  and  no  one  knew  when  or  where  the  storm 
would  burst.  The  Confederate  troops  at  Richmond  under  Gen 
erals  Lee  and  Beauregard  were  threatening  Washington.  In 
Kentucky  the  armies  of  the  Confederate  Generals,  Zollicoffer, 
Buckner  and  Leonidas  Polk  were  menacing  Lexington,  Cincin 
nati  and  Louisville,  and  General  Sterling  Price  and  other  Con 
federate  Generals  were  operating  in  Missouri  and  threatening 
Saint  Louis.  General  Sherman  at  Louisville,  General  Fremont 
at  Saint  Louis  and  General  McClellan  at  Washington  were  calling 
for  troops  to  meet  the  Confederate  armies  mustering  in  their  re 
spective  fronts.  Besides  the  disaster  at  Bull  Run  and  the  affairs 
in  which  the  regiment  had  taken  part,  a  few  inconsiderable  and 
indecisive  skirmishes  had  taken  place,  but  it  was  evident  that  both 

1      Gleason's  Diary. 


REORGANIZATION.   ADVANCE  INTO  KENTUCKY  23 

sids  were  preparing  for  titanic  struggles  both  in  the  East  and 
West. 

Now  that  the  Eastern  borders  of  Ohio  were  made  practically 
secure  by  the  successful  occupation  of  Western  Virginia  by  the 
Union  troops  in  the  three  months  campaign,  the  people  of  Ohio 
turned  their  attention  to  their  more  extensive  southern  border  and 
to  the  attitude  of  the  people  of  Kentucky.  The  position  of  that 
state  was  peculiar.  Governor  Magoffin,  April  15,  1861,  as  will 
be  remembered,  had  written  the  Secretary  of  War  that  "Ken 
tucky  would  furnish  no  troops  for  the  wicked  purpose  of  sub 
duing  her  sister  states''.  The  legislature  while  it  firmly  refused 
to  call  a  convention  to  consider  the  question  of  secession,  never 
theless  protested  against  the  use  of  force  by  the  general  govern 
ment  against  the  seceded  states.  They  declared  for  the  Union 
but  opposed  any  measures  for  its  preservation.  This  was  the 
illogical  position  of  many  of  the  leading  and  most  influential 
citizens,  among  them  John  J.  Crittenden,  James  Guthrie,  Archi 
bald  Dixon  and  others.  Governor  Magoffin  was  known  to  be  in 
active  sympathy  with  the  secessionists  and  if  it  had  not  been  for 
a  strong  Union  sentiment  in  the  legislature,  backed  by  a  strong 
Union  sentiment  throughout  the  state,  would  probably  have 
rushed  the  state  into  rebellion. 

Checked  in  obtaining  unlimited  credit  to  carry  out  his 
schemes,  he  assumed  for  the  state  a  position  of  armed  neutrality. 
His  position  was  supported  by  a  public  meeting  of  leading  citizens 
of  Louisville  which  declared  "the  present  duty  of  Kentucky  is  to 
maintain  her  present  independent  position,  taking  sides  not  with 
the  administration  nor  with  the  seceding  states,  but  with  the  Union 
against  them  both ;  that  her  soil  was  sacred  from  the  tread  of 
either,  and  that  if  necessary  she  would  make  the  declaration  good 
with  her  strong  right  arm".1 

The  militia  of  the  state  had  recently  been  reorganized  under 
the  direction  of  S.  B.  Buckner,  who  was  virtually  its  commander, 
and  was  instructed  by  Governor  Magoffin  to  employ  it  in  pre 
venting  violation  of  the  state's  neutrality  by  either  the  Southern 
or  Northern  armies.  It  was  suspected,  if  not  believed  by  the 
Union  people  of  Kentucky  and  by  the  people  of  Ohio,  Indiana 
and  Illinois  that  both  Governor  Magoffin  and  Mr.  Buckner  were 
at  heart  disloyal  and  that  it  was  their  purpose  to  finally  turn  over 
the  "State  Guard,"  as  the  organized  militia  was  called,  to  the  Con 
federacy.  General  McClellan  who  was  then  in  command  north 
of  the  Ohio  River  shared  this  feeling.  May  15.  1861,  in  a  letter 
to  General  L.  D.  Townsend,  Adjutant  General,  U.  S.  A.,  he  said: 
"From  reliable  information  I  am  sure  that  the  Governor  of  Ken- 

l     Xicolay  and  Hay's,  Lincoln. 


24  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

tucky  is  a  traitor.  Buckner  is  under  his  influence,  so  it  is  neces 
sary  to  watch  them."1  At  a  special  session  of  the  Legislature 
called  May  6,  1861,  the  Union  members  succeeded  in  framing 
the  Military  bill  so  that  the  expenditures  under  it  by  Governor 
Magoffin  should  be  controlled  by  a  Union  Board  of  Commis 
sioners.  A  "Home  Guard"  was  authorized,  to  check  the  rebel 
lious  tendencies  of  Buckner's  "State  Guards",  and  members  of 
both  organizations  were  required  to  swear  fidelity  to  both  Ken 
tucky  and  the  United  States. 

Ostensibly,  both  the  United  States  and  the  Confederate 
States  governments  respected  the  neutrality  of  Kentucky  for  a 
time,  and  during  that  time  neither  United  States  nor  Confederate 
States  troops  invaded  her  sacred  soil. 

But  such  conditions  could  not  continue.  There  was  a  strong 
Union  element  of  the  population  who  were  ready  to  fight  for  the 
old  flag  and  only  wanted  the  opportunity  to  do  so,  while  there  were 
many  who  sympathized  with  the  secessionists  and  only  waited  an 
opportunity  to  join  the  armies  of  the  Confederacy  which  were 
mustering  on  their  Southern  border.  Politically  the  state  was 
regarded  as  pivotal.  Its  alliance  with  the  Union  or  its  enemies 
was  to  be  settled  by  the  people  themselves. 

This,  however,  did  not  prevent  either  side  from  taking  such 
steps  as  would  secure  military  advantage  should  the  contending 
armies  meet  on  Kentucky  soil.  The  rival  militia  organizations, — 
the  "State  Guards"  and  the  "Home  Guards,"  vied  with  each  other 
in  increasing  their  numbers  and  perfecting  their  organizations. 
The  "State  Guards"  had  been  first  to  organize  and  Governor 
Magoffin  and  Mr.  Buckner  had  seen  to  it  that  all  state  arms  and 
munitions  of  war  were  issued  to  them.  To  offset  this  the  Union 
leaders  in  the  north  secretly  furnished  arms  and  munitions  of 
war  to  the  "Home  Guards". 

Both  sides  were  apparently  respecting  Kentucky's  assumed 
neutrality.  Such  respect  on  the  part  of  the  Confederacy  was 
more  pronounced  than  that  of  the  Union  leaders  of  the  North, 
for  President  Davis  was  advised  that  such  neutrality  was  intended 
to  aid  the  secessionists  in  their  plans.  President  Lincoln, 
while  showing  such  respect,  hoped  yet  to  win  over  to  the  side 
of  the  Union  some  of  the  leaders  who  had  not  yet  taken 
an  open  stand  in  favor  of  the  South.  He  went  so  far  as  to  offer 
commissions  as  brigadier  general  to  some  of  them.  He  even 
caused  such  a  commission  to  be  issued  for  Mr  Buckner  to  be 
tendered  to  him  by  General  Robert  Anderson, — the  tender  to 
remain  a  secret  if  declined.2  Whether  such  a  commission  was 


1  Nicolay  and  Hay's,  Lincoln. 

2  W.  R.  R.  4-255. 


REORGANIZATION.     ADVANCE  INTO  KENTUCKY  25 

ever  tendered  to  him  does  not  appear.  It  is  probable  that  it  was 
not,  for  two  weeks  later,  General  Buckner,  while  ostensibly  favor 
ing  neutrality,  was  in  Richmond,  advising  Jefferson  Davis  how 
Kentucky  neutrals  would  best  aid  the  Confederacy.1  In  the 
meantime  hundreds  of  the  younger  men  of  the  state  were  slipping 
across  the  Tennessee  border  and  joining  the  Confederate  armies 
and  on  the  other  hand,  equal  if  not  greater  numbers,  were  crossing 
the  Ohio  River  and  enlisting  in  the  armies  of  the  Union.  Colonels 
Guthrie  and  Woodford,  with  the  approval  of  the  Union  authori 
ties,  established  "Camp  Clay"  on  the  Ohio  River  above  Cincinnati 
where  two  Kentucky  regiments  made  up  of  Kentucky  and  Ohio 
Volunteers,  were  organized  and  sworn  into  the  service  of  the 
United  States.  General  Lovell  H.  Rousseau  of  Louisville 
established  "Camp  Joe  Holt,"  on  the  Indiana  side  of  the  same 
river  where  he  was  recruiting  a  brigade  for  service  in  the  Union 
army.  The  same  respect  for  the  pretended  Kentucky  neutrality 
kept  General  Robert  Anderson  at  Cincinnati  instead  of  Louisville 
where  he  was  much  needed.  July  1,  1861,  Lieutenant  William 
Nelson,  U.  S.  N.,  a  Kentuckian  of  marked  ability  and  force  of 
character,  who  was  then  at  Cincinnati,  was  selected  by  Mr.  Lin 
coln  to  look  after  the  organization  and  equipment  of  the  "Home 
Guards"  of  Kentucky  and  other  Union  men  who  desired  to  enter 
the  military  service  of  the  United  States.  He  was  authorized 
to  muster  into  the  service  of  the  United  States  five  regiments  of 
infantry  and  one  regiment  of  cavalry  in  East  Tennessee  and 
three  regiments  of  infantry  in  southeastern  Kentucky  and  at  the 
same  time  was  notified  that  10,000  stand  of  arms  and  accouter- 
ments,  six  pieces  of  field  artillery  two  smooth  bore  and  two  rifled 
cannon  would  be  at  once  sent  to  Cincinnati  to  be  used  in  arming 
these  troops  which  were  to  be  used  in  the  states  where  recruited.2 
South  of  Kentucky  considerable  armies  were  forming  and 
being  placed  in  camps  near  the  southern  border  of  the  state. 
About  June  29,  1861.  Governor  Isham  G.  Harris  of  Tennessee 
issued  a  proclamation  declaring  that  state  independent  of  the 
Union  and  tendering  to  the  Confederate  authorities  the  state 
troops  under  his  control.3  General  Pillow  had  been  in  command 
of  the  state  militia  and  in  a  few  weeks  time  had  brought  into 
the  field  more  than  20,000  men  armed  and  equipped  and  ready 
for  service.4  These  troops  were  placed  under  command  of  Gen 
eral  Leonidas  Polk,5  who  had  already  collected  a  considerable 
force  from  other  Southern  states  and  was  menacing  important 
points  in  Western  Kentucky  on  the  Ohio  and  Mississippi  Rivers. 
At  the  same  time  a  considerable  force  under  General  Zollicoffer 

1  W.  R.  R.  4-399.  3     4-363.  r,     W.  R.  R.  4-363. 

2  4-251-2.  4     W.  R.  R.  4-363.  Sig.   2 


26  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

was  collecting  in  East  Tennessee  near  the  Kentucky  border  and 
was  threatening  Lexington,  Frankfort  and  Cincinnati,  while  an 
other  considerable  force  was  threatening  Bowling  Green  and 
Louisville. 

The  Governors  of  Ohio,  Indiana  and  Illinois  were  alarmed 
lest  the  Confederates  would  over  run  Kentucky  and  thus  bring 
the  war  to  their  own  borders,  and  repeatedly  urged  the  military 
authorities  at  Washington  to  take  some  decided  steps  to  prevent 
such  a  distaster.  Governor  Morton  of  Indiana  was  especially  in 
sistent  that  decisive  steps  should  be  taken.  But  President  Lin 
coln  cautiously  opposed  any  advance  of  the  Union  armies  into 
Kentucky  until  the  election,  which  was  to  take  place  June  20, 
1861,  should  be  over  and  the  result  known.  This  election,  at 
which  members  of  Congress  were  to  be  elected  and  the  main 
tenance  of  the  Union  was  a  leading  issue,  was  watched  with 
anxious  interest.  Fortunately  for  the  country  it  resulted  in  a 
complete  triumph  of  the  Union  sentiment  of  the  state  and  nine  of 
the  ten  members  of  Congress  elected  were  outspoken  Union  men. 
In  the  mean  time,  Lieutenant  William  Nelson,  U.  S.  N.  had  se 
cretly  enrolled  and  organized  four  regiments  of  infantry,  and 
shortly  after  the  election  threw  off  all  concealment  and  suddenly 
assembled  them  at  "Camp  Dick  Robinson,"  between  Lexington 
and  Danville.1 

Governor  Magoffin  who  was  still  insisting  on  observance 
of  the  neutrality  of  the  state,  on  August  19,  1861,  wrote  to  Presi 
dent  Lincoln  urging  "the  removal  from  the  limits  of  Kentucky 
of  the  military  force  now  organized  and  in  camp  within  the  state/' 
to  which  Mr.  Lincoln  returned  a  temperate  but  emphatic  refusal.2 
About  the  same  time  he  wrote  to  Jefferson  Davis  asking  an  au 
thoritative  assurance  that  Kentucky's  neutrality  would  be  re 
spected,  to  which  Mr.  Davis,  August  28,  1861,  answered,  saying, 
among  other  things. 

"I  lose  no  time  in  assuring  you  that  the  Government  of  the 
Confederate  States  of  America  neither  intends  nor  desires  to  dis 
turb  the  neutrality  of  Kentucky."3 

How  shallow  this  pretended  respect  for  Kentucky's  neutral 
ity  really  was,  was  shortly  to  be  demonstrated.  On  the  2nd  day 
of  September,  1861,  less  than  a  week  after  the  date  of  the  letter 
of  Mr.  Davis,  the  Confederate  troops  under  General  Leonidas 
Polk  invaded  Kentucky  and  seized  Columbus  and  Hickman.  Mr. 
Davis  to  whom  General  Polk  had  reported  the  movement,  tele 
graphed  him  September  4,  1861. 

"The  necessity  justifies  the  action."4     This  sudden  violation 

1  and  2     Nicholay  and  Hay's  Lincoln.  4     W.  R.  R.  4-180-181. 

3     W.  R.  R.  4-396. 


REORGANIZATION.     ADVANCE  IXTO  KENTUCKY  27 

of  Kentucky's  neutrality  provoked  an  emphatic  protest  from 
Governor  Harris  of  Tennessee  and  other  leading  Confederates 
who  had  also  pledged  themselves  to  observe  such  neutrality  and 
who  feared  its  political  effect,  and  caused  Mr.  Davis  to  waver 
in  his  course.  On  September  5,  1861,  his  secretary  of  war,  Mr. 
L.  P.  Walker,  telegraphed  Governor  Harris  at  Nashville,  Tenn. 

"General  Polk  has  been  ordered  to  direct  the  prompt  with 
drawal  of  the  forces  under  General  Pillow  from  Kentucky.  The 
movement  was  wholly  unauthorized,  and  you  will  so  inform  Gov 
ernor  Magoffin."1 

The  Legislature  of  Kentucky  joined  Governors  Magoffin  and 
Harris  in  protest  against  the  violation  of  Kentucky  neutrality 
and  even  Mr.  Buckner  advised  that  General  Zollicoffer  be  halted 
at  the  state  line  and  that  General  Folk's  forces  should  be  with 
drawn.  He  also  advised  Mr.  Davis  to  send  General  Albert  Sydney 
Johnston  to  Nashville  with  discretionary  authority  to  withdraw 
the  Confederate  forces  from  Kentucky.2 

General  Johnston  was  sent  to  Nashville  and  September  16, 
telegraphed  Mr.  Davis  as  follows : 

"After  a  full  conference  with  Governor  Harris,  and  after 
learning  the  facts,  political  and  military,  I  am  satisfied  that  the 
political  bearing  of  the  question  presented  for  my  decision  has 
been  decided  by  the  legislature  of  Kentucky." 

"The  legislature  of  Kentucky  has  required  the  prompt  re 
moval  of  all  Confederate  forces  from  her  soil  and  the  Governor 
has  issued  his  proclamation  to  that  effect.  The  troops  will  not  be 
withdrawn.  So  far  from  yielding  to  the  demand  for  the  with 
drawal  of  our  troops,  I  have  determined  to  occupy  Bowling 
Green  at  once."3 

With  this  dispatch  all  pretence  of  regard  for  Kentucky's 
neutrality  was  cast  aside  by  the  Confederate  authorities.  It  had 
been  respected  only  while  it  could  be  used  by  Governor  Magoffin, 
Buckner  and  others  to  cover  a  deliberate  plan  to  plunge  Ken 
tucky  into  rebellion.  Now  that  it  was  demonstrated  that  Ken 
tucky  would  remain  loyal  to  the  Union  it  was  abandoned  and 
orders  were  given  for  an  immediate  advance  of  the  Confederate 
forces  into  her  territory. 

While  the  above  events  were  transpiring  the  Union  people 
of  Ohio,  Indiana  and  Illinois  had  not  been  idle.  Besides  the  steps 
to  organize  and  arm  the  Union  men  of  Kentucky,  before  related 
on  the  22nd  day  of  August,  1861,  Governor  Oglesby  of  Illinois 
directed  the  capture  at  Paducah  of  the  little  steamer,  W.  B.  Terry, 
which  he  believed  was  in  the  employment  of  the  Confederate 

1  and  2     W.  R.  R.  4-189. 
3     W.  R.  R.  4-193. 


HIO   VotCXTEEXS    AXP    C-OCPAIG>S 


States.1    The  Union  authorities  had  taken  the  precaution  to  have 

a  considerable  body  of  troops  concentrated  at  Cairo,  with  General 

L~lvs.scs  S.  Grant  in  command,  and  that  officer  or.  September  5. 


Tyler  and  Conestoga.  steamed  up  the  Ohio  River  and  took  pos- 


military  stores  which  had  been  collected   for  the   Confederate 
army.    The  Confederate  army  3000  strong  was  at  the  time  said 

•  •  :      •  .        "      >          .       .::  -     "    •' :  •.  '.    r  .'      ~~    „>   '•_-.-   ~  . ::  ~ 

-    .  -       -     •  :  ------- 


diana  and  Illinois  for  prompt  action  on  the  part  of  the  United 
Stales  to  repel  the  advance  of  the  Confederate  armies.  Governor 
'Oliver  P.  Morton  of  Indiana,  voiced  the  sentiment  of  all  when 
September  2.  1*61.  he  telegraphed  the  Hon.  Thomas  A_  Scott, 
-.-ff  is ~/iT?t  secretary  ot  war.  as  touowsi 

~  ""  :::      r .        v: .    :.    :- 


-  - 
Governor 

:  " .  u :  5  - 
An  urging 
» the  Ohio 
!onel  Lew 


;.  S.  X..  had  assembled  at  Camp  Dick  Robinson.3    At 

..  .       -        --__..,_     _      -  •  .   -          _     - •-  -    --•-"•    ^ 

Kentucky.  September  7.  1861.  General  Charles  F. 
s  sent  by  General  Grant  to  Padncah  to  hold  and  fortify 
:  and  to  occupy  Southland,  which  was  a  few  miles  above 
rath  of  the  Cumberland  River.4  September  9,  General 
r  ordered  three  Confederate  regiments  from  East  Ten- 

.-.       *  z  w.  B-  R.  4-s& 

7,     ,    .    "  ~      -•       -:.     \.     \-." 


into  XtiriTickjr-  to  be  followed  "DT  cither  forces  of  ics  <CQ833- 
naud.  September  12,  Gcrrerrjor  MOTL-OC  of  Iiicia322  leJtgrzjJhed 
the  secretary  of  war  that  tbt  TSTST  in  K^rrnackr^iad  cocameaDed. 
thai  Boiling  Green  had  :«t-er:  seized  foy  the  Scccsiwnasts.  scad 
called  for  tr>:os  to  be  setit  to  the  IsyrJana  "border.  which  wsts 
rrearjy  defesse-Iesr.1  September  15.  Mr.  Bocfaer  threw  sta-ie  2aas 
•rjc«ak  of  uentralfij.  e-r.:-r:tri  ^  :•:»  -  irri-:r:  L=  -inriiz-er  Geafiral 
from  Jt^ersoi:  Daris  ini  -=rLr  tliirf  "  :-j  -  .mi  ::  L": 
Cc»TifedeT2ie  trc'cc^  Lz-i  croered  10  coQC^mi*  then  i: 
Green.-  SfrDttmier  If.  'StSjeral  ZaTBco-ffer  TBTTLD  as  UIL!_»  -esri- 
matt  at  Iv/"11!':1-  mtd.  mircbtv:!  io  like  CiaiDerissZiC  ford  -of  T^M° 
Cnmt'erlaTrd  Rfr-er  ir  KfnrQ-fkj.*  irbil-c  2  laj^s  CsnfeQerzixr  f  DT 
-sra*  nyoTing-  to-crari  Piracah.  Af  bef'Drc  stsied  tiifst-  fcrr 
mer^cac  Lexirigicci.  FraT-Vfon  ai>d  Lc»niFrSr_  Kennarij- 
ziiir.ati.  C-'..  ^JDC.  tbr  towr^  c.^2  like  OrSc-  Rfr-er  ii  Irnr'^rr 


The  brigade 

isciaria  shore  c^pposiie  I>oci5Tir«  ira^  Inorried  across  i±>e  TTTBT 
and  wiirj  ?oci  other  rrc»ops  as  inere  aTsi"tal>lr  vtre  sent  do^rn  i3ae 
Lonisrill-e  arc  Xafhrflr  S?.vrac.d  10  Mi^drszifiis  HiH  XD  irpypede 
the  adTauce  of  Gsi'Sra]  Suciuer,  asd  cciher  ETOIGCJ?  ^rert:  'Cooa- 
cenraied  21  Cami'  "r^rr^-s.0^  10  "be  Ttrrrrg-r.  f  ccTrard  to  the  ODOE 
in  Kerrmcinr  where  incst  r-eeded.  H>err  was  nc-w  a  feTerish 
haste  in  raisins'  az>d  'zrrmng  ironpis  'rrit-i  fir  thr  trrtrrtorr  — 
whSch  a^ccnmtf  for  the  short  ISDC  lersreen  the  reoT^~~£zaricc;  -of 
the  Fifteenth  OfcSo  21  Marsfkil-d  si>d  tht-  c-r^jer  for  is  sgndimiad 


As  before  srziecL  or^Sers 
tersber  21.  to   re  rei^f     IB 


io  toe  cnmrti-tT  -i  -  -       - 
to  more  was  rj<3i  isscf-d  2nd  : 
•day  and  the  24£h_     On  - 
came  and  we  were  dire::-  -        :  .    -   -      -    • 

r*eadr  to  T'.Vf-  cars  for  -Canzt  IT^nr...--:  r      T  _n^  of  Ssrcsr 

ber  t-5.  ererythirtg-  -BTES  psacted  up,  when  wo^d  cziiae  rn^  ^ 
tT2in  wKscld  rx>i  be  ready  until  ercmi^:.  In  the  ereniu»r  afn 
srirjrp«er  the  resin>ent  marched  TSTD  liite  -OIT  arxg  fc-rnatfrd  oc  i3 
pnbfic  sgnsre,  where  a  beanrifn]  flzg"  wss  rj-resertr  d  to  3t  IJ«T  i3 
"^rnier.  ::  Mmftiriid.  _r_r  trrSfntitjin  fT«rt-:'J:  ~L.~  ~:  '-. 
HOCL  Baniaisis  Bmrns  -and  the  response  br  our  ccOcoel.  Mr® 
R_  Dickey.  The  resrim-ent  ti>eD  marched  to*  the  raihraad  ^i*iw 
10  await  the  train_ 

1      W.  t  X.  4-iTT.  I     W..  I.  i    4-»IC7 


30  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

There  were  great  crowds  on  the  streets  and  fathers,  mothers, 
brothers,  sisters  and  sweethearts  were  there  to  say  the  last  good 
byes  to  the  departing  soldiers.  Some  time  in  the  night  the  train 
was  ready.  It  was  made  up  mostly  of  freight  cars,  but  the  men 
made  no  complaint  and  cheerfully  took  things  as  they  were  with 
out  grumbling.  The  train  reached  Newark  at  nine  o'clock  next 
morning  and  the  regiment  was  marched  to  the  public  square  to 
await  a  train  for  Columbus.  The  citizens  of  the  place  learning 
that  the  men  had  not  had  breakfast,  stirred  about  and  soon  came 
laden  with  baskets  of  provisions  which  the  men  eagerly  devoured. 
They  were  served  by  the  fair  hands  of  the  women  of  the  place, 
who  won  all  hearts  by  their  tender  solicitude  for  our  comfort. 
At  12:30  P.  M.  the  regiment  left  Newark  for  Columbus  in  com 
fortable  cars,  where  it  arrived  at  4  P.  M.  At  Columbus  the  men 
were  marched  up  to  the  windows  of  the  railroad  station  dining 
hall  and  were  served  with  bread,  butter,  bologna  sausage  and  cof 
fee.  At  7  P.  M.  the  regiment  left  Columbus  for  Camp  Dennisoti 
where  it  arrived  at  day  light  the  morning  of  September  27,  and 
at  once  was  placed  in  camp.  That  evening  Andrew  J.  Gleason 
of  Company  H,  who  had  studied  music  in  Chicago  the  year  before, 
got  his  club  together  and  practiced  for  an  hour.1  September  28, 
was  spent  in  drill,  and  the  men  who  had  learned  the  preliminary 
steps  during  the  three  months  service  found  occupation  in  teach 
ing  them  to  those  who  had  not  learned  them.  In  the  evening  a 
regiment  from  Cincinnati  passed  by  our  camp  on  the  railroad, 
going  north. 

The  morning  of  September  29,  there  was  a  white  frost. 
No  blankets  had  yet  been  issued  and  the  men  suffered  from  cold. 
It  was  Sunday  and  our  chaplain,  Rev.  Richard  L.  Ganter,  held 
services  in  a  grove  near  the  camp.  In  the  evening  Gleason's 
club  sang  sacred  songs.  September  30,  Captain  Thaddeus  S. 
Gilliland  of  Company  H,  arrived  in  camp,  having  been  at  Van 
Wert  closing  up  his  business  when  the  regiment  left  Mansfield, 
and  took  command  of  his  company. 

October  1,  1861,  the  regiment  was  marched  to  the  Little 
Miami  River  about  one-half  mile  from  camp  where  the  men 
bathed  and  washed  their  clothing.  There  were  rumors  of  march 
ing  orders.  October  2,  guns  were  issued  to  the  men.  Most  of 
them  were  old  flint  lock  muskets  which  had  been  altered,  with  no 
sights,  but  there  were  some  new  Enfield  rifles  with  graduated 
sights.1  The  men  turned  out  with  their  guns  at  dress  parade  in 
the  late  afternoon.  In  the  evening  there  were  prayer  meetings  in 
some  of  the  tents.  October  3,  there  was  general  drill  all  morning. 
In  the  afternoon  word  came  that  we  would  move  at  7  o'clock  next 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


REORGANIZATION.     ADVANCE  INTO  KENTUCKY  31 

morning, — where  we  did  not  know, — but  conditions  in  Kentucky 
were  so  alarming  that  no  one  doubted  that  we  were  to  be  sent 
there.  Clothing  to  complete  the  uniforms  of  the  men  and  cart 
ridge  boxes  and  blankets  were  issued.  Many  of  the  men  sent 
their  citizens  clothing  home. 

October  4,  we  had  an  early  breakfast  and  at  7  A.  M.  took 
train  for  Cincinnati.  When  we  reached  that  place  we  were 
marched  about  three  miles  to  the  ferry  landing  and  were  crowded 
onto  a  ferry  boat.  At  10:30  A.  M.  the  boat  swung  out  into  the 
river  and  we  "bade  farewell  to  the  old  Buckeye  State,  possibly 
forever."1 

We  were  told  that  we  would  get  dinner  at  Covington  across 
the  river,  "When  we  reached  the  place,"  Gleason  says,  "we  re 
ceived  a  perfect  ovation.  As  we  marched  through  the  streets  to 
where  the  tables  were  spread  we  received  many  demonstrations 
of  hearty  good  will.  When  we  reached  the  tables  we  found  them 
literally  groaning  with  good  things  to  eat  and  enjoyed  the  most 
bountiful  repast  we  had  enjoyed  since  leaving  home."1 

To  add  to  its  relish  it  was  served  by  the  loyal  women  of  the 
place.  Every  one  voted  that  we  had  never  before  seen  so  many 
handsome  women  and  pretty  girls.  After  the  dinner  was  over 
Gleason  got  his  club  together  and  sang  the  "Red,  White  and 
Blue"  which  evoked  warm  applause.  After  this,  the  regiment 
waited,  the  men  sitting  on  their  knapsacks,  several  hours  for  the 
train  which  was  to  take  us  further  south  into  the  dark  and  bloody 
ground.  Two  incidents  then  occurring,  come  out  distinctly  from 
the  mists  of  over  fifty  years. 

After  we  were  seated  in  the  cars  a  lot  of  young  girls  in 
dulged  in  merry  badinage  with  the  men.  One  fair  bright  eyed 
little  minx  came  along  side  the  car  occupied  by  some  of  the  men 
of  Company  E  and  looking  up  demurely  said  "Do  you  know  why 
we  call  our  dog  Lige  ?"  No  one  answered  until  Tom  Wood  said, 
"No,  why  do  you  call  him  Lige?"  The  little  minx  as  demurely  re 
plied,  "Why,  that's  his  name,"  and  there  was  a  great  shout  of 
laughter  at  Tom's  expense.  Poor  Tom.  He  was  killed  at  Picketts 
Mills  May  27,  1864,  a  day  or  two  before  his  term  of  service  would 
have  expired.  When  it  was  reported  that  he  was  among  the  slain 
on  that  bloody  day,  one  thought  of  this  incident  and  of  the  little 
beauty  who  had  perpetrated  the  joke  upon  him.  The  other  inci 
dent  is  almost  too  sad  to  recall.  As  the  train  was  starting  a 
bright  little  boy  who  had  climbed  upon  the  bumpers  to  be  near 
the  soldiers  fell  beneath  the  wheels  and  was  shockingly  mangled. 

The  regiment  left  Covington  for  Lexington,  Ky.  at  3  :45  P. 
M.,  Oct.  4,  1861.  A  short  distance  out  of  town  we  passed  the 

'  1     Gleason's  Diary. 


32  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

Second  Ohio,  which  had  been  before  us  in  invading  the  sacred  soil 
of  Kentucky.  We  reached  Lexington  at  2  A.  M.  the  morning  of 
October  5,  and  the  colonel  gave  the  men  their  choice  be 
tween  remaining  on  the  cars  until  day  break,  or  marching  at  once 
to  the  site  selected  for  our  camp.  They  were  drowsy  and  voted 
unanimously  to  remain  on  the  cars.  At  day  light  the  first  object 
which  caught  the  attention  of  the  men  was  the  stately  monument 
to  Henry  Clay,  which  was  greatly  admired.  A  short  time  after 
day  light  the  regiment  was  escorted  to  the  state  fair  grounds  about 
one-half  mile  from  the  cars,  where  it  went  into  camp.  The  good 
people  of  Lexington  were  soon  in  our  midst  with  hot  coffee  and 
other  refreshments  and  gave  us  a  cordial  welcome. 

As  soon  as  tents  were  pitched  and  we  were  comfortably  en- 
stalled  in  our  new  camp,  orders  came  to  begin  drilling  and  we 
had  our  first  drill  in  the  manual  of  arms.  A  sergeant  of  Company 
H  broke  guard,  was  arrested  and  was  severely  reprimanded  by 
Colonel  Dickey.1 

Sunday,  October  6,  there  was  roll  call  at  G  A.  M.  It  rained 
in  the  afternoon  and  the  men  kept  their  tents.  Many  of 
them  wrote  letters  home.  There  were  no  religious  services  and 
dress  parade  was  omitted.  October  7,  the  men  were  vigorously 
drilled, — in  the  morning  in  the  manual  of  arms,  and  in  the  after 
noon  in  marching.  October  8,  was  also  devoted  to  such  drills  and 
in  the  evening  there  was  dress  parade.  Gleason  records  that 
"the  elite  of  the  city  were  out  to  see  our  awkward  maneuvers." 

Our  camp  at  Lexington  was  in  a  beautiful  grove.  The  turf 
was  soft  and  green  and  the  maples  throughout  the  grounds  were 
putting  on  their  autumnal  tints.  A  great  many  fair  women  and 
pretty  girls  were  attracted  to  the  grounds  the  afternoon  Gleason 
speaks  of  and  added  to  the  interest  of  the  scene.  After  the  parade 
was  over  they  moved  about  the  camp  showing  much  interest  in 
the  Ohio  soldiers.  One  fair  one  carried  a  lovely  bouquet  which 
a  number  of  our  handsome  young  officers  felt  sure  would  be  given 
to  some  one  of  them,  and  there  was  a  pleasant  strife  among  them 
to  see  who  should  receive  the  coveted  prize.  A  young  sergeant2 
who  was  present  and  witnessed  the  marked  attention  the  officers 
were  showing  the  fair  Kentuckian  and  divined  its  object,  also 
cast  longing  eyes  on  the  bouquet  and  side  long  admiring  glances 
on  its  fair  owner.  He  was  much  surprised  when  the  fair  one 
turned  from  the  officers  and  graciously  gave  the  bouquet  to  him. 
The  lovely  smile  which  accompanied  it  lingers  as  a  sweet  memory 
of  that  beautiful  October  day,  away  back  in  1861.  That  same  day 
an  Illinois  regiment  which  had  come  to  Lexington  shortly  after 

1     Gleason's  Diary.  2     The  Author. 


REORGANIZATION.     ADVANCE  INTO  KENTUCKY 

we  did  left  for  Tennessee,  it  was  said.  In  the  evening  Gleason's 
club  was  reinforced  by  some  singers  from  Company  E  and  sang 
a  number  of  the  then  popular  songs.1 

A  letter  of  Captain  Chandler  W.  Carroll  to  his  wife,  dated 
Lexington,  Ky.,  October  6,  1861,  gives  such  a  satisfactory  and 
interesting  account  of  our  invasion  of  Kentucky  and  our  impres 
sions  of  the  country  and  the  people  that  with  the  consent  of  his 
widow,  it  is  here  in  part  reproduced.  He  writes : 

"We  left  Camp  Mordecai  Bartley  at  Mansfield  and  stopped 
at  Camp  Dennison  where  we  remained  three  or  four  days, — long 
enough  to  receive  our  arms  and  equipments.  From  thence  we 
started  on  Thursday  morning  for  some  point  in  this  state,  not 
knowing  exactly  where.  But  on  arriving  here  our  previous  orders 
were  to  some  extent  countermanded  by  reason  of  the  retreat  of 
the  rebel  forces,  consequently  we  were  compelled  to  lay  over 
here." 

"We  are  now  encamped  in  the  state  fair  grounds  within  a 
mile  of  the  city  of  Lexington,  which  grounds  by  the  way  are  the 
most  complete  I  ever  saw.  *  *  *  We  crossed  the  river  from 
Cincinnati  into  the  city  of  Covington  about  two  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon.  From  the  time  we  first  set  foot  on  the  soil  of  Ken 
tucky  we  have  been  enthusiastically  greeted  by  her  citizens.  They 
seemed  indeed  to  vie  with  each  other  in  acts  of  kindness  toward 
us.  The  people  were  out  in  great  numbers  upon  the  streets,  the 
stars  and  stripes  were  floating  from  every  window, — in  fact  every 
where  could  be  seen  striking  manifestations  of  loyalty  to  our 
glorious  country  by  the  noble  and  patriotic  citizens  of  old  Ken 
tucky.  It  would  be  vain  to  attempt  to  describe  my  feelings  upon 
this  occasion.  I  felt  that  I  could  willingly  lay  down  my  life  for 
such  a  people  if  it  should  become  necessary.  *  *  *  I  felt 
that  I  could  endure  almost  any  hardships  and  privations  to  secure 
to  Kentucky  the  Government  to  which  she  is  so  much  attached 
and  for  the  maintenance  of  which  she  is  willing  to  render  all  the 
aid  in  her  power."  *  *  * 

"After  we  had  landed  on  this  side  of  the  river  and  marched 
through  the  city  (Covington)  we  found  waiting  for  us  a  table 
bountifully  spread  with  everything  the  rich  country  could  afford. 
There  were  not  only  eatables  of  all  kinds  in  abundance, — three 
times  as  much  as  we  could  eat  and  carry  away, — but  they  even 
supplied  us  with  tobacco  and  cigars  in  unlimited  quantities. 
Every  man,  whether  he  used  the  weed  or  not,  filled  his  pockets. 
The  men  stowed  away  in  their  haversacks  enough  provender  to 
last  two  or  three  days.  Old  and  young  ladies  of  the  very  best 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


34  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

families  waited  upon  us  with  the  greatest  solicitude.  They  were 
determined  the  soldiers  should  want  for  nothing  and  talked  and 
conversed  with  them  freely.  This  treatment,  as  you  may  sup 
pose,  was  received  by  the  soldiers  with  feelings  of  profound 
gratitude.  They  gave  the  ladies  cheer  after  cheer,  and  only 
ceased  cheering  when  the  train  had  gone  too  far  to  prevent  them 
to  be  heard." 

"All  along  the  road  we  met  with  indications  of  loyalty  which 
were  in  a  high  degree  encouraging.  Union  flags  were  flying  from 
every  house.  Along  the  railroad  Kentucky  soldiers  were  guarding 
the  bridges/'  *  *  * 

"We  arrived  here  about  three  o'clock  Friday  morning.  Again 
we  were  received  in  the  most  enthusiastic  manner  by  the  citizens 

of  the  place.     Flags  and  banners  were  flying  in  every  direction." 

*     *     * 

"We  had  been  ordered  in  the  first  place  to  Camp  Dick  Robin 
son  but  in  consequence  of  Zollicoffer's  retreat  we  were  ordered 
to  remain  here  until  further  orders." 

"The  country  surrounding  this  place  surpasses  everything 
I  ever  laid  my  eyes  upon.  *  *  *  Everything  that  nature 
can  do  for  man  is  here  done.  There  is  a  most  magnificent  climate, 
of  which  fact  the  appearance  of  the  people  gives  abundant  proof. 
They  are  all  fine  and  healthy  looking.  *  *  There  is  every 

thing  here  that  can  conduce  to  the  happiness  of  man." 

October  9,  there  was  the  usual  vigorous  drill,  and  afterward 
dress  parade.  At  dress  parade  the  colonel  announced  that  orders 
had  been  received  to  be  ready  to  move  to  Louisville  at  6  o'clock 
next  morning.  That  night  a  number  of  the  men  got  through  the 
guard  lines  and  went  into  the  city.  As  a  result  there  were  several 
fights  in  which  one  man  was  stabbed  and  another  severely  pom 
melled. 

We  learned  that  we  had  been  hurried  to  Lexington  because 
of  the  reported  advance  of  the  Confederates  under  General  Zolli- 
coffer,  which  threatened  both  Lexington  and  Frankfort.  It 
appeared  that  such  advance  had  been  checked  by  a  display  of 
our  forces  at  Camp  Dick  Robinson  under  General  Thomas  and 
that  we  were  now  needed  to  stay  the  advance  of  the  forces  under 
General  Buckner  along  the  Louisville  and  Nashville  Railroad 
which  threatened  the  city  of  Louisville. 

General  Buckner  had  occupied  Bowling  Green  September  12. 
as  before  stated,  and  on  September  19,  had  moved  a  force  to  Mun- 
fordville  on  Green  River1  which  was  taken  as  an  advance  of  his 
entire  army  to  that  point. 

1     W.  R.  R.  4-416. 


REORGANIZATION.     AUYANCE  INTO  KENTUCKY  35 

The  morning  of  October  19,  1861,  the  regiment  was  aroused 
early  and  after  breakfast  struck  tents,  packed  up  and  were  ready 
to  move  at  the  hour  stated.  We  left  camp  at  7  :30  A.  M.  and 
marched  to  the  railroad  station,  where  we  had  to  wait  until  noon 
for  the  train  of  box  cars  which  was  to  carry  us  to  our  destination. 
The  train  pulled  out  at  12  :30  P.  M.  and  we  were  soon  rolling 
along  through  the  lovely  blue  grass  region  of  Kentucky.  As  we 
approached  the  Kentucky  River  the  scene  changed.  The  country 
was  broken  by  numerous  hills  and  there  were  many  cuts  through 
the  solid  limestone  rock.  After  passing  Frankfort  we  soon  came 
out  into  the  blue  grass  region  again  and  every  one  thought  it  was 
the  most  beautiful  country  he  had  ever  seen.  At  Frankfort  many 
citizens  were  on  hand  with  refreshments  of  all  kinds.  Some  of 
the  men  were  afraid  of  being  poisoned  and  refused  the  proffered 
kindness.1  What  wretch  started  the  scare  about  poisoned  food 
was  not  known. 

Captain  C.  W.  Carroll,  writing  to  his  wife  at  the  time,  says : 

"At  Frankfort  we  were  literally  inundated  with  bouquets  and 
refreshments  of  all  kinds  which  were  forced  upon  us  in  unlimited 
quantities,  although  we  were  not  delayed  over  five  minutes  in  the 
place.  One  beautiful  young  lady  in  particular  appeared  perfectly 
frantic  with  delight  at  the  sight  of  us.  Her  appearance  and  man 
ners  were  such  as  to  attract  the  attention  of  the  whole  regiment. 
While  she  supported  a  large  flag  she  vociferously  hurrahed  for 
Ohio  and  Kentucky.  I  do  not  think  there  was  a  member  of  the 
regiment  who  did  not  form  a  very  warm  attachment,  bordering 
close  on  to  love,  for  the  exquisitely  beautiful  damsel." 

The  captain  here  asks  pardon  of  his  wife  for  forgetting,  for 
the  moment,  that  he  was  a  married  man.  He  says  of  the  country 
between  Frankfort  and  Louisville,  "The  foot  of  a  white  man 
never  pressed  the  sod  of  a  better  country."  We  were  greeted 
all  along  the  road  by  demonstrations  of  welcome.  The  people 
seemed  glad  to  see  us  and  manifested  their  pleasure,  by  cheering 
and  waving  flags  and  handkerchiefs. 

We  arrived  at  Louisville  late  in  the  evening  and  were  at  once 
marched  to  the  depot  of  the  Louisville  and  Nashville  Railroad. 
On  the  way  we  stopped  in  front  of  the  office  of  the  Louisville 
Journal  and  gave  its  brilliant  and  able  editor  three  times  three 
cheers.2  The  streets  were  thronged  with  people  and  Gleason  says 
"the  cheers  they  gave  us  were  enough  to  strike  dismay  to  the 
hearts  of  the  Secessionists."3  At  the  depot  we  found  fires  built 
for  our  comfort  and  soon  after  we  arrived  were  served  with 

1  Gleason's  Diary.  3     Gleason's  Diary. 

2  Letter  of  Captain  C.  W.  Carroll  to  his  wife. 


36  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

bread,  ham  and  hot  coffee.  Gleason  says  that  about  midnight  the 
regiment  boarded  a  freight  train,  some  of  the  cars  being  open. 
but  Captain  Carroll  in  the  letter  to  his  wife  above  quoted  from, 
says  he  enjoyed  a  good  nights  rest  sleeping  on  the  depot  floor. 

At  daylight,  Octobef  11,  we  were  still  at  the  depot  at 
Louisville  but  soon  pulled  out  for  Nolin,  a  station  on  the  Louis 
ville  and  Nashville  Railroad,  where  a  large  camp  had  been  estab 
lished.  It  had  begun  to  rain  in  the  night  and  continued  during 
the  day.  To  add  to  our  discomfort  on  account  of  the  rain  and 
the  open  cars  we  had  no  breakfast.  At  Lebanon  Junction  we 
had  to  wait  a  long  time  for  a  lighter  engine,  as  the  one  we  had 
was  too  heavy  to  cross  the  bridge  over  a  deep  gorge,  which  had 
been  partially  destroyed  by  the  enemy  and  was  being  rebuilt. 
Here  were  quartered  the  survivors  of  an  Illinois  regiment  which 
had  suffered  heavy  losses  in  attempting  to  cross  the  same  bridge 
a  few  days  before.  Captain  Carroll  in  the  above  letter  says : 

"Now  for  the  first  time  we  were  informed  that  we  had  a  ter 
rible  bridge  to  cross  a  few  hundred  yards  distant.  It  was  a  bridge 
across  a  large  stream,  which  was  built  in  place  of  one  burnt  down 
by  S.  B.  Buckner  on  the  eve  of  his  retreat.  It  was  100  feet  high 
and  over  150  yards  long  and  built  of  green  timbers  and  was  now 
nearly  completed.  The  members  of  the  Illinois  regiment  took 
particular  pains  to  represent  this  bridge  in  as  dangerous  a  light 
as  possible,  the  old  settlers  expressed  great  doubt  as  to  its  safety, 
the  engineer  was  apprehensive.  All  this,  after  seeing  the  de 
plorable  effects  of  a  bridge  accident  upon  one  regiment,  had  the 
effect  of  creating  alarm  in  the  breast  of  all  on  the  train.  *  *  * 
The  locomotive  we  were  waiting  for  finally  came  and  we  went 
feeling  our  way  very  carefully  until  we  reached  the  spot.  Here 
was  the  much  dreaded  bridge  before  our  eyes  and  it  was  a  ter 
rifying  sight.  It  did  not  look  as  if  it  could  bear  the  weight  of 
our  train, — it  seemed  so  slender  and  fragile  a  structure.  But  we 
ventured  on  it  at  a  snails  pace,  every  one  holding  his  breath  as  he 
looked  at  the  deep  abyss  below.  The  timbers  cracked  and 
groaned  and  to  the  consternation  of  every  one  the  train  stopped 
right  in  the  middle  of  the  bridge.  Every  one  held  his  breath  in 
anticipation  of  distaster,  but  in  a  few  moments,  it  seemed  an  age, 
the  train  again  started  and  slowly  moved  across  to  solid  ground. 
It  was  a  great  relief  and  many  declared  they  would  rather  risk 
their  lives  in  twenty  battles  than  cross  that  bridge  again." 

Soon  after  we  crossed  this  bridge  we  came  into  the  roughest 
and  hilliest  country  we  had  ever  seen.  It  was  a  steep  grade  to 
the  summit  of  the  almost  mountainous  range  we  were  crossing. 


REORGANIZATION.     ADVANCE  INTO  KENTUCKY  37 

The  two  engines  drawing  the  train  were  completely  stalled  and 
the  train  had  to  be  divided  and  drawn  up  the  steep  grade  in  sec 
tions. 

Elizabethtown  was  the  only  station  of  any  size  along  the 
route.  We  passed  several  regiments  guarding  bridges  along  the 
railroad.  We  reached  Nolin  Station,  eleven  miles  south  of  Eliza 
bethtown,  late  in  the  day  and  at  once  left  the  cars  and  marched 
a  mile  and  a  half  eastward  to  Camp  Nevin,  where  there  was  said 
to  be  12,000  men  already  encamped.  We  were  tired,  hungry  and 
sleepy  and  it  was  quite  late  before  we  got  our  tents  up  and  were 
ready  to  turn  in  for  the  rest  and  sleep  we  so  much  needed. 


CHAPTER  III. 

CAMP  NEVIN ADVANCE  TO  GREEN  RIVER  AND  CAMP  WOOD. 

SIX  MONTHS  OF  INACTION. 

THE  regiment  remained  in  Camp  Nevin  until  December  7, 
1861,  and  went  through  a  monotonous  round  of  drill,  guard,  po 
lice  and  picket  duty  and  the  disciplinary  training  necessary  to  fit 
it  for  the  arduous  trials  which  lay  before  it.  The  camp  had  been 
selected  by  General  Lovell  H.  Rousseau  who,  October  9,  1861, 
had  been  ordered  to  move  from  Muldraugh's  Hill  to  Nolin  and 
select  a  camp  for  a  large  body  of  troops,  send  scouts  to  Green 
River,  and  take  advantage  of  every  position  left  unoccupied  by 
the  enemy.1  Only  the  day  before,  General  Robert  Anderson, 
who  had  been  in  command  of  the  Department  of  the  Cumber 
land,  had  been  compelled  to  retire  on  account  of  failing  health 
and  had  turned  the  command  over  to  General  W.  T.  Sherman.2 
When  we  arrived,  there  were  about  12,000  troops  already  in 
the  camp  and  other  regiments  and  batteries  were  coming  as  fast 
as  they  could  be  armed  and  equipped  and  railroad  or  river  trans 
portation  could  be  furnished  them. 

The  day  after  we  reached  camp,  October  12,  General 
Alexander  McDowell  McCook  was  placed  in  command  of  the 
camp3  and  October  15,  Brigadier  Generals  Thomas  J.  Wood 
and  Richard  W.  Johnson  were  ordered  to  report  to  him  for  as 
signment  to  duty.4  On  the  same  day  the  Thirty-second  Indiana, 
Colonel  August  Willich,  which  had  arrived  at  Louisville,  was  or 
dered  to  move  by  way  of  Hogdensville  to  Camp  Nevin.5 

Our  other  close  comrades,  the  49th  Ohio,  had  preceded  us 
and  were  with  General  Rousseau's  column  when  it  moved  out 
to  Muldraugh's  Hill,  being  the  first  Ohio  regiment  to  set  foot  on 
Kentucky  soil.  On  October  1,  1861,  there  were  at  Camp  Nevin 
and  along  the  railroad  between  Nolin  and  Louisville  the  follow 
ing  troops :  the  Fourth,  Sixth,  Twenty-ninth,  Thirtieth,  Thirty- 
second,  Thirty-eighth,  and  Thirty-ninth  Indiana  Volunteers,  the 
Fifteenth  and  Forty-ninth  Ohio  Volunteers,  the  Third  Kentucky 
Infantry  and  the  Fourth  Kentucky  Cavalry  Volunteers,  Stone's 
Kentucky  Light  Battery  and  Cotter's  Ohio  Battery.6 

Captain  C.  W.  Carroll  in  a  letter  to  his  wife  of  date  October 
22,  1861,  says  that  on  October  21,  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  was  assigned 
to  the  Third  Brigade,  General  R.  W.  Johnson,  and  placed  on  the 

1  W.  R.  R.   4-299.  4     W.  R.  R.   4-308. 

2  W.  R.   R.   4-296-297.  f>     W.  R.  R.   4-307. 

3  W.  R.   R.   4-300.  (5     W.   R.  R.   4-315. 


Six  MONTHS  OK  INACTION  AT  CAMP  NEVJN  39 

right  of  the  brigade.  The  Third  Brigade  was  on  the  right  of  the 
division,  he  says,  and  he  therefore  claimed  that  the  Fifteenth 
Ohio  had  the  post  of  honor  in  the  entire  command.  It  is  not 
probable  that  the  division  was  then  completely  organized,  as  Gen 
eral  Negley's  brigade,  the  Fourth  Brigade  of  the  division,  did 
not  leave  Pittsburgh  until  after  October  17,  and  on  October  22 
was  in  Louisville  whence  that  day  it  was  ordered  to  Camp  Nevin.1 
November  4,  the  troops  at  Camp  Nevin  were  organized  as 

follows : 

FIRST  BRIGADE — General  L.  H.  Rousseau. 

The  Sixth  Indiana  Volunteers,  Fifth  and  Sixth  Kentucky 
Volunteers,   the   Second  Kentucky   Cavalry  Volunteers,   Stone's 
Kentucky  Battery,  two  companies  of  the  Fifteenth  U.  S.  Infantry 
and  two  companies  of  the  Nineteenth  U.  S.  Infantry. 
SECOND  BRIGADE — General  T.  J.  Wood. 

The  Twenty-ninth,  Thirtieth,  Thirty-eighth  and  Thirty-ninth 
Indiana  Volunteers. 

THIRD  BRIGADE — General  R.  W.  Johnson. 

The  Fifteenth  and  Forty-ninth  Ohio  Volunteers,  the  Thirty- 
fourth  Illinois  Volunteers  and  the  Thirty-second  Indiana  Volun- 

FOURTII  BRIGADE — General  Jas.  S.  Negley. 

The  Seventy-seventh,  Seventy-eighth  and  Seventy-ninth 
Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  Muellers'  Pennsylvania  Battery  and 
Cotters  Ohio  Battery.2 

It  so  happened  that  the  Fifteenth  Ohio,  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio 
and  Thirty-second  Indiana  were  to  be  together  in  the  same  brigade 
continuously  during  their  entire  period  of  service. 

Camp  Nevin  was  well  selected  with  a  view  to  the  health  and 
comfort  of  the  men  and  as  a  point  for  the  massing  of  a  large  force 
to  operate  directly  against  the  enemy.  It  was  on  the  Louisville 
and  Nashville  Railroad  over  which  it  could  draw  its  supplies  and 
not  far  from  Nolin's  creek  which  furnished  an  abundant  supply 
of  good  water.  The  region  was  well  timbered  and  there  was 
plenty  of  wood  for  fuel.  The  country  was  an  undulating  plain 
and  afforded  good  opportunities  for  drainage.  But  the  soil  was 
a  red  clay  which  held  the  water  and  needed  more  than  ordinary 
care  to  keep  it  from  becoming  foul  and  unwholesome.  Owing 
perhaps  to  a  lack  of  proper  care  in  this  respect  and  to  the  fact 
that  the  men  did  not  then  know  how  to  take  care  of  themselves, 
there  was  soon  a  great  deal  of  sickness  of  a  sort  which  modern 
scientific  methods  would  have  prevented.  But  the  men  as  a  rule 

1  W.  R.  R.   4-318. 

2  W.  R.   R.   4-33?,. 


40  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

were  uncomplaining  and  went  about  their  duties  in  a  light-hearted 
way.  Soon  after  we  were  established  in  the  camp  the  work  of 
preparing  for  the  active  service  ahead  was  begun  and  continued 
with  monotonous  regularity.  Captain  C.  W.  Carroll  in  a  letter  to 
his  wife  dated  November  11,  1861,  says: 

"Camp  life  as  a  general  thing  is  almost  intolerably  dull  and 
monotonous.  Where  we  are  stationed  for  any  length  of  time  at 
one  post  it  is  the  same  thing  over  and  over  every  day.  At  5 
o'clock  A.  M.,  reveille  beats,  at  which  time  we  get  up  and  prepare 
our  breakfasts.  At  9  A.  M.,  we  have  battalion  drill  which  lasts 
until  noon.  At  1  P.  M.,  we  have  company  drill  which  lasts  until 
4  or  5  P.  M.  From  this  time  until  9  P.  M.,  we  have  to  ourselves. 
At  9  P.  M.,  we  go  to  bed  and  the  next  day  go  through  the  same 
motions.  We  occasionally  go  out  on  picket  which  gives  us  some 
relief."  This  monotony  is  the  well  remembered  dominant  note 
of  our  life  at  Camp  Nevin.  But  the  following  notes  of  our  daily 
employments  taken  from  the  diaries  of  the  men,  the  letters  of 
Captain  C.  W.  Carroll  to  his  wife  and  the  writer's  personal  rec 
ollection  will  show  that  the  monotony  was  frequently  broken  by 
incidents  of  interest  at  the  time,  and  which  show  more  clearly 
than  any  general  statement  how  the  men  lived  and  what  they  did. 

October  12,  1861,  the  day  after  our  arrival  at  Camp  Nevin, 
there  was  no  morning  roll  call  in  the  camp  of  the  Fifteenth  Ohio 
and  no  guards  were  placed  around  the  camp.  The  men  were 
tired  and  it  was  decided  to  give  them  a  day  of  rest.  Some  of 
them  took  advantage  of  it  by  rambling  through  the  woods  hunting 
for  chestnuts,  while  others  made  raids  on  the  orchards  in  the 
country  round  the  camp. 

October  13,  was  Sunday  and  there  were  religious  services 
conducted  by  Chaplain  Ganter,  who  gave  notice  that  he  wished 
to  organize  a  choir  and  wished  the  singers  in  the  regiment  to 
come  to  his  tent.  October  14,  the  daily  monotonous  drills  de 
scribed  by  Captain  Carroll  began.  October  15,  Gleason  writes 
in  his  diary  that  many  of  the  men  were  suffering  from  camp  dis 
orders. 

October  15,  a  detachment  of  the  regiment  had  its  first  ex 
perience  on  picket  duty.  It  was  posted  about  four  miles  south  of 
the  camp  near  the  railroad  station  of  Sonora.  It  was  a  rainy 
night  and  as  an  introduction  to  this  sort  of  service  was  not  re 
assuring.  But  the  next  morning  the  storekeeper  at  the  station 
served  the  men  with  a  breakfast  of  fried  chicken,  biscuits  and 
hot  coffee,  which  almost  made  them  forget  the  trials  of  a  night 
watch  in  the  rain  and  strengthened  them  for  their  march  through 
the  rain  and  mud  back  to  camp. 


Six  MONTHS  OF  INACTION  AT  CAMP  NEVIN  41 

October  18,  a  soldier  of  the  Thirty-ninth  Indiana  was  ac- 
cidently  shot  while  on  picket.  There  was  said  to  be  an  item  in 
the  Cincinnati  Commercial  stating  that  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  had 
been  all  cut  to  pieces  in  battle,  and  many  of  the  men  wrote  letters 
'home  correcting  the  report.1  October  19,  in  the  morning  the 
companies  were  drilled  in  the  lock-step  to  correct  the  carriage  of 
some  of  the  men.  There  was  battalion  drill  in  the  afternoon. 
That  evening,  Adjutant  Taft,  Captain  McClenahan,  Gleason  and 
Sergeant  Lehew  of  Company  H  met  in  the  adjutant's  tent  and 
practiced  singing  the  hymns  which  were  to  be  used  in  next  day's 
religious  services.2 

Sunday,  October  20,  the  morning  inspection,  which  was  to 
become  a  regular  thing  on  Sunday  mornings  while  we  were  in 
camp,  took  place.  The  tents  were  struck  and  the  grounds  cleaned 
up,  after  which  knapsacks  and  haversacks  were  inspected.  After 
the  inspection  there  were  religious  services  and  in  the  evening 
dress  parade.  Orders  came  to  be  ready  to  move  next  morning. 

October  21,  our  regimental  camp  was  moved  to  the  other  side 
of  the  general  camp,  the  side  nearest  the  railroad. 

It  is  presumed  that  such  removal  was  made  necessary  by  our 
assignment  to  the  Third  Brigade  mentioned  in  the  letter  of  Cap 
tain  Carroll.  The  site  selected  for  our  camp  was  so  foul  that 
next  day  we  moved  a  little  farther  south  where  the  ground  was 
cleaner.  It  rained  all  night  the  22nd  and  consequently  there  was 
no  drill  on  the  23rd  and  many  of  the  men  went  outside  camp 
to  hunt  for  grapes  and  chestnuts.  It  grew  quite  cold  the  night 
of  October  23,  and  the  next  morning  there  was  a  white  frost. 
In  the  forenoon  some  of  the  men  were  taken  in  squads  to  the 
creek  to  wash  their  clothing.  In  the  afternoon  there  was  battalion 
drill  in  a  large  field  a  mile  north  of  the  camp  and  dress  parade 
before  we  returned  to  our  quarters.  October  25,  there  was  the 
usual  round  of  drill  and  on  the  26  and  27  a  large  portion  of  the 
regiment  was  on  picket  duty. 

October  28,  we  witnessed  the  first  burial  of  a  soldier.  His 
body  was  borne  to  the  burial  place  in  an  ambulance  escorted  by 
quite  a  detachment  of  his  regiment  marching  with  reversed  arms 
and  preceded  by  a  regimental  band  playing  the  doleful  and  de 
pressing  "Dead  March  from  Saul."  After  the  burial  the  cus 
tomary  salute  was  fired  over  the  grave  and  the  detachment  then 
returned  to  camp,  marching  in  quick  time.  It  was  a  very  im 
pressive  ceremony  and  very  depressing — made  doubly  so  by  the 
doleful  strains  above  mentioned.  One  wonders  why  this  mourn 
ful  music  at  our  funerals  was  not  abandoned  long  before  it  was. 

1  and  2     Gleason's  Diary. 


42  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

The  afternoon  of  October  28,  there  was  battalion  drill  in 
the  same  large  field  above  mentioned,  after  which  Colonel  Dickey 
made  an  eloquent  patriotic  speech,  which  Gleason  says  was  "right 
to  the  point  and  gave  much  encouragement  to  the  men."  At  its 
conclusion  he  asked  the  men  to  co-operate  with  him  in  winning 
for  the  regiment  an  honorable  name  and  in  response  every  hand 
was  raised  aloft.1 

October  29,  there  were  three  funerals  in  our  part  of  the  camp 
and  a  number  of  men  were  sent  to  the  hospital  at  Louisville. 
After  drill  and  dress-parade  on  October  30,  Colonel  Dickey  pro 
posed  to  the  men  that  if  they  would  observe  the  rules  requiring 
them  not  to  leave  camp  without  a  regular  pass,  he  would  reduce 
the  camp  guard  detail  from  six  to  three  from  each  company.  The 
men  gave  a  pledge  of  honor  that  they  would  obey  the  rules  just 
as  they  had  done  with  the  full  number  of  guards. 

There  was  a  white  frost  the  morning  of  October  31,  and  it 
was  quite  cold.  The  usual  drills  and  dress  parade  took  place. 
November  1,  there  was  a  general  inspection  in  the  forenoon. 
Rain  in  the  afternoon  prevented  battalion  drill.  In  the  evening 
notice  was  given  that  the  regiment  would  go  out  on  picket  duty 
next  morning.  November  2,  the  rain  had  ceased  but  had  left  the 
mud  very  deep  and  we  waded  through  it  to  the  place  where  we 
were  to  do  picket  duty.  There  was  no  unusual  experience  during 
our  twenty-four  hours  detail.  There  was,  however,  one  amusing 
incident  which  Gleason  has  preserved.  Lieutenant  Scott  of  Com 
pany  H  with  a  small  squad  was  detached  to  relieve  a  similar  squad 
which  had  been  posted  to  guard  some  government  stores  at  the 
small  station  of  Glendale.  When  Lieutenant  Scott  and  his  men 
reached  the  station  they  found  no  guard  there.  They  were  told 
that  there  had  been  a  company  on  guard  there  the  day  before 
but  that  they  had  left  as  soon  as  it  began  to  rain.  The  regiment 
we  relieved  on  this  tour  of  picket  duty  was  the  Thirty-second  In 
diana.  We  were  relieved  of  picket  duty  at  3  P.  M.,  November 
3,  and  got  back  to  camp  in  time  for  a  supper  of  corn  meal  mush, 
a  welcome  change  of  rations.1 

November  4,  5,  6  and  7  the  regiment  was  occupied  by  the 
usual  dull  round  of  drill.  On  the  7  some  of  the  companies  com 
menced  building  bake-ovens.  November  8,  there  was  also  the 
usual  round  of  drill  and  guard  duty.  In  the  evening  just  after 
taps  a  heavy  thunderstorm  came  up  and  continued  all  night.  It 
was  still  raining  next  morning  and  everything  was  drenched.  The 
ditches  in  the  camp  streets  were  filled  and  running  over  and  some 
of  the  officers  and  men  were  roused  by  the  water  rushing  through 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


Six  MONTHS  OF  INACTION  AT  CAMP  NEVIN  43 

their  tents.  The  rain  and  deep  mud  made  drill  out  of  the  ques 
tion.  It  rained  again  the  night  of  November  10  and  November 
11  and  only  squad  drill  was  undertaken.  Governor  Morton  of  In 
diana  was  expected  to  visit  the  camp  November  11  and  the  In 
diana  troops  were  making  great  preparations  to  receive  him.  Five 
thousand  of  them  marched  to  the  railroad  station  to  escort  him 
to  the  camp.1 

Captain  Carroll  from  whose  letter  of  November  11,  1861, 
the  above  is  taken,  says  that  at  that  time  there  were  thirty  thou 
sand  to  forty  thousand  troops  in  Camp  Nevin,  that  the  general 
health  of  the  troops  was  good ;  that  the  prospects  of  an  advance 
were  not  so  good  as  they  were  and  that  there  was  some  talk  of 
fixing  up  winter  quarters, — which  was  not  a  good  sign. 

November  12,  the  entire  regiment  was  on  picket  duty  and 
were  posted  about  two  miles  southwest  of  the  camp  near  the  rail 
road.  Gleason,  who  was  with  Company  H,  says  they  had  no 
particular  instructions,  that  some  of  the  men  went  out  on  a  scout 
and  many  of  those  remaining  took  off  their  cartridge  boxes  and 
threw  down  their  guns  and  were  having  a  good  time,  when  sud 
denly  Colonel  Dickey  appeared  in  their  midst.  The  result  was 
that  the  company  was  given  a  good  reprimand  and  the  men  were 
instructed  thereafter  to  pace  their  beats  and  at  all  times  to  be 
alert  and  ready  for  duty.2 

November  13,  14  and  15  were  devoted  to  drill,  police  and 
guard  duty.  There  was  a  thunderstorm  the  evening  of  Novem 
ber  14  and  it  was  uncomfortably  warm  in  the  tents.  The  night 
of  November  15  was  the  coldest  of  the  season  so  far  and  on  the 
morning  of  November  16  there  was  thick  ice  in  the  pools  about 
the  camp.  That  day  the  left  wing  of  the  regiment,  under  com 
mand  of  Lieutenant  Colonel  Wilson,  went  out  of  camp  about  two 
miles  to  discharge  their  guns.  After  this  they  had  their  first 
target  practice.  Gleason  says  Company  H  was  complimented 
by  Colonel  Wilson  on  having  made  the  best  score.  There  was 
battalion  drill  in  the  afternoon  in  the  old  field  before  mentioned. 
While  we  were  drilling  the  First  Ohio  Volunteers  went  by,  having 
marched  from  Louisville.3 

November  17,  at  11  A.  M.,  the  regiment  fell  in  for  regular 
inspection  when  orders  came  to  make  ready  for  brigade  inspection 
and  a  review  by  General  Buell,  who  had  succeeded  General  Sher 
man  in  command  of  the  department.  We  were  ordered  to  dis 
pense  with  our  overcoats  and  as  the  air  was  chilly  we  were  quite 
cold.  We  marched  to  the  parade  ground,  took  our  position  in 
the  line  and  had  to  wait  four  hours.  At  the  expiration  of  that 

1  Letter  of  Capt.  Carroll  to  his  wife,  dated  November  11,   1861. 

2  and  3     Gleason's  Diary. 


44  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

time  General  Buell  arrived  and,  accompanied  by  Generals  McCook 
and  Johnson,  rode  up  and  down  the  line  and  looked  at  us.  We 
were  then  marched  by  the  generals  in  column  of  companies.  The 
order  of  march  of  our  brigade  (the  sixth)  was  the  Fifteenth 
Ohio,  the  Thirty-second  Indiana,  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio,  the 
Twenty-ninth  Indiana.1 

In  a  note  in  his  diary,  Gleason  says  that  the  29th  Indiana 
was  afterwards  succeeded  by  the  34th  Illinois  and  that  the  34th 
Illinois  early  in  December  gave  place  to  the  39th  Indiana.  By 
order  of  General  Buell  dated  November  30,  1861,  the  Fifteenth 
Ohio,  Forty-ninth  Ohio,  Thirtysecond  Indiana  and  Thirty-ninth 
Indiana  were  constituted  the  Sixth  Brigade.2 

The  first  appearance  of  General  Buell  in  our  camp  created 
only  a  momentary  interest.  General  W.  T.  Sherman  whom  he 
succeeded  November  15,  1861,3  had  only  been  in  command  of 
the  department  since  October  4,  1861,  and  was  not  generally 
known.  General  Sherman,  on  assuming  command  of  the  depart 
ment  had  taken  hold  with  characteristic  energy  and  his  blunt  out 
spoken  criticisms  and  comment  regarding  conditions  then  exist 
ing  and  his  ill  concealed  dislike  of  the  newspaper  reporters,  who 
dogged  his  steps  day  by  day,  did  not  tend  towards  making  him  a 
popular  commander.  What  probably  led  to  the  break  in  his 
military  career  which  afterwards  became  so  famous  was  a  private 
interview  with  the  Secretary  of  War  and  the  Adjutant  General  of 
the  Army,  October  16,  1861,  in  which  when  asked  how  many  men 
he  deemed  necessary  to  drive  the  rebels  out  of  Kentucky,  promptly 
replied  200,000.4  In  a  report  to  the  Secretary  of  War  dated 
October  21,  1861,  the  Adjutant  General  related  this  conversa 
tion  and  it  in  some  way  got  into  the  newspapers.  It  was  published 
far  and  wide  with  the  comment  that  General  Sherman  was  crazy. 
General  Sherman  resented  the  publication  of  this  report  and 
sharply  expressed  his  dissatisfaction  to  the  War  Department.  In 
a  letter  to  General  George  H.  Thomas  dated  November  11,  1861, 
he  said:  "My  expression  of  dissatisfaction  at  the  publication  of 
Thomas'  (Lorenzo  Thomas,  Adjutant  General,  U.  S.  A.)  report 
and  request  to  be  relieved  of  this  charge  has  led  to  the  assign 
ment  of  General  Buell,  of  whom  I  have  not  yet  heard."  Later 
events  demonstrated  that  he  was  not  far  out  of  the  way. 

November  18,  19  and  20,  were  quite  cold  and  disagreeable, 
with  a  cold  rain  the  night  of  the  19th,  but  there  was  the  usual  mo 
notonous  routine  of  drill  and  police  and  guard  duty. 

November  21,  the  Hon.  John  J.  Crittenden  was  in  the  camp 
and  the  men  were  ordered  to  get  ready  for  a  grand  review  in  his 

1     Gleason's  Diary.       2     W.  R.  R.  7-460.       3     W.  R.  R.  4-358.       4     W.  R.  R.  4-314. 


Six  MONTHS  OF  INACTION  AT  CAMP  NEVIN  4o 

honor  but  for  some  unknown  reason  the  review  did  not  take 
place.1  That  evening  orders  came  to  go  to  picket  next  morn 
ing.  November  22  we  were  out  early,  had  breakfast  and  were 
just  about  starting  on  our  tour  of  picket  duty  when  it  began  to 
rain  and  rained  all  day.  The  mud  was  deep  and  the  marching 
hard,  but  we  soon  reached  our  post  about  four  miles  from  camp 
and  relieved  the  guards  then  on  duty.  It  was  a  dismal  day  and 
disagreeable  beyond  description,  but  every  one  took  it  good  ria- 
turedly  and  endured  it  without  complaint.  Towards  night  it  grew 
quite  cold,  with  a  high  wild  wind  and  about  midnight  there  was  a 
light  fall  of  snow.  Company  K,  in  which  the  writer  was  then  a 
non-commissioned  officer,  had  its  headquarters  in  an  old  saw  mill 
near  the  picket  line.  There  was  a  report  that  the  enemy  was 
advancing  and  every  one  was  cautioned  to  keep  a  sharp  look  out. 
The  guards  were  instructed  to  halt  any  one  approaching  the  lines. 
If  he  failed  to  stop  after  the  command  "halt"  had  been  given 
three  times,  the  guard  was  then  to  fire.  Sometime  between  mid 
night  and  morning  a  shot  was  heard  on  the  picket  line.  The  re 
serve  guards  at  once  went  forward  to  the  support  of  the  line  and 
found  that  John  Dunn,  a  member  of  Company  K,  had  been  shot 
and  mortally  wounded  by  William  Hazlewood.  Dunn  was  a  new 
recruit  and  was  one  of  the  guard  then  on  duty.  He  had  evidently 
got  confused  for  he  was  outside  the  picket  line  and  was  coming 
towards  it  when  Hazlewood,  who  did  not  recognize  him  in  the 
darkness,  called  out  three  times  ''Halt!  who  comes  there?"  and 
then  fired.  The  shot  struck  him  in  the  right  breast  and  passed 
through  his  body.  We  carried  him  back  to  the  sawmill,  laid  him 
on  a  rough  bench  and  made  him  comfortable  as  possible.  We 
opened  his  shirt  and  saw  the  ghastly  wound  the  bullet  had  made 
and  knew  that  it  was  mortal.  A  sergeant  of  the  guard2  sat  by 
him,  moistened  his  lips  and  held  his  hand,  finger  on  pulse,  while 
his  life  blood  slowly  ebbed  away.  It  was  a  wild  night.  The 
wind  howled  and  shrieked  without  and  the  sounds  mingled  with 
the  groans  of  the  dying  man.  Towards  morning  he  died.  In 
memory,  that  night  remains  one  of  the  most  awful  in  the  writer's 
more  than  four  years  of  service.  An  ambulance  came  and  took 
the  body  to  camp  where  it  was  afterwards  shipped  to  his  family 
in  the  north.  A  strict  inquiry  into  the  circumstances  of  the 
shooting  acquitted  Hazelwood  of  all  blame,3  but  the  accident 
clouded  his  life  and  made  him  very  unhappy.  He  was  after 
wards  wounded  and  taken  prisoner  at  Chickamauga  and  sent  to 
Andersonville,  where  he  endured  untold  privations,  but  was  finally 
released  and  restored  to  his  family  and  friends. 

1     Gleason's  Diary.       2     The  Writer.  3     Letter  of  Captain  Carroll  to  his  wife. 


46  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

November  23,  24  and  25  were  without  any  unusual  incident. 

November  26,  soon  after  reveille,  General  R.  W.  Johnson, 
our  brigade  commander,  came  around  and  gave  the  orderly  ser 
geants  a  shaking  up  for  being  so  tardy  in  calling  the  roll.  He 
ordered  that  thereafter  the  roll  should  be  called  immediately  after 
reveille  and  that  the  men  should  turn  out  with  arms  and  ac- 
counterments.1  That  day  the  paymaster  came  and  we  were 
marched  to  General  McCook's  headquarters  and  received  our  first 
pay  in  the  three  years  service.  Each  private  and  corporal  re 
ceived  $23.40  and  each  sergeant  a  little  over  $30.00.2 

There  were  heavy  rains  November  27,  28  and  29,  and  no 
drill.  On  the  29th  Captain  Thaddeus  S.  Gilliland,  who  was  dan 
gerously  ill  of  a  fever,  was  removed  from  his  tent  to  a  farm  house 
near  camp  and  his  wife  and  father  were  reported  as  coming  to 
care  for  him.3 

November  30,  there  was  a  change  in  the  weather.  It  grew 
much  colder  and  there  was  rain  and  a  light  snow.  We  had 
orders  to  go  out  on  picket  duty,  but  the  river4  (Nolin's  Creek) 
was  so  high  that  it  was  impossible  and  the  order  was  counter 
manded. 

There  was  the  regular  Sunday  inspection  December  1  and 
one  of  the  regimental  wagons  went  to  Elizabethtown  for  forage 
and  brought  back,  besides  the  forage,  a  bushel  of  good  apples.5 
December  2,  there  was  quite  a  snow  fall  and  December  3,  some 
of  the  boys  went  rabbit-hunting.6  The  same  day  Captain  Frank 
Askew  started  north  on  a  short  leave  of  absence.7  December  4, 
Captain  Gilliland's  wife  and  father  accompanied  by  the  father 
of  the  Gleason  boys,  all  of  Van  Wert,  Ohio,  arrived  in  camp. 
Captain  Gilliland  was  reported  not  so  well  and  there  was  much 
anxiety  over  his  condition. 

December  5  and  6  there  was  the  usual  round  of  police  and 
guard  duty  and  the  usual  drill.  The  Thirty-second  Indiana,  who 
were  encamped  across  a  little  branch  from  us,  were  building 
barracks  of  round  logs.  One  of  their  officers  said  they  "did  not 
know  that  they  should  ever  occupy  them  but  perhaps  some  one 
else  would  and  at  any  rate  it  kept  the  men  busy  and  out  of  mis 
chief."  December  7,  we  were  caught  in  a  shower  while  on  bat 
talion  drill  and  got  a  good  drenching.  December  8,  there  was  the 
usual  Sunday  morning  inspection. 

It  proved  to  be  our  last  day  at  Camp  Nevin  for  orders 
came  to  march  for  Green  River  next  morning  at  nine  o'clock. 
Everyone  was  glad  of  the  change.  The  camp  had  become  foul 
and  there  was  a  great  deal  of  sickness,  which  resulted  in  a  great 

1,  2,  3,  4,  5  and  6     (Reason's  Diary.  7     Captain  Carroll's  letter  to  his  wife. 


Six  MONTHS  OF  INACTION  AT  CAMP  NEVIN  41 

many  deaths  and  numerous  discharges  for  disability.  There 
was  a  great  deal  of  rainy  weather  during  which,  when  not  on 
duty,  both  officers  and  men  were  confined  to  their  tents.  During 
these  hours  of  inaction  both  officers  and  non-commissioned  of 
ficers  studied  the  tactics  and  army  regulations  so  as  to  familiarize 
themselves  with  their  duties.  The  frequent  drills  and  the  daily 
round  of  duties,  together  with  the  studies  above  mentioned, 
brought  the  companies  and  regiments  up  to  a  high  state  of  disci 
pline  and  efficiency.  In  fact  it  may  be  truthfully  said,  that  the 
character  of  the  regiments  at  Camp  Nevin  was  practically  formed 
during  the  dreary  weeks  we  occupied  the  place. 

The  morning  of  December  9,  reveille  was  sounded  early. 
Hundreds  of  camp  fires  soon  were  blazing  and  the  men  taking 
their  breakfasts.  This  was  followed  by  the  striking  of  tents  and 
the  packing  up  and  then  came  the  "assembly,"  blown  by  many 
bugles,  and  the  army  at  Camp  Nevin  began  its  southward  march. 

We  marched  slowly,  making  frequent  halts,  as  the  men's 
knapsacks  were  heavily  loaded  with  useless  impedimenta  which 
had  been  accumulated  during  our  long  stay  in  Camp  Nevin.  In 
passing  one  house  we  were  much  amused  to  see  an  old  woman 
dancing  and  clapping  her  hands  for  joy.1  She  may  have  been 
some  daughter  of  the  revolution  of  1776  and  had  not  forgotten 
her  love  for  the  flag  of  her  father. 

We  soon  came  in  sight  of  blue  capped  hills  which  rose  like 
mountains  in  the  distance.  After  eight  or  nine  miles  the  boys 
began  to  drop  out  and  lag  behind.  The  heavy  road  and  heavier 
knapsacks  began  to  tell  upon  them.  After  a  march  of  twelve 
miles  we  halted  for  the  night  at  Bacon  Creek,  where  the  cavalry 
and  some  of  the  infantry  were  already  in  camp.  We  noticed  the 
camp  of  the  Third  Ohio,  then  commanded  by  Colonel  John 
Beatty,  who  was  known  as  "the  Christian  Soldier."  It  was  said 
that  he  would  not  allow  swearing  in  his  presence  and  said  grace 
at  his  mess  table. 

Some  of  the  men  went  to  bathe  their  galled  feet  in  the  creek. 
As  soon  as  our  wagons  came  up,  we  pitched  our  tents  and  turned 
in  for  the  night.  "Tattoo"  sounded  wonderfully  sweet  that  night 
and  particularly  the  long  drawn  out  call  of  the  Thirty-second  In 
diana  which  used  the  German  bugle  calls. 

The  morning  of  December  10,  reveille  sounded  early  and 
we  soon  had  our  breakfasts  and  packed  up  ready  for  resuming 
our  march.  We  waited  until  10:20  A.  M.  before  we  received 
marching  orders  and  then  moved  out,  the  Thirty-ninth  Indiana 
in  advance  of  the  brigade.  We  took  the  direct  road  to  Green 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


48  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

River  and  as  it  was  macadamized  we  moved  out  briskly,  keeping 
time  to  lively  martial  music.  We  marched  three  miles — then 
halted  ten  minutes  for  rest,  then  another  three  miles  and  halted 
for  luncheon.  The  country  grew  rougher  as  we  advanced  and 
some  of  the  hills  seemed  mountainous  in  their  aspect.  After 
luncheon  a  march  of  about  six  miles  brought  us  to  the  village  of 
Munfordville  on  Green  River  where  we  went  into  camp  about 
one-fourth  of  a  mile  north  of  the  town.  Our  camp  was  named 
Camp  Wood,  in  honor  of  the  Hon.  George  Wood,  a  member  of 
the  Kentucky  Military  Board  who  lived  at  Munfordville.1  That 
night  Company  I  was  detailed  to  guard  the  ford  between  Mun 
fordville  and  Woodsonville,  a  small  hamlet  just  across  the  river, 
and  before  daylight  the  next  morning  was  attacked  by  the  Texas 
Rangers.2  In  confirmation  of  this  incident,  noted  in  McConnell's 
diary,  a  telegram  from  General  McCook  to  General  Buell  Novem 
ber  11  states  that, 

"Seventy-five  rebel  cavalry  came  up  to  Woodsonville  at  5 
A.  M.,  this  morning,  got  behind  a  house,  and  fired  a  volley.  Our 
pickets  returned  it.  The  rebel  fled."3 

At  8  o'clock  A.  M.,  all  the  regiment  except  Company  I  was 
ordered  out  on  picket  duty.  Company  H  was  posted  about  three 
miles  back  on  the  road  to  Bacon  Creek.4 

December  12,  after  the  companies  which  were  on  picket  re 
turned  to  camp,  the  men  set  about  making  their  quarters  more 
comfortable.  The  regiment  was  encamped  on  a  steep  hill  side 
and  in  some  cases  the  ground  had  to  be  graded  and  leveled  off 
before  the  tents  could  be  properly  placed.  December  13,  the  cars 
ran  to  Green  River  bringing  material  for  rebuilding  the  big  rail 
road  bridge  which  had  been  partially  destroyed  by  the  enemy  some 
days  before.  It  was  evident  that  the  bridge  over  Bacon  Creek 
had  been  repaired.  This  bridge  had  been  destroyed  by  Captain 
John  H.  Morgan  of  the  Kentucky  Cavalry  the  night  of  December 
5,  1861.5 

Orders  come  to  be  ready  to  go  out  on  picket  duty  again  next 
morning.  We  were  still  on  picket  duty  Sunday  morning,  Decem 
ber  14,  and  were  relieved  in  time  to  have  Sunday  inspection. 
There  was  a  skirmish  across  the  river  between  some  of  the 
enemy's  cavalry  and  the  pickets  of  the  Thirty-second  Indiana.6 
The  situation  was  becoming  so  critical  that  great  watchfulness 
was  necessary  in  order  to  prevent  surprise. 

December  11,  it  was  learned  and  telegraphed  to  General  Buell 
that  the  Confederate  General  Hindman  with  4000  men  was  at 


1  Ohio  at  Sh'loh,  pace  71.  4     Gleason's  Diary. 

2  Wlll'am  McCnnnell's  Diary.  5     W.  R.  R.  7-12. 

3  W.  R.  R.  7-491.  6     Gleason's  and  McConnell's  Diaries. 


Six  MONTHS  OF  INACTION  AT  CA.MP  NEVJN  49 

Bear  Wallow,  a  short  distance  from  Green  River.  General  Buell 
either  took  alarm,  or  feared  an  early  engagement  with  the  enemy 
would  interfere  with  his  plans,  and  ordered  General  McCook  to 
fall  back  from  his  position  at  Green  River.  General  McCook  at 
once  protested  that  he  was  all  right  and  safe  in  his  position,  that 
to  fall  back  would  be  demoralizing  to  his  division  and  asked  that 
the  order  be  recinded.1  As  we  did  not  fall  back  it  may  be  pre 
sumed  that  the  order  was  countermanded. 

December  16,  the  regiment  drilled  for  two  hours,  after  which 
some  of  the  men  went  to  see  the  great  railroad  bridge  which 
Captain  Carroll  describes  in  a  letter  to  his  wife  as  the  most  mag 
nificent  structure  of  the  kind  he  had  ever  seen.  Gleason  made 
a  sketch  of  it  from  the  roof  of  an  old  cabin  nearby.  It  had  been 
partially  destroyed  by  the  enemy  and  was  being  repaired  as 
rapidly  as  possible.  The  Thirty-second  Indiana  was  encamped 
between  our  quarters  and  the  bridge  and  had  erected  a  bake  oven 
where  some  of  the  men  got  some  soft  bread.2 

The  morning  of  December  17,  our  teams  had  to  join  a  forag 
ing  expedition  to  General  Buckner's  farm  eight  miles  up  the 
river.  We  got  them  off  in  good  time  and  then  went  out  on  picket, 
being  posted  in  the  same  places  as  before,  except  that  Company 
I  was  sent  to  Logston's  ford  seven  miles  down  Green  River3 
and  Company  E  was  detailed  to  guard  the  railroad  bridge  across 
it.  Soon  after  reaching  our  posts  we  heard  musketry  in  the  di 
rection  of  our  camp  followed  by  cannonading.  We  did  not  know 
whether  it  was  real  fighting  or  target  practice.  It  was  not  long, 
however,  until  the  news  came  that  a  real  engagement  had  taken 
place.  There  were  many  conflicting  reports  about  it,  but  the 
most  plausible  one  was  brought  to  us  in  the  evening  by  our  ad 
jutant,  Calvin  R.  Taft,  who  said  that  the  enemy  had  come  up  on 
the  cars  with  a  battery,  a  regiment  of  infantry  and  some  cavalry, 
that  Colonel  Willich  of  the  Thirty-second  Indiana  had  sent  out  a 
part  of  his  regiment  as  skirmishers  and  after  a  sharp  fight  with  a 
superior  force  of  the  enemy  had  fallen  back  to  the  river,  losing 
twenty  men  killed  and  wounded.4 

The  affair  was  really  more  serious  than  our  adjutant  had  re 
ported.  Four  companies  of  the  Thirty-second  Indiana  under 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Von  Treba  were  on  picket  just  across  the 
river  south  of  the  railroad  bridge  when  they  were  attacked  by  a 
force  commanded  by  General  Hindman,  which  consisted  of  the 
First,  Second  and  Sixth  Arkansas  Infantry,  a  battalion  of  Texas 
Rangers  and  Swett's  battery  of  artillery.5  They  maintained  a  gal 
lant  resistance,  were  soon  joined  by  Colonel  Willich  with  the 

1  W.  R.  R.  7-401.  3     McConnell's  Diary.  5     W.  R.  R.  7-19-20. 

2  Gleason's  Diary.  4     Gleason's  Diary. 


50  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

other  companies  of  the  regiment  and  after  a  severe  hand  to 
hand  engagement  the  enemy  were  finally  driven  off.  The  losses 
of  the  Thirty-second  Indiana  were  quite  heavy,  being  Lieutenant 
Sachs  and  ten  men  killed,  twenty-two  wounded  and  five  men 
missing.1 

Captain  C.  W.  Carroll  in  a  letter  to  his  wife  dated  December 
9,  1861,  gives  the  following  account  of  the  affair: 

"We  had  quite  a  brisk  little  time  on  last  Tuesday,  having 
had  a  skirmish  with  the  enemy  across  the  river.  Indeed  the  fir 
ing  became  so  lively  that  it  aroused  our  whole  camp  and  made  it 
assume  a  very  war-like  appearance.  Unfortunately  for  us,  our 
regiment  was  on  picket  on  that  day  or  we  certainly  would  have 
been  in  the  fight.  Our  Company  came  near  being  in  it  as  it  was. 
Having  been  an  eye  witness  of  nearly  the  whole  affair,  I  can  give 
you  a  pretty  correct  account  of  what  transpired.  I  had  the  honor 
of  being  in  command  of  Company  E  and  of  being  charged  with 
the  duty  of  protecting  the  great  iron  bridge  across  Green  River. 
My  post  at  the  bridge  was  a  very  short  distance  from  the  scene 
of  the  action.  The  day  was  exceedingly  beautiful  and  it  was 
astonishingly  warm  for  this  season  of  the  year.  About  one 
o'clock,  having  just  finished  our  dinner  of  hard  crackers  and 
coffee,  we  were  alarmed  by  the  sound  of  musketry  a  short  dis 
tance  across  the  river.  We  all  sprang  to  our  arms  and  I  formed 
the  company  in  line  prepared  for  action.  The  fighting  was  be 
tween  Colonel  Willich's  regiment,  which  was  thrown  over  the 
river  as  skirmishers,  and  from  three  to  five  thousand  rebels,  with 
a  battery  of  four  pieces.  Colonel  Willich's  regiment  is  the  32d 
Indiana  and  is  composed  entirely  of  Germans.  They  fought  the 
overwhelming  force  of  the  enemy  with  obstinate  and  desperate 
courage.  In  fact,  there  were  but  200  of  this  noble  regiment  ac 
tually  engaged — the  balance  having  been  sent  in  another  direction 
to  a  point  where  it  was  supposed  the  main  body  lay.  This  hand 
ful  of  men  held  in  check  for  three-quarters  of  an  hour  over  five 
hundred  Texan  Rangers  who  fought  with  great  bravery  and 
desperation.  These  Rangers  would  charge  right  upon  them, 
making  it  almost  a  hand  to  hand  fight.  But  the  Germans  stood 
firm  and  slew  them  right  and  left  and  caused  them  to  fall  back 
before  their  murderous  fire.  These  charges  were  frequently  re 
peated  and  as  often  repulsed,  until  our  men,  driving  the  enemy 
before  them,  ran  into  range  of  the  enemy's  battery  only  a  few 
hundred  yards  away.  They  did  not  know  until  the  battery  opened 
out  on  them  that  the  enemy  had  any  artillery  with  them.  The 
German  finding  themselves  in  the  presence  of  a  large  force  of 

1     Col.  Willich's  official  report,  W.  R.  R.  7-18. 


Six  MONTHS  OF  INACTION  AT  CAMP  NEVIN  51 

the  enemy  fell  back  until  reinforcements  could  reach  them.  Dur 
ing  this  time  I  had  crossed  the  river  with  the  company  and  had 
taken  position  within  a  short  distance  of  the  battle  ground. 
There  we  were  compelled  to  stand,  in  sight  of  the  whole  affair, 
without  being  able  to  render  our  noble  comrades  any  assistance. 
To  have  left  our  post  without  orders  would  have  subjected  me  to 
a  Court  Martial.  In  fact  in  crossing  the  river  as  I  did,  I  incurred 
the  displeasure  of  General  Johnson,  but  after  considering  the 
matter  he  concluded  that  in  crossing  the  river  I  had  taken  a  posi 
tion  which  enabled  me  to  render  more  effectual  protection  to  the 
bridge.  *  *  *  This  is  our  first  battle  and  gives  us  an  idea 
of  what  we  may  expect  hereafter.  But  let  them  do  their  best  we 
are  bound  to  whip  them." 

That  day  four  additional  brigades  and  a  number  of  batteries 
of  artillery  reached  Camp  Wood  and  a  part  of  them  crossed  the 
river.  Troops  came  in  on  the  cars  during  the  night  and  there 
were  good  prospects  for  a  fight  next  day.1 

December  18,  was  a  quiet  day  at  Camp  Wood.  The  pros 
pects  for  a  fight  had  gone,  as  the  enemy  retreated  during  the 
night.  Our  regiment  returned  from  picket  duty  about  noon  and 
in  the  evening  we  had  dress  parade. 

December  19,  we  had  drill  in  the  forenoon.  In  the  afternoon 
our  pickets  across  the  river  were  fired  on  and  two  regiments 
were  hurriedly  sent  to  reinforce  them.  These  regiments  made 
a  reconnaissance  for  some  distance  in  our  front  but  found  no 
considerable  force  of  the  enemy.  Orders  came  to  turn  over  all 
our  tents  except  six  to  the  company,  which  caused  some  dissat 
isfaction.  Our  tents  were  what  were  known  as  "Sibley"  tents, 
were  bell  shaped  with  a  pole  in  the  center  and  each  was  expected 
to  accommodate  fifteen  men.  The  men  slept  in  them  with  their 
heads  toward  the  outer  rim  and  their  feet  towards  the  center, 
and  except  in  very  bad  weather  they  were  quite  comfortable. 

December  20,  it  was  reported  that  the  Sherman  Brigade  had 
arrived  in  camp.2  Lieutenant  Chaffin  of  Company  H,  resigned 
and  left  for  home. 

It  rained  the  evening  of  December  21  and  the  morning  of 
December  22,  and  as  we  had  no  picket  duty  to  perform  the  men 
kept  their  tents.  Monday,  December  23,  was  freezing  cold  with  a 
cutting  wind  and  there  was  no  drill.  New  clothing — round-a 
bouts  and  trousers — were  issued  to  the  men.  December  24,  new 
caps  were  issued.  Gleason  says,  that  "tomorrow  being  Christmas 
we  were  selected  to  go  on  picket."  Some  of  the  men  had  got 
canned  oysters  and  had  prepared  to  have  a  royal  Christmas 

1  and  2     Gleason's  Diary. 


52  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

dinner,  but  after  hearing  of  the  order  to  go  on  picket  decided  to 
have  them  Christmas  eve. 

The  morning  of  Christmas  Day,  1861,  the  whole  regiment 
was  aroused  quite  early  and  by  8  o'clock  was  on  its  way  to  the 
picket  line.  We  crossed  the  river  on  a  bridge  which  had  been 
built  by  the  Thirty-second  Indiana  near  the  great  railroad  bridge 
and  were  posted  on  or  near  the  battle  ground  of  the  17th.  Some 
of  the  men  went  over  the  ground  hunting  for  relics  and  Lieuten 
ant  Scott  found  a  bloody  bayonet  twisted  out  of  shape  and  sent  it 
home  as  a  trophy.1  Hickory  nuts  and  butternuts  abounded  in  the 
woods  and  as  the  day  was  fair  the  squirrels  were  out  laying  in 
their  winter  supplies.  The  men  were  strongly  tempted  to  shoot 
them  but  the  orders  forbade  it.  No  fires  at  night  were  allowed, 
but  as  the  weather  was  mild  we  were  all  quite  comfortable.  There 
were  no  shots  on  the  picket  line,  and  no  other  sounds  to  disturb 
stillness  of  the  night,  except  the  barking  of  foxes.  One  could  not 
help  contrasting  this  Christmas  day  with  those  of  former  times  in 
our  homes  in  dear  old  Ohio. 

December  26,  at  9  o'clock  A.  M.,  we  were  relieved  of  picket 
duty  by  the  "Louisville  Legion"  and  returned  to  our  camp.  It 
began  raining  in  the  evening  and  we  congratulated  ourselves  that 
we  had  escaped  one  rainy  night  on  picket.1 

The  morning  of  December  27,  was  freezing  cold  and  the  men 
mostly  kept  their  tents.  It  was  still  cold  on  the  28th  but  we  went 
out  on  drill.  We  were  however  soon  called  in  and  ordered  to 
pack  knapsacks  and  be  ready  to  march  at  noon.  It  was  reported 
that  we  were  to  have  brigade  inspection.  Colonel  Dickey  and 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Wilson  were  both  absent  and  Major  Wallace 
was  in  command  of  the  regiment.  Arriving  at  the  parade  ground, 
we  found  nearly  all  the  regiments  in  camp  assembled  and  learned 
that  a  flag  was  to  be  presented  to  Rousseau's  brigade  by  Mr.  Geo. 
D.  Prentice,  editor  of  the  Louisville  Journal.  Many  of  us  were 
much  interested  in  seeing  the  distinguished  editor  whose  fame 
was  country  wide.  Gleason  describes  him  as  being  an  "ordinary 
looking,  elderly  gentleman,  quiet,  approaching  almost  to  timid 
ity."  The  writer  who  saw  him  on  this  occasion  recalls  a  strik 
ing,  wrinkled,  or  pock  marked  face  and  piercing  dark  eyes.  He 
was  slouchily  dressed,  but  no  one,  the  writer  thinks,  would  have 
taken  him  to  be  other  than  the  remarkable  man  he  was.  We 
were  too  far  from  the  speakers  to  hear  the  presentation  speech  or 
the  reply  made  by  General  Rousseau,  but  heard  some  fine  music 
by  the  band  of  the  Fifteenth,  U.  S.  A.,  which  well  paid  us  for  our 
march  through  the  mud.  We  had  dress  parade  in  the  evening. 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


Six  MONTHS  OF  INACTION  AT  CAMP  NEVIN 

Sunday,  December  29,  was  a  fine  winter  day  and  we  had  the 
usual  Sunday  morning  inspection.  December  30,  there  was  no 
unusual  occurrence.  Gleason  tells  of  exploring  a  noted  cave  in 
the  vicinity  and  seeing  some  troops  engaged  in  target  practice. 
He  also  reports  that  a  pontoon  bridge  across  the  river  had  been 
completed. 

December  31,  the  regiment  was  again  detailed  for  picket 
duty.  We  were  again  posted  on  the  battle  ground  near  Row- 
lett's  station  and  saw  the  knoll  behind  which  the  enemy  had 
masked  his  battery  on  that  memorable  day.  It  was  a  double 
"watch  night."  We  watched  for  the  approach  of  the  enemy  and 
at  the  same  time  watched  the  old  year  out  and  the  new  year  in. 
From  a  hill  near  our  line  we  had  a  fine  view  of  our  camps  about 
Munfordville  and  of  the  country  for  miles  around.  All  was 
quiet  during  the  night. 

Between  9  and  10  o'clock,  January  1,  1862,  we  were  relieved 
by  the  First  Ohio  and  returned  to  camp,  crossing  the  river  on 
the  pontoon  bridge  above  mentioned.  We  put  in  the  rest  of  the 
day  resting  and  sleeping.  January  2,  it  was  too  cold  for  drill  and 
the  men  kept  their  tents.  It  grew  warmer  towards  evening  and 
began  to  rain.  It  rained  the  next  day  and  there  was  no  drill. 
January  4,  a  reported  case  of  small-pox  some  where  in  camp 
caused  alarm  and  the  men  were  marched  by  companies  to  the 
surgeon's  tent  and  vaccinated.  Sunday,  January  3,  there  was  the 
usual  inspection  and  Lieutenant  Scott  and  Sergeant  John  Capper 
of  Company  H  received  furloughs. 1 

January  6,  at  4  P.  M.  our  regiment  was  ordered  out  on  picket 
and  we  were  placed  in  reserve  on  the  river  bottom  near  the  rail 
road  bridge.  It  was  quite  cold,  there  was  no  wood  near  with 
which  to  make  fires  and  General  McCook  gave  us  permission  to 
burn  rails  from  a  fence  nearby.2 

Next  morning,  January  7,  Major  Wallace,  while  washing 
at  a  spring,  let  his  revolver  fall  and  it  was  discharged,  wounding 
him  in  the  left  foot  so  severely  that  an  ambulance  was  sent  for 
to  take  him  to  camp.  During  the  day  the  boys  chased  rabbits  in 
the  adjoining  fields  and  caught  quite  a  number.  We  were  relieved 
earlier  than  we  expected  and  returned  to  camp,  almost  every  one 
carrying  a  bundle  of  straw  or  grass  for  bedding.  We  were  sur 
prised  on  reaching  camp  to  find  Mr.  David  Capper  of  Van  Wert, 
Ohio,  who  had  come  to  see  his  son  John.  John  had  started  home 
on  furlough  and  they  had  passed  on  the  way.3 

January  8,  was  notable  because  that  day  the  great  railroad 
bridge  across  the  Green  River  was  completed.  The  whistle  of  the 

1,  2  and  3     Gleason's  Diary. 


54  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

first  engine  which  crossed  it  was  gretted  by  cheers  from  all  parts 
of  the  camp  and  we  thought  we  would  now  make  another  for 
ward  movement.  Some  of  the  companies  went  out  to  discharge 
their  guns.  "Neb."  Miner  was  on  guard  at  the  spring  and  arrested 
a  member  of  the  Thirty-second  Indiana  for  violation  of  some 
rule.  The  man  caused  some  amusement  by  his  protests  but 
"Neb."  held  him  at  the  point  of  his  bayonet  until  a  corporal  came 
and  took  him  to  the  colonel's  quarters.1 

January  9  and  10,  the  weather  was  cloudy  and  some  rain  was 
falling.  On  the  10th,  twenty  men  from  each  company  were  de 
tailed  to  work  on  intrenchments  near  the  railroad  bridge.  Ser 
geant  John  G.  Gregg  of  Company  C,  having  received  a  commis 
sion  as  second  lieutenant  was  assigned  to  duty  in  Company  H. 
Gleason,  who  was  a  member  of  the  latter  company,  says,  "To  say 
that  he  met  with  a  cool  reception  it  putting  it  rather  mild,  as  he 
was  almost  a  total  stranger  and  was  regarded  as  a  usurper  by 
both  officers  and  men." 

January  11,  the  monotony  of  our  camp  life  was  enlivened 
by  a  little  concert,  given  by  the  band  of  the  Fourteenth  Regulars 
on  request  of  General  McCook.  It  was  the  finest  band  in  our 
part  of  the  army  and  to  hear  it  was  a  delight.  In  their  repertoire 
was  "The  Last  Rose  of  Summer,"  which  was  played  with  unusual 
sweetness  and  pathos.  The  newspapers  reported  that  a  great 
Mississippi  expedition  started  yesterday. 

Sunday,  January  12,  was  unsettled  and  showery.  We  had  our 
usual  inspection  and  that  was  all.  January  13,  was  freezing  cold, 
with  snow,  and  orders  came  to  go  on  picket  the  next  morning. 

January  14,  the  regiment  was  again  on  picket  near  the  battle 
ground  of  December  17.  We  relieved  the  troops  on  the  picket 
line  at  4  P.  M.  and  found  that  they  had  provided  pretty  good 
quarters  for  the  reserve  by  building  a  shelter  of  cedar  boughs 
and  a  stone  fire  place  behind  a  hill  .where  we  could  have  a  small 
fire  without  its  being  seen  by  the  enemy.  Towards  morning,  how 
ever,  it  rained  and  the  cedar  boughs  did  not  prevent  the  men  on 
the  reserve  from  getting  drenched. 

January  15,  it  rained  constantly  and  we  were  very  uncom 
fortable.  We  were  relieved  by  the  Louisville  Legion  and  had  a 
very  muddy  march  back  to  camp  and  the  shelter  of  our  tents. 
January  16,  a  large  detail  from  the  regiment  was  sent  to  work 
on  intrenchments.  There  was  an  alarm  on  the  picket  line,  caused 
by  a  small  detachment  of  the  enemy  appearing  on  a  hill  over 
looking  our  camp,  but  they  made  no  demonstration  and  soon  dis 
appeared. 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


Six  MONTHS  OF  INACTION    AT  CAMP  NKVIX  55 

January  17,  just  after  noon,  there  was  a  general  alarm,  the 
long  roll  was  beaten,  and  the  brigade  hurriedly  fell  into  line.  It 
was  said  the  enemy  was  advancing  to  give  us  battle  and  our  hearts 
beat  high  with  the  prospect  of  an  engagement.  We  marched 
over  a  mile  in  mud  almost  knee  deep  and  crossing  the  river  were 
formed  in  line  of  battle.  After  waiting  quite  a  while  for  orders 
to  advance,  word  came  that  it  was  a  false  alarm  and  we  were 
marched  back  to  camp  much  to  everyone's  disgust.1  The  alarm 
was  caused  by  the  explosion  of  a  shell  on  our  picket  line.  Milton 
B.  Waters  of  Company  E  who  was  responsible  for  the  explosion 
and  the  innocent  cause  of  the  alarm,  thus  relates  the  incident : 

"The  river  bank  on  which  we  were  encamped  was  quite  high 
a  mile  or  more  from  the  river  on  the  east  side  and  low  between. 
Cotter's  battery  was  on  the  west  bank  and  had  been  shooting 
at  targets  on  the  hill  on  the  east  side,  which  was  just  outside  our 
picket  line.  A  day  or  two  after  they  had  been  practicing  target 
shooting  we  were  out  on  picket,  not  far  from  the  mark.  I  had  a 
curiosity  to  know  how  near  they  had  come  to  hitting  the  target 
and  after  being  relieved  at  noon,  took  a  piece  of  pork  and  a  hard 
tack  or  two  and  went  out  to  the  hill  to  investigate.  They  had 
never  hit  the  target  and  it  would  have  been  quite  dangerous  to 
have  been  within  ten  to  forty  rods  in  any  direction  from  it.  In 
looking  around  I  noticed  that  one  of  the  shells,  balls,  or  what 
not,  had  struck  a  large  flat  rock  had  glanced  and  hit  a  red  oak 
rail,  had  broken  it  and  had  ploughed  through  the  earth  and  small 
stones  a  distance  of  about  twelve  feet.  I  proceeded  to  excavate 
for  the  missile  and  finally  got  something  which  proved  later  to 
be  a  shell.  I  had  not  been  around  the  artillery  much  and  did  not 
know  a  percussion  from  a  fuse  shell.  It  was  very  muddy  but  I 
cleaned  it  off,  threw  it  against  rocks  and  trees,  but  no  good.  I 
then  took  it  to  Lieutenant  Carroll's  quarters,  where  he  was  eating 
dinner.  He  asked  me  what  I  had  and  I  said  I  didn't  know.  He 

looked  the  thing  over  and  handed  it  back  saying  'D d  if  I 

know  either.'  He  asked  me  what  I  was  going  to  do  with  it  and 
I  told  him  I  was  going  to  take  it  to  our  picket  post  and  show  it 
to  the  boys.  I  thought  I  would  build  a  fire  and  see  if  I  could  get 
it  dry  enough  to  be  of  any  good.  I  took  it  to  the  post  and  the 
boys  looked  it  over  and  decided  it  would  do  no  harm,  as  the 
powder  was  surely  wet.  I  told  them  I  would  soon  find  out 
whether  it  was  or  not,  so  I  went  about  one  hundred  feet  outside 
the  line,  built  a  fire  and  laid  the  shell  on  it.  Corporal  Charley 
Hall  said  you  had  better  come  away,  so  after  seeing  the  fire  was 
well  started  I  returned  to  the  post.  Corporal  Hall  said,  'that 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


56  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

thing  may  explode  and  kill  half  of  our  company'  and  I  began  to 
feel  serious  about  it.  I  decided  to  go  out  and  pull  the  shell  out 
of  the  fire  and  had  taken  about  five  steps,  when  it  exploded  with 
a  tremendous  report,  scattering  fire  and  fragments  in  every  di 
rection.  After  learning  that  no  one  was  hurt  all  set  to  work  to 
put  out  the  fire.  Presently,  five  or  six  mounted  officers  came 
galloping  up  and  one  of  them  wanted  to  know  what  had  hap 
pened.  No  one  said  a  word.  He  asked  again  and  still  no  one 
spoke.  He  then  said,  'Corporal,  if  you  do  not  tell  what  this  means 
I  will  have  your  whole  squad  arrested.'  The  Corporal  then  said 
'one  of  the  men  put  an  unexploded  shell  on  the  fire'.  The  of 
ficers  seemed  very  much  disgusted  and,  wheeling  their  horses, 
rode  back  as  fast  as  they  came.  When  we  looked  toward  camp 
we  saw  that  the  whole  river  bank  was  alive  with  soldiers, — in 
fantry,  cavalry  and  artillery, — which  had  fallen  into  line  ready 
for  battle.  I  thought  my  time  as  a  soldier  had  surely  ended. 
That  evening  about  4  o'clock,  General  Johnson,  our  brigade  com 
mander,  and  Colonel  Dickey,  who  were  making  the  rounds  on 
foot,  came  towards  our  post  and  we  got  quickly  into  line  to  re 
ceive  them.  They  saluted  us  and  passed  on,  but  Colonel  Dickey 
stopped,  turned  and  stroking  his  red  beard,  said,  'this  is  the  post 
on  which  they  have  the  artillery,'  and  that  was  the  last  we  heard 
of  it." 

January  18,  19  and  20,  there  was  no  unusual  occurrence. 
On  the  evening  of  the  20  there  was  a  rumor  that  we  were  to 
march  within  forty-eight  hours.  Gleason  says  this  was  good 
news,  as  every  one  had  grown  tired  of  the  camp.  The  morning 
of  January  21,  we  found  that  the  men  in  other  camps  had  been  up 
since  midnight  cooking  three  days  rations  out  of  five  drawn  the 
night  before.  This  certainly  looked  like  moving.  Orders  came  to 
go  on  picket  the  next  day  at  3  P.  M.  January  22,  we  had  another 
tour  of  picket  duty,  with  no  unusual  occurrence.  January  23,  we 
were  relieved  about  mid-afternoon  and  returned  to  camp.  Jan 
uary  24,  there  was  a  report  of  a  skirmish  three  miles  south  of  the 
river,  in  which  40  of  the  enemy  were  captured.1 

The  25,  26,  27,  28  and  29  days  of  January  were  barren  of 
incidents  worthy  of  record.  January  30,  the  bodies  of  General 
Zollicoffer  and  Colonel  Peyton,  who  had  been  killed  at  the  battle 
of  Mill  Springs  January  19,  were  brought  to  General  McCook's 
headquarters  to  be  sent  through  the  lines.  That  afternoon  the 
regiment  was  ordered  out  on  picket  duty  and  remained  on  post 
until  afternoon  of  the  31.  On  returning  to  camp  we  crossed  the 
river  on  the  railroad  bridge. 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


MOSES  R.  DICKEY 

The  First  Colonel  of  the  Regiment,  Serving  from  its  organization 
to  October  4,  1862. 


Six  MONTHS  OF  INACTION  AT  CAMP  NEVI.X  57 

The  first  six  days  of  February  passed  by  with  no  unusual 
event  or  rumor  to  disturb  the  now  painful  monotony  of  our  life 
at  Camp  Wood.  But  on  the  7th  news  came  that  our  troops  under 
General  Grant  had  assaulted  and  captured  Fort  Henry  on  the 
Tennessee  River.  This  news  gave  hope  that  we  would  soon  be 
called  on  to  do  something,  but  nearly  a  week  more  went  by  and 
we  still  lay  idle  in  Camp  Wood.  Our  inaction  of  six  months  at 
Camps  Nevin  and  Wood,  however,  was  soon  to  be  broken  and  the 
great  army  our  department  commander  had  collected  at  these 
places  was  to  be  put  into  motion,  not  of  his  own  volition,  but  be 
cause  other  troops  under  other  commanders  had  opened  the  way. 


Sig.  x 


CHAPTER  IV. 

FURTHER  DELAY LACK  OF  CO-OPERATION   BETWEEN   HALLECK  AND 

BUELL GENERAL   GRANT    FINALLY    OPENS    WAY    FOR    GENERAL 

BUELL'S  ADVANCE  BY  CAPTURE  OF  FORTS  HENRY  AND  DONEL- 
SON. 

During  the  period  of  which  this  chapter  treats,  Major  Gen 
eral  Geo.  B.  McClellan  was  general-in-chief  of  the  armies  of 
the  United  States.  Major  General  Henry  W.  Halleck  was  com 
mander  of  the  Department  of  Missouri,  which  included  in  its 
boundaries  that  part  of  Kentucky  west  of  the  Cumberland  and 
Tennessee  Rivers,  and  Brigadier  General  Don  Carlos  Buell  was 
in  command  of  the  Department  of  the  Ohio,  which  included  be 
sides  other  territory  that  part  of  Kentucky  east  of  the  above 
named  rivers,  and  the  state  of  Tennessee.  A  district  in  the  De 
partment  of  Missouri  had  been  created,  named  the  District  of 
Cairo,  which  included  that  part  of  Kentucky  west  of  the  Cum 
berland  River,  the  southern  part  of  Illinois  and  the  counties  of 
Missouri  south  of  Cape  Girardeau,  and  had  been  placed  under 
command  of  Brigadier  General  Ulysses  S.  Grant.1 

After  it  had  been  decided  to  disregard  Kentucky's  doubtful 
neutrality  and  send  U.  S.  troops  into  that  state  to  repel  its  threat 
ened  invasion  by  the  Confederate  armies,  they  were  sent  in  such 
numbers  that  the  Confederate  advance  was  soon  checked  and  an 
aggressive  campaign  was  proposed  which  had  for  its  object  the 
expulsion  of  the  Confederate  invaders  from  Kentucky  soil.  The 
too  tender  regard  by  the  Union  authorities  for  Kentucky's  neu 
trality  had  delayed  action  so  long  that  the  Confederates  had 
seized  Columbus  on  the  Mississippi  River,  defensible  points  on 
the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland  Rivers,  Bowling  Green  on  the 
Louisville  and  Nashville  Railroad  and  Cumberland  Ford  on  the 
river  of  that  name,  at  which  points  they  appeared  to  be  concen 
trating  large  numbers  of  troops.  President  Lincoln  and  his  cab 
inet,  for  strong  political  reasons, — and  for  military  reasons  al 
so, — were  very  desirous  of  sending  a  strong  force  into  East  Ten 
nessee  to  occupy  and  hold  that  region.  The  people  of  East  Ten 
nessee  were  known  to  be  loyal  to  the  Union.  Indeed,  a  rebellion 
against  Confederate  rule  had  been  started  there  and  had  been 
repressed  with  a  bloody  hand  and  there  was  a  wide  spread  senti 
ment  throughout  the  north,  that  the  loyal  people  there  should  be 
relieved  at  whatever  cost.  With  this  in  view  Brigadier  General 

1     W.  R.  R.  7-515. 


FURTHER  DELAY  AT  GREEN  RIVER  59 

George  H.  Thomas  was  sent  to  Southeastern  Kentucky  to  organ 
ize  a  force  to  drive  back  Confederate  General  Zollicoffer's  army 
and  open  communication  with  the  loyal  East  Tennesseeans.  Gen 
eral  McClellan  was  at  first  in  hearty  sympathy  with  such  move 
ment  and  in  numerous  letters  to  General  Buell  urged  it  on.1 
General  Buell,  however,  seems  to  have  been  indifferent  in  regard 
to  it  and  more  bent  on  maturing  some  great  plan  of  campaign, 
which  he  kept  to  himself.  To  all  suggestions  of  agressive  action 
he  seems  to  have  found  insurmountable  obstacles,  or  to  have 
urged  delay.  He  seems  to  have  feared  that  any  active  movement 
on  any  portion  of  his  line  would  interfere  with  his  grand  plan. 
It  will  be  remembered  that  on  December  11,  1861,  he  ordered 
General  McCook  to  withdraw  his  division  from  Green  River  and 
only  rescinded  the  order  when  the  latter  strongly  protested  that 
it  would  demoralize  his  troops  to  do  so.2 

December  17.  1861,  he  wrote  to  General  McClellan  that  any 
formidable  demonstration  against  Zolicoffer  would  only  harrass 
his,  Buell's,  troops  and  derange  his  plans  and  that  he  was  letting 
him  alone  for  the  present.3  What  those  plans  were  he  persistent 
ly  refused  to  disclose  even  to  General  McClellan,  the  general-in- 
chief,  whom  he  addressed  in  his  official  correspondence  as 
"My  dear  Friend".  In  a  letter  to  General  McClellan  dated  De 
cember  10,  1861,  evidently  in  reply  to  one  urging  forward  the 
movement  for  the  relief  of  East  Tennessee,  he  writes : 

"The  organization  of  the  division  at  Lebanon  has  been  with 
special  reference  to  the  object  which  you  have  so  much  at  heart, 
though  fortunately  it  is  one  which  suits  any  contingencies  which 
may  arise.  *  *  *  The  plans  which  I  have  in  view  em 
brace  that  fully,  but  the  details  and  the  final  determination,  while 
there  is  yet  time  to  watch  the  progress  of  circumstances  which 
might  affect  our  plans  vitally ;  I  think  I  should  lack  the  ordinary 
discretion  by  which  I  hope  to  retain  your  confidence,  if  I  did  not 
reserve."4 

That  is,  he  did  not  propose  to  reveal  to  his  dear  friend  and 
superior  commander  the  details  of  his  plans  until  he  got  ready. 
General  Thomas  who  was  expected  to  carry  out  the  plans  for  the 
relief  of  loyal  East  Tennessee  and  was  then  at  Lebanon  in  com 
mand  of  the  division  then  being  organized  for  that  purpose,  wrote 
to  General  Schoepf :  "General  Buell  has  not  communicated  any 
of  his  plans  to  me."5  This  secrecy  on  the  part  of  General  Buell 
as  to  his  plans,  while  it  may  have  been  satisfactory  to  General 
McClellan,  did  not  satisfy  the  other  military  authorities  at  Wash- 

1  W.  R.  R.  7-447,  450,  457,  468,  473.  4     W.  R.   R.   7-487. 

2  Page  49  ante.  5     W.  R.  R.  7-509. 

3  W.  R.  R.  7-501. 


60  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

ington.  The  adjutant  general  of  the  army,  it  seems,  asked  him 
categorically  what  his  plans  were,  to  which  inquiry  General  Buell 
replied:  "The  plan  which  I  propose  for  the  troops  here  is  one 
of  defense  on  the  east  and  of  invasion  on  the  south".1  This  so 
far  as  the  records  show,  was  the  extent  to  which  General  Buell 
revealed  his  plan.  It  was  to  be  "one  of  defense  on  the  east  and 
of  invasion  on  the  south",  and  by  this  declaration  it  must  be  in 
terpreted. 

General  Buell's  announcement  that  his  plan  was  one  of  de 
fense  only  on  the  east  was  bitterly  disappointing  to  the  military 
authorities  at  Washington,  who  did  not  like  to  give  up  the  idea 
of  an  aggressive  campaign  to  recover  East  Tennessee.  This  was 
made  known  to  General  Buell,  who  seems  to  have  conferred  with 
General  Thomas  in  regard  to  a  movement  to  be  conducted  against 
General  Zollicoffer,2  and  to  have  actually  given  orders  for  such 
a  movement.3  This  movement  it  appears  contemplated  an  attack 
on  General  Zollicoffer  and  if  such  attack  was  successful  an  at 
tempt  to  push  a  column  through  the  mountains  to  Knoxville. 
General  Thomas,  however,  anticipated  so  many  difficulties  in  the 
way  of  a  successful  march  to  Knoxville  that  he  suggested  to 
General  Buell,  whether,  if  they  were  successful  in  beating  Gen 
eral  Zollicoffer's  forces,  it  would  not  be  a  better  move  to  go  down 
the  Cumberland  River  toward  Nashville  carrying  his  stores  and 
ammunition  on  flat  boats  and  marching  his  troops  in  two  columns, 
one  on  either  side  of  the  river.4  This  movement  against  General 
Zollicoffer  and  ultimately  to  Knoxville  cannot  have  been  re 
garded  by  General  Buell  as  at  all  serious,  for  on  the  day  he  is 
sued  the  order  for  it,  (December  29,  1861),  he  wrote  to  General 
McClellan  in  answer  to  a  dispatch  received  from  him,  evidently 
about  the  movement : 

"I  intend  a  column  of  12,000  men  with  three  batteries  for 
East  Tennessee ;  but  as  I  have  telegraphed  you,  it  is  impossible  to 
fix  a  time  for  it  to  be  there,  so  much  depends  on  circumstances 
which  may  arise  in  the  meantime."5  Finally,  on  January  5, 
1862,  in  answer  to  a  telegram  from  President  Lincoln,  asking  if 
arms  had  gone  forward  for  East  Tennessee  and  what  the  progress 
and  condition  of  the  movement  in  that  direction  was,  he  states 
that  his  judgment  from  the  first  had  been  decidedly  against  such 
movement,  if  it  should  render  doubtful  a  movement  against 
Bowling  Green  and  Columbus.6 

This  dispatch  was  very  disappointing  to  the  authorities  at 
Washington.  President  Lincoln  in  his  patient  kindly  way  an 
swered  it  next  day,  January  6,  saying: 

1  W.  R.  R.   7-511.  3     W.  R.  R.   7-o22.  5     W.  R.  R.   7-521. 

2  W.  R.  R.  7-519.  4     W.  R.  R.   7-524.  6     W.  R.  R.   7-530-531. 


FUHTHEK  DELAY  AT  GKEEX  RIVER  61 

"Your  dispatch  of  yesterday  has  been  received  and  it  disap 
points  and  distresses  me.  I  have  shown  it  to  General  McClellan 
who  says  he  will  write  you  today.  I  am  not  competent  to  criticize 
your  views  and  therefore,  what  I  offer  is  merely  in  justification 
of  myself.  Of  the  two,  I  would  rather  have  a  point  on  the  rail 
road  south  of  Cumberland  Gap  than  Nashville — first,  because  it 
cuts  a  great  artery  of  the  enemy's  communications,  which  Nash 
ville  does  not ;  and  secondly,  because  it  is  in  the  midst  of  a  loyal 
people,  who  would  rally  around  it,  while  Nashville  is  not.  Again 
I  cannot  see  why  the  movement  on  East  Tennessee  would  not  be 
a  diversion  in  your  favor  rather  than  a  disadvantage,  assuming 
that  a  movement  against  Nashville  is  the  main  object.  But  my 
distress  is  that  our  friends  in  East  Tennessee  are  being  hanged 
and  driven  to  despair,  and  even  now  I  fear  are  thinking  of  taking 
rebel  arms  for  the  sake  of  personal  protection.  In  this  we  lose 
the  most  valuable  stake  we  have  in  the  south.  My  dispatch,  to 
which  yours  is  an  answer  was  sent  with  the  knowledge  of  Senator 
Johnson  and  Representative  Maynard  of  East  Tennessee,  and 
they  will  be  upon  me  to  know  the  answer  which  I  cannot  safely 
show  them.  They  would  despair,  probably  resign  to  go  and  save 
their  families  some  how  or  die  with  them.  I  do  not  intend  this 
to  be  an  order  in  any  sense,  but  merely,  as 'intimated  before,  to 
show  you  the  grounds  of  my  anxiety."1 

General  McClellan  replied  to  the  telegram  in  a  confidential 
note  of  date  January  6,  1862,  in  which  he  said: 

"I  was  extremely  sorry  to  learn  from  your  telegram  to  the 
President  that  you  had  from  the  beginning  attached  little  or  no 
importance  to  a  movement  in  East  Tennessee.  I  had  not  so  un 
derstood  your  views,  and  it  develops  a  radical  difference  between 
your  views  and  my  own  which  I  deeply  regret.  My  own  general 
plans  for  the  prosecution  of  the  war  make  the  speedy  occupation 
of  East  Tennessee  and  its  lines  of  railway  matters  of  absolute 
necessity.  Bowling  Green  and  Nashville  are  in  that  connection 
of  very  secondary  importance  at  the  present  moment.  My  own 
advance  cannot,  according  to  my  present  views,  be  made  until 
your  troops  are  solidly  established  in  the  eastern  portion  of  Ten 
nessee.  If  this  is  not  possible,  a  complete  and  prejudicial  change 
in  my  own  plans  become  absolutely  necessary.  Interesting  as 
Nashville  may  be  to  the  Louisville  interests,  it  strikes  me  that  its 
possession  is  of  very  secondary  importance  in  comparison  with 
the  immense  results  that  would  arise  from  the  adherence  to  our 
cause  of  the  masses  in  East  Tennessee,  West  North  Carolina, 
South  Carolina,  North  Georgia  and  Alabama, — results  that  I  feel 

i   w.  R.  R. 


62  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

assured  would  ere  long  flow  from  the  movement  I  allude  to. 
Halleck  from  his  own  account  will  not  soon  be  in  a  condition  to 
support  properly  a  movement  up  the  Cumberland.  Why  not 
make  the  movement  independently  of  and  without  awaiting  for 
that?"1 

General  Buell  answered  this  dispatch  January  13,  justifying 
his  course,  and  saying  in  substance  that  he  would  include  in  his 
movement  against  Bowling  Green  one  in  the  direction  of  East 
Tennessee ;  that  his  army  had  suddenly  been  increased  from  70,- 
000  to  90,000  men,  that  it  had  been  organized  into  twenty-three 
brigades  and  six  divisions,  but  with  only  sixteen  batteries ;  that 
his  army  ought  to  be  increased  to  eight  divisions,  and  his  artillery 
nearly  doubled,  say  in  all  120,000  men;  then  three  divisions 
would  be  required  for  East  Tennessee,  three  in  front  of  Bowling 
Green,  one  at  Columbia  and  Jamestown  and  one  in  reserve — and 
added  a  postscript  saying: 

"The  plan  of  any  colonel,  whoever  he  is,  for  ending  the  war 
by  entering  East  Tennessee  with  his  5000  men  light — that  is,  with 
pack  mules  and  three  batteries  of  artillery  i.  e. — while  the  rest  of 
the  armies  look- on,  though  it  has  some  sensible  potent  ideas,  is  in 
the  aggregate  simply  ridiculous."2 

General  Buell  in  furtherance  of  his  plan  "of  defense  on  the 
east  and  invasion  on  the  south"  on  December  17,  1861,  had  organ 
ized  a  brigade  for  service  in  extreme  eastern  Kentucky.  Gen 
eral  Garfield  had  been  placed  in  command  of  it,3  and  instructed 
to  operate  against  a  Confederate  force  then  organizing  under 
Humphrey  Marshall. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  at  the  very  beginning  of  opera 
tions  in  Kentucky,  General  Grant  had  the  foresight  to  seize 
and  hold  Paducah  at  the  mouth  of  the  Tennessee  River  and 
Smithland  at  the  mouth  of  the  Cumberland.  Their  tremendous 
importance  as  bases  of  military  operations  was  perhaps  not  ap 
preciated  at  the  time.  On  December  23,  General  Grant  by  di 
rection  of  General  Halleck  assumed  command  of  the  newly  des 
ignated  "District  of  Cairo",  with  boundaries  as  stated  at  the  be 
ginning  of  this  chapter,  having  under  his  command,  besides  other 
troops,  all  the  troops  that  were  there  or  might  thereafter  be  sta 
tioned  along  the  banks  on  both  sides  of  the  Ohio  River  east  of 
Caledonia  and  to  the  mouth  of  the  Cumberland.4  The  aggregate 
present  for  duty  of  the  troops  under  his  command  December  31, 
1861  was  14,374,  infantry,  cavalry  and  artillery,  with  12  pieces 
of  field  artillery.5  His  duties  appear  to  have  been  to  protect  the 

1  W.  R.  R.   7-531.  4     W.  R.  R.   7-515. 

2  W.  R.  R.   7-549.  5     W.   R.  R.   7-325. 

3  W.  R.  R.   7-503. 


PURTHEK  DELAY  AT  GKEEX  RIVEU  63 

posts  at  the  mouths  of  the  rivers  above  named  against  reported 
advances  of  the  enemy,  with  no  particular  aggressive  plan  of 
campaign  in  view.  General  Halleck  with  headquarters  at  Saint 
Louis  appears  to  have  been  mainly  occupied  with  efforts  to  drive 
the  Confederate  armies  out  of  Missouri  and  save  that  state  to  the 
Union,  and  to  have  given  little  attention  to  that  part  of  his  depart 
ment  included  in  General  Grant's  district.  He  was  slow  to  real 
ize,  and  perhaps  did  not  realize,  that  General  Grant  held  the  key 
to  the  military  situation,  until  the  tireless  activity  of  that  officer 
and  his  aggressive  fighting  qualities  made  it  apparent. 

Up  to  the  close  of  the  year  1861  there  had  been  practically 
no  co-operation  between  Generals  Halleck  and  Buell.  General 
Grant  on  assuming  command  of  the  district  above  named  had 
sent  to  General  Buell  a  copy  of  the  order  defining  the  limits  of 
his  command  and  expressed  a  desire  to  co-operate  with  him  as 
far  as  practicable,  especially  in  suppressing  the  smuggling  along 
the  Ohio  River.1  Strange  to  relate,  except  this  letter  of  General 
Grant,  there  had  been  no  suggestion  of  co-operation  from  either 
general  Halleck  or  General  Buell. 

About  the  close  of  1861  General  McClellan  was  taken  sick 
and  President  Lincoln,  it  seems,  for  a  time  at  least,  took  upon 
himself  the  active  duties  of  commander-in  chief  of  all  the 
armies  of  the  Union.  On  December  31,  he  sent  a  dispatch  to 
General  Halleck  saying:  "General  McClellan  is  sick.  Are  Gen 
eral  Buell  and  yourself  in  concert.  When  he  moves  on  Bowling 
Green,  what  hinders  it  being  reinforced  from  Columbus.  A  sim 
ultaneous  movement  by  you  on  Columbus  might  prevent  it".2  At 
the  same  time  he  sent  a  similar  despatch  to  General  Buell.  To 
this  despatch  Halleck  replied  saying  he  had  never  received  a  word 
from  General  Buell  and  General  Buell  replied  saying  there  was 
no  arrangement  between  General  Halleck  and  himself.3 

At  the  beginning  of  the  year  1862  the  entire  north  had  grown 
impatient  at  the  inaction  of  the  Union  armies,  especially  that 
under  the  command  of  General  Buell.  Hundreds  and  thousands 
of  young  men  had  volunteered  to  maintain  the  Union.  They  had 
been  organized  into  regiments  of  infantry  and  cavalry  and  bat 
teries  of  artillery,  equipped  and  supplied  with  munitions  of  war 
at  lavish  expense  and  had  been  sent  to  the  camps  in  the  south. 
They  had  there  been  organized  into  brigades  and  divisions,  had 
been  trained  and  -drilled  for  months,  and  yet  nothing  had  been 
done  to  check  the  growing  power  of  the  rebellion.  The  same  feel 
ing  pervaded  the  rank  and  file  of  the  army,  who  were  eager  to  be 

1  W.  R.  R.   7-516.  3     W.  R.  R.   7-526. 

2  W.  R.  R.   7-524. 


64  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

led  against  the  enemy.  The  long  period  of  inaction,  in  some  cases, 
began  to  injuriously  affect  the  morale  of  the  men,  who  would 
often  say  to  themselves  and  to  each  other  "what  are  we  here 
for"?  Captain  Carroll  in  a  letter  to  his  wife  dated  January  18, 
1862,  says:  "We  have  been  Jying  here  perfectly  idle  for  over 
two  months,  with  no  greater  prospects  ahead  than  when  we  first 
came,  while  the  hundreds  and  thousands  of  noble  and  loyal  Ten- 
nesseeans  with  uplifted  hands  are  imploring  assistance  and  pro 
tection  from  the  despotic  rule  to  which  they  are  subjected.  At 
least  one  hundred  thousand  well  armed  and  equipped  men  in  this 
department,  who  are  enthusiastically  anxious  to  be  led  against 
the  enemy,  are  kept  back  and  doomed  to  what  is  styled  by  mili 
tary  men,  masterly  inactivity.  It  may  all  turn  out  for  the  better, 
but  I  must  say  this  delay  looks  to  me  very  unreasonable.  *  *  * 
We  are  here  conducting  the  war  on  the  principle  that  no  one 
must  be  hurt.  One  of  the  boys  says  'If  we  ever  do  make  an  ad 
vance  upon  the  rebs,  I  would  not  be  surprised  if  they  would  be 

d n  fools  enough  to  shoot  at  us, — with  balls  at  that, — and  if 

we  don't  want  our  bean-dippers  taken  we  had  better  lay  low  and 
keep  dark'." 

In  another  letter  to  his  wife  dated  January  27,  1862,  alluding 
to  the  battle  of  Mill  Springs,  he  says : 

"Nothing  has  happened  since  the  commencement  of  the  war 
more  calculated  to  arouse  the  spirits  of  the  soldiers,  that  were 
drooping  under  their  enforced  inactivity,  than  this  brilliant  vic 
tory.  *  *  *  We  are  beginning  to  feel  that  there  is  yet 
some  life  in  our  army,  and  that  something  will  be  done  in  a  short 
time  to  assure  the  world  that  we  are  really  determined  to  put 
down  the  rebellion.  To  the  soldiers  nothing  is  more  discouraging 
than  inactivity  and  nothing  more  corrupting  than  idleness  in 
camp.  If  we  could  only  be  kept  on  the  move  all  the  time,  it 
would  improve  our  present  condition  wonderfully.  Although 
we  have  been  fortunate  in  escaping  sickness,  as  compared  with 
other  regiments  here,  nevertheless  we  have  over  two  hundred 
sick,  which  all  results  from  being  compelled  to  remain  for  so  long 
a  time  inactive  in  our  muddy  and  disagreeable  camps." 

The  general  sentiment  in  favor  of  action  on  the  part  of  the 
troops  became  so  pronounced  that,  patient  as  President  Lincoln 
was,  he  felt  compelled  to  take  the  burden  and  responsibility 
of  urging  an  advance.  The  absolute  lack  of  co-operation  be 
tween  Generals  Halleck  and  Buell  in  the  military  operations  in 
Kentucky  must  have  been  a  surprise  to  him.  General  Buell 
protested  that  he  expected  General  McClellan  to  arrange  for 
such  co-operation,  and  General  Halleck  frankly  and  bluntly 


FURTHER  DELAY  AT  CREEX  RIVER  65 

stated  that  he  was  not  ready  for  it,  and  would  not  be  for  weeks. 1 
But  even  these  conditions  were  not  thought  sufficient  excuse  for 
any  further  delay,  and  on  January  3,  1862,  General  McClellan 
at  the  request  of  President  Lincoln  sent  a  despatch  to  General 
Halleck  urging  him  to  send  an  expedition  up  the  Cumberland  to 
act  in  concert  with  General  Buell,  who  was  expected  to  move 
against  Bowling  Green.2  The  President  had  written  General 
Halleck  a  letter  to  the  same  purport,  and  on  January  6,  1862  the 
latter  answered  it  saying  he  did  not  have  sufficient  force  to  war 
rant  him  in  sending  such  an  expedition ;  that  he  was  "in  the 
condition  of  a  carpenter  who  is  required  to  build  a  bridge  with 
a  dull  ax,  a  broken  saw  and  rotten  timber",  and  closed  his  letter 
by  further  saying  that  if  it  was  intended  that  Buell  should  move 
on  Bowing  Green  while  another  column  moved  from  Cairo  or 
Paducah  on  Columbus  or  Camp  Beauregard,  it  "would  be  a  rep 
etition  of  the  same  strategic  error  which  produced  the  disaster 
at  Bull  Run."  The  patient  President  folded  the  letter  and  wrote 
on  it  the  following  indorsement : 

"The  within  is  a  copy  of  a  letter  just  received  from  General 
Halleck.  It  is  exceedingly  discouraging.  As  every  where  else 
nothing  can  be  done."3 

"January  10,  1862".  "A.  Lincoln". 

Notwithstanding  this  discouraging  letter,  however,  on  the 
same  day  it  was  written  General  Halleck  sent  a  letter  to  General 
Grant  saying  he  wished  him  to  make  a  demonstration  in  force 
from  Paducah  on  Mayfield  and  Murray  and  threaten  Camp 
Beauregard,  in  order  to  prevent  Confederate  troops  from  being 
sent  from  the  latter  place  and  Columbus  to  reinforce  General 
Buckner  at  Bowling  Green.4  The  next  day,  January  7,  General 
Halleck  asked  General  Buell  to  designate  a  day  for  such  demon 
stration.  Also  on  January  7,  1862,  President  Lincoln  telegraphed 
Buell  to  name  as  early  a  day  as  he  safely  could  on  or  before  which 
he  could  be  ready  to  move  southward  in  co-operation  with  General 
Halleck. 

It  does  not  appear  that  General  Buell  paid  any  attention  to 
General  Halleck's  telegram  of  January  7,  for  on  January  10, 
General  Halleck  again  telegraphed  him  saying  that  the  troops  at 
Cairo  and  Paducah  were  ready  to  move,  and  again  asked  him  to 
fix  a  day  for  the  demonstration.5  General  Buell,  it  seems  also 
paid  no  attention  to  this  dispatch,  and  January  11,  1862,  General 
Halleck  telegraphed  to  General  Grant  that  he  could  hear  nothing 

1     W.  R.  R.  7-n2f5-527.  4     W.  R.   R.   7-533-534. 

9,     «'    T?    T?    7- ^ 07-528.  5     W.  R.  R.  7-543. 

3     W.  R.  R.   7-533. 


66  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

from  General  Buell,  and  that  he.  General  Grant,  could  tix  his  own 
time  for  the  advance.1 

General  Grant  on  January  8,  received  General  Halleck's  di 
rections  for  such  demonstration  and  the  same  day  telegraphed 
that  preparations  had  been  made  immediately  for  such  advance.2 
But  on  January  9,  he  telegraphed  that  a  dense  fog  made  it  im 
possible  to  cross  the  river  and  that  the  movement  would  be  de 
ferred  for  a  day.3  January  10,  General  Halleck  telegraphed,  de 
laying  the  movement  until  further  orders,  but  on  January  12, 
General  Grant  reported  to  General  Halleck  that  the  movement 
had  already  been  commenced  before  receipt  of  his  telegram,  and 
that  it  would  be  demoralizing  to  recall  the  troops  already  in  mo 
tion.4  So  the  demonstration  was  made  as  ordered  and  had  not 
only  the  result  hoped  for,  of  preventing  Confederate  troops  being 
sent  from  Columbus  and  Camp  Beauregard  to  Bowling  Green, 
but  the  further  result  of  causing  other  Confederate  troops  which 
were  intended  to  reinforce  General  Buckner  to  be  sent  to  Colum 
bus  and  points  on  the  Cumberland  and  Tennessee  Rivers.5 

While  these  activities  on  the  part  of  Generals  Halleck  and 
Grant  were  going  on,  efforts  were  made  to  get  General  Buell  to 
begin  a  movement  against  the  enemy  in  his  front.  He  pleaded  in 
sufficient  forces,  lack  of  transportation  and  other  excuses  for 
further  delay.  January  13,  General  McClellan  wrote  to  him  say 
ing  that  in  response  to  his  telegram  six  more  batteries  of  artillery 
had  been  sent  to  him,  and  that  two  more  would  be  ordered  next 
day,  that  General  Meigs,  the  quartermaster  general,  had  sent  him 
400  more  wagons,  which  he  had  made  requisition  for,  and  that 
if  these  were  not  enough  he  could  hire  private  teams  or  seize 
them,  and  that  Ohio  could  send  him  five  or  six  new  regiments. 
In  the  same  letter  General  McClellan  stated  that  the  pressure  for 
an  advance  was  so  strong  that  it  seemed  absolutely  necessary  to 
make  a  movement  on  East  Tennessee  at  once.6  This  letter,  it 
appears,  had  the  result  that  General  Thomas  was  ordered  for 
ward  against  General  Zollicoffer.  But  as  yet  there  seemed  to  be 
little  hope  of  an  early  forward  movement  against  Bowling 
Green. 

In  the  meantime  the  Union  people  of  the  country  were 
cheered  by  minor  successes  of  some  of  the  forces  in  the  Depart 
ment  of  the  Ohio.  January  10,  1862,  General  Garfield  attacked 
the  forces  of  Humphrey  Marshall  at  the  forks  of  Middle  Creek 
in  Eastern  Kentucky  and  completely  routed  them.7 

1  W.  R.  K.  7-544.  5  W.  R.  R.  7-565. 

2  W  R.  R.  7-537.  6  W.  R.  R.  7-547. 

3  W.  R.  R.  7-540.  7  W.  R.  R.  7-29. 

4  W.  R.  R.  7-545. 


FURTHER  DELAY  AT  CKEEX  RIVER  67 

A  more  notable  engagement  took  place  January  19,  at 
Logan's  Cross  Roads,  Kentucky,  afterwards  known  as  the  battle 
of  Mill  Springs.  It  seems  that  General  Thomas  was  about  to 
form  a  junction  of  his  forces  near  Columbia  with  those  of  Gen 
eral  Schoepf  at  Somerset  with  a  view  to  a  combined  attack  on 
General  Zollicoffer,  whose  forces  were  posted  at  Mill  Springs 
and  Beach  Grove  on  opposite  sides  of  the  Cumberland  River. 
General  Zollicoffer  learning  of  such  movement  decided  to  attack 
General  Thomas's  column  while  it  was  moving  across  his  front 
and  did  so  on  the  morning  of  January  19.  He  was  met  by  the 
Ninth  Ohio,  Second  Minnesota,  Tenth  Indiana  and  Fourth  Ken 
tucky  Volunteers  and  Batteries  B  and  C,  First  Ohio  Light  Ar 
tillery,1  when  a  sharp  engagement  took  place  in  which  General 
Zollicoffer  was  killed  by  Colonel  Speed  S.  Fry  of  the  Fourth 
Kentucky  Volunteers  and  his  forces  completely  routed.  Other 
troops  coming  up,  the  routed  enemy  was  pursued  to  Mill  Springs 
where  it  abandoned  its  intrenchments  and  12  pieces  of  artillery 
and  caissons,  a  large  amount  of  small  arms  and  ammunition,  150 
wagons,  1000  horses  and  mules,  and  a  large  amount  of  commis- 
cary  stores  and  camp  equipage.2 

The  defeat  of  General  Zollicoffer's  army  opened  the  way  for 
an  almost  unobstructed  advance  into  East  Tennessee,3  and  Gen 
eral  Buell  gave  orders  to  follow  up  the  victory.4  General 
Thomas,  however,  insisted  that  the  roads  were  almost  impassable, 
that  it  would  be  extremely  difficult  to  get  forage  for  his  animals 
and  again  asked  permission  to  move  his  forces  down  the  Cum 
berland  River  and  co-operate  with  the  main  army  against  Bow 
ling  Green.5  On  January  27,  1862,  General  Buell  reported  to 
Adjutant  General  Thomas,  U.  S.  A.  that  any  further  advance  be 
yond  Somerset,  Ky.,  into  East  Tennessee  was  impossible,  that 
he  had  put  a  column  in  motion  on  the  Cumberland  Gap  route, 
but  did  not  expect  it  to  penetrate  the  state.6  And  there  the  move 
ment  for  the  relief  of  East  Tennessee  ended. 

Up  to  this  time  all  effort  on  the  part  of  the  authorities  at 
Washington  to  get  General  Buell  to  fix  a  time  for  an  advance 
against  the  enemy  at  Bowling  Green  had  failed.  Notwithstand 
ing  large  reinforcements  which  were  being  sent  to  him  and  the 
demonstration  before  described  in  his  aid,  he  seemed  unable 
to  move.  He  seemed  to  be  holding  back  until  all  his  troops  could 
be  seasoned  and  thoroughly  trained  and  until  he  had  an  army 
large  enough  to  move  without  doubt  of  success.  He  constantly 
magnified  the  numbers  of  the  enemy  in  his  front  and  minimized 

1  W.  R.  R.  7-77.  3     W.  R.  R.  7-563.  5     W.  R.  R.  7-563. 

2  W.  R.  R.  7-81.  4     W.  R.  R.  7-562.  6     W.  R.  R.  7-568. 


68  FIFTEENTH  Omo  VOLUNTEERS   AND  CAMPAIGNS 

his  own.  In  response  to  a  call  by  the  adjutant  general  at  Wash 
ington  for  a  report  of  the  troops  under  his  command,  he  reported 
as  follows: 

"Infantry  present  for  duty  and  fit  for  the  field,  41,563;  In 
fantry  present,  raw  not  fit  for  the  field,  20,303  ;  Cavalry  present 
for  duty,  fit  for  the  field  2,549 ;  cavalry  present,  raw  or  not  or 
ganized  5,251 ;  artillery  present  for  duty  and  fit  for  the  field, 
2,038,  108  guns ;  artillery  present,  raw  or  not  organized,  708,  40 
guns.  In  these  statements  the  sick  and  absent  are  not  included."1 
In  other  words  he  deducted  from  his  army  26,262  able  bodied 
infantry,  cavalry  and  artillery,  all  armed,  with  40  pieces  of  ar 
tillery,  because  they  were  not  as  well  drilled  as  he  thought  they 
ought  to  be,  as  an  excuse  for  his  inaction,  forgetting  that  the 
enemy's  troops  were  probably  as  ill  trained  as  his  own.  He  also 
magnified  the  obstacles  to  be  overcome.  There  was  always  "a 
lion  in  the  way."  But  light  was  to  break  in  unexpected  quarters 
and  he  was  to  be  saved  for  the  moment  from  the  trouble  of  mov 
ing  against  the  enemy  with  untrained  troops.  This  was  to  be  done 
by  another  army,  smaller  and  as  ill  trained  as  his  own,  with  little 
or  no  aid  from  him. 

During  the  demonstration  made  by  General  Grant  to  prevent 
Confederate  troops  being  sent  from  Camp  Beauregard  and  Co 
lumbus  to  reinforce  the  armies  opposing  General  Buell  at  Bow 
ling  Green,  General  Charles  F.  Smith,  one  of  General  Grant's 
subordinate  commanders,  had  gone  up  the  Tennessee  River  on 
the  Lexington  with  Flag  Officer  A.  H.  Foote  to  a  point  near  Fort 
Henry,  had  looked  it  over  and  had  reported  to  General  Grant 
that  he  thought  two  iron  clad  gun  boats  could  make  short  work  of 
it.2  General  Grant  several  weeks  before  had  become  satisfied 
that  a  movement  up  the  Tennessee  River  and  the  occupation  of 
Forts  Henry  and  Donelson  would  compel  the  evacuation  by  the 
Confederates  of  the  entire  state  of  Kentucky.  He  was  so  deeply 
convinced  of  it  that  he  asked  permission  of  General  Halleck  to 
call  on  him  in  person  and  lay  the  matter  before  him.  General 
Halleck  permitted  him  to  call,  received  him  coldly  and  when  he 
presented  his  plan  for  such  movement,  denounced  it  as  preposter 
ous.3  When,  however,  the  plan  was  approved  by  so  able  a  gen 
eral  as  Chas.  F.  Smith,  General  Grant  talked  it  over  with  Flag 
Officer  Foote,  and  on  January  28,  1862  telegraphed  to  General 
Halleck  from  Cairo,  Illinois.  "With  permission  I  will  take  Fort 
Henry  and  establish  and  hold  a  large  camp  there."4  January  29, 
he  followed  up  this  dispatch  with  another  describing  the  pro- 

1  W.  R.  R.  7-563.  3     Grant's  Memoirs. 

2  W.  R.  R.  7-561.  4     W.  R.  R.  7-121. 


FURTHER  DELAY  AT  GREEX  RIVER  69 

posed  movement  more  in  detail,  and  January  30,  General  Halleck 
telegraphed  him  to  take  and  hold  the  place.1 

Some  one  whom  General  Buell  describes  as  "an  intelligent  and 
well  informed  person  I  have  at  Paducah,"  sent  to  him  a  report  of 
General  Smith's  reconnoissance  of  Fort  Henry  and  of  his  ex 
pressed  opinion  that  it  could  be  taken,  and  on  January  30,  he  for 
warded  such  information  to  Generals  McClellan  and  Halleck, 
and  said  that  the  destruction  of  the  bridges  and  boats  on  the 
Cumberland  and  Tennessee  Rivers,  was  an  object  the  importance 
of  which  could  not  be  over-rated.2  The  suggestion,  however, 
came  too  late,  for  on  that  very  day  General  Halleck  had  tele 
graphed  to  General  Buell  that  he  had  ordered  an  advance  on  Fort 
Henry  and  Dover  and  that  it  would  be  made  immediately.  Gen 
eral  Buell  at  once  wanted  to  know  General  Halleck's  plans  and 
January  31,  wrote  or  telegraphed  him  asking  if  he  considered 
active  co-operation  essential  to  success;  if  so,  each  should  know 
the  plans  of  the  other,  but  that  it  would  be  several  days  before  he, 
Buell,  could  seriously  engage  the  enemy.3  To  this  General  Hal 
leck  replied  February  1,  saying  that  co-operation  at  that  time  was 
not  essential  but  that  if  he,  Buell,  would  send  his  plans  he  would 
try  to  assist  him.4 

General  Buell  seems  to  have  become  greatly  interested  in 
the  movement  against  Fort  Henry  and  Dover,  and  on  February  3, 
expressed  a  fear  that  General  Grant  could  not  hold  both  points 
with  the  troops  he  had.  He  also  encouraged  General  Halleck  by 
telling  him  that  he  had  best  count  on  meeting  a  reinforcement  of 
10,000  Confederate  troops  from  Bowling  Green,  besides  fifteen 
regiments  General  Beauregard  was  said  to  be  bringing  from  Vir 
ginia.5  When  on  February  5,  General  Halleck  telegraphed  him 
saying  the  advance  column — twenty-three  regiments — was  mov 
ing  up  the  Tennessee  and  asking  if  he  could  not  make  a  diversion 
in  their  favor  by  threatening  Bowling  Green,  he  answered  "that 
his  position  did  not  admit  a  diversion,  that  his  progress  would 
be  slow  and  that  it  would  be  twelve  days  before  he  could  be  in 
front  of  Bowling  Green."6  General  Halleck  at  once  telegraphed 
General  McClellan  the  report  that  10,000  men  had  left  Bowling 
Green  to  reinforce  Fort  Henry,  and  that  officer  at  once  asked 
General  Buell  if  he  could  assist  General  Halleck  by  making  a 
demonstration  against  Bowling  Green.  To  General  McClellan's 
dispatch  General  Buell  replied  saying: 

"Bowling  Green  is  secure  from  any  immediate  apprehension 
of  attack  by  being  strongly  fortified  behind  a  river,  by  obstruc 
tions  between  us  (40  miles)  and  by  the  condition  of  the  roads 

1  W  R.  R.  7-121.  3     W.  R.  R.  7-.r>74.  5     W.  R.  R.  7-5PO. 

2  W.  R.  R.  7-573-574.  4     W.  R.  R.  7-576.  6     W.  R.  R.  7-583. 


70  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

themselves,  can  only  be  threatened  with  heavy  artillery.  No 
demonstration,  therefore  is  practicable.  I  will  send  him  a 
brigade."1 

While  these  telegrams  were  flying  General  Grant  with  the 
forces  he  had  was  rapidly  moving  against  Fort  Henry. 

It  seems  to  have  suddenly  dawned  on  Generals  McClellan, 
Halleck  and  Buell  that  General  Grant's  movement  was  one  of 
tremendous  significance  and  importance.  February  6,  Halleck 
telegraphed  to  General  McClellan : 

"If  you  can  give  me,  in  addition  to  what  I  have  in  this  de 
partment  10,000  men,  I  will  take  Fort  Henry,  cut  the  enemy's 
line  and  paralyze  Columbus.  Give  me  25,000  and  I  will  threaten 
Nashville  and  cut  off  railroad  communication,  so  as  to  force  the 
enemy  to  abandon  Bowling  Green  without  a  battle."2 

General  Buell,  on  the  night  of  February  6,  was  at  his 
headquarters  in  Louisville,  probably  meditating  over  General 
McClellan's  dispatches  of  the  day,  suggesting  why,  if  the  roads  in 
his  front  were  so  bad,  he  would  not  better  throw  all  his  available 
forces  on  Fort  Henry  and  Donelson,  make  that  his  main  line  of 
operations  and  go  there  in  person.  At  midnight  he  sent  the  fol 
lowing  telegram  to  General  McClellan: 

"This  whole  move,  right  in  its  strategical  bearing,  but  com 
menced  by  General  Halleck  without  appreciation — preparative  or 
concert — has  now  become  of  vast  magnitude.  I  was  myself  think 
ing  of  a  change  of  the  line  to  support  it  when  I  received  your  dis 
patch.  It  will  have  to  be  made  in  the  face  of  50,000  if  not  60,000 
men,  and  is  hazardous.  I  will  answer  definitely  in  the  morning."3 

While  Generals  McClellan,  Halleck  and  Buell  were  awak 
ing  to  the  stupendous  significance  and  importance  of  the  move 
ment  against  Fort  Henry  and  were  sending  the  telegrams  of 
February  6,  1862,  above  quoted  or  mentioned,  General  Grant  had 
invested  the  place  and  compelled  its  surrender.  He,  too,  sent  a 
dispatch  dated  February  6,  1862,  which  reads  as  follows: 
"Headquarters  District  of  Cairo" 

"Fort  Henry,  February  6,  1862" 

"Fort  Henry  is  ours.  The  gun  boats  silenced  the  batteries 
before  the  investment  was  completed.  I  think  the  garrison  must 
have  commenced  the  retreat  last  night.  Our  cavalry  followed,  finding 
two  guns  abandoned  in  the  retreat.  I  shall  take  and  destroy  Fort 
Donelson  on  the  8th  and  return  to  Fort  Henry." 

"U.  S.  GRANT," 

"MAJOR  GENERAL  H.  W.  HALLECK,"  "Brigadier  General."* 

Saint  Louis,  Mo." 

The  event  was  startling  to  the  triumvirate  of  great  generals, 
above  named.  While  they  were  writing  and  telegraphing  about 

1  W.  R.  R.  7-584.  3     W.  R.  R.  7-587-588. 

2  W.  R.  R.  7-587.  4     W.  R.  R.  7-124. 


FURTHER  DELAY  AT  GKEEX  RIVER  71 

it,  considering  its  hazards  and  conferring  about  reinforcements 
necessary  to  make  the  movement  successful,  General  Grant  had 
gone  ahead  with  his  little  army  of  15,000  men,  had  taken  Fort 
Henry  and  was  moving  against  Fort  Donalson.  General  Halleck 
must  have  recalled  how  he  had  denounced  the  movement  as  pre 
posterous  when  General  Grant  first  proposed  it,  but  that  did  not 
prevent  him  from  receiving  the  congratulations  of  General  Mc- 
Cellan  and  Buell  and  taking  the  larger  share  of  the  honor  and 
glory  of  the  achievement. 

General  Buell  could  ill  conceal  his  chagrin  that  a  subordinate 
commander  should  win  such  a  victory,  within  the  territory  of  his 
own  department,  and  that,  too,  without  his  advice  or  aid.  General 
Halleck  had  ordered  the  advance  without  consulting  him  and  he 
protested  to  General  McClellan  "against  such  prompt  proceedings, 
on  the  part  of  General  Halleck"  as,  though,  he  said  "I  had  noth 
ing  to  do  but  command  'Commence  firing'  when  he  starts  off."1 

But  startling  as  General  Grant's  capture  of  Fort  Henry  was 
to  the  Union  generals  above  named,  it  was  not  less  startling  in 
its  significance  to  a  triumvirate  of  Confederate  generals  (Albert 
Sidney  Johnston,  G.  T.  Beauregard  and  William  J.  Hardee.) 
This  triumvirate  met  at  the  Covington  House  at  Bowling  Green, 
February  7,  1862,  and  decided  that  preparations  should  at  once  be 
made  for  the  abandonment  of  Bowling  Green,  Clarksville  and  Co 
lumbus,  and  the  removal  of  the  Confederate  army  to  Nashville  in 
the  rear  of  the  Cumberland  River  with  a  possible  further  retro 
grade  movement  to  Stevenson,  Alabama.2 

General  Halleck  at  once  called  frantically  on  General  McClel 
lan,  the  secretary  of  war.  General  Buell  and  others  for  troops 
with  which  to  reinforce  General  Grant,  and  General  McClellan 
on  February  7,  again  suggested  to  General  Buell  that  he  take  the 
line  of  the  Tennessee  to  operate  against  Nashville.3  But  in  an 
swer  to  his  telegram  making  such  suggestion  General  Buell  re 
plied  saying  he  could  not  think  a  change  in  his  line  would  be  ad 
visable,  that  he  should  want  eighteen  rifled  seige  guns  and  four 
companies  of  experienced  gunners  to  man  them ;  and  hoped  Gen 
eral  Grant  would  not  require  further  reinforcements.  He  added, 
however,  "I  will  go  if  necessary."4 

February  8,  he  again  telegraphed  General  McClellan,  "I  am 
concentrating  and  preparing,  but  will  not  decide  definitely  yet."r> 

General  Halleck  had  sent  General  G.  W.  Cullum,  his  chief  of 
staff,  to  Cairo  to  watch  the  movement  up  the  Tennessee  and 
Cumberland  Rivers  and  to  give  orders  in  his  name.  To  him  Gen 
eral  Grant  reported  February  8,  that  he  had  contemplated  taking 

1  W7~R.  R.  7-933  3     and  4     W    R     R.   7-593. 

2  W.  R.  R.   7-861.  5     W.  R.  R.  7-594. 


72  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

Fort  Donelson  that  day,  but  had  found  himself  locked  in  by  high 
water  and  bad  roads  and  prevented  from  acting  offensively.  The 
banks  of  the  river  he  said  were  higher  at  the  water's  edge  than 
further  back,  leaving  a  wide  margin  of  low  land  to  bridge  over 
before  he  could  move  inland,  that  he  had  intended  to  move  with 
infantry  and  cavalry  alone,  but  all  the  troops  were  engaged  in 
saving  what  they  had  from  high  water.  He  also  reported  to  Gen 
eral  Cullum  that  the  evening  after  the  capture  of  Fort  Henry  he 
had  sent  gunboats  under  Captain  Phelps  and  a  transport  with 
troops  up  the  river  to  destroy  the  railroad  bridge.1  On  February 
9,  he  sent  a  force  under  Colonel  McPherson  which  reconnoitered 
within  one-and-a-half  miles  of  Fort  Donelson  and  had  a 
skirmish  with  the  enemy's  pickets.2  February  10,  General  Grant 
sent  a  message  to  Flag  Officer  Foote,  saying  he  had  been  waiting 
very  patiently  for  the  return  of  the  gunboats  under  Commander 
Phelps,  which  he  expected  to  go  around  and  up  the  Cumberland, 
while  he  moved  his  forces  across  to  make  a  simultaneous  attack 
on  Fort  Donelson,  and  asked  him  if  he  could  not  at  once  send  two 
boats  from  Cairo  up  the  Cumberland.3  The  same  day  he  issued 
orders  to  his  troops  to  hold  themselves  in  readiness  to  move  on 
Wednesday  the  12th  instant  at  as  early  an  hour  as  practicable.4 
He  did  not  propose  to  wait  for  reinforcements,  but  to  use  the 
forces  he  then  had  to  the  best  advantage.  February  11,  he  sent 
a  message  to  General  Halleck  saying  that  every  effort  would  be 
put  forth  to  have  Clarksville  within  a  few  days.5  He  seems  never 
for  one  instant  to  have  doubted  that  with  his  little  army  of 
15,000  men,  he  could  succeed,  and  on  February  12,  moved  for 
ward  and  invested  Fort  Donelson,  whose  garrison  had  by  that 
time  been  increased  to  21,000  men.6 

February  12,  1862,  General  Halleck  dispatched  to  General 
Buell,  that  gunboats  had  destroyed  everything  on  the  Tennessee 
River  to  Florence,  Alabama,  that  40,000  rebels  were  at  Dover 
(Fort  Donelson)  and  Clarksville,  that  if  so,  they  had  come  from 
Bowling  Green  and  that  if  he,  Buell,  concluded  to  land  a  column 
on  the  Cumberland  River  to  come  at  once.7  To  this  and  other 
dispatches  of  General  Halleck,  General  Buell  answered  at  first, 
that  he  would  determine  on  his  ultimate  movements  the  moment 
he  had  something  in  regard  to  Hallack's  position  on  the  Tennessee 
River,  but  later,  the  same  day,  he  again  telegraphed  that  he  would 
move  on  the  line  of  the  Cumberland  or  Tennessee  Rivers,  but  it 
would  take  ten  days  at  least  to  effect  the  transfer  of  his  troops.8 
General  Buell  had  already  sent  four  regiments  to  Fort  Henry  to 

1  W.  R.  R.   7-596.  4     W.  R.  R.  7-601.  7     W.  R.  R.  7-607. 

2  W.  R.  R.  7-H97.  5     W.  R.  R.  7-604.  8     W.  R.  R.  7-607. 

3  W.  R.  R.  7-600.  6     Grant's  Memoirs. 


FURTHER  DELAY  AT  GUEE.X  RIVEU  73 

reinforce  General  Grant  where  they  arrived  on  February  12  or 
14th,  and  were  sent  by  water  to  Fort  Donelson,1  and  probably  on 
February  12,  issued  orders  to  General  McCook,  commanding  our 
division,  to  march  to  the  mouth  of  Salt  River  and  get  there  Sun 
day,  February  16,  1862.2 

It  was  in  pursuance  of  this  order  that  on  the  morning  of  Feb 
ruary  14,  1862,  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  received  the  welcome  order 
which  terminated  our  long  period  of  inactivity.  The  order  came 
the  afternoon  of  February  13,  and  directed  us  to  be  ready  to  move 
at  7  o'clock  next  morning.  Strange  to  say,  it  was  rumored  that 
we  were  to  go  north  instead  of  south,  and  that  our  destination  was 
Columbus,  Kentucky.  There  was  unusual  activity  in  camp.  We 
learned  that  our  brigade  trains  had  been  sent  in  advance  to  West 
Point  on  the  Ohio  River  below  Louisville  and  that  General  O.  W. 
Mitchell's  division  had  disappeared  from  camp  early  that  morn 
ing.  Where  it  had  gone  no  one  knew. 

Friday,  February  14,  reveille  sounded  at  3  :30  A.  M.  The 
ground  was  white  with  snow  and  the  weather  was  quite  cold. 
Some  of  the  regiments  moved  out  before  daylight  but  ours  did 
not  get  started  until  7  A.  M.  The  snow  soon  melted  and  the 
roads  were  deep  with  mud  but  we  moved  rapidly,  having  the  im 
pression  that  we  were  marching  to  meet  some  emergency  and  that 
it  was  necessary  to  get  to  our  destination  as  soon  as  possible. 
Gleason  the  day  before  had  been  detailed  as  an  orderly  and  sten 
ographer  at  division  headquarters  and  went  on  a  train  with  the 
division  officers.  The  train  did  not  move  out  until. the  division 
was  well  under  way.  He  says  that  as  the  train  passed  Bacon 
Creek  he  saw  our  regiment  and  other  troops  plodding  along 
throueh  the  mud  and  "felt  deeply  for  his  comrades."3 

General  Halleck  had  been  calling  frantically  for  reinforce 
ments  to  send  to  General  Grant,  who,  he  feared,  would  be  over 
whelmed  bv  superior  numbers.  General  Grant's  position  was 
indeed  regarded  as  extremelv  critical.  February  11,  Thomas  A. 
Scott,  pssictant  serretarv  of  war,  was  at  Cairo,  111.  and  tele 
graphed  General  Halleck  asking  if  General  Grant  was  strong 
enough  for  the  Cumberland  and  Donelson  movement.4  Febru 
ary  13.  General  McClellan  sent  a  despatch  to  General  Buell,  say 
ing:  "Watch  Fort  Donelson  closely,  I  am  not  too  certain  as  to 
the  result  there."5  It  was  in  response  to  General  Halleck's  calls 
that  General  Buell  had  reluctantly  issued  the  order  putting  us 
on  the  march  toward  West  Point. 

In  the  meantime  General  Buell  had  ordered  General  O.  M. 
Mitchell  to  move  southward  on  a  reconnoissance  and  he  had  done 

1  W.  R.  R.  7-612.  4     W.  R.  R.  7-604. 

2  Probablv  February  14,  see  W.  R.  R.  7-609.  5     W.  R.  R.  7-609. 

3  Gleason's  Diary. 


74  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEKKS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

so  on  the  morning  of  February  13.  General  Mitchell  reached 
Bell's  Tavern  about  18  miles  from  Green  River  the  same  day 
unopposed  and  reported  to  General  Buell  that  Bowling  Green  was 
said  to  have  been  evacuated.1  He  pushed  on  next  day  to  Bowling 
Green,  found  the  enemy  gone  and  at  once  reported  the  fact  to 
General  Buell.  General  Buell  at  once,  February  14,  sent  a  des 
patch  to  General  McCook  "by  special  messenger  in  all  haste," 
directing  him  to  halt  and  remain  where  he  was.2  This  dispatch 
probably  reached  General  McCook  the  night  of  February  1  i,  or 
the  morning  of  February  15,  and  caused  us  to  be  stopped  and 
placed  in  camp  between  Upton  and  Bacon  Creek  to  await  fur 
ther  orders.  At  the  time  he  sent  the  despatch  halting  General 
McCook's  column,  General  Buell  sent  a  dispatch  to  General  Mc- 
Clellan  saying  that  General  Grant  could  not  longer  be  in  any 
danger  and  that  General  Mitchell's  advance  might  effect  his  move 
ments,3  and  a  few  hours  later  sent  another  dispatch  to  General 
McClellan  saying  that  the  evacuation  of  Bowling  Green  made  it 
proper  to  resume  his  original  line  on  Nashville.4  General  Buell 
also  dispatched  to  General  Halleck  his  change  of  plan  and  stated 
that  he  proposed  to  move  from  Bowling  Green  on  Nashville.-"' 

It  is  difficult  to  account  for  General  Buell's  abandonment  of 
the  plan  of  co-operation  with  General  Halleck  in  the  movement 
up  the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland  Rivers.  But  he  had  from  the 
first  regarded  Nashville  as  the  objective  point  of  his  campaign 
and  possibly  did  not  wish  to  give  it  up.  On  that  day,  February 
14,  1862,  in  response  to  an  inquiry  by  the  adjutant  general  at 
Washington,  he  had  reported  the  forces  in  his  command  present 
for  duty  as  follows:  60,882  infantry,  9,222  cavalry  and  3,368  ar 
tillery,  with  28  field  and  2  siege  batteries, — an  aggregate  for  duty 
of  73,472. 6  For  months  this  great  army  had  been  lying  in  camp 
inactive,  and  if  now  it  could  move  forward  and  capture  the  capital 
of  Tennessee  it  would  justify  its  existence.  General  Halleck  in  a 
despatch  to  General  McClellan  denounced  the  movement  from 
Bowling  Green  on  Nashville  as  "bad  strategy,"  and  urged  that  if 
Buell  could  come  and  help  him  take  Fort  Donelson  and  Clarks- 
ville,  and  then  move  on  Florence,  Alabama,  Nashville  would  be 
abandoned.7  General  McClellan  sided  with  General  Buell  and 
in  a  dispatch  to  him  dated  February  15,  1862,  10  P.  M.  said: 

"The  movement  on  Nashville  is  exactly  right.  If  Grant's 
safety  renders  it  absolutely  necessary,  of  course  reinforce  him  as 
you  propose.  But  the  ereat  object  is  the  occupation  of  Nash 
ville."8  February  15,  at  11  p.  m.  General  McClellan  dispatched 

1  W    R    R.  7-610.  4     W    R    T?    7-«2i.  7     W.  R.  R.  7-f*17. 

2  W.  R.  R.  7-615.  R     W    n    T?    7-"17.  8     W.  R.  R.  7-620. 

3  W.  R    R!  7-612.  6     W    R    R.  7-615. 


FURTHER  DELAY  AT  GREEN  RIVER  75 

to  General  Halleck,  saying  he  did  not  see  that  Buell's  movement 
was  "bad  strategy"  for  it  would  relieve  the  pressure  upon  Grant 
and  lead  to  results  of  the  greatest  importance.  He  also  informed 
General  Halleck  that  Buell's  orders  were  to  reinforce  Grant  if 
he  could  not  reach  Nashville  in  time,  and  that  he  was  arranging 
to  talk  with  him  and  Buell  over  the  wires  next  morning.1 

At  midnight  that  same  day  General  Buell  seems  to  have 
found  another  ''lion  in  the  way"  for  he  telegraphed  to  General 
McClellan  that  it  would  take  a  week  to  repair  the  road  to  Bowling 
Green  and  that  no  formidable  advance  could  be  made  until  that 
was  done.2  On  receipt  of  a  dispatch  from  General  Halleck,  say 
ing,  that  the  Confederate  forces  from  Bowling  Green  were  con 
centrating  at  Clarksville,  that  the  garrison  at  Fort  Donelson  was 
estimated  at  30,000,  that  the  place  had  been  completely  invested, 
that  four  sorties  had  been  repulsed,  and  unless  more  troops  could 
be  sent  to  General  Grant  the  attack  might  fail,3  General  Buell  at 
once  answered  that  one  division,  (twelve  regiments  and  three  bat 
teries)  under  General  Nelson  would  embark  for  the  Cumberland 
the  next  day,  February  16,  and  that  he  would  himself  have  em 
barked  with  two  divisions  to  make  the  Cumberland  the  line  of 
operations  if  it  had  not  been  for  the  evacuation  of  Bowling 
Green.  General  Halleck,  rejoiced  at  this  turn  of  affairs,  called 
on  General  Buell  to  come  and  help  him  take  Fort  Donelson  and 
Clarksville  and  move  on  Florence  and  that  all  would  be  right.4 
After  directing  the  movement  of  General  Nelson's  division  to  the 
support  of  General  Grant,  General  Buell  directed  his  other  troops 
to  move  southward  and  General  McCook  to  be  at  Bowling  Green 
on  February  17.5  All  this  occurred  on  February  15,  1862,  but  on 
February  16,  General  Halleck,  probably  fearing  that  there  might 
be  another  change  on  the  part  of  General  Buell,  again  telegraphed 
General  McClellan: 

"I  am  perfectly  confident  that  if  Buell  moves  from  Bowling 
Green  on  Nashville  we  shall  regret  it.  Think  of  it  before  you 
approve — I  am  certain  that  if  you  were  here  you  would  agree 
with  me.  If  I  had  any  doubts  I  would  not  insist.  Fort  Donelson 
and  Clarksville  are  the  key  points.  Since  the  evacuation  of  Bowl 
ing  Green  the  importance  of  Nashville  has  ceased."6 

Aerain  on  the  same  day,  February  16,  he  telegraphed  General 
McClellan  saying  that  there  had  been  hard  fighting  at  Fort  Donel 
son  on  Thursday,  Friday  and  Saturday,  that  at  5  P.  M.  the  day 
before  Grant  had  carried  the  upper  fort,  and  that  the  Union  flag 
was  flyine  over  it.  He  further  urgred  that  Buell  should  not  ad 
vance  on  Nashville  but  come  to  the  Cumberland  with  his  available 

1  W.  R.  R.  7-617-618.  3     W.  R.  R.  7-«21.  5     W.  R.  R.  7-623. 

2  W.  R.  R.  7-620.  4     W.  R.  R.  7-621-622.  6     W.  R.  R.  7-624. 


76  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

forces.1  To  these  dispatches  General  McClellan  answered, 
"Should  Donelson  fall  you  will  move  on  Nashville  by  either  route 
which  may  at  the  time  be  quickest.  A  part  of  the  column  moving 
from  Bowling  Green  toward  Nashville  might  relieve  Donelson, 
but  the  direct  move  on  Nashville  is  the  most  important."2 

On  the  same  day,  February  16,  1862,  President  Lincoln, 
knowing  perhaps  of  the  divided  counsels  above  mentioned,  sent 
the  following  message  to  General  Halleck : 

"You  have  Fort  Donelson  safe,  unless  Grant  shall  be  over 
whelmed  from  outside,  to  prevent  which  latter  will,  I  think,  re 
quire  all  the  vigilance,  energy  and  skill  of  yourself  and  General 
Buell,  acting  in  full  co-operation,  Columbus  will  not  get  at  Grant, 
but  the  force  from  Bowling  Green  will.  They  hold  the  railroad 
from  Bowling  Green  to  within  a  few  miles  of  Fort  Donelson  with 
the  bridge  at  Clarksville  undisturbed.  It  is  unsafe  to  rely  that 
they  will  not  dare  to  expose  Nashville  to  Buell.  A  small  part  of 
their  force  can  retire  slowly  to  Nashville  breaking  up  the  rail 
road  as  they  go,  and  keep  Buell  out  of  that  city  twenty  days. 
Meanwhile  Nashville  will  be  defended  by  forces  from  all  south 
and  perhaps  from  here  at  Manassas.  Could  not  a  cavalry  force 
from  General  Thomas  on  the  upper  Cumberland  dash  across, 
almost  unresisted,  and  cut  the  railroad  at  or  near  knoxville. 
Tenn.  ?  In  the  midst  of  a  bombardment  of  Fort  Donelson,  why 
could  not  a  gunboat  run  up  and  destroy  the  bridge  at  Clarksville? 
Our  success  or  failure  at  Fort  Donelson  is  vastly  important,  and 
I  beg  of  you  to  put  your  souls  in  the  effort.  I  send  a  copy  of  this 
to  Buell."3 

While  these  divided  counsels  were  prevailing  as  to  the  man 
ner  and  method  of  supporting  the  movement  in  which  General 
Grant  was  engaged,  and  while  the  foregoing  dispatches  of  Febru 
ary  15,  and  16,  1862  were  flying,  General  Grant  had  fought  his 
way  into  the  outermost  intrenchments  of  Fort  Donelson.  On  the 
morning  of  February  16,  1862,  he  received  its  surrender,  and  he 
too  sent  a  dispatch,  which  reads  as  follows : 

Fort  Donelson   (Via  Smithland) 

February  16,  1862 
Maj.  Gen.  H.  W.  Halleck: 

We  have  taken  Fort  Donelson  and  from  12,000  to  15,000  prisoners, 
including  Generals  Buckner  and  Bushrod  Johnson,  also  about  20,000 
stand  of  arms,  48  pieces  of  artillery,  17  heavy  guns,  from  2,000  to 
4,000  horses,  and  large  quantities  of  commissary  stores. 

U.  S.  GRANT, 
Brigadier  General  Commanding.4 

1  W.  R.  R.  7-624.  3     W.  R.  R.  7-624. 

2  W.  R.  R.  7-625.  4     W.  R.  R.  7-625. 


FURTHKR  DELAY  AT  GREEN  RIVER 


77 


February  16,  1862,  the  men  of  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  and  other 
troops  of  the  brigade  and  division  turned  their  faces  again  south 
ward.  The  great  campaign  for  the  possession  of  Nashville,  un 
known  to  us  at  the  time,  had  been  won  by  other  troops,  not  of  our 
army,  and  we  were  to  march  to  that  city  unopposed.  Later  we 
were  to  join  the  victors  of  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson  on  a  bloody 
field  where  our  timely  arrival  was  to  save  the  day  for  the  Union. 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE  ADVANCE  ON  BOWLING  GREEN  AND  NASHVILLE  AND  OCCU 
PATION  OF  LATER  PLACE. 

As  stated  in  the  preceding  chapter  the  "special  messenger" 
sent  by  General  Buell  "in  all  haste"  to  General  McCook  directing 
him  to  halt  in  his  march  to  reinforce  General  Grant  at  Fort 
Donelson,  must  have  reached  General  McCook  on  the  evening  of 
February  14,  or  the  morning  of  February  15,  and  that  on  the 
evening  of  February  14,  we  were  halted  between  Upton  Station 
and  Bacon  Creek.  On  the  15th,  orders  came  to  move  and  at 
2  p.  m.  we  were  about-faced  and  marched  back  to  Bacon  Creek, 
nine  miles,  and  went  into  camp  for  the  night.  It  was  reported 
that  General  Mitchell's  division  had  moved  south,  had  met  the 
enemy  and  needed  reinforcements.1  At  4  a.  m.,  February  16,  we 
resumed  our  march  southward  from  Bacon  Creek  and  in  the  late 
afternoon  reached  Green  River,  which  we  crossed  and  went  into 
camp  about  one  mile  south  of  Munfordville.  February  17,  we  re 
sumed  our  march  at  4  a.  m.,  and  marched  to  Horse  Cave  where  at 
10  a.  m.,  we  halted  and  went  into  camp.  It  was  said  that  General 
McCook  had  received  a  dispatch  telling  of  the  surrender  of  Fort 
Donelson.2  We  remained  in  camp  at  Horse  Cave  until  2  p.  m., 
February  18,  when  we  marched  eight  miles  to  Bell's  Tavern, 
where  we  went  into  camp  and  pitched  our  tents.  It  was  said  that 
our  division  would  remain  here  for  two  or  three  days.  We  re 
mained  at  this  place  until  February  20.  It  rained  during  the 
night  of  February  18  and  the  next  day  was  wet  and  dismal.  The 
ground  inside  our  tents  was  muddy  and  some  of  the  men  went 
foraging  for  straw  to  make  their  beds  more  comfortable. 

The  night  of  February  19  there  was  a  snow  storm  and 
the  morning  of  February  20  was  quite  cold.  At  2  p.  m., 
February  20,  we  marched  again  and  after  a  tramp  of  four  miles 
were  halted  and  went  into  camp.  This  camp  was  designated  as 
Camp  Fry3  in  honor  of  Colonel  Speed.  S.  Fry  who  had  shot  Gen 
eral  Zollicoffer.  General  Buell  and  staff  arrived  in  camp.  We 
remained  in  Camp  Fry  until  February  23.  On  the  21st  the 
weather  was  pleasant  and  General  McCook  and  some  of  his  staff 
went  to  see  Mammoth  Cave.4  On  the  evening  of  February  22, 
orders  came  to  be  readv  to  march  next  morning.  February  23, 
the  regiment  marched  at  9  a.  m.  Our  route  took  us  through  a 
good  farming  country  and  we  saw  a  great  many  fine  plantations 

1  and  2     Gleason's  Diary.  3     Wm.  McConnell's  Diary.          4     Gleason's  Diary. 


ADVANCE  ON  BOWLING  GREEN  AND  NASHVILLE  79 

and  a  great  many  negro  slaves.  The  road  was  a  substantial  lime 
stone  pike,  the  weather  pleasant  and  we  made  rapid  progress. 
About  3  o'clock  p.  m.,  we  came  in  sight  of  Bowling  Green  and 
encamped  about  two  miles  north  of  the  town.  General  McCook 
and  staff  took  up  quarters  in  an  unoccupied  house  in  front  of  a 
formidable  redoubt  which  had  been  abandoned  by  the  enemy. 
We  marched  twenty  miles  during  the  day.  Our  camp  was  desig 
nated  as  Camp  Rousseau.1  It  was  located  in  an  open  woods  and 
our  quarters  were  quite  comfortable.  We  remained  here  Febru 
ary  24  and  25.  During  the  25th  a  number  of  regiments  crossed 
the  river  to  Bowling  Green  on  a  steam  ferry  boat.  That 
afternoon  a  shot  was  heard  in  the  basement  of  General  McCook's 
headquarters  and  we  learned  that  a  prisoner  held  by  the  provost 
guard  had  been  shot  and  killed  while  carelessly  handling  a  gun. 
We  thought  it  was  rather  lax  discipline  to  permit  a  prisoner  under 
guard  to  have  a  loaded  gun  in  his  hands.2  Some  of  the  men  went 
to  inspect  the  fortifications  which  the  enemy  had  abandoned  and 
saw  that  the  river,  the  Big  Barren,  had  overflowed  its  banks  and 
flooded  the  low  lands.  A  steamer  was  making  efforts  to  affect 
a  landing  within  reach  of  the  shore  but  failed  to  do  so.  February 
26,  a  small  steamer  arrived  and  it  was  decided  to  cross  the  river 
at  all  hazards.  Later,  a  larger  boat  named  the  "Masonic  Gem" 
arrived  at  the  ferry  landing  and  about  dark  came  over  and  we 
crossed  the  river  on  it  to  Bowling  Green  and  went  into  camp  be 
tween  the  town  and  the  river. 

February  27,  reveille  sounded  about  5  o'clock  A.  M.,  and  at 
7  o'clock  we  pulled  out, — for  Nashville  it  was  said.  We  passed 
through  Bowling  Green  about  8  o'clock  A.  M.  and  four  miles 
beyond  it  came  to  Lost  River,  a  stream  which  gushed  out  of  a 
hill  and  flowing  about  two  hundred  yards  through  a  gorge  went 
roaring  and  foaming  right  under  the  road  on  which  we  were 
marching.  The  weather  was  fine,  we  had  a  good  pike  to  march 
on  and  made  good  time.  In  the  late  afternoon  we  came  to  Frank 
lin.  Kentucky,  where  we  went  into  camp  for  the  night,  having 
marched  24  miles.3 

February  28,  at  8  a.  m.,  we  resumed  our  march  southward 
and  11  a.  m.  came  to  the  line  between  Kentucky  and  Tennessee. 
The  boundary  was  marked  by  a  large  stone  set  in  the  center  of 
the  pike.  As  the  men  saw  it  every  one  realized  that  we  were  en 
tering  the  Southern  Confederacy  and  cheers  broke  forth  all  along 
the  line — cheers  for  the  Union  and  the  Constitution.4  We  con 
tinued  our  march  until  dark  when  we  came  to  Tyree  Springs 
and  went  into  camp,  having  marched  25  miles.  Rations  of  flour 

1  Wm  McConnell's  Diary.  3     Wm.  McConnell's  Diary. 

2  Gleason's  Diary.  4     Letter  of  Captain  C.  W.  Carroll  to  his  wife. 


80  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

and  salt  were  issued  to  the  tired  men  who  set  about  baking 
"dough  cakes"  in  the  ashes  for  their  suppers.  We  realized  that 
we  were  making  a  forced  march  and  everyone  was  nerved  up  to 
put  forth  his  best  endeavor  to  reach  our  destination  at  the  earl 
iest  possible  moment.  That  destination  we  knew  was  Nashville. 
As  it  transpired  there  was  really  no  necessity  for  pushing  us  for 
ward  on  a  forced  march.  On  February  24,  while  we  were  wait 
ing  at  Bowling  Green  for  a  steamer  to  carry  us  across  the  swol 
len  river,  General  Nelson  with  his  division,  who  had  been  sent 
to  Smithland  and  thence  up  the  Cumberland  River,  arrived  at 
Clarksville,  Tennessee,  and  reported  to  General  Grant.  General 
Grant  ordered  him  to  proceed  at  once  to  Nashville,1  where  he 
arrived  at  dawn  on  the  morning  of  February  25  and  took  posses 
sion  of  the  city.2  General  Buell  on  February  26,  reported  to 
General  Halleck  that  he  entered  Nashville  the  day  before  with 
a  small  force,  having  been  "compelled  to  it  by  the  landing  of  a 
portion  of  the  troops  contrary  to  his  intentions."  He  must  have 
been  chagrined  that  General  Grant  had  again  been  before  him  in 
reaching  the  great  objective  point  in  his  campaign,  and  still  more 
so  when  on  the  morning  of  February  27,  he  received  a  letter  from 
General  Grant,  stating  that  he  had  arrived  at  Nashville  early  thai 
morning,  anxiously  expecting  to  see  him,  but  having  failed  to 
do  so  must  return  to  his  command.3  General  Grant's  brief  visit 
to  Nashville  was  afterwards  claimed  to  have  been  made  without 
the  knowledge  or  authority  of  General  Halleck  and  was  one  of 
the  charges  brought  against  him  which  led  to  his  being  temporar 
ily  deprived  of  his  command. 

March  1,  we  resumed  our  march  at  6  a.  m.,  and  soon  began 
to  descend  into  the  Cumberland  River  Valley.  On  the  way 
Gleason  plucked  the  first  wild  flower  of  the  season  in  a  sheltered 
nook  by  the  roadside.4  After  a  march  of  about  six  miles  we 
halted  near  the  Cumberland  River  where  we  went  into  camp  and 
remained  during  the  night. 

March  2,  at  7:45  a.  m.,  we  resumed  our  march  and  at  10 
a.  m.,  came  in  sight  of  the  city  of  Nashville, — the  first  prominent 
object  being  the  noble  state  capitol.  After  a  great  many  tedious 
and  tiresome  halts  we  finally  reached  the  river,  went  aboard  the 
steamer  "City  of  Madison,"  and  at  8  a.  m.  were  ferried  across. 
It  had  rained  all  day  and  was  still  raining,  but  we  marched 
through  the  city  and  three  or  four  miles  beyond  and  went  into 
camp  on  the  Franklin  pike.  We  had  at  last  reached  the  objec 
tive  point  in  our  campaign  without  meeting  the  enemy  and  prac 
tically  without  firing  a  shot.  But  we  had  done  our  duty  as  sol- 

1  W.  R.  R.  7-602.  3     W.  R.  R.  7-670. 

2  General  Ammen's  Diary,  W.  R.  R.  7-659.  4     Gleason's  Diary. 


Am.\.\(K  ox   BOWLING  GREEN  AND  NASIIVILI.K  81 

diers  and,  in  a  general  way,  claimed  and  were  entitled  to  a  share 
in  the  glory  and  honor  of  what  had  been  accomplished. 

The  foregoing  narrative  of  our  winter  march  from  Green 
River  contains  few  incidents  which  show  its  real  character  and 
the  difficulties  and  hardships  the  men  endured.  It  was  a  hard, 
trying  experience  and  tested  the  powers  of  endurance  of  the  men 
as  severely,  perhaps,  as  any  march  in  our  long  period  of  service. 
Captain  C.  W.  Carroll  in  a  letter  to  his  wife  written  just  after 
we  reached  Nashville  reviews  it  at  some  length  as  follows : 

"Since  the  13th  of  last  month  (February)  we  have  been  kept 
constantly  on  the  move  and  during  this  period  have  experienced 
the  severest  hardships  that  fall  to  the  lot  of  a  soldier.  *  *  * 
On  the  night  of  February  13  we  received  orders  to  be  prepared 
to  march  on  the  following  morning.  Everything  that  night  was 
bustle  and  confusion  among  the  camps,  in  making  the  necessary 
preparation,  and  many  were  the  speculations  on  the  subject  of 
our  destination.  Of  course,  everyone  concluded  that  we  were  to 
move  on  Bowling  Green,  had  it  not  been  that  General  Mitchell 
had  started  for  that  place  on  the  day  before.  This  fact  confused 
us,  for  certainly,  we  thought,  we  would  not  follow  Mitchell's  di 
vision  after  our  division  had  held  the  advance  for  so  long.  How 
ever,  the  preparations  were  made,  the  morning  came  and  to  our 
great  surprise,  our  faces  were  turned  toward  the  north.  *  *  * 
Why  \ve  should  turn  our  backs  on  Bowling  Green  and  march  in 
the  opposite  direction  was  a  mystery  we  could  not  solve.  But 
we  were  soon  relieved  of  our  perplexity  by  the  announcement 
that  General  McCook's  division  was  ordered  to  report  at  West 
Point  on  the  Ohio  River  at  the  mouth  of  Salt  River — a  big  three 
days  march.  Further  than  that  we  knew  nothing.  The  morning 
we  started  there  were  three  inches  of  snow  on  the  ground  and  it 
was  very  cold.  The  water  in  our  canteens  froze  and  our  ears 
almost  froze.  We  plodded  along  all  day  until  we  came  to  a  little 
place  called  Upton,  distant  13  miles,  where  we  stopped  for  the 
night.  It  became  evident  to  us  long  before  we  reached  the  place 
that  we  would  have  to  put  through  the  night  without  our  tents 
and  camp  equipage,  for  the  roads  were  so  bad  the  wagons  could 
not  possibly  get  up.  We  banished  all  thought  of  sleep  and  tried 
to  keep  warm  by  making  large  fires  of  rails  and  standing  around 
them.  About  midnight  we  were  again  surprised  by  another  or 
der  which  stated  that  we  were  to  remain  at  Upton  until  further 
orders.  The  next  day  we  received  orders  to  about  face  and  march 
for  Bowling  Green.  You  can  imagine  the  intense  indignation  of 
the  men  when  this  order  was  published.  It  was  not  because  they 
cared  about  the  double  toil  and  exposure  of  marching  in  the  bleak 
weather,  over  almost  impassable  roads,  without  tents  to  shelter  us 


82  FIFTEENTH  Omo  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

at  night,  but  because  they  felt  we  were  cheated  out  of  our  well- 
earned  position — the  advance.  It  was  evident,  when  the  counter 
march  was  ordered,  that  General  Mitchell's  division  which  had 
been  in  the  rear  for  months  was  to  reach  Bowling  Green  before 
us,  while  our  division  which  had  always  been  in  the  front  and 
had  done  picket  duty  for  the  entire  army  tagged  along  behind. 
However,  we  were  comforted  by  the  report  that  our  division  had 
been  selected  to  reinforce  General  Grant  at  Fort  Donelson,  and 
that  taken,  was  to  move  up  the  Cumberland  and  take  Bowling 
Green  in  the  rear.  The  taking  of  Fort  Donelson  changed  the 
program  and  we  had  the  mortification  of  marching  far  in  the 
rear  of  Mitchell's  division  until  we  arrived  at  this  point.  We 
reached  the  much-dreaded  place.  Bowling  Green,  on  Sunday,  Feb 
ruary  23.  Here  we  were  compelled  to  remain  for  three  days, 
having  no  way  to  cross  Barren  River  but  by  small  tug  boats — all 
the  bridges  having  been  destroyed  by  the  enemy.  We  finally  got 
across  on  the  night  of  the  26th  of  February  and  on  the  morning 
of  the  next  day  started  on  a  forced  march  to  Nashville  without 
our  teams  and  baggage.  After  much  hard  marching  in  all  kinds 
of  weather  over  all  kinds  of  roads,  without  the  least  protection 
from  the  inclement  weather  when  we  laid  down  to  rest  our  wet 
and  tired  limbs,  we  finally  reached  our  present  camp." 

Our  camp  at  Nashville  was  named  Camp  Andrew  Johnson. 
We  remained  there  until  March  16,  drilling,  doing  picket  duty 
and  occasionally  responding  to  a  call  to  arms  at  the  anticipated 
near  approach  of  the  enemy. 

On  the  morning  of  March  8,  Colonel  John  H.  Morgan  with 
a  small  detachment  of  his  cavelry  got  through  our  pickets  on  the 
Murfreesboro  pike  and  captured  five  men  of  the  Thirteenth  Ohio. 
Passing  the  cavalry  camp  they  moved  in  the  direction  of  Nashville 
and  concealing  themselves  in  the  woods  opposite  the  Lunatic 
Asylum  captured  a  train  and  twenty-three  more  prisoners.  They 
continued  their  operations  inside  our  lines  until  they  had  taken  in 
all  ninety-eight  prisoners,  including  several  officers.  They  then 
tried  to  make  their  way  back  to  Murfreesboro  and  were  followed 
by  a  detachment  of  the  Fourth  Ohio  Cavalry  under  Colpnol  John 
Kennett,  which  recaptured  all  the  prisoners  except  thirty-eight, 
with  a  loss  of  a  few  men  missing  and  a  reported  loss  to  the  enemy 
of  four  men  killed  and  two  wounded.1 

On  the  morning  of  March  9,  forty  men  of  the  First  Louisiana 
Cavalry  under  command  of  Captain  jno.  S.  Scott  made  an  attack 
on  our  troops  about  six  miles  out  on  the  Granny  White  pike  and  a 
sharp  skirmish  took  place  in  which  quite  a  number  were  wounded 
on  both  sides2  The  long  roll  was  sounded  in  our  camp  and  we 

1     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-6.  2     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-7. 


ADVANCE  ON  BOWLING  GEEEN  AND  NASHVILLE  83 

were  formed  in  line  of  battle.  The  alarm  spread  to  the  entire 
division  and  many  of  the  regiments  moved  out  to  repel  a  sup 
posed  attack  of  the  enemy  in  force.  The  enemy,  however,  soon 
retreated  and  all  returned  to  camp.  Our  losses  in  the  skirmish 
were  reported  to  be  two  wounded,  one  perhaps  mortally. 

While  we  were  thus  employed  in  Camp  Andrew  Johnson 
plans  were  preparing  for  another  grand  campaign  against  the 
enemy,  whose  main  body  was  believed  to  be  falling  back  or  to 
have  fallen  back  beyond  the  Tennessee  River.  It  was  generally 
agreed  by  Generals  McClellan,  Halleck  and  Buell  that  the  next 
move  of  our  armies  in  the  west  should  be  to  strike  somewhere  the 
line  of  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad,  effect  a  lodgment 
there  and  thus  prevent  the  junction  of  the  Confederate  forces  at 
Columbus  and  other  points  on  the  Mississippi  River  with  General 
A.  S.  Johnston's  forces  which  were  falling  back  through  Mur- 
freesboro,  Shelbyville  and  Stevenson  towards  Chattanooga.  As 
early  as  February  28,  General  Halleck  had  telegraphed  General 
McClellan  asking  if  he,  Halleck,  would  not  better  immediately 
move  Grant  up  the  Tennessee  River  and  try  to  destroy  the  rail 
road  connections  at  Corinth,  Jackson  and  Humboldt.1  The  rec 
ords  do  not  disclose  any  answer  by  General  McClellan  to  this  dis 
patch,  but  it  may  be  presumed  that  he  approved  the  movement  for 
on  March  1,  General  Halleck  telegraphed  General  Grant,  who 
was  at  Fort  Henry,  that  transports  would  be  sent  to  him  as  soon 
as  possible  to  move  his  troops  up  the  Tennessee  River.  In  this 
telegram  General  Halleck  stated  that  the  main  object  of  the  pro 
posed  movement  would  be  to  destroy  the  railroad  bridge  over 
Bear  Creek  near  Eastport,  Mississippi,  and  the  connections  at 
Corinth,  Jackson  and  Humboldt  in  the  order  named.  General 
Halleck  represented  that  with  strong  detachments  of  cavalry  and 
light  artillery  supported  by  infantry  these  points  might  be  reached 
from  the  river  without  serious  opposition.  In  the  same  order  he 
directed  General  Grant  "to  avoid  any  engagement  with  strong 
forces"  and  that  "it  would  be  better  to  retreat  than  to  risk  a  gen 
eral  battle."2 

General  Sherman  who  was  at  Paducah,  under  direction  of 
General  Halleck  at  once  set  out  procuring  the  necessary  transports 
and  March  2,  reported  that  he  had  sent  the  "Chateau"  a  very 
large  boat  up  the  Tennessee  and  that  General  Grant  would  be  in 
possession  of  twenty  good  steamboats  capable  of  carrying  15,000 
men  and  3000  horses.3  General  Grant  had  with  his  accustomed 
energy  issued  the  necessary  orders  for  the  assembling  and  em 
barkation  of  his  troops,  when  an  incident  occurred  which  for  a 

1     W.  R.  R.  7-671-2.  2     W.  R.  R.  7-674.  3     W.  R.  R.  7-677. 


84  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

short  time  checked  his  growing  fame  and  came  near  terminating 
his  military  career. 

The  occupation  of  Nashville  by  Nelson's  division  under  or 
ders  of  General  Grant  had  apparently  alarmed  General  Buell,  who 
feared  the  enemy  might  return  and  attempt  to  recapture  the  city 
before  the  remainder  of  his  forces  could  reach  the  place.  He 
therefore  on  February  25,  issued  an  order  to  General  C.  F.  Smith, 
who  was  at  Clarksville  in  command  of  a  division  of  General 
Grant's  forces,  to  at  once  move  his  division  to  Nashville  and 
sent  transports  to  convey  them  to  the  city.1  As  some  of  his 
troops  had  been  ordered  to  Nashville,  early  on  the  morning  of 
February  27,  General  Grant  had  gone  to  Nashville  to  consult 
with  General  Buell  about  the  situation  and  not  finding  him  had 
returned  to  Clarksville.  Before  going  he  had  notified  General 
Cullum,  General  Halleck's  chief  of  staff,  that  he  intended  to  do  so 
unless  prevented  by  orders.2  March  2,  General  Cullum  tele 
graphed  to  General  Grant  that  General  Halleck  the  night  before 
had  sent  a  dispatch  to  him  (General  Cullum),  demanding  to 
know  who  sent  Smith's  division  to  Nashville  and  saying  that  he, 
Halleck,  had  ordered  it  across  to  the  Tennessee  and  that  it  must 
be  ordered  back.  The  same  day  General  Cullum  telegraphed  to 
General  Halleck  that  Grant,  writing  from  Fort  Donelson  on  the 
28th,  said  he  had  just  returned  from  Nashville  while  he,  Cullum, 
supposed  him  and  his  army  yet  at  Donelson.3  General  Halleck, 
probably  irritated  because  General  C.  F.  Smith's  division  had  been 
ordered  to  Nashville  without  consulting  him  and  that  General 
Grant  had  gone  there  without  his  personal  knowledge  or  consent, 
sent  an  inconsiderate  and  unjustifiable  dispatch  to  General  Mc- 
Clellan  saying,  among  other  things, 

"I  have  had  no  communication  with  General  Grant  for  more 
than  a  week.  He  left  his  command  without  my  authority  and 
went  to  Nashville.  His  army  seems  to  be  as  much  demoralized 
by  the  victory  of  Fort  Donelson  as  was  that  of  the  Potomac  by 
the  defeat  of  Bull  Run.  It  is  hard  to  censure  a  successful  gen 
eral  immediately  after  a  victory,  but  I  think  he  richly  deserves 
it.  I  can  get  no  returns,  no  reports,  no  information  of  any  kind 
from  him.  Satisfied  with  his  victory  he  sits  down  and  enjoys  it 
without  regard  to  the  future.  I  am  worn  out  and  tired  with  this 
neglect  and  inefficiency.  C.  F.  Smith  is  almost  the  only  officer 
equal  to  the  emergency."4 

This  remarkable  dispatch  was  received  at  Washington  March 
3,  and  at  6  p.  m.,  that  evening  General  McClellan  in  a  dispatch 
approved  by  Secretary  of  War  Stanton,  answered  it  saying: 

1  W.  R.  R.  7-944-r>.  3     W.  R.  R.  676-G77. 

2  W.  R.  R.  7-6(56.  4     W.  R.  R.  7-679-680. 


ADVANCE  O.N   BOWLING  GJJEE.X  AND  NASHVILLE  85 

"Your  dispatch  of  last  evening  received.  The  future  success 
of  our  cause  demands  that  proceedings  such  as  Grant's  should 
at  once  be  checked.  Generals  must  observe  discipline  as  well  as 
private  soldiers.  Do  not  hesitate  to  arrest  him  at  once  if  the  good 
of  the  service  requires  it,  and  place  C.  F.  Smith  in  command. 
You  are  at  liberty  to  regard  this  as  a  positive  order  if  it  will 
smooth  your  way."1 

General  Halleck  on  receipt  of  this  dispatch,  on  March  4,  tele 
graphed  an  order  to  General  Grant  directing  him  to  remain  at 
Fort  Henry  and  place  General  C.  F.  Smith  in  command  of  the 
expedition  up  the  Tennessee  River.2  In  the  same  telegram  he 
asked  General  Grant  why  he  did  not  obey  orders  to  report 
strength  and  positions  of  his  command.3 

It  might  be  sufficient  for  the  purposes  of  this  history  to  here 
conclude  this  incident  in  General  Grant's  career,  but  justice  to 
memory  seems  to  demand  that  the  whole  story  should  be  briefly 
told. 

General  Halleck  March  4,  telegraphed  General  McClellan 
that  he  did  not  think  it  advisable  to  arrest  Grant  at  present  but 
that  he  had  placed  General  C.  F.  Smith  in  command  of  the  expedi 
tion  up  the  Tennessee  River,  who  he  thought  would  restore  order 
and  discipline,  and  in  order,  apparently,  to  justify  his  former  tele 
gram,  he  reported  that  a  rumor  had  just  reached  him  "that  since 
the  taking  of  Fort  Donelson  General  Grant  had  resumed  his  for 
mer  bad  habits."4 

General  Grant,  on  receiving  the  order  of  General  Halleck 
palcing  General  Smith  in  command  of  the  expedition  up  the  Ten 
nessee  and  ordering  him,  General  Grant,  into  practical  inactivity 
at  Fort  Henry,  gracefully  accepted  the  conditions  and  like  a  true 
patriot  gave  the  necessary  orders,  congratulated  General  Smith 
on  his  promotion5  and  proceeded  to  help  him  in  every  possible 
way. 

To  General  Halleck's  question  why  he  had  not  obeyed  his. 
Halleck's  orders  to  report  strength  and  positions  of  his  command 
he  answered  March  5 : 

"I  am  not  aware  of  ever  having  disobeyed  any  order  from 
headquarters — certainly  never  intended  such  a  thing.  I  have  re 
ported  almost  daily  the  condition  of  my  command  and  reported 
every  position  occupied.  I  have  not,  however,  been  able  to  get 
returns  from  all  the  troops  *  *  *  All  have  come  in  except 
from  General  (C.  F.)  Smith's  command  at  Clarksville.  *  *  * 
The  General  has  probably  been  unable  to  get  his  in  consequence  of 
being  ordered  to  Nashville  by  General  Buell  *  *  As  soon 

1 W.  R.  R.  7-680.  4     W.  R.  R.  7-682. 

2  and  3     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-3.  5     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-6. 


86  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

as  I  was  notified  that  General  Smith  had  been  ordered  to  Nash 
ville,  I  reported  the  fact  and  sent  a  copy  of  Buell's  order.  My 
reports  have  nearly  all  been  made  to  General  Cullum,  chief  of 
staff,  and  it  may  be  that  many  of  them  were  not  thought  of  suffi 
cient  importance  to  forward  more  than  a  telegraphic  synopsis  of 
*  *  *  *  I  have  forty-six  infantry  regiments,  three  cavalry 
regiments  and  eight  independent  companies  and  ten  batteries 
of  light  artillery.  The  average  available  strength  of  regiments 
fit  for  the  field  is  about  500  men.  In  conclusion,  I  will  say  that 
you  may  rely  on  my  carrying  out  your  instructions  in  every  par 
ticular  to  the  very  best  of  my  ability."1 

Unfortunately,  General  Halleck  did  not  receive  this  com 
munication  until  March  9,  1862.  March  0,  he  wrote  to  General 
Grant  enclosing  an  anonymous  letter  addressed  to  Judge  David 
Davis  of  the  Western  Investigating  Commission,  charging  irreg 
ularities  in  contracts  and  in  the  purchase  of  supplies  in  his  de 
partment  and  saying: 

"The  want  of  order  and  discipline  and  the  numerous  ir 
regularities  in  your  command  since  the  capture  of  Fort  Donel- 
son  are  matters  of  general  notoriety,  and  have  attracted  the 
serious  attention  of  the  authorities  at  Washington.  Unless  these 
things  are  immediately  corrected  I  am  directed  to  relieve  you  of 
the  command."2 

Again  the  same  day.  General  Halleck  telegraphed : 

''General  McClellan  directs  that  you  report  to  me  daily  the 
number  and  positions  of  the  forces  under  your  command.  Your 
neglect  of  repeated  orders  to  report  the  strength  of  your  com 
mand  has  created  great  dissatisfaction  and  seriously  interfered 
with  military  plans.  Your  going  to  Nashville  without  authority, 
and  when  your  presence  with  your  troops  was  of  the  utmost  im 
portance,  was  a  matter  of  very  serious  complaint  at  Washington, 
so  much  so,  that  I  was  advised  to  arrest  you  on  your  return."3 

In  answer  to  this  dispatch  General  Grant  on  March  7.  tele 
graphed  to  General  Halleck  as  follows : 

"Your  dispatch  of  yesterday  received.  I  did  all  I  could  to 
get  you  returns  of  my  command.  Every  move  I  made  was  re 
ported  daily  to  your  chief  of  staff,  who  must  have  failed  to  keep 
you  properly  posted.  I  have  done  my  very  best  to  obey  orders 
and  to  carry  out  the  interests  of  the  service.  If  my  course  is 
not  satisfactory,  remove  me  at  once.  I  do  not  wish  to  impede 
in  any  way  the  success  of  our  arms.  I  have  averaged  writing 
more  than  once  a  day  since  leaving  Cairo  to  keep  you  informed 
of  mv  position,  and  it  is  no  fault  of  mine  if  you  have  not  re- 

1  W    R    R.  10,  part  2-4-5.  3     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-15. 

2  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-13. 


ADVANCE  o.\   BOWLING  GUEEN  AND  NASHMLLE  87 

ceived  my  letters.  My  going  to  Nashville  was  strictly  intended 
for  the  good  of  the  service,  and  not  to  gratify  any  desire  of  my 
own.  Believing  sincerely  that  I  must  have  enemies  between  you 
and  myself,  who  are  trying  to  impair  my  usefulness,  I  ask  to  be 
relieved  from  further  duty  in  the  department."1 

General  Halleck,  March  8,  answered  the  above,  saying: 

"You  are  mistaken.  There  is  no  enemy  between  you  and 
me.  There  is  no  letter  of  yours  stating  the  number  and  position 
of  your  command  since  the  capture  of  Fort  Donelson.  General 
McClellan  has  asked  for  it  repeatedly  with  reference  to  ulterior 
movements  but  I  could  not  give  him  the  information.  He  is  out 
of  all  patience  waiting  for  it.  Answer  by  telegraph  in  general 
terms."2 

General  Grant  on  March  9,  answered  as  follows : 

"Your  dispatch  of  yesterday  is  just  received.  I  will  do  all 
in  my  power  to  advance  the  expedition  now  started.  You  had  a 
better  chance  of  knowing  my  strength  whilst  surrounding  Fort 
Donelson  than  I  had.  Troops  were  reporting  daily,  by  your 
order,  and  immediately  assigned  to  brigades.  There  were  no 
orders  received  from  you  until  February  28  to  make  out  returns, 
and  I  made  every  effort  to  get  them  in  as  early  as  possible.  I 
have  always  been  ready  to  move  anywhere,  regardless  of  conse 
quences  to  myself,  but  with  a  disposition  to  take  the  best  of  care 
of  the  troops  under  my  command.  I  renew  my  application  to  be 
relieved  from  further  duty.  Returns  have  been  sent."3 

General  Grant  the  same  day  sent  a  further  telegram  giving 
numbers  and  location  of  his  troops  and  stating  that  a  return  of 
his  forces  and  their  location  had  been  mailed  from  Paducah 
March  6.4 

General  Grant  did  not  receive  General  Halleck's  letter  of 
March  6,  until  March  11,  and  at  once  telegraphed  to  him  saying: 

"Yours  of  the  6th  instant,  enclosing  the  anonymous  letter 
to  Hon.  D.  Davis,  speaking  of  frauds  committed  again  Gov 
ernment  is  just  received.  I  refer  you  to  my  orders  to  suppress 
marauding  as  the  only  reply  necessary.  There  is  such  a  disposi 
tion  to  find  fault  with  me  that  I  again  ask  to  be  relieved  from 
further  duty  until  I  can  be  placed  right  in  the  estimation  of  those 
higher  in  authority."5 

In  the  light  of  the  foregoing  letters  and  telegrams  it  is  dif 
ficult  to  resist  the  impression  that  there  was  a  disposition  on  the 
part  of  some  of  General  Grant's  superiors  to  find  fault  with  him, 
to  belittle  his  achievements  and  to  check  his  growing  fame.  Gen 
eral  Halleck  while  he  had  at  first  denounced  as  preposterous 

T     W~R.  R.  10,  part  2-l.">.  5     W.  R.  R.  10.  part  2-30. 

2.  3  and  4     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-21. 


88  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGN? 

General  Grant's  suggestions  of  the  movement  against  Forts 
Henry  and  Donelson,  when  it  had  succeeded  claimed  the  honor 
and  glory  of  it.  February  17,  almost  immediately  on  receipt  of 
General  Grant's  dispatch  announcing  the  capture  of  Fort  Donel 
son,  he  telegraphed  to  General  McClellan:  "Make  Buell,  Grant 
and  Pope  Major  Generals  of  volunteers  and  give  me  command 
in  the  west.  I  ask  this  in  return  for  Forts  Henry  and  Donel 
son."1 

Two  days  afterwards,  he  telegraphed  to  General  McClellan, 
saying  that  "Brigadier  General  Charles  F.  Smith  by  his  coolness 
and  bravery  at  Fort  Donelson  when  the  battle  was  against  us 
turned  the  tide  and  carried  the  enemy's  out  works,  make  him  a 
major  general."2  Not  one  word  about  General  Grant  who  had 
given  General  Smith  the  orders  to  charge  the  enemy's  works. 
On  the  same  day  he  telegraphed  to  General  Hunter,  saying :  "To 
you  more  than  to  any  other  man  out  of  this  department  are  we 
indebted  for  our  success  at  Fort  Donelson.  In  my  strait  for 
troops  to  reinforce  General  Grant  I  appealed  to  you.  You  re 
sponded  nobly  and  generously."8  When  on  the  same  day  he  is 
sued  an  order  congratuating  the  victors  "on  the  recent  victories 
on  the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland,"  he  named  Flag  Officer  Foote 
before  General  Grant.4  In  fact  we  seek  in  vain  among  the  pub 
lished  official  reports  and  correspondence  for  one  word  from 
General  Halleck  in  specific  commendation  of  General  Grant  for 
the  brilliant  successes  at  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson.  General 
Buell  seems  to  have  ignored  him  altogether.  Can  it  be  that  these 
distinguished  generals  were  piqued  at  General  Grant's  victories, 
secretly  jealous  of  his  growing  fame,  and  willing  to  listen  to  re 
ports  and  rumors  to  his  discredit? 

There  was  one  general,  however,  who  seemed  to  have  been 
impressed  by  the  superior  military  qualities  General  Grant  had 
exhibited  and  who  wrote  him  a  kind  letter.  That  General  was  W. 
T.  Sherman.  The  letter  cannot  be  found,  but  its  character  can  be 
partly  judged  by  General  Grant's  reply  in  which  he  said  February 
19,  1862.  "I  feel  under  many  obligations  to  you  for  the  kind  tone 
of  your  letter,  and  hope  that,  should  an  opportunity  occur,  you 
will  win  for  yourself  the  promotion  you  are  kind  enough  to  say 
belongs  to  me.  I  care  nothing  for  promotion  so  long  as  our  arms 
are  successful  and  no  political  appointments  are  made."5 

Perhaps  these  interchanges  were  the  begining  of  that  mu 
tual  understanding  and  appreciation,  and  that  close  mutual  con 
fidence  which  brought  success  to  our  arms  and  before  the  end 

1  W.  R.  R.  7-028.  4     W.  R.  R.  7-638. 

2  W.  R.  R.  7-637.  5     W.  R.  R.  7-638. 

3  W  .R.  R.  7-636. 


ADVANCE  ON  BOWLING  GREEN  AND  NASHVILLE  89 

came  made  these  two  men  the  great  commanding  figures  of  the 
war. 

It  is  reasonable  to  suppose  that  President  Lincoln  had  heard 
the  reports  derogatory  to  General  Grant,  and  did  not  propose 
to  have  the  only  general  who  had  won  a  great  victory  condemned 
without  a  thorough  understanding  of  all  the  facts.  March  10, 
1862,  he  directed  the  adjutant  general  at  Washington  to  require 
General  Halleck  "to  ascertain  and  report  whether  General  Grant 
left  his  command  at  any  time  without  proper  authority,  and,  if  so 
for  how  long;  whether  he  has  made  to  you  proper  reports  and 
returns  of  his  force;  whether  he  has  committed  any  acts  which 
were  unauthorized  or  not  in  accordance  with  military  subordina 
tion  or  propriety,  and  if  so  what."1 

General  Halleck  by  this  time  must  have  become  convinced 
by  General  Grant's  letters  and  telegrams  that  he  had  been  hasty 
and  inconsiderate  in  making  the  outrageous  charges  against  him, 
and  on  March  13,  in  answer  to  General  Grant's  telegram  of 
March  9,  asking  the  third  time  to  be  relieved,  said : 

"You  cannot  be  relieved  from  your  command.  There  is  no 
good  reason  for  it.  I  am  certain  that  all  which  the  authorities 
at  Washington  ask  is  that  you  enforce  discipline  and  punish  the 
disorderly.  The  power  is  in  your  hands ;  use  it,  and  you  will  be 
sustained  by  all  above  you.  Instead  of  relieving  you  I  wish  you, 
as  soon  as  your  new  army  is  in  the  field,  to  assume  the  immediate 
command  and  lead  it  on  to  new  victories."2 

To  this  last  dispatch  of  General  Halleck,  General  Grant  an 
swered  as  f ollows : 

"After  receiving  your  letter  enclosing  copy  of  anonymous 
letter,  upon  which  severe  censure  was  based,  I  felt  as  though  it 
would  be  impossible  for  me  to  serve  longer  without  a  court  of 
inquiry.  Your  telegram  of  yesterday,  however,  places  such  a  dif 
ferent  phase  upon  my  position  that  I  will  again  assume  com 
mand,  and  give  every  effort  to  the  success  of  our  cause.  Under 
the  worst  circumstances  I  would  do  the  same."3 

March  16,  1862,  General  Halleck  made  report  of  the  inquiry 
into  General  Grant's  conduct  which  President  Lincoln  had  di 
rected  him  to  make,  as  follows : 

"Headquarters  Department  of  the  Mississippi, 

Sain  Louis,  March  15,  1862. 
Brigadier  Gen.  Lorenzo  Thomas, 

Adjutant  General  of  the  Army,  Washington: 

In  accordance  with  your  instructions  of  the  10th  instant  I  report 
that  General  Grant  and  several  other  officers  of  high  rank  in  his  com- 


1  W.  R.  R.  7-683.  3     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-36. 

2  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-32.  Sig.   4 


90  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

mand,  immediately  after  the  battle  of  Fort  Donelson,  went  to  Nashville 
without  my  authority  or  knowledge.  I  am  satisfied,  however,  from 
investigation,  that  General  Grant  did  this  from  good  intentions,  and 
from  a  desire  to  subserve  the  public  interests.  Not  being  advised  of 
General  Buell's  movements,  and  learning  that  General  Buell  had 
ordered  Smith's  division  of  his  (Grant's)  command  to  Nashville,  he 
deemed  it  his  duty  to  go  there  in  person.  During  the  absence  of 
General  Grant  and  a  part  of  his  general  officers,  numerous  irregulari 
ties  are  said  to  have  occurred  at  Fort  Donelson.  These  were  in  violation 
of  the  orders  issued  by  General  Grant  before  his  departure,  and 
probably,  under  the  circumstances,  were  unavoidable.  General  Grant 
has  made  the  proper  explanations,  and  has  been  directed  to  resume 
his  command  in  the  field.  As  he  acted  from  a  praiseworthy,  although 
mistaken  zeal  for  the  public  service  in  going  to  Nashville  and  leaving 
his  command,  I  respectfully  recommend  that  no  further  notice  be 
taken  of  it.  There  never  has  been  any  want  of  military  subordination 
on  the  part  of  General  Grant,  and  his  failure  to  make  returns  of  his 
forces  has  been  explained  as  resultiing  partly  from  the  failure  of 
colonels  of  regiments  to  report  to  him  on  their  arrival  and  partly  from 
an  interruption  of  telegraphic  communication.  All  these  irregularities 
have  now  been  remedied.  H.  W.  HALLECK, 

Major  General. i 

In  the  great  movement  now  under  way  in  which  the  Fif 
teenth  Ohio  was  to  take  an  humble  part,  and  which  had  been  be 
gun  by  the  expedition  up  the  Tennessee  River  which  General 
Halleck  had  ordered  March  1,  that  general  foresaw  from  the  ex 
perience  of  recent  former  campaigns  that  to  fully  succeed,  the 
movements  of  both  his  ond  General  Buell's  armies  should  be 
under  the  command  of  one  directing  mind.  In  this,  putting  aside 
for  the  moment  a  suspicion  of  personal  ambition,  events  showed 
that  he  was  correct.  Full  co-operation  between  him  and  General 
Buell  as  to  details  was  hardly  to  be  expected  and  was  likely  to 
fail  at  the  critical  moments  of  the  campaign.  We  have  already 
noted  a  dispatch  from  General  Halleck  to  General  McClellan  just 
after  the  capture  of  Fort  Donelson  asking  to  be  placed  in  com 
mand  of  all  the  troops  in  the  west.  February  20,  General  Hal 
leck  again  telegraphed  General  McClellan,  that  he  must  have 
command  of  the  armies  of  the  west,  that  hesitation  and  delay 
were  losing  golden  opportunities,  and  asked  General  McClellan 
to  at  once  lay  the  matter  before  the  President  and  Secretary  of 
War.2 

February  21,  he  telegraphed  to  Secretary  of  War  Stanton 
to  the  same  effect,  and  said  he  could  not  strike  a  fatal  blow  unless 
he  could  control  Buell's  army.3 

February  22,  Secretary  Stanton  telegraphed  that  he  had  laid 
the  matter  before  the  President,  who  did  not  think  any  change  in 

1  W.  R.  R.  7-683.     In  this  connection,  see  Grant's  letter  to  Halleck  of  March   22, 

1862.    W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-62. 

2  W.  R.  R.  7-641.  3     W.  R.  R.  7-655. 


ADVANCE  ON  BOWLING  GREEN  AND  NASHVILLE  91 

the  organization  of  the  army  or  the  military  departments  then 
advisable,  but  directed  and  expected  full  co-operation  between 
him  and  General  Buell.1  General  Halleck  seems  to  have  ac 
quiesced  in  this  decision,  still,  however,  adhering  to  his  former 
opinions.2 

General  Halleck  was  very  desirious  that  General  Buell 
should  join  him  in  the  movement  up  the  Tennessee  River  and  re 
peatedly  pressed  the  importance  of  such  junction  on  the  authori 
ties  at  Washington.  March  2,  General  McClellan  telegraphed 
General  Buell  saying  that  it  was  important  to  isolate  Johnston's 
Confederate  army  from  Memphis  and  Columbus,  and  directing 
him  to  arrange  details  with  Halleck,  co-operate  fully  with  him 
and  give  him  all  the  assistance  he  could.3  General  Buell  an 
swered  this  dispatch  saying  he  could  not  get  exactly  at  what  Hal 
leck  was  doing  and  therefore  coud  not  see  how  he  could  assist 
him  at  that  time  even  if  he  should  need  it.4  General  Buell  seems 
to  have  been  possessed  with  the  apprehension  that  General  John 
ston  would  receive  reinforcements  and  turn  upon  him,  and  that 
he  should  be  prepared  to  hold  Nashville  against  such  possible  at 
tack.  To  these  expressed  apprehensions,  General  Halleck  urged 
that  in  as  much  as  Johnston  had  destroyed  the  railroad  and 
bridges  in  his  rear  he  could  not  return  to  make  an  attack,  and 
urged  General  Buell  to  come  to  the  Tennessee  and  co-operate 
with  him.5  To  this  and  other  similar  suggestions  General  Buell 
gave  no  direct  answer,  but  proposed  a  personal  meeting  with 
General  Halleck  to  talk  over  plans.  General  Halleck  could  not 
leave  his  post  to  attend  such  proposed  meeting.  March  6,  General 
Halleck  sent  a  message  to  Assistant  Secretary  of  War  Thomas 
A.  Scott,  saying  that  it  was  reported  that  Beauregard  had  20,000 
men  at  Corinth  and  was  fortifying,  and  what  a  mistake  it  was 
that  Buell  did  not  send  troops  to  move  with  him  up  the  Tennes 
see  so  as  to  sieze  that  point.  He  added  that  General  Smith  had 
gone  to  seize  it,  but  he  feared  it  was  too  late  and  that  he  was  too 
weak.  He  also  stated  that  he  could  not  make  Buell  understand 
the  importance  of  stratetgic  points  until  it  was  too  late.6 

March  7,  General  Halleck  again  telegraphed  to  Assistant 
Secretary  Scott  saying  he  had  telegraphed  General  Buell  to  rein 
force  him  as  strongly  as  possible  at  or  near  Savannah,  that  he 
should  move  immediately  and  not  come  in  too  late  as  he  had  done 
at  Donelson.7  March  9,  he  telegraphed  to  General  McClellan 
giving  the  reported  strength  of  Smith's  column  and  saying  that 
he  was  too  weak  without  General  BuelFs  aid  to  operate  on  the 


1  W.  R.  R.  7-652.  4     W.  R.  R.  7-679.  6     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-10. 

2  W.  R.  R.  7-660.  ~>     W.  R.  R.  7-682.  7     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-16. 

3  W.  R.  R.  7-678. 


92  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

Tennessee.1  The  same  day  General  Buell  telegraphed  to  General 
Halleck  saying  he  could  move  from  one  side  of  the  river  to  the 
other  at  pleasure,  but  that  an  attempt  to  move  on  both  sides  might 
result  in  the  armies  being  beaten  in  detail,  that  the  point  he  had 
suggested  (Florence)  was  the  only  one  from  which  they  could 
operate  centrally,  that  if  this  point  was  not  occupied,  he  might 
detach  too  little  to  serve  Halleck's  purpose  or  so  much  as  to  en 
danger  Middle  Tennessee.2 

To  this  dispatch  General  Halleck  replied  March  10,  saying 
that  his  forces  were  moving  up  the  Tennessee  as  rapidly  as  trans 
portation  could  be  secured,  that  Florence  had  originally  been  des 
ignated  as  the  point  of  concentration,  but  on  account  of  the 
enemy's  forces  at  Corinth  and  Humboldt  it  had  been  decided  to 
land  at  Savannah,  that  General  Smith,  who  commanded  the 
advance,  had  made  the  selection,  and  closed  by  saying,  "you  do 
not  say  whether  we  are  to  expect  any  reinforcements  from 
Nashville."3 

To  this  dispatch  General  Buell  answered  the  same  day  say 
ing  that  the  country  north  of  the  Tennessee,  with  Nashville  as 
a  center,  was  of  vital  importance  and  under  no  circumstances 
should  be  jeopardized,  and  that  it  was  unnecessary  and  inadvis 
able  to  change  the  line  on  which  he  proposed  to  advance  in  a  few 
days,  or  as  soon  as  his  transportation  was  ready.4 

That  evening  General  Halleck  exploded  in  a  dispatch  to  Gen 
eral  McClellan  saying,  among  other  things : 

"I  am  surprised  that  General  Buell  should  hesitate  to  rein 
force  me.  He  was  too  late  at  Fort  Donelson  as  Hunter  was  in 
Arkansas.  I  am  obliged  to  make  my  calculations  independent  of 
both.  Believe  me,  general,  you  make  a  serious  mistake  in  having 
three  independent  commands  in  the  west.  There  never  will  and 
never  can  be  any  co-operation  at  the  critical  moment ;  all  military 
history  proves  it.  You  will  regret  your  decision  against  me  on  this 
point.  Your  friendship  for  individuals  has  influenced  your  judg 
ment.  Be  it  so.  I  shall  soon  fight  a  great  battle  on  the  Tennes 
see  unsupported,  as  it  seems,  but  if  it  is  successful  it  will  settle 
the  campaign  in  the  west.5'5 

This  dispatch  must  have  created  a  sensation  in  Washington 
and  probably  hastened  the  issue  next  day  of  President  Lincoln's 
War  Order  No.  3,  in  which  General  McClellan  was  relieved  from 
the  command  of  all  the  military  departments  and  directed  to  con 
fine  his  activities  to  the  Department  of  the  Potomac.  The  two 
departments  commanded  respectively  by  Generals  Halleck  and 

1  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-22.  4     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-27. 

2  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-22-23.  5     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-24-25. 

3  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-25-26. 


ADVANCE  ox  BOWLING  GREEN  AND  NASHVILLE  93 

Hunter  were  consolidated,  that  part  of  General  Buell's  depart 
ment  lying  west  of  a  north  and  south  line  indefinitely  drawn 
through  Knoxville  was  added,  the  whole  was  designated  the  De 
partment  of  the  Mississippi  and  General  Halleck  was  placed  in 
command1 

March  13,  General  Halleck  kindly  but  perhaps  mistakenly, 
informed  General  Buell  that  the  foregoing  order  would  not  inter 
fere  with  his  command  and  that  he  would  continue  in  command 
of  the  same  army  and  district  of  country  as  before,  so  far  as  he, 
Halleck,  was  concerned,  but  in  order  to  have  perfect  co-operation 
Buell  was  asked  to  report  the  strength  and  position  of  his 
forces.2 

General  Buell  in  compliance  with  such  request  on  March  14, 
reported  an  aggregate  force  of  101,737  in  his  department,  with 
55,000  concentrating  at  Nashville  to  operate  against  the  enemy. 
In  the  same  dispatch  he  stated  that  he  proposed  to  move  in  two 
columns,  one  through  Murfreesboro,  Shelbyville  and  Fayette- 
ville,  the  other  through  Columbia.3 

From  this  it  seems  General  Buell  was  still  insisting  on  his 
own  original  plan,  but  General  Halleck  argued  strongly  that  all 
Buell's  available  forces  should  be  sent  up  the  Tennessee.  After 
two  or  three  days  parleying,  General  Halleck,  March  16,  1862, 
cut  matters  short  and  ordered  General  Buell  to  move  his  forces 
by  land  to  the  Tennessee  River,  directing  his  march  on  Savannah.4 

It  \vas  in  pursuance  of  this  order  of  General  Halleck,  that 
March  18,  1862,  General  McCook,  commanding  our  division,  re 
ceived  the  following  orders  from  General  Buell : 

"Move  steadily  forward  with  your  division  on  the  road  to 
Savannah.  Ford  the  streams  where  they  are  fordable,  and  when  it 
is  necessary  to  make  permanent  repairs  in  the  road,  such  as  building 
bridges  over  streams  which  are  liable  to  frequent  interruptions  by 
high  water,  leave  only  a  sufficient  working  party  and  guard  for  that 
purpose.  As  fast  as  your  supply  wagons  are  exhausted  send  them 
back  for  supplies,  say  about  twenty  at  a  time  in  charge  of  an  officer 
and  escort." 

''The  railroad  will  probably  be  in  condition  tomorrow  to  forward 
supplies  as  far  as  Franklin,  and  in  a  few  days  more  to  Columbia.  You 
will  meet  supplies  at  Savannah.  Use  all  possible  industry  and  energy 
so  as  to  move  forward  steadily  and  as  rapidly  as  you  can  without 
forcing  your  marching  or  straggling.  Send  forward  at  once  to  com 
municate  with  General  Smith  and  learn  his  situation.  It  will  be  best 
to  send  an  intelligent  and  discreet  messenger,  so  as  to  avoid  the 
necessity  of  sending  written  intelligence,  that  might  be  cut  off  and 
reach  the  enemy.  The  messengers  must  be  on  their  guard  against 


1  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-28-29.  3     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-37-38. 

2  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-33.  4     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-42. 


94  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

that.  They  should  try  to  go  through  in  twenty-four  hours.  Let  them 
observe  the  amount  of  forage  on  the  road.  Report  to  me  daily  by 
express."! 

The  movement  southward  from  Nashville  by  General  Buell's 
army  had  already  begun  when  the  above  order  was  issued. 
March  16,  1862,  our  division,  McCook's,  broke  camp  at  Nash 
ville  and  marched  to  Franklin,  Tennessee,  19  miles,  and  went  into 
camp.  The  Fifteenth  Ohio  started  at  8  a.  m.,  and  went  into 
camp  about  one-half  mille  south  of  Franklin.  The  morning  of 
March  17,  at  8  o'clock  we  resumed  our  march.  The  day  was 
sunny  and  mild,  the  road  was  good  and  we  swung  along  at  a 
good  rate  of  speed.  The  country  on  either  side  of  the  road  was 
hilly  and  the  road  went  up  and  down  between  cotton  fields  where 
a  great  many  slaves  were  cutting  and  burning  stalks  and  prepar 
ing  the  fields  for  the  plow  and  another  crop.  The  trees  were 
showing  a  tinge  of  green  and  peach  and  pum  trees  were  in 
bloom.  In  the  afternoon  we  passed  through  the  village  of  Spring- 
Hill  and  after  a  march  of  17  miles  went  into  a  camp  named  Camp 
Kirk  near  Rutherford's  Creek,  where  we  were  when  the  order  to 
move  onward  to  Savannah  was  issued.  We  knew  we  were 
marching  toward  the  enemy,  but  where,  when  and  under  what 
circumstances  we  were  to  meet  him  we  did  not  know. 


1     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-46. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE  CAMPAIGN  WHICH  RESULTED  IN  THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH, 
AND  THE  FIRST  DAY  OF  THE  STRUGGLE. 

WHILE  General  Grant  was  at  Fort  Henry,  suspended  from 
the  active  command  of  the  expedition  up  the  Tennessee  River,  he 
had  put  forth  every  energy  towards  aiding  General  Smith,  who 
had  superseded  him  in  such  active  command,  by  forwarding  re 
inforcements  and  supplies  and  otherwise  carrying  out  General 
Halleck's  orders.  On  March  6,  General  Sherman  who  was  in 
command  at  Paducah  and  had  helped  in  collecting  transportation 
and  in  the  forwarding  of  the  troops,  asked  permission  of  Gen 
eral  Halleck  to  join  General  C.  F.  Smith's  column,  and  at  the 
same  time  informed  General  Halleck  that  the  enemy  had  col 
lected  a  large  force  at  Eastport,  or  at  the  bridge  near  there,  and 
also  at  Corinth,  estimated  at  20,000 ;  that  he  had  transports  for 
the  whole  grand  command  and  that  he  would  send  all  troops  at 
Paducah  to  General  Smith.  General  Halleck  at  once  granted 
General  Sherman's  request  and  sent  a  joint  telegram  addressed 
to  him  and  General  Grant  saying  that  General  Smith  must  ad 
vance  with  great  caution  and  if  the  enemy  was  in  force  at  East- 
port  or  Corinth  the  landing  must  be  below.1  On  the  same  day, 
Assistant  Secretary  of  War  Scott  telegraphed  Secretary  Stanton 
that  the  enemy  at  Corinth  and  vicinity  was  receiving  daily  rein 
forcements  and  that  Halleck's  forces  were  inadequate  for  the 
work  they  were  undertaking.  In  the  same  dispatch  Assistant 
Secretary  Scott  said  that  the  Potomac  column,  twenty  days  be 
fore,  could  have  secured  all  that  country  and  completely  crushed 
secession  in  the  West.1  The  inference  from  this  dispatch  is  that 
reinforcements  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  perhaps  been 
asked  for  and  refused. 

General  Sherman,  with  the  garrison  of  Paducah  organized 
into  a  division,  embarked  March  8,  arrived  at  Fort  Henry  March 
9,  and  at  Savannah,  Tenn.,  March  II.2 

Under  the  direction  of  General  C.  F.  Smith,  General  Lewis 
Wallace  with  his  division  had  effected  a  landing  at  Crump's 
Landing  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Tennessee  and  on  March  11, 
had  sent  an  expedition  out  towards  Purdy  which  destroyed  the 
bridge  across  Beach  Creek  and  a  long  stretch  of  trestle  on  the 
Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad  north  of  that  place.3 

1  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-12-13.  3     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-10. 

2  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-28. 


96  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

March  12,  under  direction  of  General  C.  F.  Smith,  General 
Sherman  was  ordered  to  operate  between  Eastport  and  Corinth, 
at  a  point  about  twelve  miles  from  the  river  in  the  neighborhood 
of  Burnsville.1  General  Smith's  orders  for  this  expedition  are 
not  given,  but  we  learn  from  General  Sherman's  orders  that  it 
was  directed  to  strike  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad  at 
a  point  near  Burnsville  and  to  destroy  some  trestle  work  and  as 
much  of  the  railroad  as  time  and  the  circumstances  would  per 
mit.2 

The  expedition,  composed  of  General  Sherman's  entire  di 
vision  on  nineteen  transports  escorted  by  the  Gunboat  Tyler, 
Commander  Gwin,  started  at  10  a.  m.,  March  14,  from  Savannah. 
It  proceeded  up  the  river  to  the  mouth  of  Yellow  Creek  and  at 
7  p.  m.  debarked  at  Tyler's  Landing.  At  11  p.  m.  in  a  heavy 
storm  of  rain  and  snow  it  started  out  toward  the  Memphis  and 
Charleston  Railroad.  The  advance  of  the  infantry  was  brought 
to  a  halt  four  and  one-half  miles  out  at  an  unnamed  creek  which 
had  been  so  swollen  by  the  heavy  rain  that  it  was  impossible  to 
get  across  it.  Two  attempts  to  bridge  it  were  made  without  suc 
cess.  Scouts  from  the  cavalry  which  had  got  across  returned 
and  reported  it  impossible  to  proceed  further.  The  streams  in 
their  rear  were  rising  rapidly  and  it  was  feared  they  would  not 
be  able  to  get  back  to  the  river.8  The  expedition  therefore  re 
turned  to  the  boats.  An  attempt  to  effect  a  landing  further  up  the 
river  was  made,  but  failed,  and  the  expedition  then  dropped 
down  the  river  to  Pittsburg,  reported  to  General  Smith4  and  was 
directed  by  him  to  occupy  that  place  strongly,5  with  a  view  to 
further  operations  against  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Rail 
road. 

March  16,  at  midnight,  General  Sherman  started  on  another 
expedition  to  cut  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad  which 
also  failed.  March  17,  he  reported  to  General  Grant  that  the 
object  of  such  expedition,  as  directed  by  General  Smith,  was  to 
cut  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad  without  a  general  or 
serious  engagement,  that  this  was  impossible  from  Pittsburg  be 
cause  the  ground  was  well  watched  and  a  dash  could  not  be  made ; 
that  he  had  tried  it  twice,  the  first  time  being  defeated  by  rains 
and  the  second  time  by  coming  in  contact  with  a  cavalry  force  of 
the  enemy,  which,  however,  he  had  signally  defeated.  General 
Sherman  suggested  that  the  best  way  to  accomplish  the  object  in 
view  was  to  make  a  strong  demonstration  from  Pittsburg  on  the 
Corinth  road  and  at  the  same  time  send  a  force  up  to  Tyler's 
Landing  and  push  it  out  rapidly  to  Burnsville.6 

1  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-8.          4     Sherman's  official  Report,  W.  R.  R.   10.  part   I -22-23. 

2  W.  R  R.  10,  part  1-22.          5     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-25. 

3  Sherman's  Memoirs.  0     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-26-27. 


SHILOH  CAMPAIGN — FIKST  DAY'S  BATTLE  97 

On  the  same  day  he  reported  that  Crump's  Landing  was  a 
good  point  from  which  to  move  toward  Corinth.  He  also  re 
ported  that  he  had  just  returned  from  a  reconnoissance  towards 
Corinth  and  Purdy  and  was  strongly  impressed  with  the  import 
ance  of  the  position  at  Pittsburg — both  for  its  land  advantages 
and  its  strategic  position ;  that  the  ground  itself  admitted  of  easy 
defense  and  yet  afforded  admirable  camping  ground  for  a  hun 
dred  thousand  men.1 

The  same  day,  March  17,  Hurlbut's  division,  sent  by  General 
Smith,  reported  to  General  Sherman  and  was  directed  by  him 
to  disembark  and  go  into  camp  on  a  line  perpendicular  to  the 
(Corinth)  road,  about  one  mile  from  the  river.  He  decided  to 
hold  his  own  division  on  the  transports  ready  to  move  promptly 
in  any  direction  either  by  land  or  water.2 

General  Grant  arrived  at  Savannah  March  17,  and  at  once 
reported  his  arrival  to  General  Halleck  and  said  he  would  order 
all  forces  at  Savannah  except  McClernand's  division  to  Pittsburg.3 
He  also  reported  his  arrival  to  General  Sherman  and  said  that 
''although  he  had  been  sick  for  two  weeks  he  began  to  feel  better 
at  again  being  along  with  the  troops."4  The  same  day  General 
Halleck  telegraphed  to  General  Buell  asking  him  if  he  could  not 
extend  a  telegraph  line  from  Nashville  to  Mount  Pleasant  and 
thence  to  Savannah  and  send  his  cavalry  to  open  the  way  to  that 
place  from  Mount  Pleasant  through  Waynesborough.  He  di 
rected  him  to  push  his  troops  rapidly  forward  so  that  the  enemy's 
railroad  communication  could  be  cut.  General  Buell  on  the 
same  day  telegraphed  to  General  Halleck  that  he  had  informa 
tion  that  General  Beauregard  had  moved  on  the  Thursday  before 
from  Corinth  and  Jackson  to  some  other  point,  not  named, — 
probably  Savannah,  with  26,000  men  to  operate  against  General 
Smith  in  anticipation  of  his  crossing  the  Tennessee  River  and 
that  a  part  of  his  force  was  to  strike  the  river  below  Savannah 
and  cut  off  Smith's  transportation.5  To  this  dispatch  General 
Halleck  answered  rather  curtly : 

"I  fully  understand  these  movements.  Move  on,  as  ordered 
today,  to  reinforce  Smith.  Savannah  is  now  the  strategic  point. 
Don't  fail  to  carry  out  by  instructions.  I  know  that  I  am  right."6 

March  18,  General  Grant  reported  to  General  Halleck.  that 
he  had  found  on  arrival  at  Savannah  that  Generals  Sherman's 
and  Hurlbut's  divisions  were  at  Pittsburer,  partly  debarked.  Gen 
eral  Wallace's  division  at  Crump's  Landing  six  miles  below  on 
the  same  side  of  the  river,  General  McClenand's  division  en- 


1  W.  R.  R.  in,  part  1-27.  4     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-43. 

2  W.  R.  R.  10.  part  1-28.  5  and  6     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-44. 

3  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-42. 


98  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

camped  at  Savannah  and  General  Smith's  division,  with  unat 
tached  regiments,  on  board  transports  at  the  latter  place,  and  that 
he  had  ordered  all  troops  except  McClernand's  division  to  Pitts- 
burg,  to  debark  there  at  once  and  to  discharge  the  steamboats  and 
direct  them  to  report  at  Paducah  for  further  orders.  General 
Grant  also  stated  that  he  had  not  been  long  enough  at  Savannah 
to  form  much  idea  of  the  actual  strength  of  the  enemy,  but  felt 
satisfied  that  they  did  not  at  that  time  exceed  40,000  armed  ef 
fective  men ;  that  he  should  go  next  day  to  Crump's  Landing  and 
Pittsburg  and  if  he  thought  any  change  of  the  positions  of  any 
of  the  troops  was  needed  he  would  make  it, — but  having  full 
faith  in  the  judgment  of  General  Smith,  who  had  located  the 
points  of  debarkation,  he  did  not  expect  any  change  would  be 
made.1 

On  March  19,  General  Grant  sent  two  scouts  (Breckenridge 
and  Carson)  to  General  Buell  to  learn  his  whereabouts  and  move 
ments  and  inform  him  that  he,  Grant,  was  massing  troops  at 
Pittsburg,  Tenn.,  and  that  there  was  every  reason  to  believe  that 
the  enemy  had  a  large  force  at  Corinth,  Miss.,  and  many  at  other 
points  on  the  road  toward  Decatur.  He  asked  General  Buell  to 
send  by  such  scouts  any  information  he  possessed.2 

Notwithstanding  General  Halleck's  seeming  disregard  of 
General  Buell's  dispatch  stating  that  it  was  reported  that  the 
enemy  would  try  to  cut  off  General  Smith's  transports  below 
Savannah,  he  reported  it  to  General  Grant  and  observed  that  if 
the  report  was  correct.  General  Smith  should  at  once  destroy 
the  enemy's  railroad  connection  at  Corinth.3  General  Grant  at 
once  telegraphed  to  General  Halleck  that  immediate  preparations 
would  be  made  to  execute  his  "perfectly  feasible  order,"  that  he. 
Grant,  would  go  in  person,  leaving  General  McClernand  in  com 
mand  at  Savannah.4  General  Halleck,  probably  a  little  alarmed 
at  the  promptness  with  which  General  Grant  was  acting  on  his 
suggestion,  the  next  day  telegraphed  him  saying  he  did  not  fully 
nnderstand  him,  and  directing  him  by  all  means  to  keep  his  forces 
together  until  he  connected  with  General  Buell,  who  was  then  at 
Columbia  and  would  move  on  Waynesborough  with  three  divi 
sions  ;  to  not  let  the  enemy  draw  him  into  an  engagement  then, 
but  wait  until  he  was  properly  fortified  and  received  orders.5 

Colonel  McPherson,  chief  engineer,  had  laid  out  what  he 
thought  was  the  proper  line  to  fortify  at  Pittsburg,  but  it  was  too 
far  from  water,  and  as  it  was  intended  to  soon  advance  the 
scheme  was  given  up.  It  was  also  thought  that  the  troops,  which 

1  W  .R.  R.  10,  part  2-45.  4     W.   R.   R.    10,  part  2-49. 

2  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-47.  5     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-50. 

3  W.    R.   R.    10,  part  2-46. 


SHILOH  CAMPAIGN — FIRST  DAY'S  BATTLE  99 

were  largely  new  and  untrained  would  better  be  employed  in 
drilling  than  in  building  fortifications.1  Sherman  in  his  memoirs 
says  he  acted  on  the  supposition  that  they  were  an  invading 
army,  that  their  purpose  was  to  move  forward  in  force  and  make 
a  lodgment  on  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad,  that  they 
did  not  fortify  their  camps  against  an  attack  because  they  had  no 
orders  to  do  so  and  because  such  a  course  would  have  made  their 
raw  men  timid.  He  also  says,  that  the  position  was  naturally 
strong,  with  Snake  Creek  on  their  right,  a  deep,  bold  stream  with 
a  confluent  (Owl  Creek)  to  their  right  front;  and  Lick  Creek, 
with  a  similar  confluent  on  their  left,  thus  narrowing  the  space 
over  which  they  could  be  attacked  to  about  a  mile  and  a  half  or 
two  miles,  and  adds,  that  at  a  later  period  of  the  war  they  could 
have  rendered  this  position  impregnable  in  one  night.2 

March  20,  General  Grant  wrote  or  telegraphed  to  General 
Halleck,  saying: 

"I  will  go  with  the  expedition  to  Corinth  in  person,  if  no 
orders  prevent  it.  Owing  to  the  limited  space  where  a  landing 
can  be  effected  it  will  take  some  days  yet  to  debark  the  troops 
now  there.  (Meaning  of  course  Pittsburg  Landing.)  I  was  in 
hopes  of  starting  out  the  22,  but  now  think  the  23  or  24  will  be 
as  early  as  I  can  get  off.  There  is  no  enemy  on  this  side  of  the 
river  much  before  reaching  Forence.  I  sent  yesterday  two  scouts 
to  find  General  Buell.  They  will  probably  be  back  tomorrow." 
*  *  *  "I  will  take  no  risk  at  Corinth  under  the  instructions 
I  now  have.  If  a  battle  on  any  thing  like  equal  terms  seems  to  be 
inevitable,  I  shall  find  it  out  in  time  to  make  a  movement  upon 
some  other  point  of  the  railroad,  or  at  least  seem  to  fill  the  ob 
ject  of  the  expedition  without  a  battle,  and  thus  save  the  de 
moralizing  effect  of  a  retreat  upon  the  troops.  I  am  very  much 
in  hopes  of  receiving  further  instructions  by  mail."3 

This  letter  or  dispatch  was  sent  to  Captain  N.  H.  McLean, 
one  of  General  Halleck's  assistant  adjutant  generals.  Not  re 
ceiving  any  "further  instructions"  at  the  time,  General  Grant 
March  20,  issued  orders  to  General  McClernand  whose  division 
was  at  Savannah  to  make  immediate  preparations  for  shipping 
his  command  to  Pittsburg  Landing,  and  to  General  C.  F.  Smith, 
who  was  commanding  at  Pittsburg,  to  hold  all  the  command  at 
that  place  subject  to  marching  orders,  with  three  days'  rations 
in  haversacks  and  seven  in  wagons.  He  also  issued  similar  orders 
to  General  Lewis  Wallace,  who  was  at  Crump's  Landing.4 

On  March  21,  however,  General  Grant  telegraphed  to  Gen- 


1  Grant's  Memoirs.  3     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-51. 

2  Sherman's  Memoirs.  4     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-52. 


100  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AM>  CAMPAIGNS 

eral  Halleck  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  move  with  any  celerity, 
taking  artillery,  that  Corinth  could  not  be  taken  without  meeting 
a  large  force,  say  30,000,  that  a  general  engagement  would  be 
inevitable,  and  that  therefore  he  would  wait  a  few  days  for  fur 
ther  instructions."1  The  same  day  he  sent  General  Halleck  a 
dispatch  saying  he  had  just  returned  from  Pittsburg,  that  the 
roads  back  were  next  to  impassable  for  artillery  or  baggage 
wagons;  that  on  the  19th,  thirteen  trains  of  cars,  twenty  cars  to 
each  train,  all  loaded  with  troops,  had  arrived  at  Corinth;  that 
this  indicated  that  Corinth  could  not  be  taken  without  a  general 
engagement,  which,  under  his  (Halleck's  instructions  was  to 
be  avoided,  and  that  this,  taken  in  connection  with  the  impassable 
state  of  the  roads,  had  determined  him  not  to  move  for  the  pres 
ent  without  further  orders.2 

March  22,  in  reply  to  General  Halleck's  telegram  of  March 
20,  above  mentioned,  General  Grant  said  that  the  troops  at  Sa 
vannah  had  been  sent  to  Pittsburg  and  that  no  movement  had 
been  made  at  that  point  except  to  advance  General  Sherman's 
division  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  fortifying  Pea  Ridge.3  The 
same  day  General  Halleck  telegraphed  to  General  Grant  that 
several  regiments  of  infantry  and  batteries  would  leave  that  day 
for  the  Tennessee  and  that  he  proposed  to  fit  out  one  or  more 
heavy  seige  batteries  to  be  drawn  by  oxen  and  asked  if  Grant 
could  supply  the  oxen.4  March  23,  General  Grant  issued  an  or 
der  to  General  C.  F.  Smith,  whom  he  addressed  as  "Commanding 
U.  S.  Forces,  Pittsburg,  Term."  directing  him  to  carry  out  his 
(Smith's)  idea  of  occupying  and  partially  fortifying  Pea  Ridge 
and  saying,  "I  do.  not  hear  one  word  from  Saint  Louis."5  In 
the  same  order  he  informed  General  Smith  that  he  was  clearly 
of  the  opinion  that  the  enemy  was  gathering  strength  at  Corinth 
quite  as  rapidly  as  we  were  at  Pittsburg,  that  the  sooner  they 
were  attacked  the  easier  would  be  the  task  of  taking  the  place 
and  that  if  General  Ruggles  was  in  command  at  Corinth  it  would 
assuredly  be  a  good  time  to  attack. 

In  the  light  of  this  order  one  wonders  whether  General 
Grant,  in  the  absence  of  "further  instructions"  from  General 
Halleck,  was  not  considering  whether  he  should  not  assume  the 
responsibility  and  move  against  Corinth  before  the  enemy  could 
further  concentrate  at  that  point. 

In  view  of  the  great  struggle  which  was  soon  to  take  place 
at  Pittsburg  Landing,  it  is  well  to  take  a  brief  survey  of  the 
ground  back  of  the  landing  and  of  the  positions  in  which  the 

1  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-55.  4     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-57. 

2  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-55.  5     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-62. 

3  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-57. 


SHILOH  CAMPAIGN — FIRST  DAY'S  BATTLE  101 

troops  had  been  posted.  The  point  as  has  been  shown,  was  se 
lected  by  General  Smith  and  occupied  by  General  Sherman  under 
the  former's  direct  orders.  The  course  of  the  Tennessee  at  Pitts- 
burg  Landing  is  nearly  north  and  south.  The  ground  west  of 
the  river  is  about  seventy  feet  above  the  stream,  and  back  of  it 
is  somewhat  broken  and  hilly,  the  hills  rising  to  the  west.  At 
that  time  it  was  mostly  covered  with  thick  woods,  with  cleared 
spaces  between,  and  a  growth  of  underbrush  along  the  smaller 
streams.  On  the  right  or  north  was  Owl  Creek,  a  branch  of 
Snake  Creek — the  latter  a  deep  bold  stream  which  flowed  into 
the  river, — the  two  forming  a  natural  protection  to  the  right 
flank  of  the  position.  To  the  left  or  south  was  Lick  Creek, 
which,  with  a  confluent  similar  to  Owl  Creek,  formed  a  natural 
protection  to  the  left  flank. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  the  Fourth  Division,  General 
Hurlbut's,  was  directed  to  debark  at  Pittsburg  Landing  and  es 
tablish  its  camp  on  a  line  perpendicular  to  the  road  about  one 
mile  from  the  river.  March  19,  General  Sherman  posted  his 
own  division  in  front  of  and  covering  the  entire  camp,  about  three 
miles  back  from  the  river,  the  First  Brigade  at  the  bridge  on  the 
Purdy  road  about  abreast  of  Shiloh  Chapel,  the  Second  Brigade 
on  the  Hamburg  road  where  the  Purdy  road  comes  into  it,  the 
Third  Brigade  on  the  left  of  the  Corinth  road,  its  right  near 
Shiloh  Chapel,  the  Fourth  Brigade  on  the  right  center,  its  left 
reaching  to  Shiloh  Chapel.  Each  brigade  was  ordered  to  en 
camp  to  the  west,  so  that  when  the  regiments  were  on  their  regi 
mental  parade  grounds,  the  brigades  would  be  in  line  of  battle. 
The  intervals  between  regiments  were  not  to  exceed  twenty-two 
paces.1  March  20,  the  Second  Division,  General  C.  F.  Smith's, 
then  commanded  by  Colonel  Lauman  and  afterwards  by  General 
W.  H.  H.  Wallace,  was  directed  by  General  Sherman  to  select  a 
line  for  the  entire  division  nearly  parallel  to  the  river,  about  one 
mile  distant  from  it,  arid  encamp  by  brigades,  so  that  they  could 
promptly  form  line  of  battle  and  move  out  in  such  line  by  the 
road  leading  into  the  interior  as  might  thereafter  be  designated  as 
the  line  of  operations.2  March  20,  General  McClernand  was 
ordered  to  make  immediate  preparations  to  ship  his  division  from 
Savannah  to  Pittsburg  Landing,3  and  a  day  or  two  afterward 
arrived  at  that  point  and  was  placed  in  camp  on  a  line  some  dis 
tance  in  rear  of  General  Sherman's  division  and  somewhat  to  his 
left.  March  26,  General  B.  M.  Prentiss  reported  to  General 
Grant  and  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  a  division  made  up 
of  unattached  troops  at  Pittsburg.  This  division  was  placed  in 

1  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-50.  3     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-52. 

2  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-54. 


102  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AMD  CAMPAIGNS 

camp  to  the  left  of  and  somewhat  in  front  of  General  McCler- 
nand's  division,  so  that  his  division  was  really  between  the  three 
right  brigades  of  Sherman's  division  and  his  left  brigade,  Colonel 
Stuart's,  which  then  was  on  the  extreme  left  guarding  the  ford 
over  Lick  Creek.1 

While  General  Grant's  forces  were  occupying  the  positions 
above  indicated,  efforts  were  made  from  time  to  time  by  scouting 
parties  and  reconnoissances  sent  out  on  the  different  roads  to 
wards  Corinth  and  Purdy,  to  ascertain  the  enemy's  strength, 
position  and  movements,  but  with  little  success. 

March  24,  General  Halleck  telegraphed  General  Buell  that 
it  was  reported  that  Jackson  and  Humbolt  had  been  evacuated 
and  that  the  enemy  had  concentrated  his  forces  at  Corinth  with 
the  intention  of  giving  battle,  that  a  battle  should  be  avoided  for 
the  present  until  a  larger  army  could  be  concentrated  against 
him,  but  if  possible,  without  a  serious  engagement,  the  railroad 
at  Jackson  and  Humboldt  should  be  cut,  and  asked  him  to  trans 
mit  a  copy  of  the  dispatch  to  General  Grant,  as  he  could  be  sooner 
reached  from  Columbia  than  Fort  Henry.2 

The  same  day  General  Buell  telegraphed  from  Nashville  to 
General  Halleck  that  intercepted  letters  from  Corinth  dated  March 
18  and  19  estimated  the  forces  there  at  25,000  to  40,000,  that  re 
inforcements  were  rapidly  arriving,  that  they  expected  to  have 
80,000  to  100,000  men,  and  that  he,  Buell,  expected  a  battle  at 
Corinth.3  March  27,  General  Halleck  had  received  information 
from  General  Grant  and  reported  it  to  the  Secretary  of  War, 
that  thirteen  trains,  twenty  cars  each,  loaded  with  troops  had 
recently  arrived  at  Corinth.4  March  28,  General  Grant  informed 
General  Halleck  that  the  enemy  for  the  last  eight  days  had  been 
evacuating  Island  No.  10  and  concentrating  at  Corinth.5 

General  Buell,  who  it  seems  was  still  fearful  that  the  enemy 
would  move  on  Nashville  by  way  of  Decatur  and  Stevenson, 
reported  his  fears  to  General  Halleck.  General  Halleck  at  once 
telegraphed  him  that  there  was  no  danger  of  the  enemy's  moving 
against  Nashville,  that  he  wished  he  would,  and  directed  General 
Buell  to  concentrate  all  his  available  forces  at  Savannah  or  Pitts- 
burg,  12  miles  above,  and  added  that  "we  must  be  ready  to  attack 
the  enemy  as  soon  as  the  roads  are  passable."6  General  Buell 
acknowledged  receipt  of  this  dispatch  from  Columbia  and  the 
same  day  answered  it  saying  "we  will  waste  no  time."7  March 
31,  General  Grant  telegraphed  to  General  Halleck's  adjutant  gen- 

1  Sherman's  Official  Report,  W.  R.   R.   10,  part  1-248.       5  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-73. 

2  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-64.  6  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-77. 

3  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-64-65.  7  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-77. 

4  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-70. 


SiiiLou  CAMPAIGN — FIRST  DAY'S  BATTLE  103 

eral,  that  two  soldiers  from  the  head  of  General  McCook's  divi 
sion  had  come  in  that  evening,  bearing  General  Halleck's  dis 
patch  of  the  24,  above  mentioned,  and  stating  that  all  the  in 
formation  they  brought  was  that  some  of  Buell's  command  had 
crossed  Duck  River  at  Columbia  on  the  29  and  established  guards 
eight  miles  out.  In  the  same  dispatch  General  Grant  stated  that 
on  April  1,  he  would  send  General  Sherman  with  a  regiment  of  in 
fantry,  two  companies  of  cavalry  and  a  section  of  artillery,  with 
three  gunboats,  up  the  Tennessee  to  destroy  the  batteries  at  Chick- 
asaw.1  This  expedition  got  off  as  ordered  and  found  that  the 
batteries  at  Chickasaw  and  Eastport  had  been  abandoned. 

At  this  time  it  seems  that  all  at  Pittsburg  were  awaiting  the 
arrival  of  General  Buell's  column,  expecting  as  soon  as  it  arrived 
to  at  once  move  forward  and  attack  the  enemy  at  Corinth.  Gen 
eral  Buell,  April  1,  from  Columbia,  85  miles  from  Savannah, 
sent  a  dispatch  to  General  Halleck  saying  that  his  advance  was 
two  days  march  from  that  place  and  that  he  expected  to  concen 
trate  at  Savannah  Sunday  or  Monday.2 

It  is  apparent  from  the  foregoing  dispatches  and  correspond 
ence,  that  it  was  finally  understood  that  the  main  object  of  the 
campaign  was  to  make  a  lodgment  on  the  Memphis  and  Charles 
ton  Railroad,  so  as  to  sever  the  connection  between  the  Confed 
erate  armies  east  and  west,  that  the  enemy  had  concentrated  at 
Corinth,  that  he  was  to  be  attacked  there,  and  that  the  movement 
on  that  place  would  commence  as  soon  as  General  Buell's  army 
reached  Pittsburg  Landing.  There  was  apparently  no  serious 
thought  that  the  enemy  who  were  fortified  at  Corinth  and  ex 
pected  to  be  attacked  at  that  place,  would  leave  so  defensible  a 
position  and  risk  an  encounter  in  the  open.  So,  it  seems  all  plans 
were  made  for  offense  and  not  defense.  Ordinarily,  the  judg 
ment  of  Generals  Halleck,  Grant,  Smith,  Sherman  and  others 
in  this  respect  would  have  been  correct.  But  the  Confederate 
armies  at  Corinth  were  commanded  by  General  Albert  Sidney 
Johnston,  who  was  smarting  under  severe  criticism  for  losing 
Fort  Donelson  and  abandoning  Nashville  without  making  a  vig 
orous  defense,  and  who  thought  by  a  bold  stroke  to  restore  his 
former  military  reputation.  Knowing  that  General  Buell  with 
a  large  army  was  marching  toward  Savannah  to  join  General 
Grant,  he  decided  to  strike  the  latter  before  the  junction  could  be 
effected.  With  this  in  view,  on  April  2,  1862,  he  issued  orders 
to  his  corps  commanders,  Generals  Polk,  Bragg  and  Hardee,  to 
hold  their  commands  in  readiness  to  advance  on  the  Union  forces 
at  Pittsburg  the  next  morning  at  6  o'clock.3 

"~~1     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-82.  3     W.  R.  R.   10,  part  2-383. 

!i     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-85. 


104  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

The  organization  of  his  forces  was,  General  Beauregard 
second  in  command,  General  Polk  in  command  of  the  left,  Gen 
eral  Hardee  in  command  of  the  center,  General  Bragg  in  com 
mand  of  the  right  and  General  Breckenridge  in  command  of  the 
reserve.1  His  command  consisted  of  75  regiments  of  infantry, 
two  regiments  and  fourteen  battalions  of  cavalry,  one  company 
of  dragoons  and  twenty-two  batteries  of  artillery.2  An  abstract 
of  his  field  returns  dated  April  1,  1862,  which  is  incomplete  and 
omits  Breckenridge's  reserve  corps  and  several  other  organiza 
tions,  shows,  in  the  organizations  thus  reported,  an  aggregate 
present  of  45,524.3  It  is  claimed  that  Johnston  in  this  report  in 
cluded  in  his  aggregate  present  only  men  with  guns  in  their  hands, 
while  in  the  returns  made  by  the  Union  forces  the  aggregate 
present  for  duty  included  all  the  men  carrying  guns  and  all  the 
non-combatants  as  well.4 

To  oppose  this  mighty  force  General  Grant  had  at  Pittsburg 
sixty-three  regiments  of  infantry,  two  regiments,  four  batteries 
and  twelve  separate  companies  of  cavalry  and  twenty-one  batter 
ies  of  artillery  ;5  numbering  according  to  General  Halleck's  re 
turns  for  March,  1862,  1583  officers  and  33,600  men,  an  aggre 
gate  of  35,183  present  for  duty  at  Pittsburg,6  which  did  not  in 
clude  General  Lewis  Wallace's  division  which  was  at  Crump's 
Landing  six  miles  below  and  contained  eleven  regiments  of  in 
fantry  two  battalions  of  cavalry  and  two  batteries  of  artillery, 
numbering  by  the  same  returns  an  aggregate  present  for  duty  of 
7,534.7 

The  morning  of  April  3,  1862,  General  Johnston  gave  orders 
for  the  advance  of  his  army  and  by  noon  it  was  well  under  way 
toward  Pittsburg  Landing  only  twelve  miles  away.8  General 
Hardee's  corps  was  in  advance,  then  General  Bragg's,  then  Gen 
eral  Folk's  and  last  General  Breckenridge's  reserve  corps.9  Corps 
commanders  were  instructed  that  every  effort  should  be  made 
to  turn  the  left  flank  of  General  Grant's  forces  so  as  to  cut  off 
their  line  of  retreat  to  the  Tennessee  River,  and  throw  them  back 
on  Owl  Creek  where  they  would  be  obliged  to  surrender.10 

The  movement  of  this  overwhelming  force  on  Pittsburg 
Landing  was  <  unknown  and  unsuspected  by  General  Grant  or 
any  of  his  division  generals.  They  were,  as  before  stated,  quietly 
resting  in  camp  awaiting  the  arrival  of  General  Buell.  The  fate 
ful  hours  passed  in  fancied  security  from  attack,  while  only  a  few 
miles  away  the  enemy,  in  vastly  superior  numbers,  was  bearing 

1  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-3*7.  6  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-84. 

2  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-382.  7  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-100. 

3  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-382.  8  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-3^2. 

4  Grant's  Memoirs.  9  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-393. 

5  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-100.  10  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-397. 


SHILOH  CAMPAIGN — FIRST  DAY'S  BATTLE  105 

down  upon  them.  In  the  meantime  where  was  General  Buell 
and  our  division,  his  advance  troops,  which  we  left  in  Camp  Kirk 
on  Rutherfords'  Creek,  March  17,  1862? 

The  entire  division  remained  in  Camp  Kirk  until  March  20, 
waiting  for  the  rebuilding  of  a  bridge  which  had  been  destroyed 
by  the  enemy..  The  weather  was  clear  and  pleasant  and  there 
was  the  usual  round  of  camp  duty.  On  March  18,  General  Mc- 
Cook  returned  fro  ma  scout  toward  Columbia,  bringing  back  two 
prisoners  and  some  guns  and  horses  which  had  been  captured 
on  the  trip.1  That  afternoon  Captain  A.  C.  Cummins  of  the 
15th  Ohio  started  back  to  Nashville  in  charge  of  an  ambulance 
train.2  On  the  19  there  was  a  rumor  that  John  Morgan  had  at 
tacked  one  of  our  trains  at  Gallatin,  capturing  Colonel  Pope  and 
the  train  guard,  burning  the  cars  and  running  the  locomotive  into 
the  Tennessee  river.3 

That  evening  Gleason  with  the  other  singers  of  the  regiment 
met  in  one  of  the  tents  and  sang  the  old  songs.  General  McCook 
published  an  order  excluding  all  negro  slaves  from  our  division 
and  directing  that  those  already  there  should  be  returned  to  their 
masters.4  March  20,  it  was  decided  not  to  wait  longer  for  the 
rebuilding  of  the  bridge  across  Rutherford's  Creek,  but  to  get 
across  it  in  some  way  and  move  toward  Columbia.  The  15th 
Ohio,  waded  through  the  stream  a  short  distance  above  the  un 
finished  bridge.  The  32nd  Indiana  crossed  on  a  temporary  foot 
bridge  formed  by  planks  laid  on  a  pile  of  drift  near  the  bridge. 
The  stream  had  fallen  and  the  teams  were  able  to  ford  it.  A 
march  of  five  miles  brought  us  to  Duck  River  opposite  Columbia 
and  near  the  ruined  bridge.  Some  of  the  men  had  got  across  the 
river  and  pursued  a  small  detachment  of  the  enemy,  capturing 
four  prisoners  which  they  brought  over  on  a  small  ferry  boat. 
The  regiment  went  into  camp  a  short  distance  from  the  bridge 
and  was  told  that  the  division  would  remain  at  this  place  until 
the  bridge  could  be  built.  Our  camp  was  named  Camp  Stanton. 
We  remained  in  this  camp  until  March  31,  working  on  the 
bridge,  drilling,  doing  guard  duty  and  when  off  duty  fishing  and 
hunting  rabbits.  On  two  or  three  evenings  the  singers  voices 
were  heard  singing  the  then  popular  songs.  There  were  the 
usual  number  of  camp  rumors.  One  was  that  Richmond  had 
been  taken,  another,-  that  our  brigade  had  been  ordered  to  report 
to  General  Grant  at  Savannah,  and  still  another  that  it  was  to 
be  broken  up  and  the  15th  Ohio  sent  to  Chicago  to  guard  pris 
oners.5  March  28  a  squad  of  soldiers  from  various  regiments 

1  Gleason's  Diary.  3     Morgan's  Report,  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-31. 

2  McConnell's  Diary.  4  and  5     Gleason's  Diary. 


106  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AMD  CAMPAIGNS 

of  the  division  was  marched  through  the  camp  to  the  tune  of 
the  Rogue's  March.  The  heads  of  all  had  been  closely  shaven, 
that  of  the  foremost  man  was  bare  and  the  hats  of  the  others 
were  trimmed  with  chicken  feathers  and  wings.  It  was  their 
punishment  for  depredations  of  some  sort.1 

March  2\)  while  some  of  the  men  were  watching  the  work 
on  the  bridge,  General  Nelson  came  riding  down  toward  the 
river  and  without  pausing  pushed  into  the  stream  and  waded 
across  followed  by  his  entire  division.  When  we  had  partially 
recovered  from  the  surprise  and  mortification  of  seeing  other 
troops  take  the  advance,  we  saw  that  the  movement  had  been  well 
planned  beforehand.  Cavalrymen  had  taken  post  in  the  river 
to  guide  the  men  away  from  the  deeper  places  in  the  stream,  and 
the  men  had  taken  off  their  trousers  and  drawers  and  carried 
them  in  bundles  on  their  bayonets.  How  this  came  about  is  re 
lated  in  the  following  extracts  from  the  diary  of  General  Ammen 
who  commanded  a  brigade  in  Nelson's  division. 

"March  27,— late  in  the  evening  General  Nelson  informed  me 
that  he  had  General  Buell's  permission  to  take  the  advance  and  gave 
me  a  verbal  order  to  cross  Duck  Creek  at  daylight  the?  29th.  1  inquired 
if  the  bridge  would  be  done.  He  answered  'No.'  Are  there  boats?  He 
said  'No,  but  the  river  is  falling;  and,  d-— n  you,  get  over,  for  we 
must  have  the  advance  and  get  the  glory.'  He  enjoined  secrecy,  lest 
we  should  be  prevented  taking  the  advance." 

"March  28 — Went  to  Duck  River  to  examine  fords;  sent  some 
of  my  cavalry  in;  river  200  yards  or  more  wide;  fords  crooked.  For 
tunately,  some  army  wagons  return  with  forage  and  ford  the  river; 
the  water  just  touches  the  beds  of  the  wagons;  current  strong;  water 
above  and  below,  deep;  no  boats." 

"March  29, — Reveille  at  3  A.  M.  breakfast,  wagons  loaded,  column 
formed;  march  commenced  before  it  is  light;  reach  the  ford,  the 
men  are  ordered  to  make  bundle  of  pantaloons,  drawers,  etc.,  attach 
it  to  their  bayonets,  and  wade  the  stream.  Cavalry  were  stationed  in 
the  river  to  point  out  the  ford,  break  the  force  of  the  current,  and  pro 
tect  the  infantry  if  necessary.  The  Tenth  Brigade  (Ammens) — infantry 
and  artillery  and  train — crossed  Duck  River  this  cold  and  disagreeable 
day  without  accident:  went  two  miles  southwest  of  Columbia,  Tenn., 
and  encamped. "2 

The  other  brigades  of  Nelson's  division  which  were  en 
camped  ten  miles  back  moved  up,  waded  the  river  and  next  day 
were  followed  by  Crittenden's  division,8  and  we  thus  lost  our 
place  as  the  advance  division  of  General  Buell's  army.  To  say 
that  our  officers  and  men  were  deeply  chagrined  and  mortified 
but  feebly  expresses  their  feeling  at  the  time.  But  we  now  see 
that  if  all  General  Buell's  troops  then  at  or  near  Columbia  had 
waited  until  the  bridge  across  Duck  River  at  that  place  had  been 

1  Reason's  Diary.  3     W.  U.  R.  10,  part  1-330. 

2  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-329-330. 


SiiiLon  CAMPAIGN — FIRST  DAY'S  BATTLE  107 

completed,  the  battle  of  Shiloh  would  probably  have  been  won 
without  their  aid,  or  irretrievable  lost. 

On  one  of  the  days  while  a  detachment  from  our  regiment 
was  working  on  the  bridge.  Generals  Buell.  Crittenden  and  Mc- 
Cook  came  to  the  river  and  looked  on  for  a  while.1  We  worked 
on  the  bridge  on  the  30,  and  on  the  31  until  noon,  when  an  order 
came  to  move.  \Ye  at  once  returned  to  camp,  struck  tents  and 
at  3  p.  m.  crossed  the  river  on  the  bridge,  marched  through 
Columbia  and  two  miles  beyond  it  and  halted  for  the  night. 
April  1,  at  9  a.  m..  the  regiment  resumed  its  march.  At  3  p.  m. 
we  passed  through  Mount  Pleasant  and  in  the  evening  encamped 
on  a  beautiful  little  stream  called  Bigbee  Creek,  having  marched 
fourteen  miles.2 

April  2.  was  fair  and  warm.  Reveille  sounded  at  4  a.  m. 
and  at  6  a.  m.  we  resumed  our  march.  Our  course  was  south 
westerly  through  a  hilly  region.  The  road  followed  a  tortuous 
valley  for  some  distance  then  wound  partly  around  a  hill  until 
it  reached  the  very  top  where  it  followed  a  high  tableland.  We 
passed  through  a  little  village  called  Summertown,  a  summer  re 
sort  where  there  was  a  fine  spring,  and  on  to  Big  Buffalo  Creek 
where  we  went  into  camp.2  The  days  march  15  miles.3  That 
evening  the  paymaster  was  in  camp  and  paid  off  five  of  the  com 
panies.  Later  in  the  evening  the  regimental  quartette  got  to 
gether  in  one  of  the  tents  and  sang,  mingling  their  voices  with 
the  gentle  murmurs  of  Buffalo  Creek.  Before  they  again  met 
events  were  to  occur  which  would  cause  them  to  strike  minor 
chords  in  their  melodies. 

April  3,  two  more  companies  were  paid  off  and  at  9  a.  m. 
we  resumed  our  march.  It  was  said  we  were  to  march  seven 
miles  and  then  halt  to  await  the  coming  up  of  the  supply  trains. 
After  marching  six  miles  the  brigade  turned  into  a  field  near 
Little  Buffalo  Creek,  to  go  into  camp,  as  we  supposed.  Our  halt, 
however,  was  short  and  we  marched  steadily  on.  Where  the  ad 
vance  troops  had  encamped  the  woods  were  on  fire  in  many  places 
and  the  smoke  made  the  marching  disagreeable.  We  plodded  on 
and  on  until  after  dark  and  at  last  turned  into  camp  near  Pardee's 
Furnace,  having  marched  twenty  miles.4 

April  4,  we  resumed  our  march  at  8  :30  a.  m.  Six  miles  out 
we  passed  through  Waynesborough,  a  village  of  about  600  in 
habitants,  and  then  turned  into  the  Savannah  road.  There  was 
now  no  doubt  as  to  our  destination.  We  moved  forward  rapidly 
and  after  a  day's  march  of  14  miles,  halted  at  Hardin's  Creek  and 

1  MoConneM's  Diary.  3     McConnell's  Diary. 

2  Gleason's  Diary.  4     (Reason's  Diary. 


108  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

went  into  camp  for  the  night.  That  evening  the  remaining  com 
panies  of  the  regiment  were  paid  off. 

April  5,  we  got  started  at  7  a.  m.  our  brigade  being  in  the 
advance  of  the  division.  It  had  rained  in  the  night  and  the  roads 
were  very  bad.  Our  march  was  very  slow  with  frequent  halts 
and  after  going  about  seven  miles  the  brigade  turned  into  a  little 
nook  where  we  remained  during  the  night. 

The  morning  of  April  6,  1862,  we  were  still  twenty  miles 
from  Savannah  an  dthirty-two  miles  fro  mPittsburg  Landing. 
The  regiment  was  up  at  6  a.  m.  and  about  7  a.  m.  started  on  its 
last  lap  toward  Savannah.  The  roads  were  the  worst  we  had  ever 
travelled  over.  When  we  had  gone  about  two  miles  we  began 
to  hear  distant  reverberations,  either  thunder  or  cannon,  in  the 
direction  of  the  Tennessee  River.  Colonel  Willich  of  the  32nd 
Indiana  was  seen  to  dig  a  small  hole  in  the  ground  with  his  sword 
and  lie  down  with  his  ear  over  it.  It  was  soon  understood  that 
the  sounds  were  sounds  of  cannon  and  a  little  later  it  was  re 
ported  that  a  battle  was  going  on  somewhere  in  the  region  towards 
which  we  were  marching. 

The  cannonading  continued  as  we  tramped  along  through 
the  mud  and  grew  more  distinct  and  louder  as  we  approached 
Savannah.  Reports  came  that  our  forces  had  at  first  been  driven 
back,  but  afterwards  had  rallied  and  driven  back  the  enemy.  The 
following  account  of  this  day's  march  is  taken  from  a  letter  of 
Captain  Carroll  to  his  wife  written  just  after  the  battle  of  Shiloh. 

"Shortly  after  we  heard  the  cannonading,  an  order  came  di 
recting  us  to  leave  our  baggage  train  and  everything  else  except 
what  was  needed  in  action  and  march  with  all  speed  to  Savan 
nah.  We  had  not  gone  far  before  another  order  came  directing 
us  to  halt  and  wait  for  our  trains  to  come  up.  This  led  to  the  be 
lief  on  the  part  of  some  that  the  noise  we  were  hearing  was  only 
a  little  fight  between  some  of  our  gunboats  and  some  batteries  of 
the  enemy  along  the  river.  The  train  soon  came  up,  the  men 
were  supplied  with  three  days'  rations  and  we  resumed  our  old 
slow  march,  halting  every  few  hundred  yards  to  let  the  wagons 
pass  over  a  mud  hole.  We  continued  this  slow  march  for  two 
hours  when  another  order  came  to  leave  every  thing  and  report 
at  Savannah  as  soon  as  possible.  This  had  the  effect  of  arousing 
our  spirits  and  quickening  our  steps  and  we  pushed  on  over  the 
worst  roads  I  ever  saw.  We  reached  Savannah  about  11  o'clock 
p.  m.1  and  stacked  arms  in  the  middle  of  the  street.  It  com 
menced  raining  and  rained  hard  all  night.  We  were  without 
shelter  and  everyone  was  wet  to  the  skin." 

1     Gleason  says  12  o'clock  and  McConnell  3  a.  m. 


SIIILOH  CAMPAIGN — FIRST  DAY'S  BATTLE  109 

In  the  preceding  pages  we  have  shown  the  strength  and  dis 
position  of  the  Union  forces  at  Pittsburg  Landing,  their  non- 
apprehension  of  an  attack  by  the  enemy,  and  that  on  the  morning 
of  April  3,  the  Confederate  forces  were  moving  upon  them  in 
overwhelming  force.  This  was  not  meant  to  imply  that  General 
Grant's  army  was  not  watchful  in  guarding  against  surprise. 

At  midnight,  April  2,  Colonel  Taylor  of  the  Fifth  Ohio 
Cavalry,  with  four  hundred  men  of  his  command,  under  orders 
of  General  Sherman,  went  out  on  a  scout  on  the  Corinth  road. 
Colonel  Smith's  regiment  of  Zouaves  had  preceded  them  at  8 
o'clock  with  directions  to  post  the  command  in  ambush  at  Greer's 
House  on  Lick  Creek.  Colonel  Taylor  was  directed  after  going 
some  distance  on  the  Corinth  road  to  turn  toward  Greer's. 
Colonel  Smith,  after  going  about  four  miles  on  the  Corinth  road, 
halted  until  daylight.  About  a  mile  and  a  half  beyond  Chambers 
House  he  came  on  the  enemy's  pickets,  wounded  one  and  cap 
tured  another.  His  troops  chased  the  enemy's  pickets  some  dis 
tance  and  found  fifteen  of  his  cavalry  posted  a  mile  and  a  half 
from  Greer's  House.  Marching  on  toward  Greer's  and  finding 
no  trace  of  the  enemy,  the  command  returned  to  camp.1 

April  3,  Colonel  Buckland's  brigade  of  Sherman's  division 
was  sent  out  three  miles  to  his  front  on  the  Corinth  road  for 
drill  and  instructions,  and  to  arrest  and  bring  in  any  suspicious 
characters.2 

April  4,  General  Sherman  issued  orders  directing  that  in 
case  of  an  alarm  day  or  night,  regiments  and  brigades  should 
form  on  their  parade  grounds  and  await  orders.  In  case  of  an 
attack  on  the  advanced  pickets  they  were  directed  to  fire  and  fall 
back  on  the  guard  posted  between  them  and  the  main  brigade 
guard.  This  guard  was  to  hold  its  ground  and  if  necessary  be 
re-inforced  from  the  nearest  regiment  by  the  commanding  officer 
of  the  brigade.  In  no  event  was  a  brigade  commander  to  go 
beyond  his  advance  pickets  without  orders  from  his  division 
commander,  as  thereby  the  advantage  of  position  and  artillery 
would  be  lost.3 

April  4,  the  enemy's  cavalry  attacked  General  Sherman's 
pickets  two  miles  out  on  the  Corinth  road,  and  captured  an 
officer  and  seven  men.  Colonel  Buckland  sent  out  a  company  to 
re-inforce  the  pickets  and  then  followed  it  with  a  regiment. 
General  Sherman,  fearing  Colonel  Buckland  might  be  worsted, 
called  out  his  entire  brigade  and  advanced  some  four  or  five 
miles  when  the  cavalry,  which  were  in  advance,  encountered  the 
enemy's  artillery.  After  dark  General  Sherman  withdrew  his 
forces  and  reported  the  incident  to  General  Grant.4 

1  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-86,  part  2-90.  3     W.  R.  R.  10,  2-92. 

2  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-90.  4     Sherman's  Memoirs. 


110  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

April  5,  there  was  no  unusual  incident  along  his  front  and 
General  Sherman  reported  to  General  Grant  that  all  was  quiet 
along  the  lines,  that  the  enemy  was  saucy  but  got  the  worst  of  it 
the  day  before  and  would  not  press  his  pickets  far.1 

Saturday  evening,  April  5,  General  Prentiss  posted  the  usual 
advance  guards  in  front  of  his  division  and  later,  on  receipt  of 
information  from  its  commander,  sent  forward  five  companies 
of  the  Twenty-fifth  Missouri  under  Colonel  David  Moore,  and 
after  consultation  with  Colonel  David  Stuart,  commanding  a 
brigade  of  General  Sherman's  division,  sent  to  the  left  one  com 
pany  of  the  Eighteenth  Wisconsin. 

About  7  o'clock  the  same  evening  Colonel  Moore  returned 
and  reported  some  activity  in  front — which  was  believed  to  be 
a  reconnoissance  by  the  enemy's  cavalry.  On  receiving  this 
information  General  Prentiss  strengthened  the  guard  stationed 
on  the  Corinth  road,  extended  his  picket  lines  to  the  front  a 
mile  and  a  half  and  extended  and  doubled  the  lines  of  his  grand 
guard.2 

In  the  meantime,  April  4,  General  Buell,  from  a  point  three 
miles  west  of  Waynesborough,  reported  to  General  Grant  that 
he  would  be  at  Savannah  the  next  day  with  one,  or  perhaps 
two  divisions,  and  asked  General  Grant  to  meet  him  there.3 
That  day  General  Halleck  reported  to  General  Grant  that  General 
Buell's  forces  would  concentrate  at  Waynesborough,  that  he  and 
General  Buell  would  act  in  concert,  that  General  Buell  would 
exercise  his  separate  command  unless  he,  General  Grant  should 
be  attacked,  in  which  case  General  Grant  was  authorized  to  take 
general  command.4 

The  Confederate  Army,  which  had  moved  out  from  Corinth 
April  3,  on  April  4  had  reached  a  point  within  striking  distance 
of  General  Grant's  forces  and  orders  were  given  to  make  the 
attack  early  in  the  morning  of  April  5,  in  three  lines  of  battle: 
The  first  and  second  lines  extending  from  Owl  Creek  on  the 
left  to  Lick  Creek  on  the  right,  supported  by  the  third  line  and 
the  reserve.  The  second  line  was  to  follow  the  first  at  a  dis 
tance  of  500  yards,  the  third  line  to  follow  the  second  at  a  distance 
of  800  yards,  and  the  reserve  to  follow  closely  the  third  line.5 
But  a  heavy  rain  on  the  night  of  April  4,  seems  to  have  dampened 
General  Johnston's  ardor  and  the  attack  was  postponed  until  the 
morning  of  April  6. 

The  night  of  April  5,  passed  without  unusual  incident  and 
all  was  quiet  along  the  fronts  of  Generals  Sherman  and  Prentiss. 

1  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-93-94.  3     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-91. 

2  General  Prentiss'  official  report,  4     W.  R.  R.  10,  part,  2-94. 

W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-277.  5     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-386. 


SHILOH  CAMPAIGN — FIRST  DAY'S  BATTLE  111 

The  pickets  were  well  out  and  watchful  and  in  front  of  General 
Prentiss'  division  both  pickets  and  grand  guards  had  been 
strengthened  and  extended.  About  three  miles  away  the  enemy 
in  battle  order  lay  also  quiet,  except  in  front  of  General  Bragg's 
corps,  where  ''continued  firing  by  volleys  and  single  shots  was 
kept  up  all  night  by  the  undisciplined  troops"  in  his  front.1 

The  morning  of  Sunday,  April  6,  dawned  bright  and 
clear ;  the  sky  was  without  a  cloud  and  gave  promise  of  a  lovely 
day.  It  may  be  asserted  with  some  credibility  that  the  battle 
was  commenced  by  the  Union  forces.  General  Prentiss  in  his 
official  report  states  that  at  3  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  April  6, 
Colonel  David  Moore  of  the  Twenty-first  Missouri,  with  five 
companies  of  his  regiment  proceeded  to  the  front,  and  at  break 
of  day,  drove  in  the  enemy's  pickets  and  pushed  forward  and  en 
gaged  his  advance,  commanded  by  General  Hardee.2 

General  Beauregard  in  his  official  report  says,  that  "at  5 
a.  m.  on  the  6th  instant,  a  reconnoitering  party  of  the  enemy 
having  become  engaged  with  our  advanced  pickets,  the  com 
mander  of  the  forces  gave  orders  to  begin  the  movement  and  at 
tack  as  determined  upon."3 

General  Bragg  in  his  official  report  says :  "The  enemy  did 
not  give  us  time  to  discuss  the  question  of  attack,  for  soon  after 
dawn  he  commenced  a  rapid  musketry  fire  on  our  pickets.  The 
order  was  immediately  given  by  the  commanding  general  and 
our  lines  advanced."4  The  discussion  to  which  General  Bragg 
refers  was  doubtless  begun  the  evening  before  when  General 
Beauregard  had  proposed  abandoning  the  attack  and  falling  back 
on  Corinth.5 

General  Hardee,  who  commanded  the  enemy's  first  line,  in. 
his  official  report  says :  "At  early  dawn  the  enemy  attacked  the 
skirmishers  in  front  of  my  line,  commanded  by  Major  (now 
Colonel)  Hardcastle,  which  was  handsomely  resisted  by  that 
promising  young  officer.  My  command  advanced  and  in  half  an 
hour  the  battle  became  fierce."6 

Colonel  Hardcastle,  in  his  official  report  gives  a  graphic 
account  of  this  opening  incident  of  the  battle,  in  which  he 
says  that  on  the  evening  of  the  fifth  he  was  on  picket 
duty  covering  the  front  of  his  brigade  and  about  a  quarter  of 
a  mile  in  front  of  it,  that  just  before  dawn  indications  of  the 
enemy's  approach  were  made  known  by  singular  beats  on  the 
drum  in  their  lines ;  that  about  dawn  the  cavalry  videttes  in  his 
front  fired  three  shots,  wheeled  and  galloped  back;  that  the 

1  General  Bragg's  official  report  W.  R.  R.,  part  1-464. 

2  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-278.  5     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-407,  Grant's  Memoirs. 

3  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-386.  6     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-568. 

4  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-464-465. 


112  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

lines  of  the  enemy  seemed  to  be  about  350  yards  long  and  to 
number  about  1000;  that  he  suffered  them  to  approach  within 
ninetey  to  one  hundred  yards  and  then  fired  on  them  and  returned 
to  his  battalion :  that  the  enemy  opened  a  heavy  fire  at  the 
distance  of  about  200  yards ;  that  he  returned  their  fire  im 
mediately,  and  fought  the  enemy  an  hour  or  more  without  giving 
an  inch,  and  at  6  :30  A.  M.,  seeing  his  brigade  formed  in  his  rear, 
he  fell  back.1 

This  testimony,  besides  showing  that  the  battle  was  com 
menced  by  the  Union  forces,  seems  to  establish  beyond  doubt 
that  General  Prentiss'  division  was  not  surprised  by  the  enemy, 
as  was  reported  in  the  newspapers  shortly  after  the  battle  and 
was  generally  believed.  But  how  was  it  with  General  Sherman's 
division  ?  In  his  official  report  he  says  : 

"On  Sunday  morning  early,  the  6th  instant,  the  enemy  drove 
our  advance  guard  back  on  the  main  body,  when  I  ordered  under 
arms  my  division  and  sent  word  to  General  McClernand  asking 
him  to  support  my  left,  to  General  Prentiss,  giving  him  notice 
that  the  enemy  was  in  our  front  in  force,  and  to  General  Hurlbut 
asking  him  to  support  General  Prentiss."  *  *  *  "Shortly 
after  7  A.  M.,  with  my  entire  staff,  I  rode  along  a  portion  of 
our  front,  and  when  in  the  open  field  before  Appier's  regiment, 
the  enemy's  pickets  opened  fire  on  my  party,  killing  my  orderly, 
Thomas  Holliday  of  Company  H,  second  Illinois  Cavalry.  The 
fire  came  from  the  bushes  which  line  a  small  stream  that  rises 
in  the  field  in  front  of  Appier's  camp  and  flows  to  the  north  along 
my  whole  front.  This  valley  afforded  the  enemy  a  partial  cover, 
but  our  men  were  so  posted  as  to  have  a  good  fire  at  him  as  he 
crossed  the  valley  and  ascended  the  rising  ground  on  our  side." 

"About  8  A.  M.  I  saw  the  glistening  bayonets  of  heavy 
masses  of  infantry  to  our  left  front  in  trie  woods  beyond  the 
small  stream  alluded  to,  and  became  satisfied  for  the  first  time 
that  the  enemy  designed  a  determined  attack  on  our  whole  camp. 
All  the  regiments  of  my  division  were  then  in  line  of  battle  at 
their  proper  posts."2 

Colonel  John  A.  McDowell,  commanding  the  right  brigade 
of  Sherman's  division,  in  his  official  report,  says : 

"At  the  first  alarm  of  the  enemy's  attack  Sunday,  the  6th, 
the  line  of  the  First  Brigade  was  formed,  as  per  previous  orders, 
to  hold  the  Purdy  road' and  the  right  front.  Two  companies  of 
the  Sixth  Iowa  were  detached  to  defend  the  bridge  crossing  Owl 
Creek  and  one  of  the  twelve-pound  howitzers  of  the  Morton 
battery  placed  to  command  the  crossing  on  the  hill  at  the  right 
of  our  encampment.  About  8  o'clock  the  line  was  thrown  for- 

1  W.  R.  R.,  part  1-G02-603. 

2  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-248-249. 


SHILOII  CAMPAIGN — FIRST  DAY'S  BATTLE  113 

ward  to  the  brow  of  the  hill,  and  the  remaining  guns  of  the 
Morton  battery  brought  up  to  command  the  several  openings  to 
the  front,  and  from  this  position  several  shots  were  fired  on  the 
enemy's  masses,  not  then  formed  into  line."1 

Colonel  David  Stuart,  who  commanded  the  brigade  of  Gen 
eral  Sherman's  division  which  was  posted  on  the  extreme  left,  a 
little  to  the  left  and  rear  of  Prentiss'  division,  and  was  guarding 
the  ford  over  Lick  Creek,  in  his  official  report,  says : 

"In  obedience  to  General  Sherman's  orders  I  kept  a  company 
at  and  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Back  (Bark?)  road  (coming  in  on 
the  hills  opposite  and  southeast  of  the  encampment)  as  picket 
guards,  and  on  his  order  on  Saturday  sent  six  companies  out 
on  the  Hamburg  road,  with  a  squadron  of  cavalry  sent  forward 
by  General  McClernand,  to  reconnoiter  beyond  Hamburg.  The 
disposition  of  my  pickets  was  reported  to  and  approved  by 
General  Sherman.  At  7 :30  o'clock  on  Sunday  morning  I 
received  a  verbal  message  from  General  Prentiss  that  the  enemy 
was  in  his  front  in  force.  Soon  after,  my  pickets  sent  in  word 
that  a  force  with  artillery  was  advancing  on  the  Back  (Bark?) 
road,  *  *  *  I  established  my  line  of  battle  *  *  *  with 
the  right  of  the  Seventy-first  Ohio  resting  opposite  the  eastern 
extremity  of  the  Fifty-fifth  Illinois.  *  *  *  I  had  two  com 
panies  of  the  Fifty-fifth  Illinois  and  two  companies  of  the  Fifty- 
fourth  Ohio  detached  as  skirmishers  on  the  hills  opposite  and 
across  the  creek  or  ravine."2 

Colonel  Ralph  P.  Buckland,  who  commanded  the  brigade  of 
General  Sherman's  division  which  was  posted  on  the  right  of 
the  Corinth  road  with  its  left  near  Shiloh  Church,  in  his  official 
report,  says : 

"Between  6  and  7  o'clock  on  Sunday  morning  I  was 
informed  that  our  pickets  were  fired  upon.  I  immediately  gave 
orders  for  forming  the  brigade  on  the  color  line,  which  was 
promptly  done.  About  this  time  I  was  informed  that  the  pickets 
were  being  driven  in.  I  ordered  the  Forty-eighth  Regiment 
(Ohio),  Colonel  Sullivan,  to  advance  in  support  of  his  pickets, 
which  he  did,  but  discovered  that  the  enemy  had  advanced  in 
force  to  the  creek,  about  eighty  to  one  hundred  yards  in  front. 
I  immediately  ordered  the  brigade  to  advance  in  line  of  battle. 
We  had  marched  about  thirty  or  forty  rods  when  we  discovered 
the  enemy,  and  opened  fire  upon  him  along  the  whole  line,  which 
checked  his  advance  and  caused  him  to  fall  back."3 

Colonel  Jesse  Hildebrand,  who  commanded  the  brigade  of 
Sherman's  division  which  was  posted  on  the  left  of  the  Corinth 

1  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-254-255.  3     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-266. 

2  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-257. 


114  FiiTEEXTii  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

road,  its  right  resting  near  Shiloh  Church,  in  his  official  report, 
says: 

"Early  on  the  morning  of  Sunday,  6th  instant,  our  pickets 
were  fired  on,  and  shortly  after  7  o'clock  the  enemy  appeared 
in  force,  presenting  himself  in  heavy  columns  of  regiments  at 
least  four  deep.  I^e  opened  upon  our  camp  a  heavy  fire  from 
infantry  which  was  immediately  followed  by  shell.  Having 
formed  my  brigade  in  line  of  battle,  I  ordered  an  advance.  The 
Seventy-seventh  and  Fifty-seventh  (Ohio)  Regiments  were 
thrown  forward  to  occupy  a  certain  position  but  encountered  the 
enemy  within  300  yards  of  our  camp.  Unfortunately,  we  were 
not  supported  by  artillery,  and  consequently  were  compelled  to 
retire  under  cover  of  our  camp.  The  engagement  becoming  gen 
eral  along  the  entire  front  of  my  command,  a  battery  having  been 
brought  to  support  our  right,  the  Fifty-seventh  and  Seventy- 
seventh  Regiments  stood  side  by  side  for  four  hours,  contending 
with  a  force  of  not  less  than  four  to  one."1 

Lieutenant  Colonel  Robert  A.  Fulton,  Fifty-third  Ohio,  of 
Hildebrand's  brigade,  who  made  the  official  report  for  that  regi 
ment,  says  that  "shortly  after  daylight  on  the  morning  of  the 
6th  the  regiment  was  formed  on  the  color  line  under  order  and 
direction  of  Colonel  Appier."2 

So  it  appears  from  the  foregoing  official  reports  that  there 
was  no  surprise  by  the  enemy  on  any  part  of  Sherman's  line, 
such  as  was  reported  in  the  newspapers  at  the  time.  Such  re 
ports,  however,  continued  so  persistently  that  on  May  2,  General 
Halleck  sent  a  dispatch  to  Secretary  Stanton  saying : 

"Reports  of  the  battle  of  the  6th  and  7th  are  received,  and 
copies  forwarded  as  rapidly  as  possible.  The  newspaper  accounts 
that  our  divisions  were  surprised  are  utterly  false.  Every  divi 
sion  had  notice  of  the  enemy's  approach  hours  before  the  battle 
commenced."3 

As  has  been  shown,  the  battle  commenced  at  the  break  of 
day  in  front  of  General  Prentiss'  division  on  the  left  of  the  Union 
line,  by  an  attack  on  the  enemy's  advance  troops  by  troops  under 
command  of  Colonel  David  H.  Moore.  Shortly  before  6  o'clock 
Colonel  Moore  was  severely  wounded,  and  his  regiment  fell  back, 
reaching  the  front  line  of  Prentiss'  division  about  6  o'clock. 
Here  the  entire  division  was  formed  in  line  and  with  cavalry  on 
its  right  and  left  was  advanced  to  the  extreme  front,  and  shortly 
after  6  o'clock  came  under  the  enemy's  fire  and  received  the 
assault  of  the  enemy,  who  was  advancing  in  three  columns  upon 
its  left  center  and  right.4 

1  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-262.  3     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-99. 

2  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-264.  4     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-27S. 


SIIILOH  CAMPAIGN — FIRST  DAY'S  BATTLE  115 

Prentiss  seems  to  have  held  his  position  until  the  enemy 
passed  his  right  flank,  when  he  ordered  his  division  to  return  to 
the  color  line  of  his  camp  and  sent  word  of  the  movement  to 
General  Smith,  who  he  supposed  was  in  command  of  his  old 
division,  and  General  Hurlbut,  asking  for  reinforcements.  Being 
again  assaulted  by  an  overwhelming  force  of  the  enemy,  he 
ordered  his  division  again  to  fall  back  to  the  line  occupied  by 
General  Hurlbut,  and  at  about  9  o'clock  reformed  to  the  right 
of  General  Hurlbut  and  to  the  left  of  General  Smith's  division, 
which  was  then  commanded  by  General  W.  H.  H.  Wallace. 
About  10  o'clock  Prentiss'  line  was  again  assailed.  Many  of  his 
men  being  for  the  first  time  exposed  to  the  enemy's  fire,  became 
panic-stricken,  and  fell  back  to  the  river.  General  W.  H.  H. 
Wallace  at  this  moment  sent  the  Eighth  Iowa  Infantry  to  rein 
force  Prentiss,  who,  with  its  aid,  drove  the  enemy  back. 

At  this  juncture  General  Grant  appeared  and  on  seeing  the 
disposition  of  Prentiss'  force,  ordered  him  to  maintain  his 
position  at  all  hazards.  He  maintained  such  position  until  4  P. 
M.  when  General  Hurlbut,  on  his  left,  was  overpowered  by 
superior  numbers  and  compelled  to  retire.  When  General  Hurl- 
but  retired,  General  Prentiss  consulted  with  General  Wallace  and 
both  agreed  to  hold  their  positions  at  all  hazards. 

Shortly  after  this  General  Wallace  was  mortally  wounded, 
and  his  division,  except  three  Iowa  and  one  Illinois  regiments, 
also  retired  from  the  field.  Perceiving  that  the  enemy  had 
passed  between  him  and  the  river.  General  Prentiss  sent  an  aide 
for  reinforcements  and  determined  to  assault  the  enemy  with  his 
entire  force.  The  enemy  was  advancing  in  mass,  completely  sur 
rounding  him,  but  he  kept  up  the  fight  until  5  :30  P.  M.  when 
finding  that  further  resistance  would  result  in  the  slaughter  of 
his  entire  command,  he  gave  up  the  fight  and  yielded  himself  and 
2200  of  his  rank  and  file  as  prisoners  of  war,  many  of  them  being 
wounded. 1 

The  same  heroic  resistance  to  overpowering  numbers  of  the 
enemy  was  made  by  the  divisions  of  Generals  Hurlbut  and  W. 
H.  H.  Wallace.  General  Hurlbut,  when  his  division  fell  back 
from  support  of  General  Prentiss,  reformed  his  line  near  the 
river,  and  under  direction  of  General  Grant  assumed  command 
of  all  troops  that  came  up,  checked  the  further  advance  of  the 
enemy,  and  at  dark  advanced  his  line  100  yards  to  the  front, 
threw  out  pickets  and  bivouaced  for  the  night.2 

Colonel  James  M.  Tuttle,  Second  Iowa,  who  assumed  com 
mand  of  General  W.  H.  H.  Wallace's  division  when  the  latter 
fell,  rallied  what  was  left  of  his  own  brigade  and  was  joined 

1  General  Prentiss'  official  report,  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-277. 

2  General  Hurlbut's  official  report,  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-203. 


116  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

by  the  Thirteenth  Iowa,  the  Ninth  and  Twelfth  Illinois  and  sev 
eral  fragments  of  other  regiments,  formed  them  in  line  on  the 
main  Pittsburg  and  Corinth  road  and  held  the  enemy  in  check 
until  the  line  was  formed  which  repulsed  the  enemy's  last  charge 
on  the  left  just  before  dark.1 

Colonel  David  Stuart  who,  with  his  brigade,  held  the  extreme 
left  of  the  Union  line,  after  receiving  word  from  General  Pren- 
tiss,  that  the  enemy  was  in  force  in  his  front,  formed  his  brigade. 
and  sent  forward  four  companies  as  skirmishers  to  the  hills 
opposite  and  across  the  creek  from  his  position,  where  the  enemy 
was  trying  to  plant  a  battery.  The  enemy  succeeded  in  planting 
their  battery  and  opened  fire  on  Stuart's  brigade,  and  under 
cover  of  such  fire  advanced  his  infantry  diagnoally  from  the 
right  of  Prentiss's  division.  Colonel  Stuart  at  once  hastened  to 
the  battery  which  half  an  hour  before  he  had  seen  was  posted 
in  front  of  the  tent  of  Colonel  Rodney  Mason  of  the  Seventy- 
first  Ohio,  intending  to  order  it  further  east  to  a  more  command 
ing  position,  and  found  that  it  had  left  without  firing  a  gun  and 
that  the  battalion  on  its  right  had  disappeared.  For  a  quarter 
of  a  mile  to  his  right,  Colonel  Stuart  says,  no  soldier  could  be 
seen,  except  fugitives  making  their  way  to  the  rear.  A  large 
force  of  the  enemy  was  advancing  due  north  toward  Colonel 
Mason's  camp  and  he  saw  that  his  position  was  flanked  by  an 
overwhelming  force.  Before  he  could  change  his  position  the 
Fifty-fifth  Ohio  had  become  engaged,  but  he  soon  withdrew  them 
to  the  brow  of  a  hill  and  formed  a  new  line.  At  this  point  all 
of  his  brigade  had  disappeared  but  about  800  men  of  the  two 
above  named  regiments.  The  enemy's  force  of  five  regiments 
of  infantry  and  a  battery  of  artillery  which  had  been  moving  on 
his  right  flank  was  here  halted  and  formed  line  of  battle,  a  body 
of  cavalry  was  sent  to  the  right  and  rear  to  cut  off  his  retreat, 
and  a  force  was  sent  to  turn  his  left  flank. 

The  fighting  at  this  point  began  with  the  opposing  lines 
150  yards  apart.  Inadequate  as  Colonel  Stuart's  forces 
were,  he  held  his  position  here  for  more  than  two  hours,  hoping 
to  check  the  enemy's  advance  toward  the  river.  While  in  this 
position  Colonel  Stuart  received  a  message  from  General 
McArthur  to  hold  on,  and  that  he  would  be  supported  on  his 
right.  He,  however,  received  no  support  from  General 
McArthur,  nor  any  one  else.  His  men  had  emptied  their  own 
cartridge  boxes  and  those  of  the  killed  and  wounded,  their  am 
munition  had  become  exhausted,  and  with  the  advice  of  his 
regimental  commanders,  Colonel  T.  Kilby  Smith  and  Colonel 
Malmborg,  Colonel  Stuart  gave  orders  to  fall  back  through  a 

1     W.  R.  R.  General  Tuttle's  Official  Report,  W.  R.   10,  part  1-149. 


SHILOH  CAMPAIGN — FIRST  DAY'S  BATTLE  117 

ravine  and  form  on  a  hill  to  his  right.  But  when  he  reached  the 
new  position  he  found  that  the  enemy  commanded  it.  Where 
upon  he  moved  still  farther  to  the  rear,  by  ravines  and  circuitous 
paths.  On  the  way  a  portion  of  the  Seventy-first  Ohio  joined  the 
command.  Colonel  Stuart  finally  decided  that  instead  of  send 
ing  for  ammunition,  he  would  march  to  .the  rear  toward  the 
river,  which  he  did.  Being  wounded,  Colonel  Stuart  turned  over 
the  command  to  Colonel  Smith.  General  Grant  appearing  at 
this  time  ordered  the  command  into  line  near  the  batteries,  and 
through  the  efforts  of  Colonel  Malmborg  the  remnants  of  the 
brigade  and  other  straggling  troops  were  brought  together  and 
a  line  of  3000  men  was  formed,  which  took  part  in  repelling  the 
last  attack  of  the  enemy  near  the  landing.1 

The  Confederate  lines  which  had  become  heavily  engaged 
with  General  Prentiss'  division  a  little  before  6  o'clock  A.  M.  did 
not  strike  the  three  right  brigades  of  General  Sherman's  division 
until  after  7  A.  M.  (Sherman  says  about  8  A.  M.)  The  three 
brigades  were  posted  as  before  stated.  Taylor's  Battery  was 
posted  at  Shiloh  and  Waterhouse's  on  a  ridge  to  the  left.  Eight 
companies  of  the  Fourth  Illinois  Cavalry  were  posted  in  a  large 
field  to  the  left  and  rear  of  Shiloh  Church,  which  Sherman  re 
garded  as  the  center  of  his  position.  When  he  saw  the  glistening 
bayonets  of  heavy  masses  of  the  enemy's  infantry  to  his  left 
front,  he  rode  to  Colonel  Appier  (Fifty-third  Ohio),  who  held 
the  extreme  left  of  his  front  line,  and  ordered  him  to  hold  his 
ground  at  all  hazards.  At  General  Sherman's  request  General 
McClernand  had  sent  three  regiments  of  his  division  which  were 
posted  to  protect  Waterhouse's  Battery  and  the  left  of  his  line. 
The  battle  opened  on  Sherman's  front  by  the  enemy  throwing 
shells  into  his  camp  from  a  battery  in  the  woods  to  his  front,  to 
which  Taylor's  and  Waterhouse's  Batteries  responded.  General 
Sherman  soon  observed  heavy  battalions  of  infantry  passing 
obliquely  to  the  left  across  the  open  field  in  Colonel  Appier's 
front  and  other  columns  advancing  directly  upon  his  position. 
Infantry  and  artillery  at  once  opened  all  along  the  line  and  the 
battle  became  general. 

Other  heavv  masses  of  the  enemy's  troops  kept  passing 
across  the  open  field  and  directing  their  course  on  General  Pren 
tiss'  division.  General  Sherman,  it  seems,  then  saw  that  the 
enemy  designed  to  pass  his  left  flank  and  fall  on  General  McCler 
nand  and  Prentiss,  whose  line  of  camp,  he  says,  was  almost 
parallel  with  the  river  and  two  miles  west  from  it.  The  sounds 
of  musketry  and  artillery  soon  announced  that  Prentiss  was 
engaged  and  at  0  a.  m..  General  Sherman  judged  that  he  was 

1     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-257-259. 


118  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

falling  back.  About  this  time  Appier's  regiment  broke  in  dis 
order  and  fell  back,  followed  by  fugitives  from  Mungen's  regi 
ment,  the  Fifty-seventh  Ohio,  and  the  enemy  pressed  forward 
on  Waterhouse's  battery.  In  spite  of  the  gallant  resistance  made 
by  the  three  Illinois  regiments,  which  were  supporting  it,  the 
enemy  got  possession  of  three  of  its  guns.  Although  Sherman's 
left  was  thus  turned,  he  deemed  Shiloh  so  important  that  he  gave 
orders  to  Colonels  Buckland  and  McDowell  to  hold  their  ground, 
which  they  did  until  10  A.  M.,  when  the  enemy  got  their  artillery 
to  the  rear  of  his  left  flank. 

This  made  a  change  of  position  necessary  and  orders  were 
given  to  fall  back  to  the  Purdy  and  Hamburg  road  and  make 
that  the  new  line.  But  the  enemy  pressed  forward  with  such  vigor 
that  Sherman  was  forced  to  choose  a  new  line  of  defence. 
Hildebrand's  brigade  had  disappeared  from  the  field,  though 
Hildebrand  himself  remained,  but  Buckland's  and  McDowell's 
brigades  retained  their  organizations  and  were  conducted  back 
and  formed  on  General  McClernand's  right.  This,  Sherman 
says,  was  about  10:30  A.  M.  The  enemy  then  made  a  furious 
attack  on  General  McClernand's  whole  front.  At  an  opportune 
time,  General  Sherman  with  McDowell's  brigade  charged  against 
the  left  flank  of  the  enemy  and  drove  him  back  for  some  distance. 
At  this  point  in  the  battle.  General  Grant  visited  this  part  of  the 
line  and  presumably  told  Sherman  and  McClernand  to  hold  hard 
as  he  had  sent  Colonel  McPherson  and  another  staff  officer  to 
hurry  up  General  Lewis  Wallace's  division.  General  Sherman 
says  he  and  General  McClernand,  acting  in  perfect  concert,  held 
this  line  for  four  hours,  sometimes  gaining  and  at  other  times 
losing  ground.  But  about  4  P.  M.  it  was  known  that  General 
Hurlbut  had  been  driven  back  to  the  river,  and  Generals  Sher 
man  and  McClernand,  knowing  that  General  Wallace  was  on  the 
way  from  Crump's  landing,  selected  a  new  line  of  defence,  with 
its  right  covering  the  bridge  by  which  General  Wallace  had  to 
approach.  They  fell  back  to  this  line  as  well  as  they  could, 
gathering  in  addition  to  their  own  such  scattered  forces  as  they 
could  find.  The  enemy  pressed  upon  them  with  fury,  charging 
with  his  cavalry,  but  was  checked  by  the  timely  arrival  of  two 
batteries  of  artillery.  General  McClernand's  division  charged  the 
enemy  and  drove  him  back  into  the  ravines  to  the  front  and  right, 
and  there  the  battle  on  the  right  ended  for  the  day.1 

General  Wallace's  division  arrived  from  Crump's  Landing 
after  dark  and  formed  line  to  Sherman's  right  and  rear.  General 
Wallace  had  mistaken  General  Grant's  orders,  had  taken  the 


1     Sherman's  official  report,  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-248. 


SHILOII  CAMPAIGN — FIISST  DAY'S  BATTLE  119 

wrong  road  and  thus  missed  a  great  opportunity.  If  he  had 
taken  the  right  road  he  would  have  arrived  on  the  field  in  the 
thick  of  the  fight  and  his  eight  thousand  seasoned  troops,  which 
had  gone  through  the.  ordeal  of  Fort  Donelson,  would  probably 
have  turned  the  tide  of  battle  in  favor  of  the  Union.  He  was 
charged  with  failure  to  obey  General  Grant's  orders  to  move 
by  the  river  road,  and  separate  reports  made  by  Colonel,  after 
wards,  General,  McPherson,  Major  W.  R.  Rowley  and  Cap 
tain,  afterwards,  General,  John  A.  Rawlins,  seem  to  support 
the  charge.1  But  General  Grant  in  his  Memoirs,  not  wishing  to 
do  any  one  an  injustice,  says  that  General  Wallace  under  the 
circumstances  may  have  been  justified  in  taking  the  road  he  did.- 
The  night  of  April  6,  the  troops  of  both  armies  bivouaced 
on  the  field  in  the  midst  of  a  pouring  rain.  The  woods,  ravines 
and  fields,  in  the  limited  space  over  which  the  battle  had  raged, 
were  filled  with  the  dead  and  dying,  but  the  survivors  slept  the 
sleep  of  exhaustion,  broken  only  by  the  shells  of  the  gunboats, 
which  at  intervals  during  the  night  were  fired  from  the  river  to 
ward  the  Confederate  camps. 

1  W.  R.  B.  10.  part  1-177  to  188. 

2  Grant's  Memoirs. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE  SECOND  DAY  OF  THE  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH. 

In  the  preceding  chapter  we  left  the  opposing  armies 
bivouaced  in  the  rain  on  the  field  where  the  fierce  and  bloody 
struggle  of  April  6,  had  taken  place. 

General  Grant's  forces  had  been  driven  back  to  near  Pitts- 
burg  Landing.  The  left  of  his  line  rested  near  the  river  where 
it  was  protected  by  a  ravine  at  the  mouth  of  which  the  gunboats 
Lexington  and  Tyler,  all  night  long,  at  intervals,  sent  shells  into 
the  enemy's  camps.  The  line  extended  nearly  due  west  along 
the  main  Pittsburg  and  Corinth  road  and  on  to  the  Savannah 
and  Hamburg  road,  and  thence  northwesterly  along  the  latter 
road  to  near  Owl  Creek,  covering  the  bridge  across  the  stream 
over  which  General  Lewis  Wallace's  division  arrived  during  the 
night. 

The  advance  brigade  of  Nelson's  division,  Buell's  army, 
reached  Savannah  about  noon  April  5,  and  went  into  camp.  The 
rest  of  the  division  arrived  during  the  day  and  also  went  into 
camp.  General  Grant  knew  of  its  arrival,  but  did  not  order  it 
forward  to  Pittsburg,  because  he  thought  there  would  be  no 
battle  there,  but  that  the  enemy  would  fight  at  Corinth  where 
they  were  fortified.1 

April  6,  after  the  enemy's  attack  had  begun  he  sent  an  order 
to  General  Nelson  directing  him  to  move  his  entire  command  to 
the  river  opposite  Pittsburg.2  The  division  started  at  1 :30  P.  M., 
and  marched  to  a  point  on  the  river  opposite  the  landing  where 
it  arrived  in  four  hours.  At  5  P.  M.  the  head  of  the  column 
crossed  the  river,  marched  up  the  bank  and  took  position  in  the 
road  under  fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery.  By  9  o'clock  the  infantry 
of  the  division  was  all  across  the  river.3  General  Hurlbut  says 
that  at  12  P.  M.,  General  Nelson's  division  passed  through  his 
line  and  went  to  the  front,  when  he  called  in  his  advance  guard.4 

General  Grant,  just  before  dark,  after  the  last  assault  of  the 
enemy  at  the  ravine  near  the  the  steamboat  landing  had  been 
repulsed,  sought  General  Sherman,  told  him  that  he  was  con 
vinced  the  battle  was  over  for  the  day  and  ordered  him  to  be 
ready  to  assume  the  offensive  in  the  morning.  He  said  that  he 
had  observed  at  Fort  Donelson  at  the  crisis  of  the  battle  that 
both  sides  seemed  defeated  and  whoever  assumed  the  offensive 


1     Colonel  Ammen's  Diary,  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-331.  2     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-95. 

3     General  Nelson's  Report.  W.  R.  R.,  part  1-323.  4     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-205. 


SECOND  DAY  AT  SHILOH  121 

was  sure  to  win.1  Though  his  army  had  been  sorely  worsted 
by  the  day's  engagement.  General  Grant  seems  to  have  been 
undismayed'.  Whitelaw  Reid  in  "Ohio  In  The  War"  describes 
him  as  sitting  on  his  horse,  quiet  and  stolid,  near  the  point  where 
the  enemy  was  making  his  last  charge  on  the  left,  and  when 
someone  said  to  him,  "Does  not  the  prospect  begin  to  look 
gloomy?"  answered,  "Not  at  all;  they  can't  force  our  lines 
around  these  batteries  tonight.  Tomorrow  we  shall  attack  them 
with  fresh  troops  and  drive  them,  of  course." 

General  Crittenden's  division  of  General  Buell's  army,  com 
posed  of  General  J.  P.  Boyle's  and  Colonel  W.  S.  Smith's 
Brigades,  the  Third  Kentucky  Cavalry  and  Captain  Menden- 
hall's  and  Captain  Bartlett's  Batteries,  had  reached  Savannah, 
and  on  the  evening  of  April  6  and  all  except  the  cavalry,  embarked 
for  Pittsburg  Landing,  which  place  they  reached  at  9  P.  M.  The 
cavalry  marched  up  the  river  to  a  point  opposite  the  landing, 
and  not  being  able  to  get  boats  to  carry  them  across,  were  com 
pelled  to  hold  their  horses  almost  in  sight  of  the  battle  field,  but 
powerless  to  aid  their  comrades  in  the  fierce  struggle  in  which 
they  were  engaged.  The  troops  arriving  on  the  boats  were  soon 
landed  and  marched  about  a  half  mile  from  the  landing,  where 
they  stood  at  arms  all  night  in  the  road.  At  about  5  o'clock  next 
morning  they  were  placed  in  position  on  the  right  of  General 
Nelson.2 

General  McCook,  in  his  official  report  says,  that  he  arrived 
at  Savannah  with  his  entire  division,  except  the  Second  Kentucky 
Cavalry,  which  \vas  left  to  guard  the  baggage,  at  7  P.  M.,  April 
0.  This  is  evidently  a  mistake,  as  our  brigade  did  not  arrive  until 
much  later,  as  shown  by  diaries  of  Gleason  and  McConnell  and 
letter  of  Captain  Carroll.  Eager  to  get  to  the  battlefield,  he  saw 
that  Rousseau's  Brigade  was  embarked  and,  with  the  Thirty- 
fourth  Illinois,  took  passage  on  another  boat  and  arrived  at 
Pittsburg  Landing  at  5  A.  M.,  April  7th.  On  arrival  he  found 
Rousseau's  Brigade  debarking,  and  as  soon  as  it  was  ashore 
marched  it  forward  to  a  point  where  he  believed  his  troops  would 
be  of  most  service.  Here  he  met  General  Buell  and  was  directed 
to  form  line  of  battle  with  his  left  on  General  Crittenden's  right, 
his  right  extending  in  the  direction  of  General  McClernand's 
division.3  This,  according  to  General  Rousseau's  report  was  a 
little  after  6  a.  m.4 

The  rest  of  Colonel  Kirk's  Brigade  arrived  shortly  after 
wards  and  was  placed  by  General  McCook  in  position  as  a 

1  Sherman's  Memoirs 

2  General  Crittenden's  report,  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-354. 

3  W.  R.  R.   10,  part  1-302. 

4  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-307.  Sig".     5 


122  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

reserve.1  General  Grant  on  the  night  of  April  (>,  had  given 
orders  for  an  advance  next  morning  ''as  soon  as  day  dawned,"- 
and  General  Buell  ordered  Nelson's  and  Crittenden's  divisions  to 
move  forward  "as  soon  as  it  was  light  in  the  morning."-'5 

General  Buell's  three  divisions  may  be  said  to  have  formed 
the  left  of  the  line  and  General  Grant's  divisions  the  right,  bur 
Colonel  Tuttle,  then  commanding  General  W.  H.  H.  Wallace's 
division,  had  collected  all  of  the  division  that  could  be  found  and 
such  other  detached  regiments  as  volunteered  to  join  him  and 
formed  them  as  a  reserve  for  General  Buell.4  General  Buell 
says  he  found  on  the  ground  parts  of  about  two  regiments — about 
1000  men — and  subsequently  a  similar  fragment  of  General 
Grant's  force  came  up,  that  he  directed  the  first  to  act  with 
General  McCook's  attack  and  the  second  was  similarly  employed 
on  the  left.  He  also  saw  some  straggling  troops  of  General 
Grant's  force  immediately  on  McCook's  right  where  some  firing 
had  already  commenced. r> 

The  battle  of  April  1,  was  begun  on  the  extreme  right  soon 
after  daybreak  by  two  batteries  of  General  Lewis  Wallace's 
division,  throwing  shells  at  a  battery  of  the  enemy  posted  across 
a  hollow  in  front  of  a  portion  of  his  line.G  On  the  extreme 
left,  according  to  General  Nelson,  his  division  moving  forward, 
met  the  enemy  at  5  :30  A.  M.,  when  the  action  commenced  with 
vigor.7  General  Sherman  on  the  immediate  left  of  General  Lewis 
Wallace's  division,  at  daylight  received  orders  from  General 
Grant  to  advance  and  recapture  his  original  camps.  He  dis 
patched  several  members  of  his  staff  to  bring  up  all  the  men 
they  could  find,  and  especially  Colonel  Stuart's  brigade,  and  at 
the  appointed  time  (hour  not  stated),  moved  forward  and  re- 
occupied  the  ground  on  the  extreme  right  of  General  McCler- 
nand's  camp,  where  he  attracted  the  fire  of  a  battery  located  near 
Colonel  McDowell's  former  headquarters.  Here  he  waited  for 
the  sound  of  General  Buell's  advance  on  the  main  Corinth  road.s 

About  8  o'clock  the  skirmishers  in  front  of  General  Rous 
seau's  Brigade  of  General  McCook's  division  near  the  main 
Corinth  road  were  driven  in  and  his  line  was  fiercely  assailed. !> 

General  McClernand  had  early  in  the  morning  moved  for 
ward,  attacked  the  enemy,  pressed  forward  and  readjusted  his 
line  just  behind  his  old  camp,10  and  soon  the  battle  raged  along 
the  whole  line.  Our  brigade,  Johnson's  of  McCook's  division, 
commanded  by  Colonel  W.  H.  Gibson  of  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio, 

1  \V.  R.  R.   10,  part  1-303.  6  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-170. 

2  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-109.  7  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-324. 

3  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-292.  8  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-251. 

4  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-149.  9  W.  R.  R.   10,  part  1-308. 

5  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-293.  10  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-119. 


SECOND  DAY  AT  SHFLOH  123 

was  still  at  Savannah  where  it  had  stood  on  the  street  of  that 
village  all  the  night  before  in  the  rain. 

The  Fifteenth  Ohio,  with  the  rest  of  the  brigade,  had  had 
an  early  breakfast  of  hot  coffee,  bacon  and  hard  tack  and  awaited 
orders.  About  9  o'clock  A.  M.,  the  entire  brigade,  consisting  of 
the  Fifteenth  and  Forty-ninth  Ohio  and  the  Thirty-second  and 
Thirty-ninth  Indiana,  marched  to  the  river  and  were  crowded  on 
the  steamer  John  J.  Roe.  While  the  men  were  embarking  the  dis 
tant  boom  of  cannon  at  Pittsburg  Landing  grew  louder  and 
louder  and  boats  were  arriving  from  the  battlefield  filled  with 
the  dead,  dying  and  wounded.  As  the  steamer  left  the  shore  a 
band  struck  up  the  "Marcellaise,"  and  to  its  inspiring  strains  we 
moved  slowly  up  the  river. 

Captain  Carroll,  in  the  letter  to  his  wife  before  mentioned, 
says : 

"The  boat  being  heavily  loaded  moved  very  slowly,  which 
gave  us  plenty  of  time  for  sober  reflection.  There  were  a  great 
many  long  faces,  and  more  serious  looks  would  overspread  the 
countenances  of  the  men  when  a  boat  would  pass  loaded  with  the 
dead  and  wounded  from  the  battlefield."  There  is  conflicting 
testimony  as  to  the  exact  time  at  which  we  reached  the  landing 
at  Pittsburg.  Captain  Carroll  does  not  give  the  hour.  McCon- 
nell  in  his  diary  says  it  was  at  10  A.  M.  Gleason  says  10:45  A. 
M.  Captain  (afterwards  Colonel)  Askew  says  the  steamer 
reached  the  landing  at  Pittsburg  in  about  an  hour  after  it  left 
Savannah.  Colonel  Harrison  of  the  Thirty-ninth  Indiana  says. 
"At  10:30  o'clock,  guided  by  the  din  of  battle  we  moved  upon 
the  field."  Colonel  Willich,  Thirty-second  Indiana,  which  was 
the  first  regiment  to  debark,  says:  "The  regiment  arrived  at  1<» 
A.  M.  at  Pittsburg  Landing  and  marched  up  the  hill,  where  it 
received  orders  from  General  Grant  to  start  immedately  for 
the  field  of  action."  Colonel  Gibson  says,  "We  reached  Pittsburg 
Landing  about  11  o'clock."  It  is  possible  that  Colonel  Gibson's 
statement  is  more  nearly  correct,  and  it  seems  to  be  confirmed 
by  Gleason,  who  was  very  careful  and  methodical,  and  fixes  the 
hour  positively  at  10:45  A.  M.  This  is  partly  confirmed  by 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Blackman,  commanding  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio. 
who  says  "the  command  was  brought  into  action  at  2  P.  M.," 
and  by  Captain  Carroll  who  says,  "the  regiment,  when  it  reached 
the  scene  of  the  conflict  was  formed  in  line  in  reserve  and  listened 
for  two  hours  to  the  din  of  battle  before  orders  came  to  engage 
the  enemy."  The  three  regiments  of  the  brigade  which,  during 
the  engagement  were  under  Colonel  Gibson's  immediate  com 
mand,  were  formed  in  line  with  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  on  the  right, 
the  Thirty-ninth  Indiana  in  the  center  and  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio 


124  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

on  the  left,1  and  the  whole  line  moved  into  action  at  one  and  the 
same  time.  Four  descriptions  of  the  part  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  took 
in  the  battle  of  Shiloh  are  at  hand — a  short  one  in  John  G.  Greg 
ory's  diary,  one  in  Gleason's  diary,  taken  in  shorthand  at  the  time 
and  afterwards  written  out  in  longhand,  one  in  a  letter  of  Captain 
C.  W.  Carroll  to  his  wife,  dated  April  14,  1862,  and  one  in  a 
letter  of  Colonel  Frank  Askew  to  his  father,  dated  April  11, 
1862,  Gregory  says: 

"April  7,  marched  to  the  river,  got  on  the  boat,  started  for 
the  battleground  twelve  miles  up  the  river ;  arrived  on  the 
ground  at  12  o'clock.  Laid  back  one  hour  on  reserve,  then  went 
into  them  rough  shod.  Fought  three  hours ;  drove  them  howling 
back.  Then  we  marched  back  toward  the  river  and  camped. 
We  had  nj  blankets  or  overcoats;  rained  all  night." 

Gleason  says :  ''About  9  o'clock  we  went  aboard  a  steamer 
and  started  up  the  river,  reaching  the  landing  at  10 :45  A.  M. 
The  river  bank  and  the  sides  of  the  road  through  the  bluff  were 
crowded  with  panic-stricken  cowards  who  had  drifted  back  from 
various  regiments  of  Grant's  army,  and  could  only  be  restrained 
from  leaping  on  the  boats  by  a  strong  line  of  guards  with  fixed 
bayonets  at  the  landing.  No  appeals  or  threats  sufficed  to  induce 
them  to  return  to  duty,  and  having  thrown  away  their  arms  and 
accoutrements  it  was  useless  to  waste  time  upon  them.  They 
were  evidently  not  without  some  sense  of  shame,  for  many  of 
them  greeted  us  with  the  most  doleful  accounts  of  the  battle, 
which  were  not  calculated  to  inspire  us  with  courage.  But  the 
boys  sized  them  up  at  once,  and  taunted  them  with  cowardice, 
urging  them  to  fall  in  the  ranks  and  do  their  duty.  *  *  *  We 
marched  at  once  from  the  boat  to  the  front,  only  stopping  near 
the  landing  to  pile  up  our  knapsacks2  and  leave  a  man  to  guard 
them,  and  pushed  on  to  the  scene  of  the  conflict,  a  part  of  the 
way  on  the  double  quick.  \Ve  met  many  wounded  returning 
painfully  to  the  landing,  and  soon  began  to  see  many  dead — both 
Union  and  Confederate,  which  was  not  calculated  to  brace  us 
up  much,  but  not  a  man  flinched.  On  the  contrary  all  seemed 
afraid  of  not  getting  there  in  time.  *  *  *  We  passed  on  some 
two  or  three  miles  and  halted  in  the  rear  of  the  battle  line  under 
cover  of  a  ridge.  After  a  short  rest,  during  which  we  had  lunch, 
we  were  ordered  up  to  relieve  the  force  which  was  then  en 
gaged.  We  advanced  in  line  of  battle  till  within  sight  of  the 
fighting  when,  opening  ranks  for  our  predecessors  to  retire,  we 
took  their  place  on  the  front  line.  While  advancing  in  line  three 
boys  of  Company  H — Philip  Beamer,  Chris.  Harnley  and  Reuben 

1  Gibson's  Report,  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-315. 

2  Colonel  Askew,  it  will  be  noted,  says  we  left  our  knapsacks  with  the  teams  before 

we  reached  Savannah. 


SECOND  DAY  AT  SHILOH  125 

Cremean  were  wounded,  all  in  the  feet  or  legs,  showing  that  the 
enemy  was  firing  low.  About  the  time  we  took  our  place  in 
line  a  rebel  battery  on  our  left  planted  a  shell  which  exploded 
in  the  ranks  between  Companies  H  and  E,  doing  sad  execution. 
Being  but  a  short  distance  from  where  it  struck,  I  witnessed 
most  of  the  havoc  it  wrought.  Corporal  Deniston  of  Company 
H,  was  hit  in  one  foot  by  a  fragment  of  it  and  sprang  up  on  his 
other  foot,  crying  out  in  agony,  and  was  borne  to  the  rear.  Cor 
poral  Campbell  of  Company  E,  was  terribly  mangled,  and  as  he 
was  taken  back  begged  to  be  shot,  knowing  he  could  not  live. 
Others  sustained  severe  or  slight  injuries  which  I  could  not  note 
in  the  confusion.  We  had  been  ordered  to  lie  down  as  soon  as 
we  got  in  position,  and  soon  opened  such  a  hot  fusilade  that  the 
enemy  began  to  fall  back,  as  the  slackening  of  their  fire  indicated, 
and  the  battery  which  had  annoyed  us  so  much  was  soon  silenced 
by  Captain  Cotter's  guns  of  our  brigade.1  The  smoke  from  our 
guns  (caliber  69)  and  the  dense  forest  in  front  prevented  us 
from  seeing  the  enemy  and  we  had  to  guess  at  his  position,  mainly 
by  the  flashes  and  smoke  of  his  guns.  We  fired  low  where 
the  smoke  outside  of  our  line  was  thickest.  As  the  rebel  line  gave 
way  ours  advanced,  with  our  battery  well  to  the  front.  At  about 
4  o'clock  the  enemy's  fire  ceased,  showing  them  to  be  in  full 
retreat.  We  then  advanced  and  the  Thirty-second  Indiana  threw 
out  a  strong  skirmish  line  to  the  front  and  found  no  enemy  within 
reach.  After  advancing  to  open  ground  overlooking  a  creek 
other  troops  took  up  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  and  we  were  with 
drawn  a  short  distance  and  stacked  arms,  as  we  supposed,  for 
the  night." 

Gleason  says  that  after  this  he,  with  a  few  men  got  permis 
sion  to  go  back  to  the  landing  and  procure  blankets.  That  after 
much  trouble  they  secured  them  and  started  back,  but  \vhen  they 
reached  the  place  where  the  regiment  had  stacked  arms  it  had 
disappeared.  They  finally  learned  after  much  inquiry  that  it 
had  marched  back  to  the  landing.  It  was  then  pitch  dark ;  they 
could  not  find  their  way  back,  and  coming  to  the  recovered  camp 
of  an  Iowa  regiment  they  were  kindly  taken  in  and  fed  and 
given  shelter  for  the  night.  He  closes  his  story  of  the  day  as 
follows : 

"When  they  (the, Iowa  boys)  learned  that  we  belonged  to 
BuelPs  army,  it  seemed  they  could  not  do  enough  for  us,  saying 
that  we  had  saved  them  from  defeat  and  probable  capture,  and 
were  welcome  to  the  best  they  had.  So  after  a  hearty  supper, 
such  as  we  had  not  eaten  since  leaving  Nashville,  we  were  given 

1  Gleason  is  here  mstaken.  This  battery  did  not  reach  the  field  until  the  action  was 
over.  It  was  then  "Goodspeed's"  battery,  Captain  Cotter  having  left  it  some 
time  before — see  W.  R.  R.  10,  par  1-302. 


126  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

an  empty  tent,  and  having  plenty  of  blankets  we  were  soon 
sound  asleep.  Outside  on  the  parade  ground  lay  many  a  form 
in  blue  or  gray  uniform,  sleeping  their  eternal  slumber.  A 
pitiless  thunder  storm  raged  nearly  all  night,  but  we  slept  in  the 
dry,  with  much  concern,  however,  for  our  comrades  who  were 
shelterless  and  blanketless  by  reason  of  our  failure  to  find  them. 
There  were  also  doubtless  many  wounded  lying  on  the  battle 
field  exposed  to  the  drenching  rain,  and  many  a  life  flickered  and 
went  out  amid  the  fury  of  the  elements.  Firing  had  long  since 
ceased  all  along  the  lines  and  silence  would  have  been  supreme, 
if  it  had  not  been  for  the  storm,  the  moans  of  the  wounded  and 
the  plaintive  bleating  of  a  species  of  frog  in  a  swamp  near  by." 
We  have  already  quoted  from  Captain  Carroll's  letter 
describing  the  feelings  of  the  men  as  the  steamer  carrying  them 
passed  slowly  up  the  river.  He  goes  on  to  say,  "We  at  last 
reached  the  landing  and  immediately  disembarked  and  proceeded 
to  the  scene  of  action,  distant  three  miles.  We  had  not  gone 
far  before  the  terrible  effects  of  a  desperate  battle  were  visible 
on  either  side  of  the  road.  Dead  Federal,  dead  Sesesh  and  dead 
horses  and  mules  lay  thick  on  the  ground  and  the  wounded  could 
be  heard  groaning  even  above  the  noise  and  confusion  of  the 
battle.  These  sights,  although  the  first  of  the  kind  we  had  ever 
witnessed,  strange  as  it  may  seem,  dispelled  all  gloomy  thoughts, 
directed  our  thoughts  toward  the  enemy  and  nerved  us  for  the 
encounter.  Our  brigade  was  ordered  to  take  position  in  reserve 
and  immediately  in  rear  of  the  point  where  the  battle  was  hottest. 
I  thought  I  had  a  pretty  good  idea  of  what  a  battlefield  was,  but 
this  exceeded  anything  I  had  ever  imagined.  The  noise  was 
deafening.  The  artillery  belched  forth  at  a  tremendous  rate, 
making  everything  quake,  and  the  roar  of  the  musketry  was 
incessant.  To  this  music  we  listened  for  two  hours.  The  men 
began  to  show  signs  of  uneasiness  and  an  eagerness  to  get  into  the 
fight.  We  had  been  drawn  up  in  line  for  two  hours  when  an  order 
came  for  our  brigade  to  take  the  advance.  The  men  stepped  off 
silently  but  cheerfully,  with  animation  and  spirit.  I  had  always 
believed  that  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  was  composed  of  good  fighting 
material,  that  it  would  never  disgrace  the  state  from  which  it 
came,  and  the  manner  in  which  it  conducted  itself  on  this  oc 
casion,  the  coolness  with  which  the  men  marched  into  the  gall 
ing  fire  of  the  enemy  exceded  my  most  sanguine  expectations.  It 
made  me  feel  proud  that  I  belonged  to  it.  In  moving  to  the 
position  assigned  to  us  we  had  to  pass  some  distance  under  the 
enemy's  fire,  but  not  a  man  flinched.  When  we  reached 
our  position,  the  command,  'Commence  firing,'  was  given  and 
our  men  opened  on  the  enemy  with  one  of  the  most  deafening 


SECOND  DAY  AT  SHILOH  127 

volleys  of  musketry  I  heard  at  any  time  during  the  day.  It  was 
continuous  and  incessant  for  over  two  hours.  We  then  changed 
front  under  fire,  but  every  one  stuck  to  his  work  nobly  and 
manfully.  Again  we  let  loose  upon  the  enemy  with  such  vigor 
and  energy  that  he  was  forced  to  fall  back.  About  this  time  the 
enemy  fell  back  all  along  the  line,  the  retreat  soon  became  a  rout, 
and  thus  ended  the  great  battle  of  Pittsburg  Landing." 

The  letter  of  Colonel  Askew  describing  the  battle  is  given  in 
full  as  follows : 

Pittsburgh  Landing,   eight   miles   above    Savannah,   on   the   Tennessee 
River,  April  11,  1862. 

Dear  Father: — I  write  this  on  the  ferry  boat  on  my  way  to  Sa 
vannah  from  this  landing  where  I  go  to  express  money  home. 

You  will  have  heard  ere  this  of  the  terrible  battle  fought  here 
on  the  6th  and  7th  inst.  On  Sunday  morning  the  6th,  we  were  en 
camped  16  miles  from  Savannah  on  the  road  between  there  and  Co 
lumbia,  Tenn.  We  quietly  struck  our  tents,  packed  our  baggage  and 
started  on  our  march  to  Savannah.  We  had  gone  but  a  short  distance 
when  we  heard  the  distant  firing  of  cannon.  We  marched  on  for  some 
time,  the  cannon  still  sounding  and  the  discharges  becoming  more 
frequent  and  louder,  finally  we  halted.  Our  teams  were  allowed  to 
come  up  and  we  were  ordered  to  leave  our  knapsacks  with  the  teams, 
taking  our  blankets  and  three  days  rations  and  our  ammunition,  which 
we  did,  and  started  in  quick  time. 

We  reached  Savannah  about  11  o'clock  that  night.  Shortly  after 
we  arrived  a  violent  hail  and  thunder  storm  came  up  which  we  stood 
and  took  the  best  way  we  could.  We  stacked  our  arms  in  the  street, 
built  fires  out  of  the  fences  and  remained  there  until  morning. 

We  got  some  hot  coffee  in  the  morning  and  got  on  a  steamboat 
about  9  o'clock  in  the  morning  and  started  for  the  scene  of  action. 

During  the  night  of  Sunday  we  could  hear  the  discharge  of  can 
non  at  short  intervals,  said  to  be  fired  by  the  gunboats  to  harass  the 
rebels,  but  at  daylight  in  the  morning  they  all  commenced  again  and 
there  was  almost  an  incessant  roar.  We  reached  the  landing  in  about 
an  hour,  our  whole  brigade  being  on  the  boat,  with  one  battery  of 
artillery.  The  whole  river  bank  and  bluff  were  crowded  with  the 
wounded  and  stragglers. 

We  disembarked  and  started  for  the  field  in  double  quick  time, 
the  roar  of  the  cannon  and  the  rattle  of  the  musketry  keeping  up  an 
infernal  din.  We  reached  the  field,  passing-  over  the  scene  of  the 
battle  on  Sunday,  our  men  having  driven  the  rebels  back  early  Monday 
morning  from  the  position  they  had  driven  our  men  from  on  Sunday. 
Although  we  had  but  little  time  to  look  around,  the  scene  was  truly  hor 
rible.  The  ground  was  thickly  strewn  with  dead  men  and  horses 
killed  in  almost  every  conceivable  way. 

We  formed  in  line  of  battle  in  the  rear  of  Rousseau's  brigade  of 
our  division,  who  had  been  engaging  the  enemy  on  that  part  of  the 
field  since  early  in  the  morning.  We  had  been  there  but  a  short  time 
when  a  shell  came  hissing  through  the  tops  of  the  trees  and  lit  about 
ten  feet  in  front  of  our  company,  throwing  the  dirt  in  our  faces,  but 
fortunately  doing  no  injury.  We  were  soon  ordered  to  advance  and 
relieve  Rousseau's  brigade  whose  ammunition  was  about  exhausted. 


128  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

We  advanced  leisurely,  Rousseau  falling  to  the  rear.  The  scene  of 
the  action  was  in  a  woods.  We  soon  got  within  close  range  of  the 
rebels,  as  the  bullets  whistling  about  our  heads  too  plainly  told.  Joe 
Hewetson  was  wounded  here,  I  think  before  he  got  a  chance  to  fire  a 
shot,  the  ball  entering  near  the  stomach. 

We  were  then  ordered  to  lie  down  and  commence  firing,  which 
we  did,  pouring  into  the  rebels  a  most  terrific  fire  which  was  well 
responded  to  by  them.  We  kept  up  the  firing  for  an  hour  and  a  half 
or  more  almost  incessantly,  when  our  cartridges  being  nearly  ex 
hausted,  we  were  ordered  to  fall  back  to  get  more  ammunition  and 
to  allow  our  battery  to  take  a  position.  We  fell  back  about  25  yards, 
got  a  new  supply  of  ammunition  and  the  battery  was  placed  in  posi 
tion  right  in  front  of  our  company.  It  poured  into  the  rebels  and 
their  battery  several  rounds  of  grape  and  canister  when  it  soon  be 
came  evident  that  the  enemy  were  retiring,  which  they  did  over  the 
brow  of  a  small  hill  out  of  reach  of  our  battery. 

We  were  then  wheeled  into  column  by  company,  filed  past  our 
battery  and  were  brought  into  line  again  beyond  our  battery,  all  of 
which  was  executed  with  almost  as  much  precision  as  if  we  had  been 
on  battalion  drill. 

We  were  again  ordered  to  advance,  which  we  did.  We  reached 
the  brow  of  the  hill  but  there  was  no  enemy  to  be  seen.  The  only 
signs  we  saw  of  them  were  some  shells  thrown  from  their  battery 
from  a  wooded  eminence  at  some  distance  from  us.  Our  battery  in  the 
meantime  having  been  placed  on  the  top  of  the  hill  above  us,  poured  a 
tremendous  storm  of  grape  and  canister  after  the  flying  foe.  We  re 
mained  in  line  under  the  brow  of  this  hill  for  some  time,  our  battery 
firing  over  our  heads,  and  other  batteries  pursuing  the  rebels.  The 
cannon  shots  finally  became  less  frequent  and  more  distant  and  told 
that  we  were  left  masters  of  the  field. 

Stacy  Craft,  poor  fellow,  was  shot  dead  near  the  beginning  of 
the  action  by  a  musket  ball  through  the  head.  He  never  spoke  after 
he  was  struck. 

Joe  Hewetson,  I  have  told  you,  was  wounded.  The  doctor  thought 
the  wound  was  not  dangerous,  declaring  that  the  ball  did  not  penetrate 
the  stomach,  but  I  learn  that  he  died  on  the  next  day  after  the  battle. 
Walter  was  with  him  and  I  have  not  been  able  to  see  him  since. 

John  Campbell,  from  near  Farmington  or  Colerain  was  shot  in 
the  leg  with  either  a  cannon  ball  or  canister  shot,  shattering  and  mu 
tilating  his  leg  most  horribly  from  the  hip-joint  almost  to  the  foot. 
He  has  since  died,  making  in  all  three  killed  of  our  company. 

The  same  ball  which  struck  Campbell  also  struck  Park  Mechem, 
and  shattered  his  ankle  so  that  it  is  probable  his  foot  will  have  to  be 
amputated.  It  also  struck  John  Thompson,  taking  off  all  the  flesh  on 
the  ball  of  his  foot  though  not  injuring  the  bone.  John's  wound  is 
not  serious.  The  same  ball  wounded  two  men  in  Company  H  next  to 
us.  I  saw  it  strike  Campbell.  Was  but  a  few  feet  from  him  when  he 
was  struck  and  it  was  a  most  pitiful  sight. 

Wm.  R.  Smith,  a  stepson  of  George  Anderson,  was  wounded  in 
the  thigh  by  the  fragment  of  a  shell — a  flesh  wound — pretty  serious, 
though  not  dangerous. 

Hugh  Douglass  was  wounded  slightly  in  the  head  by  the  same 
shell.  He  is  going  about. 

Sergt.  Jno.  W.  Harris  was  wounded  by  a  musket  ball  in  the  right 
arm — not  serious — a  flesh  wound. 


SECOND  DAY  AT  SHILOH  129 

John  T.  Mercer  from  Mt.  Pleasant  left  the  company  before  we 
had  got  fairly  into  the  fight  and  has  not  been  heard  from  since. 
Charles  J.  Williams  was  with  the  company  until  near  the  close  of  the 
fight  when  he  disappeared,  no  one  of  our  company  seeing  him  go. 
One  of  Company  H  says  he  saw  him  leaving  the  field  wounded  in  the 
head.  He  is  from  Mt.  Pleasant.  This  makes  our  casualties  3  killed,  5 
wounded,  2  missing. 

The  rest  of  the  boys  are  all  well  and  the  wounded  are  doing  as 
well  as  could  be  expected. 

I  will  have  to  close  this  now  as  I  have  reached  the  express  office 
and  it  is  growing  dark,  hoping  to  give  you  a  fuller  account  on  a  more 
favorable  opportunity. 

Your  son, 

FRANK  ASKEW. 

It  will  be  noted  that  Colonel  Askew  states  that  John  T. 
Mercer  of  Company  E,  left  the  company  before  it  had  fairly  got 
into  the  fight  and  had  not  been  heard  from  at  the  time  he  wrote, 
but  Captain  Carroll  three  days  later,  in  letter  above  mentioned, 
states  that  he  was  wounded  in  the  head.  The  official  rosters, 
however,  do  not  include  his  name  among  the  wounded. 

Colonel  Dickey  and  Lieutenant  Colonel  Wilson  were  both 
absent  from  the  regiment  during  the  engagement  and 
its  command  devolved  upon  Major  William  Wallace. 
Major  Wallace  made  a  very  brief  official  report,  in 
which  he  says:  "Being  the  only  field  officer  present, 
I  detailed  Captain  I.  M.  Kirby  of  Company  D,  and  Captain  A. 
R.  Z.  Dawson  of  Company  G,  as  acting  field  officers.  *  *  * 
The  Fifteenth  occupied  the  right  of  the  Sixth  Brigade,  and  about 
12  M.  engaged  the  enemy,  and  until  near  4  o'clock  P.  M.  we 
were  under  a  most  galling  fire  of  the  rebel  forces.  During  the 
entire  time  no  inch  of  ground  was  yielded,  but  twice  we  advanced 
our  lines  until  we  were  in  close  proximity  to  the  rebel  forces.  No 
language  can  do  justice  to  the  brave  officers  and  men  under  my 
command.  They  poured  a  most  deadly  fire  into  the  enemy's 
ranks  amid  a  raking  charge  of  musketry  and  artillery  which  was 
fast  thinning  my  ranks,  but  nothing  could  move  the  gallant 
Fifteenth.  Forty  rounds  of  ammunition  were  discharged  by  my 
brave  men  with  such  precision  that  the  enemy  at  last  gave  way 
and  our  artillery  occupied  the  ground,  the  Fifteenth  scattering 
the  flying  rebels  in  wild  confusion."  He  expresses  his  obligation 
to  Captains  Kirby  and  Dawson,  and  Adjutant  Taft  for  their 
valuable  assistance,  and  closes  his  report  by  saying,  "We  are  all 
proud  of  the  regiment,  the  Sixth  Brigade  and  the  Second 
Division ;  of  General  McCook,  its  brave  commander,  and  yourself 
(Colonel  Gibson),  who  led  us  to  victory  and  honor."1 

Colonel  Win.  H.  Gibson  of  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio,  who  in  the 

1     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-319 


130  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

absence   of   General   R.   W.   Johnson,    was   in    command   of    the 
brigade,  describes  the  battle  as  follows : 

''Reaching  Savannah  at  10  P.  M.  of  the  Gth,  and  holding 
the  rear  of  the  Second  Division,  we  were  compelled  to  await 
transportation  until  the  next  morning  at  9  o'clock. 

"After  great  exertions  the  entire  brigade  with  two  batteries 
of  artillery  was  embarked  on  the  steamer  John  J.  Roe.  We 
reached  Pittsburg  Landing  about  1 1  o'clock,  and  at  once  hastened 
forward  to  the  scene  of  the  conflict  in  the  center,  where  a  por 
tion  of  the  Second  Division  was  then  engaged.  Colonel  Willich, 
with  the  Thirty-second  Indiana,  being  the  first  to  debark,  and 
to  reach  the  field,  was  detached  from  the  brigade  and  placed  in 
position  by  General  McCook  in  person.  Nothing  further  was 
heard  from  him  by  me  during  the  day,  but  his  list  of  casualties 
shows  that  he  was  hotly  engaged,  and  the  testimony  of  dis 
tinguished  officers  who  witnessed  the  conduct  of  his  command, 
justifies  me  in  saying  that  officers  and  men  gave  proof  of  skill 
and  courage  worthy  of  the  heroes  of  Rowlett's  Station.  Here 
with  I  submit  Colonel  Willich's  report  for  full  particulars. 
Obedient  to  orders,  the  balance  of  the  brigade  was  deployed  in 
line  of  battle  in  rear  of  the  Fourth  Brigade  under  General  Rous 
seau,  then  closely  engaged.  His  ammunition  being  exhausted,  the 
Sixth  Brigade  was  ordered  to  advance,  which  command  was 
executed  promptly  and  in  perfect  order.  The  enemy's  infantry, 
concealed  by  tents,  behind  trees  and  in  dense  undergrowth, 
opened  a  terrific  fire  on  our  whole  line  simultaneously.  With 
one  battery  he  opened  on  the  Fifteenth  Ohio,  holding  the  right, 
with  another  he  annoyed  the  left  of  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio,  hold 
ing  the  left,  and  with  a  third  he  poured  a  torrent  of  grape  on  the 
Thirty-ninth  Indiana,  holding  the  center.  The  fire  of  the  enemy's 
infantry  was  promptly  responded  to  along  our  entire  line.  Our 
volleys  were  delivered  with  rapidity,  regularity  and  effect.  The 
enemy's  lines  were  shaken,  and  we  steadily  pressed  forward, 
driving  him  before  us  at  least  eighty  rods.  I  here  discovered 
that  under  cover  of  a  ravine  the  enemy  was  turning  my  left,  and 
at  once  ordered  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  to  change  line  of  battle 
to  the  rear  on  first  company,  which  order  was  executed  with 
perfect  order  under  a  heavy  fire.  Lieutenant  William  C.  Turner 
was  dispatched  to  General  McCook  to  inform  him  of  the  danger 
of  my  left,  but  the  fire  of  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  from  its  ne\v 
position  soon  drove  the  enemy  back,  and  the  regiment  moved 
forward  into  line.  The  enemy  now,  with  increased  force,  made 
a  second  demonstration  on  my  left,  and  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  again 
changed  line  to  the  rear  and  arrested  his  advance.  Captain 
Bouton  with  two  guns  of  his  Chicago  battery  reached  the  ground 


SECOND  DAY  AT  SHILOH  131 

at  this  junction,  and  after  silencing  the  enemy's  battery  which 
had  been  annoying  my  left,  moved  quickly  to  the  left  of  the 
Fifteenth  Ohio,  and  opened  on  the  batteries  which  had  up  to  that 
time  harassed  that  regiment  and  the  Thirty-ninth  Indiana.  The 
enemy's  guns  were  quickly  silenced,  and  Captain  Bouton  has  my 
warmest  thanks  for  the  aid  so  skillfully  and  gallantly  rendered. 
The  Forty-ninth  Ohio,  having  again  moved  forward  into  line  and 
my  left  being  supported  by  troops  ordered  forward  for  that  pur 
pose  by  General  McCook,  I  again  ordered  an  advance,  and  our 
line  pushed  forward  in  gallant  style,  driving  the  enemy  before  us 
a  full  half  mile  and  taking  possession  of  the  camp  from  which  a 
portion  of  General  Sherman's  division  had  been  driven  the  day 
before,  including  the  General's  headquarters.  The  enemy  now 
abandoned  the  contest  and  retreated  under  the  protection  of  his 
cavalry,  leaving  us  in  possession  of  that  portion  of  the  field  and 
two  of  his  hospitals  crowded  with  his  wounded."1 

Colonel  Gibson  praises  the  conduct  of  the  officers  and  men 
of  the  brigade  and  makes  special  mention  of  Mr.  Rodig,  hospital 
steward  of  the  Fifteenth  Ohio,  for  his  efficiency  in  caring  for  the 
wounded.  "Little  Rodig,"  we  called  him,  was  afterwards  pro 
moted  to  second  lieutenant  and  yielded  up  his  life  at  the  battle 
of  Nashville. 

The  battle  had  raged  all  along  the  line  from  early  morning. 
The  enemy  had  been  driven  from  position  to  position,  making  his 
last  desperate  stand  near  Shiloh  Church,  near  which  General 
McCook's  division  and  a  portion  of  General  Grant's  forces  were 
posted.  The  last  charge  was  made  under  the  personal  direction 
of  General  Grant,  who  gathered  up  two  or  three  regiments,  among 
them  the  First  Ohio  of  General  Rousseau's  brigade,  and  ordered 
them  to  charge  across  an  open  field  in  Rousseau's  front,  where 
the  enemy  was  making  his  last  stand.  They  moved  forward  in 
gallant  style,  drove  the  enemy  in  utter  rout  and  thus  ended  the 
battle.2  By  this  time  the  enemy  had  retreated  all  along  the  line, 
but  was  making  extraordinary  efforts  to  save  his  artillery  and 
trains.  The  troops  of  both  Grant's  and  Buell's  armies  were  too 
much  exhausted  to  make  vigorous  pursuit.  General  T.  J.  Wood's 
division  of  General  Buell's  army  came  on  the  field  after  the  fight 
was  over  and  under  General  Grant's  directions  moved  forward 
in  pursuit  of  the  fleeing  foe  but  was  unable  to  reach  them  with 
small  arms.3 

The  men  of  the  Fifteenth  Ohio,  the  Sixth  Brigade  and  Sec 
ond  Division  of  Buell's  army  may  well  feel  proud  of  the  part  they 
took  in  the  struggle  of  that  memorable  day. 

1  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-315 

2  General  Rousseau's  report,  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-309,  and  Grant's  Memoirs. 

3  W.  R.  R.   10,  part  1-378. 


132  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

General  Sherman,  in  his  official  report,  says,  "I  concede  that 
General  McCook's  splendid  division  from  Kentucky  drove  back 
the  enemy  along  the  Corinth  road,  which  was  the  great  central 
line  of  this  battle.  There  Beauregard  commanded  in  person, 
supported  by  Bragg's,  Johnston's  and  Breckenridge's  division."1 
They  were  on  the  part  of  the  line  where  the  enemy  made  his  most 
stubborn  resistence  and  where  the  fight  was  hottest.  This  is 
shown  by  the  official  lists  of  casualties.  The  losses  in  Nelson's 
division  were  716,  in  Crittenden's  465,  and  in  McCook's  916. 

The  casualties  in  Grant's  army  on  the  second  day  of  the 
battle  are  not  stated  separately,  but  the  losses  in  General  Lewis 
Wallace's  division,  which  was  the  only  one  not  engaged  on  the 
first  day,  were  296.  The  losses  by  brigades  in  McCook's  division 
were:  Rousseau's,  311;  Kirk's  346;  Johnson's,  261.  The 
losses  by  regiment's  in  Johnson's  brigade  were:  Thirty-second 
Indiana,  96;  Fifteenth  Ohio,  75 ;  Forty-ninth  Ohio,  40 ;  Thirty- 
ninth  Indiana,  36.  There  is  testimony  outside  the  reports  of  our 
immediate  commanders,  showing  the  gallant  bearing  of  our 
officers  and  men.  General  Sherman,  especially,  pays  them  a  high 
tribute.  In  his  official  report  he  says  that  under  cover  of  the 
fire  of  artillery,  "we  advanced  till  we  reached  the  point  where  the 
Corinth  road  crosses  the  line  of  McClernand's  camps,  and  here 
I  saw  for  the  first  time  the  well  ordered  and  compact  columns 
of  General  Buell's  Kentucky  forces,  whose  soldierly  movements  at 
once  gave  confidence  to  our  newer  and  less  disciplined  forces. 
Here  I  saw  Willich's  regiment  advance  upon  a  point  of  water 
oaks  and  thicket,  behind  which  I  knew  the  enemy  was  in  great 
strength,  and  enter  it  in  beautiful  style.  Then  arose  the  severest 
musketry  fire  I  ever  heard,  which  lasted  some  twenty  minutes, 
when  this  splendid  regiment  had  to  fall  back.  *  *  *  The 
enemy  had  one  battery  close  by  Shiloh  and  another  near  the  Ham 
burg  road,  both  pouring  grape  and  canister  upon  any  column 
of  troops  that  advanced  toward  the  green  point  of  water  oaks. 
Willich's  regiment  had  been  repulsed,  but  a  whole  brigade  of 
McCook's  division  advanced  beautifully,  deployed  and  entered 
this  dreaded  woods."2  He  says  he  ordered  his  Second  Brigade, 
then  commanded  by  Colonel  T.  Kirby  Smith,  and  his  Fourth 
Brigade,  Colonel  Buckland,  to  form  on  the  right  of  the  brigade 
of  McCook's  division,  and  all  to  advance  abreast  with  it.  He 
says  this  brigade,  which  he  afterwards  learned  was  Rousseau's, 
"moved  in  splendid  order  steadily  to  the  front  sweeping  every 
thing  before  it."3 

1  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-251. 

2  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-251-2. 

3  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-252. 


SECOND  DAY  AT  SHILOII  133 

The  following  is  a  carefully  revised  list  of  the  killed  and 
wounded  and  missing  in  the  Fifteenth  Ohio : 

Company  A. — Wounded:  James  E.  Boyd,  Robert  Ham 
mond,  Jacob  Kissinger,  William  R.  Stewart,  John  D.  Fleming. 

Company  B. — Wounded:  Sergeant  William  McClenahan, 
Alfred  C.  Cleaves  and  John  Frazier. 

Company  C. — Killed:  Reuben  Hissong.  Wounded:  Ser 
geant  Thomas  C.  Davis,  Corporal  William  A.  Rogers,  Corporal 
Hugh  :>.  Moore,  Reuben  Davis,  Daniel  Shuma,  Enoch  Numbers, 
Hiram  A.  Morehouse,  Joel  T.  Miller  (died  of  wounds  at  Lexing 
ton,  Ky.,  Sept.  1,  1862),  and  William  C.  Markwood,  who  was 
also  reported  missing. 

Company  D. — \Vounded :  Color  Bearer,  Sergeant  William 
C.  Mulford  and  Caleb  Hesser. 

Company  E. — Killed :  John  Campbell,  Joseph  Hewetson, 
Stacey  B.  Craft.  Wounded:  Sergeant  John  H.  Thompson, 
Andrew  J.  Taylor,  Edward  P.  Mechem  (died  of  wounds  May  8, 
1862),  John  W.  Harris,  William  R.  Smith,  Charles  J.  Williams. 

Company  F. — Killed  :  James  McKirahan.  Wounded :  Levi 
Brock,  George  A.  Porterfield  and  David  Mills. 

Company  G. — Killed :  James  McBride  Dickey,  William  N. 
Beach,  Martin  B.  Leedy.  Wounded :  Benjamin  F.  Cline,  Wilson 
Barcus,  Henry  S.  Robinson,  William  Wood,  William  F.  Curtis, 
Jeremiah  Mackley,  John  F.  Gardner,  William  H.  Shade,  Jacob 
Stauffer,  N.  P.  Hagerman. 

Company  H. — Wounded :  Philip  Beamer,  Reuben  H. 
Cremean,  William  H.  H.  Deniston,  Christian  Harnley,  George 
Myers,  James  L.  Updegrove,  Andrew  J.  Stewart,  William  H. 
Payne. 

Company  I. — Wounded :  Daniel  Geiseman,  Barnet  Sims, 
Charles  E.  Livenspire,  James  T.  Purdy. 

Company  K. — Wounded :  Levi  Atkins,  Simpson  G.  Haines, 
Alanson  Herrick,  John  W.  Ridgeway,  Giles  Tillet. 

After  the  first  days  fierce  struggle  at  Pittsburg  Landing  the 
newspapers  were  filled  with  alarming  reports  of  the  battle.  It 
was  said  that  the  Union  forces  had  been  surprised,  that  many  of 
them  had  been  bayoneted  in  their  tents,  that  General  Grant  was 
drunk,  that  no  steps  had  been  taken  to  entrench  the  camps,  that 
thousands  of  lives  had  been  sacrificed  by  the  inefficiency  and 
carelessness  of  the  officers  in  command,  and  that  General  Grant's 
forces  were  only  saved  from  utter  defeat  and  capture  by  the 
timely  arrival  of  General  Buell's  army. 

A  storm  of  hostile  criticism  was  directed  against  General 
Grant,  the  chief  officer  in  command.  Relatives  and  friends  of 


134  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

those  who  had  been  killed  and  wounded  and  some  officers  who 
had  disgraced  themselves,  wrote  letters  to  the  newspapers  which 
increased  the  fury  of  the  storm.  The  stories  of  the  battle  thus 
set  afloat  made  a  deep  and  strong  impression  which  still  to  some 
extent  prevails. 

The  first  official  reports  given  to  the  press  did  not  tend  to 
remove  such  impression.  General  McClernand  in  his  official 
report  impliedly  stated  that  General  Prentiss,  with  his  division, 
had  been  captured  early  in  the  morning  of  April  6th,  thus  lending 
credence  to  the  story  that  his  troops  had  been  surprised  and  some 
of  them  bayoneted  in  their  tents.  Generals  Buell,  Nelson  and 
Crittenden,  in  their  official  reports,  dwelt  upon  the  demoralization 
of  Grant's  army  at  the  time  of  their  arrival,  and  also  gave 
credence  to  the  newspaper  reports. 

General  Prentiss  and  many  of  his  brigade  and  regimental 
officers,  unfortunately,  had  been  captured  by  the  enemy  and  could 
make  no  reports  of  what  had  occurred  on  their  part  of  the  line. 
General  Grant  bore  the  storm  of  reproach  which  had  burst  over 
his  head  in  silence,  but  General  Sherman  took  up  a  cudgel  in 
his  defense  and  in  the  newspapers  denounced  these  stories  as  vile 
calumnies.1  But  they  had  come  to  be  generally  believed  and  his 
fierce  invective  had  little  effect.  General  Grant  never  made  any 
official  report  of  the  battle.  A  few  days  after  it  was  over  General 
rialleck  arrived  at  Pitsburg  Landing,  ordered  the  reports  of 
division  commanders  sent  direct  to  him,  and  General  Grant  never 
saw  them  until  some  time  afterwards.  It  was  not  until  after 
General  Prentiss  was  exchanged  and  returned  from  captivity, 
that  the  real  truth  in  regard  to  what  occurred  on  the  Union  left, 
his  heroic  fight  against  overwhelming  numbers  and  the  hour  of 
his  capture,  were  known  by  the  public. 

In  one  of  the  articles  on  the  Civil  War  published  in  the 
Century  Magazine  in  1885,  General  Grant  first  broke  silence  and 
gave  his  story  of  the  battle  of  Shiloh.  Afterwards  in  his  memoirs 
he  repeats  the  story,  striving  to  correct  or  modify  statements  in 
his  century  article  which  he  feared  were  unjust  to  others.  In  the 
foregoing  narrative  the  pertinent  facts  in  the  official  reports  and 
correspondence  have  been  given  and  they  confirm  General 
Grant's  story.  In  their  examination,  preconceived  opinions  and 
strong  prejudices  have  been  laid  aside,  with  a  desire  to  report 
only  the  truth. 

It  was  natural  that  in  the  thirst  for  glory  General  Buell  and 
his  divsion  commanders  should  exalt  their  own  achievements  by 
enlarging  upon  the  desperate  condition  of  General  Grant's  forces 
when  General  Nelson's  division  arrived  on  the  field,  the  de- 

1     Sherman's  Memoirs 


SECOND  DAY  AT  SHILOH  135 

moralization  of  the  skulkers  they  saw  at  the  landing,  and  their 
loss  of  all  sense  of  shame.  They  seem  not  to  have  realized  that 
there  were  perhaps  nearly  20,000  of  General  Grant's  troops  who 
had  not  been  stampeded  and  all  day  had  bravely  faced  greatly 
superior  numbers,  before  their  arrival  had  completely  checked 
the  enemy's  advance,  and  were  under  orders  to  renew  the  fight 
next  day.  General  Grant  pertinently  remarks  that  if  they  could 
have  seen  the  rear  of  the  enemy's  line,  they  would  have  seen  as 
great,  if  not  greater  demoralization  among  the  Confederate 
troops.  This  is  confirmed  by  General  Bragg's  official  report,  in 
which  he  states  that  on  April  6,  the  Confederate  ranks  were 
"thinned  by  killed,  wounded  and  stragglers,  amounting  to  nearly 
half  our  force."  As  their  entire  losses  in  killed,  wounded  and 
missing  were  officially  reported  to  be  10,699,  their  stragglers 
must  have  numbered  over  10,000.  But  these  contentions  and 
bickerings  are  now  almost  forgotten.  It  must  be  admitted  that 
the  fierceness  and  fury  of  the  first  day's  battle  far  surpassed  that 
of  the  second  day,  which  was  fierce  and  furious  enough  to  satisfy 
the  ambition  of  those  engaged  in  it.  That  is  shown  by  the  official 
reports  of  casualties.  The  losses  in  Grant's  army,  the  larger 
part  of  which  occurred  the  first  day  were,  killed:  1513; 
wounded,  6601;  missing  or  captured,  2830;  total,  10,944. 

In  Buell's  army  the  casualties  were,  killed:  241;  wounded. 
1807;  captured  or  missing,  55;  total,  2103. 1 

Both  armies  fought  with  determination  and  valor.  It  was 
the  first  great  battle  in  which  many  of  the  troops  were  engaged. 
Many  of  them  had  not  been  long  enough  in  the  field  to  be  properly 
trained  and  disciplined,  and  it  is  little  wonder  that  some  of  them 
became  panic-stricken  and  fled  the  field.  Afterwards  these  same 
troops  who  fled  at  Shiloh  received  the  proper  training  and  dis 
cipline  and  fought  bravely  on  many  a  bloody  field. 

It  was  the  first  great  battle  in  which  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  was 
engaged.  It  had  had  a  long  period  of  severe  training  and  dis 
cipline  and  its  ranks  stood  firm.  It  was  a  fiery  ordeal,  but  its 
experience  was  valuable,  and  its  lessons  were  not  forgotten  in 
other  battles  and  campaigns  in  which  it  was  afterwards  to  take 
part. 

1     W.   R.   R.    10,  part  1-108. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

THE  SIEGE  OF  CORINTH. 

The  night  of  April  7,  1862,  after  the  fighting  of  the  day  was 
over,  General  Grant  sent  a  note  to  General  Buell  saying  that  it 
was  his  intention  to  have  the  infantry  occupy  the  most  advanced 
position  for  the  night  and  follow  up  the  success  of  the  day  with 
cavalry  and  fresh  troops,  expected  to  arrive,  but  that  the  fatigue 
of  the  men  after  three  days  fighting  and  marching  would  pre 
clude  the  idea  of  making  any  advance  that  night  without  the 
arrival  of  the  expected  reinforcements.  He  stated  that  his  plan 
therefore  would  be  "to  feel  on  in  the  morning  with  all  the  troops 
on  the  outer  lines,  until  the  cavalry  and  a  sufficient  force  of 
artillery  and  infantry  support  to  follow  them  was  ready  for  a 
move."  He  also  stated  that  previous  instructions,  and  a  dis 
patch  received  that  day  from  General  Halleck,  would  not  permit 
an  advance  beyond  Pea  Ridge,  or  some  point  from  which  the 
troops  could  return  in  a  day.1  , 

The  above  mentioned  dispatch  from  General  Halleck  is  not 
found. 

A  Mr.  Stevens,  Western  Union  telegraph  operator  at  Cin 
cinnati,  O.,  states  that  "General  Halleck  gave  orders  to  General 
Grant  some  days  previous  to  the  battle  that  in  case  he  was 
attacked  not  to  pursue  the  enemy.  Consequently  pursuit  was  not 
kept  up  for  any  distance."2 

It  is  now  apparent  that  it  was  a  great  mistake  that  the  enemy 
was  not  vigorously  pursued.  He  was  thoroughly  beaten  and 
dispirited  and  if  he  had  been  hotly  pressed,  his  artillery  and 
trains  and  a  good  part  of  his  army  would  have  been  compelled 
to  abandon  Corinth.  General  Bragg  in  a  dispatch  to  General 
Beauregard,  dated  three  miles  on  the  road  from  Mickey's  to 
Corinth,  April  8,  at  7  A.  M.,  says : 

"Our  condition  is  horrible.  Troops  utterly  disorganized  and 
demoralized.  Road  almost  impassable.  No  provisions  and  no 
forage,  consequently  everything  is  feeble.  Straggling  parties 
may  get  in  tonight.  Those  in  the  rear  will  suffer  much.  *  *  * 
It  is  most  lamentable  to  see  the  state  of  affairs,  but  I  am  power 
less  and  almost  exhausted.  Our  artillery  is  being  left  all  along 
the  road  by  its  officers ;  indeed,  I  find  but  few  officers  with  their 
men."3 

1  W.  R.  R.  1,  part  2-96 

2  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-104. 

3  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-398. 


SIEGE  OF  CORINTH  137 

Again  at  2  P.  M.,  he  sent  another  dispatch  to  General 
Beauregard  saying: 

"The  roads  are  horrible  and  unless  we  can  mend  them  it  is 
impossible  for  the  artillery  to  get  in.  The  teams  are  exhausted 
by  i.-ccssant  labor  and  no  forage.  *  *  *  1  left  General  Hardee 
behind  in  command  with  working  parties  on  the  road,  but  the 
men  are  exhausted,  dispirited  and  work  with  no  zeal."1 

General  Breckenridge,  who  was  in  command  of  the  rear 
guard,  at  5 :45  P.  M.,  April  8,  sent  a  dispatch  from  Mickey's 
to  General  Bragg,  saying: 

"My  troops  are  worn  out,  and  I  don't  think  can  be  relied 
on  after  the  first  volley."2 

It  was  said  that  the  Union  troops  were  too  much  exhausted 
to  pursue  the  enemy,  but  that  is  only  partly  true.  General  Wood's 
division  of  nearly  6000  men  came  to  the  field  the  evening  of  the 
7th  after  the  fighting  was  over.  They  did  pursue  the  enemy  for 
a  short  distance  that  evening,  but  were  comparatively  fresh  next 
morning.  General  Thomas'  division,  of  over  8000  fresh  troops, 
arrived  shortly  after  General  Wood's.  Colonel  Ammen  in  his 
diary  says  it  arrived  on  the  7th. ;}  General  Wallace's  division,  of 
over  7000  men,  had  had  no  marching  and  few  losses  and  was  not 
at  all  exhausted  by  the  battle  of  the  7th.  The  Third  Kentucky 
Cavalry,  which  all  day  of  the  7th,  had  held  their  horses  across 
the  river  from  the  landing,  were  ferried  over  that  evening.  There 
were  over  20,000  comparatively  fresh  troops  which,  on  the 
morning  of  April  8th,  could  have  been  sent  after  the  defeated 
and  demoralized  army.  They  could  have  been  closely  supported 
by  other  cavalry,  which,  owing  to  the  nature  of  the  ground,  had 
taken  little  part  in  the  two  days'  battle,  and  by  those  portions  of 
Nelson's,  McCook's  and  Crittenden's  divisions  which  had  suf 
fered  few  losses  and  had  had  a  night's  rest,  even  if  it  had  been 
in  the  rain.  They  would  cheerfully  have  made  the  sacrifice. 

It  was,  perhaps,  not  wholly  because  of  General  Halleck's 
orders  that  the  enemy  was  not  promptly  followed  up.  His  real 
strength  was  not  known  and  it  was  feared  that  he  would  receive 
reinforcements  and  return  and  renew  the  struggle.  It  seems  that 
there  was  actually  a  suggestion  that  the  Union  forces  should 
retire  across  the  river  and  there  await  reinforcements.  This  may 
have  been  caused  by  the  results  of  reconnoissances  sent  put  the 
morning  of  April  8,  particularly  that  of  General  Sherman  on  the 
Corinth  road,  where  in  the  affair  of  Fallen  Timbers,  his  advance 
was  charged  upon  and  routed  by  the  enemy's  cavalry  led  by 

1  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-399. 

2  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-400. 

3  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-336. 


138  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

General  Forrest.1  But,  be  that  as  it  may,  General  Grant  April 
9,  sent  a  dispatch  to  General  Halleck  saying  there  was  little  doubt 
that  the  enemy  intended  concentrating  at  and  near  Corinth  all 
the  force  possible,  that  they  had  sent  steamers  up  the  White  River 
in  Arkansas  to  bring  down  Van  Dorn's  and  Price's  commands 
and  were  also  bringing  forces  from  the  east,  and  adds :  "I  do 
not  like  to  suggest,  but  it  appears  to  me  that  it  would  be  de 
moralizing  upon  our  troops  to  be  forced  to  retire  upon  the 
opposite  bank  of  the  river  and  unsafe  to  remain  on  this  for  many 
weeks  without  large  reinforcements."2 

The  strength  of  General  Beauregard's  forces,  as  compared 
with  the  combined  strength  of  General  Grant's  and  Buell's  armies, 
seems  to  have  been  overestimated. 

April  9,  General  Beauregard  sent  a  dispatch  to  General 
Coopei,  Adjutant  General  at  Richmond,  saying  that  he  could 
then  muster  only  about  35,000  effectives.3  His  field  returns  of 
April  15,  by  which  time  he  had  probably  received  some  reinforce 
ments,  show  an  aggregate  present  of  43, 529. 4  On  the  other 
hand,  the  strength  of  the  Union  forces  was  under-estimated. 

The  field  returns  of  General  Grant's  forces  of  April  10-15, 
show  an  aggregate  present  of  34,206, 5  while  the  returns  of  Buell's 
army  for  the  month  of  April  made  up  of  division  returns  of 
earlier  dates  than  April  30,  but  perhaps  later  than  April  7.  show 
a  probable  aggregate  present  of  over  35,000,°  making  a  total 
aggregate  present  April  8,  in  Grant's  and  Buell's  armies  of  69/206. 

Surely  with  such  a  superiority  in  numbers  a  vigorous  pursuit 
should  have  been  ordered  and  the  result  doubtless  would  have 
been  succssful.  Even  if  begun  as  late  as  April  10,  it  probably 
would  have  succeeded,  for  at  that  time  the  enemy  had  received 
no  reinforcements,  though  six  regiments  had  been  ordered  from 
Chattanooga  and  Kingston.7 

But  both  officers  and  men  of  Grant's  and  Buell's  armies 
were  greatly  depressed  by  the  terrible  losses  they  had  suffered, 
and  worn  by  the  severe  strain  of  the  .two  days'  battle.  The  roads 
were  very  bad,  the  country  was  difficult  and  little  was  known  of 
the  enemy's  strength  and  resources.  Halleck's  over-cautions 
orders  were  in  the  way,  and  so  a  great  opportunity  was  lost. 

Fortunately,  on  April  8,  General  Halleck  was  able  to  report 
to  Generals  Grant  and  Buell  that  General  Pope  had  captured 
Island  No.  10  in  the  Mississippi  river,  and  on  April  15,  his  army 
of  21,510  men  was  ordered  to  Pittsburg  Landing.8  Other  re 
inforcements  were  hurried  forward  until  the  Union  forces  at 

1  W.  R.   R.    10,  part   1-639  5  W.   R.   R.   10,  part  1-113 

2  W.  R.   R.   10,  part  2-99  (>  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-148 

3  W.  R.  R.   10,  part  2-403  7  W.  R  .R.  10,  part  2-409 

4  W.  R.   R.   10,  part  2-421  8  W.  R.  R.   10,  part  2-107 


SIEGE  OF  CORINTH  139 

Pittsburg  Landing  were  increased  to  an  aggregate  of  128,91s.1 
The  Confederate  Army  at  Corinth  had  at  the  same  time  received 
large  reinforcements  and  on  May  26,  had  reached  an  aggregate 
present  of  75,402. 2 

General  Halleck  arrived  at  Pittsburg  Landing  April  13,  and 
took  immediate  command  of  all  the  forces  which  were  to  operate 
against  Corinth,  and  ordered  that  Generals  Grant  and  Buell 
should  retain  the  immediate  command  of  their  respective  armies 
in  the  field.3  April  22  he  informed  General  Pope  that  General 
Grant's  army  would  form  the  right  wing,  his  right  resting 
on  Owl  Creek ;  General  Buell's  the  center,  his  left  resting  on 
Lic£  Creek,  and  General  Pope's  the  left,  his  right  connected  with 
General  Buell.  April  28,  in  the  orders  preparatory  to  a  general 
advance.  General  Grant  was  to  command  the  right  wing.4  But 
April  30,  an  order  was  issued  transferring  General  Thomas' 
division  to  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  placing  General  Thomas 
in  command  of  the  right  wing  and  making  General  Grant  second 
in  command,5  thus  practically  retiring  him  from  active  service. 
The  order,  however,  specified  that  General  Grant  should  retain 
General  command  of  the  District  of  West  Tennessee,  including 
the  Army  Corps  of  the  Tennessee,  and  reports  should  be  made 
to  him  as  before.  General  Sherman,  in  his  memoirs,  says  that 
soon  after  General  Halleck's  arrival  at  Pittsburg  Landing  it 
became  manifest  that  his  mind  had  been  prejudiced  by  the  rumors 
which  had  gone  forth  to  the  detriment  of  General  Grant:  that 
when  he  issued  the  orders  reorganizing  the  whole  army,  General 
Grant  was  substantially  left  out  and  was  named  "Second  in 
Command,"  according  to  some  French  notion,  with  no  well 
defined  command  or  authority ;  that  for  more  than  a  month  he 
thus  remained,  rarely  complaining,  but  feeling  deeply  the 
indignity,  if  not  insult,  heaped  upon  him;  and  that  after  the 
occupation  of  Corinth  by  our  forces  he  obtained  a  leave  of 
absence  with  a  view  of  retiring  from  the  service,  but  was  dis 
suaded  therefrom  by  his,  Sherman's,  advice. B  General  Grant 
soon  -  found  himself  completely  ignored.  His  division  com 
manders  were  directed  to  report  direct  to  General  Halleck  and 
were  receiving  orders  in  the  same  way.  He  complained  about 
this  treatment  and  May  12,  General  Halleck  wrote  him  a  letter 
which  throws  a  curious  light  on  the  incident.  In  it  he  says : 

"I  am  very  much  surprised,  General,  that  you  should  find 
any  cause  of  complaint  in  the  recent  assignment  of  commands. 
You  have  precisely  the  position  to  which  your  rank  entitles  you. 
*  *  *  You  certainly  will  not  suspect  me  of  any  intention  to 

1  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-235.  4     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-138. 

2  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-548.  5     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-144. 

3  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-105.  6     Sherman's  Memoirs. 


140  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

injure  vour  feelings  or  reputation  or  to  do  you  any  injustice; 
if  so,  you  will  eventually  change  your  mind  on  the  subject.  For 
the  last  three'  months  I  have  done  everything  in  my  power  to 
ward  off  the  attacks  which  were  made  upon  you.  If  you  believe 
me  your  friend  you  will  not  require  explanations ;  if  not, 
explanations  on  my  part  would  be  of  little  avail.  l 

While  the  army  was  thus  being  reinforced  and  reorganized, 
the  troops  at  Pittsburg  Landing  went  through  another  period 
of  practical  inaction,  save  only  the  usual  round  of  drill,  police 
and  guard  duty  and  an  occasional  reconnoissance. 

The  morning  of  April  8,  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  got  breakfast 
and  after  making  a  detail  of  men  to  aid  in  gathering  up  the 
wounded  who  still  lay  on  the  field,  marched  out  about  five  miles 
in  pursuit  of  the  enemy  and  then  returned  to  a  position  near  the 
place  vhere  it  had  fought  the  day  before.2  Gregory  in  his  diary 
says,  "Oh,  what  a  horrible  sight,  ground  covered  with  dead  and 
dying  men  and  horses."  It  commenced  raining  again  about  mid 
night  and  the  men  were  compelled  to  rise  and  sit  by  the  camp- 
fires  until  daylight.3  April  9  and  10,  the  men  remained 
quietly  in  camp  and  were  visited  by  some  of  the  officers  of  the 
Forty-sixth  and  Sixty-fifth  Ohio  Regiments  who  reported  their 
experiences  during  the  battle. 

The  evening  of  the  10th,  Major  Wallace  formed  the  regi 
ment  in  line  and  made  a  speech  praising  the  men  for  their  gal 
lant  conduct  in  battle  and  thanking  them  for  the  confidence  they 
had  shown  in  him  as  their  commander.4  April  11  was  prac 
tically  without  incident  to  break  the  monotony  of  standing  or 
sitting  about  in  the  rain  and  wet,  for  as  yet  we  were  without 
tents.  April  12  was  a  very  wet  day.  In  the  evening  the  wagons 
of  Companies  E  and  G  came  up  and  the  men  of  those  companies 
rejoiced  in  having  tents  to  sleep  in.  During  the  day  we  moved 
our  camp  a  short  distance  to  a  better  position.  Major  Smith  and 
Chaplain  Baker  of  the  Forty-sixth  Ohio,  came  over  in  the  after 
noon.  Gleason  says,  "We  came  in  for  a  good  deal  of  praise  from 
the  Forty-sixth  boys,  who  generally  blame  their  generals  for  not 
being  prepared  to  resist  the  attack  on  the  first  day,  having  been 
duly  warned  of  the  enemy  the  day  before.  General  Grant  comes 
in  for  a  good  share  of  the  criticism,  it  being  claimed  that  no 
regular  line  was  established  until  General  Buell  came  on  the  field 
and  established  one."  April  13  was  a  clear  bright  day;  other 
wagons  came  up  and  the  men  were  about  to  pitch  tents  when  an 
order  came  to  get  ready  to  go  out  on  picket.  We  marched  to  an 
open  field  where  the  entire  brigade  had  assembled  for  the  same 
purpose. 

1     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-182  3  and  4     Gleason's  Diary. 

2     Gregory's  Diary 


SIEGE  OF  CORINTH  141 

The  brigade  took  a  westerly  course  and  marched  about  four 
miles  where  it  halted  and  posted  guards  for  the  night.  The  left 
wing  of  the  regiment  was  fortunate  in  being  a  part  of  the  reserve. 
The  night  passed  without  alarm  or  disturbance  of  any  kind.  We 
were  ordered  to  sleep  with  accouterments  on  and  consequently 
did  not  rest  well.  The  morning  of  April  14  broke  bright  and 
fair  and  gave  promise  of  another  fine  day. 

Gleason  got  permission  to  go  on  a  scout  to  an  old  Con 
federate  camp,  not  far  away,  and  noticed  in  the  woods  a  beauti 
ful  shrub  which  he  could  not  name,  which  bore  a  white  and  pink 
blossom  and  was  very  fragrant,  having  an  odor  like  the  garden 
pinks  at  home.  He  also  noticed  that  the  frogs  in  that  region 
made  a  bleating  noise  like  that  of  a  young  lamb  or  kid.1  Our 
relief  arrived  between  10  and  11  o'clock  and  we  marched  back  to 
our  camps,  where  we  arrived  at  12:30  P.  M.,  and  at  once  set 
about  pitching  tents.  As  soon  as  the  tents  were  up,  many  of  the 
men  began  writing  letters  home.  It  was  the  first  opportunity 
they  had  to  do  so  since  the  battle.  That  evening  the  men  were 
a  good  deal  worked  up  over  an  account  of  the  battle  in  the 
Chicago  Tribune,  which  made  favorable  mention  of  Wood's  and 
Thomas'  divisions,  which  were  not  in  the  fight,  and  did  not  men 
tion  our  division  at  all. 

April  16,  we  moved  about  two  miles  further  west  and  en 
camped  in  a  wheat  field.  April  17,  the  men  were  busy  putting 
quarters  in  order.  The  weather  was  very  warm.  April  18, 
orders  came  to  send  overcoats  and  other  winter  clothing  to  the 
landing  to  be  sent  home.  About  noon  the  long  roll  was  beaten 
in  the  camps  of  other  regiments,  our  drummers  took  it  up  and 
the  loud  voice  of  Adjutant  Taft  was  heard  calling  us  to  "fall  in." 
The  regiment  and,  indeed,  the  entire  division,  was  soon  in  line 
and  marched  out  to  the  picket  line  where  we  remained  until  about 
4  o'clock.  During  this  time  the  picket  line  was  advanced  about 
two  miles  farther  to  the  front.  While  we  were  so  occupied  a 
violent  thunder  storm  broke  upon  us  and  a  heavy  rain  drenched 
us  to  the  skin.  It  was  said  that  the  alarm  was  given  and  the 
movement  ordered  to  accustom  the  troops  to  getting  out 
promptly.2 

April  19,  it  rained  steadily  all  day  and  the  men  not  on  guard 
duty  kept  their  tents.  In  the  evening  Colonel  Dickey  returned  and 
took  command  of  the  regiment.  April  20,  was  Easter  Sunday. 
Gleason  says  that  the  question  of  "eggs"  came  up  in  his  mess 
but  that  old  Gouger  (Geiger),  the  sutler,  wanted  50  cents  per 
dozen  and  they  decided  to  go  without  them.  In  the  evening  "the 
singers"  sang  several  songs  from  the  "Jubilee."  April  21,  was 

1  and  2     Gleason's  Diary. 


142  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

another  rainy  day,  with  the  usual  discomforts  of  such  days,  but 
we  had  become  accustomed  to  them  and  did  not  worry  about 
them.  In  the  afternoon  Lieutenant  Colonel  Wilson  returned. 
That  evening  Captain  A.  C.  Cummins,  who  had  resigned  the  day 
before,  left  for  home.1  April  22,  a  curious  incident  is  related  by 
Gleason.  He  says  that  he  and  some  of  his  comrades  got  permis 
sion  to  go  to  a  deserted  Confederate  camp  to  look  for  relics ;  that 
they  found  quite  a  number  and  packed  them  in  a  barrel  to  send 
home;  that  the  relics  only  filed  one-half  the  barrel  and  they  filled 
the  other  half  with  their  surplus  coffee  to  help  pay  transporta 
tion.  This  shows  that  the  United  States  was  very  liberal  with 
its  coffee  or  that  Gleason's  mess  was  very  sparing  in  its  use.  In 
the  evening  Gleason  got  his  singers  together  and  sang  several 
glees.2  April  23,  regular  inspection  was  ordered  for  9  a.  m. 
The  men  were  formed  in  line  and  waited  for  a  full  hour  before 
our  time  came.  There  was  an  exchange  of  wounded  prisoners 
that  day  and  our  regiment  made  coffee  for  them.3  That  evening, 
some  of  the  boys  having  got  somewhere  a  couple  of  fiddles  and 
men  who  could  play  them,  there  was  a  regular  old  stag  dance  in 
one  of  the  company's  streets.4 

April  24,  while  s.ome  of  the  men  were  still  at  dinner  we 
were  suddenly  called  into  line  and  hurriedly  marched  out  to  the 
front.  The  entire  division  was  called  out  to  support  a  recon- 
noissance  in  force,  ordered  by  General  Halleck.5  We  marched 
out  about  five  miles  from  camp  where  we  learned  that  our  cav 
alry,  supported  by  artillery,  had  made  a  dash  on  a  Confederate 
camp  at  Monterey,  taking  a  number  of  prisoners  and  burning 
their  quarters.  We  met  the  cavalry  coming  back  and  saw  that 
they  had  nine  prisoners  with  them — stout  lusty  looking  fellows. 
As  soon  as  the  cavalry  passed  us  we  about  faced  and  marched 
back  to  our  camps.6  We  learned  that  Captain  Gilliland  had 
resigned  on  account  of  ill  health.  In  the  evening  orders  came  to 
be  ready  for  picket  duty  at  11  o'clock  next  morning.  It  was 
raining  the  morning  of  April  25,  and  rained  most  of  the  day. 
Between  10  and  11  o'clock  the  regiment  started  out  on  picket 
duty,  taking  the  same  route  we  had  taken  the  day  before.  We 
marched  about  two  miles  and  took  post  for  the  night.  In  the 
late  afternoon  the  rain  ceased  and  we  had  rather  a  pleasant  night, 
free  from  disturbance  or  alarm.  April  26,  we  were  relieved 
about  11  A.  M.,  and  made  a  quick  march  back  to  camp,  where 
we  arrived  about  noon. 

April  27,  we  had  inspection  at  9  o'clock.  There  was  a 
movable  picture  gallery  in  camp  and  many  of  the  men  had  their 

1  McConnell's  Diary.  4     McConnell's  Diary. 

2  Gleason's  Diary.  5     W.   R.   R.   10,  part  1-677. 

3  McConnell's  Diary.  6     Gleason's  Diary. 


SIEGE  OF  CORINTH  143 

pictures  taken  to  send  home.  Our  teams  went  to  the  landing, 
taking  our  surplus  clothing,  which  was  put  on  a  steamboat  bound 
for  Louisville.  We  had  dress  parade  at  5  p.  m.1  April  28,  it 
was  reported  that  the  enemy  had  again  occupied  Monterey. 
There  was  dress  parade  at  5  P.  M.,  and  about  dark  we  received 
orders  to  march  at  7  o'clock  next  morning.2 

We  had  now  been  three  weeks  encamped  on  and  near  the 
battleground  of  April  6  and  7,  while  General  Halleck  was 
assembling  the  grand  army  for  the  movement  against  Corinth. 
He  was  now  ready  and  the  advance  was  to  begin.  General  Hal 
leck,  April  28,  issued  preliminary  orders  for  such  movement, 
but  they  did  not  fix  the  hour  or  the  day  when  it  was  to  commence. 
In  it  he  specified  that  the  usual  allowance  of  wagons  per  regi 
ment  should  be  thirteen — one  for  each  company — two  for  field 
officers  and  one  for  extra  ammunition — and  that  a  company 
officer  should  be  detailed  to  inspect  the  men's  food  at  each  meal 
to  see  that  it  was  properly  cooked.3  The  allowance  of  trans 
portation  to  each  regiment  in  the  light  of  our  subsequent 
experience  seems  extravagant.  We  had  not  then  learned  to  rid 
ourselves  of  useless  impedimenta,  strip  ourselves  of  every  useless 
encumbrance,  even  knapsacks,  and  go  through  great  campaigns 
carrying  everything  we  needed  on  our  backs  with  only  enough 
wagons  to  carry  necessary  supplies  and  ammunition. 

On  the  morning  of  April  29,  reveille  sounded  at  4  o'clock 
and  we  had  breakfast  and  were  ready  to  move  at  the  hour 
designated.  Captain  Gilliland  took  leave  of  his  company  and 
regiment  and  went  to  the  landing  to  await  the  acceptance  of  his 
resignation.  Shortly  before  7  o'clock  we  fell  in  and  were  soon 
on  the  march.  We  moved  very  slowly,  for  the  whole  division 
was  moving.  After  we  had  passed  the  place  where  we  had  been 
on  picket  we  turned  toward  the  left.  Our  pulses  had  been  quick 
ened  by  hearing  distant  cannonading.  Company  A,  by  order  of 
General  McCook,  was  sent  to  the  front  as  skirmishers  and  beat 
the  woods  in  front  of  our  column  in  order  to  prevent  surprise.4 
About  mid-afternoon,  after  a  march  of  four  or  five  miles,  we 
halted  and  pitched  tents  about  one-half  mile  from  Lick  Creek 
and  about  one  mile  to  the  left  of  the  Cornith  road.5  The  woods 
where  we  camped  were  full  of  "varmints"  of  every  description.6 
April  30,  was  clear  and  pleasant  and  we  cleaned  up  and  policed 
the  streets  of  our  camp  and  put  everything  in  good  sanitary  con 
dition.  The  boys  had  a  good  deal  of  fun  chasing  squirrels  and 
wild  turkeys,  but  were  not  allowed  to  shoot  them.  Quite  a  num- 

1  Gleason's  Diary.  4     Gregory's  Diary. 

2  McConnell's  Diary.  5     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-677. 

3  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-138.  6     Gleason's  Diary. 


144  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

her  of  recruits  for  the  regiment  arrived,  among  them  E.  L.  Quick 
and  Daniel  Stanton,  Company  H,  and  Alexander  Lord  and  Wil 
liam  Ross,  Company  I. 

May  1,  the  men  of  Company  H  were  a  good  deal  worked  up 
over  the  assignment  of  Lieutenant  Culbertson  of  Company  D  to 
the  command  of  their  company.  They  preferred  their  own  Lieu 
tenant  Scott  and  looked  upon  Lieutenant  Culbertson  as  an 
intruder.  There  would  probably  have  been  a  public  manifesta 
tion  of  their  feelings,  had  not  an  order  to  go  on  picket  inter 
vened  at  3  P.  M.  We  moved  out  to  the  picket  line  about  a  mile 
and  a  half  south  of  our  camp  and  posted  guards  for  the  night. 
The  weather  was  pleasant  and  the  night  passed  without  dis 
turbance.  About  noon  the  next  day  Lieutenant  Colonel  Wilson 
came  along  the  line  and  said  we  were  to  march  next  morning  with 
seven  days'  rations  and  advised  us  to  be  prepared  for  a  long  rapid 
march. 

We  were  not  relieved  until  4  P.  M.  and  were  late  getting 
back  to  camp.  On  arrival  the  trouble  in  Company  H  was  settled. 
Captain  Kirby  of  Company  D  had  resigned  and  Lieutenant  Cul 
bertson  would  take  his  place,  thus  leaving  Lieutenant  Scott  in 
command  of  Company  H.1  Gleason,  Gregory  and  McConnell 
all  note  in  their  diaries  that  on  this  day  we  received  our  first  sky 
blue  pants.  The  morning  of  May  3,  every  one  was  astir  early 
and  we  began  preparations  for  marching.  Our  orders  directed  us 
to  be  ready  to  march  at  11  o'clock.  We  were  all  ready  by  that 
time  but  had  to  stand  by  the  roadside  an  hour  waiting  for  the 
advance  troops  to  pass.  We  finally  got  started  but  there  were 
frequent  halts  and  our  progress  was  so  slow  that  at  6  P.  M.  we 
had  only  gone  two  miles.  About  that  time  we  heard  heavy  can 
nonading  in  front  which  indicated  an  attack  in  earnest,  but  it 
finally  ceased.  When  we  got  started  again  we  made  up  for  lost 
time  and  marched  at  a  rapid  pace,  part  of  the  time  at  a  double- 
quick.  After  marching  at  this  rapid  rate  for  a  mile  and  a  half 
we  came  to  quite  a  steep  hill  and  ascended  it  at  such  a  killing 
pace  that  some  of  the  men  could  not  keep  up.  We  finally  reached 
the  summit  and  kept  on  at  a  double-quick  for  quite  a  distance, 
when  we  turned  to  the  left  into  the  woods  where  we  formed  line 
of  battle  and  stacked  arms. 

Colonel  Dickey  here  passed  along  the  line  and  told  us  we 
were  near  the  enemy's  lines  and  that  if  he  was  wise  he  would 
attack  us  at  daybreak  next  morning.  He  exhorted  us  to  remem 
ber  Ohio  and  the  friends  at  home.2  Our  wagons  did  not  come  up 
so  officers  and  men  slept  on  the  ground  without  shelter,  many  of 
them  on  beds  of  leaves.  The  morning  of  Sunday,  May  4,  we 

1  and  2     Gleason's  Diary. 


SIEGE  OF  CORINTH  145 

were  informed  that  we  were  not  to  attack  the  enemy  on  that  day 
and  the  men  were  permitted  to  take  off  their  accounterments,  pro 
vided  they  kept  them  within  reach.  But  we  were  not  allowed  to 
rest  long.  The  Colonel  soon  came  along  the  line  and  ordered  us 
to  be  ready  in  eight  minutes  with  guns  and  accouterments  to  go 
with  the  brigade  on  a  reconnoissance.  We  took  the  Hamburg 
and  Corinth  road,1  passing  several  camps,  and  halted  opposite 
that  of  Nelson's  division.  After  a  short  halt  we  hurried  on  about 
six  miles  and  threw  out  skirmishers.  Our  skirmishers  advanced 
two  miles  further  where  they  came  upon  the  enemy's  pickets 
which  were  posted  about  two  or  three  miles  from  Corinth,  ex 
changed  shots  with  them,  driving  them  back  and  then  returned. 
Our  brigade  then  marched  back  to  camp,  having  accomplished 
the  object  of  the  reconnoissance.2 

It  had  commenced  to  rain  about  noon  and  continued  all 
the  afternoon,  making  the  ground  slippery  and  the  marching 
hard.  To  add  to  the  discomfort,  when  we  started  back  we 
were  hurried  as  if  our  lives  depended  on  our  getting  back  quick 
and  the  men  vented  their  displeasure  on  the  Colonel  with  curses 
deep  if  not  loud.3  We  finally  reached  camp  at  4 :30  wet  to  the 
waists.4  We  were  tired  out  and  went  to  rest  early,  but  were 
awakened  by  Adjutant  Taft  with  orders  to  march  at  6  A.  M.  next 
morning  with  three  days  rations.  The  morning  of  May  5,  reveille 
sounded  about  4  A.  M.  and  we  were  ready  to  move  at  the  hour 
designated.  It  had  rained  all  night  and  the  prospect  for  the  day 
was  dismal  indeed.  After  waiting  about  two  hours  we  were 
much  relieved  by  the  announcement  that  we  would  not  move 
unless  the  enemy  came  out  and  attacked  us  and  every  one  made 
himself  as  comfortable  as  he  could  the  rest  of  the  day.  May  6, 
was  clear  and  pleasant.  We  had  reveille  at  4  A.  M.  and  got  ready 
for  an  early  start  when  the  movement  was  again  postponed  on 
account  of  the  roads,  which  were  said  to  be  impassable  for 
artillery  and  trains.  A  large  detail  from  the  regiment  was  sent 
out  with  picks,  shovels  and  axes  to  repair  the  roads.  Rumors 
were  rife  that  Corinth  had  been  evacuated.  In  the  evening 
orders  came  to  be  ready  to  march  at  6  o'clock  next  morning.  The 
men  made  beds  of  green  branches  to  keep  them  out  of  the  mud. 

The  morning  of  May  7,  we  moved  out  about  7  o'clock  but 
progressed  slowly.  The  roads  were  bad  and  we  had  to  keep  the 
artillery  along  with  us.  As  soon  as  the  road  was  clear,  however, 
we  marched  rapidly  forward  for  four  or  five  miles  and  halted 
while  the  generals  selected  proper  camping  grounds.  We  were 
soon  moved  to  the  left  of  the  Hamburg  and  Corinth  road  and 
went  into  camp  in  an  unusually  fine  location.  Our  position  was 

1  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-678  3     Gleason's  Diary 

2  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-678  4     Gregory's  Diary 


146  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

a  little  south  of  Seven  Mile  Creek ;   General  Wood's  division  was 
on  our  right  and  General  Nelson's  was  on  our  left. 

May  8,  we  remained  in  camp  all  day.  Our  wagons  came  up 
and  we  pitched  our  tents  and  made  ourselves  comfortable.  About 
9  A.  M.  some  men  of  the  Twenty-ninth  Indiana  and  Seventy- 
seventh  Pennsylvania  who  were  at  work  on  a  bridge  over  Seven 
Mile  Creek  were  attacked  by  the  enemy,  when  a  spirited  skirmish 
took  place  in  which  the  enemy  was  driven  off  with  a  loss  of  four 
killed,  a  number  wounded  and  one  prisoner.  Our  loss  was  one 
killed,  three  wounded  and  one  captured ;  all  of  the  Thirty-ninth 
Indiana.1  That  evening  after  we  had  returned  we  heard  heavy 
cannonading  over  on  the  left,  in  the  direction  of  General  Pope's 
command. 

May  9,  at  8:30  A.  M.,  we  were  ordered  out  on  picket  duty. 
We  marched  about  a  mile  and  a  half  south  towards  Corinth, 
where  the  four  right  companies  of  the  regiment  were  posted  as 
picket  guards  and  the  four  left  companies,  with  the  Forty-ninth 
Ohio,  placed  in  proper  position  as  a  reserve.  Soon  afterwards 
firing  was  heard  on  the  left  which  gradually  extended  to  our 
front  and  continued  for  about  half  an  hour.  The  enemy  had 
attacked  our  pioneers,  killing  and  wounding  several,  who  were 
carried  back  past  our  post.  We  expected  to  be  ordered  to  the 
front  but  were  not,  as  it  was  reported  the  enemy  had  fallen  back. 
Adjutant  Taft  went  back  to  camp  to  report  the  attack  and  soon 
came  back  with  Captain  Dan  McCook,  A.  A.  G.  at  division  head 
quarters,  who  told  the  Colonel  he  ought  to  send  out  the  two 
pieces  of  artillery  which  were  with  us  and  "belt  h — 1  out  of 
them."2  The  pioneers  were  then  ordered  back  to  work 
and  there  was  no  further  disturbance  in  our  front/' 
During  the  day  we  heard  cannonading  over  on  the  left  in  the 
direction  of  General  Pope's  position.  It  was  reported  that  Gen 
eral  Pope  had  driven  the  enemy  and  taken  many  prisoners.  The 
firing  we  heard  was  at  Farmington  where  a  large  force  of  the  en 
emy  moved  out  against  our  left  wing  and  attacked  General  Pope's 
advance  brigade.  Quite  a  severe  engagement  took  place,  and 
General  Pope,  being  under  instructions  from  General  Halleck  to 
avoid  a  general  engagement,  withdrew  his  troops  behind  Seven 
Mile  Creek.  His  losses  were  178  killed  and  wounded.3  May  10, 
between  9  and  10  A.  M.,  the  First  Ohio  and  a  battalion  of  regu 
lars  came  out  to  relieve  us,  but  they  had  no  artillery  with  them 
and  we  had  to  wait  until  a  section  of  artillery  was  sent  out. 
When  it  came  we  marched  back  to  camp  which  we  reached  about 

1  General  McCook  relates  this  incident  as  occuring  on  the  8th    (\V.   R.   R.    10,  part 

1-678)    but  Gleason,  Gregory  and  McConnell  place  it  on  the  9th. 

2  Gleason's  Diary 

VV.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-804-5 


SIEGE  OF  CORINTH  147 

noon.  We  had  barely  time  to  eat  our  dinners  when  orders  came 
to  pack  up  and  move  at  once.  After  we  had  struck  tents  and 
loaded  our  wagons  General  Wood's  division  took  the  road  in 
advance  of  us  and  we  were  kept  waiting  until  6  P.  M.  We  then 
pulled  out  but  soon  overtook  General  Wood's  train  which 
hindered  our  progress  until  we  came  to  where  his  division  had 
halted.  From  this  point  we  pushed  on  quite  rapidly  about  two 
miles  and  turned  into  an  open  field  where  we  supposed  we  would 
bivouac  for  the  night.  A  detail  of  five  men  from  each  company 
was  sent  forward  on  picket  until  we  could  learn  if  there  was  a 
picket  line  in  front  of  us.  The  pickets  did  not  have  to  stand 
guard  very  long,  as  we  soon  resumed  our  march  and  moved  for 
ward  about  half  a  mile  to  a  woods  where  we  lay  all  night  in  line 
of  battle. 

The  attack  on  our  left  wing  in  such  force  May  9,  caused 
some  anxiety  on  the  part  of  our  superiors.  The  Hon.  Thomas  A. 
Scott,  Assistant  Secretary  of  War,  who  was  with  General  Pope's 
army,  was  thrown  into  a  momentary  panic,  and  at  10  P.  M.  that 
evening  telegraphed  to  Secretary  Stanton  that  the  enemy  was 
in  overwhelming  force  and  that  a  heavy  reinforcement  of  in 
fantry  and  artillery  should  be  sent  to  General  Halleck  at  once 
or  he  would  soon  be  besieged  in  the  heart  of  the  enemy's 
country.1 

May  11,  we  lay  in  line  of  battle  until  dusk  when  we  marched 
about  a  mile  to  the  left  and  bivouaced  near  General  McCook's 
headquarters.  Our  division  had  been  designated  as  the  reserve 
of  the  center  of  the  army  before  Corinth.2 

May  12,  at  2:30  A.  M.,  the  adjutant  came  round 
with  orders  to  be  ready  to  move  in  three  quarters  of  an  hour. 
Our  entire  brigade,  supported  by  General  Rousseau's  brigade,  was 
to  go  out  on  a  reconnoissance  to  ascertain  the  position  of  the 
enemy.  We  moved  out  on  the  Hamburg  road  to  Chambers 
Creek,  where  General  Rousseau's  brigade  was  posted  as  a  reserve, 
and  our  brigade  sent  forward  to  develop  the  enemy.  We  soon 
came  upon  the  enemy's  pickets,  drove  them  in  and  then  returned 
to  camp,3  which  we  reached  about  noon.  General  McCook  in 
his  official  report  says  this  reconnoissance  took  place  on  the  14th, 
but  all  our  diarists  place  it  on  the  12th. 

May  13,  news  of  the  battle  of  WTilliamsburg  and  the  taking 
of  Memphis  reached  our  camps.  It  was  also  rumored  that 
Corinth  had  been  evacuated  and  General  Johnson  was  reported 
as  saying  that  we  would  not  be  in  the  service  more  than  six  weeks 
longer.4  That  evening  Colonel  Gibson  of  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio, 

1  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-803  3     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-678. 

2  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-678  4     Gleason's  Diary. 


148  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

returned  from  a  leave  of  absence.1  There  was  some  picket  firing 
during  the  day.  May  14,  water  being  scarce  a  number  of  wells 
were  dug  to  add  to  our  supply.  He  had  dress  parade  in  the  even 
ing  when  it  was  announced  that  the  paymaster  was  at  the  landing 
and  would  soon  be  out  to  pay  us  off.  There  was  heavy  can 
nonading  off  to  our  right.  May  15,  we  went  out  with  the  division 
on  a  reconnoissance.  There  was  hard  marching  but  no  fighting. 
May  16,  there  was  the  usual  round  of  camp  duty  and  dress 
parade  in  the  evening.  After  dress  parade  orders  were  pub 
lished  to  be  ready  to  march  a  8  A.  M.  next  morning  with  three 
days'  cooked  rations  and  Colonel  Dickey  said  he  believed  "the 
dogs  of  war  would  bark  tomorrow."2 

May  17,  we  had  roll  call  without  reveille,  packed  knapsacks 
and  were  ready  to  march  at  the  time  appointed.  We  then  stacked 
arms  and  awaited  orders.  No  orders  to  move  came.  There  was 
heavy  cannonading  on  the  right  and  it  was  reported  that  our 
troops  had  effected  a  lodgment  on  the  Memphis  and  Charleston 
Railroad,  and  had  been  attacked  by  the  enemy  but  had  held 
their  ground. 

The  next  ten  days  we  lay  in  camp  on  reserve,  engaged  in 
the  usual  routine  of  camp  duties.  During  that  time  some  changes 
in  the  officers  of  the  regiment  took  place.  The  non-commissioned 
officers  and  men  of  Company  H  had  heard  that  Captain  Culbert- 
son  was  again  to  be  assigned  to  command  the  company,  and 
signed  a  petition  to  the  Governor  asking  that  Lieutenant  Scott 
be  promoted  to  Captain  and  placed  in  command  of  the  company. 
Their  petition,  however,  was  disregarded  and  Lieutenant  Cyrus 
Reasoner  of  Company  A  was  promoted  to  captain  and  placed 
in  command  of  the  company.  This  caused  a  good  deal  of  dis 
satisfaction  and  some  of  the  men  proposed  a  concerted  plan  to 
disobey  his  orders.  Wiser  counsels,  however,  prevailed.  Lieu 
tenant  Scott  resigned  and  after  a  time  it  all  blew  over.2 

While  we  were  thus  resting  quietly  in  reserve  General  Hal- 
leek  was  pressing  his  lines  towards  Corinth  by  regular  ap 
proaches.  Scores  of  miles  of  well-constructed  intrenchments 
were  made  and  as  our  men  advanced  from  one  position 
to  another,  other  intrenchments  were  built  and  it  was 
said  our  troops  had  discarded  guns  for  the  pick  and 
spade.  The  advance  to  a  new  position  was  usually  con 
tested  by  the  enemy  and  almost  every  day  we  heard  can 
nonading  and  sometimes  musketry,  but  were  not  called  upon  to 
take  part  in  the  movements.  By  this  time,  however,  our  army 
was  nearly  up  to  the  enemy's  advanced  works  and  had  control 
of  or  were  close  up  to  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad 

1  McConnell's  Diary. 

2  Gleason's  Diary. 


SIEGE  OF  CORINTH  149 

east  and  west  of  Corinth.  General  Halleck  was  still  over 
estimating  the  enemy's  strength  and  Assistant  Secretary  Scott 
and  others  were  so  persistently  urging  that  reinforcements  be 
sent  to  him  that  on  May  24,  Mr.  Lincoln  was  constrained  to  send 
him  a  telegram,  saying  in  substance,  that  all  the  commanders 
along  the  line  from  Richmond  to  Corinth  believed  they  were 
confronted  by  superior  numbers,  that  the  War  Department  had 
done  the  best  it  could  to  meet  calls  for  reinforcements,  and  that 
he  believed  the  brave  officers  and  men  of  his,  Halleck's,  army 
would  be  victorious  at  Corinth.1 

General  Halleck  answered  this  dispatch  on  the  25th,  saying 
he  had  not  asked  for  reinforcements,  but  only  whether  any  were 
coming.  If  they  were,  he  would  wait  for  them ;  if  not,  he  would 
venture  an  attack;  that  his  army  was  now  in  the  immediate 
presence  of  the  enemy  and  the  battle  might  occur  at  any  moment; 
that  he  had  every  confidence  he  would  succeed  but  did  not  like 
to  run  any  risk,  etc.2  At  that  time  General  Beauregard  and  his 
chief  officers  had  held  a  council  of  war  and  decided  to  evacuate 
Corinth,  and  on  May  26,  orders  were  given  accordingly.3 

May  27,  the  regiment  drilled  for  an  hour  in  the  morning  and 
after  drill  returned  to  quarters.  The  men  were  eating  their  din 
ners  when  the  bugle  sounded  "Attention,''  and  the  companies 
fell  into  line,  but  stacked  arms  in  order  to  get  two  days  rations 
in  their  haversacks.  The  men  had  hardly  time  to  get  their 
dinners  when  we  were  order  to  "fall  in"  and  the  whole  division 
was  soon  moving  out  to  the  front  on  the  Hamburg  and  Corinth 
road,  our  brigade  in  advance.  We  were  halted  for  a  short  time 
to  allow  a  large  body  of  other  troops  to  get  out  of  our  way  and 
then  pushed  on.  About  two  miles  out  we  passed  General  Buell's 
headquarters  and  a  half  mile  further  came  into  a  large  open 
space  near  Wood's  division  which  was  posted  behind  strong 
intrenchments.  After  an  hour's  delay  our  brigade  moved  out 
half  a  mile  beyond  the  intrenchments,  where  we  formed  line  of 
battle.  The  Thirty-second  Indiana  threw  out  a  strong  skirmish 
line  which  advanced,  engaged  the  enemy's  pickets  and  drove  them 
back  across  Bridge  Creek,  suffering  a  loss  of  two  men  wounded. 
General  McCook  in  his  official  report  relates  this  advance  as 
occurring  on  the  26th,  but  General  Buell  and  our  diarists  place 
it  on  the  27th,  which  is  doubtless  correct.  After  this  skirmish 
was  over  we  lay  down  for  the  night,  expecting  to  be  called  to 
arms  at  any  moment,  but  were  undisturbed.  The  night  was  cool ; 
we  were  without  our  blankets  and  some  of.  the  men  got  little 
sleep. 

1  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-666 

2  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-667 

3  W.  R.  R.   10,  part  2-54G 


150  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

May  28,  according  to  General  Buell's  report,  McCook's, 
Nelson's  and  Crittenden's  divisions  all  advanced,  and  our  division, 
General  Rousseau's  brigade  leading,  drove  the  enemy  from  and 
occupied  Serratt's  Hill,  a  commanding  position  which  was  less 
than  a  thousand  yards  from  the  enemy's  works  and  the  nearest 
point  occupied  by  any  of  the  troops  in  front  of  Corinth  previous 
to  the  evacuation.1 

General  McCook  gives  a  detailed  report  of  the  ad 
vance  of  our  division  and  states  that  his  skirmishers  drove 
the  enemy  across  Bridge  Creek  and  over  Serratt's  Hill  and  kept 
up  the  pursuit  until  4  P.  M.,  when  an  officer  came  to  him  and 
reported  that  the  advance  was  not  more  than  200  yards  from  the 
enemy's  intrenchments.  He  says  the  losses  in  Rousseau's  brig 
ade  were  thirteen  men  wounded  and  in  our  brigade  seven 
wounded,  five  in  the  Thirty-second  and  two  in  the  Thirty-ninth 
Indiana.  The  enemy's  loss  was  reported  to  be  forty-one  killed 
and  seventy-three  wounded.  - 

The  following  account  of  our  operations  is  taken  substantially 
from  Gleason's  diary:  On  the  28th  about  10  o'clock.  General 
McCook  came  back  from  the  front  and  said  "we  would  go  oiit 
and  see  what  we  could  find."  We  then  moved  out  about  one- 
fourth  of  a  mile,  formed  line  of  battle  and  awaited  the  progress 
of  events.  Skirmishing  was  going  on  a  short  distance  to  the 
front  and  artillery  firing  to  the  right  and  left.  It  was  understood 
that  General  (T.  W.)  Sherman  was  trying  to  carry  an  important 
position  known  as  McGee's  Hill  and  that  our  brigade  was  ex 
pected  to  support  him.  The  Thirty-second  and  Thirty-ninth 
Indiana  were  in  front  as  skirmishers,  the  Fifteenth  ( )hio  sup 
porting  the  former  and  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  supporting  the 
latter — Ohio  thus  supporting  Indiana.  As  the  enemy  was  driven 
back  we  advanced  and  the  enemy  was  driven  back  across  a  field, 
but  held  his  position  in  the  woods  across  it  until  Cotter's  battery 
came  up  and  shelled  the  woods.  We  then  crossed  the  field,  but 
were  at  once  recalled  to  our  former  position  in  the  edge  of  fhe 
woods.  Sharp  firing  all  along  the  line  took  place ;  our  skir 
mishers  were  driven  back  and  it  was  thought  there  was  a  general 
advance  of  the  enemy.  We  took  position  along  the  fence  over 
looking  the  field,  while  Cotter's  battery  to  our  left  poured  a 
raking  fire  into  the  woods  where  the  enemy  was  supposed  to  be 
advancing.  We  held  our  position  along  the  fence  without  at 
tempting  any  further  advance.  That  night  after  dark  we  posted 
four  companies  and  five  men  from  each  of  the  other  six  com 
panies,  all  under  command  of  Captain  Culbertson,  in  the  center 
of  the  field  to  give  warning  of  the  enemy's  approach.  We  could 

1  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-675 

2  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-670 


SIEGE  OF  CORINTH  151 

hear  quite  a  hubbub  in  the  enemy's  camp  and  towards  morning 
saw  quite  a  number  of  rockets  which  were  sent  up  by  the  enemy 
as  signals  of  some  kind.  A  Sergeant  of  Company  K1  was  sitting 
on  the  ground  behind  the  fence  with  his  gun  between  his  knees 
trying  to  keep  awake,  when  the  first  rocket  was  discharged.  It 
went  up  with  a  great  roar  and  he  thought  it  was  a  shell  coming 
straight  towards  him.  Acting  upon  a  natural  impulse  he  dropped 
his  gun  and  hugged  the  ground  to  escape  it.  He  soon  saw  that 
it  was  a  rocket  instead  of  a  shell,  and  looked  around  to  see  if 
any  one  had  noticed  his  momentary  panic.  Fortunately  no  one 
saw  him  and  he  kept  the  incident  to  himself. 

May  29,  we  lay  all  day  and  all  night  along  the  fence  above 
mentioned,  annoyed  a  good  deal  by  the  enemy's  sharp  shooters 
in  the  woods  across  the  field,  to  whose  fire  our  skirmishers  re 
plied  in  a  vain  effort  to  put  them  out  of  business.  They  were 
concealed  in  the  woods  and  when  they  would  fire  our  men  would 
notice  the  puffs  of  smoke  from  their  guns  and  aim  at  them. 
One  of  the  enemy's  sharp  shooters  was  particularly  annoying 
and  came  near  his  mark  a  number  of  times.  The  boys  got 
familiar  with  the  crack  of  his  rifle,  which  they  called  "Long 
Tom.'  and  a  determined  effort  was  made  to  get  rid  of  him. 
Finally  one  of  the  men  climbed  a  tree  off  to  the  right  and  after 
a  little  maneuvering  fired  and  reported  that  he  "had  got  him/' 
This  was  probably  true,  for  we  heard  no  more  the  familiar  crack 
of  "Long  Tom."  It  was  a  pleasant  day  in  the  woods,  barring 
the  fire  of  the  sharpshooters,  and  we  had  nothing  to  do  but 
await  developments  on  other  parts  of  the  line.  A  siege  gun  on 
our  left  kept  booming  away,  throwing  shells  into  Corinth,  but 
evoking  no  reply,  and  an  occasional  rattle  of  musketry,  also  on 
the  left,  indicated  some  activity  on  that  part  of  the  line.  The 
quartermaster  brought  up  some  rations  to  piece  out  our  nearly 
exhausted  supply.  The  sutler  had  ventured  up  within  half 
a  mile  of  our  line,  and  supplied  ale  to  those  who  cared  to  go  that 
distance  for  it  and  could  get  permission  to  do  so.  General 
McCook's  headquarters  were  a  short  distance  above  us  in  the 
woods.  About  noon  we  sa\v  some  negroes  spreading  a  cloth  on 
the  ground  for  the  noonday  repast  of  himself  and  staff  and 
noticed  that  his  larder  was  well  supplied  with  eatables  and  drinka 
bles.  Not  far  away  Edward  L.  Quick  of  Company  H,  "Lasky" 
the  boys  called  him,  was  lying  on  the  ground  asleep.  He  sud 
denly  started  up  with  a  cry  of  pain  and  began  running  round 
and  round  crying  out  and  holding  his  hands  to  his  head.  General 
McCook  came  running  down,  took  hold  of  him  and  on  inquiry 
found  that  a  bug  had  crept  into  his  ear.  The  General  at  once 

1     The  writer. 


152  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

directed  him  to  lie  down  on  his  side,  produced  a  flask  and  poured 
some  whisky  into  his  ear  when  the  bug  came  out.  By  this  time 
a  crowd  had  collected,  among  them  the  General's  staff.  All 
laughed  heartily  over  the  incident,  and  Mr.  J.  W.  Collier,  the 
General's  purveyor,  upbraided  him  for  wasting  the  whisky  when 
water  would  have  served  the  purpose  quite  as  well.  Gleason 
notices  the  incident  in  his  diary  but  says  the  bug  came  out  be 
fore  the  whisky  was  poured  in.  A  short  time  before  General 
McCook's  death  the  writer  had  the  pleasure  of  meeting  him, 
when  the  incident  was  recalled.  Late  that  evening  we  were 
relieved  by  the  Thirty-second  Indiana,  and  bivouaced  near  Gen 
eral  McCook's  headquarters. 

The  evening  of  the  29th,  General  Buell  proposed  to  General 
rialleck  to  advance  and  crowd  the  enemy  back  and  across  Bridge 
Creek  and  suggested  that  General  Pope  should  also  be  prepared 
to  advance  at  the  same  time.  General  Halleck  replied  that  General 
Pope  was  of  the  opinion  that  he  could  not  advance  without  bring 
ing  on  a  general  engagement.  General  Buell  therefore  gave 
orders  for  a  general  advance  next  morning. 

The  morning  of  May  30,  we  were  up  early  and  ready  for 
action,  The  day  was  expected  to  be  the  decisive  one  of  the  cam 
paign.  Soon  came  a  rumor  that  deserters  had  come  into  Gen 
eral  Nelson's  lines  and  reported  Corinth  evacuated.  We  soon 
fell  in  and  moved  forward  across  the  open  field.  Just  before  the 
regiment  reached  the  woods  on  the  farther  side  of  the  field.  Ser 
geant  Hanson  of  Company  A  and  Sergeant  Cope  of  Company  K, 
were  ordered  to  step  a  hundred  paces  to  the  front  of  the  right  and 
left  respectively  of  the  regiment  and  advance  into  the  woods  to 
see  if  the  enemy  was  in  ambush  there. 

They  found  no  sign  of  the  enemy  and  the  regiment  moved 
forward.  We  soon  cleared  the  woods  and  came  in  full  view 
of  the  enemy's  intrenchments  which  were  entirely  deserted.  We 
then  marched  by  the  flank  inside  the  enemy's  fortifications  and 
beheld  the  town,  which  seemed  wholly  abandoned.  Much  of  it 
was  in  smoldering  ruins.  We  here  halted  to  await  orders  and 
learned  that  Nelson's  division  had  preceded  us  by  about  two 
hours.  General  Buell  in  his  official  report  states  that  about  4  :30 
A.  M.  he  received  a  message  from  General  Nelson  saying  that 
the  enemy  were  evacuating  the  place  and  that  he  ordered  his 
troops  to  advance,  but  in  view  of  dispatches  he  had  received  from 
Generals  Halleck  and  Pope  two  and  a  half  hours  before,  he 
ordered  General  Nelson  to  adhere  to  his  original  instructions  and 
advance  at  the  time  appointed.  He  adds  that  very  soon  after  this 
the  divisions  of  McCook  and  Nelson  entered  the  enemy's  works.1 

1     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-676 


SIEGE  OF  CORINTH  153 

Toward  evening  the  entire  brigade  moved  back  towards  the  woods 
under  orders  of  General  Johnson.  One  regiment  had  already 
crossed  a  road  leading  to  the  south  and  the  Fifteenth  Ohio,  led 
by  Colonel  Dickey,  had  just  commenced  to  cross  it,  when  Gen 
eral  Nelson  at  the  head  of  his  division,  hot  and  dusty  from  a  vain 
pursuit  of  the  enemy,  came  marching  up  the  road  we  were  cross 
ing.  General  Nelson  in  a  loud  angry  voice,  with  much  profanity, 
ordered  Colonel  Dickey  to  take  his  regiment  out  of  the  way  and 
let  his  troops  pass.  Colonel  Dickey  said  he  was  moving  under 
orders  of  General  Johnson  and  being  already  partly  across  the 
road  had  the  right  of  way.  Thereupon  General  Nelson  got  into 
a  towering  rage  and  cursed  the  colonel  up  and  down.  Colonel 
Dickey  put  his  hand  on  his  holsters  and  glared  at  General  Nelson 
as  if  he  intended  to  draw  his  pistol.  The  general  saw  the  glare 
and  exclaimed,  "God  d — n  you,  don't  you  look  at  me  that  way."1 
The  altercation  finally  ended  by  the  general  placing  Colonel 
Dickey  in  arrest  and  ordering  him  to  take  his  place  in  the  rear 
of  the  regiment,  which  the  colonel  sullenly  obeyed. 

General  Nelson  then  called  on  Lieutenant  Colonel  Wilson  to 
take  command  of  the  regiment  and  turn  it  aside,  which  order 
was  also  obeyed,  and  we  waited  until  his  entire  division  had 
passed.  A  few  months  later  at  Louisville  General  Nelson  was 
shot  by  General  Jeff.  C.  Davis,  when  this  incident  was  recalled, 
and  some  thought  that  if  General  Davis  had  been  in  place  of 
Colonel  Dickey  at  Corinth,  the  tragedy  which  resulted  in  his  death 
would  have  occurred  there  instead  of  at  Louisville.  General 
Nelson  was  a  brave  and  most  capable  officer  and  it  is  a  matter  of 
unavailing  regret  that  his  ungovernable  temper  resulted  in  his 
loss  to  the  country,  which  at  that  time  sorely  needed  his  services. 
Had  he  lived  he  would  doubtless  have  greatly  distinguished  him 
self  and  attained  high  rank  in  his  country's  service. 

After  General  Nelson's  division  had  passed  we  counter 
marched  and  took  position,  for  the  night  we  supposed,  near  an 
old  Confederate  camp.  We  had  just  made  ourselves  reasonably 
comfortable  when  an  order  came  to  go  on  picket.  We  started 
at  once  and  after  several  halts  reached  the  center  of  the  town 
and  halted  near  the  ruins  of  the  Confederate  commissary  depart 
ment.  There  was  quite  a  quantity  of  stores  uninjured  by  the 
fire,  among  them  some  hogsheads  of  sugar,  from  which  the  men 
supplied  themselves  liberally.  We  crossed  the  railroad  on  a  high 
bridge  and  after  going  a  short  distance  halted  and  sent  out  three 
companies  as  picket  guards.  The  other  companies  were  consti 
tuted  the  reserve.  The  men  were  without  shelter  or  blankets  and 
got  what  rest  they  could  on  the  bare  ground.2 

1  Colonel  Dickey  was  cross-eyed 

2  Gleason's  Diary.  Sig.    6 


154  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

After  more  than  seven  weeks  of  digging,  with  little  march 
ing  or  fighting,  the  great  army  of  General  Halleck  had  taken 
Corinth.  General  Halleck  duly  reported  it  to  the  Secretary  of 
War  on  May  30,  in  several  dispatches.  The  first  merely  stated 
that  his  advance  guards  were  in  Corinth ;  the  second,  that  the 
enemy's  wrorks  were  exceedingly  strong  and  that  General  Beau- 
regard  evidently  distrusted  his  troops  or  he  would  have  defended 
so  strong  a  position :  that  in  his  flight  he  destroyed  an  immense 
amount  of  public  and  private  property,  stores,  provisions,  wagons, 
tents,  etc.;  that  for  miles  out  of  town  the  roads  were  filled  with 
arms,  haversacks,  etc.,  thrown  away  by  the  flying  troops  and  that 
General  Pope  estimated  that  2000  prisoners  and  deserters  had 
been  captured.  His  next  dispatch  stated  that  General  Pope  with 
50,000  men  was  pursuing  the  demoralized  enemy.  June  4,  he 
telegraph  that  General  Pope  with  40,000  men  was  thirty  miles 
south  of  Corinth  pursuing  the  enemy  hard  and  had  already  re 
ported  10,000  prisoners  and  deserters  and  15,000  stands  of  amis 
captured  and  that  thousands  of  the  enemy  were  throwing  away 
their  arms.1 

General  Pope  afterwards  denied  that  he  had  ever  made  such 
report,2  but  it  evoked  from  Secretary  Stanton  the  following  dated 
June  4,  1862 : 

"Your  glorious  dispatch  is  just  received,  and  I  have  sent  it 
to  every  state.  The  whole  land  will  soon  ring  with  applause  at 
the  achievemnt  of  your  gallant  army  and  its  able  and  victorious 
commander,"  and  from  President  Lincoln  a  message  saying, 
"Thanks  for  the  good  news."3 

The  land  soon  rang,  not  with  applause,  but  with  criticism  and 
ridicule  that  so  great  an  effort  had  resulted  in  such  little  gain. 
The  special  correspondent  of  the  Chicago  Tribune  in  a  dispatch 
dated  May  30,  wrote  as  follows  : 

"General  Halleck  has  achieved  one  of  the  most  barren  tri 
umphs  of  the  war.  In  fact  it  is  tantamount  to  a  defeat.  It  gives 
the  enemy  an  opportunity  to  select  a  new  position  as  formidable 
as  that  at  Corinth  and  in  which  it  will  be  far  more  difficult  for  us 
to  attack  him,  on  account  of  the  distance  our  army  will  have  to 
transport  its  supplies.  *  *  I  look  upon  the  evacuation  * 
as  a  victory  for  Beauregard  *  *  It  prolongs  the  contest 
for  at  least  six  months.  *  •  *  *  *  *  General  Halleck 
must  be  deeply  mortified  at  the  evacuation.  It  shows  that  he 
knew  nothing  of  the  position  and  strength  of  the  enemy  and  his 
ulterior  designs."4 

1  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-668-669.  3     W.  R.  R.   10,  part  1-669. 

2  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-635-636.  4 


SIEGE  OF  CORINTH  155 

Whitelaw  Reid,  the  special  correspondent  of  the  Cincinnati 
Commercial,  May  30,  wrote  to  that  newspaper  the  following: 

"On  the  day  the  Second  Division  moved  out,  advances  with 
heavy  cannonading  were  made  by  Thomas  on  the  right  and  Pope 
on  the  left,  but  not  a  response  in  kind  was  elicited  from  the  en 
emy.  During  that  night  we  could  hear  teams  being  driven  oft" 
and  boxes  being  nailed  in  the  rebel  camp.  *  *;  *  Last  night 
the  same  band  sounded  retreat,  tattoo  and  taps  all  along  the  rebel 
lines,  moving  from  place  to  place,  and  this  morning  suspicion  was 
ripened  into  certainty  when  we  saw  dense  columns  of  smoke  arise 
in  the  direction  of  Corinth  and  heard  the  report  of  an  exploding 
magazine.  Corinth  had  been  evacuated  and  Beauregard  had 
achieved  another  triumph.  I  do  not  know  how  the  matter  strikes 
abler  military  men,  but  I  think  we  have  been  fooled.  The  works 
are  far  from  being  invulnerable,  and  the  old  joke  of  quaker  guns 
has  been  played  on  us.  They  were  real  wooden  guns,  with  stuffed 
'paddies'  for  gunners.  I  saw  them.  We  approached  clear  from 
Shiloh  in  line  of  battle  and  made  preparations  to  defend  our 
selves  compared  with  which  the  preparations  of  Beauregard  sink 
into  insignificance.  This  morning  we  could  have  poured  shot 
and  shell  from  over  300  guns  into  works  that  never  saw  the  day 
when  General  McCook  could  not  have  taken  his  division  into 
them.  The  rebel  force  here  did  not  exceed  60,000  men.  With 
what  light  I  had  I  regarded  the  mode  of  our  advance  on  Corinth 
as  deep  wisdom  ;  with  the  light  I  now  have  I  do  not."1 

The  columns  of  other  newspapers  of  the  country  were  crowd 
ed  with  similar  comment  and  our  great  campaign  against  Corinth 
became  the  subject  of  ridicule  throughout  the  country.  We  had 
taken  the  place,  it  is  true,  but  after  all  our  vast  preparations  and 
large  expenditure  of  time  and  strength  the  military  power  of  the 
rebellion  had  not  been  materially  weakened.  The  taking  of 
Corinth  was  a  practically  bloodless  victory  and  resulted  in  little 
material  gain  to  the  cause  of  the  Union. 

1     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-772 


CHAPTER  IX. 

THE  MARCH  FROM  CORINTH,  Miss.  TO  BATTLE  CREEK,  TENN. 

May  30,  1862,  General  Halleck,  not  yet  satisfied  that  the 
enemy  was  in  full  retreat,  and  evidently  apprehensive  that  he 
might  return  and  deliver  an  attack  on  some  portion  of  his  line,  is 
sued  an  order  directing  General  Pope  to  withdraw  his  forces  and 
occupy  the  high  ground  southeast  of  Corinth.  General  Thomas 
by  the  same  order  was  directed  to  fall  back  to  the  enemy's  en 
trenchments  and  hold  the  Corinth  and  Purdy  Road  and,  with 
General  McClernand's  division  in  reserve,  be  prepared  to  meet 
any  movement  of  the  enemy  on  our  right  flank.  General  Buell 
was  directed  to  place  a  cavalry  force  in  Corinth,  occupy  the  en 
emy's  entrenchments  with  one  division  and  hold  his  forces  in  the 
rear,  ready  to  move  to  the  right  or  left.1  In  view  of  our  now 
known  great  superiority  in  numbers  and  the  enemy's  precipitate 
retreat,  one  smiles  at  this  over  cautious  order.  It  was  in  pursu 
ance  of  this  order  that  our  (General  McCook's)  division  was 
placed  in  control  of  the  place.  May  31,  however,  General  Hal 
leck  had  become  convinced  that  the  enemy  was  in  full  retreat 
toward  Okolona  and  telegraphed  the  Secretary  of  War  that  he 
did  not  propose  to  follow  him  far  into  the  Mississippi  but  would 
immediately  proceed  to  open  the  railroad  to  Decatur,  Ala.  and 
Columbus,  Ky.2 

At  that  time  General  George  W.  Morgan  with  the  Seventh 
Division  of  General  BuelFs  army  was  holding  Cumberland  Ford 
on  the  river  of  that  name  and  watching  a  force  of  the  enemy  at 
Cumberland  Gap,  12  miles  away.  General  Ormsby  M.  Mitchell, 
commanding  the  Third  Division  of  General  Buell  s  army,  by  a 
remarkably  brilliant  campaign  had  cleared  Middle  Tennessee  of 
the  enemy,  except  some  roving  bands  of  free  booters,  and  held 
the  north  bank  of  the  Tennessee  River  from  a  point  near  Chat 
tanooga  to  Decatur,  Ala.3  He  had  also  occupied  positions  in  the 
mountain  regions  bordering  on  the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga 
Railroad  from  which  he  menaced  Chattanooga.4  He  could  have 
taken  and  held  that  place  if  the  reinforcements  he  repeatedly 
called  for  had  been  furnished.  We  now  see  that  those  could 
easily  have  been  supplied  from  General  Halleck's  great  army  at 
Corinth  without  impairing  its  necessary  strength.  It  was  with  a 
view  of  opening  connection  with  General  Mitchell's  troops  that 

1  W.  B.  R.  10,  part  2-230  3     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-876 

2  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-668  4     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-892 


THE  MOVEMENT  TOWARDS  CHATTANOOGA  157 

General   Halleck  was  preparing    to    repair    the    railroad    from 
Corinth  to  Decatur. 

May  31  he  suggested  to  General  Buell  that  General  Mitchell 
be  directed  to  cross  a  small  force  at  Decatur  and  repair  the  rail 
road  and  telegraph  line  towards  Corinth.  The  same  day  he  or 
dered  General  Buell  to  immediately  put  his  engineer  regiment  and 
such  railroad  officers  and  men  as  he  might  have,  at  work  to  open 
and  repair  the  road  from  Corinth  to  Tuscumbia,  sending  with 
them  a  sufficient  force  to  guard  the  working  parties.1  General 
Buell  the  next  day,  June  1,  issued  orders  putting  his  engineer 
regiment  at  work  on  the  bridges  near  Corinth,  and  assigning  Gen 
eral  Wood's  division  to  the  duty  of  repairing  the  Memphis  and 
Charleston  Railroad  from  Corinth  to  Decatur.  General  Wood 
was  ordered  to  assume  military  command  of  the  expedition,  to 
furnish  the  necessary  working  parties  and  guards,  to  take  neces 
sary  precautions  to  prevent  surprise  and  to  give  all  orders  neces 
sary  to  accomplish  the  speediest  repair  of  the  railroad  and  secure 
the  government  interests.  General  W.  S.  Smith  was  detailed  as 
superintendent  of  the  work,  and  General  Wood  was  directed  to 
honor  his  requisitions  for  fatigue  parties,  etc.2 

June  2  General  Halleck  ordered  General  Buell  to  push  Gen 
eral  Wood's  division  toward  Decatur,  repairing  the  road  as  rapid 
ly  as  possible  as  they  advanced  and  saying,  that  it  was  possible 
that  the  original  army  of  the  Ohio  would  soon  move  in  that  direc 
tion  and  that  he,  Buell,  should  make  arrangements  on  that  sup 
position.3  Probably  on  this  suggestion  General  Buell,  June  3, 
directed  General  Nelson,  unless  otherwise  ordered,  to  move  his 
division  to  the  Bear  Creek  bridge  on  the  Memphis  and  Charleston 
Railroad,  following  up  General  Wrood's  division,  and  at  the  same 
time  General  Wood,  on  General  Nelson's  approach  to  Bear  Creek, 
was  to  move  his  division  further  on  towards  Decatur.4  General 
Pope,  however,  who  had  been  following  up  the  enemy,  reported 
that  they  were  making  a  stand  at  Baldwyn  on  the  Mobile  and 
Ohio  Railroad,  and  General  Halleck  ordered  General  Buell  to 
move  two  of  his  divisions  to  reinforce  General  Pope.5  General 
Buell  decided  to  go  with  his  two  divisions  and  made  known  his 
intention  to  General  Halleck,  who  directed  him  to  take  command 
of  all  the  forces  moving  against  Baldwyn.  He  also  informed 
General  Buell  that  it  was  not  the  intention  to  pursue  the  enemy 
beyond  that  place,  and  that  the  repair  of  the  railroads  was  the 
great  object  to  be  attended  to,  after  getting  the  enemy  at  sufficient 
distance  so  that  he  could  not  cut  our  lines.6 


1  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-232.  4     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-250-251. 

2  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-236.  5     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-253. 

3  W.  R.  R.   10,  part  2-244.  6     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-254. 


158  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

June  5  General  Pope  found  the  enemy  in  force  posted  behind 
Twenty-Mile  Creek,  reported  the  fact  to  General  Halleck  and  said 
that  he  proposed  to  attack  him  if  not  prevented  by  orders  to  the 
contrary.1  June  6  General  Buell  arrived  at  Twenty-Mile  Creek 
and  reported  to  General  Halleck  that  he  "should  not  run  any  im 
proper  risk."  The  same  day  General  Halleck  telegraphed  General 
Buell  saying  that  if  he,  Buell,"  "was  confident  the  enemy  was 
retiring,"  he  might  assume  command  and  make  the  attack  but 
that  no  risk  should  be  taken.2  June  7,  while  General  Buell 
was  preparing  to  press  the  enemy  at  Twenty-Mile  Creek,  General 
Mitchell  telegraphed  from  Huntsville,  Ala.  to  General  Halleck, 
that  the  enemy  still  occupied  the  railroad  from  Tuscumbia  to 
Decatur,  that  he  had  no  force  to  drive  him  out,  that  he  supposed 
this  would  be  done  by  General  Buell,  but  was  informed  by  that 
officer  that  his  troops  would  not  probably  pass  east  of  Bear 
Creek  for  seven  or  eight  days.3  The  same  day,  evidently  on  re 
ceipt  of  this  dispatch,  General  Halleck  directed  General  Buell  to 
urge  General  Wood  to  push  forward  the  work  on  the  Bear  Creek 
bridge  with  all  possible  dispatch  and  employ  every  man  who 
could  find  room  to  \vork  on  it.4 

June  8  General  Buell  issued  elaborate  orders  for  an  attack 
next  day  on  the  enemy's  position  on  Twenty-Mile  Creek,  but  at 
midnight  found  that  he  had  retreated  and  reported  the  fact  to 
General  Halleck.5  General  Mitchell  had  sent  a  force  under  Gen 
eral  Negley  against  Chattanooga  which  reached  the  side  of  the 
Tennessee  river  opposite  the  town  June  7,  and  June  8,  after  a  six 
hours'  artillery  duel,  drove  the  enemy  from  his  rifle  pits  and  com 
pelled  him  to  evacuate  the  place.6  General  Mitchell  reported  this 
event  to  General  Buell  June  8,  and  expressed  the  opinion  that 
every  effort  should  be  made  to  maintain  the  position  General 
Negley  then  held.  He  urged  that  if  we  fell  back  the  door  would 
be  opened  to  the  enemy  to  pour  in  troops  at  the  exact  point  they 
had  already  determined  to  use,  and  that  if  we  commenced  to  fall 
back  it  was  difficult  to  determine  where  we  could  stop.  He 
deemed  this  a  matter  of  such  importance  that  he  requested  orders 
of  both  Generals  Buell  and  Halleck." 

These  views  of  General  Mitchell  in  the  light  of  subse 
quent  events  seem  prophetic.  June  8,  the  eastern  line  of 
General  Halleck's  department  was  chang'ed  so  as  to  place  all 
of  the  states  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  under  his  command.8 

June  9,  General  Buell  reported  to  General  Halleck  that 
he  had  countermanded  the  order  for  an  advance  upon  Bald- 

1  W.  R.  R.   10,  part  2-258.  5  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-273-274. 

2  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-264  6  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-920 

3  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-271  7  W.  R.  R.   10,  part  2-275 

4  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-268  8  W.  R.  R.   10,  part  2-277 


THE  MOVEMENT  TOWARDS  CHATTANOOGA  159 

wyn  and  that  everything  indicated  the  enemy  was  continuing 
his  retreat.1  General  Halleck  the  same  day,  probably  on  re 
ceipt  of  this  report,  dispatched  to  General  Buell  saying  that 
it  was  useless  to  pursue  the  enemy  further,  and  directed  him 
to  send  another  division  toward  Tuscumbia  to  repair  the  rail 
road  and  drive  out  the  enemy  this  side  of  Decatur.  In  the  same 
dispatch  General  Halleck  urged  that  connection  with  General 
Mitchell  be  made  with  all  possible  dispatch  and  added,  that 
he  was  only  watiing  for  advices  from  Washington  to  order 
his.  Buell's  movement.2  The  same  day  in  another  dispatch 
General  Halleck  ordered  General  Buell  to  move  Nelson's  and 
Crittenden's  divisions  in  the  direction  of  Decatur  on  such 
roads  as  he  might  deem  best,  to  send  General  T.  W.  Sher 
man's  division  to  Corinth,  to  replace  McCook's,  and  to  order 
General  McCook's  division  east.3  Orders  were  at  once  given 
by  General  Buell  for  the  movements  of  General  Nelson's  and 
General  Crittenden's  divisions  as  above  directed.  June  9, 
General  Buell  reported  to  General  Halleck  General  Mitchell's 
dispatch  of  June  8,  above  given,  and  stated  that  he  had 
istructed  him  on  June  7,  that  he  was  in  no  sufficient  force  to 
advance  on  Chattanooga,  and  that  if  he  succeeded  in  taking 
it  he  would  jeopardize  the  force  sent  there  and  expose  middle 
Tennessee.4  The  same  day,  June  9,  General  Mitchell  sent  a 
dispatch  direct  to  General  Halleck,  which  is  so  important  in 
view  of  subsequent  events  that  it  is  given  in  full : 

Huntsville,  Ala.,  June  9,  1862. 

General  Halleck: — I  have  kept  General  Buell  fully  advised  of  my 
own  movements  and  those  of  the  enemy.  Fearing  my  dispatches  may 
not  have  reached  him  T  venture  to  address  you  direct.  Having  heard 
that  the  enemy  was  passing  troops  from  Chattanooga  across  the  Ten 
nessee  for  the  purpose  of  occupying  Jasper,  Winchester  and  the 
mountains  bordering  on  the  river  and  railroad,  I  sent  an  expedition 
under  General  Negley  to  arrest  the  movement  of  the  enemy  and  drive 
them  back,  and  this  has  been  handsomely  done,  and  General  Negley 
on  the  7th  held  a  position  opposite  Chattanooga,  as  well  as  Jasper  and 
all  the  ferries,  thus  effectually  shutting  that  door  of  entrance;  but  on 
yesterday  I  learned  that  a  heavy  force  was  threatening  Murfreesboro 
and  the  adjacent  posts,  and  I  am  thus  compelled  to  withdraw  General 
Negley  and  send  him  to  reinforce  Colonel  Lester.  Since  the  fall  of 
Corinth  the  enemy  being  relieved  from  the  necessity  of  concentrating 
all  his  strength  at  that  point,  will  be  at  liberty  to  advance  through 
Cumberland  Gap  into  Kentucky,  from  Knoxville  across  the  mountains 
into  Nashville  and  from  Chattanooga  into  Northern  Alabama. 

Pardon  me  if  I  have  exceeded  the  limits  of  my  duty.  It  is  for 
me  to  report  that  my  force  is  totally  insufficient  to  do  anything  more 
than  to  guard  the  extensive  region  over  which  they  are  spread  from 

1  W.  R.  R.   10,  part  2-279.  3     W.  R.  R.   10,  part  2-281. 

2  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-280.  4     W.  R.  R.   10,  part  2-280. 


160  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

hostile  citizens  and  small  bands  of  the  enemy.    I  wait  your  orders  with 
anxiety. 

O.  M.  MITCHELL,  Major  General.! 

General  Halleck  seems  to  have  been  too  much  occupied 
with  the  repairs  of  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad  to 
heed  General  Mitchell's  phophetic  warning  as  to  the  probable 
movements  of  the  enemy,  if  the  Union  troops  were  withdrawn 
from  Chattanooga,  and  instead  of  sending  Mitchell  reinforce 
ments  to  enable  him  to  hold  his  advanced  positions,  he  merely 
advised  him  that  General  Buell  would  move  one  division 
across  Bear  Creek  at  once  and  that  another  would  follow  soon, 
and  urged  him  to  get  some  locomotives  and  cars  across  the 
river  at  Decatur  with  all  possible  dispatch,  to  aid  in  repair 
ing  the  railroad.2 

It  is  now  apparent  that  if  Generals  Buell  and  Halleck  had 
heeded  General  Mitchell's  warning  and  had  sent  him  the  re 
inforcements  he  needed,  the  immense  disaster  which  a  few 
weeks  afterwards  overtook  the  Union  arms  would  have  been 
prevented.  It  was  sheer  folly  to  waste  time  in  repairing  the 
railroad  from  Memphis  to  Chattanooga  as  a  means  of  sup 
plying  Buell's  army.  It  ran  300  miles  through  the  enemy's 
country  and  was  liable  to  be  broken  at  any  hour.  After  ex 
perience  demonstrated  this  fact.  If  General  Mitchell  had 
been  properly  reinforced  at  this  time,  as  could  easily  have 
been  done  from  the  great  army  at  Corinth,  Chattanooga  could 
have  been  occupied  and  held  and  the  whole  of  East  Tennes 
see  would  have  been  abandoned  by  the  enemy.  General  E. 
Kirby  Smith,  who  was  in  command  of  the  Confederate  forces 
in  East  Tennessee,  June  6  sent  a  dispatch  to  the  war  depart 
ment  at  Richmond  saying,  that  General  Mitchell's  movement 
upon  Chattanooga,  he  feared,  "involved  the  loss  of  East  Ten 
nessee  and  with  it  the  railroad,  Cumberland  Gap  and  Chat 
tanooga."3  June  7,  General  Smith  gave  orders  'to  General 
Stevenson,  commanding  the  Confederate  forces  at  Cumber 
land  Gap,  looking  to  its  abandonment,4  as  well  as  the  ictire- 
ment  from  Chattanooga. 

General  Halleck,  as  has  before  been  stated,  had  'ordered 
General  Buell  eastward  from  Corinth  along  the  Memphis  and 
Charleston  Railroad,  repairing  it  as  he  went,  and  laid  such 
emphasis  on  rebuilding  bridges  and  putting  the  railroad  in 
running  order,  that  General  Buell  seems  to  have  acted  on 
the  idea  that  this  was  the  chief  object  of  his  movement.  In 
fact  he  aftenvards  claimed,  when  charged  with  neglect  of 

1  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-282  3     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-597 

2  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-283  4     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-598 


THE  MOVEMENT  TOWARDS  CHATTANOOGA  161 

duty  in  not  getting  to  Chattanooga  in  time  to  prevent  the 
tnemy's  concentration  at  that  point,  that  "General  Halleck 
desired  that  the  movement  should  be  made  as  promptly  as 
possible,  but  it  was  a  condition  that  the  railroad  from  Corinth 
cast  should  be  repaired  and  it  was  his  idea  that  I  should  draw 
my  supplies  by  that  route."1  The  military  commission  which 
tried  General  Buell  in  its  report  states:  "We  are  of  the 
opinion  that  General  Buell  had  force  sufficient  to  accomplish 
the  object  if  he  could  have  marched  promptly  to  Chattanooga. 
The  plan  of  operations,  however,  prescribed  by  General  Hal 
leck,  compelled  General  Buell  to  repair  the  Memphis  and 
Charleston  Railroad  from  Corinth  to  Decatur,  and  put  it  in 
running  order  as  a  line  of  supply  during  his  advance."2  Gen 
eral  Halleck  indorsed  this  report  as  follows :  "So  much  of 
the  report  as  states  that  General  Buell's  march  on  Chatta 
nooga  was  delayed  by  the  repairs  of  the  Memphis  and 
Charleston  Railroad  and  that  General  Buell's  line  of  supplies 
was  unnecessarily  long  is  incorrect.  General  Buell  had  no 
other  line  of  supply  but  this  road  until  he  reached  Decatur 
and  connected  with  Nashville.  General  Buell  was  not  delayed 
an  hour  beyond  what  he  himself  deemed  necessary  to  secure 
his  supplies.  Moreover,  his  lines  of  supply  were  those  which 
he  himself  selected."3 

There  seems  to  have  been  no  written  orders  to  General 
Buell  directing  his  movement  eastward  from  Corinth  to  Chat 
tanooga.  The  Military  Commission  above  mentioned  states 
that  "on  the  llth  day  of  June,  General  Buell  with  his  army 
of  the  Ohio  was  ordered  by  General  Halleck  to  march  against 
Chattanooga,  and  take  it,  with  the  ulterior  object  of  dislodg 
ing  Kirby  Smith  and  his  rebel  force  from  East  Tennessee."4 

We  have  already  noted  that  on  June  9,  General  Halleck 
directed  that  the  division  of  General  T.  W.  Sherman  be  sent 
back  to  Corinth  from  Twenty  Mile  Creek  to  relieve  our 
division,  McCook's,  so  that  it  could  be  ordered  east.  No 
order  directing  General  McCook  to  move  is  found,  but  June 
12,  he  acknowledged  receipt  of  such  order,  and  said  he  would 
move  as  ordered.  General  McCook  at  the  same  time 
acknowledged  receipt  of  an  order  about  extra  baggage.5  The 
order  about  extra  baggage  was  probably  issued  by  General 
Buell  June  3,  and  directed  that  each  soldier  in  his  army  should 
have  the  following  named  articles  of  clothing  and  none  other : 
One  blanket,  two  shirts,  two  pairs  drawers,  two  pairs  socks,  one 

1  Statement  of  General   Buell   reviewing  evidence  before  military  commission.     W. 

R.  R.  16,  part  1-30. 

2  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  1-9.  4     W.  R.  R.  16,  part  1-9. 

3  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  1-12.  5     W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-18. 


162  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

jacket  or  blouse,  one  pair  pants,  one  pair  shoes  and  one  cap 
or  hat,  and  no  articles  of  clothing  were  to  be  carried  in  the 
knapsack  except  such  of  the  above  as  were  not  worn.1 

In  the  preceding  chapter  we  left  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  on 
the  night  of  May  30,  posted  as  pickets  a  short  distance  out 
of  Corinth.  At  noon  May  31,  it  was  relieved  from  picket 
duty  and  started  back  to  the  camp  it  had  occupied  May  27, 
previous  to  the  final  movement  on  Corinth.  It  was  a  hot 
afternoon  and  it  was  a  tiresome  march,  as  most  of  the  men 
were  overburdened  with  loot  gathered  in  the  deserted  camps 
of  the  enemy.  There  was  a  good  deal  of  straggling  and  as 
the  regiment  approached  camp  a  good  many  of  the  men  began 
firing  off  their  guns,  preparatory  to  cleaning  them  up,  they 
said.  The  firing  was  without  orders  and  Gleason  and  "Billy" 
Geller  of  Company  E,  were  caught  in  the  act  by  Colonel 
Gibson  and  placed  in  arrest.  However,  Lieutenant  Carroll 
interceded  for  them  and  they  were  not  punished.2  June  1, 
one  half  of  the  regiment  was  paid  off.  June  2,  Gleason  says 
Colonel  Dickey  signed  a  paper  commending  Lieutenant 
Scott's  record  while  with  the  regiment.  Lieutenant  Scott  had 
resigned  and  next  day  went  to  the  landing  where  he  took  a 
steamboat  for  home.  June  3,  at  6  A.  M.,  the  entire  division 
broke  camp,  marched  into  Corinth  and  stacked  arms  in 
the  edge  of  the  town.  General  Halleck  rode  up  and  passed 
us  just  as  we  halted.3  June  4  and  5,  we  were  in  camp  near 
Corinth,  engaged  in  usual  camp  duties  and  having  company 
drills.  On  the  morning  of  June  6,  we  marched  about  a  mile 
east  of  the  town  and  went  into  camp  on  a  large  plantation. 
The  wagons  soon  arrived,  the  tents  were  pitched  and  the  men 
then  scattered  in  search  of  dew  berries  and  huckleberries 
which  were  abundant  in  the  fields  and  woods.  One  party 
found  a  wild  plum  thicket  laden  with  fruit  which  was  soon 
stripped  bare.4  June  7  and  8  there  was  only  the  usual  round 
of  camp  duty.  June  9,  a  detail  of  forty  men  was  sent  into  the 
city  to  clean  and  drain  the  streets.  Gleason  was  with  the 
detail  and  frankly  states  that  the  sun  was  very  hot  and  that 
they  did  not  overwork  themselves.  There  wras  great  cheering 
throughout  the  camp  that  evening,  and  at  dress  parade  Major 
Wallace  announced  that  news  had  come  that  Richmond  had 
fallen  and  that  10,000  prisoners  had  been  taken.  He  said  he 
had  called  us  out  in  order  that  \ve  might  give  three  cheers 
for  the  glorious  victory.  Of  course  the  cheers  were  given, 
but  many  doubted  the  truth  of  the  story.5  Gregory  says  in 

1  W.  R.  R.  10,  part  2-628  4     Gleason's  Diary 

2  Gleason's  Diary  5     Gleason's  Diary. 

3  McConnell's  Diary 


THE  MOVEMENT  TOWARDS  CHATTANOOGA  163 

his  diary :  "Our  brigade  is  nearly  all  drunk  over  the  news 
that  Richmond  has  been  taken  with  16,000  prisoners."  June 
10,  in  the  morning"  rations  of  whisky  were  issued  to  the  men. 
It  was  mixed  with  quinine  at  which  many  grumbled  but  most 
of  them  partook  of  it.  Some  of  the  men  worked  all  the  fore 
noon  digging  a  well  and  had  reached  a  good  supply  of  water 
when  orders  came  to  be  ready  to  march  at  a  moment's  notice. 
Later  we  were  ordered  to  be  ready  by  3  P.  M.  We  struck 
tents,  packed  up,  and  were  ready  to  move  at  the  appointed 
time.  Not  receiving  orders  to  move,  we  stacked  arms  and 
waited.  At  4:30  P.  M.,  the  orders  came,  the  bugles  sounded 
and  we  moved  out,  taking  a  short  route  to  the  road  leading 
eastward  from  Corinth,  thus  avoiding  the  town.  When  we 
reached  this  road  we  marched  eastward  until  we  reached 
the  Purdy  road  and  there  turned  south,  passing  through 
Farmington  and  General  Pope's  long  line  of  formidable  in- 
trenchments.  Wre  then  again  turned  toward  the  east.  Our 
march  was  over  a  hilly  region.  The  hills  were  partly  covered 
by  pine  trees  and  there  were  no  streams  to  furnish  needed 
water.  We  continued  our  march  after  night-fall.  Many  of 
the  men  became  exhausted  and  fell  out,  and  nothing  but  the 
hope  of  soon  reaching  water  prevented  others  from  doing  so. 
At  10  P.M.,McConnell  says  11  P.M.,  we  halted  near  a  stream 
of  water  and  bivouaced  for  the  night,  having  marched  fifteen 
miles.1  June  11,  at  7  A.  M.,  we  resumed  our  march.  Our 
brigade  had  the  lead  of  the  division.  We  passed  through  an 
extensive  swamp  and  then  came  into  another  hilly  region  and 
the  most  extensive  pine  forest  we  had  yet  seen.  The  sun  was 
hot  and  the  road  dusty,  the  halts  were  few  and  the  men  soon 
began  to  fall  out  in  considerable  numbers.  Gleason  was  one 
of  the  stragglers  and  relates  that  when  he,  with  others,  came 
to  the  springs  near  luka,  "General  McCook  with  his  staff  was 
there  and  spoke  kindly  to  them,  telling  them  to  drink  all  they 
wished  and  then  fill  their  canteens."  The  regiment  reached 
luka  about  3  P.  M.  and  went  into  camp  about  a  mile  beyond 
the  town.  There  was  a  small  stream  near  by  which  furnished 
a  good  supply  of  water  and  afforded  the  men  the  luxury  of  a 
bath.  June  12,  there  were  no  marching  orders  and  all  enjoyed 
a  day  of  rest.  That  evening  General  McCook  received  the 
following  order  from  General  Buell : 

"March  for  Florence  with  your  division  tomorrow  morn 
ing.  You  are  expected  to  reach  that  point  on  the  14th  instant 
and  rest  there  on  the  15th,  during  which  day  you  will  have 
everything  closed  up  snug  for  crossing  the  river  on  the  16th. 

1     McConnell  says  12  miles 


164  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

General  Crittenden  follows  you,  so  keep  your  troops  and 
trains  well  in  hand."1  The  same  day  General  Halleck  issued 
an  order  directing  that  the  states  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee 
east  of  the  Tennessee  River,  except  Forts  Henry  and  Donel- 
son,  and  such  portions  of  North  Alabama  and  Georgia  as 
are  or  may  be  occupied  by  our  troops,  will  constitute  the  Dis 
trict  of  the  Ohio  under  command  of  Major  General  Buell,  and 
that  the  District  of  West  Teennessee  should  include  all  that 
portion  of  the  state  west  of  the  Tennessee  River,  and  Forts 
Henry  and  Donelson.2 

June  13,  we  resumed  our  march  at  about  6  A.  M.,  and 
were  eager  to  make  as  much  time  as  possible  before  the  heat 
of  the  day.  In  this  we  were  disappointed.  The  trains  of  the 
brigades  preceding  us  encountered  bad  places  in  the  road  and 
caused  frequent  and  annoying  delays.  About  the  middle  of 
the  afternoon  we  crossed  the  line  between  Mississippi  and 
Alabama.  There  we  halted  for  a  long  rest,  made  coffee  and 
had  our  suppers.  We  then  resumed  our  march  and  at  sunset 
came  to  Bear  Creek.  We  rolled  up  our  trousers,  waded 
through  the  stream  and  marched  on.  A  mile  or  two  further 
on  we  forded  another  stream  and  soon  came  into  an  open 
country  where  there  were  many  fine  plantations  with  fields 
of  corn  as  high  as  our  heads.  Our  march  after  this  was  quite 
rapid,  and  when  we  had  gone  about  six  miles  from  Bear  Creek 
we  went  into  camp  for  the  night.3 

The  morning  of  June  14,  reveille  sounded  about  4.30  A. 
M.,  and  by  6  A.  M.  we  were  ready  to  continue  our  march. 
Our  wagons  having  come  up,  we  drew  rations  and  then  swung 
out  at  a  good  pace,  ours  being  the  rear  regiment  of  the 
brigade.  About  noon  we  crossed  a  stream  and  halted  for 
dinner.  The  men  at  once  threw  off  their  knapsacks  and 
clothing  and  rushed  down  the  banks  into  the  stream  for  a  bath 
and  swim.  We  had  our  dinners  and  rested  until  4:30  P.  M. 
We  then  resumed  our  march.  During  the  morning  General 
Buell  with  his  staff  rode  by  and  seeing  a  good  many  strag 
glers,  roundly  reprimanded  General  Johnson  for  permitting 
it.  General  Johnson  threw  the  blame  on  the  colonels  and 
they  passed  it  on  down  the  line.  As  a  result  the  captains 
were  ordered  to  cause  anyone  caught  straggling  to  carry  a 
rail  for  two  hours,  and  to  have  the  roll  call  at  night  in  order 
to  detect  the  delinquents.4  We  marched  until  dark  when 
we  bivouaced  in  an  open  field  about  three  miles  from  Tus- 
cumbia,  having  marched  thirteen  miles.6  Before  turning  in 

1  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-18.  4     Gleason's  Diary. 

2  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-20.  5     McConnell's  Diary. 

3  McConnell's  Diary. 


THE  MOVEMENT  TOWARDS  CHATTANOOGA  165 

we  had  orders  to  march  at  3  o'clock  next  morning.  June  15, 
reveille  sounded  at  1 :30  A.  M.,  and  at  the  time  designated 
we  moved  out  slowly  and  reached  the  outskirts  of  Tuscumbia 
at  sunrise.  We  were  halted  and  stacked  arms  near  a  beautiful 
stream  of  clear  water  which  was  said  to  come  from  large 
springs  near  by.  We  filled  our  canteens  and  then  contined 
•our  march,  passing  through  a  portion  of  the  town.  The  Ten 
nessee  River  was  three  miles  distant  and  before  we  reached 
it  the  sun  came  out  scalding  hot.  General  Buell  was  appar 
ently  directing  the  march.1  After  nearly  reaching  the  river 
we  had  to  retrace  our  steps  about  a  mile.  We  then  marched 
across  a  plantation  to  a  bluff  above  the  river  where  we  halted 
and  went  into  camp.  That  morning  General  Buell  issued  an 
order  directing  General  McCook  to  hold  one  brigade  in  readi 
ness  to  cross  the  river  next  day.  The  same  order  directed 
that  in  moving  forward  on  the  other  side  of  the  river,  the 
brigades  should  march  with  considerable  intervals,  the  leading 
brigade  being  a  day  in  advance  of  the  other  two,  the  intervals 
between  the  last  two  to  be  indicated  thereafter.2 

The  site  of  our  camp  on  the  bluff  above  mentioned  was 
covered  with  a  thick  growth  of  saplings.  Water  could  not 
be  obtained  from  a  large  spring  200  feet  below.  To  reach  the 
spring  we  had  to  descend  the  bluff,  part  of  the  way  on  rude, 
almost  perpendicular  ladders,  fastened  to  the  bluff.  Our 
wagons  soon  arrived,  the  saplings  were  cut  away  and  we 
pitched  our  tents  in  the  spaces  thus  cleared.  After  this  great 
numbers  of  the  men  went  swimming  and  bathing  in  the  Ten 
nessee  River.  Some  of  them  swam  across  it,  a  distance  of 
about  one-fourth  of  a  mile.  Several  accidents  occurred.  One 
man  was  reported  drowned,  two  bitten  by  snakes  and  one 
nearly  killed  by  falling  over  the  bluff3 — all  of  the  Thirty-ninth 
Indiana.  June  16,  we  remained  in  camp  all  day.  In  the 
evening  we  heard  some  fine  music  by  the  band  of  the  Fif 
teenth  regulars  of  Rousseau's  brigade.  June  17,  an  order 
came  to  turn  over  all  tents  except  three  Sibley  and  one  wall 
tent  to  each  company,  all  clothing  except  one  blanket  and  a 
change  of  underclothing,4  and  pack  the  surplus  to  be  sent 
home.  In  the  afternoon  there  was  an  inspection  of  knapsacks 
to  see  that  the  order  had  been  obeyed.  That  evening  a  steam 
boat  and  two  barges  laden  with  supplies  came  up  the  river. 
A  large  crowd  had  collected  at  the  wharf  to  see  them  land, 
which  the  provost  guard,  under  orders  of  General  McCook, 
soon  dispersed.  June  18,  there  was  regular  inspection  and 
guns  were  found  in  bad  condition.  While  at  Tuscumbia  an 

1  Gleason's  Diary.  3     Gleason's  Diary. 

2  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-24.  4     W.  R.  R.   16,  part  2-25. 


166  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

epidemic  of  gambling  broke  out  and  everywhere  throughout 
the  camps  small  groups  of  men  in  secluded  spots  were  seen  en 
gaged  in  it.  The  game  was  called  "chuck-a-luck."  and  was  proba 
bly  introduced  by  southern  negroes  who  had  come  into  our 
lines.  Large  sums  of  money  Were  said  to  have  changed  hands 
every  day.  On  the  18th,  two  men  of  Company  H  were  said 
to  have  cleared  up  one  hundred  dollars.  The  evil  became  so 
prevalent  that  special  orders  were  issued  for  its  suppression 
and  were  rigidly  enforced  by  the  provost  guard.1  A  steam 
boat  came  up  the  river,  carrying  a  railroad  engine  and  sup 
plies,  which  were  landed,  and  troops  were  being  ferried  across 
the  river.  June  19,  wre  had  little  to  do  but  watch  the  loading 
of  wagons  and  mules  on  the  ferryboats  and  talk  about  the 
many  rumors  which,  in  the  absence  of  news  of  any  kind, 
were  of  the  wildest  character.  It  was  reported  that  Rich 
mond  had  been  taken  and  Jeff  Davis  and  Beauregard 
captured.  The  absence  of  reliable  news  caused  some  to  think 
that  McClellan  had  been  defeated.2 

June  20,  was  uneventful.  Some  of  the  men  went  fishing 
and  caught  some  fine  catfish.  In  the  evening  two  steamboats 
came  up  the  river  heavily  loaded  with  supplies.  General 
Buell's  advance  forces  had  now  been  nearly  two  weeks  in 
motion  towards  effecting  a  junction  with  General  Mitchtell 
with  a  view  of  seizing  Chattanooga  and  occupying  East  Ten 
nessee,  and  had  only  covered  the  comparatively  short  distance 
between  Corinth  and  Tuscumbia.  General  McCook,  as  will 
be  remembered,  on  June  12,  had  been  ordered  by  General 
Buell  to  march  toward  Florence,  Ala.,  next  morning,  arriving 
there  on  the  14th,  and  to  be  ready  to  cross  the  river  on  the 
16th.  General  Crittenden's  division  was  to  immediately  fol 
low  him.  But  on  the  15th,  General  Nelson,  whose  division 
was  near  luka,  reported  to  General  Buell  that  the  enemy  were 
said  to  be  concentrating  a  considerable  force  at  Fulton,  with 
the  purpose  of  attacking  our  scattered  forces  in  flank.3  This 
report  doubtless  caused  further  delay  in  the  movement  east 
ward.  But  there  were  other  causes  which  operated  to  post 
pone  the  movement.  June  17,  General  Buell  sent  a  dispatch 
to  General  Halleck  saying  in  substance  that  "the  movement 
in  which  he  was  engaged  could  not  be  made  without  risk  if 
it  was  not  made  promptly" ;  that  General  Nelson  had 
reported  that  the  enemy  was  in  force  at  Fulton,  Okolona  and 
other  points  ready  to  take  advantage  of  any  disorder  in  his 
arrangements,  and  on  the  other  hand  General  Mitchell 

1  and  2     Gleason's  Diary. 
3     W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-25. 


THE  MOVEMENT  TOWARDS  CHATTANOOGA  167 

reported  that  there  were  20,000  of  the  enemy's  troops  at  Chat 
tanooga  and  more  arriving  from  the  west,  and  that  our  forces, 
scattered  as  they  were,  were  really  weaker  than  a  smaller  one 
concentrated.  He  then  stated  that  in  his  opinion  the  im 
portance  of  the  railroad  from  Bear  Creek  to  Decatur  was 
greatly  over-rated  ;  that  as  a  means  of  transporting  troops  it 
was  of  no  value  and  as  a  means  of  supplying  those  in  Ten 
nessee,  it  was  neither  essential  nor  the  most  convenient.1 

To  this  General  Halleck  answered  the  same  day  that  he 
appreciated  the  importance  of  moving  promptly  and  that  he 
did  not  think  there  w^as  any  serious  risk  of  a  flank  attack  from 
Fulton.  He  also  stated  that  it  seemed  to  him  that  by  repair 
ing  the  road  to  Decatur,  Chattanooga  could  be  reached  sooner 
than  in  any  other  way,  but  would  oppose  no  objection  to 
Buell's  crossing  a  part  of  his  army  at  Florence  if  in  his, 
Buell's,  opinion  it  would  facilitate  his  advance — still  he 
thought  the  movement  along  the  railroad  to  Decatur  was  the 
shortest  and  best  route.2  Late  that  evening  General  Nelson 
from  luka  reported  to  General  Buell  that  a  considerable  force 
of  the  enemy  had  advanced  from  Fulton  to  a  point  on  Bear 
Creek,  twenty-seven  miles  from  Tuscumbia,  and  was  directed 
to  halt  his  march  at  Tuscumbia  and  await  further  orders.3 
June  18,  President  Lincoln  sent  a  dispatch  to  General  Halleck 
wishing  to  know  how  the  expedition  towards  East  Tennessee 
was  progressing,4  in  answer  to  which  General  Halleck  sent 
the  following  dispatch : 

Corinth,  Miss.,  June  21,  1862. 

General  Buell's  column  is  at  Tuscumbia.  As  soon  as  the  bridge 
at  that  place  is  rebuilt  he  will  move  east  more  rapidly.  The  enemy 
has  evacuated  Cumberland  Gap,  must  soon  leave  all  East  Tennessee. 
Our  troops  have  reached  Memphis  and  the  railroad  connection  will  be 
complete  in  a  few  days. 

H.  W.  HALLECK,  Major  General.5 

The  same  day  General  Halleck  sent  a  dispatch  to  General 
Buell  saying  he  was  still  of  the  opinion  that  the  railroad, 
rather  than  the  river,  should  be  relied  upon  for  supplies, 
expressing  dissatisfaction  that  such  slow  progress  had  been 
made  in  repairing  it,  and  directed  that  the  road  should  be  put 
in  order  with  all  possible  dispatch.6 

June  20,  General  Buell  ordered  General  McCook  to  begin 
sending  his  baggage  trains  across  the  river  the  next  day, 
and  saying  that  the  same  orders  would  apply  to  Crittenden's 
and  Wood's  divisions  which  were  to  immediately  follow  him.7 

r    1  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-33.  5  W.  R.  R  16,  part  2-43 

2  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-33.  6  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-43-44. 

3  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-34  7  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-40. 

4  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-37 


168  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEEBS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

But  on  June  22,  he  received  a  telegram  from  General  Nelson 
telling  of  the  advance  of  a  column  of  the  enemy  of  at  least 
10,000  men  which  threatened  Eastport.  General  Buell  at 
once  sent  General  Nelson's  dispatch  to  General  Halleck  and 
said  that  he  could  move  two  divisions  east  across  the  river 
next  day,  and  would  do  so  if  the  reports  of  the  enemy's 
advance  were  less  serious  than  at  present.  General  Halleck, 
on  the  receipt  of  the  telegram,  at  once  ordered  General 
Thomas'  division  to  luka,  and  a  division  under  General  Rose- 
crans  to  move  against  the  enemy's  flank  by  the  Jacinto  road. 
At  the  same  time  General  Thomas'  division  was  ordered  to 
report  to  General  Buell,  but  wras  not  to  be  moved  beyond 
Tuscumbia.1  General  Buell  the  same  day  sent  a  joint  dis 
patch  to  Generals  Thomas  and  Nelson  ordering,  that  if  the 
report  of  the  enemy's  advance  should  prove  untrue  or  the 
danger  not  serious,  General  Nelson's  division  should  move  to 
Tuscumbia  for  further  orders.2  The  same  day  General  Buell 
telegraphed  to  General  Mitchell  at  Huntsville  that  it  was 
doubtful  whether  reinforcements  could  be  sent  to  him  by  the 
time  before  indicated,  and  that  he  must  make  his  dispositions 
with  that  in  view.3 

June  21,  we  heard  the  German  bugle  call  "strike  tents" 
sounded  in  the  tent  of  the  Thirty-second  Indiana,  and  soon 
an  order  came  directing  us  to  pack  up  everything  and  load  the 
wagons.  We  were  also  directed  to  have  three  days'  rations 
in  our  haversacks.  We  loaded  the  wagons  as  directed, 
saw  them  start  for  the  ferry  landing  and  then  waited  for 
further  orders.  We  soon  learned  that  we  should  probably 
remain  where  we  were  another  night.  Some  of  the  men  went 
swimming  in  the  river  and  noticed  that  it  was  falling  rapidly. 
That  night  we  bivouaced  in  the  open  air.  Sunday,  June  22, 
at  a  very  early  hour  we  heard  the  bugles  of  the  other  brigades 
of  our  division  sounding  the  reveille,  but  ours  did  not  sound 
until  the  usual  time.  We  got  our  breakfast  and  lay  around 
until  near  9  o'clock,  when  the  assembly  sounded  and  we 
started  for  the  ferry  landing,  the  other  brigades  having  pre 
ceded  us.  After  a  tedious  delay  we  marched  aboard  the  ferry 
boat  "Lady  Jackson"  and  were  ferried  across  the  river.  We 
marched  about  a  half  mile  from  the  landing  and  there  waited 
an  hour  and  a  half  for  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  to  come  up.  We 
then  marched  on  and  about  1  o'clock  reached  Florence,  Ala., 
which  we  found  to  be  a  pleasant  looking  town  of  about  2000 
population,  with  three  or  four  churches.  We  passed  through 

1  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-48. 

2  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-50. 

3  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-51. 


THE  MOVEMENT  TOWARDS  CHATTANOOGA  169 

the  place  and  about  a  mile  beyond  it  and  went  into  camp  on 
a  small  knoll  near  the  river.  There  were  rumors  that  we  were 
^oing  home,  but  such  rumors  were  too  good  to  be  true.  That 
afternoon  some  of  the  men  discovered  a  bee  tree  and  after 
nightfall  slipped  out  of  camp  and  cut  it  down.  They  were 
rewarded  by  a  rich  store  of  fine  honey  which  sweetened  their 
toil  and  also  their  plain  rations.1  June  23,  we  remained  in 
camp  near  Florence.  There  was  little  restraint  on  our  goings 
and  comings  and  many  of  the  men  went  fishing  and  swim 
ming  in  the  river.  General  Buell,  who  had  arrived  in 
Florence,  noticed  this  relaxation  of  military  discipline,  and  in 
the  afternoon  orders  were  issued  prohibiting  the  men  from 
leaving  the  camp  without  a  pass  from  their  company  com 
manders.  Orders  were  also  issued  requiring  us  to  have  forty 
rounds  of  ammunition  in  our  cartridge  boxes  and  be  prepared 
for  a  long  and  rapid  march  on  short  notice.  We  learned  that 
marching  orders  had  been  received  by  other  regiments  in  the 
division  but  received  none  ourselves.  The  morning  of  June 
24,  we  heard  reveille  in  other  brigades  long  before  it  was 
sounded  in  ours.  While  we  were  at  morning  roll  call  orders 
came  to  hurry  up  our  breakfasts  and  be  ready  to  march  at 
6  A.  M.  A  detail  was  made  to  report  to  Lieutenant  Miles 
of  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio,  to  act  with  similar  details  from 
other  regiments  of  the  brigade  as  a  pioneer  corps.  We  moved 
out  a  little  after  6  o'clock  and  took  a  road  leading  eastward. 
We  passed  through  a  fine  rolling  country  and  some  distance 
out  crossed  a  wide,  shallow,  swift  stream  which  was  spanned 
by  a  covered  bridge.  We  marched  about  nine  miles  and  about 
noon  halted  for  the  day  near  a  beautiful  stream — the  outlet 
of  Gray  Springs,  which  were  not  far  away.2  Orders  came  to 
be  ready  to  march  at  3  o'clock  next  morning.  June  25,  the 
bugles  of  other  brigades  commenced  sounding  a  little  after 
midnight  and  kept  us  awake  until  1 :45  A.  M.,  when  our  own 
bugles  blared  out  that  it  was  time  for  us  to  be  up  and  getting 
ready  to  march.  We  pulled  out  at  the  appointed  time  and, 
as  the  road  was  fine,  we  made  good  time.  The  day  was 
cloudy  and  cool  and  at  our  frequent  halts  the  men  gathered 
blackberries  which  grew  in  abundance  along  the  roadside. 
We  passed  through  the  dilapidated  little  hamlet  of  Rogers- 
ville  and  at  5:30  P.  M.  came  to  Elk  River,  which  we  forded, 
and  about  one  half  mile  beyond  it  went  into  camp  for  the 
night.  The  other  brigades  did  not  cross  the  river  but  en 
camped  on  its  west  bank.  Our  day's  march,  according  to 
Gleason,  had  been  seventeen  miles.  McConnell  says  eighteen 

1  Gleason's  Diary 

2  McConnell's  Diary. 


170  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

miles,  and  Gregory,  nineteen  miles.  Before  turning"  in  for 
th^  night  orders  came  to  march  at  •>  o'clock  next  morning 
and  make  eight  miles  before  breakfast.  June  £6,  reveille 
sounded  at  2  A.  M.  and  at  3  A.  M.  we  resumed  onr  march. 
We  moved  quite  rapidly  and  before  we  were  aware  of  it  had 
passed  our  advance  guard  of  cavalry,  leaving  them  asleep 
behind  us.  Three  or  four  miles  beyond  we  halted  until  the 
cavalry  could  come  up  and  take  the  advance.  After  a  march 
of  ten  miles  we  came  to  a  little  creek  about  five  miles  from 
Athens,  Term.,  and  went  into  camp  in  an  open  field  on  the 
farther  side  of  the  creek.  The  captain  of  Company  H  was 
placed  in  arrest  by  the  provost  guard  for  permitting  William 
Angevine  of  his  company  to  straggle  from  the  ranks.1  We 
heard  of  several  similar  arrests  in  the  brigade.  Orders  came 
to  be  ready  to  march  at  (5  o'clock  next  morning.  June  27,  the 
bugles  sounded  reveille  at  4  A.  M.  We  were  ready  to  march 
at  6  A.  M.,  when  orders  came  announcing  that  we  would  not 
move  until  4  P.  M.  Many  of  the  men  took  this  opportunity 
to  write  letters  home.  Our  march  was  resumed  at  the 
appointed  time,  our  brigade  being  in  rear  of  the  division.  We 
reached  Athens  about  sunset  and  halted  for  awhile  opposite 
a  house  full  of  pretty  girls,  whose  fair  faces,  Gleason  says, 
"were  wreathed  with  smiles  and  presented  quite  a  contrast 
to  the  scowling  visages  which  had  greeted  us  at  times."  There 
was  a  Young  Ladies'  Institute  in  the  town,  which  probably 
accounted  for  the  fair  faces  mentioned  by  Gleason.  We 
marched  about  five  miles  beyond  the  town  and  bivouaced  for 
the  night.  From  the  stores  which  had  been  accumulating  at 
Athens  we  drew  rations  of  fresh  beef  and  beans  —  articles 
we  had  not  seen  for  several  weeks.  Orders  came  to  be  ready 
to  march  at  4  o'clock  next  morning.  June  28,  we  were 
awakened  by  the  bugles  at  2  :30  A.  M.,  and  at  4  A.  M.  marched 
off  at  a  brisk  pace.  We  passed  through  a  level  fertile  country 
abounding  in  fine  plantations.  A  decided  Union  sentiment 
was  manifested  at  many  places.  Blackberries  of  a  fine  quality 
were  abundant  along  the  road  and  the  men  had  a  surfeit  of 
them.  About  10:30  A.  M.  wre  came  to  a  small  stream  called 
Indian  Creek,  about  eight  miles  from  Huntsville,  Ala.  where 
we  halted  for  the  day.  Our  camp  was  on  a  bluff  overlooking 
the  creek  and  reminded  us  of  our  camp  at  Tuscumbia, 
especially,  where  we  had  to  descend  the  bluff  to  get  water. 
Sunday,  June  29,  we  had  orders  to  resume  our  march  at  the 
usual  early;  hour,  but  reveille  did  not  sound  until  after  4  A. 
M.,  and  at  roll  call  we  were  informed  that  we  would 


1     Gleason's  Diary 


up 

of 


THE  MOVEMENT  TOWARDS  CHATTANOOGA  ,  171 

not  move  until  further  orders  were  received  ,.  from 
General  Buell.  During  the  afternoon  many  negroes 
from  neighboring  plantations  came  into  camp  .bring 
ing  a  great  quantity  of  green  apples  for  sale.  They  were  of 
poor  quality,  too  sour  for  eating  purposes,  and  when 
cooked,  took  too  much  sugar  to  make  them  palatable.1 , 

We  remained  in  camp  at  Indian  Creek  until  July  5  occu 
pied  with  the  usual  camp  duties.  June  30,  a  report  came  from 
the  Thirty-second  Indiana  that  our  forces  had  taken  Chatta 
nooga  and  a  large  number  of  prisoners  and  had  burned  the 
towrn.  Captain  Reasoner  was  released  from  arrest  and  sent 
in  his  resignation  which  was  approved  by  Colonel  Dickey. 
During  the  day  we  moved  our  camp  to  a  better  place  further 
the  creek  and  pitched  tents  in  regular  order.  As  many 
the  men  had  got  to  slipping  out  of  camp  to  hunt  black 
berries  and  on  other  adventures,  orders  were  issued  to  have 
roll  call  at  tattoo.  July  1,  the  officers  undertook  to  regulate 
and  control  the  indiscriminate  foraging  above  mentioned,  and 
a  detail  of  a  non-commissioned  officer  and  three  men  from 
each  mess,  under  command  of  Lieutenant  Cyrus  Askew,  was 
sent  out  into  the  country  to  gather  blackberries  for  the  regi 
ment.  The  detail,  of  about  100  men,  marched  out  about  a  mile 
on  the  Athens  road  where  a  rendezvous  was  established,  and 
the  men  in  squads  were  sent  out  to  scour  the  country  and 
gather  and  bring  in  the  berries.  In  the  late  afternoon  the  men 
returned  to  the  rendezvous  with  buckets  and  camp  kettles 
laden  with  the  delicious  fruit  and  \vere  marched  back  to  camp. 
July  2,  an  old  rooster  which  one  of  the  men  had  brought  into 
camp  the  day  before,  sounded  reveille  some  time  before  the 
bugles  sounded  it,  and  caused  some  of  the  men  to  swear.2 
Rations  of  flour  were  issued  and  some  of  the  mess  cooks  made 
blackberry  cobblers  and  pies.  It  was  reported  that  the  Fif 
teenth  and  Forty-ninth  Ohio,  under  command  of  Colonel 
Dickey,  were  to  be  sent  to  Huntsville  to  garrison  the  place, 
and  that  Adjutant  Taft  would  be  detailed  as  a  member  of 
General  McCook's  staff.  Lieutenant  Gregg  of  Company  H 
tendered  his  resignation,  which  was  accepted.  Lieutenant 
Thos.  E.  Douglass  of  Company  G,  was  temporarily  placed 
in  command  of  Company  H.3  Newspapers  of  June  30,  an 
nounced  great  successes  of  our  troops  near  Richmond,  Va., 
but  no  particulars  were  given.  July  3,  Lieutenant  Douglass 
made  a  speech  to  Company  H,  in  which  he  said  that  his 
assignment  had  not  been  of  his  own  seeking,  but  if  he  was 
continued  in  command  he  would  try  to  make  the  company 

1,  2  and  3     Gleason's  Diary 


172  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

equal  if  not  superior  to  any  in  the  regiment.1  July  4,  was  the 
dullest  Independence  Day  some  of  us  had  ever  experienced. 
The  day  was  ushered  in  by  two  shots  from  a  revolver.  A 
search  was  made  for  the  offender  but  he  was  not  found.  We 
heard  cheering  in  other  regiments,  but  there  was  no  demon 
stration  in  our  camp  except  the  revolver  shots  above  men 
tioned.  In  the  evening  Gleason  got  his  singers  together  and 
sang  some  pieces  from  the  "Jubilee."2  July  5,  at  morning 
roll  call  we  were  notified  to  get  ready  to  march.  We  got 
breakfast,  struck  tents  and  at  9  A.  M.  moved  out  in  an  easterly 
direction.  General  Johnson,  in  General  McCook's  absence, 
was  in  command  of  the  division  and  Colonel  Dickey  in  com 
mand  of  the  brigade.  The  men  were  permitted  to  put  their 
knapsacks  in  the  wagons.  We  soon  came  in  sight  of  the  Cum 
berland  Mountains,  their  tops  blue  in  the  distance,  and  after 
a  march  of  about  nine  miles,  wrent  into  camp  on  a  small  stream 
about  two  miles  north  of  Huntsville,  Ala.  The  First  Ohio 
passed  us  on  their  way  to  Huntville  to  take  cars  for  Steven 
son,  Ala.  Lieutenant  Colonel  Wilson  and  Captains  Dawson 
and  Burns  returned  from  leave  of  absence.  Orders  came  to 
be  ready  to  march  at  4  o'clock  next  morning. 

July  0,  reveille  sounded  at  2:30  A.  M.,  and  we  marched 
at  the  appointed  time.  We  soon  came  to  the  foothills  of  the 
Cumberland  range  and  began  their  ascent,  which  was  steep 
and  rocky.  The  road,  after  reaching  the  top  of  a  considerable 
hill,  wound  along  a  ridge  for  about  a  mile  and  then  descended 
into  a  valley  of  surpassing  loveliness.  On  the  way  we  met  a 
number  of  wagons  loaded  with  cotton  on  their  way  to  Hunts 
ville.  After  marching  ten  miles  we  came  to  Flint  River,  a 
swift,  shallow  stream,  crossed  by  a  railroad  bridge  which  was 
guarded  by  a  company  of  the  Tenth  Wisconsin.  We  crossed 
on  the  railroad  bridge,  and  four  miles  further  on  came  to  a 
smaller  stream  where  we  went  into  camp,  and  received  orders 
to  be  ready  to  march  at  3  o'clock  next  morning.  July  7,  we 
resumed  our  march  at  the  hour  appointed  and  marched 
twelve  miles  to  Paint  Rock  Creek,  where  we  found  a  railroad 
bridge  200  feet  long,  also  guarded  by  a  company  of  the  Tenth 
Wisconsin.  The  brigade  went  into  camp  in  the  woods  about 
half  a  mile  above  the  bridge.  A  short  distance  above  the 
camp  was  one  of  the  finest  springs  we  ever  saw.  It  rose  from 
a  great  depth  and  discharged  a  volume  of  water  sufficient 
to  furnish  power  for  a  mill  which  once  stood  near  it.  The 
water  was  wonderfully  sweet  and  refreshing.  July  8,  we 
resumed  our  march  at  4  A.  M.  Two  miles  from  the  bridge 

1  and  2     Gleason's  Diary. 


THE  MOVEMENT  TOWARDS  CHATTANOOGA  173 

we  passed  the  village  and  station  of  Woodville,  whose  houses 
had  been  burned  because  a  train  had  been  fired  on  by  bush- 
wackers  at  that  point.  The  road  was  very  rough  and  rocky. 
After  a  march  of  about  twelve  miles  we  came  to  the  pleasant 
little  town  of  Larkinsville,  where,  at  3  P.  M.,  we  went  into 
camp  for  the  night.  Another  beautiful  spring  supplied  us 
with  abundance  of  good  water.  July  9,  we  continued  our 
march  at  an  early  hour.  For  a  few  miles  the  country  was 
more  heavily  timbered  than  any  we  had  passed  through  and 
not  so  hilly.  But  we  soon  came  to  a  more  hilly  region  and 
plodded  along  until  near  noon,  when  we  reached  Bellefonte, 
Ala.,  and  went  into  camp.  The  town  was  appropriately 
named  from  three  beautiful  springs,  near  which  we  pitched 
our  tents  in  a  fine  grove  of  oaks.  A  cavalry  detachment  had 
occupied  the  ground  previous  to  our  arrival  and  left  us  a 
legacy  of  flees  which  disturbed  our  rest  during  the  night. 
July  10,  we  resumed  our  march  at  2  A.  M.  The  road  was 
obstructed  by  fallen  timber.  We  made  slow  progress,  as  we 
had  to  wait  for  the  pioneers  to  clear  the  way.  We  crossed  a 
number  of  small  streams,  among  them  Crow  Creek,  which  we 
forded,  and  one  half  mile  beyond  it  went  into  camp  in  a  dense 
forest  about  three  miles  from  Stevenson,  Ala.  Here  we 
pitched  our  tents  and  were  told  we  were  to  remain  for  a 
few  days. 

We  remained  in  this  camp  until  July  18,  awaiting,  we 
supposed,  the  movements  of  other  troops,  and  putting  in  the 
time  as  best  we  could.  July  15,  we  were  placed  on  half 
rations  because  of  General  Forrest's  raid  on  the  Nashville  and 
Chattanooga  Railroad.  That  dashing  officer  with  a  force 
estimated  at  1300  to  2000  cavalry,  at  4  :30  A.  M.,  the  morning 
of  July  1.3,  attacked  Murfreesboro,  compelled  the  surrender 
of  its  garrison  of  about  1400  men,  and  four  pieces  of  artillery, 
and  burned  the  railroad  bridge  below  the  town.1 

July  16,  Adjutant  Taft  returned  from  leave  of  absence, 
bringing  a  commission  as  Captain  for  Lieutenant  Thomas  E. 
Douglass,  who  was  permanently  assigned  to  duty  as  com 
mander  of  Company  PL2  Orders  were  received  to  be  ready 
to  march  next  morning.  July  17,  the  orders  to  march  that 
day  were  countermanded,  and  in  the  evening  we  were  notified 
that  we  would  move  at  4  o'clock  next  morning.  July  18,  we 
had  reveille  at  3  A.  M.,  and  moved  out  on  time  in  the  direction 
of  Jasper,  Tenn.  The  road  and  bridges  needed  repairing  and 
the  pioneers  were  sent  ahead  to  do  the  work.  Gleason  was 
with  the  pioneers  and  relates  that  while  they  were  building 

1  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  1-810 

2  Gleason's  Diary. 


174  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

a  bridge  over  a  small  stream  General  Johnson,  our  brigade 
commander  rode  up  and  hearing  some  of  the  men  complaining 
about  having  to  work  on  half  rations,  told  them  they  "talked 
more  like  children  than  soldiers."  He  then  dismounted  and 
seizing  a  pick  put  in  a  few  vigorous  blows  by  way  of 
example.  Further  on,  when  the  pioneers  came  to  an  almost 
impassable  section  of  the  road,  the  General  and  his  handsome 
little  orderly,  Frank,  busied  themselves  helping  to  carry  brush 
to  fill  the  holes.  Before  the  holes  were  all  filled  the  boys 
turned  the  "half  rations"  joke  on  the  general.  Orderly  Frank 
got  hungry  and  asked  if  some  one  could  give  him  a  piece  of 
cracker,  and  only  one  man  could  spare  any.1  After  a  toilsome 
march  of  about  fifteen  miles,  we  went  into  camp  near  Battle 
Creek,  in  a  dense  woods  about  one  mile  from  the  Tennessee 
River.  Here  we  were  destined  to  remain  for  more  than  a 
month,  during  which  time  events  occurred  which  compelled 
a  complete  change  in  the  plans  of  our  military  commanders. 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


CHAPTER  X. 

A  MONTH  AT  BATTLE  CREEK  AND  RETREAT  TO  NASHVILLE. 

While  we  were  making  the  slow  and  deliberate  march  from 
Corinth  to  Battle  Creek  and  Generals  Halleck  and  Buell  were 
haggling  over  repairs  of  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad 
between  Corinth  and  Decatur,  the  opportunity  to  seize  Chat 
tanooga  was  lost.  The  activities  of  Generals  O.  M.  Mitchell  and 
Geo.  W.  Morgan  had  compelled  the  evacuation  June  18  of  Cum 
berland  Gap1  and  General  Kirby  Smith  was  about  to  abandon 
Chattanooga. 

On  June  22,  after  receiving  a  telegram  from  Jefferson  Davis, 
that  there  was  little  chance  of  Bragg's  being  able  to  aid  him  in 
holding  Chattanooga,2  he  ordered  the  troops  at  that  point  to 
Knoxville.3  The  Confederate  authorities  at  that  time  were  evi 
dently  of  the  opinion  that  General  Mitchell  had  been  reinforced 
so  as  to  enable  him  to  hold  the  important  commanding  positions 
he  had  gained.  But  his  withdrawal  from  before  Chattanooga 
indicated  that  he  had  not  been  reinforced  as  they  had  supposed. 

June  20,  General  Bragg  was  assigned  by  President  Davis 
to  the  command  of  the  Confederate  Armies  in  the  West,  Vice 
General  Beauregard,  and  June  22,  reported  to  the  Confederate 
Secretary  of  War  that  General  Halleck  had  divided  his  army  and 
that  he  proposed  to  strike  his  center.4  Thereupon  it  was  decided 
to  hold  Chattanooga  and  large  reinforcements  were  ordered  to 
that  point/"'  The  enforced  withdrawal  of  General  Mitchell  from 
the  important  points  he  had  gained  at  Chattanooga  and  along 
the  Tennessee  River  resulted  as  he  had  predicted.  The  enemy 
were  free  to  cross  the  river  and  threaten  our  lines  of  communica 
tion  and  even  Nashville  itself.  We  have  already  mentioned  the 
successful  attack  of  a  small  force  under  General  Forrest  on  Mur- 
freesboro  and  the  destruction  of  the  railroad  bridge  at  that  place 
July  14.  About  this  time  General  John  H.  Morgan  with  his  own 
regiment,  a  Georgia  regiment,  a  squadron  of  Texas  rangers  and 
two  additional  companies  of  cavalry,  was  sent  from  Knoxville 
into  Kentucky,  and  in  a  raid  of  M  days,  according  to  his  official 
report,  "captured  seventeen  towns,  destroyed  all  the  government 
supplies  and  arms  in  them,  dispersed  about  1500  Home  Guards 
and  parolled  nearly  1200  regular  troops."6  Among  the  towns 
he  captured  were  Tompkinsville,  Galsgow,  Lebanon,  Harrods- 

1  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-683  4     W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-701. 

2  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-695  5     W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-707. 

3  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-699  6     W.  R.  R.  16,  part  1-770. 


176  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

burg,  Lawrenceburg,  Georgetown,  Cynthiana,  Paris,  Crab 
Orchard  and  Somerset.  This  raid  produced  the  wildest  sort  of 
a  panic  in  the  north,  and  let  to  the  detachment  of  two  of  General 
Buell's  divisions  from  the  main  object  of  his  expedition  to  guard 
against  similar  raids,  and  an  order  from  General  Halleck  to  put 
down  the  Morgan  raid  even  if  the  Chattanooga  expedition  should 
thereby  be  delayed.  It  also  led  to  an  order  directing  General 
Thomas's  division  to  move  to  General  Buell's  assistance.1 

Encouraged  by  the  success  of  the  Confederate  raids  above 
mentioned,  General  Bragg  July  17,  ordered  all  the  available 
cavalry  of  his  command,  under  General  Armstrong,  to  move  to 
ward  the  Tennessee  River  near  Decatur,2  and  July  21,  issued 
orders  sending  the  Army  of  the  Mississippi  under  General  Hardee 
via  Mobile  to  Chattanooga.3  By  these  movements,  General 
Buell,  with  an  army  which,  omitting  General  Thomas'  division, 
contained  July  10,  an  aggregate  present  of  over  65,000  men,4 
found  his  communications  seriously  interrupted,  his  supplies 
partly  cut  off,  and  was  compelled  to  assume  the  defensive  against 
an  enemy  whose  numbers  were  much  inferior  to  his  own. 

The  expedition  to  "seize  Chattanooga  and  drive  the  enemy 
from  East  Tennessee"  was  however  at  that  time  not  entirely 
abandoned,  and  troops  in  large  numbers  were  being  moved  for 
ward  to  Battle  Creek,  Tenn.,  at  which  point  our  division, 
McCook's,  arrived  July  18,  as  related  in  the  preceding  chapter. 

The  more  than  a  month  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  passed  at  Battle 
Creek  was  a  trying  period  in  its  experience.  Our  camp  was  in 
a  thick  woods  near  the  Tennessee  River  which  was  full  of 
miasms ;  the  days  were  hot,  we  were  most  of  the  time  on  short 
rations  and  part  of  the  time  without  sufficient  clothing.  Our 
shoes  and  socks  and  outer  garments  began  to  wear  out  and  it 
was  impossible  to  replace  them.  The  record  of  our  daily  doings 
may  be  hurriedly  sketched  as  follows : 

July  19,  after  a  day  of  discontented  idleness  the  men  had 
all  retired,  when  an  alarm  was  given  and  all  tumbled  out  and 
were  hurriedly  formed  in  line  of  battle.  The  occasion  for  the 
alarm  was  not  explained,  and  after  standing  in  line  for  half  an 
hour,  we  were  permitted  to  return  to  quarters  where  we  stacked 
arms  and  again  retired  to  rest.  July  20,  there  was  an  inspection 
of  arms.  July  21,  we  began  to  clean  up  our  camp  and  some  of 
the  men  made  cots  of  poles  to  keep  them  off  the  damp  ground. 
Some  got  permission  to  go  to  the  river  about  a  mile  and  a  half 
away,  where  on  the  opposite  shore  they  saw  the  enemy's  pickets 
posted  in  rifle  pits  along  the  river  bank.  Although  they  were 

1  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-143.  3     W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-731. 

2  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2,728.  4     W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-120. 


RETREAT  OF  BVELL  TO  NASHTILLE  177 

within  easy  range  of  our  rifles,  our  men  were  not  permitted  to 
fire  on  them  and  they  did  not  fire  on  us.  July  22,  23,  24  and  25 
were  uneventful.  We  were  on  half  rations  and  all  were  con 
stantly  hungry.  A  number  slipped  out  of  camp  and  went  foraging 
for  additional  food  with  little  success.  A  number  of  the  men 
were  arrested  and  brought  back  to  camp  and  orders  were  issued 
from  division  headquarters,  heavily  reinforcing  the  camp  guards 
and  requiring  daily  regulation  guard  mounting.  July  26,  27  and 
28,  were  also  uneventful.  Squads  were  sent  out  under  command 
of  commissioned  officers  to  scour  the  region  for  food  but  found 
little.  One  squad  under  Lieutenant  Cyrus  Askew  brought  in 
about  two  bushels  of  green  apples.  July  29,  Gleason  records  that 
the  day  was  very  quiet  and  that  he  read  the  "Merry  Wives  of 
Windsor".  That  evening  orders  came  sending  the  entire  regi 
ment  out  on  picket  duty  at  once,  and  it  was  said  the  entire  divi 
sion  was  to  go  out  on  similar  duty  at  2  o'clock  next  morning.  Our 
regiment  was  posted  up  on  the  mountain  side  and  next  morning 
we  could  see  the  enemy's  camps  across  the  river.  July  30,  was 
pleasant  until  late  in  the  afternoon,  when  a  torrential  rain  storm 
flooded  the  camps,  and  the  men,  who  had  by  this  time  returned 
from  picket  duty,  had  to  build  scaffolds  to  sleep  on  at  night.1 

July  31,  was  remarkable  for  the  arrival  of  a  supply  train. 
Gleason  says,  "It  was  amusing  as  well  as  pathetic  to  see  the  men 
flocking  to  the  commissary  tent  to  feast  their  eyes  on  the  piles 
of  cracker  boxes,"  and  that  "the  issue  of  the  crackers  made  a  very 
agreeable  change  in  the  condition  of  the  men".  August  1,  orders 
were  issued  requiring  three  hours  company  drill  in  the  morning 
and  battalion  drill  in  the  afternoon.  The  captains  of  companies 
at  the  same  time  were  ordered  to  have  daily  meetings  of  the 
non-commissioned  officers  at  which  they  were  instructed  in  their 
duties.  August  3.  Colonel  Dickey  informed  company  com 
manders  that  an  officer  and  one  man  from  each  company  were 
to  be  sent  home  on  recruiting  service.  In  the  evening  orders 
came  directing  the  entire  regiment  to  go  out  on  picket  duty  next 
morning  at  6  o'clock.  August  4  the  entire  brigade  moved  out  of 
camp  at  6  a.  m..  which  looked  like  a  reconnoissance  in  force. 
We  crossed  Battle  Creek  and  after  a  march  of  about  three  miles 
were  posted  along  the  Tennessee  River  above  the  mouth  of  the 
creek.  There  was  no  alarm  during  the  night  and  the  men  not  on 
duty  slept  undisturbed. 

The  morning-  of  August  5.  iust  before  we  were  relieved,  we 
saw  the  enemv  relieving  his  pickets  across  the  river.  We  were 
relieved  at  7  A.  M.  and  reached  camp  at  9  :30  A.  M.  where  we 
found  that  a  supply  train  had  come  up  bringing  rations  and  a 

1     Gleason's  Diary 


178  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

small  supply  of  clothing.1  We  again  rejoiced  when  full  rations 
were  issued.  We  heard  that  the  order  requiring  details  of  men 
for  recruiting  service  had  been  countermanded.  August  6,  7, 
and  8,  were  quiet  and  uneventful  but  on  the  evening  of  the  eighth 
orders  came  to  go  on  picket  again  at  6  o'clock  next  morning. 
August  9,  the  regiment  marched  at  an  early  hour  and  was  posted 
on  picket  between  the  river  and  Battle  Creek.  Nothing  unusual 
occurred  during  the  day  6r  night.  The  enemy  across  the  river 
was  quiet  and  there  was  no  firing.  It  was  said  that  some  of  the 
pickets  of  the  opposing  forces  found  a  way  to  communicate  with 
each  other  in  mid  stream  and  exchange  tobacco  for  coffee.  Cap 
tain  C.  W.  Carroll  in  a  letter  to  his  wife  of  date  August  5,  1862, 
gives  an  account  of  one  such  picket  detail,  and  at  the  same  time 
discloses  how  the  men  in  the  ranks  talked  and  felt.  He  says : 

"We  have  just  put  through  twenty- four  hours  of  picket  duty 
at  Battle  Creek  on  the  Tennessee  River.  For  the  first  time  since 
the  siege  of  Corinth  we  were  within  sight  and  speaking  distance 
of  the  rebel  pickets,  who  were  on  the  other  side  of  the  river. 
There  was  no  firing  and  a  great  many  questions  were  asked  by 
the  men  on  both  sides  and  there  were  some  amusing  answers. 
Among  the  questions  the  rebels  asked  were,  'How  do  you  like 
old  Abe?'  'How  do  you  like  McClellan's  magnificent  change  of 
base?'  'WThat  do  you  want  with  300,000  more  men  when  you  al 
ready  have  700,000  to  our  250,000  etc?'  Our  men  would  an 
swer  these  questions  as  well  as  they  could,  and  in  return  would 
taunt  the  rebels  by  calling  out  the  battles  we  had  won.  One  of 
our  men  called  out,  'How  do  you  like  General  O.  M.  Mitchell?' 
and  a  rebel  answered,  'Oh!  he:  has  gone  to  Washington  where 
he  can  do  no  more  devilment.'  Another  of  the  men  called  out, 
'  How  do  you  like  Buell  ?'  and  the  answer  was,  'First  rate,  first 
rate,  bully,  he's  a  bully  fellow.'  Another  asked,  "How  do  yon 

like  Pope?'   and  a  reb  answered,   'He's  a  d d  rascal.'     It  was 

easy  to  tell  from  these  answers  their  estimate  of  our  generals  and 
why  they  made  them.  One  thing  is  certain, — the  officer  who 
handles  them  as  if  he  meant  something  has  their  ill  will,  while 
those  who  pursue  the  'velvet  policy'  have  their  good  wishes." 

This  desultory  conversation  between  the  pickets  bred  con 
siderable  familiarity.  One.  day  a  rebel  having  proposed  an  ex 
change  of  newspapers,  one  of  our  men  swam  across  the  river 
and  exchanged  the  "Cincinnati  Commercial"  for  the  "Southern 
Confederacy"  and  returned  without  being  fired  on.  This  incident 
became  generally  known  and'  orders  were  issued  forbidding  fur 
ther  communication  between  the  pickets.  August  10,  fhe  resri- 
ment  was  relieved  at  7  A.  M.  arid  reached  camp  about  9  A.  M. 

1     Gleason's  Diary 


RETREAT  OF  BUELL  TO  NASHVILLE  179 

That  morning  a  general  order  was  received  assigning  Colonel 
August  \Yillich  of  the  32nd  Indiana,  who  had  been  promoted  to 
Brigadier  General,  to  the  command  of  our  brigade.  Colonel 
Dickey  as  soon  as  the  regiment  came  in  from  picket  duty  tendered 
his  resignation.1  Whether  there  was  any  connection  between  the 
two  is  not  known. 

General  Willich  was  an  interesting  personality  and  com 
manded  marked  attention  whenever  he  was  seen  in  our  camps. 
His  regiment  was  made  up  of  Germans  and  was  remarkably  well 
drilled  and  efficient.  At  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  Colonel  Willich  had 
led  it  into  the  thickest  of  the  fight  and  had  won  high  praise,  not 
only  from  General  McCook,  but  from  General  Sherman  and 
other  superior  commanders.  He  was  over  six  feet  tall,  with 
broad  shoulders  and  yellow  hair,  and  when  in  action  or  on  the 
drill  ground  gave  the  impression  of  one  born  to  command.  About 
this  time  Moncure  D.  Conway,  who  was  one  of  his  close  friends, 
wrote  an  article  which  appeared  in  a  Cincinnati  paper  in  which 
he  stated  that  General  \Villich  was  the  child  by  a  morganatic 
marriage  of  the  elder  brother  of  King  William  of  Prussia,  who 
afterwards  became  Emporer  William  of  Germany.  Mr.  Conway 
further  stated  that  General  Willich  was  educated  by  the  royal 
family  of  Prussia  and  at  an  early  age  was  captain  in  the  Royal 
Artillery :  that  he  became  a  liberal  and  for  some  indiscreet  action 
or  speech  was  arrested  and  thrown  into  military  prison  at 
Spandau  from  which  royal  influence  secured  his  escape;  that 
afterwards  he  held  a  high  command  in  the  revolutionary  army 
of  1848  and  when  the  revolution  collapsed  fled  to  Switzerland 
and  thence  made  his  way  to  London,  where  for  a  time  he  was 
in  close  association  with  Kossuth.  Mazzini  and  other  European 
liberals :  that  from  London  he  went  to  New  York  and  thence  to 
Cincinnati  where  he  was  editor  of  a  German  newspaper  when 
the  war  broke  out.  This  story  is  partly  confirmed  in  Mr.  Con- 
way's  "Autobiography,  Memories  and  Experiences",  1904,  in 
which  he  says  that  Judge  Stallo  of  Cincinnati  and  other  Germans 
believed  that  General  Willich  "bore  in  his  viens  the  blood  of  the 
royal  family  of  Prussia'',  that  he  was  a  soldier  in  the  Prussian 
army  until  1846,  but  was  compelled  to  resign  because  he  had 
joined  the  band  for  the  liberation  of  Germany,  and  that  Judge 
Stallo  had  said  that  Willich  had  committed  enough  political  of 
fenses  in  Prussia  to  have  lost  him  his  head  a  dozen  times,  if  he 
had  not  been  a  natural  son  of  one  of  the  royal  family. 

This  story  created  an  additional  interest  in  General  Willich 
in  the  minds  of  those  who  read  it.  At  all  events,  it  did  not  make 
him  less  interesting  as  our  future  brigade  commander.  We  were 

1     Gleason's  Diarv 


180  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

soon  to  know  him  better,  and  he  was  to  become  in  time  the  idol 
of  the  men  of  the  brigade. 

Lieutenant  Colonel  Wilson  had  sent  in  his  resignation  some 
days  before,  but  August  10,  it  was  returned  "not  accepted"  and 
he  assumed  command  of  the  regiment.1 

Late  in  the  afternoon  a  detail  of  men  from  the  regiment  was 
ordered  to  work  on  fortifications  at  the  mouth  of  Battle  Creek. 
August  11,  an  insufficient  supply  of  clothing  was  issued  and  on 
the  12th  another  detail  was  sent  to  work  on  fortifications.  This 
day  some  of  the  men  got  some  green  corn  to  piece  out  their  short 
rations.  August  13,  General  Willich  reviewed  the  brigade  and 
afterwards  it  was  formed  into  a  hollow  square  and  he  made  a 
speech  in  broken  English  to  the  men  which  made  a  good  impres 
sion.  August  14,  the  regiment  was  again  on  picket  along  the 
Tennessee  River.  The  enemy's  pickets  on  the  other  shore  kept 
hallooing  across  at  us  all  day.  August  15,  we  were  relieved  at 
6  A.  M.  and  marched  back  to  camp.  During  the  day  General 
Willich  called  the  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  of  the 
regiment  together  and  gave  them  some  novel  instructions. 
August  16,  he  stated  that  German  bugle  calls  would  be 
adopted  by  the  entire  brigade,  and  explained  them  by  putting 
words  to  the  music.  He  caused  great  laughter  by  saying  that  the 
alarm  call  meant,  "The  devil  is  loose !  the  devil  is  loose !  the  devil 
is  again  loose". 

August  16,  Lieutenant  Colonel  Wilson's  resignation  was  ac 
cepted  and  he  left  for  home,  leaving  Captain  James  C.  Cummins  in 
command  of  the  regiment.  August  17,  Sergeant  Gleason  left 
for  home  with  a  detail  of  an  officer  and  enlisted  man  from  each 
company,  which  were  being  sent  north  on  recruiting  service. 
August  18,  at  6  A.  M.  the  regiment  again  went  out  on  picket 
along  the  river  and  stood  guard  all  day.  About  dusk  part  of  a 
Union  Tennessee  regiment  arrived  and,  dressed  in  citizens  cloth 
ing,  went  out  through  our  lines.2  We  were  relieved  at  6  a.  m. 
August  19,  and  marked  back  to  camp  where  General  Willich  had 
another  meeting  of  the  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers. 

August  20,  at  6  A.  M.  there  was  battalion  drill  by  Captain 
J.  C.  Cummins  and  orders  came  to  be  ready  to  march  at  any 
moment.  At  4  P.  M.  orders  came  to  strike  tents  and  be  ready  to 
march  at  7  P.  M.  We  started  at  8  P.  M.  The  men  were  in 
structed  to  keep  silence  and  the  bridge  across  the  creek  was  muf 
fled,  by  piling  green  corn  stalks  on  it,  to  prevent  the  enemy  hear 
ing  our  trains  and  artillery  when  they  crossed  it.  We  reached 
the  mouth  of  Battle  Creek,  about  two  miles  distant,  at  midnight 

1  Gleason's  Diary 

2  Nathan  Muneaugh's  Diary. 


RETREAT  OF  BUELL  TO  NASHTILLE  181 

and  then  lay  down  and  slept.  We  wondered  what  it  all  meant. 
At  5  o'clock  August  21,  we  resumed  our  march.  Our  route  was 
along  the  Tennessee  River  at  the  foot  of  a  range  of  mountains 
until  we  came  to  within  a  mile  of  Jasper,  where  at  10  a.  m.  we 
halted  and  remained  until  noon.  There  were  corn  fields  near, 
where  the  men  were  permitted  to  gather  roasting  ears  to  piece 
out  their  half  rations.  After  dinner  we  marched  on,  passed 
Crittenden's  and  Mitchell's  divisions,  and  went  into  camp  in  a 
field  wrhere  the  weeds  were  higher  than  our  heads.  August  22,  we 
marched  forward  about  three  miles,  the  49th  Ohio  with  two  pieces 
of  artillery  leading  the  brigade.1  We  were  moving  towards  Chat 
tanooga.  After  we  had  gone  about  three  miles  we  halted  while 
the  cavalry  were  sent  forward.  From  this  point  we  turned  back 
and  halted  at  a  tannery  for  dinner.  At  2  P.  M.  we  resumed  our 
march,  passed  back  through  Jasper,  and  late  in  the  evening  ar 
rived  at  the  place  near  Battle  Creek  where  we  had  been  on  picket. 
Then  we  turned  to  the  right  of  our  old  camp  on  the  north  side 
of  the  mountain  and  went  into  camp  on  the  creek.1  It  had  been 
a  rainy  day  and  our  days  march  of  fifteen  miles  had  made  us 
ready  for  a  nights  rest. 

W^hile  we  were  lying  at  Battle  Creek  General  Buell  was  very 
slowly  getting  his  army  together  for  an  attack  on  Chattanooga. 
Preparatory  to  such  attack,  he  was  repairing  with  great  delibera 
tion  and  care  the  railroads  from  Nashville  to  Decatur  and  Chat 
tanooga,  and  had  given  orders  to  build  stockades  at  all  the  bridges 
on  both  roads  to  protect  them  from  Confederate  raiders.  He  had 
under  his  immediate  command,  July  10,  an  army  of  65,0002  men 
omitting  General  Thomas'  division.  Including  the  latter  division 
which  was  soon  returned  to  him  he  had  force  of  about  60,000 
which  he  could  have  hurled  against  Chattanooga,  if  he  could  have 
moved  promptly.  But  the  raids  of  the  Confederate  Generals 
Forrest  and  Morgan  broke  his  lines  of  supply  and  created  such 
a  panic  that  he  was  compelled  to  scatter  his  forces  and  delay  con 
centration  until  it  was  too  late. 

In  the  meantime  the  enemy  had  recovered  from  their  loss  of 
Corinth,  and  learning  that  General  Halleck  had  divided  his  great 
army,  began  preparations  to  turn  this  strategic  mistake  to  ad 
vantage.  July  17,  General  Bragg  who  was  in  command  of  the 
Confederate  forces  at  Tupelo,  Miss.,  ordered  all  the  cavalry  of 
the  Army  of  the  West  under  General  Armstrong  to  move  toward 
the  Tennessee  River,  as  near  as  possible  to  Decatur,  to  operate 
on  General  Buell's  flank.3  To  General  Kirby  Smith,  however,  is 
given  the  distinction  of  originating  the  movement  which  further 

1  Mumaueh's  Diary  3     W.  R.  R.  part  2-728. 

2  W.  R.  R.   16,  part  2-120. 


182  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

scattered  and  practically  paralyzed  General  BuelFs  army,  and 
compelled  its  shameful  retreat  to  the  Ohio  River  a  few  weeks 
later. 

July  20,  General  Smith,  who  was  in  command  of  the  Con 
federate  forces  in  East  Tennessee,  sent  a  dispatch  to  General 
Bragg,  stating  that  General  Buell  had  completed  his  preparations 
for  crossing  the  Tennessee  River  at  Bridgeport  and  that  now 
was  his  time  to  strike  at  Middle  Tennessee.1  This  dispatch  seems 
to  have  met  with  immediate  response,  for  on  July  21,  General 
Bragg  ordered  the  Army  of  the  Mississippi,  commanded  by  Gen 
eral  Hardee  and  composed  of  Cheathanrs,  Withers,  Jone's  and 
Wood's  divisions,  to  move  without  delay  to  Chattanooga,- — the  ar 
tillery  and  trains  by  common  roads  and  the  infantry  by  rail  by  way 
of  Mobile.2  But  July  24,  General  Smith  had  conceived  a  much 
grander  scheme,  which  he  on  that  day  submitted  to  General 
Bragg.  It  was  that  General  Bragg  should  shift  the  main  body  of 
his  forces  to  East  Tennessee,  take  command  in  person  of  his  own 
and -Smith's  forces,  and  from  that  region  make  a  summer  cam 
paign,  with  every  prospect  of  regaining  Middle  Tennessee  and 
possibly  Kentucky.  General  Smith  in  this  communication  stated 
his  own  force  to  be  18,000  effectives.3  General  Bragg  arrived 
at  Chattanooga  July  30,  and  on  the  31,  met  General  Kirby  Smith 
and  arranged  that  they  should  co-operate.  General  Smith  was 
to  move, at  once  against  General  Geo.  W.  Morgan  at  Cumberland 
Gap,  and,  if  successful,  their  combined  forces  were  to  be  thrown 
into  Middle  Tennessee  to  cut  off  General  Buell.4  In  pursuance  of 
this  plan,  August  5,  Cleburne's  and  Preston  Smith's  brigades  of 
the  Army  of  the  Mississippi,  were  ordered  from  Chattanooga  to 
Knoxville  to  report  to  General  Smith,5  and  August  8,  General 
Bragg  issued  orders  stripping  his  command  of  all  unnecessary  im 
pedimenta  for  the  campaign.6 

.In  the  meantime  Generals  Morgan  and  Forrest  were  raiding 
at  will  in  Tennessee  and  Kentucky,  cutting  railroads,  destroying 
bridges  and  tunnels,  capturing  town  after  town,  and  creating  the 
wildest  sort  of  panic  in  the  North,  which  began  to  express  fears 
for  the  safety  of  Buell's  army. 

August  12,  General  Bragg  reported  to  General  Kirby  Smith 
from  Chattanooga  that  his  infantry  would  all  be  up  that  day  and 
on  Friday,  August  15,  he  should  probably  commence  crossing  the 
Tennessee  River ;  that  as  soon  as  possible  he  should  move  on  to 
middle  Tennessee,  ignoring  the  enemy's  strong  works  at  Steven 
son,  Murfreesboro,  etc.,  and  that  he  had  ordered  Van  Dorn  and 

-rrhrrrH-:-:-  '. 

1  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-730.  4  W.  R.  R.   16,  part  2-741. 

2  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-731.  •",  W.  R.  R.   16,  part  2-744. 

3  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-734.  (>  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-716. 


RETREAT  OF  BUELL  TO  NASHTILLE  183 

Price  with  about  25,000  men  to  threaten  West  Tennessee.  Gen 
eral  Bragg  also -stated  in  the  same  dispatch  that  "the  government 
is  aware  of  our  proposed  operations  and  cordially  approves."1 

General  Smith  the  next  day  reported  to  General  Bragg  that 
on  Saturday  night  (August  16)  he  would  cross  the  mountains 
by  Rogers  Gap  with  four  brigades  of  infantry,  6000  strong,  and 
march  directly  on  Cumberland  Ford ;  that  at  the  same  time  Gen 
eral  Heth  with  the  artillery  and  trains  and  two  brigades  would 
move  by  Big  Creek  Gap  upon  Barboursville,  Ky.,  while  General 
Stevenson  (with  about  9000  men)  would  move  up  and  take 
position  close  to  Cumberland  Gap,  then  held  by  General  Geo.  W. 
Morgan's  division,  and  that  General  Scott  with  900  cavalry  and 
a  battery  of  mounted  howitzers,  would  reach  London,  Ky.  on 
Sunday  (August  17).2 

August  15,  General  Bragg  assumed  command  of  the  J^rmy 
of  the  Mississippi,  then  at  Chattanooga,  with  General  Leonidas 
Polk  in  command  of  the  right  wing  and  General  Wm.;  J;  Hardee 
of  the  left  wing.  The  actual  strength  of  Bragg's  army  at  that 
time  is  not  accurately  known.  The  field  returns  of  the  right  wing 
August  '22,  show  an  aggregate  present  of  18,731,  and  included 
Preston  Smith's  brigade,  which  had  been  sent  to  Kirby  Smith.3 
No  returns  of  the  left  wing  are  found,  but  it  is  possible  that  it 
did  not  number  more  than  the  right  wing.  August  27,  when 
Bragg's  movement  w^as  under  way,  his  field  returns  show  an  ag 
gregate  present  of  only  31,884. •*  This  apparent  falling  off  in  only 
five  days  may  be  explained  by  the  absence  of  Patrick  Cleburne's 
and  Preston  Smith's  brigades,  which  had  been  ordered  to  report 
to  Kirby  Smith  at  Knoxville  as  before  stated. 

General  Kirby  Smith's  army,  according  to  his  reports  to 
General  Bragg  before  mentioned,  numbered  about  21,900  men. 
Add  to  the  two  armies  the  commands  of  Generals  Forrest  and 
Jno.  H.  Morgan,  about  3500,  and  it  appears  that  the  aggregate 
of  Bragg's  and  Kirby  Smith's  forces  was  about  60,000  men  and 
that  the  forces  General  Bragg  had  across  the  river  from  Chat 
tanooga  did  not  exceed  25,000. 

General  Kirby  Smith's  forces  moved  rapidly  into  Kentucky 
and  August  17,  Colonel  Scott  with  his  900  cavalry  and  battery  of 
mountain  howitzers,  reached  London,  Ky.,  and  attacked  and  cap 
tured  the  place/'  General  Kirby  Smith  with  Generals  Cleburne's 
and  Churchill's  divisions  (6000)  as  claimed  by  General  Smith, 
commenced  crossing  the  mountains  August  16,  and  on  the  18th 
took  possession  of  Barboursville,  Ky.,6  where  on  the  22nd  he  was 

1  W.  R.  R.  Ifi.  part   2-7",.  4     W.  R.  R.   16,  part  2-784. 

2  W.   R.   R.    Ifi,  part   2-7.r,~.  5     W.  R.  R.   16,  part  1-937. 

3  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-772.  6     W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-766. 


184  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

joined  by  General  Heth's  division  with  the  artillery  and  supply 
trains.1  On  the  19th  General  John  H.  Morgan  made  a  raid  on 
the  Louisville  and  Nashville  Railroads  and  destroyed  all  the 
bridges  between  Gallatin  and  Edgefield  Junction,2  having  previous 
ly  destroyed  the  tunnel  at  the  former  place.  August  20,  General 
Kirby  Smith  reported  to  General  Bragg  that  he  proposed  to  move 
on  Lexington,  Ky.  as  soon  as  possible.3  On  the  same  day  he  sent 
word  to  General  Humphrey  Marshall,  who  was  at  Piketon  with 
a  force  of  perhaps  two  or  three  thousand  men,  that  he  should 
leave  Barboursville  the  25th  and  move  on  Lexington  via  Rich 
mond,  Ky.  and  asked  Marshall's  co-operation.4  So  it  appears 
that  when  our  part  of  Buell's  army  was  still  at  Battle  Creek, 
Tenn.,  the  invasion  of  Kentucky  was  well  under  way  and  our 
main  line  of  supplies  cut  off.  The  successful  movement  of  a 
large  body  of  the  enemy  across  the  Cumberland  mountains  and 
its  advance  to  the  borders  of  the  Blue  Grass  region  of  Kentucky, 
threw  the  people  of  the  border  states  into  still  wilder  panic. 
General  Geo.  W.  Morgan's  division  at  Cumberland  Gap  was 
practically  surrounded  and  it  was  feared  would  be  captured.  The 
numbers  of  the  enemy  were  greatly  magnified  and  there  were 
rumors  that  General  Kirby  Smith  had  been  largely  reinforced 
by  troops  from  Lee's  army  at  Richmond.5  It  was  also  feared 
that  the  safety  of  Buell's  army  in  Tennessee  was  imperiled.  It 
would  be  interesting  to  relate  the  incidents  of  the  uprisings  in 
the  States  of  Ohio,  Indiana  and  Illinois  to  meet  the  southern  in 
vaders,  but  this  is  only  incidental  to  the  history  of  the  regiment 
and  its  campaigns  and  will  not  be  attempted.  It  is  sufficient  to 
say  that  in  a  few  weeks  these  three  states  raised  and  sent  into  the 
field  nearly  sixty  regiments  of  new  troops,  and  thousands  of  the 
men  of  Ohio,  armed  with  squirrel  rifles,  flocked  to  the  Ohio  River 
to  the  defense  of  Cincinnati  and  other  towns  on  the  border. 

General  Buell  was  duly  informed  of  General  Kirby  Smith's 
invasion  of  Kentucky  and  on  August  16,  ordered  General  Nelson 
to  Kentucky  to  take  charge  of  all  troops  opposing  General  Kirby 
smith's  advance.0  He  also  appealed  to  General  Halleck  for  more 
troops.  A  former  similar  appeal  had  resulted  in  General  Grant's 
ordering  Davis'  and  Paine's  divisions  east,  to  reinforce  the  troops 
at  Battle  Creek  and  Stevenson.7  General  Buell  had  been  apprised 
of  a  probable  movement  of  Bragg's  army  into  Middle  Tennessee 
and  had  ordered  a  large  number  of  troops  to  McMinnville  and 
other  places  within  supporting  distance,  and  August  16,  ordered 
General  Thomas  to  that  point  to  take  command  of  them.  General 

1  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-777.  5  W.  R.  R.   16,  part  2-323-324. 

2  W.  R.  R.   16,  part  1-878-879.  6  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-S4S. 

3  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-766.  7  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-337. 

4  W.  R.  R.   16,  part  2-767. 


AUGUST  WILLICH 

Brevet    Major   General — Commander    of   the    First    Brigade,    Third 
Division,  Fourth   Corrjs,  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 


RETREAT  OF  BUELL  TO  NASHTILLE  185 

Buell  still  kept  his  headquarters  at  Huntsville,  Ala.,  and  seemed 
so  indifferent  to  what  was  taking  place  in  Kentucky  and  so  de 
liberate  in  his  movements,  that  August  18,  General  Halleck  tele 
graphed  him  saying: 

"So  great  is  the  dissatisfaction  here  at  the  apparent  want  of 
energy  and  activity  in  your  district,  that  I  was  this  morning  noti 
fied  to  have  you  removed,  I  got  the  matter  delayed  till  we  could 
hear  further  of  your  movements".  l 

To  this  dispatch  General  Buell  replied  saying  only,  that  his 
movements  had  been  such  as  the  circumstances  seemed  to  him 
to  require,  and  that  if  the  dissatisfaction  could  not  cease  on 
grounds  which  he,  Buell,  thought  might  be  supposed  or  apparent, 
he  wished  to  be  relieved.  He  also  stated  that  lacking  cavalry,  the 
work  of  rebuilding  the  railroads  and  erecting  stockades  to  keep 
open  his  400  miles  supply  line  had  to  be  done  under  the  protec 
tion  of  heavy  detachments,  which  had  been  tedious,  and  that  he 
was  apprehensive  this  would  have  to  be  repeated.  He  also  re 
minded  General  Halleck  that  three  months  before  he  had  asked 
the  War  Department  for  eight  more  regiments  of  cavalry  for 
service  in  Tennessee  and  Kentucky.2 

There  was  not  one  word  in  the  dispatch  about  his  future 
plans  or  movements  and  the  Washington  authorities  were  as  much 
in  the  dark  as  ever  in  regard  to  them.  General  Buell's  orders 
at  this  time  seem  indefinite  and  inconclusive,  and  while  apparently 
indicating  a  purpose  to  advance  and  attack  the  enemy,  at  the 
same  time  they  seem  to  imply  that  there  was  little  hope  of  meet 
ing  him  on  such  terms  as  would  insure  success.  In  almost  every 
instance  retreat  is  counselled  should  the  enemy  advance  in  sup 
posed  superior  force.  August  19,  he  issued  an  order  to  General 
McCook  saying  that  the  purpose  was  to  advance  against  the 
enemy,  if  it  could  be  done  with  any  prospect  of  success,  and  if 
the  enemy  advanced,  to  fight  him  and  to  the  best  advantage  and 
to  the  last  extremity.  He  then  gives  the  various  roads  over  which 
the  enemy  might  advance,  and  gives  McCook  directions  how  he 
should  fall  back  to  Murfreesboro  by  way  of  Hillsborough,  Man 
chester  and  Beech  Grove.  He  asks  General  McCook  to  study  the 
situation  and  adds,  that  the  details  of  an  advance  could  be  con 
sidered  at  another  time/" 

The  same  day  he  issued  an  order  to  General  Rousseau  plac 
ing  him  in  command,  when  necessary,  of  all  troops  on  both  lines 
of  railroad  from  Huntsville  to  Nashville,  and  tells  him  that  it 
was  possible,  when  the  main  army  advanced,  the  enemy  would 
come  upon  our  rear  in  such  force  that  it  would  be  impossible  to 

1  W.  R.  R.   16,  part  2-360.  3     W.  R.  R.   16,  part  2-368. 

2  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-360-361.  Sig.     7 


186  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

hold  such  extended  lines,  and  that  in  such  case  the  Decatur  road 
should  be  first  abandoned  and  a  determined  effort  made  to  hold 
Huntsville,  Stevenson,  Battle  Creek  and  the  railroad.  In  certain 
contingencies  he  says  that  it  will  be  necessary  for  the  whole  force 
from  Battle  Creek  to  Huntsville  to  fall  back  toward  Nashville, 
but  always  making  a  stand  whenever  it  would  be  done  with  ad 
vantage.  One  sentence  in  this  order  seems  to  give  a  key  to  Gen 
eral  Buell's  attitude  of  mind  at  this  time.  He  says,  "these  sug 
gestions  suppose  an  advance  of  the  enemy  which  cannot  be  re 
sisted  with  any  prospect  of  success,  but  a  determined  resistance 
is  always  to  be  made  when  there  is  any  hope  of  success.''1 

The  same  day  General  Buell  ordered  General  Paine's  divi 
sion,  which  General  Grant  had  placed  at  his  disposal  some  days 
before,  to  march  to  Decatur  on  the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga 
Railroad.2 

The  same  day  the  War  Department,  apparently  hopeless  of 
General  Buell's  being  able  to  give  any  relief  to  the  situation  in 
Kentucky,  created  a  new  Department  of  the  Ohio,  which  included 
Ohio,  Indiana,  Illinois,  Michigan,  Wisconsin  and  that  part  of 
Kentucky  east  of  the  Tennessee  River,  including  Cumberland 
Gap  and  the  troops  at  that  point,  and  placed  General  H.  G. 
Wright  in  command.3 

August  20,  General  Buell  ordered  General  Davis'  division 
of  General  Grant's  army,  which  had  also  been  ordered  to  report 
to  him  some  days  before,  to  move  by  forced  marches  via  Colum 
bia,  Tenn.  to  Nashville.4  On  the  same  day  he  ordered  General 
McCook  to  move  his  division  up  the  Sequatchie  Valley  on  the 
north  side  of  the  Anderson  road  and  send  out  strong  foraging 
parties  to  collect  forage,  beef  and  flour  if  he  could  find  them, 
stating  that  supplies  was  the  great  problem  and  that  we  "must 
solve  it  by  management  and  by  starving  too  if  necessary".  He 
also  directed  him  to  move  Crittenden's  division  at  the  same  time 
and  halt  him  near  where  the  road  from  the  Sequatchie  Valley 
turns  off  to  Tracy  City.  He  tells  McCook  that  Thomas'  division 
had  been  ordered  to  Tracy  City  next  day  and,  as  some  little  time 
would  be  required  to  concentrate,  not  to  become  seriously  en 
gaged  with  the  enemy.  He  also  again  gives  direction  for  the 
retirement  of  McCook's  divisions  if  it  was  necessary.5  The  last 
named  order  was  the  occasion  of  our  march  from  Battle  Creek  to 
Jasper  before  narrated. 

August  22,  General  McCook  reported  to  General  Buell  that 
on  Friday  (August  15)  General  Cheatham's  division  had  crossed 

1  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-370.  4     W.  R.  R.  Ifi,  part  2-376. 

2  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-369.  5     W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-377. 

3  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-375. 


RETREAT  OF  BUELL  TO  NASHTILLE  187 

the  river  at  Chattanooga:  that  up  to  Wednesday  (Augst  20),  33 
regiments  had  crossed  and  that  6  regiments  had  crossed  the  night 
before:  that  General  Withers  had  crossed  11  regiments  of  his  di 
vision  on  Wednesday  (August  20),  that  the  troops  crossing  were 
well  armed  and  had  good  artillery ;  that  the  enemy's  advance  had 
reached  the  top  of  XValden's  Ridge  the  night  before  and  was 
marching  toward  Tracey  City ;  that  he  was  fully  convinced  the 
enemy  was  marching  upon  McMinnville,  and  that  he,  McCook 
expected  to  be  there  Sunday  (August  24). l  General  Buell  was 
slow  to  concur  in  General  McCook's  ideas  as  'to  the  intentions  of 
the  enemy  and  believed  they  would  advance  on  Decherd  where 
he  then  was.  He  at  once  telegraphed  to  General  Thomas  at 
McMinnville,  stating  the  substance  of  General  McCook's  report, 
and  asking  him  how  it  would  do  to  fight  the  enemy  at  Altamont. 
He  ordered  him  to  be  ready  to  march  in  the  morning.2  The 
same  day  he  had  ordered  General  Thomas  to  withdraw  his  absent 
troops  and  that  he  would  advance  to  attack  the  enemy  in  the 
Sequatchie  Valley.  General  Thomas  on  the  same  day  answered 
General  Buell's  several  dispatches  and  advised  concentration  at 
McMinnville,  leaving  a  division  at  Decherd,  saying  that  neither 
water  or  forage  could  be  obtained  at  Altamont,  that  it  would  be 
as  difficult  for  him  to  march  across  the  mountains  to  the 
Sequatchie  Valley  as  for  the  enemy  to  come  either  to  Altamont 
or  McMinnville  and  that  he  would  not  advise  concentrating  at 
McMinnvlle,  except  for  battle,  or  for  an  advance  into  East  Ten 
nessee.  He  also  pointed  out  that  the  enemy  could  not  reach 
Nashville  by  any  other  route  than  through  McMinnville,  except 
by  way  of  Sparta,  and  that  in  his  opinion  the  demonstrations  of 
the  enemy  in  the  direction  of  McMinnville  were  intended  to 
cover  an  advance  to  Kentucky.3  Notwithstanding  these  repre 
sentations  of  General  Thomas.  August  23,  General  Buell  advised 
him  that  there  was  no  possibility  of  concentrating  at  McMinnville, 
that  the  army  must  concentrate  in  advance  of  that  place  and  as 
sume  the  of?nsive  or  fall  back  to  Murfreesboro.  He  therefore 
ordered  General  Thomas  to  move  by  a  forced  march  to  Altamont 
and  there  form  a  junction  with  McCook.  Crittenden  and 
Schoepf.4 

In  accordance  with  the  foregoing,  orders  were  given  for  con 
centration  of  the  foregoing  troops  at  Altamont  on  the  evening 
of  August  24,  and  General  Wood's  division  was  also  ordered  to 
that  point."'  A  dispatch  from  General  Buell  to  General  Halleck 
dated  August  24,  at  2:15  P.  M.  reveals  the  former's  inadequacy 

1  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-389.  4     W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-399. 

2  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-400.  5     W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-401. 
«     W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-392. 


188  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

to  control  the  situation  and  its  apparent  hopelessness.     It  is  as 
follows : 

"The  intimations  of  various  kinds  which  I  have  heretofore 
alluded  to,  of  a  design  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  to  attempt  a  for 
midable  invasion  of  Tennessee  are  being  verified,  and  there  can 
be  no  doubt  that  Tennesse  and  Kentucky  are  in  very  great  peril. 
It  is  impossible  to  ascertain  with  any  certainty  what  the  force  of 
the  enemy  is.  It  probably  is  not  less  than  60,000  men  independ 
ently  of  irregular  cavalry  and  the  force  operating  toward  Ken 
tucky  in  the  rear  of  Cumberland  Gap.  They  have  crossed  at 
Chattanooga,  Harrison,  Blythe's  Ferry  and  Kingston  and  are 
marching  on  McMinnville.  Upon  receipt  of  this  information  I 
ordered  the  forces  at  Battle  Creek  to  move  up  the  Sequatchie 
River  (Valley)  ;  one  division  to  stop  on  the  Little  Sequatchie  at 
the  Higginbottom  road  leading  to  Tracy  City  and  the  other  to 
the  Anderson  road  which  leads  directly  from  Chattenooga 
through  Altamont.  Thomas  with  two  divisions  was  ordered  to 
watch  the  Sparta  road  by  which  the  Kingstgn  column  would  ad 
vance,  and  be  prepared  to  concentrate  on  Altamont  or  in  the 
Sequatchie  Valley,  according  to  circumstances.  Owing  to  the 
mountainous  character  of  the  country,  and  perhaps  some  misap 
prehension,  the  concentration  was  not  effected  as  I  designed,  and 
is  not  yet,  though  the  troops  are  now  in  motion  for  that  object. 
If  not  too  late  it  will  yet  be  made  at  Altamont  and  the  enemy  at 
tacked  on  that  route ;  but  my  impressions  are  that  the  enemy  is 
already  at  Altamont.  If  the  junction  cannot  be  effected  then  it 
may  be  necessary  to  fall  back  on  Murfreesboro.  More  embar 
rassing  than  the  force  in  front  is  the  condition  of  things  in  the 
rear.  Our  communications  have  now  been  effectually  cut  for 
twelve  days.  I  have  had  no  force  there  sufficient  to  open  and 
keep  them  open,  and  our  supplies  cannot  last  more  than  ten  days. 
The  condition  of  things  has  determined  me  to  withdraw  the  sta 
tionary  force  from  the  roads  so  as  to  increase  the  force  at  Nash 
ville  and  in  the  rear  if  possible,  without  reducing  our  active  force, 
which  after  all  cannot  be  brought  up  to  more  than  about  30,000 
men.  The  force  is  clearly  insufficient,  and  ought  to  be  increased 
without  an  hour's  delay.  The  consequences  may  be  of  the  most 
serious  character.  I  have  been  of  this  opinion  for  some  time. 
Grant's  troops  have  not  crossed  the  river  that  I  have  heard  of 
and  it  must  be  several  days  before  they  can  complete  the  march 
to  form  a  junction,  even  if  they  were  already  across.  New 
troops,  if  they  could  move  rapidly  enough,  are  not  suitable  for 
the  service  required.  We  want  cavalry  very  much".1 


1     W.  R.  R.   16,  part  2-406. 


RETREAT  OF  BUELL  TO  NASHTILLE  189 

How  the  hearts  of  President  Lincoln  and  his  close  advisers 
must  have  sunk  on  reading  this  hopeless  dispatch  from  a  nerve 
less  commander  of  a  great  army.  That  it  produced  a  very  un 
favorable  impression  may  be  inferred  from  the  fact  that  August 
25,  General  Halleck  telegraphed  to  General  H.  G.  Wright  that 
the  President  and  Secretary  of  war  were  very  much  displeased 
with  the  slow  movements  of  General  Buell,  and  unless  he  did 
something  very  soon,  he  believed  he  would  be  removed.1  As 
usual  General  Buell  was  greatly  overestimating  the  strength  of 
the  enemy  and  under  estimating  his  own.  We  have  already  seen 
that  the  official  returns  of  Bragg's  army  showed  that  his  force 
at  Chattanooga  could  not  have  been  over  35,000  men. 

Governor  Andrew  Johnson,  who  must  have  had  unusual 
means  of  informing  himself,  August  1,  informed  General  Buell 
that  Bragg's  forces  did  not  exceed  25,000  and  that  50,000  troops 
could  not  be  subsisted  or  supplied  between  McMinnville  and 
Chattanooga  or  any  other  place  from  which  they  had  marched. - 
From  this  force  General  Bragg  detached  a  considerable  force 
under  General  Sam  Jones  to  hold  his  base  at  Chattanooga  and 
make  demonstrations  against  Bridgeport  and  other  points  along 
the  river.:i  General  Buell,  according  to  his  official  returns  of  date 
August  1,  had  under  his  immediate  command,  including  the 
troops  at  Nashville  and  excluding  General  George  W.  Morgan's 
division  at  Cumberland  Gap,  an  army  of  60,122.  He  had  had  no 
losses  by  battle  and  between  that  date  and  August  24,  his  strength 
had  probably  not  been  materially  diminished.  Besides  these 
troops  two  divisions  of  General  Grant's  army  were  on  the  way 
by  forced  marches  to  join  him  and  General  Grant  had  sent  troops 
to  reoccupy  Clarksville  on  the  Cumberland  River  a  short  distance 
below  Nashville.  With  such  a  force  a  general  with  nerve  and 
dicision,  it  seems,  would  have  interposed  between  Bragg  and 
Kirby  Smith,  or  moved  against  General  Bragg's  flank  and  brought 
the  proposed  invasion  of  Kentucky  to  a  sudden  and  disastrous 
end.  General  Bragg  was  delayed  in  getting  his  transportation 
from  Tupelo,  and  did  not  issue  orders  for  the  advance  of  his 
main  body  until  August  25.4  General  Wheeler's  cavalry  brigade, 
consisting  of  parts  of  the  First  Alabama  and  First  Kentucky 
regiments,  the  advance  of  General  Hardee's  troops,  did  not  cross 
the  Tennessee  River  until  August  27,  and  did  not  receive  orders 
to  march  on  Altamont  until  the  29th. r>  General  Bragg's  army  did 
not  take  up  its  march  over  WTalden's  Ridge  and  the  mountains 
until  August  28, p>  and  there  was  ample  time  for  General  Buell 

1  W.  R.  R.   1C,  part  2-421.  4     W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-779. 

2  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-461.  5     W.  R.  R.  16,  part  1-893. 

3  W.  R.  R.   16,  part  2-785.  6     W.  R.  R  16,  part  1-1089. 


190  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

to  have  concentrated  a  sufficient  force  to  intercept  and  destroy 
him. 

The  orders  for  our  division  were  first,  to  move  by  way  of 
Tracy  City  to  McMinnville,  but  August  24,  we  were  directed  to 
move  by  way  of  Pelham  to  Altamont  and  be  at  that  place  by  noon 
August  26.  *  On  the  '33rd  we  moved  out  about  a  mile  from  our 
camp  near  Battle  Creek  into  an  open  field  where  we  killed  hogs, 
sheep  and  geese,  got  corn  and  sweet  potatoes  and  put  up  brush 
shanties  to  sleep  in  during  the  night.2  The  morning  of  August 
24,  we  were  called  out  about  2  :30  A.  M.  and  ordered  to  be  ready 
to  march  at  4  A.  M.  We  were  all  ready  by  that  time,  when  the 
order  was  countermanded  and  the  men  laid  down  for  a  little  more 
sleep.  But  at  5  :30  A.  M.  the  bugle  sounded  and  we  fell  in  and 
marched  out  in  a  northwesterly  direction,  our  regiment  leading 
the  brigade.  We  soon  began  to  climb  a  mountain  by  the  steepest 
road  we  had  ever  marched  over.  Ropes  were  attached  to  the 
artillery  and  we  aided  in  pulling  the  guns  up  the  mountain.  Water 
was  scarce,  but  we  fortunately  found  some  fine  springs.  WTe 
finally  apparently  reached  the  top  of  the  mountain  and  rested  by 
a  small  brook.  We  then  moved  on  to  another  brook  and  bivou- 
aced  for  the  night  having  marched  fifteen  miles.  The  five  right 
companies  of  the  regiment  were  ordered  out  on  picket  duty/'' 
The  regiments  of  the  brigade  were  bivouaced  in  close  support  on 
either  side  of  a  narrow  road  and  beyond  them  was  the  artillery. 
Word  was  given  out  that  Wheeler's  Confederate  cavalry  was  not 
far  away  and  to  be  on  the  alert  for  an  attack.  About  midnight 
two  artillery  horses  which  had  been  tethered  with  their  harness 
on  got  loose  and  came  galloping  down  the  road,  the  heavy  chains 
of  their  harness  clanking  as  they  came.  The  men,  awakened  from 
sound  sleep,  thought  that  Wheeler's  cavalry  were  making  a  night 
charge  on  our  camp,  and  for  a  few  moments  there  was  the  wildest 
sort  of  a  panic.  Some  of  the  men  commenced  firing  their  guns 
at  the  imaginary  enemy.  General  W7illich's  boy,  "Sam,"  climbed 
up  a  tree  with  the  General  boots  and  would  not  come  down.  The 
General  and  other  officers  exerted  themselves  to  restore  order 
and  soon  convinced  the  men  that  there  was  no  cause  for  alarm. 
The  panic  thereupon  subsided,  with  many  a  hearty  laugh  over  the 
many  amusing  incidents  which  it  had  occasioned.  August  25. 
the  bugles  sounded  about  4  A.  M.  and  at  4 :30  A.  M.  we  resumed 
our  march.  Our  route  was  over  a  flat  table  land  on  top  of  the 
mountain.  One  would  have  thought  we  were  on  a  level  plain  if 
breaks  in  the  forest  had  not  shown  mountains  all  about  us.  We 
passed  two  considerable  farms  and  then  started  down  the  moun- 

1  W.  R.  R.  IB.  part  2-40S.  3     McConnell's  Diary. 

2  Gleason's  Diary. 


RETREAT  OF  BUELL  TO  NASHVILLE  191 

tain  by  a  road  so  steep  that  the  artillery  and  trains  could  not  fol 
low  it,  but  were  sent  by  another  route.  After  a  march  of  six  miles 
we  came  to  one  of  the  finest  springs  we  had  seen  where  we  went 
into  camp  in  an  open  field  nearby.  Not  far  away  was  one  of  the 
largest  peach  orchards  we  had  ever  seen  from  which  the  men  sup 
plied  themselves  liberally.  There  were  also  corn  fields  near  and 
foraging  was  lively.1  It  was  reported  that  the  whole  of  BuelFs 
army  was  nearby  and  that  the  enemy  80,000  strong  was  at 
McMinnville.1 

August  26,  we  remained  in  camp  all  day  and  sent  out  forag 
ing  parties.  Some  of  the  men  brought  in  some  honey.  The  64th 
Ohio  and  6th  Ohio  Battery  were  encamped  near  us.  Some  of 
their  men  told  us  they  had  burned  their  tents  while  crossing  the 
mountains.  Four  men  of  Company  H  were  reported  captured, 
but  they  returned  to  camp  late  in  the  evening  bringing  some  do 
mestic  ducks  and  a  lot  of  honey.  There  were  rumors  that  Steven 
son,  Battle  Creek  and  Bridgeport  had  been  occupied  by  the 
enemy. '2  This  rumor  was  partly  true,  for  on  that  day  General 
Maxev  occupied  Bridgeport  and  was  ordered  to  send  a  force  to 
take  Battle  Creek.3  We  remained  in  camp  all  day  the  27th.  The 
men  occupied  the  time  foraging  and  visiting  other  regiments, 
among  them  the  17th  and  64th  Ohio.  General  McCook  was  said 
to  be  in  command  of  all  the  forces  in  our  neighborhood  and  Gen 
eral  Sill  was  in  command  of  our  division.  In  the  evening  we  re 
ceived  orders  to  march  next  morning  at  3  o'clock.  August  28. 
we  were  ready  to  march  at  the  appointed  time  but  did  not  get 
started  until  day  light.  We  moved  out  in  an  easterly  direction, 
but  soon  turned  north.  We  soon  came  to  a  fine  spring  where  we 
made  a  short  halt  and  filled  our  canteens.  We  then  started  up 
the  mountain  and  got  near  its  summit,  when  the  report  came  that 
there  was  no  water  to  be  found  and  the  whole  column  counter 
marched  about  two  miles  and  went  into  camp  by  a  spring  we 
had  passed.  That  evening  some  of  the  foragers  brought  in  a 
large  store  of  fine  honey.  Our  day's  march  was  14  miles.  We 
heard  that  Battle  Creek  had  been  taken  by  the  enemy.4 

August  29,  we  resumed  our  march  at  5  A.  M.  and  marched 
to  the  top  of  the  mountain  where  we  rested  until  noon.  After 
dinner  we  marched  on  over  a  flat  table  land  to  Altamont  where 
we  went  into  camp.  Our  day's  march  was  about  10  miles.5  A 
lot  of  Confederate  prisoners  were  brought  into  camp.  It  \vas 
said  McCook's  command  was  the  only  body  of  Union  troops  at 
Altamont.  August  30,  we  remained  in  camp  until  10  o'clock 

1  Mumaugh's  Diary  4     Mumaugh's  Diary. 

2  Mumaugh's  Diary.  5     McConnell's  Diary. 

3  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-783. 


192  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

P.  M.  Companies  A,  F,  B  and  G  went  out  on  a  reconnoissance 
but  developed  no  great  force  of  the  enemy.  At  1  P.  M.  we  took 
up  our  line  of  march  in  a  southwesterly  direction.  Our  regular 
rations  were  exhausted  and  we  had  to  depend  on  our  foragers. 
We  passed  a  woman  standing  by  the  road  side  and  crying  because 
some  of  our  foragers  had  taken  her  oxen.1  We  started  down 
the  mountain  at  5  P.  M.  We  noticed  a  Confederate  ambulance 
which  had  been  wrecked  on  the  mountain  side  and  went  into 
camp  in  a  field  where  there  was  running  water.  Our  days  march 
was  about  9  miles.  On  this  day  General  Thomas  who  was  at 
McMinnville  reported  to  General  Buell  that  the  news  from  all 
sources  seemed  to  indicate  that  General  Bragg  would  move  his 
main  force  by  Sparta,  and  advised  that  if  he  was  moving  on 
Murfreesboro  the  army  should  concentrate  at  that  place  as  soon 
as  possible  and  drive  him  back.2  Acting  probably  on  this  sug 
gestion.  General  Buell  August  30,  issued  orders  for  such  concen 
tration.  The  orders  for  our  division  were  to  march  to  Pelham 
September  1,  to  Manchester  September  2,  to  Hoover's  Gap  Sep 
tember  3,  to  a  point  within  ten  miles  of  Murfreesboro  September 
4,  and  to  Murfreesboro  September  5.:i  August  30,  General 
Kirby  Smith  defeated  General  Nelson's  raw  troops  at  Richmond, 
Ky.  and  was  supposed  to  be  marching  on  either  Louisville  or 
Cincinnati  and  the  whole  North  was  arousing  to  meet  and  check 
the  invaders. 

August  31,  and  September  1,  our  part  of  the  army  rested  at 
the  foot  of  the  mountain  where  we  had  encamped  the  evening  of 
August  30,  and  sent  out  foraging  parties  who  scoured  the  valley 
and  brought  in  cattle,  chickens,  salt,  honey  and  every  article  of 
food  they  could  lay  hands  on.  Three  Confederate  prisoners 
were  brought  in,  one  of  whom  had  an  Enfield  rifle  belonging  to 
a  bugler  in  the  32nd  Indiana,  who  was  missing.  A  force  was 
sent  out  to  block  the  road  down  the  mountain  by  felling  large 
trees  across  it.  The  night  of  the  3 1st  there  was  a  big  fire  on  the 
mountain  some  distance  away,  which  indicated  the  presence  of 
the  enemy.  That  night  a  part  of  the  regiment  was  posted  as 
pickets  up  the  mountain  side.  One  who  was  then  a  sergeant  in 
Company  K4  recalls  that  the  night  was  very  dark  and  that  he  had 
much  difficulty  in  posting  his  relief  because  of  the  darkness. 
Fortunately  he  stumbled  over  a  stump  of  phosphoresent  wood 
and  afterwards  used  portions  of  it  to  mark  the  line  through  the 
dark  woods  and  back  to  a  sweet  potato  patch  where  the  reserve 
was  posted.  He  recalls  that  in  the  middle  of  the  night  he  heard 
a  woman's  scream  far  down  the  valley. 

1  Mumauch's  Diary  3     W.  R.  R.  16,  part   2-455. 

2  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-433  4     The  Writer. 


RETREAT  OF  BUELL  TO  NASHVILLE  193 

September  2,  at  5  A.  M.  we  marched  in  a  southwesterly  di 
rection  toward  the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga  Railroad.  After 
marching  three  miles  we  halted  for  a  rest  at  a  fine  spring.  After 
this  our  route  was  along  the  McMinnville  branch  of  this  road. 
At  3  P.  M.  after  a  march  of  fifteen  miles  we  came  to  Manchester 
where  we  encamped  for  the  night.  The  night  was  cool  and 
many  of  the  men  were  without  blankets.  During  the  day  we 
heard  of  the  disaster  to  our  arms  at  Richmond,  Ky.  and  realized 
that  our  march  was  a  retreat  in  earnest.1  September  3,  we 
marched  at  7  A.  M.  taking  the  road  to  Murfreesboro.  Our  route 
was  through  a  fine  farming  country  and  foraging  parties  were 
sent  out  to  collect  food  and  forage  and  drive  in  horses  and  cattle. 
After  a  march  of  thirteen  miles  we  went  into  camp  for  the  night. 
The  18th  Ohio  \vas  temporarily  attached  to  our  brigade.  Sep 
tember  4,  we  resumed  our  march  at  5  A.  M.  For  about  three 
miles  the  road  passed  through  a  cedar  woods.  Water  was  very 
scarce.  After  marching  about  9  miles  we  came  to  a  small  muddy 
spring.  General  Willich  stood  over  it  and  allowed  each  man  only 
one  cup  of  water.  The  sun  was  very  hot,  the  pike  over  which 
we  marched  was  very  dusty  and  the  men  suffered  intensely  from 
thirst.  After  a  march  of  about  sixteen  miles  we  halted  about 
four  miles  from  Murfreesboro  and  went  into  camp.  During  the 
day  we  heard  of  Kirby  Smith's  attack  on  Lexington,  Ky.  Frank 
fort  had  been  occupied  by  the  enemy  September  3,  and  the  flag 
of  the  1st  Louisiana  cavalry  had  been  hoisted  over  the  state 
house.2  At  the  same  time  we  heard  of  General  Pope's  defeat  in 
Virginia.  In  the  evening  our  tents  and  knapsacks  came  up.3 

General  Buell  now  had  his  whole  force  concentrated  at  Mur 
freesboro  and  had  been  reinforced  by  a  division  from  General 
Grant's  army.  September  2,  General  Thomas  had  advised  him 
that  the  enemy  was  advancing  on  the  Therman,  Dunlap  and 
Sparta  roads,  and  that  by  convenient  roads  our  main  force  could 
be  thrown  upon  him  between  McMinnville  and  Decherd,  or  at 
Hillsborough,  overcome  him  and  drive  him  toward  Sparta,  his 
longest  line  of  retreat,  while  a  force  of  cavalry  and  light  in 
fantry  could  be  pushed  across  the  mountains  by  the  Dunlap  and 
Therman  road,  attack  him  in  rear  and  completely  route  his  whole 
force.  To  give  emphasis  to  his  suggestion,  General  Thomas 
added  that  he  had  studied  the  roads  and  was  convinced  that  this 
was  the  best  plan  of  attack.4  If  General  Buell  had  needed  any 
additional  spur  to  action  it  was  supplied  by  a  dispatch  from  Gen 
eral  Halleck  dated  the  same  day.  General  Buell  had  telegraphed 
to  General  Halleck  from  Nashville  that  his  whole  force  would 


1  Mumaueh's  Diary.  3     Mumaugh's  Diary. 

2  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  1-939.  4     W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-471. 


194  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

be  at  Murfreesboro  on  the  5th,  that  the  movement  had  become 
necessary  in  order  to  protect  Nashville  and  open  his  lines  of  com 
munication ;  that  he  proposed  to  fortify  and  hold  Nashville  and 
with  the  remainder  of  his  army  move  rapidly  against  the 
enemy  in  Kentucky,  that  Bragg  had  crossed  the  Tennessee 
River  with  45,000  or  50,000,  etc.1  General  Halleck  answered 
this  dispatch  by  curtly  saying  "March  where  you  please  provid 
ing  you  will  find  the  enemy  and  fight  him".2  But  General  Buell 
feared  to  risk  an  encounter  with  the  enemy  unless  with  known 
superior  numbers  and  the  opportunity  was  lost. 

General  Buell  was  an  accomplished  soldier  and  had  the  re 
spect  and  confidence  of  his  contemporaries  in  the  old  army,  but  he 
was  slow,  over  cautious,  and,  singular  to  say,  during  the  whole 
time  he  was  in  high  command  never  fought  a  battle  that  was  not 
forced  on  him.  It  is  true  that  he  gave  orders  to  General  Thomas 
to  attack  the  enemy  at  Mill  Springs  but  the  enemy  attacked  before 
Thomas  could  concentrate  against  him.  His  orders  to  fight  had 
nearly  always  a  caution,  or  condition,  or  a  suggestion  of  retreat, 
which  must  have  been  painful  and  paralyzing  to  his  subordinate 
commanders.  He  was,  with  always  superior  numbers,  continually 
on  the  defensive.  While  concentrating  at  Murfreesboro  to  strike 
the  enemy  he  was  contemplating  falling  back  on  Nashville  and 
September  3,  telegraphed  General  Wright  from  Nashville  that 
Louisville  was  the  point  the  enemy  was  aiming  for.3  He  was 
perhaps  at  that  time  considering  a  retreat  to  that  point. 

It  was  soon  evident  that  we  were  not  to  advance  against  the 
enemy,  but  to  make  a  further  retreat.  We  lay  in  camp  three  or 
four  miles  southeast  of  Murfreesboro  all  day  September  5,  and 
until  9  a.  m.  September  6,  when  orders  came  from  General  Mc- 
Cook  to  march  to  Lavergne.4  We  started  at  once,  marched  four 
miles  beyond  Murfreesboro,  and  then  countermarched  three  miles 
in  order  to  get  water,  making  our  day's  march  about  10  miles. 

The  morning  of  September  7,  reveille  sounded  at  3  o'clock 
and  we  had  orders  to  march  at  5.  As  our  trains  were 
ordered  ahead  we  did  not  get  started  until  7  o'clock. 
The  sun  was  very  hot,  the  roads  were  thick  with  dust 
and  water  was  very  scarce.  Added  to  this,  the  shoes  of 
many  of  the  men  were  worn  thin  and  marching  on  the  hard  lime 
stone  pike  blistered  their  feet.  But  we  trudged  on,  not  knowing 
whither  we  were  bound.  At  one  point  along  the  road  we  saw  a 
fine  plantation  house,  cotton  press  and  outbuildings  on  fire  and 
were  told  that  they  had  been  burned  because  the  owner  had  given 
information  to  the  enemy.  After  a  tiresome  hot  march  of  15 

1  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-470  3     W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-476 

2  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-471  4     W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-490 


RETREAT  or  BUELL  TO  NASHVILLE  195 

miles  we  came  to  the  little  town  and  railway  station  of  Lavergne 
and  halted,  as  we  supposed,  for  the  night.  Soon  after  we  halted 
General  Willich  called  the  brigade  together  and  in  his  broken 
but  impressive  English  told  us  that  the  enemy  was  in  Kentucky 
and  that  we  "must  get  there  quick  and  give  him  salt  and  pepper'', 
lie  dwelt  upon  the  patience  and  endurance  of  the  men,  their 
courage  and  self  sacrifice  in  former  campaigns,  and  said  we  must 
be  ready  for  still  greater  exertions,  for  Louisville  and  Cincinnati 
were  in  danger.  He  then  said  we  would  rest  two  hours  and  then 
march  on  to  Nashville,  16  miles  distant.  His  speech  produced 
a  profound  impression.  Every  one  felt  the  gravity  of  the  situa 
tion  and  the  necessity  for  prompt  action.  One  little  Irishman, 
John  F.  Murray  of  Company  K,  said  all  he  wanted  was  "nothing 
to  eat  and  forty  rounds  of  cartridges".  After  the  two  hours 
rest  and  such  food  as  we  could  prepare,  we  moved  out  into  the 
darkness  and  took  up  the  march  to  Nashville.  That  it  was  night 
favored  us,  for  it  was  cooler,  but  the  dust  was  stifling  and  we 
were  short  of  water.  The  hard  pike  blistered  our  feet,  the 
blisters  broke  and  our  feet  bled  as  we  marched.  The  way  was 
long,  and  before  we  reached  our  destination  many  of  the  men 
fell  out  from  sheer  exhaustion.  About  2  A.  M.  the  regiment 
reached  the  suburbs  of  Nashville  and  turned  into  a  field  deep 
with  clover,  which  was  reeking  wet  with  the  dews  of  the  night. 
Into  the  wet  clover  those  who  had  had  the  courage,  strength  and 
dogged  determination  to  keep  afoot  and  not  fall  out,  dropped 
exhausted  and  were  soon  in  a  stony  sleep. 


CHAPTER   XI. 

THE    RETREAT    FROM     NASHVILLE    TO    LOUISVILLE    AND     MARCH     TO 
CRAB    ORCHARD,     KENTUCKY. 

The  morning  of  September  8,  1862,  we  were  awakened 
by  the  hot  sun  beating  down  on  our  faces,  and  arose  stiff 
and  footsore  from  the  thirty  miles  march  of  the  day  before. 
Some  of  the  men  took  off  their  shoes  and  socks  to  cool  their 
feet  in  the  wet  clover  and  found  it  a  painful  operation.  The 
blood  from  the  broken  blisters  had  dried  and  their  socks  stuck 
to  their  feet.  At  7  A.  M.  orders  came  to  move  and  we  took 
up  again  our  painful  march.  We  marched  toward  Nashville 
and  in  about  an  hour  halted  on  an  eminence  commanding  a 
fine  view  of  the  city,  and  were  told  we  would  rest  five  hours 
and  then  move  on  to  the  north.  The  prospect  of  even  a  short 
rest  was  very  welcome,  for  we  had  had  little  sleep  during  the 
preceding  forty-eight  hours  and  were  very  tired.  Since 
August  24,  we  had  been  almost  constantly  on  the  move.  The 
distance  from  Battle  Creek  to  Nashville  was  said  to  be  164 
miles,  but  by  the  route  we  had  come  it  must  have  been  over 
200  miles.  Word  soon  came  that  we  would  remain  where  we 
were  during  the  day  and  night,  which  was  also  welcome  news. 
During  the  day  we  received  rations  of  soft  bread,  which  was 
a  rarety.  A  large  mail  was  received  and  many  got  letters 
from  home ;  Lieutenant  George  W.  Cummins  returned  to  the 
regiment,  and  many  men  who  had  been  sick  in  hospital 
rejoined  their  companies.  September  9,  our  wagons  were  sent 
across  the  river  and  the  brigade  was  expected  to  move  on,  but 
did  not.  Hugh  Long  of  Company  I,  was  shot  by  a  provost 
guard  of  Nashville.1  At  this  time  General  Bragg  with  his 
army  had  reached  the  Cumberland  River  near  Carthage, 
Tenn.,  and,  sending  Wheeler's  cavalry  and  other  troops  to 
make  a  strong  demonstration  against  Nashville,2  crossed  the 
river  and  gave  orders  directing  the  concentration  of  his  entire 
force  at  Glasgow,  Ky.3  It  was  the  opinion  of  the  Commis 
sion  which  later  investigated  the  operations  of  General  Buell's 
army,  that  General  Buell  should  not  have  fallen  back  from 
Murfreesboro,  but  should  have  attacked  Bragg's  army  before 
it  crossed  the  Cumberland  River,  and  that  if  he  had  done  so, 
he  would  have  been  successful.4  But  as  before  stated,  Gen 
eral  Buell  believed  that  the  enemy  greatly  outnumbered  him, 

1  McConnell's  Diary.  3     W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-804 

2  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  1-893  4     W.  R.  R.  16,  part  1-9 


RETREAT  TO  LOUISVILLE  AND  PEKRYVILLE  CAMPAIGN  197 

and  he  decided,  as  usual,  to  take  no  risks.  He  had  even  then 
contemplated  falling  back  from  Nashville  to  Louisville  and 
avoiding  a  general  engagement  until  he  could  be  reinforced 
by  the  troops  collecting  at  that  place.  He  had  already  ordered 
General  Rousseau's,  General  Wood's  and  General  Crittenden's 
divisions  to  march  to  Bowling  Green.  He  could  get  no 
reliable  news  of  the  movements  of  Bragg's  army,  and  Sep 
tember  8  President  Lincoln  ironically  asked  him  by  telegraph 
"how  he  knew  that  Bragg  and  his  army  were  not  in  the 
Shenandoah  Valley."1  To  this  dispatch  General  Buell 
answered  that  Bragg  was  certainly  this  side  of  the  Cumber 
land  Mountains,  that  for  the  want  of  supplies  he  could  not 
follow  him  nor  remain  at  Nashville,  and  that  he  thought  he 
must  withdraw  from  Tennessee.2  With  a  great  army  at  his 
command  and  more  certain  of  supplies  than  was  the 
enemy,  he  was  helpless  and  hopeless.  On  September  10, 
he  received  a  report  from  General  Wood,  whose  division  had 
reached  within  twelve  miles  of  Bowling  Green,  that  Bragg 
had  crossed  the  Cumberland  River,  September  7,  and  was 
moving  by  forced  marches  to  Glasgow,  Mumfordsville  and  on 
to  Louisville."  This  information  probably  led  to  General 
Buell's  orders  of  the  same  day  directing  General  Nelson's 
division,  then  commanded  by  General  Ammen,  and  our 
division,  to  move  on  at  once  to  Bowling  Green.4  The  morn 
ing  of  September  10,  we  had  orders  to  march  on  fifteen 
minutes'  notice.  Joseph  Navins  of  Company  H,  was  killed 
by  a  tree  falling  on  him  in  the  camp  of  the  First  Ohio  Cavalry. 
At  7  P.  M.  the  bugles  sounded  and  we  again  took  up  our  line 
of  march  northward.  The  three  days  rest  had  put  us  in  good 
condition  and  we  took  up  a  swinging  pace  and  marched  with 
out  fatigue.  We  marched  through  Nashville,  crossed  the 
river  on  the  railroad  bridge  and  took  the  main  road  to  Louis 
ville,  over  which  we  had  marched  southward  six  months 
before.  The  Third  and  Fourth  Ohio  Cavalry  passed  us  soon 
after  we  got  started.  After  a  march  of  fifteen  miles,  at  2  A. 
M.,  we  came  to  Tracy  Junction  and  went  out  on  picket.  Sep 
tember  11,  we  had  orders  to  resume  our  march.  A  body  of 
cavalry  passed  us  and  also  the  other  brigade  of  the  division, 
and  we  did  not  get  started  until  3  P.  M.  We  were  the  rear 
guard  of  the  column.  Generals  Buell  and  McCook  passed  us, 
riding  to  the  front.  Just  after  passing  through  Goodrichville 
a  heavy  rain  drenched  us  thoroughly.  A  march  of  about  thir 
teen  miles  brought  us  toTyree  Springs  where,  at  11  P.  M.,  we 
bivouaced  for  the  night,  without  supper.  There  was  another 

1  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-497.  3     W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-501-502. 

2  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-500.  4     W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-501. 


198  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

heavy  shower  during  the  night.  It  was  reported  that  General 
Ammen's  division  had  had  a  skirmish  with  Forrest's  cavalry. 
September  12,  at  5  A.  M.,  we  fell  in  and  marched  without 
breakfast,  except  hard  tack,  and  there  was  some  hard  swear 
ing  over  it.1  The  day  was  cloudy  and  wet  and  every  one  was 
in  ill  humor.  We  fooled  along  for  a  distance  of  about  fifteen 
miles,  and  at  4  P.  M.,  went  into  camp  near  Mitchellsville  for 
the  night.  An  unexpected  night's  rest  was  very  welcome  for 
we  had  lost  much  sleep.  September  13,  we  resumed  our 
march  at  3  A.  M.,  passed  through  Mitchellsville  and  near  it 
crossed  the  state  line  between  Kentucky  and  Tennessee.  As 
we  passed  through  Franklin,  Ky.,  the  citizens  were  entertain 
ing  General  McCook.  After  a  march  of  about  fifteen  miles, 
at  1  P.  M.,  we  halted  and  were  told  we  would  remain  there 
for  the  night.  Our  foragers  went  out  and  brought  in  some 
sweet  potatoes.  In  the  evening  we  received  orders  to  march 
at  1  o'clock  next  morning.  That  day  General  Buell  ordered 
General  Thomas,  whose  division  was  still  at  Nashville,  to 
move  with  his  own  and  General  Paine's  division  by  forced 
marches  to  Bowling  Green,  and  get  there  in  three  and  a  half 
days  at  least.  He  informed  General  Thomas  that  Bragg's 
army  would  be  concentrated  at  Glasgow  the  next  day,  that 
if  it  was  defeated  Nashville  was  safe,  and  if  not,  it  was  lost.2 
There  was  no  intimation,  however,  in  this  dispatch  that  he 
intended  to  attack  the  enemy.  In  fact  he  seems  to  have  been 
as  helpless  and  hopeless  as  ever.  On  the  14th  he  sent  a  dis 
patch  to  General  Halleck  which  reached  Evansville,  Indiana, 
the  19th  and  was  forwarded  to  Washington  from  that  point, 
in  which  he  told  of  the  concentration  of  Bragg's  forces  at 
Glasgow,  of  his  own  concentration  at  Bowling  Green,  and  said 
he  would  "commence  to  move  against  Bragg's  force  on  the 
16th,"  and  that  the  danger  was  that  Bragg  would  form  a 
junction  with  Kirby  Smith.  He  also  stated  that  Bragg  was 
virtually  between  him  and  Louisville,  and  all  communication 
between  him  and  Louisville  by  rail  and  telegraph  were  cut 
off.3  It  was  another  nerveless  and  hopeless  dispatch. 

On  the  same  day  he  sent  a  dispatch  also  by  way  of 
Evansville,  to  General  Wright  saying  that  Bragg  was  then 
moving  to  form  a  junction  with  Kirby  Smith,  and  that  he, 
General  Wright,  should  prevent  it  if  possible  at  once,  and  that 
not  an  hour  should  be  lost.4  He  also  said  he  would  commence 
moving  against  Bragg  on  the  16th,  but  the  dispatch  was  as 
hopeless  and  nerveless  as  the  one  to  General  Halleck.  Sep- 

1  Mumaugh's  Diary  3     W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-515 

2  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-511-512  4     W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-516 


RETREAT  TO  LOUISVILLE  AND  PERRY VILLE  CAMPAIGN  199 

tember  14,  we  were  aroused  about  1  A.  M.,  got  breakfast  and, 
at  2  A.  M.,  marched  toward  Bowling  Green.  After  a  march 
of  about  thirteen  miles  we  came  to  Lost  River,  about  two 
miles  from  the  town,  and  went  into  camp.  At  5  P.  M.  that 
evening  we  had  inspection  of  arms  and  at  7  P.  M.  went  out 
on  picket.  Some  of  our  pickets  fired  by  mistake  on  the 
Fourth  Ohio  Cavalry,  but  fortunately  hit  no  one.1  At  6  A. 
M.,  September  15,  our  pickets  were  called  in  and  we  were 
notified  to  be  ready  to  march  in  an  hour.  After  drawing 
rations  of  sugar  and  coffee  w^e  marched  into  Bowling  Green 
and  went  into  camp  northwest  of  the  town  on  the  Barren 
River,  where  we  had  opportunity  to  wash  and  boil  our  clothing 
to  get  rid  of  vermin.  September  16,  we  remained  in  camp 
and  heard  that  the  enemy  in  force  had  attacked  our  troops 
at  Munfordville.  AVood's  division  crossed  the  river,  moving 
north  and  we  had  orders  to  march  next  morning  at  3  o'clock. 
If  General  Buell  had  any  notion  of  moving  to  attack  the 
enemy  at  Glasgow  he  evidently  had  given  it  up.  September 
17,  at  5  A.  M.,  we  fell  in,  waded  the  river  and  set  out  on  a 
seventeen-mile  march  to  Dripping  Springs,  which  we  reached 
at  7  P.  M.,  and  went  into  camp.  It  rained  all  night  and  we 
were  without  blankets  and  got  little  sleep.  That  day  General 
Wilder,  after  a  gallant  defense  of  Munfordville,  was  com 
pelled  to  surrender  his  entire  force  of  155  officers  and  392 12 
men  and  all  his  artillery  (ten  guns)  to  General  Bragg.  We 
had  orders  to  march  next  morning  at  daybreak  with  three 
days'  rations  in  haversacks.  We  had  no  bread  of  any  kind 
but  fortunately  had  flour  and  salt.  We  made  dough  of  the 
flour,  put  in  a  little  salt  and  baked  it  in  hot  ashes,  and  thus 
prepared  our  three  days'  rations.  We  did  not  march  until 
1  P.  M.  After  a  march  of  about  twelve  miles  we  encamped 
for  the  night  in  the  rear  of  our  old  camp  near  Prewitt's  Knob. 
September  19,  we  remained  in  camp  near  Prewitt's  Knob. 
The  officers  and  men  who  had  been  captured  at  Munfordville 
passed  our  camp.  They  had  been  paroled  and  the  officers  had 
been  permitted  to  keep  their  swords  and  the  men  their 
blankets.  There  was  some  firing  in  front.  The  Fourth  Ohio 
Cavalry  were  encamped  near  us.  They  reported  that  on  the 
day  before  they  had  taken  600  prisoners  and  some  wagons 
at  Glasgow,  and  that  the  prisoners  said  they  had  been  living 
on  pumpkins.3  We  cleaned  our  guns  and  were  supplied  with 
a  fresh  stock  of  ammunition.  September  20,  we  were  still 
in  camp  near  Prewitt's  Knob.  General  Thomas'  division 
passed  us,  and  the  cavalry  broke  camp  and  moved  on.  The 

1  Mumaugh's  Diary.  3     Mumaugh's  Diary. 

2  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  1-967. 


200  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

men  put  in  most  of  the  afternoon  baking  ash  cakes,  our  only 
bread.  Orders  came  to  be  ready  to  march  at  daylight  next 
morning.  There  was  a  report  that  the  enemy  was  leaving, 
which  was  perhaps  true,  as  on  the  19th  General  Bragg  had 
issued  orders  to  concentrate  his  army  at  Bardstown.1 

On  the  20th  General  Halleck  sent  a  dispatch  to  General 
Buel  saying,  among  other  things,  that  he  feared  he,  Buell, 
would  permit  the  junction  of  Generals  Bragg  and  Smith,  and 
added,  "The  immobility  of  your  army  is  most  surprising. 
Bragg  in  the  last  two  months  has  marched  four  times  the  dis 
tance  you  have."- 

September  21,  there  were  rumors  that  Bragg  had  left 
Munfordville  and  was  moving  on  Louisville,  and  General 
Buell  sent  a  messenger  to  General  Nelson,  who  was  in  com 
mand  at  that  place,  to  apprise  him  of  the  movement. 

Although  under  orders  to  march  at  daylight,  we  did  not 
get  started  until  4  P.  M.,  and  then  fooled  along,  halting  every 
few  minutes,  and  did  not  reach  Cave  City  until  dark.  We 
kept  on  in  the  same  slow  pace,  many  of  the  men  dropping 
asleep  and  falling  out,  and  after  a  march  of  thirteen  miles,  at 
3  A.  M.,  we  reached  Rowlett's  Station  and  dropped  down  for 
a  little  sleep,  with  warning  to  be  ready  to  march  at  6  A.  M. 

September  22,  we  were  aroused  at  6  A.  M.  It  was 
reported  that  the  enemy  was  moving  on  Louisville  and  that 
General  Wood  had  had  a  fight  with  them.  Rations  of  fresh 
beef  were  issued,  but  before  it  could  be  cooked  the  assembly 
sounded  and  we  had  to  leave  it.  We  moved  out  at  11  A.  M. 
Near  Rowlett's  Station  we  saw  dead  horses  and  other  signs 
of  the  fighting  at  Munfordville  on  the  14th  and  17th.  We 
also  saw  wounded  men,  both  Union  and  Confederate.  We 
forded  Green  River  and  saw  that  the  railroad  bridge  had  been 
partly  burned.  Water  was  scarce  and  we  filled  our  canteens 
from  ponds  covered  with  green  scum  and  containing  dead 
animals.  We  pushed  on  to  Bacon  Creek,  thirteen  miles,  and 
went  into  camp  for  the  night.  September  23,  General  Buell 
ordered  General  McCook  to  march  to  the  mouth  of  Salt  River 
and  cross  next  day.  General  McCook  said  he  would  be  at 
mouth  of  Salt  River  "tonight,"  but  must  march  so  as  not  to 
leave  his  men  on  the  road.3  We  marched  at  6  a.  m.  It  was 
reported  that  Bragg's  army  consisted  of  forty-two  regiments, 
30,000  men,  which  was  nearly  accurate.4  We  struck  out  at 
a  swinging  pace  which  we  maintained  all  day.  About  noon 
we  came  to  Camp  Nevin  where  we  took  a  good  rest  and 

1  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-849.  3     W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-536. 

2  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-530.  4     W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-784. 


RETREAT  TO  LOUISVILLE  AND  PEURYVILLE  CAMPAIGN  201 

made  coffee.  We  saw  some  dead  Confederate  soldiers,  said 
to  have  been  killed  by  our  advance,  and  heard  that  the  enemy 
had  here  turned  to  the  right  to  join  Kirby  Smith's  forces. 
About  1  P.  M.  we  swung  into  the  road  again  and  marched 
on  until  8  P.  M.,  and  went  into  camp  about  one  mile  from 
Elizabethtown.  Our  day's  march  had  been  twenty-three 
miles.  Orders  came  to  be  ready  to  march  at  5  o'clock  next 
morning.  September  24,  reveille  sounded  at  3  A.  M.,  and  at 
5  A.  M.  we  resumed  our  march.  We  passed  through  Eliza 
bethtown  and  about  twelve  miles  beyond  it  halted  for  dinner. 
After  dinner  we  pushed  on  at  a  rapid  pace  and  at  7  p.  m. 
came  to  West  Point  on  the  Ohio  River,  at  the  mouth  of  Salt 
River,  and  bivouaced  for  the  night.  Our  day's  march  had  been 
twenty-five  miles.  The  night  was  cold ;  we  were  without 
tents  or  blankets,  but  all  were  so  tired  that  they  slept,  cold  as 
it  was.  The  morning  of  September  25,  when  we  awoke,  we 
looked  out  on  the  Ohio  River  and  saw  that  it  was  so  low  it 
was  only  navigable  for  small  boats.  No  orders  came  to  march 
and  the  men  set  about  baking  ash  cakes.  At  9  o'clock  orders 
came  to  fall  in  and  resume  our  march.  We  crossed  Salt  River 
at  its  mouth  on  a  pontoon  bridge,  followed  the  Ohio  for  three 
or  four  miles,  and  then  left  it  for  the  open  country.  After  a 
march  of  fifteen  miles,  we  again  turned  towards  the  Ohio 
and  at  6  P.  M.  went  into  camp  on  its  banks.  September  26, 
at  8:30  A.  M.,  we  moved  on  to  Louisville,  distant  about  eight 
miles.  Up  to  this  time  we  had  given  little  thought  to  our 
personal  appearance.  WTe  had  marched  over  400  miles  since 
leaving  Battle  Creek.  We  were  footsore  and  our  shoulders 
had  become  calloused  from  carrying  our  heavy  guns,  like  our 
feet  used  to  be  after  running  barefoot  in  the  summer.  Our 
clothing  was  in  rags ;  of  our  shoes  little  remained  except  the 
soles,  and  we  were  covered  with  dust.  But  we  soon  forgot  all 
about  our  ragged  uniforms  in  the  almost  frantic  demonstra 
tions  of  welcome  which  greeted  us  from  housetops,  windows 
and  sidewalks,  as  we  marched  through  the  principal  streets 
of  the  city.  Never  in  all  our  experience  had  we  received  such 
an  ovation.  As  we  marched  square  after  square  amid 
enthusiastic  cheering  and  waving  of  flags  and  handkerchiefs 
from  housetops  and  windows,  we  began  to  feel  proud  of  our 
ragged  blouses  and  shirts  and  worn  shoes,  and  a  contempt 
for  the  soldiers  in  new  uniforms  and  white  collars  which  we  saw 
in  great  numbers  along  the  sidewalks.  And  how  proudly  and 
splendidly  we  marched.  Our  lines  were  true,  we  kept  perfect 
step  and  proper  distances  and  moved  like  an  army  of  veterans. 
After  marching  through  the  principal  streets  we  moved  out  to 


202  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

one  of  the  suburbs  and  went  into  camp  on  the  Ohio  River. 
The  arrival  of  Buell's  army  was  an  event  of  tremendous  mo 
ment  to  the  citizens  of  Louisville,  for  that  night  they  went 
to  sleep  feeling  that  the  safety  of  their  city  was  assured.  From 
September  27  to  30,  inclusive,  we  rested  quietly  in  camp.  We 
were  fitted  out  with  brand  new  uniforms,  underclothing  and 
shoes,  and  felt  the  joy  of  again  being  clean.  The  paymaster 
came  and  paid  us  off  and  we  had  some  spending  money. 
A  On  the  29th,  we  were  startled  by  the  report  that  General 
Nelson  had  been  shot  at  the  Gait  House  by  General  Jeff  C. 
Davis.  Some  of  us  went  into  the  city  and  through  an  excited 
crowd  at  that  hotel  where  we  learned  that  the  report  was  true  and 
that  General  Nelson  was  dead.  The  circumstances  of  the  tragedy 
were  reported  by  General  Buell  to  General  Halleck  October 
3,  as  follows:  "Brigadier  Davis  is  under  arrest  at  Louisville 
for  the  killing  of  General  Nelson.  His  trial  by  a  court  martial 
or  military  commission  should  take  place  immediately,  but  I 
can't  spare  officers  from  the  army  now  in  motion  to  compose 
a  court.  It  can,  perhaps,  better  be  done  from  Washington. 
The  circumstances  are,  that  on  a  previous  occasion,  Nelson  cen 
sured  Davis  for  what  he  considered  neglect  of  duty  and  ordered 
him  to  report  to  General  Wright  at  Cincinnati,  Ohio.  Davis 
said  with  reference  to  that  matter  that  if  he  could  not  get  satis 
faction  or  justice  he  would  take  the  law  into  his  own  hands.  On 
the  occasion  of  the  killing  he  approached  Nelson  in  a  large  com 
pany  and  introduced  the  subject.  Harsh  or  violent  words  en 
sued  and  Nelson  slapped  Davis  in  the  face  and  walked  off.  Davis 
followed  him,  having  procured  a  pistol  from  some  one  in  the 
party,  and  met  Nelson  in  the  hall  of  the  hotel.  Davis  fired.  The 
ball  entered  the  right  breast,  inflicting  a  mortal  wound  and  caus 
ing  death  in  a  few  minutes."1 

General  Nelson  had  been  in  command  of  all  the  troops  at 
Louisville  previous  to  General  Buell's  arrival  and  had  the  confi 
dence  of  the  Union  people  of  Kentucky.  A  general  order  an 
nouncing  his  death  paid  deserved  tribute  to  his  fine  qualities  as 
a  soldier.2  He  was  a  man  of  violent  temper  and  sometimes  in 
tolerant  and  abusive  in  speech,  as  was  shown  in  his  altercation 
with  Colonel  Dickey  at  Corinth.  General  Davis  was  acquitted 
of  blame  for  shooting  General  Nelson,  and  afterwards  rendered 
distinguished  service  to  his  country  in  high  command. 

Before  the  arrival  of  General  Buell  at  Louisville,  on  Sep 
tember  23,  by  direction  of  the  President,  the  Department  of  the 
Tennessee  was  created,  consisting  of  the  state  of  Tennessee  east 

1  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-566 

2  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-558 


RETISEAT  TO  LOUISVILLE  AXD  PERKYVILLE  CAMPAIGX  203 

of  the  Tennessee  River  and  such  parts  of  Northern  Alabama  and 
Georgia  as  might  be  taken  possession  of  by  our  troops,  and 
General  Thomas  was  placed  in  command,  with  directions  to  find 
the  enemy  and  give  him  battle.  At  the  same  time  an  order  was 
issued  relieving  General  Buell  and  directing  him  to  turn  over  the 
command  to  General  Thomas.  These  orders  were  placed  in  the 
hands  of  Colonel  J.  C.  McKibben,  Aide  de  Camp,  with  directions 
to  find  General  Buell,  and  if  he  was  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy 
preparing  to  fight  a  battle,  or  had  gained  a  victory,  or  if  General 
Thomas  was  separated  from  General  Buell  so  that  he  could  not 
take  command  of  the  troops,  the  orders  were  not  to  be  delivered.1 
September  27,  General  Halleck  telegraphed  to  Colonel  McKibben 
who  was  then  supposed  to  be  at  Cincinnati,  not  to  deliver  the  dis 
patches  until  further  orders,2  and  the  same  day  informed  Gen 
eral  Buell  that  by  virtue  of  his  rank  he  would  exercise  command 
of  the  troops  in  Louisville  until  further  orders,  with  a  caution 
that  there  should  be  as  little  delay  as  possible  in  advancing  upon 
the  enemy.2  September  29,  General  Halleck  again  telegraphed 
to  Colonel  McKibben  at  Louisville  to  await  orders  before  acting, 
but  the  latter  did  not  receive  the  dispatches,  and  at  12:45  p.  m. 
that  clay,  delivered  the  orders  and  so  informed  General  Halleck, 
stating  that  it  was  fortunate  that  he  had  obeyed  instructions,  as 
there  was  much  dissatisfaction  with  General  Buell.3  General 
Buell  at  once  turned  over  the  command  to  General  Thomas. 
That  officer,  however,  shrank  from  the  responsibility  and  asked 
that  General  Buell  be  retained  in  command.  General  Halleck  at 
once  denied  responsibility  for  the  orders,  they  were  suspended 
by  order  of  the  President,4  and  September  30,  General  Buell  re 
sumed  command.5  It  was  afterwards  known  that  Secretary 
Stanton  was  responsible  for  the  attempted  removal  of  General 
Buell.6  In  the  light  of  subsequent  events  it  probably  would  have 
been  fortunate  for  the  country  if  the  great  war  secretary  had 
had  his  way. 

These  events  doubtless  had  the  effect  to  stir  Gen 
eral  Buell  to  unusual  activity.  He  now  had  under  his  command 
an  army  of  probably  90,000  men  and  proceeded  to  organize  it 
into  three  corps,  commanded  respectively  by  Generals  McCook, 
Crittenden  and  C.  C.  Gilbert,  twelve  divisions  commanded  re 
spectively  by  Generals  Schoepf,  Sill,  Rousseau,  William  S. 
Smith,  Van  Cleve,  Thomas  J.  Wood,  Negley,  Robert  B.  Mitchell, 
James  S.  Jackson,  Sheridan,  Dumont  and  John  M.  Palmer,  and 
a  division  of  cavalry  commanded  by  Colonel  John  Kennett.  His 
artillery,  consisting  of  thirty-six  batteries,  was  distributed  among 

1  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-538-539  4     W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-554-555 

2  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-549.  5     W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-559 

3  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-554  6     W.  R  .R.  16,  part  2-652 


204  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AMJ  CAMPAIGNS 

the  several  brigades  and  divisions.1  General  Thomas  was  named 
second  in  command.2  Our  division,  then  commanded  by  General 
Sill,  was  assigned  to  McCook's  corps.  October  1,  General  Buell 
issued  tentative  orders  to  continue  the  march  toward  the  enemy.8 
He  was  probably  further  quickened  in  his  movement  by  a  dis 
patch  from  General  Halleck  dated  October  2  in  which  that  of 
ficer  stated  there  was  much  apprehension  in  Washington  that 
unless  he,  Buell,  moved  immediately,  the  enemy  would  send  a 
portion  of  his  forces  against  Cincinnati,  which  was  not  in  posi 
tion  to  resist  a  serious  attack,  and  urging  him  to  prompt  action.4 

September  30,  our  entire  brigade  was  called  out  at  3  a.  m., 
marched  through  Louisville  and  then  returned  to  camp.  The 
cause  of  the  march  was  not  known,  but  it  probably  was  an  idea  of 
General  Willich's  to  give  us  a  little  exercise  before  beginning  the 
campaign.  October  1,  at  7  a.  in.,  our  division  moved  out  in  the 
direction  of  Lexington,  passing  through  Middletown.  The  men 
were  in  good  spirits,  the  road  was  good,  and  although  the  enemy 
was  reported  to  be  not  very  far  in  our  front,  there  seemed  to  be 
no  haste.  After  a  pleasant  march  of  about  fifteen  miles,  at  7 
p.  m.,  we  halted  for  the  night  near  Carter's  Creek.  Cannonading 
was  heard  some  distance  in  front.  Colonel  Dickey  who  had 
tendered  his  resignation  at  Battle  Creek  and  gone  home,  was 
back  in  command  of  the  regiment.  October  2,  we  resumed  our 
march  at  S  a.  m.  We  crossed  Carter's  Creek  and  passed  through 
a  number  of  small  villages  along  the  route.  After  marching 
about  seventeen  miles  we  came  to  Shelbyville-y  The  enemy  had 
been  there  the  night  before  and  their  camp  fires  were  still  burning. 
On  arriving  near  the  town  our  regiment  was  ordered  out  on  a 
reconnoissance  and  then  on  picket  duty.5  There  was  rain  during 
the  night.  The  diarists  speak  of  the  enthusiastic  Union  senti 
ment  of  the  people  of  Shelby ville,  and  note  that  they  were  lavish 
in  their  attentions  to  our  troops.  October  3,  there  was  firing 
heard  in  our  front  and  the  picket  line  was  advanced  about  500 
yards.  At  5  p.  m.,  we  were  relieved  and  went  into  camp  on  a 
dirt  road  leading  to  Frankfort.0  October  4,  there  were  no  orders 
to  move  and  we  rested  quietly  in  camp.  Our  teams  went  back  to 
Louisville  for  rations.  October  5,  there  were  still  no  orders  to 
move.  It  was  Sunday  and  one  of  the  clergymen  of  Shelbyville 
held  religious  services  in  our  camp, — the  first  for  a  year, — Mu- 
maugh  says  in  his  diary.  We  also  had  regular  inspection  and 
afterwards  went  out  on  picket,  at  the  same  place  as  before.  Oc 
tober  6,  we  had  reveille  at  3  :30  a.  m.,  and  at  6  a.  m.,  started  on  a 

1  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-591-596  and  562  4     W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-564 

2  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-560  5     McConnell's  and  Mumaugh's  Diaries 

3  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-560  6     Mumaugh's  Diary. 


RETREAT  TO  LOUISVILLE  AND  PERRYVILLE  CAMPAIGN  205 

rapid  march  for  Frankfort,  distant  21  miles.  The  country 
through  which  we  marched  was  most  interesting  and  the  views 
along  the  Kentucky  River  were  exceedingly  fine.  At  Hardins- 
ville,  fourteen  miles  out,  we  halted  for  a  short  rest  and  then 
pushed  on  through  Claysville,  Bridgeport  and  other  villages  and 
in  the  evening  went  into  camp  on  the  pike  one  mile  west  of 
Frankfort.  It  was  said  that  our  advance  had  driven  the  enemy 
out  of  the  place.  October  7,  we  remained  at  Frankfort  all  day. 
Our  camp  was  moved  down  closer  to  the  river  where  the  men 
could  bathe  and  wash  their  clothing.  On  October  2  General 
Bragg  had  reported  to  General  Polk,  who  was  at  Bardstown,  that 
he  expected  to  be  in  Frankfort  on  the  3rd  with  all  his  force,  and 
directed  Polk  to  attack  the  enemy  in  flank,1  but  that  officer  re 
ported  that  the  rapid  advance  of  our  forces  made  such  an  attack 
impracticable.2  A  good  part  of  General  Kirby  Smith's  forces 
were  then  in  Frankfort  and  it  was  General  Bragg's  intention  to 
concentrate  his  whole  army  there.  General  Folk's  neglect  to 
move  as  ordered  made  such  concentration  impossible,  and  neces 
sitated  an  entire  change  in  General  Bragg's  plans.3  General 
Bragg  was  in  Frankfort  October  4,  had  the  Confederate  flag 
hoisted  over  the  capitol  and  went  through  the  form  of  installing 
a  provisional  governor  of  Kentucky.4  On  the  same  day  he  gave 
orders  for  concentration  at  Harrodsburg  for  the  purpose  of  giv 
ing  battle.5  The  movements  of  General  Buell's  forces  had  com 
pelled  the  concentration  of  General  Bragg's  forces  at  Perryville 
instead  of  Harrodsburg,  and  October  7,  General  Buell  reported 
to  General  Thomas  the  near  approach  of  his  own  forces  to  that 
place  and  that  he  expected  to  attack  and  carry  the  place  next 
day.  At  the  same  time  he  directed  General  Thomas  to  march  at 
3  o'clock  next  morning,  gave  directions  about  placing  the  troops, 
and  ordered  him,  when  the  column  was  in  position,  to  report  in 
person  at  his,  Buell's  headquarters,  when  further  instructions 
wuold  be  given.6  Probably  in  pursuance  of  this  order  and  with 
the  purpose  of  having  our  division  join  in  the  attack  on  the 
enemy  at  Perryville,  we  were  aroused  at  midnight,  October  7, 
and  at  1  a.  m.,  October  8,  took  up  our  march  for  the  place.  We 
marched  around  through  the  city  and  started  south  on  the  west 
side  of  the  river.  We  passed  through  the  village  of  Rough  and 
Ready  and  on  to  Lawrenceburg.  At  that  place  a  force  of  the 
enemy  caused  us  to  halt,  while  a  detachment  of  the  9th  Kentucky 
Cavalry  under  Colonel  Jacobs  was  sent  forward  to  reconnoiter. 
As  the  detachment  was  emerging  from  a  cut  in  the  road,  it  was 
charged  by  a  force  of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  thrown  into  confusion, 

1  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-896-897.  4     W.  R.  R.  10,  part  1-1091. 

2  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-901.  5     W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-905-906. 

3  W.  R:  R.  16,  part  1-1091.  6     W.  R.  R  16,  part  2-580-581. 


206  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

and  a  general  hand  to  hand  conflict  took  place.  The  15th  Ohio 
was  ordered  forward  at  a  double  quick  and  formed  along  a  fence 
overlooking  the  field  where  the  fight  was  going  on.  Both  sides 
were  using  the  saber  and  the  movements  were  so  rapid  and  in 
volved,  that  we  could  not  fire  without  danger  of  hitting  our  own 
men.  Finally,  we  saw  a  Confederate  soldier  with  a  double  bar 
relled  shot  gun  pursuing  Colonel  Jacobs,  who  was  wounded, 
calling  out  to  him  /'Surrender  G — d  d — n  you!",  and  heard  the 
Colonel  say,  <4G — d  d — n  you,  I  won't  surrender."  The  two 
came  on  toward  our  line,  when  suddenly  more  than  a  dozen  men 
in  our  ranks  fired  and  brought  down  Colonel  Jacob's  pursuer. 
The  horse  and  rider,  both  mortally  wounded,  came  on  towards 
our  line  and  fell  dead  a  few  paces  from  it.  The  man's  shot  gun 
was  picked  up  as  a  trophy  by  Morris  Cope  of  Company  E.  The 
aggressive  fighting  of  the  9th  Kentucky  Cavalry  soon  drove  the 
enemy  back  and  they  beat  a  hasty  retreat,  leaving  their  dead  and 
some  of  their  wounded  in  our  hands.  Cotter's  battery  of  our 
division  threw  a  few  shells  after  the  retreating  enemy  and  hast 
ened  their  flight.  After  this  little  engagement,  we  marched  west 
on  a  new  road  about  eight  miles  where  we  bivouaced  for  the  night 
among  the  hills,  near  a  place  called  Dog  Walk.1  Our  day's 
march,  according  to  Mumaugh  was  25  miles,  according  to  Mc- 
Connell  27  miles. 

While  we  were  making  this  day's  march  the  battle  of  Perry- 
ville  was  fought  by  Rousseau's  and  Jackson's  divisions  of  Mc- 
Cook's  corps  and  Sheridan's  and  Mitchell's  divisions  of  Gilbert's 
Corps,  while  the  other  troops  of  Buell's  army,  in  supporting  dis 
tance,  lay  idly  by,  not  daring  to  move  because  it  would  interfere 
with  Buell's  plans.  As  our  regiment  was  not  engaged  in  the  battle 
no  detailed  account  of  it  will  be  given.  Suffice  it  to  say  for  the 
present,  that  about  2:30  p.  m.,  the  left  of  Buell's  army  at  Perry- 
ville, — two  divisions  of  McCook's  corps,  and  Sheridan's  division 
of  Gilbert's  corps  were  attacked  by  General  Bragg's  army.  Gen 
eral  R.  B.  Mitchell's  division  of  Gilbert's  Corps  came  to  their 
relief,  and  they  maintained  an  unequal  fight  against  greatly  su 
perior  numbers  until  dark,  with  a  loss  of  4231  men  killed  and 
wounded2  and  11  pieces  of  artillery,  only  two  of  which,  however, 
were  carried  off  the  field.8 

October  9,  we  had  orders  to  march  at  7  a.  m.  and  were  get 
ting  ready  to  move  when  we  heard  cannonading  behind  us.  We 
formed  line  of  battle  and  the  32d  Indiana,  1st  Ohio  and  the  15th 
and  19th  Regulars  were  sent  out  as  skirmishers  and  met  the 
enemy's  forces  coming  up  in  our  rear.  A  severe  skirmish  en- 

1  Writer's  recollection. 

2  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-1035. 

3  General  McCook's  Report,  W.  R.  R.   16,  part  1-1042. 


RETREAT  TO  LOUISVILLE  AND  PEBRYVILLE  CAMPAIGN  207 

sued  in  which  our  losses  were,  32d  Indiana,  1  killed ;  1st  Ohio,  3 
killed  and  8  wounded,  and  1  killed  in  one  of  the  Regular  Regi 
ments.  During  the  engagement  the  49th  Ohio  went  to  the  sup 
port  of  the  men  engaged.1  A  train  insufficiently  guarded  had 
gone  down  to  a  small  stream  where  there  was  sufficient  water  for 
the  animals,  and  was  captured  and  burned,  and  the  officers  and 
men  in  charge  were  taken  prisoners  and  parolled.  Among  the 
property  captured  and  destroyed  were  our  regimental  and  com 
pany  books  and  the  private  baggage  of  the  officers.  About  1 
p.  m.,  the  enemy  being  driven  off  we  took  up  our  march  towards 
Perryville,  our  brigade  acting  as  rear  guard.  After  a  march  of 
ten  miles  we  went  into  camp  on  Beaver  Creek,  near  Johnson- 
ville.-  October  10,  we  resumed  our  march  at  5  a.  m.,  and  at  noon 
halted  at  a  creek  where  we  got  dinner  and  filled  our  canteens, 
being  told  that  we  would  not  find  water  again  for  ten  miles.  Our 
advance  was  said  to  have  taken  some  horses  and  clothing  belong 
ing  to  one  of  the  Confederate  generals.  We  began  to  get  reports 
from  the  Perryville  battle  field.  It  began  to  rain,  but  we  moved 
on  and  at  4  p.  m.  made  another  halt  and  rested  for  two  hours  or 
more.  Night  came  on  and  it  was  so  dark  we  could  scarcely  see 
the  men  immediately  before  us.  At  9  p.  m.  we  stopped  for  the 
night.  Some  of  the  men  got  hay  somewhere  for  their  beds. 
October  11,  we  were  called  up  at  4  a.  m.,  got  breakfast,  cleaned 
our  guns,  dried  our  blankets  and  were  ordered  to  be  ready  to 
move  at  any  moment.  At  9  a.  m.  the  bugles  sounded  and  we  re 
sumed  our  march.  We  marched  to  Willisburg,  where  we  took 
the  pike  and  marched  southeast  to  Maxville.  There  we  began 
to  meet  men  who  were  wounded  at  Perryville  and  to  hear  the 
fate  of  friends  and  relatives  in  the  regiments  engaged.  We  moved 
thence  on  towards  Perryville  and  at  dark  went  into  camp  in  a 
field  where  the  battle  had  raged  three  days  before.  Strange  to 
say,  some  of  the  dead  were  still  unburied.  One  who  had  a 
brother  in  the  98th  Ohio3  who  was  reported  killed  in  the  battle, 
wandered  about  in  the  dark  with  the  vain  hope  of  finding  his 
body.  That  night  General  McCook  came  to  our  camp  and  was 
greeted  with  wild  cheering.  We  had  been  separated  from  him 
since  leaving  Louisville.  He  said  that  if  he  had  had  us,  his  old 
division,  with  him  in  the  battle,  "we  would  have  cleaned  them 
out."4  He  said  he  would  lead  us  ahead  next  morning,  Major 
Cotter,  his  chief  of  artillery,  who  had  been  captured  and  parolled, 
was  with  him.  Our  days  march  had  been  fifteen  miles.  October 
12,  we  marched  at  5  a.  m.  We  soon  began  to  see  dead  men  and 
horses  and  other  evidences  of  the  battle,  but  Mumaugh  says  "it 

1  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  1-1134-1135.  3     The  Writer. 

2  Mumaugh's  Diary.  4     Mumaugh's  Diary. 


208  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

was  not  a  patching  to  what  we  had  seen  at  Shiloh."  We  marched 
on  to  Perryville  where  we  saw  a  great  many  wounded  and  pa- 
rolled  men  and  prisoners  coming  in.  We  rested  for  two  hours 
and  then  marched  on  to  near  Harrodsburg  where  we  bivouaced 
for  the  night.  Our  day's  march  had  been  about  11  miles.  Gen 
eral  Rousseau  rode  through  our  camp  and  the  cheers  that  greeted 
him  were  hardly  less  loud  and  enthusiastic  than  those  we  had 
given  General  McCook.  He  said  we  would  go  after  the  enemy 
again  tomorrow.  October  13,  at  5:30  a.  m.  we  resumed  our 
slow  march  in  pursuit  of  Bragg's  army  which  was  now  said  to 
be  in  full  retreat.  We  marched  about  seven  miles,  passing  around 
but  in  sight  of  Harrodsburg,  and  through  the  village  of  Brad- 
fordsville,  which  had  been  burned.  We  finally  came  to  a  fine 
spring  about  four  miles  from  Danville  and  went  into  camp  with 
no  orders  for  a  further  advance.  The  enemy  was  said  to  be  at 
Camp  Dick  Robinson.  October  14,  the  division  marched  at  9 
a.  m.,  but  our  regiment  was  detached  to  guard  the  division  trains 
and  did  not  move  until  5  p.  m.  We  marched  through  Danville 
and  three  miles  beyond,  where,  at  midnight  the  trains  halted  and 
we  dropped  down  for  a  little  sleep.  The  night  was  cold  with  a 
heavy  frost  and  the  men  suffered  from  cold  and  lack  of  shelter. 
October  15,  at  6  a.  m.,  we  were  relieved  from  duty  as  train  guard 
and  marched  to  rejoin  our  brigade  and  division.  The  whole  of 
McCook's  corps  was  said  to  be  present  and  we  were  pressing  for 
ward  in  the  hope  of  overtaking  the  retreating  enemy  and  bringing 
him  to  bay.  There  was  heavy  cannonading  in  our  front  and, 
formerly,  our  blood  would  have  been  stirred  with  the  prospect 
of  a  battle.  But  we  had  been  so  long  accustomed  to  being  led 
away  from  or  around  the  enemy,  that  it  caused  little  interest. 
We  marched  through  Stanford  and  on  to  Crab  Orchard,  a  dis 
tance  of  twenty  miles,  and  went  into  camp  in  sight  of  the  Cum 
berland  mountains.  Here  our  part  in  the  pursuit  of  Bragg's 
army  ended. 

On  October  16,  General  Buell  reported  to  General  Halleck 
that  he  thought  it  useless  and  inexpedient  to  continue  the  pursuit 
of  Bragg's  army  and  proposed  to  move  with  his  main  force  rap 
idly  back  to  Nashville.2 

General  Halleck  strongly  objected  to  General  Buell's  pro 
posed  movement  and  October  18,  telegraphed  him  saying  that  the 
main  object  of  the  campaign  was  to  drive  the  enemy  from  Ken 
tucky  and  Tennessee,  and  that  if  it  could  not  be  done  then  we 
need  never  hope  for  it.  General  Halleck  urged  that  by  keeping 
between  Bragg  and  Nashville,  Buell  could  cover  that  place  and  at 

1  MumaiiKh's  Diary. 

2  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-619. 


RETREAT  TO  LOUISVILLE  AND  PERKY VILLE  CAMPAIGN  209 

the  same  time  compel  Bragg  to  fall  back  into  the  valley  of  Vir 
ginia  or  into  Georgia.  That  by  the  occupation  of  Knoxville  or 
Chattanooga  the  enemy  could  be  kept  out  of  Tennessee  and  Ken 
tucky,  and  that  to  fall  back  on  Nashville  would  be  to  give  up  East 
Tennesssee  to  be  plundered.  General  Halleck  also  pointed  out 
that  Buell  was  nearer  to  Knoxville  than  Nashville  and  as  near 
to  Chattanooga,  and  suggested  that  if  he  went  to  Nashville  the 
enemy  might  make  another  raid  into  Kentucky.1  October  li), 
General  Halleck  again  telegraphed  General  Buell,  saying  that 
President  Lincoln  concurred  in  his  views,  and  that  he  was  di 
rected  by  the  President  to  say  that  his,  Buell's  army  "must  enter 
Tennessee  this  fall  and  that  it  ought  to  move  there  while  the 
roads  are  passable"  and  that  the  President  "does  not  understand 
why  we  cannot  march  as  the  enemy  marches,  live  as  he  lives  and 
fight  as  he  fights,  unless  we  admit  the  inferiority  of  our  troops 
and  of  our  generals."2 

General  Buell  answered  General  Halleck's  dispatch  of  the 
18th  On  the  20th,  opposing  the  movement  into  East  Tennessee 
and  representing  that  it  would  take  an  available  force  of  80,000 
men  to  take  and  hold  it,  and  made  other  objections/5  These  ob 
jections  seem  to  have  made  no  impression  on  the  authorities  at 
Washington,  for  at  12  :20  p.  m.  of  that  day,  General  Halleck  is 
sued  a  positive  order  to  General  Buell  to  proceed  and  occupy 
East  Tennessee  with  all  possible  dispatch.4  The  authorities  at 
Washington  by  this  time  had  become  thoroughly  dissatisfied 
with  General  Buell  and  had  decided  on  his  removal.  October 
23,  General  Rosecrans,  who  was  at  Corinth,  was  ordered  by  tele 
graph  to  report  at  once  at  Cincinnati,5  and  October  24,  orders 
were  issued  relieving  General  Buell  and  placing  General  Rose 
crans  in  command  of  the  army.6  General  Rosecrans  was  not 
able  to  assume  the  command  until  October  30, 7  and  by  this  time 
the  situation  had  materially  changed.  General  Bragg  had  got  into 
Middle  Tennessee  and  October  31,  General  McCook  telegraphed 
from  Green  River,  that  he  was  attempting  by  forced  marches  to 
reach  Nashville  ahead  of  our  forces. s  The  orders  sending  us 
back  to  Nashville  were  therefore  not  changed. 

1  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-623.  5  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-639. 

2  W.  R.  R.   16,  part  2-626-627.  6  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-640-641-642. 

3  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-636-637.  7  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-654. 

4  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-638.  8  W.  R.  R.  16,  part  2-658. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

THE  MARCH  BACK  TO  NASHVILLE  AND  PREPARATION  FOR  THE 
MURFREESBORO  CAMPAIGN. 

Our  pursuit  of  Bragg's  army  came  to  an  end  October  15, 
1862,  after  a  march  of  twenty  miles  to  Crab  Orchard  in  plain 
view  of  the  mountains.  We  encamped  at  9  o'clock  p.  m.,  three 
miles  east  of  that  place.  Here  we  remained  until  the  20th,  and 
then  started  back  over  the  route  we  came.  We  did  not  know 
then  what  a  failure  our  toilsome  summer's  campaign  had  been. 
We  heard,  on  the  march  from  Nashville  north,  that  we  had 
lost  opportunities  to  inflict  damaging  blows  on  the  enemy  at 
Munfordville  and  Glasgow,  and  that  with  more  prompt  move 
ments  we  might  have  prevented  the  capture  of  the  former 
place  and  General  Wilders'  force  of  nearly  5000  men.  We  also 
heard  rumors  that  McCook,  Rousseau  and  Sheridan  had 
fought  Bragg's  entire  army  at  Perryville,  while  Union  troops, 
equal  in  numbers  to  those  engaged,  lay  within  supporting  dis 
tance  and  were  not  permitted  to  help  them,  and  that  if  Mc 
Cook  and  Rousseau  had  had  proper  support  from  these  unen 
gaged  troops,  Bragg's  army  would  have  been  destroyed.  But 
this  was  only  talk  while  we  marched  or  lay  in  camp  or  bivouac. 
We  did  not  know  the  real  facts  then,  and  perhaps  it  was  better 
that  we  did  not  know  them.  It  was  after  the  war  ended  that 
the  facts  were  made  known  to  the  public.  We  afterwards 
heard  that  these  rumors  and  complaints  had  reached  the  ears 
of  General  Buell  and  that  he  had  demanded  a  court  of  in 
quiry  as  to  his  conduct  of  the  campaign  and  that  the  court  had 
vindicated  him.  It  is  now  known  that  on  November  4,  1862, 
the  Secretary  of  War  directed  Halleck  to  organize  "a  military 
commission  to  inquire  into  and  report  upon  the  operations  of 
the  forces  under  command  of  Major  General  Buell  in  the  states 
of  Tennessee  and  Kentucky,  and  particularly  in  reference  to 
General  Buell  suffering  the  state  of  Kentucky  to  be  invaded 
by  the  rebel  forces  under  General  Bragg,  and  in  his  failure  to 
relieve  Munfordville  and  suffering  it  to  be  captured ;  also  in 
reference  to  the  battle  of  Perryville  and  General  Buell's  con 
duct  during  that  battle,  and  afterwards  suffering  the  rebel 
forces  to  escape  from  Kentucky  without  loss  or  capture." 

Such  a  commission  was  afterwards,  November  20,  1862, 
appointed,  composed  of  the  following  officers :  Major  General 
Lewis  Wallace,  Major  General  E.  O.  C.  Ord,  Brigadier  Gen 
eral  Albin  Schoepf,  Brigadier  General  N.  J.  T.  Dana,  Briga- 


THE  MARCH  BACK  TO  NASHVILLE  211 

(Her  General  Daniel  Tyler,  with  Major  Donn  Piatt  as  Judge 
Advocate  and  Recorder. 

The  commission  met  in  Cincinnati,  Ohio,  took  the  testi 
mony  of  a  large  number  of  witnesses  and  made  its  report, 
which  was  submitted  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  April  15,  1863, 
and  in  some  unaccountable  manner  was  lost.1  On  March  1T 
1872,  nearly  ten  years  later,  the  House  of  Representatives 
passed  a  resolution  calling  for  a  copy  of  the  proceedings  of  the 
commission,  and  the  Secretary  of  War  reported  "that  a  careful 
and  exhaustive  search  among  all  the  records  and  files  in  this 
department  fails  to  discover  what  disposition  was  made  of  the 
proceedings  of  the  commission  and  the  papers  annexed  there 
to,  and  that  no  record  indicative  of  the  nature  of  the  report  of 
the  board  or  the  conclusions  reached  by  it  can  be  found,  other 
than  what  is  contained  in  the  accompanying  papers."  The  ac 
companying  papers  were  a  copy  of  the  original  opinion  of  the 
commission,  copy  of  a  communication  from  General  Buell  of 
date,  April  10,  1864,  commenting  on  the  report  of  the  board; 
copy  of  an  unsigned  communication  reviewing  the  proceedings 
of  the  commission  which  was  referred  to  the  Secretary  of 
War  by  the  Judge  Advocate  General,  at  the  request  of  Lieu 
tenant  Colonel  Donn  Piatt,  May  23,  1863;  copy  of  a  communi 
cation  submitted  by  General  Buell  to  the  commission  May  2, 
1863;  copy  of  a  communication  from  General  Buell,  April  11, 
1864,  submitting  statement  prepared  by  him  reviewing  the  evi 
dence  taken  before  the  commission  ;  and  a  copy  of  General  Or 
ders  No.  29a,  Headquarters  Army  of  the  Ohio  of  July  11,  1862. 

On  June  5,  1872,  Congress  passed  an  act  to  provide  for  the 
restoration  of  the  records  of  the  proceedings  of  the  court  of  in 
quiry  concerning  the  operations  of  the  army  under  "the  com 
mand  of  General  Buell  in  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  directing 
that  whereas  there  was  a  full  and  complete  report  of  the  pro 
ceedings  of  said  court  of  inquiry  then  in  the  possession  of  Ben 
Pittman,  the  stenographic  reporter  of  said  court,  that  the 
Secretary  of  WTar  be  directed  to  employ  said  Ben  Pittman  to 
make  a  full  and  correct  transcript  of  the  notes  taken  by  him 
during  the  sessions  of  said  court  of  inquiry  and  that  the  same 
be  placed  on  file  in  the  WTar  Department  and  furnish  a  copy 
to  Congress." 

This  was  done  and  the  same  is  to  be  found  in  Volume 
16,  Part  1.  Series  1,  of  the  War  of  the  Rebellion  Records,  pages 
67  to  724,  inclusive. 

This  did  not  contain  the  "opinion  of  the  commission"  or 
"the  unsigned  review  of  the  proceedings''  heretofore  mentioned, 

1     W.  R.  R.,  Series  1,  Vol.  16,  part  1-8. 


212  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

which  was   evidently   prepared  by   Major   Dorm    Piatt,  Judge 
Advocate  of  the  commission. 

The  copy  of  the  opinion  of  the  court  or  commission,  states 
in  substance  that  on  the  llth  day  of  June,  1862,  General  Buell, 
who  was  then  with  his  army  at  or  near  luka,  Miss,  was  or 
dered  to  march  against  Chattanooga  and  take  it ;  that  his 
forces  were  sufficient  for  the  purpose,  and  that  he  could  have 
done  so  if  he  had  moved  promptly,  but  that  the  plan  of  opera 
tions  prescribed  by  General  Halleck,  his  superior  in  command, 
compelled  him  to  repair  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad 
from  Corinth  to  Decatur ;  that  while  the  road  thus  repaired, 
was  of  little  service,  the  work  of  repairing  it  made  a  prompt 
march  on  Chattanooga  impossible  ;  that  such  delay  gave  Bragg 
time  to  send  a  numerous  cavalry  force  to  operate  against 
Buell's  lines  of  supply,  and  that  made  it  impossible  to  concen 
trate  enough  of  the  army  of  the  Ohio  to  capture  Chattanooga  ; 
that  the  massing  of  the  rebel  forces  at  Chattanooga  compelled 
a  relinquishment  of  the  designs  on  that  place,  after  which  Gen 
eral  Buell  was  required  to  exert  all  his  energies  to  prevent  the 
recapture  of  Nashville  and  the  invasion  of  Kentucky.  The 
commsision  \vas  of  opinion  that  he  could  have  done  this  by  an 
early  concentration  of  his  army  at  Sparta,  McMinnville  or 
Murfreesboro,  that  instead  of  that,  he  waited  until  September 
5,  before  concentrating  at  Murfreesboro,  from  which  point  he 
retired  to  Nashville  and  thereby  permitted  Bragg  to  cross  the 
Cumberland  River  without  interruption.  The  commission 
could  not  justify  General  Buell's  falling  back  from  Murfrees 
boro  to  Nashville  and  expressed  the  opinion  that  it  was  his 
duty  from  that  point  to  have  attacked  the  rebel  army  before 
it  crossed  the  Cumberland  River,  and  that  if  he  had  done  so  he 
could  have  defeated  that  part  of  it  under  Bragg's  immediate 
command. 

The  commission  also  found  that  General  Buell  was  not 
responsible  for  the  capture  of  Munfordville,  except  so  far  as 
his  failure  to  attack  Bragg  south  of  the  Cumberland  River 
made  him  responsible  for  the  consequences  of  that  failure. 
The  commission's  findings  and  opinion  in  regard  to  General 
Buell's  conduct  at  the  battle  of  Perryville,  were  substantially 
that  he  intended  to  attack  Bragg  at  Perryville  on  the  ninth  of 
October.  That  on  the  morning  of  the  8th  General  Gilbert 
with  his  corps  was  in  position  in  the  center.  General  McCook 
with  his  corps,  except  General  Sill's  division,  arrived  on  the 
left  about  9  o'clock,  and  that  General  Thomas,  in  command 
of  the  right  wing  (Crittenden's  corps)  reached  his  position 
and  reported  to  General  Buell  about  noon.  That  about  2 


THE  MARCH  BACK  TO  NASHVILLE  213 

o'clock  the  enemy  poured  a  heavy  column  of  attack  on  Mc- 
Cook,  resulting  in  an  obstinate  and  bloody  contest  which 
lasted  five  hours,  and  ended  at  nightfall,  at  which  time  Mc- 
Cook's  right  had  been  turned  and  driven  back  with  serious 
loss :  that  General  Buell  had  established  his  headquarters 
about  '2l/2  miles  from  the  front  on  the  Springfield  road:  that 
he  was  not  on  the  field  or  along  the  line  during  the  day,  and 
did  not  know  of  the  attack  on  McCook  until  about  4  o'clock 
in  the  evening:  that  about  2  o'clock  a  heavy  and  furious 
cannonading  was  heard  at  his  headquarters,  and  coming  out 
of  his  tent  he  said  "there  was  a  great  waste  of  powder  over 
there"  and  directed  General  Gilbert,  who  was  with  him  at  the 
time,  to  send  an  order  to  the  front  "to  stop  that  useless  waste 
of  powder."  The  commission  therefore  thought  it  clear  that 
General  Buell  did  not  believe  a  battle  was  in  progress  and 
mildly  state  that  in  their  opinion,  "General  Buell  should  have 
been  on  the  field  ready  for  emergencies  and  advantages,  or 
have  taken  and  required  to  be  taken  every  precaution  for  the 
instant  transmission  of  intelligence  to  his  headquarters,  and 
that  as  he  had  an  organized  signal  corps  with  his  army,  this 
failure  was  all  the  more  culpable."  The  commission  in  order 
to  be  as  neutral  as  possible  say,  "General  McCook  wras  equally 
culpable  because  he  did  not  send  up  to  General  Buell  instant 
notice  of  the  attack  upon  him." 

The  commission  also  found  that  during  the  greater  part  of 
the  attack  on  McCook,  Gilbert's  corps  was  unengaged,  al 
though  his  left  was  only  300  yards  from  McCook's  right  when 
the  severest  fighting  took  place,  while  the  right  wing  under 
Thomas  had  not  so  much  as  a  demonstration  made  against  it, 
and  that  there  could  be  no  question  "that  it  was  somebody's 
duty  to  assist  McCook.  That  nothing  but  positive  orders 
fixing  and  holding  Gilbert  in  his  position,  could  justify  his 
failure  to  do  so,  and  that  there  was  no  evidence  that  he  had  re 
ceived  any  such  orders." 

The  commission  also  found  that  General  Buell's  army  was 
superior  to  the  armies  of  Bragg  and  Kirby  Smith  combined. 
They  stated  they  had  reason  to  believe  that  all  of  Bragg's 
army  at  Perryville  at  the  time  was  thrown  against  McCook, 
and  that  his  lines  of  retreat  by  way  of  Harrodsburg  and  Dan 
ville  were  so  exposed  that  after  4  o'clock  they  might  have 
been  cut  off,  if  the  troops  under  Thomas  had  been  pushed 
vigorously  forward  for  this  purpose,  and  that  in  their  judg- 
li.ent  the  opportunity  slipped  by  through  General  Buell's  ab 
sence  from  the  field,  or  on  account  of  his  ignorance  of  the  con 
dition  of  the  battle.  They  say,  "We  are  very  sure  that  if  he 


214  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

could  have  ordered  supports  to  McCook  at  an  earlier  hour 
than  he  did  order  them  the  attack  would  have  repulsed  with 
less  loss  to  himself  and  greater  to  the  enemy." 

The  commission  also  found  that  the  escape  of  Bragg's 
army  from  Kentucky  was  due  to  Buell's  delay. 

General  Halleck  received  the  report  of  the  commission, 
and  recommended  that  the  commission  be  dissolved  and  that 
its  officers,  as  well  as  General  Buell  be  ordered  on  other  duty. 

The  unsigned  paper,  a  copy  of  which  was  found  in  the 
War  Department  as  above  stated,  is  evidently  a  review  of  the 
evidence  by  the  Judge  Advocate  of  the  commission,  Major 
Donn  Piatt. 

It  is  a  mild  arraignment  of  General  Buell's  conduct 
throughout  the  entire  campaign.  General  Buell  reviewed  the 
evidence  taken  before  the  commission  and  endeavored  to  jus 
tify  himself.  All  these  papers  are  now  accessible,  and  the 
careful  reader  cannot  help  concluding  that  the  findings  of  the 
commission  were  mild  when  judged  by  the  facts  brought  out 
in  the  hearing.  It  is  well,  as  has  been  before  remarked,  that 
we  did  not  know  at  the  time  why  our  summer's  trying  cam 
paign  of  long  marches,  scant  food  and  clothing,  hardships  and 
dangers,  had  all  been  for  nought.  So  as  above  stated  we 
started  back  over  the  same  road  on  which  we  had  marched 
in  pursuit  of  Bragg's  army,  not  knowing  what  was  before  us 
in  coming  campaigns,  but  trusting  in  those  who  commanded 
us. 

"Ours  not  to  reason  why 
Ours  not  to  make  reply, 
Ours  but  to  do  or  die," 
as  those  in  authority  over  us  should  command. 

On  October  20,  we  started  at  7  o'clock  a.  m.,  marched 
about  twenty  miles  and  encamped  where  our  brigade  had  en 
camped  on  the  evening  of  October  14 — about  three  miles 
southeast  of  Danville.  We  were  told  that  our  trains  had 
started  for  Lebanon  Junction  on  the  18th,  carrying  our  tents, 
and  we  had  with  us  only  our  knapsacks,  blankets  and  cooking 
utensils.  Fortunately  the  weather  was  fine.  The  nights  were 
cool,  but  by  doubling  up  we  managed  to  sleep  comfortably 
without  shelter.  The  next  day  we  marched  through  Danville 
and  then  took  a  road  leading  west  and  encamped  near  a  large 
spring,  having  only  made  about  eleven  miles.  The  next  morn 
ing  we  started  at  6  :30  o'clock,  still  marching  west,  and  unex 
pectedly  came  into  Perryville.  We  were  told  that  by  the  road 
we  had  come  the  distance  from  Crab  Orchard  to  Perryville 
was  twenty  miles  shorter  than  by  the  road  we  had  marched 


THE  MARCH  BACK  TO  NASHVILLE  215 

over  in  pursuit  of  Bragg.  At  Perryville  we  saw  a  number  of 
dead  lying  out  by  a  hospital  and  were  told  that  many  of  the 
wounded  left  there  were  dying.  After  leaving  Perryville  we 
inarched  about  nine  miles  and  encamped  on  Rolling  Fork 
about  two  miles  from  the  road,  having  marched  during  the 
day  about  fifteen  miles.  The  night  was  very  cold  and  ice 
formed  on  the  water  where  it  was  still.  Next  morning,  Octo 
ber  23,  we  were  awakened  by  reveille  at  4:30  o'clock  and  or 
dered  to  be  ready  to  march  at  (5  o'clock.  We  started  at  7  and 
followed  Rolling  Fork  to  Bradsfordville,  where  most  of  the 
houses  had  been  burned  by  the  rebels  about  two  weeks  before. 
On  the  march  we  passed  General  Gilbert's  troops  and  many  of 
our  men  saw  among  them  neighbors  and  friends  in  other  regi 
ments.  At  12  o'clock  we  rested  and  made  coffee,  and  orders 
came  to  march  two  miles  further  and  there  go  into  camp  for 
the  night.  We  marched  about  five  miles  further  over  a  hilly 
road  and  when  we  halted  for  the  night  we  were  very  tired. 
We  had  marched  about  fifteen  miles.  That  night  we  had 
straw  to  sleep  on  and  got  the  impression  that  we  were  to 
remain  here  for  some  time.  Wre  had  no  orders  to  march  fur 
ther  and  took  a  good  rest.  Next  morning  there  were  still  no 
orders  and  we  went  to  work  fixing  up  and  making  ourselves 
comfortable.  But  at  10  o'clock  orders  came  to  march  again 
and  every  one  was  angry.  According  to  the  diaries  of  Nathan 
Mumaugh,  Company  H,  and  John  G.  Gregory,  Company  A, 
there  was  some  tall  swearing  by  the  men.  WTe  fell  in  and 
resumed  our  march  and  as  we  left  our  camp  we  saw  General 
Sheridan's  division  marching  in  and  occupying  our  camp.  Our 
route  soon  brought  us  to  the  pike  south  of  Lebanon,  Ky.  We 
passed  the  village  of  New  Market,  where  General  Rousseau's 
division  was  encamped,  crossed  Rolling  Fork  on  a  covered 
bridge,  and  went  into  camp  at  dark  at  Saloma,  eight  miles 
from  New  Market.  Mumaugh's  and  Gregory's  diaries  before 
mentioned  state  that  on  this  day,  October  24,  1862,  Colonel 
Dickey  left  us,  having  again  resigned,  and  that  Captain  Doug 
lass  left  on  leave  of  absence.  The  next  day  we  remained  in 
camp  at  Saloma  and  our  tents,  which  we  had  not  seen  for 
over  two  months,  came  to  us.  It  was  a  dull  drizzly  day  and  in 
the  evening  it  snowed.  Some  of  the  men  put  up  their  tents, 
but  many  bivouaced  on  the  ground  without  shelter,  as  we  had 
been  doing  for  the  past  two  months.  One  of  the  men  of 
Company  K1  recalls  a  sense  of  chilliness  when  he  lay  down 
with  three  of  his  comrades  and  they  drew  their  blankets  over 
them,  which  was  succeeded  by  delicious  warmth,  and  then 

1     The  writer. 


216  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

by  a  profound  refreshing  sleep.  Such  rest  was  not  broken 
until  daylight  next  morning.  A  comrade  of  Company  K, 
Squire  Palmer,  roused  us  by  imitating  a  cock's  crow.  We 
looked  out  from  under  our  blankets  and  saw  that  we  were 
covered  by  two  or  three  inches  of  snow.  This  was  the  blanket 
which  had  caused  such  delicious  warmth  and  sound  sleep.  All 
around  us  were  white  mounds  which  indicated  where  others  of 
our  comrades  had  bivouaced  as  we  had  done,  and  soon  from 
scores  of  such  mounds,  Squire  Palmer's  cock  crow  was  an 
swered  by  similar  imitations.  We  were  all  so  comfortable 
we  did  not  care  to  get  up,  and  for  quite  a  while  the  badinage 
of  the  camp  went  on  from  mound  to  mound.  We  got  no  or 
ders  to  march  on  the  26th,  but  lay  in  camp  all  day,  busy  with 
routine  camp  duty.  The  weather  grew  warmer  and  the  snow 
soon  melted.  Sergeant  Andrew  J.  Gleason  joined  the  regiment 
with  a  number  of  recruits  for  Company  H,  whose  men  gave 
him  and  them  a  rousing  reception. 

On  Monday  the  27th,  we  were  awakened  by  the  bugle  of 
the  Forty-ninth  Ohio,  which  was  soon  followed  by  reveille 
sounded  by  our  own  bugler,  and  we  soon  received  orders  to 
march  at  6  a.  m.  but  did  not.  march  until  7  a.  m.  We  took  a 
mud  road  leading  towards  Bell's  Tavern,  marched  to  Green 
River  and  crossed  it  on  a  bridge  of  rails  and  went  into  camp 
before  dark  about  three-quarters  of  a  mile  beyond  the  river — 
distance  marched  about  fifteen  miles. 

The  next  day  we  marched  twelve  miles  to  Three  Springs. 
The  weather  was  fair  and  warm.  We  crossed  the  Little  Bar 
ren  River  when  about  five  miles  out  and  went  on  for  two 
miles  when  we  halted  and  rested  for  two  hours.  Apples  and 
persimmons  were  abundant  along  the  road  and  we  helped 
ourselves  to  them  liberally.  After  our  rest  we  marched 
five  miles  farther  and  encamped  on  the  farm  of  a  noted  "se- 
cesh"  who  had  fled  on  our  approach.  He  had  a  large  flock  of 
sheep  and  as  rations  were  scarce  we  confiscated  two  or  more 
for  each  company  and  had  fresh  mutton  for  our  meat  ration. 
We  were  told  by  General  Sill,  commanding  the  division,  that 
we  would  not  get  regular  rations  until  we  got  to  Bell's  Tavern 
next  day. 

On  the  29th  we  marched  at  8  o'clock  for  Bell's  Tavern, 
or  Proctor,  said  to  be  distant  15  miles,  but  it  proved  to  be 
nearer  20  miles.  We  had  two  or  three  miles  of  pike  to  march 
on  and  then  left  it  to  the  right  and  bearing  nearly  west  went 
on  until  we  reached  the  Bowling  Green  pike  at  Prewitt's 
Knob.  We  reached  our  destination  in  good  season  and  drew 
rations,  which  we  were  very  much  needing,  but  could  not  get 


WILLIAM  WALLACE: 

Colonel  of  the  Regiment  from  October  24,  1862  to  July  19.  1804. 


THE  MARCH  BACK  TO  NASHVILLE  217 

before  because  our  supply  train  was  not  up.  On  the  30th  we 
marched  to  Dripping  Springs,  eight  miles,  and  on  the  31st 
to  Lost  River,  17  miles.  We  started  on  this  march  at  7:30  a. 
m.  moving  directly  on  the  turnpike  leading  south  and  as  the 
road  was  good  we  made  good  time.  We  reached  the  river 
opposite  Bowling  Green  a  little  after  noon  and  crossed  it  on  a 
pontoon  bridge.  Wre  rested  awhile  on  the  commons  between 
the  river  and  the  city  and  then  moved  on  through  the  city  and 
three  miles  beyond  to  Lost  River  and  went  into  camp,  where 
we  remained  until  the  morning  of  November  4.  While  in 
this  camp  we  heard  that  General  Rosecrans,  wrho  had  suc 
ceeded  General  Buell  as  our  commander,  had  arrived  at  Bowl 
ing  Green,  and  a  little  later  that  he  was  actually  in  our  camp, 
but  we  did  not  see  him. 

Here  we  drew  clothing,  replenished  our  equipment  and 
had  opportunity  to  bathe  and  wash  our  clothing.  On  the 
evening  of  November  2,  1862,  we  heard  the  singers  of  the 
regiment,  the  Gleason  boys,  Major  McClenahan,  Adjutant 
Taft  and  others,  singing  in  one  of  the  tents  of  Company  H  the 
old  home  songs,  which  sounded  sweet  and  awakened  in  some 
hearts  unutterable  longings.  On  Novmeber  3,  we  received 
orders  to  march  next  morning  with  five  days'  rations,  two  of 
which  were  to  be  in  our  haversacks.  Next  morning  we  sent 
a  number  of  our  sick  men  to  hospital  in  Bowling  Green  and 
left  our  camp  at  Lost  River  between  ?  and  8  o'clock,  marching 
on  the  pike  toward  Franklin,  Ky.  which  we  reached  at  2 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  Wre  were  all  impressed  by  the  sub 
stantial  look  of  the  place,  as  compared  with  Bowling  Green. 
We  marched  through  the  village  with  drums  beating  and 
colors  flying.  A  squad  of  horsemen  in  citizens'  dress  was  as 
sembled  on  the  square,  which  we  regarded  with  suspicion, 
thinking  perhaps  they  were  guerillas.  We  were  afterwards 
told  that  our  suspicions  were  groundless,  as  Franklin  was 
known  as  one  of  the  strongest  Union  towns  in  Kentucky.  We 
marched  about  three  miles  beyond  the  town  and  encamped 
near  a  small  stream.  We  were  allowed  one-half  dozen  rails 
to  the  company  for  fuel.  There  was  a  straw  stack  in  a  field 
not  far  off  and  we  were  allowed  to  get  some  of  it  for  our  beds. 
This  permission  was  no  sooner  announced  than  each  man 
raced  for  his  share.  It  was  soon  surrounded  and  covered  over 
with  blue-coated  men  and  in  almost  an  instant  it  was  gone 
as  a  stack,  but  its  separate  parts,  of  the  size  of  armfulls,  seemed 
to  be  alive  and  moving  in  every  direction  over  the  field.  That 
night  the  more  swift  of  foot  had  soft  beds  to  sleep  on. 

November    5.    our     bugles     awakened     us     at     4     o'clock 

Sig.    8 


218  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

a.  m.  and  we  received  orders  to  march.  We  were  the  advance 
brigade  and  got  started  a  little  before  6  o'clock.  The  road 
was  dusty  and  the  march  was  a  weary  one.  We  crossed  the 
state  line  between  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  a  little  after  7 
o'clock.  We  were  marching  back  over  the  same  ground  we 
had  marched  over  September  13,  1862,  going  north.  There 
is  a  little  hamlet  named  Mitchelville  near  the  line  and  we 
all  recognized  the  place.  As  our  column  crossed  the  line,  we 


"John  Brown's  body  lies  a  mouldering  in  the  ground 

But  his  soul  is  marching  on." 

The  chorus  rose  and  swelled  as  regiment  after  regiment  came 
to  the  line  and  took  it  up,  and  one  felt  that  the  spirit  of  the 
old  martyr  to  liberty  was  indeed  pervading  the  hearts  of  the 
dusty  men  in  blue  and  that  they,  willingly,  or  unwillingly, 
were  to  be  God's  instruments  to  break  the  yoke  of  the  op 
pressor  and  let  the  oppressed  go  free.  Wre  rested  a  brief  space 
near  Mitchellville  and  made  a  small  detail  of  men  to  guard 
a  railroad  tunnel  nearby.  Further  on  we  met  two  spruce 
young  men  in  a  buggy,  dressed  in'  citizen's  clothing,  whom  we 
regarded  with  suspicion,  as  they  seemed  quite  inquisitive. 
They  were  afterwards  arrested  and  indentified  as  being  two 
of  John  Morgan's  men.1  After  a  twenty-mile  march  we 
reached  Tyree  Springs  at  2  o'clock  and  went  into  camp  near  a 
large  hotel.  We  had  some  trouble  in  getting  \vater  as  the 
springs  were  low.  Some  of  the  boys  got  a  violin  and  in  the 
evening  had  a  dance  in  the  hotel.  While  the  dance  was  going 
on  Nathan  Mumaugh,  Company  H,  discovered  that  the  hotel 
was  on  fire  and  gave  the  alarm,  and  by  dint  of  hard  work  the 
building  was  saved  from  destruction.  Some  mattresses  stored 
in  a  room  had  been  set  on  fire  and  the  fire  was  extinguished  by 
throwing  the  mattresses  out,  with  the  result  that  some  of  the 
men  had  soft  beds  that  night.  Som'e  of  the  officers  and  men 
had  taken  quarters  for  the  night  in  the  hotel,  and  a  guard  was 
placed  about  it  to  prevent  further  attempts  to  burn  it.  It 
was  reported  to  be  a  harbor  for  guerillas.  The  next  morning 
we  found  the  hotel  still  standing,  to  the  surprise  of  many  who 
thought  that  the  attempt  to  burn  it  would  be  renewed.  We 
marched  November  6  to  near  Edgefield  Junction,  twelve 
miles.  We  were  aroused  by  an  early  bugle  call,  but  as  our 
brigade  was  to  march  in  the  rear  of  the  division  we  did  not 
start  until  10  o'clock.  Near  the  little  hamlet  of  White  Hill 
we  halted  for  a  short  time.  Resuming  our  march  we  soon 
came  to  the  winding  descent  into  the  Cumberland  valley.  The 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


THE  MARCH  BACK  TO  NASHVILLE  ^19 

day  was  cloudy  and  cold,  a  day  of  unusual  depression.  One 
of  "the  men  in  the  ranks,  at  a  turn  in  the  road,  saw  the  long 
dusty  column  of  men  moving  painfully  southward,  and  recall 
ing  the  experiences  of  the  past  year,  involuntarily  said  to  him 
self,  "Will  this  war  ever  end?"1  It  was  the  dark  year  of  the 
war.  Almost  everywhere  our  arms  had  met  with  disaster,  and 
incompetence  and  inefficiency  had  been  exhibited  in  some  of 
our  most  exalted  leaders.  All  over  the  north  men's  hearts 
seemed  failing  them.  It  is  no  wonder,  that  recalling  our  own 
experience,  some  of  us  should  at  times  be  also  faint-hearted. 
On  our  march  this  day,  a  rebel  lieutenant  was  captured  by 
some  stragglers  of  Goodspeed's  battery  while  spying  the 
movements  of  our  army.  We  rather  expected  an  attack  from 
guerillas.  Our  regiment  was  in  the  advance  and  two  sections 
of  Goodspeed's  battery  were  placed  in  the  center  of  it.  But 
no  signs  of  the  enemy  were  seen,  and  we  marched  on  to  Edge- 
field  Junction  and  encamped  on  a  hill  where  we  had  plenty  of 
rails  for  fuel  and  plenty  of  straw  for  our  beds.  Companies  C 
and  II  were  sent  out  on  picket  duty.  We  received  orders  to  be 
ready  to  march  at  6  o'clock  next  morning.  On  the  morning  of 
November  7  reveille  was  sounded  at  4 :30  o'clock,  but  we  did 
not  march  until  near  7,  when  we  moved  out  rapidly  on  the 
road  to  Nashville,  distant  nine  miles.  We  soon  met  a  long 
supply  train  going  after  supplies.  The  train  was  escorted  by 
a  battalion  of  cavalry  and  some  artillery  and  the  wagons  car 
ried  a  large  detachment  of  armed  men.  After  we  met  this 
train  our  progress  was  slow.  Once  we  were  halted  for  nearly 
an  hour  and  our  men  built  small  fires  of  rails  to  keep  them 
selves  warm,  for  the  day  was  raw  and  cold.  When  we  came 
in  view  of  the  city  of  Nashville  we  turned  to  the  left,  marched 
to  the  Cumberland  River  and  encamped  on  its  banks.  When 
we  had  halted  and  stacked  arms.  Colonel  Wallace  gave  the 
command,  "Get  Rails"  which  was  promptly  obeyed. 

We  pitched  our  tents  and  soon  got  the  impression  we 
would  remain  in  this  camp  for  some  days.  Some  of  the  men 
erected  small  furnaces  to  warm  their  tents  and  otherwise  pre 
pared  to  make  themselves  comfortable.  Our  impression  this 
time  was  correct,  for  we  remained  here  until  November  1(>, 
nine  days.  While  here  orders  came  to  make  out  lists  of  men 
who  had  remained  in  Nashville  when  we  marched  north  from 
the  city  in  September,  with  a  view  of  having  them  returned 
to  the  regiment.  On  November  12,  the  five  right  companies 
of  the  regiment  went  on  picket  duty.  November  14,  we  were 
supplied  with  new  caps  and  other  clothing  and  needed  equip- 

1     The  writer. 


220  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

ment,  and  took  part  in  a  brigade  review.  The  reviewing  offi 
cers  were  Generals  Rosecrans  and  McCook.  It  was  our  first 
sight  of  General  Rosecrans,  our  new  army  commander.  Ac 
companied  by  General  McCook  he  passed  down  the  line  in 
front  and  then  between  the  open  ranks  talking  familiarly  to 
the  men,  examining  their  dress  and  commenting  on  it.  One 
sergeant,1  who  had  taken  exquisite  pains  to  put  this  gun  and 
accounterments  in  first-rate  order  and  have  the  buttons  on 
his  uniform  bright  as  burnished  gold,  was  deeply  humiliated 
when  the  general  passed  him  and  said  "Sergeant  button  up 
your  coat."  One  button,  unfortunately,  had  by  mistake  been 
left  unbuttoned.  After  the  inspection  we  marched  in  column 
past  the  generals  and  then  returned  to  our  camp,  all  much 
pleased  over  the  review.  General  Rosecrans  had  won  all  hearts, 
and  we  felt  that  we  had  a  commander  on  whom  we  could  safe 
ly  depend.  The  weather  was  fair  and  pleasant  all  the  days  we 
were  in  this  camp,  and  in  the  evenings,  we  had  stag  dances 
in  the  company  streets.  One  day  while  we  \vere  in  this  camp 
we  got  another  sight  of  Colonel  Daniel  McCook,  our  General 
McCook's  brother.  He  and  Lieutenant  Colonel  D.  D.  T. 
Cowen  of  the  Fifty-second  Ohio  came  riding  through  our 
camp  and  Colonel  McCook  forced  his  horse  down  the  steep 
bank  to  the  river  to  give  him  a  drink,  with  the  result  that 
both  horse  and  rider  went  into  the  river  and  came  near  drown 
ing.  On  the  evening  of  the  loth,  Captain  Thomas  E.  Douglass 
of  Company  H  returned,  having  come  through  on  a  wagon 
train  from  Mitchelville.  That  night  we  received  orders  to 
have  reveille  at  4  o'clock  next  morning  and  be  ready  to  march 
at  6. 

The  next  morning  we  were  ready  to  march  at  the  ap 
pointed  time,  but  our  wagons  were  not  all  up,  so  each  com 
pany  was  ordered  to  put  its  baggage  all  in  one  tent  and  leave 
it  standing  until  the  wagons  came  up.  We  started  at  6  o'clock, 
passed  through  Edgefield  and  crossed  the  river  on  the  railroad 
bridge.  We  marched  through  Nashville  and  on  out  the  Mur- 
freesboro  pike  four  or  five  miles  and  then  haired  and  threw 
out  skirmishers.  Reports  came  that  the  enemy  had  been  seen 
in  our  front,  but  we  moved  on  and  finally  got  orders  to  double 
quick.  Our  knapsacks  were  well  filled  and  heavy  and  we  were 
soon  winded  carrying  them.  We  then  were  ordered  to  unsling 
them,  which  was  quite  a  relief.  They  were  piled  up  and  a 
guard  was  placed  over  them.  We  again  advanced .  and  soon 
wheeled  into  line  and  supported  the  Thirty-ninth  Indiana  on 
the  skirmish  line.  Wre  found  it  pretty  severe  work  marching 

1     The  author. 


THE  MARCH  BACK  TO  NASHVILLE  221 

through  cornfields,  over  fences  and  through  patches  of  burrs 
which  covered  us  from  head  to  foot.  After  advancing  in  this 
manner  for  nearly  two  miles  we  halted,  while  a  section  of 
artillery  was  brought  up  and  shelled  the  woods  in  our  front. 
We  then  pushed  on  about  two  miles  further,  developed  the 
enemy  in  some  force  and  then  retired  and  marched  back  to 
the  place  where  we  had  left  our  knapsacks,  where  we  went 
into  camp.  The  place  was  near  the  state  asylum  for  the 
insane.  Our  camp  was  in  a  large  field,  part  of  the  asylum 
grounds,  and  there  was  a  large  fine  spring  nearby.  Our 
wagons  soon  came  up  with  out  tents  and  the  more  expeditious 
of  the  men  had  them  up  in  time  to  shelter  them  from  a  hard 
shower. 

We  remained  in  this  camp  until  November  29,  1862.  It 
was  one  of  the  most  pleasant  camps  in  our  recollection  and, 
although  we  heard  frequent  rumors  of  a  change  and  two  or 
three  times  had  orders  to  be  ready  to  march,  we  remained 
lon.sf  enough  to  make  ourselves  very  comfortable.  The  enemy 
we  knew  were  not  far  off,  and  individual  foraging  by  the  men 
was  done  at  great  risk  of  capture.  This  was  shown  on  the 
17th,  when  James  A.  Jackson  and  Pelham  C.  Johnson  of  Com 
pany  H  and  others  of  the  brigade  were  captured  while  forag 
ing  on  private  account. 

The  morning  of  November  18,  we  heard  several  shots 
fired  out  towards  the  picket  line,  but  paid  little  attention  to 
them.  We  were  just  about  ready  for  our  breakfast  when  the 
brigade  call  was  sounded,  quickly  followed  by  our  own  regi 
mental  call,  and  we  were  at  once,  ordered  out  on  a  reconnois- 
ance,  leaving  our  breakfast  untasted.  We  marched  to  the 
picket  line,  where  we  formed  a  line  of  battle  and  moved  for 
ward  to  the  same  position  we  had  advanced  to  on  the  16th. 
Again  a  section  of  artillery  was  brought  forward  and  shelled 
the  woods  in  our  front.  We  remained  in  this  position  about 
an  hour,  when  all  being  apparently  serene,  we  marched  back 
to  camp,  as  hungry  as  bears.  At  3  o'clock  we  received  orders 
to  o  on  picket.  It  being  a  rainy  day  and  night  it  was  an  un 
comfortable  duty.  We  got  back  to  our  camps  the  next  day  at 
-i  o'clock,  and  got  orders  for  a  general  inspection  at  9  o'clock, 
November  20. 

The  inspection  took  place  at  3  o'clock  p.  m.  and  when  it 
was  over,  many  of  the  men  commenced  building  fireplaces 
and  chimneys  for  their  tents,  as  the  weather  had  cleared  and  it 
was  growing  rapidly  colder.  An  incident  occurred  this  day 
which  caused  some  adverse  comment.  Sergeant  Capper  of 


FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

Company  H  was  reduced  to  the  ranks  for  taking  rails  to  build 
a  fire. 

On  the  2.2nd,  the  regiment  was  detailed  as  guard  for  a 
foraging  train.  It  marched  at  8  o'clock  a.  m.  and  returned  at 
3  p.  m.  The  expedition  was  successful  in  getting  a  good  sup 
ply  of  forage.  Some  of  our  men  were  just  as  successful  in 
adding  to  their  stock  of  eatables,  and  brought  back  quite  a 
quantity  of  yams,  turnips,  cabbages  and  beets.  That  evening 
Captain  Douglass  entertained  some  of  the  officers  in  his  tent 
and  uncorked  a  bottle  of  "Congers'  "  best.1  Our  sutler  was 
George  Geiger  and  because  of  the  high  prices  he  charged  was 
called  by  the  men  "Gouger."  On  the  23rd  we  had  brigade  in 
spection  by  General  Sill  and  Colonel  Gibson,  who  was  tem 
porarily  in  command  of  the  brigade,  and  at  2:30  p.  m.  were 
ordered  out  on  picket  duty.  We  got  back  next  day,  Novem 
ber  24,  at  3  o'clock  p.  m.  The  regiment  had  light  duty  during* 
this  detail,  being' on  the  reserve.  This  day,  Lieutenant  }. 
Alonzo  Gleason,  Company  H,  was  detailed  as  commandant  of 
a  pioneer  company  made  up  of  two  men  from  each  company  of 
the  regiment.  It  was  the  first  organized  force  of  the  kind  we 
had.  The  men  carried  besides  their  guns,  axes,  picks  and 
shovels,  etc — a  full  set  of  entrenching  tools.  That  evening 
we  heard  again  the  old  songs  swelling  from  a  tent  in  the 
quarters  of  Company  H  where  the  Gleasons,  Major  McClena- 
han.  Adjutant  Taft  and  others  had  come  together  for  a  sing. 

On  the  25th,  we  had  dress  parade  in  the  evening  and  or 
ders  were  published  requiring  two  hours'  company  drill  every 
morning.  On  the  26th,  we  had  another  dress  parade  and  were 
then  drawn  up  in  close  column  to  hear  the  orders  read.  On 
the  27th,  just  as  dinner  was  ready,  the  assembly  sounded  and 
we  wrere  hurried  to  the  picket  line,  a  foraging  party  having* 
been  attacked.  General  Willich,  our  brigade  commander, 
who  had  been  absent  for  some  time,  joined  us  on  our  hurried 
march  and  was  given  a  cordial  welcome. 

November  28,  we  had  company  drill  in  the  morning  at 
which  General  Willich  was  present  and  instructed  us  in  skir 
mish  movements,  according  to  the  German  tactics.  In  the  aft 
ernoon  the  regiment  was  ordered  on  picket.  The  line  we  oc 
cupied  was  about  a  mile  long  and  it  took  two-thirds  of  the 
men  to  occupy  it.  Towards  night,  however,  the  number  of 
posts  was  reduced  so  that  we  could  have  three  reliefs.  There 
was  a  brick  house  on  the  left  of  the  pike  where  one  of  the  re 
serve  posts  was  sheltered  by  a  barn.  The  night  passed  with 
out  incident,  but  at  4 :30  next  morning  all  were  awakened  and 

1     Gleason's  Piarv. 


THE  MARCH  BACK  TO  NASHVILLE  223 

stood  at  arms  until  daylight.  This  and  other  like  incidents 
gave  us  a  premonition  that  an  attack  by  the  enemy  might  be 
made  at  any  time  and  that  we  were  being  prepared  for  it.  We 
were  relieved  from  picket  duty  about  10  o'clock  on  the  29th, 
by  the  Thirty-fifth  Indiana  and  a  small  Irish  regiment  of  the 
same  brigade.  As  soon  as  we  were  relieved  we  started  back 
to  our  camp  but  found  it  deserted  by  the  other  regiments  of 
the  brigade.  Thereupon  we  were  marched  back  toward  the 
picket  line  about  a  mile,  then  changed  our  direction  to  the  left, 
passed  under  a  new  railroad  bridge  which  had  been  built  by 
our  own  engineers,  and  on  to  a  new  camp  on  Mill  Creek,  where 
we  were  placed  on  the  right  of  our  brigade,  the  other  regi 
ments  having  preceded  us.  We  found  the  ground  selected  for 
our  camp  covered  with  walnuts  and  all  fell  to  cracking  them 
at  a  lively  rate.  That  night  the  quartermaster  for  the  first 
time  furnished  us  straw  to  sleep  on.  Wre  pitched  our  tents 
and  made  ourselves  unusually  comfortable  for  the  night.  No 
vember  30,  was  Sunday,  and  we  policed  our  new  streets 
and  had  our  usual  Sunday  morning  inspection.  After  this  the 
men  lay  resting  in  their  tents,  or  were  employed  in  writing 
letters  to  loved  ones  at  home.  The  increased  activity  in  drill 
and  other  preparatory  precautions  made  us  feel  that  we  were 
being  trained  and  nerved  up  for  some  great  exertion  soon  to 
be  called  for.  We  learned  that  the  enemy  in  force  was  near  at 
hand,  but  whether  they  should  attack  us  or  we  should  attack 
them  we  could  not  guess.  December  1  a  dispatch  was  re 
ceived  from  Captain  A.  R.  Z.  Dawson  of  Company  G  who  was 
in  Columbus,  O.  that  Captain  Frank  Askew  of  Company  E 
had  been  appointed  Lieutenant  Colonel  of  the  regiment  and 
that  he  (Dawson)  had  Askew's  commission  in  his  pocket. 
This  appointment  gave  general  satisfaction,  not  because  of 
any  dissatisfaction  with  Major  McClenahan,  but  because  Cap 
tain  Askew  had  already  exhibited  unusual  skill  and  efficiency 
and  unusual  q-ualifications  and  fitness  for  larger  command. 
In  the  evening  Captain  Askew  held  a  reception  for  the  officers 
of  the  regiment  at  his  tent,  where  liquid  refreshments  were 
dispensed  liberally  and  a  number  of  the  officers  grew  quite 
mellow  and  hilarious.  It  was  told  about  camp  that  Charles 
De  Graffenried,  the  captain's  colored  servant,  had  remarked 
that  a  certain  tall  officer  "was  the  onhandiest  man  he  had 
ever  tried  to  put  to  bed,  that  when  he  had  his  head  on  the 
cot  his  feet  were  still  on  the  ground,  that  when  he  put  his 
feet  up,  his  head  went  back  to  the  floor,  and  when  he  took 
him  by  the  middle  both  head  and  feet  were  on  the  ground." 


224  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

On  the  2nd  of  December  we  lay  quietly  in  camp  and  on 
the  13rd  we  had  regimental  drill,  in  order  that  General  \Yillich 
might  judge  of  onr  proficiency,  and  we  were  ordered  to  have 
roll  call  four  times  a  day  until  further  orders.  On  the  4th  we 
had  battalion  drill  under  Colonel  Wallace  and  Lieutenant 
Colonel  Askew  in  which  the  latter  showed  such  skill  in  com 
mand  as  to  elicit  general  praise.  Orders  were  issued  to  have 
the  men  turn  out  for  roll  call  at  reveille  fully  armed  and 
equipped.  December  5  was  very  cold  with  light  snow.  We 
kept  our  tents  closely  and  were  undisturbed  by  orders  of  any 
kind.  December  6  the  drums  beat  the  reveille  at  0  a.  in.  and 
we  all  turned  out  for  roll  call  armed  and  accoutered  as  or 
dered.  About  noon  we  received  orders  to  go  on  picket  at 
2  o'clock  and  a  little  later  were  ordered  to  start  at  1  o'clock. 
We  marched  out  the  Mill  Creek  pike  about  two  miles  and  then 
took  a  road  leading  west,  which  we  followed  until  we  came  to 
the  picket  line  we  were  to  relieve.  After  we  had  been  as  wre 
supposed  properly  placed,  General  Wilich  came  out  along  the 
line  and  made  some  changes,  and  we  received  orders  forbiding 
the  men  to  build  fires  day  or  night.  We  had  no  unusual  ex 
periences  during  the  night.  It  was  unusually  cold,  and  while  on 
post  we  had  to  shake  ourselves  to  keep  warm. 

The  next  morning,  December  7,  was  the  coldest  of  the 
winter  so  far.  We  were  relieved  at  3  o'clock  in  the  after 
noon  and  got  back  to  camp  in  time  for  supper.  Soon  after  we 
reached  camp  the  adjutant  came  round  with  an  order  requiring 
us  to  cook  three  days'  rations,  put  them  into  our  haversacks 
and  be  prepared  to  march  at  a  moment's  notice. 

December  8  we  received  no  orders  to  march  but  lay  about 
expecting  such  orders  at  any  moment.  Orders  came  that  all 
men  who  were  unable  to  march  were  to  be  left  behind  to  pack 
the  tents  in  wagons,  which  were  then  to  be  sent  inside  the  for 
tifications  at  Nashville.  In  the  evening  \ve  were  directed  to 
be  in  line  of  battle  at  daylight  next  morning. 

December  9,  at  3  o'clock  we  were  ordered  out  on  a  recon 
naissance.  We  marched  out  beyond  the  picket  line  but  did  not 
develop  the  enemy.  We  were  ordered  to  remain  out  all  night, 
but  to  our  surprise  and  satisfaction,  at  night  fall  we  were  marched 
back  to  our  camp. 

Dec.  10,  we  were  called  into  line  and  moved  back  on  the 
Mill  Creek  pike  one-half  mile,  turned  there  to  the  right,  and  halt 
ing  at  the  foot  of  a  hill  near  a  stream  went  into  camp.  We 
pitched  our  tents  and  prepared  to  make  ourselves  comfortable. 
But  in  the  afternoon.  General  R.  W.  Johnson,  who  had  that  day 
succeeded  General  Sill  in  command  of  our  division,  sent  word 


THE  MARCH  BACK  TO  NASHVILLE  225 

that  we  should  not  go  to  much  trouble  in  fixing  up  our  quarters, 
as  we  should  probably  not  remain  in  this  camp  longer  than  next 
day.  In  the  evening  we  received  orders  to  be  ready  at  6  o'clock 
next  morning  to  escort  a  foraging  expedition.  The  night  was 
cold,  the  ground  was  damp  and  we  did  not  get  much  sleep. 

On  December  11,  our  entire  brigade  and  a  section  of  artil 
lery  started  as  escort  for  a  large  train  of  empty  wagons  to  gather 
forage  from  the  country.  We  marched  across  to  the  Nolens- 
ville  pike,  striking  it  where  Sheridan's  division  had  been  en 
camped.  We  followed  this  pike  about  three  miles  where  we 
found  plenty  of  forage,  loaded  our  wagons  and  brought  them 
safely  into  camp  only  a  little  after  noon. 

Decemebr  12,  we  remained  all  day  in  camp,  attending  to 
usual  routine  of  camp  duty.  December  13,  we  moved  our  camp 
to  a  much  better  location  further  up  on  the  hill  and  got  our  tents 
pitched  and  the  company  streets  in  pretty  good  order  before  noon. 
The  day  was  one  of  unusual  excitement.  Orders  came  to  have 
three  days'  rations  constantly  in  haversacks,  and  we  learned  that 
shelter  tents  had  arrived  at  brigade  headquarters.  We  had  heard 
about  these  tents,  which  were  really  a  sheet  of  canvass  about  six 
feet  square,  with  buttons  and  button  holes  at  the  edges.  Each 
man  was  to  have  one  of  these  squares,  and  four  men  could  button 
together  the  squares  and  thus  make  a  tent  under  which  they 
could  all  sleep  together.  There  were  three  light  pieces  of  wood 
with  each  four  squares,  which  were  to  serve  as  ridge  poles  and 
props  for  the  tent.  We  decided  that  we  would  not  have  them. 
Late  in  the  evening  came  the  stereotyped  order  "to  be  ready  to 
march  at  a  moment's  notice." 

The  next  day,  December  14,  we  remained  in  camp.  A  shelter 
tent  was  set  up  at  the  tent  of  the  regimental  quartermaster.  It 
attracted  much  attention  and  was  universally  condemned.  A 
regimental  board  of  survey  was  called  and  condemned  it,  and  our 
Surgeon  openly  said  they  would  cost  the  army  ten  thousand  men 
if  they  were  adopted.  In  the  evening  we  received  orders  to  go 
on  picket  at  G  o'clock  next  morning. 

December  15,  we  had  reveille  at  4  o'clock  and  marched  out 
to  the  picket  line  at  6  o'clock.  The  forenoon  was  fair  and 
warmer  than  usual,  but  rain  came  about  noon  and  poured  down 
during  the  afternoon  and  night,  so  our  picket  duty  was  far  from 
pleasant. 

December  16,  we  did  not  get  in  from  picket  duty  until  near 
eleven  o'clock  and  after  we  got  our  dinners  we  were  permitted 
to  rest  the  remainder  of  the  day.  In  the  afternoon  Captain  Doug 
lass  was  detailed  as  member  of  a  general  Court  Martail  to  try 
Captain  Monk  of  the  32d  Indiana  for  some  trifling  offense. 


226  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

December  17,  we  received  orders  to  drill  in  changing  front 
in  line  of  battle,  and  in  firing,  which  we  did  for  an  hour.  This 
was  still  another  incident  in  confirmation  of  the  prevailing  idea 
that  we  would  soon  be  called  on  for  heavy  work,  but  we  light 
heartedly  put  it  aside.  It  passed  out  of  our  thoughtts  when  in 
the  evening  we  again  received  orders  to  march  with  the  brigade 
as  escort  for  another  foraging  train  at  7  o'clock  next  morning. 
December  18,  we  marched  a  little  before  the  time  appointed, 
taking  the  same  route  on  the  Nolensville  Pike,  the  Thirty-second 
Indiana  in  advance.  When  about  three  miles  beyond  our  picket 
line,  we  turned  into  a  by-road  leading  east  and  soon  found  a  barn 
full  of  corn  and  plenty  of  it  in  the  fields.  After  emptying  the 
barn  we  marched  to  a  field  on  a  hillside,  where  we  stacked  arms 
and  all  hands  turned  in  to  fill  the  remaining  empty  wagons.  This 
was  quickly  done  and  we  started  with  the  train  back  to  our  camp. 
We  had  several  roll-calls  during  the  day  as  a  precaution  to  keep 
the  men  together  and  prevent  straggling.  The  men  made  much 
sport  of  it  by  shouting  at  every  halt,  ''Roll  Call",  "Roll  Call". 
During  the  march  the  sun  came  out  bright  and  warm,  melting  the 
ice  in  the  fields  and  roads  and  making  the  marching  hard  and 
tiresome.  We  got  back  to  our  camp  about  one  o'clock  and  the 
orderly  sergeants  were  busy  the  rest  of  the  day  drawing  and  is 
suing  rations. 

December  19,  our  adjutant,  Calvin  R.  Taft,  was  as 
signed  to  duty  on  General  Johnson's  staff  and  Lieutenant  Joseph 
N.  Dubois  of  Company  E.  took  his  place.  Captain  Theodore  C. 
Bowles,  our  old  quartermaster,  who  had  been  visiting  the  regi 
ment,  bade  us  all  goodbye  and  Lieut.  John  R.  Clark  who  had  been 
acting  as  quartermaster  sent  in  his  resignation,  being  compelled 
to  leave  the  service  because  of  heart  disease.  He  was  a  great 
favorite  and  we  were  sorry  to  have  him  leave  us.  On  this  day 
our  men  witnessed  for  the  first  time  the  ceremony  of  drumming 
out  of  camp.  Two  soldiers,  one  of  Company  B.  of  our  own  regi 
ment,  had  been  tried  by  court  martial  and  convicted  of  stealing 
a  watch.  They  were  marched  through  the  camp,  a  fife  and  drum 
playing  the  "Rogue's  March."  Both  appeared  to  be  under  the 
influence  of  intoxicating  liquor  but  conscious  of  their  degrada 
tion.  The  procession  passed  through  our  regimental  quarters 
and  thence  to  the  Nashville  pike,  where  the  guard  left  them  and 
the  music  stopped.  One  or  two  of  their  friends  accompanied 
them  for  a  short  distance,  as  they  struck  out  for  Nashville,  still 
with  the  placards  on  their  backs  bearing  the  word  "Thief,"  which 
they  had  forgotten  to  remove.  They  were  doubtless  glad  to 
escape  from  the  scene  of  their  humiliation  and  soon  disappeared 
in  the  distance. 


THE  MARCH  BACK  TO  NASHVILLE  227 

December  20,  we  had  a  brigade  drill,  beginning  at 
8  o'clock  and  lasting  until  noon,  which  was  witnessed  by  Generals 
Johnson  and  Sill.  General  Willich  put  us  through  a  number  of 
rapid  movements  and  as  a  result  we  felt  fully  capable  of  success 
fully  meeting  any  equal  body  of  troops  under  the  sun.  We  were 
well  drilled,  and  each  man  in  the  ranks  seemed  to  feel  the  enthus 
iasm  of  acting  in  perfect  concert  with  his  fellows  in  making  our 
movements  successful.  We  felt  that  we  were  getting  well  pre 
pared  for  the  heavy  work  which  now  seemed  nearer  at  hand 
than  ever  before.  During  the  evening  cannonading  was  heard  in 
the  direction  of  the  Murfreesboro  pike,  and  we  could  see  the 
flashes  of  the  guns.  We  afterwards  learned  that  a  force  of  the 
enemy  had  come  up  and  had  tnrown  some  shells  at  our  picket 
line,  but  that  no  damage  had  been  done. 

Sunday,  December  21,  reveille  sounded  a  little  earlier 
than  usual  and  we  turned  out  and  stood  to  arms.  The  cannon 
ading  of  the  evening  before  was  the  cause  of  our  early  call.  No 
enemy  appearing  we  stacked  arms  and  got  our  breakfasts.  We 
had  the  usual  Sunday  morning  inspection.  Shelter  tents  suffi 
cient  for  the  entire  regiment  were  drawn  and  issued  to  the  sev- 
era  companies,  and  we  were  directed  to  turn  over  all  surplus  arms 
on  hand  and  also  those  of  other  caliber  than  69-100.  So  we  were 
not  only  being  made  fit  for  a  coming  struggle,  but  we  were  being 
stripped  of  all  unnecessary  impedimenta. 

On  the  22nd,  we  had  battalion  drill  and  on  the  23rd,  brigade 
drill,  and  all  permits  to  visit  Nashville  or  to  leave  the  regiment 
even  temporarily  were  refused. 

On  the  evening  of  the  23d  an  order  came  detailing  the  right 
wing  of  the  regiment  for  picket  duty  in  the  morning  and  later  an 
order  directing  us  to  escort  a  foraging  train.  On  the  morning  of 
the  24th  reveille  sounded  at  5  o'clock  and  we  fell  in  and  stood  at 
arms  as  usual.  A  little  later  an  order  came  notifying  us  that  we 
would  not  go  foraging  but  must  be  ready  to  march  at  daylight 
with  three  days'  rations.  Shelter  tents  were  issued  to  the  men. 
and  as  we  got  the  impression  we  were  also  to  retain  our  Sibley 
tents,  no  objection  was  made  to  them.  Soon  after  this  an  order 
came  to  strike  tents  and  pack  up.  We  had  barely  time  to  obey 
this  order  when  the  bugles  sounded  the  ''assembly",  and  we  fell 
in.  Our  teams  started  back  toward  Nashville  and  the  regiment 
took  the  opposite  direction.  We  marched  nearly  to  the  Nolens- 
ville  pike  where  we  halted  for  an  hour  and  were  then  ordered 
back  to  our  old  camp.  The  wagons  came  back  and  we  repitched 
our  tents,  to  remain  until  tomorrow,  it  was  said.  f 

tl  was  Christmas  Eve,  and  there  was  a  great  deal  of  hilarity 
in  some  of  the  quarters. 


228  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

December  25,  was  Christmas  Day,  but  it  was  no  holi 
day  for  us.  After  breakfast  we  received  orders  to  march  with 
another  foraging  expedition  at  8  o'clock.  We  took  our  former 
route,  following  it  until  we  came  to  a  road  leading  south  from  the 
Nolensville  Pike.  We  marched  about  five  miles  on  this  road, 
when  we  came  to  a  place  where  there  was  forage  in  abundance 
and  filled  our  wagons  by  3  o'clock.  There  had  been  some  skir 
mish  firing  in  our  front  as  we  marched. 

Near  the  place  where  we  loaded  our  wagons  there  was  a 
house  where  a  Christmas  dinner  had  been  prepared  for  some  of 
our  enemies,  and  some  of  our  men  either  confiscated  it  or  paid 
for  it  with  counterfeit  confederate  scrip.  We  were  well  into  a 
portion  of  country  where  the  enemy  was  in  control  and  it  was 
a  matter  of  some  concern  to  get  our  loaded  train  back  safely  to 
camp.  But  we  had  a  formidable  force,  covered  our  train  well  with 
flankers  and  brought  it  in  safely.  On  arriving  at  camp  we  learned 
that  orders  had  been  received  at  brigade  headquarters  to  march 
in  the  morning,  but  that  they  would  not  be  published  until  it  was 
certain  that  we  would  move.  There  was  now  every  indication 
that  a  general  movement  was  on  foot. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

THE  CAMPAIGN  AND  BATTLE  OF  STONE  RIVER. 

The  morning  of  December  26,  we  had  roll  call  at  5  o'clock. 
As  we  were  eating  breakfast  the  order  came  to  move  in  an  hour. 
At  the  time  appointed  the  assembly  sounded  and  we  marched, 
taking  the  familiar  route  of  our  late  foraging  expeditions.  We 
were  halted  before  we  reached  the  Nolensville  Pike  to  allow  a 
large  body  of  troops  to  pass,  and  when  we  reached  the  pike  there 
was  a  long  .ambulance  train  moving  out  in  advance  of  us.  We 
now  had  little  doubt  that  there  was  a  general  forward  movement 
of  our  entire  army,  and  that  there  was  hot  work  for  us  ahead. 
We  felt,  however,  that  we  were  ready  and  fit  for  any  trial  or 
emergency,  and  our  hearts  quickened  and  beat  high  with  the 
thought  of  again  meeting  the  enemy.  We  took  the  direct  road  for 
Nolensville.  Our  progress  was  slow,  there  was  considerable  cav 
alry  skirmishing  ahead,  and  it  was  evident  that  the  enemy's  cav 
alry  was  impeding  our  advance.  It  was  thought  that  the  enemy 
would  make  a  stand  at  Stewart's  Creek,  but  they  fell  back  from 
this  line  after  destroying  the  bridge  to  impede  our  progress. 
Night  came  on  while  we  were  still  on  the  march,  but  we  marched 
on  until  we  reached  Nolensville,  and  went  into  camp  just  beyond 
it  on  a  hillside  near  the  road.  For  the  first  time,  we  pitched  our 
shelter  tents.  We  were  safely  tucked  away  in  them  when  it  be 
gan  to  rain  and  we  found  them  rain-proof  and  comfortable.  From 
our  regimental  camp  we  looked  out  on  a  great  number  of  other 
camps  which  formed  an  irregular  semi-circle  overlooking  a  valley 
or  depression.  The  tents  were  lighted  with  candles,  and  they  gave 
the  impression  of  an  almost  innumerable  host.  It  was  an  in 
spiring  and  comforting  spectacle.  At  nine  o'clock  we  were  called 
to  rest  by  the  "German  Tattoo",  sounded  by  General  Willich's 
bugler.  Never  in  all  the  lives  of  some  of  us,  have  we  heard  any 
thing  sweeter  than  those  long  drawn  notes  of  that  famous  call  as 
it  was  sounded  that  night  on  the  hill  near  Nolensville. 

Mr.  John  H.  Sarchet  of  Cambridge,  Ohio,  who  was  our 
principal  musician  and  band  leader  during  the  later  years  of  our 
service,  has  reproduced  the  music  of  this  call  and  it  is  here  given : 


230  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AXD  CAMPAIGNS 


We  were  all  very  tired  after  the  day's  march,  although  we 
had  marched  only  ten  miles. 

It  was  raining  next  morning,  December  27,  but  we  resumed 
our  march  at  nine  o'clock,  passing  Negley's  and  Sheridan's  divi 
sions  and  taking  the  front  in  the  advance.  After  marching  at  a 
rapid  pace  for  three  or  four  miles,  hearing  cannonading  in  front, 
we  reached  a  little  valley  where  the  advance  of  our  division  was 
drawn  up  in  line  of  battle.  We  were  halted  here  until  afternoon, 
when  we  were  moved  forward  in  double  ranks  over  the  hill  and 
across  another  little  valley,  and  halted  on  the  summit  of  the  next 
ridge.  Our  artillery  was  here  brought  forward  and  opened  on 
the  enemy,  who  occupied  a  position  across  another  little  valley 
in  our  front.  Our  fire  soon  drew  the  fire  of  the  rebel  artillery 
and  down  in  the  valley  we  heard  the  rattling  fire  of  the  carbines 
of  the  cavalry  who  were  advancing  against  the  enemy.  While 
this  firing  was  going  on  a  very  heavy  rain  set  in  and  continued 
until  the  firing  ceased.  One  who  was  there,  a  sergeant  of  Com 
pany  K,  has  a  vivid  recollection  of  General  Willich  and  of  his 
appearance  at  this  time. 

He  wore  a  rubber  cap,  rubber  overcoat  and  rubber  boots, 
ne  seemed  changed  in  manner,  for  he  was  quiet  and  cool,  where 
before  he  had  been  nervously  and  intensely  active.  Afterwards 
we  learned  that  this  quiet,  cool,  deliberate  demeanor  was  his  battle 
manner. 

The  enemy's  artillery  was  soon  silenced  and  we  were  moved 
forward  beyond  the  ridge  and  soon  came  in  sight  of  the  village 
of  Triune  on  a  steep  bank  beyond  a  small  stream.  The  enemy 
having  retreated  we  moved  forward  rapidly,  crossing  the  stream 
on  the  stringers  of  a  bridge  and  on  stones  in  the  stream,  and 
passing  through  the  village  were  halted  on  a  wooded  hillside 
where  we  encamped  for  the  night.  The  entire  population  of 
the  village  seemed  to  have  fled  and  it  was  literally  sacked  by  our 
men.  Everything  was  taken  that  the  stragglers  could  carry  away. 
On  our  march  next  morning  men  were  seen  carrying  bolts  of 
cloth,  muslin,  calico,  hoopskirts,  ribbons,  hardware,  queensware 
and  glassware,  and  one  was  happy  in  the  possession  of  an  old 
fashioned  surveyor's  compass,  which  he  was  carrying  on  his 
knapsack. 


CAMPAIGN   AND  BATTLE  OF  STONE  RIVER  231 

General  Rosecrans  on  December  28,  reported  to  General 
Halleck  at  Washington,  concerning  our  advance  on  Triune,  as  fol 
lows:  "Our  advance  was  delayed  one  day.  The  right  wing  under 
McCook  drove  Hardee's  skirmishers  18  miles  down  the  Nolens- 
ville  pike  and  advanced  on  Triune  for  battle.  A  heavy  fog  de 
layed  their  advance  and  gave  Hardee  time  to  escape  towards 
Murfreesboro." 

Sunday  December  28,  we  had  orders  to  move  at  7  o'clock 
a.  m.  After  passing  the  outposts,  the  two  Indiana  regiments  of 
the  brigade,  the  32d  and  39th,  sent  out  skirmishers,  with  a  squad 
ron  of  cavalry  in  the  advance.  We  moved  forward  rapidly 
southward  on  the  Shelbyville  pike,  but  soon  left  it  and  turning 
into  a  road  running  west  toward  Salem,  followed  it  for  two  or 
three  miles  and  formed  line  of  battle  in  a  large  open  field,  where 
a  sharp  skirmish  took  place  in  front.  There  we  received  orders 
to  return  and  marched  back  to  our  camp  at  Triune. 

General  Rosecrans  speaks  of  this  march  as  a  reconnoissance 
to  Riggs  Cross  roads,  which  developed  the  fact  that  Hardee's 
corps  had  fallen  back  toward  Murfreesboro.1  General  McCook 
at  1 :30  P.  M.  sent  a  dispatch  to  General  Rosecrans  saying,  among 
other  things : 

"The  following  dispatch  has  just  been  received  (verbatim  et 
literatim)  from  General  Willich,  who  is  7  miles  in  advance  on  the 
Shelbyville  pike.  'The  enemy  is  no  more  here ;  all  gone  to  Mur 
freesboro'  ".2 

On  the  night  of  the  28th,  General  McCook  sent  word  to  Gen 
eral  Rosecrans  that,  unless  he  had  other  orders,  before  daylight 
next  morning  he  would  march  his  troops  (the  right  wing)  as 
rapidly  as  possible  toward  Murfreesboro  over  the  Bole  Jack 
road,  that  the  road  went  by  Lane's  store  and  crossed  the  old 
Shelbyville  road  at  Wilkinson's,  seven  miles  from  Murfreesboro. 
that  the  distance  from  Triune  to  Murfreesboro  was  16  miles,  that 
his  corps  threatened  the  enemy's  line  of  communication  and  that 
he  expected  to  be  strongly  resisted.3 

December  28,  we  marched  at  7  o'clock,  and  in  order  to  reach 
the  Bole  Jack  road  marched  apparently  towards  Nashville  for 
about  three  miles,  which  gave  rise  to  the  rumor  that  we  were  re 
treating.  We  then  struck  the  Bole  Jack  road  and  followed  it  all 
day.  The  first  few  miles  of  the  road  had  been  beaten  smooth  by 
other  troops  preceding  us  and  the  marching  was  easy.  But  after 
passing  over  a  hill  from  the  top  of  which  we  had  a  fine  view  of 
'the  country  for  a  long  distance,  we  came  to  a  dense  cedar  forest 

1  W.  R.  R.  R.  20.  part  1-190. 

2  W.   R.   R.   20,  part   2-254. 

3  W.  R.  R.  20,  part  2-255. 


232  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

where  the  roads  were  nearly  impassable  and  we  made  slow  prog 
ress.  About  dark,  when  pushing  on  ahead  of  the  artillery  and 
trains,  we  came  into  an  open  country  where  we  rested  for  awhile. 
We  then  moved  into  a  muddy  corn  field  near  Wilkinson's  Cross 
roads,  where  we  bivouaced  for  the  night  and  were  forbidden  to 
build  fires.  We  were  hungry  and  cold  and  would  have  given 
almost  anything  for  a  cup  of  hot  coffee  or  a  chance  to  make  it. 
To  add  to  our  discomfort  it  began  raining.  We  passed  a  miser 
ably  uncomfortable  night.  Except  some  light  skirmishing  early 
in  the  evening,  nothing  occurred  to  indicate  our  close  approach 
to  the  enemy,  although  we  were  said  to  be  within  four  or  five 
miles  of  Murfreesboro.  At  10:25  that  night  General  McCook 
sent  a  dispatch  to  General  Rosecrans  saying  that  all  was  quiet  on 
his  front,  that  his  right  was  retired  and  he  thought  safe,  that  his 
headquarters  were  exactly  on  the  cross  roads  and  that  he  hoped 
to  see  him,  General  Rosecrans,  that  night  or  early  next  morning.1 

Next  day,  the  30th,  at  daybreak,  we  were  permtited  to  build 
small  fires,  and  after  getting  our  breakfasts  stood  around  them 
in  a  pouring  rain.  We  were  ordered  to  move  at  8  o'clock  and 
resumed  our  onward  march  toward  Murfreesboro  on  a  new  pike 
made  of  sharp  gravel  which  ground  away  our  shoe  soles,  already 
grown  thin  from  recent  marches.  We  began  to  hear  an  occa 
sional  boom  from  our  cannon  opening  the  great  contest  which 
we  realized  was  beginning.  After  marching  two  miles  we  formed 
column  in  a  piece  of  woods,  where  the  5th  brigade,  (General 
Kirk's)  was  also  formed.  We  afterwards  advanced  to  the  cover 
of  another  woods,  where  we  remained  during  the  afternoon.  Con 
siderable  firing  was  going  on,  both  artillery  and  infantry,  as  our 
army  gradually  closed  in  on  the  enemy. 

The  writer  recalls  that  while  in  these  woods  awaiting  orders, 
all  were  impressed  with  the  sense  of  impending  battle.  Those 
who  were  close  friends  seemed  to  wish  to  get  together  and  talk 
of  home  and  mutual  friends  and  of  the  chances  of  the  strife. 
The  writer  recalls  a  talk  he  had  with  Sergeant  William  Addison 
Hogue  of  Company  E,  a  home  friend  and  companion,  who  went 
into  the  battle  next  day  and  was  never  heard  of  afterwards. 

We  were  held. in  this  place  in  reserve  until  near  dark,  when 
we  were  moved  about  a  mile  to  the  right  on  the  Franklin  road. 
There  the  brigade  was  formed  to  protect  the  extreme  right  of 
the  army.  Five  companies  of  the  30th  Indiana  were  formed  on 
the  right  of  General  Kirk's  brigade,  but  retired  almost  at  right 
angles  to  it,  and  five  companies  were  put  forward  as  skirmishers, 
connecting  with  General  Kirk's  skirmishers  on  the  left,  and  on  the' 
right  with  the  skirmishers  of  the  32nd  Indiana,  which  extended 

1     W.  R.  R.  20,  part  2-269. 


CAMPAIGN  AND  BATTLE  OF  STONE   RIVEU  233 

south  and  west  of  the  brigade  and  covered  its  flank,  extending 
round  to  its  rear.  The  49th  Ohio  was  formed,  its  left  connecting 
with  the  right  five  companies  of  the  39th  Indiana,  and  fronting 
south.  The  89th  Illinois  was  in  close  column  in  rear  of  the  49th 
Ohio.  Our  regiment  was  formed  facing  to  the  west,  directly  west 
of  the  right  flank  of  the  89th  Illinois — our  left  only  a  short  dis 
tance  from  the  right  of  the  49th  Ohio.  Our  line  was  at  right  an 
gles  to  that  of  the  49th  Ohio,  and  we  faced  directly  to  the  rear.  In 
the  angle  formed  by  the  loth  and  49th  Ohio  was  placed  Good- 
speed's  battery.  In  this  position  we  bivouaced  for  the  night.  We 
were  not  allowed  to  build  fires,  the  night  was  very  cold  and  some 
of  the  men  suffered  severely.  We  did  not  know  how  we  were 
situated  with  reference  to  the  enemy,  but  we  afterwards  learned 
that  our  position  was  about  opposite  the  center  of  the  rebel  army. 

General  Rosecrans'  plan  of  battle  was  to  make  a  feint  of 
moving  to  the  right  to  threaten  the  enemy's  line  of  communica 
tions  and  when  the  enemy  had  massed  to  meet  the  feigned  attack, 
to  push  the  left  of  his  army  rapidly  across  Stone  River  and  into 
Murfreesboro.  It  was  made  on  the  assumption  that  the  enemy 
would  not  make  the  counter-attack  which  he  did,  with  a  view  of 
cutting  us  off  from  our  communications.  We  did  not  know  our 
General's  plans  and  rested  in  blissful  ignorance  of  what  awaited 
us  on  the  morrow. 

That  night,  it  is  presumed,  General  Rosecrans  issued  the 
following  general  orders  dated  December  31,  1862. 

Hdqrs.  Dept.  of  the  Cumberland, 

In  Front  of  Murfreesborough. 

General  Orders.  December  31,  1862. 

No.— 

The  General  commanding  desires  to  say  to  the  soldiers  of  the 
Irrny  of  the  Cumberland  that  he  was  well  pleased  with  their  conduct 
yesterday,  it  is  all  he  could  have  wished  for,  he  neither  saw  nor  heard 
of  any  skulking,  they  behaved  with  the  coolness  and  gallantry  of 
veterans.  He  now  feels  perfectly  confident,  with  God's  grace  and 
their  help,  of  striking  this  day  a  blow  for  the  country,  the  most  crush 
ing,  perhaps,  which  the  rebellion  has  yet  sustained. 

Soldiers,  the  eyes  of  the  whole  nation  are  upon  you,  the  very  fate 
of  the  nation  may  be  said  to  hang  on  the  issue  of  this  day's  battle. 
Be  true,  then,  to  yourselves,  true  to  your  own  manly  character  and 
soldierly  reputation,  true  to  the  love  of  your  dear  ones  at  home,  whose 
prayers  ascend  to  God  this  day  for  your  success. 

Be  cool!  I  need  not  ask  you  to  be  brave,  keep  ranks.  Do  not 
throw  away  your  fire.  Fire  slowly,  deliberately,  above  all  fire  low, 
and  be  always  sure  of  your  aim.  Close  steadily  in  upon  the  enemy,  and, 
when  you  get  within  charging  distance,  rush  on  him  with  the  bayonet. 


234  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

Do  this,  and  the  victory  will  certainly  be  yours.    Recollect  that  there  are 
hardly  any  troops  in  the  world  that  will  stand  a  bayonet  charge,  and 
that  those  who  make  it,  therefore  are  sure  to  win. 
By  command  of  Maj.  Gen.  W.  B.  Rosecrans. 

J.  P.  GARESHE, 
Asst.  Adjt.  Gen.  and,  Chief  of  Staff. 

As  will  be  seen  there  was  no  time  to  publish  this  order  on  the 
morning  of  December  31  to  the  troops  on  our  part  of  the  line. 

The  morning  of  December  31,  1862,  was  very  cold  and  clear. 
At  daybreak  we  were  awakened,  built  small  fires  and  made  our 
coffee.  While  we  were  so  engaged  we  had  time  to  look  about  us. 
We  saw  that  our  brigade,  posted  as  above  described,  was  in  a 
wooded  field  about  330  yards  square  and  that  a  comparatively 
open  country  stretched  away  toward  the  supposed  position  of  the 
enemy,  with  a  clump  of  woods  several  hundred  yards  to  the  south 
east  of  our  position.  To  our  rear,  towards  which  our  regiment 
fronted,  was  a  small  open  field  and  on  the  farther  side  of  it  was 
a  fence  made  of  upright  cedar  poles  closely  tied  together,  and 
to  the  left  of  the  fence  was  a  small  farm  house  which  was  reached 
by  a  gate  in  the  fence. 

Lieutenant  Colonel  Miles,  of  the  49th  Ohio,  who  was  then 
a  Lieutenant  and  Aide  de  Camp  on  the  staff  of  General  Willich, 
in  a  letter  written  to  his  father  January  7,  1863,  says  that  very 
early,  on  the  morning  of  December  31,  General  Willich  rode  to 
General  Johnson's  headquarters,  that  he.  Lieutenant  Miles,  noti 
fied  Colonel  Gibson  of  General  Willich's  absence  and  then  fol 
lowed  him.  That  the  general  had  started  back  to  the  brigade  and 
rode  right  into  the  advancing  enemy  and  was  captured ;  that  he, 
Lieutenant  Miles,  after  reporting  to  General  Johnson,  also  started 
back  to  the  brigade  and  rode  between  two  of  the  advancing  lines 
of  the  enemy.  That  having  on  his  overcoat,  he  was  mistaken 
for  an  aide  of  one  of  the  Confederate  generals  and  ordered  to 
place  an  Arkansas  regiment  in  position.  He  says,  "I  saluted  him 
as  I  would  one  of  our  own  commanders,  wheeled  my  horse  and 
rode  in  the  direction  of  their  reserve  until  behind  a  cluster  of 
bushes,  when  I  turned  to  the  left  and  came  out  through  Davis' 
lines".  He  also  says  that  he  met  General  Davis,  told  him  where 
the  enemy's  lines  were,  saw  him  place  a  battery  in  position  to 
play  on  them  and  then  rode  back  to  the  brigade. 

While  we  were  blowing  our  coffee  cool  enough  to  drink,  sud 
denly  came  the  sharp  zt,  st,  of  bullets  and  we  heard  General  Gib 
son's  stentorian  voice  calling  out,  "Fall  in  49th  and  15th  Ohio! 
Hook  up  them  battery  horses"  !  Dashing  our  coffee  to  the  ground 
we  rushed  to  the  line,  took  our  guns  from  the  stacks  and  soon  had 
orders  to  move  a  few  paces  forward  and  countermarch.  In  the 


CAMPAIGN   A.ND  BATTLE  OF  STOAE  RLMAI  235 

confusion,  the  order  was  not  understood  by  Captain  Joshua  K. 
Brown,  commanding  Company  B,  and  there  was  a  momentary 
delay,  until  a  sergeant  of  Company  K1  ran  to  him,  took  him  by  the 
arm,  told  him  the  order  and  pulled  him  in  the  right  direction. 
But  before  the  movement  to  countermarch  could  be  completed, 
we  were  ordered  to  lie  down  and  commence  firing.  Captain  Thos. 
E.  Douglass,  long  afterwards,  claimed  to  have  first  given  the  order 
to  fire.  Air.  A.  B.  Graham,  who  was  writing  a  history  of  Rich- 
land  County,  asked  the  \vriter  to  confirm  his  statement  in  this  re 
spect,  as  Captain  Douglass  had  cited  him  as  witness  of  the  fact, 
but  the  writer  could  not  recall  the  incident  he  described.  How 
many  rounds  we  fired  one  cannot  remember.  Colonel  Gibson  in 
his  official  report  as  brigade  commander  says  six.  It  may  have 
been  more  or  less.  It  seems,  however,  from  the  official  reports 
that  \ve  held  our  ground  long  enough  to  enable  the  49th  Ohio  and 
89th  Illinois  to  retire  in  fairly  good  order,  but  not  the  32d  and 
:>9th  Indiana,  who  for  a  time  were  separated  from  the  brigade. 
It  soon  became  apparent  that  the  enemy  were  rapidly  closing  in 
on  our  front  and  flank  and  threatening  our  rear  in  such  numbers 
that  our  only  hope  of  escape  was  in  rapid  retreat.  Whether  we 
received  an  order  to  fall  back  or  not  one  cannot  recall,  (Colonel 
Wallace  in  his  official  report  says  he  gave  such  order).  We  went 
back  in  fairly  good  order  until  the  picket  fence,  heretofore  men 
tioned,  arose  in  our  way.  Many  of  our  men  tried  to  pull  the 
pickets  apart  in  order  to  get  through.  Some  got  over  and  many 
were  either  killed  or  wounded  trying  to  do  so.  The  writer  tried 
to  get  over  or  through  the  fence  and  failing  to  do  so,  ran  to  the 
left  towards  the  advancing  enemy  and  passed  through  the  gate 
leading  into  the  house  before  mentioned.  Just  after  passing  the 
house  a  ball  from  one  of  the  enemy's  rifles  struck  him  in  the  right 
arm  and  knocked  his  gun  from  his  hand.  He  picked  it  up  with 
his  left  hand  and  continued  his  retreat  not  knowing  whether  his 
arm  was  broken  or  only  bruised.  Fortunately  the  ball  was  so  far 
spent  and  his  overcoat  cape  so  thick  that  it  only  inflicted  a  severe 
bruise. 

The  above  description  of  the  beginning  of  the  battle  is  the 
writer's  personal  recollection.  Gleason  in  his  diary  says,  "we 
had  hardly  tasted  our  breakfasts  when  the  bullets  began  to 
whistle  about  our  heads  and  we  sprang  to  arms  as  quickly  as 
possible.  Advancing  to  the  open  field  in  the  edge  of  which  we 
had  lain,  we  received  the  order  to  counter-march  by  file  left  to 
bring  us  facing  the  enemy,  but  before  this  movement  could  be 
executed  our  men  began  to  fall  and  after  delivering  one  volley, 
seeing  the  enemy  in  close  proximity,  three  lines  deep,  with  no 

1     The    writer. 


236  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

supports  near  us,  we  were  ordered  to  fall  back.  A  high  rail 
fence  was  close  in  our  rear,  while  a  little  to  our  right  was  a  gap 
leading  to  some  negro  quarters  on  a  plantation.  Many  of  the 
men  went  through  the  gap  instead  of  climbing  the  fence,  and  got 
too  far  to  the  right  (he  means  too  far  to  the  west),  while  those 
who  got  over  the  fence  necessarily  lost  their  formation,  and  the 
result  was  an  indiscriminate  retreat  to  the  rear,  in  which  men  of 
nearly  all  the  regiments  of  the  brigade  mingled  together." 

This  fence  proved  to  be  a  fatal  obstruction  to  anything  like 
an  orderly  retreat.  The  writer  thinks  he  cannot  be  mistaken  in 
its  character,  for  he  tried  to  get  through  it  by  pulling  the  cedar 
pickets  apart  and  failing  to  do  so  took  the  course  before  men 
tioned.  The  fence  farther  to  the  right  may  have  been  built  of 
rails  and  this  may  account  for  the  discrepancy  in  our  experiences. 
It  was  in  this  field  and  at  or  near  this  fence  that  we  suffered  our 
chief  losses  of  the  four  day's  battle.  Here  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Askew,  Major  McClenahan,  Capt.  Thos.  E.  Douglass  and  Lieu 
tenants  Samuel  Hilles  and  Nicholas  Fowler  were  wounded.  Here 
the  most  of  our  killed  and  wounded  fell,  and  here  over  a  hundred 
of  our  men  were  taken  prisoners  by  the  enemy.  Lieut.  Col. 
Askew  was  severely  wounded  in  the  hip.  Sergeants  Wm.  G. 
Malin  and  William  Addison.  Hogue  of  Company  E  tried  to  get 
him  off  the  field,  but  he  ordered  them  to  leave  him  and  take  care 
of  themselves,  which  they  did.  Sergeant  Malin  is  the  last  known 
person  who  saw  Sergeant  Hogue  alive.  He  was  never  seen  or 
heard  of  afterwards  and  to  this  day  his  fate  is  not  known.  Father, 
mother,  sisters  and  brothers,  since  then  have  searched  among  the 
grave  stones  in  all  the  cemeteries  north  and  south  and  have 
traced  every  clue  which  promised  anything  tangible,  but  all  to 
no  purpose.  All  that  can  be  said  of  him  is,  that  he  went  into  the 
battle  and  was  never  heard  of  afterwards.  One  can  imagine  the 
weary  vigil  in  the  country  home  where  he  was  the  joy  and  pride 
of  the  family,  and  how  a  step  on  the  walk,  or  an  unexpected  knock 
at  the  door,  made  the  hearts  of  loved  ones  beat  with  fond  hope, 
only  to  sink  again  into  despair.  The  father  and  mother  are  long 
since  dead,  but  perhaps  even  yet,  some  loving  one  of  the  family 
is  still  hoping  against  hope  for  his  return.  The  war  was  full  of 
terrible  tragedies,  but  there  were  few  more  terrible  than  instances 
like  this. 

Shortly  after  clearing  the  fence,  those  who  did  so,  crossed 
a  small  stream  and  came  on  to  higher  ground.  Our  compact,  close, 
efficient  organizations  had  apparently  gone  all  to  pieces  and  one 
could  see  only  a  disorganized  crowd  moving  to  the  rear,  appar 
ently  under  no  command  whatever.  The  enemy's  cavalry  ap 
peared  on  our  flank,  and  some  one  called  out  "fix  bayonets"  and 


CAMPAIGN  AND  BATTLE  OF  STONE  RTVEI-  237 

every  man  fixed  his  bayonet  to  be  ready  for  a  cavalry  charge. 
Soon  we  came  to  a  rail  fence  extending  along  a  bluff  bank  which 
commanded  a  good  view  of  the  valley  we  had  crossed  in  our 
disorderly  retreat.  Everyone  saw  it  was  a  good  place  to  make 
a  stand,  and  without  orders  the  men  formed  a  line  along  the 
fence.  A  sergeant  of  Company  K1  noticed  that  the  men  still  had 
their  bayonets  on  their  guns,  and  went  along  between  the  fence 
and  the  approaching  enemy  and  asked  the  men  to  unfix  bayonets 
so  they  could  better  fire  through  the  fence.  The  request  was  as 
promptly  complied  with  as  if  it  had  been  an  order  from  the  com 
mander  in  chief  delivered  in  person.  Lieutenant  Belden  with 
one  gun  of  Goodspeed's  battery  had  taken  position  on  our  left, 
and  as  the  enemy  came  forward  in  heavy  columns  he  planted 
some  shells  right  in  their  midst.  The  shells  and  the  well-delivered 
fire  from  our  line  behind  the  fence  gave  the  enemy  a  momentary 
check.  Soon,  however,  we  were  out-flanked  by  the  enemy's 
cavalry  and  were  compelled  to  fall  back,  firing  at  the  enemy 
every  chance  we  could  get.  Finally,  we  came  to  a  "devil's  lane", 
two  fences  close  together,  crossed  them  and  came  into  a  fine  open 
piece  of  woods  through  which  thousands  of  men  seemed  to  be 
drifting  in  disorder.  There  had  been  no  attempt  to  reform  our 
regiment  and  so  far  as  one  could  see,  the  other  regiments  of  the 
brigade  with  one  exception  were  in  the  same  state  of  disorder. 
The  exception  was  the  89th  Illinois.  It  appeared  to  be  compact 
and  in  perfect  order.  It  was  commanded  by  Charles  T.  Hotch- 
kiss.  its  Colonel,  who  was  mounted  and  was  coolly  conducting 
its  retreat.  In  this  woods  we  had  the  color  sergeant  with  us, 
who  was  still  carrying  our  regimental  flag.  Lieutenant  Chandler 
W.  Carroll  of  Company  E  and  a  few  men  rallied  about  the  flag, 
raised  a  shout,  and  started  back  through  the  woods  to  the  devil's 
fence  above  mentioned,  calling  on  every  one  to  turn  back.  In  a 
moment,  almost,  the  tide  of  retreat  turned  and  everyone  was 
cheering  and  rushing  wildly  back.  We  formed  along  the  devil's 
lane  and  as  the  enemy  came  up  we  gave  them  a  galling  fire.  We 
continued  it  until  the  enemy's  cavalry  again  came  round  our 
flank  and  we  were  again  compelled  to  fall  back.  It  was  our  last 
stand  until  we  reached  the  Nashville  pike.  Here  we  saw  a  line 
of  men  in  perfect  order,  standing  with  bayonets  fixed,  and  ready 
to  meet  the  enemy  as  soon  as  our  stragglers  got  out  of  the  way. 
The  line  was  in  command  of  Colonel  Moses  B.  Walker  of  the 
31st  Ohio,  who  sternly  ordered  us  to  pass  round  his  troops  and 
not  to  attempt  to  break  his  line.  We  had  no  sooner  passed  to  his 
right  than  the  enemy  approached  within  firing  distance,  and 
Walker's  men  did  some  as  fine  stand  up  firing  and  fighting  as  we 

1     The  writer. 


238  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

had  ever  seen.  The  remnants  of  our  regiment  soon  formed  on 
the  right  of  Walker's  troops  and  with  them  advanced  into  the 
cedar  woods  and  engaged  the  enemy.  Here  Isaac  Eugene  Dillon 
of  Company  E  was  wounded — shot  in  the  cheek  or  jaw — and  the 
writer  can  still  see  his  look  of  anguish  as  he  went  to  the  rear.  At 
this  point  the  enemy's  advance  was  checked.  It  was  about  night 
fall.  The  remnants  of  the  regiments  of  the  brigade  were  gathered 
together  and  withdrawn  a  few  yards  and  placed  in  reserve,  Col 
onel  Wallace  in  command. 

We  bivouaced  among  the  rocks,  and  as  our  stragglers  came 
up  we  began  to  realize  how  disastrous  the  day  had  been.  General 
Willich  was  reported  killed.  Colonel  Askew  was  wounded  and 
captured,  and  more  than  one-half  our  men  were  missing,  many 
of  whom  were  killed  or  wounded  and  in  the  enemy's  hands.  We 
had  been  driven  back  between  three  and  four  miles  and  had  lost, 
it  was  said,  thirty-one  pieces  of  artillery  and  thousands  of  pris 
oners.  The  night  was  very  cold,  all  had  lost  their  blankets  and 
overcoats  and  fires  were  forbidden.  A  group  of  shivering  men, 
in  violation  of  the  order,  had  made  a  small  fire  between  two  rocks 
and  were  trying  to  warm  themselves  when  General  Rosecrans 
came  by  on  foot.  He  said,  "My  men  you  must  not  do  that.  Just 
a  short  while  ago  some  men  farther  along  the  line  made  a  little 
fire  and  the  rebels  threw  a  shell  into  their  midst  and  killed  or 
wounded  some  of  them.  Better  bear  the  cold".  The  men  put 
out  the  fire  very  promptly.  WThile  we  were  shivering  and  wait 
ing,  a  group  of  officers  were  crouched  together  talking,  and  we 
noticed  Colonel  Gibson  who  had  been  taken  prisoner  in  the  morn 
ing,  and  when  released  had  drifted  back  wtih  the  debris  of  battle 
to  Overall's  or  Stewart's  Creek.  He  had  just  come  up  and  was 
relating  his  experiences.  He  said,  among  other  things,  "when  our 
cavalry  charged  the  enemy  and  released  us,  I  thought  the  day  was 
lost,  and  said  to  myself,  'Here's  for  Nashville  or  the  Cumberland 
River'  ".  General  Rosecrans  came  to  our  part  of  the  line  more 
than  once  during  the  night.  He  seemed  to  be  unattended.  He 
wore  a  private's  cavalry  overcoat.  His  face  was  drawn,  his  jaw 
set,  and  we  heard  him  say  more  than  once,  "Bragg's  a  good  dog, 
but  Hold  Fast's  a  better".  His  presence  inspired  confidence. 
He  gave  us  to  understand  that  there  was  to  be  no  retreat,  but  that 
we  would  fight  it  out  where  we  were.  We  got  the  impression 
that  we  were  receiving  large  reinforcements,  and  stragglers  com 
ing  in  reported  seeing  the  camp  fires  of  several  thousand  new 
troops  coming  to  our  help.  We  heard  afterwards  that,  to  create 
this  same  impression  on  the  enemy,  General  Rosecrans  had  sent 
out  officers  to  instruct  the  stragglers  back  at  Overall's  and 
Stewart's  Creeks  to  build  fires.  This  deception  evidently  had  its 


CAMPAIGN   AND  BATTLE  OF  STONE  RIVER  239 

desired  effect  for  General  Bragg  in  his  official  report  of  the  battle 
gives  our  reinforcements  as  one  of  his  reasons  for  giving  up 
Murfreesboro.  It  also  gave  us  hope  that  we  could  renew  the 
battle  next  morning  with  hope  of  final  victory. 

Our  regiment  that  night  was  but  a  sorry  remnant  of  the  fine 
body  of  men  which  had  faced  the  enemy  at  daybreak.  Over  one 
hundred  had  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  how  many  had 
been  killed  and  wounded,  we  could  not  know.  Company  H  which 
mustered  60  men  in  the  morning,  could  only  muster  8  including 
Lieutenant  Updegrove  and  Orderly  Sergeant  Gleason.1  Some  of 
the  other  companies  had  suffered  as  severely.  But  our  thinned 
ranks  closed  up  and  there  was  no  faltering  on  the  part  of  any  one. 
Added  to  the  terrible  depression  over  our  defeat  and  the  loss  of 
so  many  of  our  comrades,  was  the  hunger  which  seized  us.  We 
had  had  no  rations  all  day  and  none  were  in  sight.  So  in  hunger 
and  cold  and  wretchedness  we  passed  the  awful  night.  The  near 
presence  of  the  enemy  and  an  occasional  firing  along  the  picket 
line,  however,  kept  us  nerved  up  for  further  effort  and  prevented 
anything  like  despair. 

The  next  morning  we  drew  one  day's  rations  of  hard  tack, 
bacon  and  coffee.  We  were  on  the  reserve  of  the  brigade  but 
expecting  to  be  called  on  at  any  moment.  The  conflict  of  the 
preceding  day  had  been  so  fierce  and  deadly,  that  it  seemed  both 
armies  were  loth  to  renew  it.  There  was  some  artillery  firing  on 
different  parts  of  our  line  and  an  occasional  lively  rattle  of  mus 
ketry  along  parts  of  the  skirmish  line,  which  seemed  a  renewal 
of  the  battle.  Although  we  were  on  the  reserve,  we  were  exposed 
to  the  artillery  fire  of  the  enmy,  but  it  did  us  no  damage.  One 
solid  shot  from  the  enemy's  cannon  came  ricocheting  into  our 
bivouac,  knocked  down  a  stack  of  guns  and  struck  Sergeant  John 
J.  Glover  in  the  rump,  which  caused  a  great  laugh  at  his  expense, 
as  we  saw  it  did  not  seriously  hurt  him. 

W^e  were  shortly  called  into  line  and  the  brigade,  Colonel  Gib 
son  in  command,  moved  back  along  the  pike.  We  moved  out 
behind  a  ridge  which  hid  our  movement  from  the  enemy  and 
then  marched  back  in  plain  view  of  his  skirmishers  and  cavalry. 
We  did  this  a  number  of  times,  for  the  purpose,  it  was  said,  of 
giving  the  rebels  the  impression  that  we  were  receiving  reinforce 
ments.  We  were  a  nervous  lot,  although  we  made  a  bluff  of 
seeming  as  brave  as  ever.  When  we  were  making  one  of  these 
marches,  a  single  musket  ball  from  the  enemy's  lines  came  singing 
over  our  heads  and  every  man  in  the  line  ducked  his  head  as  it 
passed,  which  caused  a  general  laugh.  Finally  we  were  posted 
along  the  pike  to  resist  a  threatened  attack  on  our  right.  Colonel 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


240  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

Gibson  in  his  official  report  says  our  brigade  was  directed  to 
reconnoiter  the  woods  to  the  right  and  rear  of  our  position,  that 
it  was  done  under  the  observation  of  Generals  Rosecrans  and 
McCook;  that  we  reached  the  woods  unobserved  by  the  enemy, 
but  soon  met  his  sharpshooters  and  discovered  that  he  was  mass 
ing  his  infantry  under  cover  of  these  woods,  with  the  apparent 
design  of  attacking  our  extreme  right;  that  in  withdrawing  we 
were  harassed  by  shot  and  shell  from  the  rebel  batteries,  but  sus 
tained  no  loss ;  that  we  were  soon  directed  to  reoccupy  the  woods 
and  promptly  took  up  our  position  with  the  15th  Ohio,  the  32d 
Indiana  and  the  89th  Illinois  in  line  of  battle,  (their  front  covered 
by  skirmishers)  and  the  39th  Indiana  and  49th  Ohio,  which  had 
been  temporarily  consolidated  under  Lieutenant  Colonel  Jones, 
as  a  reserve ;  and  that  the  enemy's  cavalry  made  a  dash  upon  our 
position  but  were  gallantly  repulsed  by  our  skirmishers.  He  also 
says  that  other  troops  were  placed  on  our  left,  our  line  with 
drawn  to  the  margin  of  the  woods,  our  flank  covered  by  a  strong 
force  of  cavalry  and  that  "the  prompt  movement  of  our  forces 
and  the  splendid  maneuvering  of  the  commander  in  chief  defeated 
the  designs  of  the  enemy  and  no  further  attack  was  made".1 

Lieutenant  Miles  really  first  discovered  and  reported  this  at 
tempt  of  the  enemy  on  our  right,  and  in  the  letter  before  quoted 
from  he  says :  "General  Rosecrans  in  the  after  part  of  the  day, 
(January  1st)  ordered  Gibson  out  with  the  brigade  about  three- 
fourths  of  a  mile  to  the  rear  and  right  on  a  reconnoissance.  We 
discovered  immense  bodies  of  the  enemy's  infantry  and  artillery 
approaching,  preceded  by  cavalry,  which  made  one  dash  upon 
us  and  were  handsomely  repulsed.  Reporting  the  same  to  General 
Rosecrans,  he  came  on,  viewed  the  ground,  and  in  a  few  moments 
great  preparation  was  made  for  an  attack.  The  enemy  seeing 
this,  withdrew  during  the  night  to  their  center". 

We  remained  in  the  position  last  above  described  until 
night,  when  our  regiment  was  marched  back  near  the  General 
Hospital,  where  we  were  permitted  to  build  fires  and  make 
ourselves  as  comfortable  as  possible  for  the  night.  Companies 
G  and  H  were  called  out,  however,  after  three  hours  rest, 
and  went  on  picket  duty  for  the  same  length  of  time.  We  were 
without  rations  and  there  were  no  prospects  of  receiving  any, 
as  the  enemy  had  burned  the  train  which  was  bringing  them 
up  to  the  front.  These  facts  are  taken  from  Gleason's  diary, 
and  he  adds,  "So  we  expect  to  fast  tomorrow  as  well  as  fight." 
The  day  had  passed  without  any  very  serious  fighting  on  any 
part  of  the  lines,  and  it  seemed  both  armies  were  resting  and 
making  ready  for  hot  work  on  the  morrow.  During  the  day 

1     W.  R.  R.  20,  part  1-306. 


CAMPAIGN  AND  BATTLE  OF  STONE  RIVER  241 

quite  a  number  of  our  men  who  had  been  slightly  wounded 
came  up  and  took  their  places  in  the  ranks. 

The  morning  of  January  2,  we  were  called  out  on 
picket  and  stood  until  daylight,  when  we  were  relieved  and 
built  fires  with  rails  from  the  roadside.  We  soon  heard  con 
siderable  artillery  firing  at  the  front  towards  Murfreesboro, 
and  wrere  marched  back  to  the  position  we  held  the  morn 
ing  of  the  1st.  The  cannonade  soon  became  louder  and  more 
terrific,  and  we  knew  that  the  enemy  was  making  an  assault 
on  a  portion  of  our  line.  The  attack  continued  nearly  an  hour, 
the  shells,  some  of  them,  falling  unpleasantly  near  us,  when 
the  enemy  was  driven  back.  We  were  again  in  reserve,  one 
of  the  most  trying  positions  during  a  battle.  We  were 
exposed  to  the  enemy's  fire  but  could  not  reply.  We  were 
in  constant  suspense,  not  knowing  when  we  would  be  called 
on,  but  realizing  that  some  disaster  on  some  portion  of  the 
line  might  occur  at  any  moment,  and  that  then  we  would  be 
called  to  help  retrieve  it.  Added  to  our  suspense  was  a 
keen  hunger,  for  we  had  no  rations  issued  to  us  that  morning. 
During1  the  day  we  did  get  some  corn  which  we  parched  on 
the  cob,  and  each  man  got  about  two  cubic  inches  of  mixed 
vegetables  which  we  cooked  and  ate.  We  congratulated  our 
selves  that  we  were  not  yet  driven  to  horse  flesh,  as  we  heard 
•was  the  case  with  the  men  in  Rousseau's  division.  After  the 
assault  in  the  morning  there  was  more  or  less  firing  going  on 
on  different  parts  of  the  line,  but  it  was  desultory  and  indi 
cated  no  serious  advance  of  either  army.  Suddenly,  there 
was  a  furious  rattle  of  musketry  and  roar  of  artillery  over 
on  our  left,  and  our  batteries  on  a  knoll  to  our  left  and  a  few 
hundred  yards  in  front,  began  a  furious  cannonade.  The 
storm  of  battle  raged  for  perhaps  an  hour.  It  had  grown  dark 
enough  to  reveal  the  flashes  of  the  guns,  when  out  of  the 
dun  smoke  of  the  batteries  came  an  officer  riding  with  great 
speed  towards  our  bivouac.  It  was  General  McCook.  As  he 
came  up  he  called  out:  "Colonel  Gibson,  take  your  brigade 
and  charge  those  d — d  rebels  who  are  coming  up  along  the 
river.  Give  'em  the  bayonet !  Drive  'em  into  the  river !  Stick 
'em  in  the  — !"  Colonel  Gibson  at  once  called  out,  "Fall  in 
First  Brigade."  We  quickly  formed  and  Colonel  Gibson 
made  us  a  little  speech.  He  said:  "Men,  there  is  no  use  to 
disguise  matters ;  our  situation  is  desperate.  We've  got  to 
fight  for  our  very  existence.  We'll  march  out  here  in  double 
column  and  deploy  and  go  in  on  the  bayonet.  Every  man 
to  his  post !"  That  speech,  delivered  with  that  marvellous 
voice  and  impressive  manner  which  distinguished  Colonel 


242  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

Gibson  above  all  other  men  of  his  day  and  generation,  has 
never  been  forgotten  by  the  men  who  heard  it.  All  suspense, 
all  anxiety  at  once  vanished,  and  each  man  seized  his  gun 
with  a  firmer  grasp,  as  we  marched  forward  to  the  charge. 
We  deployed  into  line,  fixed  bayonets  and  marched  up  the 
knoll  where  our  batteries,  fifty  cannon,  were  posted  and  firing 
on  the  enemy.  In  the  growing  dusk,  the  flashes  gleamed 
through  the  smoke,  and  it  seemed  a  genuine  inferno  into 
which  we  were  marching.  The  ground  in  rear  of  the  big  guns 
was  covered  by  men  lying  on  the  ground  in  support  of  them. 
We  tried  to  pick  our  way  through  them,  but  they  called  out, 
"step  right  on  us  boys,"  and  we  did  step  on  their  prostrate 
bodies  and  so  preserved  our  line  unbroken.  We  soon  cleared 
the  batteries  and  charged  down  along  the  river.  The  Thirty- 
second  Indiana  was  to  our  right,  and  was  the  only  regiment 
of  the  brigade  to  meet  the  enemy,  who  gave  way  under  their 
well  directed  fire.  We  kept  on  until  our  regiment  found  itself 
facing  the  river,  with  our  backs  toward  the  enemy's  bat 
teries,  which  were  shelling  a  ford  in  our  front.  There  we 
were  halted  and  ordered  to  lie  down  still  facing  the  river.  A 
sergeant  of  Company  K1  noticing  that  our  own  troops  \vere 
across  the  river  in  our  front,  and  that  by  moving  a  few  feet 
forward  the  line  could  protect  itself  from  the  enemy's  shells, 
by  the  river  bank,  was  imprudent  enough  to  go  to  Colonel 
Wallace  and  make  this  suggestion,  and  was  rudely  ordered 
back  to  his  post.  Just  then  a  shell  from  one  of  the  enemy's 
guns  exploded  in  our  midst,  and  severely  wounded  Sergeant 
W.  G.  Malin  of  Company  E  and  one  or  two  others.  There 
upon  the  line,  without  orders,  quickly  advanced  to  the  river 
bank,  faced  about  and  took  the  position  the  imprudent  ser 
geant  had  suggested.  We  remained  in  this  position  for  a 
short  time  and  were  then  marched  back  and  bivouaced  near 
the  river  bank.  On  the  way  General  Negley,  a  part  of  whose  di 
vision  had  been  engaged  on  the  left  across  the  river,  galloped  past 
us  carrying  a  rebel  battle  flag  which  had  been  captured  in  the 
engagement.  Mounted  on  a  fine  horse,  on  which  he  sat 
superbly,  his  striking  face  all  aglow,  he  formed  a  picture  long 
to  be  remembered. 

The  following  taken  from  the  official  report  of  General 
Crittenden,  who  commanded  on  the  left,  is  a  good  description  of 
the  battle  that  evening,  and  gives  just  credit  to  our  brigade  for 
the  part  it  took  in  securing  the  complete  success  of  the  engage 
ment.  He  says  :2 

1  The  writer. 

2  W.  R.  R.  20,  part  1-450-451. 


CAMPAIGN   AND  BATTLE  OF  STONE  RIVER  243 

"On  the  evening  of  the  2nd  about  4  P.  M.,  a  sudden  and 
concentrated  attack  was  made  on  the  Third  Division,  now 
commanded  by  Colonel  Beatty.  Several  batteries  opened  at 
the  same  time  on  this  division.  The  overwhelming  numbers 
of  the  enemy,  directed  upon  two  brigades  (across  the  river)  r 
forced  them  after  bloody,  but  short,  conflict,  back  to  the  river. 
The  object  of  the  enemy  (it  is  since  ascertained)  was  to  take 
the  battery  which  we  had  on  that  side  of  the  river.  In  this 
attempt  it  is  most  likely  they  would  have  succeeded  but  for 
the  judgment  of  Colonel  Beatty  in  changing  the  position 
of  his  battery. 

As  soon  as  it  became  evident  that  the  enemy  were  driv 
ing  Colonel  Beatty,  I  turned  to  my  chief  of  artillery,  Captain 
John  Mendenhall,  and  said:  'Now,  Mendenhall,  you  must 
cover  my  men  with  your  cannon.'  Without  any  show  of  ex 
citement  or  haste,  almost  as  soon  as  the  order  was  given, 
the  batteries  began  to  open.  So  perfectly  had  he  placed  them, 
in  twenty  minutes  from  the  time  the  order  was  received,  fifty- 
two  guns  were  firing  upon  the  enemy.  They  cannot  be  said 
to  have  been  checked  in  their  advance — from  a  rapid  advance 
they  broke  at  once  into  a  rapid  retreat.  Reinforcements  soon 
began  to  arrive,  and  our  troops  crossed  the  river,  and  pursued 
the  fleeing  enemy  until  dark. 

It  is  a  pleasant  thing  to  report  that  officers  and  men 
from  the  center  and  right  wing  hurried  to  the  support  of  my 
left,  when  it  was  known  to  be  hard  pressed.  General  J.  C. 
Davis  sent  a  brigade  at  once,  without  orders ;  then  applied 
for  and  obtained  orders  to  follo\v  immediately  with  his 
division.  General  Negley,  from  the  center,  crossed  with  a 
part  of  his  division.  General  McCook,  to  whom  I  applied  for 
a  brigade,  not  knowing  of  Davis'  movement,  ordered  im 
mediately  Colonel  Gibson  to  go  with  his  brigade,  and  the 
Colonel  and  the  brigade  passed  at  double-quick  in  less  than 
five  minutes  after  the  request  was  made.  Honor  is  due  to 
such  men." 

In  the  evening  we  heard  that  the  heavy  firing  just  before 
our  charge  was  an  attack  by  Breckenridge  on  our  left,  which 
had  been  repulsed,  and  that  we  had  captured  several  pieces 
of  artillery.  We  were  also  told  that  the  enemy  were  forming 
to  cut  off  our  troops  across  the  river,  and  that  our  charge  pre 
vented  it.  That  night  we  got  rations  of  flour,  beans  and 
molasses,  and  our  hunger  was  appeased.  Shortly  after  we 
got  back  to  our  bivouac  it  began  to  rain  and  rained  all  night. 

Since  December  31,  the  enemy  had  tried  in  vain  to  find 
some  weak  spot  in  our  line,  and  with  the  day's  successes  we 


244  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

were  encouraged  to  hope  that  victory  would  yet  crown  our 
arms. 

Once  in  the  night  we  were  awakened  by  an  alarm  which 
proved  to  be  false.  The  rain  was  so  heavy  that  our  shelter 
tents  afforded  us  little  shelter.  At  4  o'clock  next  morning, 
January  3,  1863,  we  were  called  into  line  and  moved  by  a 
circuitous  route  through  water  and  mud  to  our  former  place 
on  the  reserve  in  a  grove  of  tall  cedars.  After  daylight  we 
built  fires  from  dead  branches  picked  up  in  the  grove.  Our 
supply  train  had  come  up  and  about  11  o'clock  we  were  get 
ting  in  a  new  supply  of  rations,  when  we  were  called  into 
line  and  stood  for  an  hour  expecting  the  enemy  to  attack  our 
right.  The  attack  was  not  made  and  we  returned  to  our 
fires  and  rations.  The  rain  ceased  about  noon.  The  firing 
during  the  remainder  of  the  day  was  desultory,  and  we  dried 
our  clothing  and  blankets  and  some  of  us  cleaned  our  guns, 
which  had  become  very  foul  and  rusty.  We  had  prepared 
our  supper  and  were  thinking  we  would  have  no  more  fight- 
ing  that  day,  when  suddenly  our  guns  began  shelling  the 
woods  to  our  left  front.  The  cannonade  continued  for  a  space 
and  then  we  heard  cheering  that  indicated  a  charge  on  the  left 
of  our  line.  The  cheering  extended  along  the  line  from  the 
left  until  finally  it  reached  our  front,  and  we  were  expecting 
to  be  called  out,  but  no  such  orders  came.  We  afterwards 
learned  that  a  force  of  three  or  four  regiments,  under  cover 
of  our  artillery,  had  advanced  and  driven  the  enemy's  skir 
mishers  back  to  their  main  line.  Picket  firing  was  kept  up 
during  the  night  until  towards  morning,  when  it  apparently 
ceased,  on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  at  least,  and  we  slept. 

Next  morning,  January  4,  1863,  we  could  scarcely  realize 
that  we  were  not  to  be  called  into  line  and  stand  at  arms  in 
anticipation  of  attack  by  the  enemy.  Instead,  we  slept  on, 
and  when  we  did  rise  from  our  damp  beds,  it  was  daylight 
and  all  was  quiet  along  the  line.  Soon  reports  came  that 
Murfreesbora  had  been  evaculated.  and  some  of  our  troops 
began  moving  to  the  front.  Later  the  report  was  confirmed. 
The  long,  hard  and  bloody  battle  was  over  and  we  were  in 
possession  of  the  field. 

In  the  early  afternoon  all  who  had  loaded  guns  wete 
taken  out  to  a  safe  place  and  discharged  them.  The  writer 
was  placed  in  charge  of  a  detachment  of  two  men  from  each 
company  of  the  regiment  and  directed  to  go  over  the  ground 
covered  by  our  retreat  of  December  31  and  look  after  the 
killed  and  wounded.  It  was  a  march  of  three  or  four  miles 
back  to  our  position  on  December  31,  1862,  and  covered  the 


CAMPAIGN  AND  BATTLE  OF  STOXE  RIVEH  245 

ground  where  some  of  the  hardest  fighting  took  place  We 
found  that  the  enemy  had  begun  to  make  preparations  f<  r 
burying  our  dead.  Their  own  had  already  been  buried  or 
carried  off  the  field.  In  a  number  of  places  the  bodies  were 
laid  side  by  side  in  long  ghastly  rows,  and  in  one  or  two 
places  the  ditch  in  which  they  were  to  be  placed  was  partly 
dug.  The  dead  had  been  stripped  of  their  outer  clothing, 
their  shoes  and  socks,  and  the  awful  wounds  gaped  at  us  as 
\ve  went  by.  They  were  of  every  conceivable  character.  The 
rain  had  washed  them  clean  and  there  was  absent  the  sicken 
ing  smell  of  dead  human  flesh  that  is  one  of  the  usual  results 
after  a  two  or  three  days'  battle.  But  no  one  who  that  day 
saw  these  awful  results  of  the  conflict  could  ever  forget  it. 
\Ve  went  on  and  on  and  finally  came  to  the  house  and  the  fence 
where  so  many  of  our  men  were  killed,  wounded,  or  captured. 
In  one  house  we  found  several  of  our  men  who  were  badly 
wounded,  and  almost  starved,  and  we  gave  them  everything  in 
our  haversacks.  Some  of  them  wept  for  joy  at  our  coming.  In 
one  room  we  found  Fernando  W.  Shackelford  of  Company  E, 
John  Rennard  of  Company  K  and  others.  Sergeant  John 
Dan  ford  of  Company  E,  was  lying  on  the  floor  with  his  shoes 
for  a  pillow.  He  was  suffering  from  a  mortal  wound  in  the 
abdomen,  from  which  he  shortly  afterwards  died. 

In  another  house  we  found  others  of  our  wounded,  and 
in  still  another,  about  a  mile  from  where  he  wras  wounded,  we 
found  Captain  Douglass,  who  had  been  shot  in  the  lungs  and 
still  carried  in  his  body  until  his  death  in  1914:,  the  bullet  which 
wounded  him. 

Some  of  the  men  had  wonderful  stories  to  tell  of  their 
experience,  but  we  could  not  take  the  time  to  hear  all  of  them 
then.  We  searched  the  fields  for  our  killed,  found  some  of 
them,  and  as  hogs,  running  at  large,  had  begun  to  eat  some 
of  the  bodies,  we  hastily  gathered  together  all  of  our  dead 
we  could  find,  and  built  a  pen  of  rails  to  protect  them  until 
another  party  could  come  to  bury  them.  One  of  the  severely 
wounded  men  has  written  the  story  of  his  experience  in  such 
a  wonderfully  interesting  manner  that  it  is  given  here,  and 
will  show  how  our  seriously  wounded  suffered  on  and  after 
that  first  terrible  day  of  the  battle. 

He  who  writes  the  story  is  John  Rennard  of  Company 
K.  He  had  enlisted  August  "ll,  1862,  had  fallen  in 
with  the  Ninety-eighth  Ohio  just  before  the  battle  of  Perry- 
ville,  and  had  fought  with  that  regiment  in  that  battle,  its 
baptism  of  fire,  October  8,  3802.  After  the  battle  he  had 


246  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

joined   the   Fifteenth   Ohio -and   had  been    with   it   ever  since. 
He  says,  under  date  of  May,   1!)OJ): 

Your  request  for  my  recollections  of  the  Battle  of  Stone  River, 
brings  to  my  mind  recollections  of  scenes  that  I  shall  never  forget  as 
long  as  reason  remains  on  her  throne.  The  battle  for  you,  and  for 
me,  began  December  31,  1862,  when  we  were  attacked  about  sunrise 
where  we  had  bivouaced  the  night  before.  When  the  attack  began  we 
^vere  trying  to  make  our  breakfast  on  the  remains  of  our  rations, 
which  were  supposed  to  have  run  out  the  evening  before.  The  attack 
was  so  sudden  that  we  did  not  know  what  to  do.  The  battery  horses 
had  gone  to  water.  Colonel  Gibson  rode  up,  inquired  for  our  Colonel, 
and  ordered  us  to  fall  in.  He  then  galloped  off  in  cearsh  of  Colonel 
Wallace.  Colonel  Gibson  assumed  command  of  *he  brigade  as  General 
Willich  was  on  the  picket  line  and  had  been  taken  prisoner  by  the 
Confederate  forces.  We  marched  rear  in  front  and  in  line  out  into 
a  cotton  field.  In  crossing  the  cotton  field  Colonel  Wallace  saw  we 
were  in  an  awkward  fix  and  tried  to  change  our  front  by  a  counter 
march.  As  we  were  trying  to  accomplish  this  feat  the  Colonel  saw 
the  rebels  were  gaining  on  us  too  fast,  and  gave  the  command  for 
ward!  That  seemed  only  to  tangle  the  men  all  the  more.  We  were 
then  ordered  to  lie  down  and  fire.  It  was  when  we  rose  to  retreat 
that  one  of  our  boys  was  shot  through  the  head.  His  name  was 
Samuel  Cowles.  We  then  came  to  a  fence,  and  after  getting  over  it 
I  was  trying  to  reload  my  gun  as  we  ran.  Had  succeeded  in  getting 
the  charge  in  the  muzzle,  took  my  place  in  line,  and  was  in  the  act 
of  trying  to  ram  the  charge  home  when  I  was  shot  in  the  right  thigh 
by  a  minnie  ball.  I  threw  my  gun  in  one  direction  and  the  ramrod 
in  another,  spread  my  arms,  a  black  curtain  came  before  my  eyes, 
and  I  fell  on  my  side.  When  I  struck  the  ground  the  curtain  seemed 
to  be  gone.  I  lay  in  a  thick  frost  which  had  fallen  in  the  night,  and 
was  without  overcoat  or  blanket.  The  rebels  marched  by  me  three 
lines  deep,  the  first  passing  directly  over  me.  It  was  but  a  few  minutes 
until  some  of  them  came  back,  bringing  with  them  some  of  our  boys 
as  prisoners.  I  recall  Calvin  Etzler,  Leinard  Pickering,  and  a  boy 
named  Wagner  (of  Co.  G  I  think),  whom  we  called  "Cap"  Wagner. 
As  they  passed  I  called  out  "hello  Cap".  I  was  dreadfully  cold,  my 
teeth  were  chattering,  and  I  saw  the  Hospital  flag  hoisted  over  the 
Smith  house,  about  two  hundred  yards  away.  I  thought  I  would  try 
to  drag  myself  to  it,  as  it  did  not  seem  so  very  far  off.  My  feet  were 
towards  it,  and  I  found  I  must  get  around  with  my  head  towards  it. 
I  drew  up  my  sound  leg,  anchored  my  heel  in  a  horse  track,  and  made 
the  effort.  But  I  might  as  well  have  tried  to  crawl  away  with  my 
body  chained  to  the  rock  of  Gibraltar. 

During  the  forenoon  two  rebel  captains  came  along  gathering 
up  stragglers,  and  stopped  to  talk  with  me.  One  of  them  asked  if  I 
was  cold.  I  asked  him  if  he  did  not  see  my  teeth  chattering.  He 
ordered  some  of  the  men  he  had  gathered  up  to  go  upon  the  field  and 
get  some  blankets.  They  soon  came  back  bringing  three,  which  had 
been  discarded  by  the  rebel  soldiers  when  they  found  better  ones 
thrown  away  by  our  men  in  their  retreat.  He  spread  them  on  the 
ground  so  as  to  make  the  holes  in  them  miss  each  other,  and  then 
said,  "come  men",  and  made  a  move  to  put  me  on  them,  but  I  begged 
to  remain  just  as  I  was.  He  said  he  would  be  careful  with  my  broken 
leg,  so  I  consented,  and  they  lifted  me  and  placed  me  on  the  blankets. 
He  ordered  his  men  to  get  more  blankets  and  they  brought  three  more 


CAMPAIGN  AND  BATTLE  OF  STONE  RIVER  247 

and  he  placed  them  over  me  tenderly,  and  said  he  could  do  no  more. 
I  thanked  him  warmly.  He  then  kneeled  at  my  head,  uncorked  his 
canteen  and  told  me  to  take  a  good  drink.  I  was  shy  about  it,  but 
he  told  me  it  would  do  me  good,  as  it  was  something  fine.  I  drank  of 
it  and  it  was  as  he  said.  The  blankets,  the  whiskey  and  the  sunshine 
began  to  warm  me  up,  but  the  night  was  before  me,  and  it  gave  indi 
cations  of  being  very  cold.  The  rebels  at  Murfreesboro  had  parolled 
some  of  our  men,  and  had  directed  them  to  go  out  over  the  field  and 
care  for  the  wounded.  I  had  a  call  from  one  of  them.  The  night  was 
very  clear  and  I  got  very  cold.  All  night  long  I  could  hear  the  groans 
of  Samuel  Cowles,  but  towards  morning  he  died.  He  was  a  noble  true 
hearted  soldier. 

The  next  day  dawned  bright  and  clear  and  about  ten  o'clock  two 
men  rode  up  and  I  asked  them  if  there  were  no  surgeons  in  their  army. 
They  asked  me  why,  and  I  told  them  I  would  like  to  have  my  wound 
dressed.  They  called  each  other  doctor  and  both  got  off  their  horses 
and  looked  at  my  leg.  I  asked  them  about  the  possibility  of  saving 
it  and  they  told  me  that  if  they  had  me  where  they  could  care  for  me, 
they  could  save  it.  Towards  evening  they  put  me  on  a  stretcher,  car 
ried  me  to  the  hospital  and  and  laid  me  in  the  yard  with  my  head 
near  a  tree.  They  filled  the  circle  around  the  tree  with  other  wounded 
men.  Morning  came  again,  at  last,  and  the  day  wore  on  until  evening 
of  Friday,  January  2,  when  I  was  taken  into  a  lower  room  of  an  out 
house  which  had  been  used  for  cooking  and  weaving.  As  I  was  taken 
into  this  place  one  of  the  doctors  said,  "Now  I  have  all  sheltered  but 
one  up  among  the  rocks  who  is  shot  in  the  head,  and  a  squad  are 
after  him."  It  then  began  to  rain.  While  I  lay  out  in  the  field  I 
thought  the  noise  from  the  artillery  would  burst  my  head.  The  echo 
from  that  wide  valley  was  far  louder  than  the  original  report,  and 
nearly  distracted  me.  I  tried  to  keep  out  the  noise  by  stopping  my 
ears  with  my  fingers. 

I  recall  another  incident  which  occurred  while  I  was  lying  on 
the  field.  Three  stragglers  came  along,  and  seeing  me  covered  up, 
one  of  them  said  "he  is  one  of  our  men  and  is  all  right."  Then  one  of 
them  saw  my  cap  and  said,  "No,  he  is  a  yank".  Another  picked  up  my 
gun  and  ram  rod  and  said,  "Look!  he  had  a  ball  ready  to  ram  down 
to  kill  us.  Let  us  ram  it  down  and  give  it  to  him  and  see  him  grind." 
Another  agreed  with  him  so  he  rammed  the  load  in  the  gun.  But  the 
third  said,  "No,  he  cannot  hurt  us  now"  and  pursuaded  the  others  to 
go  away  and  let  me  alone.  They  took  my  gun  with  them.  On  Satur 
day  night  the  firing  ceased  and  on  Sunday  morning  I  remarked  that 
there  were  no  Johnnies  around,  and  was  told  they  were  cleaning  up 
for  inspection.  That  morning  they  brought  us  some  chicken  broth 
in  one  of  our  tin  cups.  It  tasted  good  for  it  was  the  first  food  I  had 
had  since  Wednesday  morning.  I  begged  for  more  but  was  told  it  was 
all  I  could  have.  In  the  afternoon  the  nurse  told  me  there  was  a 
skirmish  line  coming  across  the  field  and  he  thought  it  was  our  men. 
He  went  out,  and  soon  came  back  and  said  it  was  indeed  our  men. 
He  had  hardly  told  it,  until  the  door  opened  and  Captain  C.  W.  Carroll 
and  a  few  comrades  walked  in  and  I  wept  the  sweetest  tears  I  ever 
shed.  My  eyes  fill  again  as  I  pen  this  sketch.  I  begged  them  for 
something  to  eat,  but  all  they  had  was  one  hard  tack  and  a  part  of 
another.  After  they  had  gone  I  broke  the  hard  tack  into  small  pieces 
and  divided  it  among  the  wounded  in  the  room.  I  think  there  were 
five  besides  myself.  After  suffering  eight  days,  they  came  in  the  night 


248  FrmEyra  OHIO  VQUTXTOKSS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

of  the  eighth  day  and  set  my  leg.  Doctor  Park.  Surgeon  of  the  49th 
Ohio,  was  head  surgeon  of  the  Smith  Hospital,  where  we  lay.  Of  the 
soldiers  in  this  hospital  I  recall  the  names  of  but  two.  "Fernando 
Snaeketfbrd  of  Company  E  of  oar  regiment  and  John  T.  Gantz  of  the 
83th  niinois-  Gantz  was  wounded  in  the  right  thigh,  and  Shackelford 
:-  -.:.r  :-;  :  i\:~  :i,  /:;-, 

Sometime  after  Shaekelford's  leg  was  set.  the  pus  burrowed 
down  to  near  the  ankle,  and  it  was  decided  to  amputate  it.  The  doctors 
were  consulting  about  trying  to  save  the  knee,  but  Shackelford  in 
sisted  that  they  should  cut  off  the  knee  too.  as  it  too  was  affected. 
When  the  surgeons  were  ready  to  operate  they  came  to  me  and  asked 
if  I  wished  them  to  take  him  to  another  room  for  the  operation.  I 
told  them  that  if  Gantz  was  willing  to  have  it  done  in  the  room.  I  was. 
Gantz  consented  and  we  saw  as  much  of  the  operation  as  we  cared 
to  see.  The  bone  was  not  sawed  off  short  enough,  and  soon  pro 
truded  through  the  flap,  making  necessary  a  second  operation.  As 
we  were  soon  to  be  remorei!  to  the  General  Field  hospital  near  Mur- 
freesboTO,  Doctor  Park  said  he  would  not  perform  the  second  operation 
until  after  such  remoral.  After  tlie  removal  the  same  three  of  us  were 
in  the  same  tent  and  I  saw  him  operated  on  again.  Oh!  but  I  felt  sorry 
for  him.  When  the  aenesthesia  passed  off  I  did  not  dare  to  look  at 
him.  But  when  supper  time  came  I  turned  towards  him.  and  to  my  sur 
prise  and  astonishment,  he  said  in  a  weak  voice,  "Rennard.  when  this 
leg  gets  wen  I  am  going  to  have  the  other  one  cut  off."  I  asked  why, 
and  he  said,  "then  I  will  get  some  more  good  wine  to  drink."  He  ha'd 
more  grit  than  any  man  I  ever  knew. 

At  one  time  while  we  were  in  the  Smith  Hospital  they  ran  short 
of  proper  food  for  the  wounded,  as  all  the  chickens  in  the  neighbor 
hood  had  been  killed.  The  doctors  were  troubled  about  it,  and  Mr. 
Smith  who  owned  the  premises,  snggested  that  they  get  robins.  Doctor 
Park  laughed  and  said  there  would  be  nothing  left  of  the  robin  when 
shot  by  one  of  our  guns.  Mr.  Smith  then  suggested  that  if  the  attend- 
go  out  after  night  with  a  lantern  into  the  second  growth 
'here  they  roosted,  and  tap  them  with  clubs,  they  could  get 
of  them.  This  was  tried  and  the  first  party  came  back  with 
a  half  bushel  basket  full,  and  the  next  with  a  two  bushel  bag  and  a 
basket  full.  Some  of  them  were  sent  to  another  hospital  about  a  mile 
away  from  us.  They  usually  served  them  boiled  with  hulled  barley, 
and  they  were  Hue  gating  But  they  only  gave  us  one  a  day  for  fear 
-  -  -•  .  :  -  ;-  : J  -.I-" 

This  one  personal  reminiscence  reveals  the  condition 
in  which  our  wounded  were  left  after  our  right  wa^ 
overwhelmed  on  that  terrible  morning  of  December  :>1.  186*2. 
The  case  is  a  typical  one  —  not  the  most  extreme  —  for 
Shackelford  was  left  on  the  field  without  shelter  or  covering 
until  Friday  evening,  his  leg  below  the  knee  being  shattered 
by  a  ball  and  being  also  shot  through  the  arm.  and  was  not 
operated  on  until  the  wound  in  his  leg  had  begun  to  mortify. 

We  had  more  than  a  hundred  men  captured  during  the 
battle,  and  to  show  how  it  went  with  them,  the  following 
narrative  has  been  prepared  by  Morris  Cope,  who  was  then 
a  Corporal  of  Company  ET  and  afterward-1  a  First  Lieutenant 
of  Company  I.  The  narrative  is  dated  809  Vance  Avenue, 


241 


ClK.ttaixios'aL.   T«nn.    iTrhexe  he  BOW  reside*^,.  Msy  la. 

It  if  a?  ic'Ikm-f.  : 

"Ton  probably  EHOV  that  on  The  night  of  Beeember  3ti,  1862,  the 
rebel  army  "was  nuiss-Hc  in  Irani,  of  the  extreme  rignt  of  onr  Imf-  bfiinre 
MurfreefiborG.  their  left  -esn/sncLiiig  far  beyanfi  our  ^igrr,  Tin*  Uci.  EJLIL 
4&ti.  Qfcifj  ILefT-meiLtc  were  formed  si  right  angles  ID  our  from  gnr8  an 
the  extreme  ens}  of  anr  line.  I  •trETr.k  rh^  generiiJ  nnaerHiEnciug  EJHDI;£. 
our  soldiers  vas  that  tbe  most  oi  tbe  rebel  aj-my  vat  in  ±rom  of  onr  S^jRL 
Our  eomirifiji^erE.  I  suppose,  fciM?v  or  fibouig  iifirvt 
I  0011*1  remeitibsr  TJiEt  BJiy  eszraarfiiaiEry 
it>  CUETC  KKEJiitsi  finrpriseE.  or  ~zs>  refiisi  KH 


TT*r  ii&c  auJT  a&e  lint  of  bamifc.  u"'n:li  U 
rLS  cLisiEiie*:.     Tfe  D€Xi  mamiBg  vMie  OET  Birtinilery 
vEter  Einfi  Diir  men  EL  nreafciasi.  vitt  eiins  siackefi  in  line,  our 
7T7B.T7  of  rbsm.  vsr^  cE.p:;LTec.  finfi  ife  reel  were  flrrvsii  in.  ioiliTwefl  «£) 

:j  IPF  tbt  eneiEj.  tbKi  niEiiy  of  onr  men  ^werc  ^101  a0W!n  bsfiart 

reacbefi  tiieir  £nni£. 

I  FiipU'Ds*  yon  r^jrteniber  tbt  avfnil  binn&er  xfaic:  vat  mafie  igy 
our  refimenii  XD  coinneriiHCTdii  (iratt  in  an  open  Seifi  unfler  firt 
of  tbt  enemy,  before  vt  coi  TO  d&rt  £  sboi.  By  tb^  xiant  ~wt  ^it  into 
jiosirion  T£>  fc*f  rte  rebefe  vert  close  npon  ns.  anfi  &VSL  rbsn.  onr  com- 
TnB.Ti^-T,g  officer  yeliefl  KL  ns  mflt  to  tfirfc.  Tiffin  xbey  "wart  our  c?vx  inei.. 
Bet  dear  oifi  Asfcev  -vras  ib.er*  and  bafi  irig  bean  v±cb  'fetm.  arnc  SEJL. 
•  •Tm.tr  T:  ii.  dont  yon  se*  their  rebel  fea??  Fire.'  £nifi  fire  vt  fiifi.  virn  aooc 
ef  eci.  Bet  as  ibty  ~w&r*-  close  ic>  onr  single  3zne  of  baixif  "wrdi  irheir 
four  lines,  ve  conlfi  not  siKnc  long  before  Tiiem.  In  onr  rear  va*  one  of 
tbose  eedar  niccet  Jencet  vinh  some  ^Bj>£  in  it.  esnsL  1  "nfciEik  sf^erad  of 
our  boys  vere  caprcrec  bere.  Ton  tncrw  ii  is  a  serious  mamer  UP  climib 
one  of  TJnose  fences  nnoer  rbe  most  Ha^orable  circmnsianeefi.  but  nTdi 
a  bc>v!iij£  mob  erf  Janomies  after  yon  ii  vas  someirbai  embarrassing. 
remember  one  ineioeni  commcced  "«rrth  ties  crossiBg  thai  in  ^iise  of  lie 
serious  snrraiinciii£s  vas  annHBtcg.  Ton  remember  ~we  iiafl  in  Cr  E. 
one  Jack  Beaton  i  familiarly  caBefi  Srajmy  HeHKon  <  .  anfi  one  Eflvin 
t.  Bioccer.  boii  eoofi  olfi  soltbers,  alvays  reaftr  for  fiury  anfl  ue^er 
sbrrnfciiig  from  cancer,  bm  tiiey  -were  ctisposeci  to  be  a  lirtle  irritable 
ar  times  viien  maitiers  Safin1!  STLIT  Tiem.  THiey  vonifl  onarrei  ic  liie 
drop  of  a  hat.  On  titis  occasion  they  bodi  arrivecl  an:  lie  same  momem 
at  a  narrow  opening  in  this  fence..  IT  w&  TOO  narrow  for  liotn  ID  pass 
at  ibe  same  time.,  anfi  each  vas  oeternrinefi  TO  go  tterougii  first, 
quarrejefi  aboct  ii  until  both  came  near  being  captiirefi. 

After  passing  this  liarrier.  OTET  Iwce'S  flail  srine 
They  vere  cansafierably  •nrt^r-^fi  up,  lomn:  feU  back  sitw^jy  anfl  f  ougin 
ail  tbe  gronnfi.  ITe  savefi  one  gun  of  onr  battery  acnfi  nnoer  conmamfl 
of  Laemenant  Beiden.  ii  moin^ifi  some  goofi  gaps  tbrongii  The  Tools  of 
tiie  rebs.  I  fiont  kncmr  iiie  particniars  of  tbe  capture  of  many  of  onr 
boys.  I  wonifi  not  bave  been  taken  prisoner  if  I  iiafi  noi  undertaker 
to  carry  off  one  of  our  boys.  Johnny  Fenton  ncras  snot  through  xbe  foot. 
Ton  remember  ne  vas  a  little  feZtow.  anfi  l»e  coassfi  so  isarfl  for  me  ic 
belp  him  TbaT  I  took  him  on  my  back  anfi  T^irsfi  >riTF  off.  1  iiafi  been 
painfnlly  linrt  about  tbe  rime  ]  crossefi  the  fence.  I  thinifr  IT  must  iiavf' 
been  &  iarge  piece  of  shell  -which  struck  my  gnn.  treating  it  anfi  knock 
ing  it  om  of  iny  hanfi  amfi  fiisiocating  my  vrist.  from  vhiich  I  sufferefl 
terribly  until  it  vas  pint  in  place  severa:  cays  afEervarfis  "by  a  rebel 
doctor  at  Atlanta,  • 


250  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

Right  here  I  wish  to  relate  an  incident  which  should  be  given  a 
permanent  place  in  the  history  of  our  regiment.  I  was  one  of  the  color 
guard,  and  the  color  sergeant  had  been  shot  in  the  beginning  of  the 
fight,  one  of  the  other  color  guards  took  the  colors,  and  just  after  we 
got  over  or  through  the  picket  fence  the  colors  went  down.  I  took  the 
flag  and  tried  to  keep  it  up.  Captain  Andrew  R.  Z.  Dawson  noticed 
me,  saw  that  I  was  hurt,  and  himself  took  the  flag  and  waved  it  and 
called  on  the  men  to  rally  to  it. 

I  carried  Fenton  back  until  we  came  to  an  old  log-house  filled  with 
corn  shucks.  I  put  him  inside  near  a  window  and  covered  him  up  with 
my  overcoat  and  started  out,  when  I  saw, — I  think,  not  less  than  twenty 
revolvers,  pointing  at  me  and  several  gentlemen  very  emphatically  in 
vited  me  to  surrender.  I  notified  them  that  I  would  do  so  at  once.  It 
was  the  Texas  Rangers  who  captured  us.  They  were  a  bully  set  of 
fellows  and  treated  us  very  nicely.  We  had  seen,  as  we  were  going 
into  the  cabin,  a  long  line  of  blue-coated  cavalry  on  our  flank,  and 
thought  they  were  our  own  men  until  they  introduced  themselves  as 
above  described.  They  gave  Fenton  a  horse  to  ride  and  at  once  started 
with  us  for  Murfreesboro.  As  we  passed  through  corn  fields  they  let 
me  lead  the  horse,  so  as  to  keep  standing  stalks  from  hurting  Fenton's 
foot.  When  we  got  to  Murfreesboro  we  wrere  reouired  to  sign  a  parole 
binding  us  not  to  perform  any  military  duty  until  exchanged.  We  were 
then  turned  into  the  Court  House  yard,  among  the  rest  of  the  prisoners 
from  our  regiment  and  brigade.  The  yard  was  about  full. 

As  we  were  passed  into  the  crowd,  I  noticed  General  Willich.  He 
seemed  very  much  distressed  to  see  so  many  of  his  soldiers  captured. 
He  was  rubbing  his  hands,  and  as  we  passed  him  he  said,  "Oh  my  poor 
poys,  my  poor  poys."  I  did  not  see  him  again  during  our  captivity. 

A  very  strange  circumstance  occurred  that  afternoon.  I  have 
never  had  any  explanation  of  it,  and  suppose  I  never  will,  now.  Some 
rebel  soldiers  came  to  the  yard  and  took  me  and  four  or  five  others 
out  and  marched  us  to  the  county  jail  and  not  only  locked  us  up,  but 
placed  a  guard  over  us  for  the  night.  I  do  not  remember  who  the 
others  were,  but  if  this  incident  should  ever  appear  in  print  and  any 
of  them  who  were  with  me  in  that  jail  the  last  night  of  Dec.  31,  1862, 
should  see  it,  Ihope  they  will  write  to  me  at  once.  I  don't  think  this 
special  attention  was  because  we  were  more  dangerous  looking  than  the 
other  prisoners.  They  must  have  thought  us  the  handsomest,  (i)  and 
should  be  separated  from  the  common  herd.  They  came  the  next  day 
and  without  further  explanation  took  us  out  and  loaded  us  in  stock  cars 
with  the  other  prisoners. 

At  Chattanooga  we  were  placed  in  camp  on  a  hillside  which  is 
now  covered  with  beautiful  residences.  It  was  raining  and  the  wounded 
were  furnished  with  old  tents  that  the  water  dripped  through.  The 
water  ran  through  under  the  tent  I  was  in  and  drove  us  out.  Next 
morning  we  were  again  loaded  on  stock  cars  and  started  for  Atlanta. 
I  think  I  suffered  a  thousand  deaths  from  my  dislocated  wrist,  that 
night  and  the  next  day,  until  we  reached  Atlanta,  where  it  had  the  first 
attention.  From  Atlanta  we  were  taken  to  Montgomery,  and  then  back 
to  Atlanta,  and  there  we  were  put  on  a  train  for  Richmond,  where  we 
finally  landed  in  "Libby."  We  understood  that  it  was  first  intended  to 
take  us  to  Vicksburg  but  Grant's  operations  there  caused  them  to  change 
their  minds. 

I  think  our  boys  wrere  mostly  captured  by  keeping  too  far  to  our 


1     Corporal  Cope's  comrades  will  appreciate  this  joke. 


CAMPAIGN  AND  BATTLE  OF  STONE  RIVER  251 

right  as  we  fell  back.  Wheeler's  rebel  cavalry  was  hovering  on  our 
flank  ready  to  take  any  one  who  came  their  way. 

It  was  a  long  tedious  trip.  The  railroads  were  in  poor  condi 
tion  and  poorly  equipped.  We  rode  many  miles  over  roads  with  wooden 
rails  with  a  bar  of  iron  spiked  on  top.  The  weather  was  mild  and 
pleasant  most  of  the  time,  which  was  well  for  us,  for  we  had  neither 
blankets  nor  overcoats.  We  had  little  to  eat,  I  have  no  recollection  of 
what  we  did  eat,  but  I  remember  I  was  hungry  most  of  the  time.  One 
time  we  stopped  at  Dalton,  Ga.,  and  waited  most  of  a  day  for  an  engine 
to  pull  us  to  Knoxville,  Tenn.  On  a  side  track  near  our  train,  was  a 
car  load  of  sugar.  We  managed  to  open  a  hogshead,  and  filled  our  haver 
sacks  with  it,  and  some  of  the  boys  also  filled  their  tin-cups  and  pockets 
with  it.  I  saw  one  boy  with  his  cap  full.  We  were  a  sweet  lot  for  a 
day  or  two  at  least. 

We  passed  up  through  East  Tennessee  at  a  time  when  they  were 
conscripting  every  man,  young  and  old  for  the  Confederate  army.  It 
was  a  sorrowful  time  for  these  people,  for  they  were  dragging  young 
boys  and  old  men  from  their  homes  at  the  railway  stations,  followed 
by  their  weeping  wives  and  children.  I  do  not  remember  the  day  we 
arrived  at  ''Hotel  Libby."  Libby  Prison  had  been  an  old  tobacco  ware 
house,  and  was  situated  on  the  bank  of  the  James  River.  Near  two 
hundred  and  sixty  prisoners,  including  myself,  were  quartered  in  a 
room  in  the  second  story  of  the  building.  We  were  somewhat  crowded. 
When  we  lay  down  to  sleep  at  night  we  covered  about  all  the  floor  space. 
WTe  had  nothing  to  do  but  to  talk  and  time  passed  slowly  with  us.  We 
were  fed  once  a  day.  One  day  we  had  a  small  loaf  of  bread  and  some  soup 
and  the  next  day  some  bread  and  the  meat  the  soup  was  made  from. 
We  were  hungry  most  of  the  time,  but  hungriest  after  disposing  of  our 
daily  rations.  It  was  mid-winter  and  part  of  the  time  it  was  quite  cold. 
We  were  without  blankets,  and  the  floor  was  pretty  hard,  but  it  was 
dry,  and  some  of  us  slept  a  good  deal.  There  were  windows  in  the 
end  of  the  room,  without  glass,  and  sometimes  the  wind  blew  in  off  the 
river  and  chilled  us  through.  But  as  I  recall  it  now,  after  47  years,  we 
were  most  of  us  in  good  health.  The  quarters  where  our  captured  of 
ficers  were  confined  were  on  the  first  floor  directly  under  us  and  we 
managed  to  make  a  hole  in  the  floor  large  enough  for  them  to  pass  a 
deck  of  cards  up  to  us.  I  think  several  packs  found  their  way  to  us 
through  this  hole,  and  I  think  none  of  them  was  idle  as  long  as  it  was 
light  enough  to  see  the  spots  on  them.  When  the  sun  went  down 
our  light  went  out.  It  came  back  when  the  sun  rose  in  the  morning. 
We  were  allowed  no  artificial  lights  in  the  prison,  and  the  gloomy 
winter  nights  seemed  doubly  long.  Day  and  night  the  sentinels  paced 
their  beats  about  the  prison,  and  every  hour  of  the  night  was  called 
the  refrain,  "All  is  well."  I  remember  how  lonesome  and  homesick  I 
would  feel  when  the  sentinel  at  mid-night  would  call  out,  "Twelve 
o'clock  and  all  is  well. 

One  day  some  rebel  officers  came  in  to  our  room  and  asked  us  to 
volunteer  to  work  on  the  stockade  for  the  prison  they  were  building 
on  Belle  Isle.  We  told  them  we  were  already  volunteers  for  three 
years  or  more,  or  during  the  war,  and  could  not  volunteer  again  until 
our  time  expired.  After  that  we  would  volunteer  to  build  stockades, 
but  it  would  be  to  put  them  in. 

When  our  time  came  to  leave  the  prison  we  had  no  notice  of  it 
until  we  were  ordered  to  get  ready  to  leave.  I  don't  understand  yet 
what  we  had  to  do  to  get  ready,  or  why  that  order  was  given,  unless 
some  of  us  were  lying  down,  and  it  meant  for  us  to  get  up.  We  had 


252  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

nothing  else  to  do  to  get  ready.  Perhaps  some  of  us  had  to  turn  around 
and  face  the  door  before  starting.  We  were  not  told  where  we  were 
to  go.  Some  one  said  we  were  going  to  South  Carolina,  and  it  was  re 
ported  we  were  going  to  Andersonville,  Ga.,  where  a  prison  was  to  be 
established.  As  we  were  marching  along  the  street  a  man  handed 
me  a  morning  paper,  and  I  read  in  it  an  item  stating  that  1000  Yankee 
prisoners  were  to  be  sent  to  City  Point  to  be  turned  over  to  U.  S.  of 
ficers.  We  soon  all  knew  that  we  were  going  home  and  no  one  could 
express  what  that  meant  to  us.  We  were  loaded  on  flat  cars,  but  that 
didn't  matter,  we  were  going  home!  We  would  have  been  willing  to 
ride  on  the  cow  catcher. 

We  were  all  feeling  fine,  but  kept  quiet  until  we  rounded  the  bend 
of  the  river  at  City  Point  and  caught  a  glimpse  of  our  own  Stars  and 
Stripes  floating  over  the  steamer  New  York.  Then  we  broke  loose. 
Talk  about  the  Fourth  of  July,  political  meetings,  Teddy,  or  the  cheers 
of  modern  base  ball  fans.  Any  or  all  of  these  would  be  tame  beside 
the  cheers  we  sent  forth.  We  got  off  the  cars,  cheering,  and  kept  it 
up  until  we  got  on  the  boat.  Then  the  cheering  suddenly  stopped.  We 
were  passed  between  two  lines  of  our  own  men  and  each  one  of  us  was 
given  a  loaf  of  bread,  a  big  hunk  of  meat  and  a  tin-cup  full  of  good  old 
black  coffee.  Gee!  we  soon  forgot  all  about  that  old  flag,  and  ate  and 
drank  until  we  were  too  full  to  cheer  any  more  just  then.  We  ate 
what  was  given  us,  and  then  more  and  more,  for  they  gave  us  all  we 
wanted  and  I  really  thought  some  of  us  would  be  sick  from  over  eating. 
But  I  guess  when  a  fellow  is  real  hungry,  it  does  not  matter  how 
much  he  eats.  None  of  us  suffered  from  our  over-eating,  as  I  recall  it. 

We  rejoined  the  regiment  about  the  middle  of  June,  finding  it 
encamped  on  the  Stone  River  battlefield,  and  two  days  afterwards, 
started  on  the  Tullahoma  campaign.  While  absent  we  had  seen  our 
friends  at  home,  and  had  missed  no  battles.  We  dropped  back  into  the 
routine  of  a  soldier's  life  so  quietly  and  naturally  that  in  a  day  or  so 
we  could  hardly  realize  there  had  been  any  break  or  gap  in  our  service. 

Lieutenant  Colonel  Frank  Askew,  it  will  be  remembered, 
was  severely  wounded  in  the  hip  on  the  morning  of  December 
31,  1862,  and  was  left  on  the  field.  He  soon,  of  course,  fell 
into  the  enemy's  hands.  He  was  taken  to  a  house  in  Mur- 
freesboro  and  placed  in  the  same  room  with  General  George 
W.  Gordon,  then  Colonel  of  the  Eleventh  Tennessee,  who  had 
been  dangerously  wounded  in  the  cedar  thicket  where  our 
line  made  its  last  stand  and  the  enemy  was  checked.  The  two 
wounded  officers,  though  political  and  military  enemies,  soon 
became  friends.  Colonel  Gordon,  with  genuine  southern 
hospitality,  interceded  for  Colonel  Askew,  and  he  was  spared 
the  trouble  and  annoyance  of  signing  a  parole.  Afterwards, 
when  Murfreesboro  fell  into  our  hands  and  Colonel  Gordon 
was  our  prisoner,  Colonel  Askew  interceded  for  him  and  the 
same  courtesy  was  extended  to  him  that  had  been  shown  to 
Colonel  Askew.  Occasionally  during  their  long  period  of 
after  service  they  exchanged  personal  compliments  under  the 
white  flag.  Later,  in  another  battle,  they  again  had  oppor 
tunity  to  meet  face  to  face,  but  that  belongs  to  a  later  chapter. 


CAMPAIGN  AND  BATTLE  OF  STONE  RIVER  253 

The  evening  of  January  4,  1 863,  after  our  return  from  our 
trip  over  the  battlefield,  Colonel  Gibson  made  us  a  speech, 
telling  us  in  substance,  that  Murfreesboro  had  been  the 
objective  point  in  our  campaign,  that  it  was  now  in  our  pos 
session  and  that  the  enemy  was  in  full  retreat.  As  usual, 
when  he  made  a  speech,  he  was  heartily  cheered. 

On  January  5,  we  sent  out  a  party  of  three  men  from  each 
company  to  bury  our  dead.  We  heard  cannonading  at  a  distance 
during  the  day,  which  indicated  that  our  troops  who  were  in  pur 
suit  of  the  enemy  had  come  up  with  his  rear  guard.  We  got  no 
rations  that  day,  as  all  on  hand  had  been  issued  to  the  troops  who 
were  pursuing  the  enemy.  We  were  very  hungry  and  when  our 
teams  bringing  rations  came  up  in  the  evening  the  boys  helped 
themselves  to  a  box  of  crackers.  Some  of  our  slightly  wounded 
men  who  had  been  taken  to  hospital  in  Murfreesboro  rejoined 
the  regiment.  During  the  day  the  orderly  sergeants  and  the 
adjutant  were  busy  making  out  lists  of  our  losses  for  the  official 
reports.  The  following  are  the  names  of  the  killed,  wounded 
and  missing,  or  captured,  during  the  engagement : 

FIELD    AND    STAFF. 

WOUNDED. — Lieutenant  Colonel  Frank  Askew  and  Major 
John  McClenahan. 

COMPANY  A. 

WOUNDED. — WTm.  T.  McKinney  (and  captured),  Jacob  Kis 
singer,  Wm.  J.  Permar  (and  captured),  James  W.  White,  Cor 
poral  Johnston  Hammond  (and  captured),  Jos.  S.  Brown  (and 
captured),  and  Richard  McKinney  (and  captured). 

MISSING. — Sergeant  Andrew  L.  Hadden  Joseph  McKinney, 
Corporal  John  D.  Fleming,  Corporal  Matthew  E.  Cherry,  Samuel 
B.  Fewr,  Wm.  Melone,  Robert  W.  Thompson,  David  Wilson,  Wm. 
R.  Stewart  and  Benoni  Ledman. 

COMPANY   B. 

KILLED. — Corporal  James  W.  Pollock,  Alvah  P.  Allison, 
Absalom  Sines  and  Levi  Frost. 

WOUNDED  AND  AFTERWARDS  DIED  AS  THE  RESULT  OF  SUCH 
WOUNDS — Corporal  John  R.  McCune,  Wm.  H.  Wiles,  Samuel 
Black  and  Andrew  S.  Ross. 

OTHER  WOUNDED  were,  Isaac  Adamson,  Benjamin  Chance, 
Wm.  Calvert,  Andrew  Downer,  Wm.  Selders,  Alonzo  Milner, 
John  S.  Penrose,  David  Frazier,  who  was  also  captured,  Thomas 
W.  Evans,  also  captured,  Lemuel  Smith,  John  Hunter,  Patrick 
Kelly,  and  Alexander  Milligan. 

COMPANY  C. 

KILLED — John  Massmore. 


254  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

WOUNDED  AND  DIED  OF  SUCH  Wouxi<s. — Marshall  S.  Byrd, 
Emanuel  Strawbridge  and  Sherman  A.  Jolly. 

OTHER  WOUNDED. — Wm.  A.  Ward,  Albert  Noe,  David  K. 
Baggs,  Geo.  M.  Chambers,  Daniel  C.  Courtwright,  Amos  T. 
Harding,  Enoch  Timbers,  Calvin  S.  Paxton,  and  Jacob  S.  Riser, 
who  was  also  captured. 

MISSING. — Henry  C.  Graft",  Robert  D.  McBride,  Harvey  C. 
Calkins,  Henry  C.  Meredith,  Aaron  M.  Craven,  Wm.  D.  Ham- 
mell,  Alfred  H.  Kurd,  and  Joseph  B.  Ross. 

COMPANY  D. 

WOUNDED. — Amos  F.  Miller,  Henry  Schriver  and  John 
Hesser. 

MISSING. — Corporal  John  Sheeny,  Charles  F.  Hoffman,  Wm. 
H.  Cavins,  John  A.  Clark,  Francis  M.  Carter,  John  Harriett,  John 
Hahn,  Christian  Mafzgar,  Butler  Ramey  and  George  W.  Tucker. 

COMPANY   E. 

KILLED  AND  MISSING. — Sergeant  William  Addison  Hogue, 
who  went  into  the  battle,  and  was  last  seen  trying  to  help  Colonel 
Askew  off  the  field.  He  was  never  heard  from  afterwards. 

WOUNDED  AND  DIED  AS  RESULT  OF  SUCH  WOUNDS — Cor 
poral  John  W.  Danford  and  John  B.'  Dysart. 

OTHER  WOUNDED. — Lieutenant  Samuel  Hilles,  Sergeant 
Wm.  G.  Malin,  Isaac  Eugene  Dillon,  George  Billeb,  Geo.  W. 
Ashton,  Corporal  Morris  Cope,  John  Fenton,  John  P.  Heaton 
(the  four  last  named  were  also  captured)  Smith  Gardner,  Fer 
nando  W.  Shackelford,  Samuel  McMillan,  John  Pickering.  An 
drew  j.  Taylor,  Wm.  B.  Smith  and  James  Hall. 

MISSING. — Corporal  Calvin  Etzler,  Isaac  W.  Knight.  Henry 
H.  Brooks,  Stephen  Burley,  Wm.  Cavender,  Charles  Embree, 
Hugh  Foster,  William  Cilham,  Oliver  J.  Henderson.  Charles  W. 
Hall,  Abner  Jones,  Anderson  McGrew,  David  S.  McMasters. 
Alfred  Powell,  John  D.  Roscoe,  Jos.  E.  Stewart,  Wm.  H.  Sat- 
terthwaite,  Albert  Wagner,  Hugh  Hawkins,  Isaac  Paxton  and 
Wm.  McComas. 

COMPANY   F. 

KILLED. — Corporal  Adam  C.  McCaffrey,  John  Craig  and 
Jacob  Hesht. 

WOUNDED  AND  DIED  OF  WOUNDS. — Wm.  Scott. 

OTHER  WOUNDED. — Corporal  E.  W.  Hutcheson,  Dixon  M. 
Hays,  Josiah  D.  Bowles,  Joseph  Bowles,  Andrew  Oarlock,  Xel- 
son  D.  Madden. 

MISSING. — Lafayette  Hess,  Thos.  Benton  Jackson,  Charles 
Brandon,  Thomas  C.  Collins,  Charles  C.  Gibson,  Isaac  H.  Green, 
Joseph  McMillan,  Daniel  Thomas,  James  Barnett.  James  Bernard. 


CAMPAIGN  AND  BATTLE  or  STONE  RIVEK  255 

COMPANY  G. 

KILLED. — William  Bell,  Edward  Brown,  Wesley  Nelson, 
John  R.  Park  and  Archibald  Ralston. 

WOUNDED  AND  DIED  AS  RESULT  OF  WOUNDS. — Jacob  G. 
Kverly  and  Philip  C.  Haflick. 

WOUNDED. — Wm.  H.  Patterson,  Joseph  C.  McColley,  Smith 
A.  Walker,  Wm.  G.  Whips,  Jacob  Stauffer,  Thos.  G.  Maycock, 
Charles  W.  Craycraft  and  Charles  K.  Sanders,  the  four  last 
named  being  also  captured. 

MISSING. — Andrew  B.  Dobson,  Joseph  T.  Hanes,  Logan 
McD.  Scott,  Wilson  Barcus,  George  B.  Gilbert,  Hiram  K.  Brooks, 
Joseph  Harnley,  William  \Vallace,  John  Koons,  and  Theodore 
Coss. 

COMPANY   H. 

KILLED. — Elias  H.  Evers. 

WOUNDED  AND  DIED  AS  RESULT  OF  WOUNDS. — Chris.  R. 
Harnley,  Henry  K.  Wise  and  Wm.  Crone. 

WOUNDED. — Captain  Thomas  E.  Douglass,  Corporal  Wm. 
Crates,  Corporal  David  Capper,  Jas.  R.  Updegrove,  William  H. 
Pier.  Eli  Timbers  (also  captured),  Casper  Miller,  Wm.  Angevine 
and  Philip  Beamer. 

MISSING. — Sergeant  George  T.  Todd,  Corporal  Calvin  More- 
head,  Corporal  Jos.  S.  Lehew,  Cornelius  Linn,  Wm.  G.  Balding, 
Asa  T.  Crapo,  Peter  Cupp,  Andrew  J.  Stewart. 

COMPANY   I. 

KILLED. — Lucas  Borer,  John  W.  Charity  and  William  H. 
Whiting. 

WOUNDED  AXD  DIED  AS  RESULT  OF  WOUNDS.— Louis  Gos- 
horn. 

WOUNDED. — William  Morton  (also  captured),  William 
McConnell,  James  M.  Swanger  and  Winfield  S.  White. 

MISSING. — Sergeant  Alexander  R.  Lord,  Corporal,  Jos.  J. 
Millard,  David  D.  Hart,  Barnet  Sims,  Joseph  Lee  Kerr,  Benjamin 
Gardner,  George  Stoll,  Thomas  W.  Curran,  Jas.  C.  Delancy,  Alva 
Anderson,  John  Coble,  Samuel  Canter,  Samuel  Fletcher,  James 
Guthrie.  Peter  S.  Kirkendell,  Joseph  E.  Meek,  Geo.  W.  Rockwell, 
Alexander  Simon,  Joseph  Sheehy,  John  F.  White,  Thomas 
Connor. 

COMPANY   K. 

KILLED. — Samuel  W.  Cowles. 

WOUNDED. — Sergeant  Alexis  Cope  (slightly),  Landon  B. 
Grimes.  John  Rennard,  Peter  Russell,  Jas.  W.  Thompson,  Eber 
T.  Fort  and  Frank  W.  Sanders. 

MISSING. — Sergeant    George    W.    Chessell,    Corporal    Rees 


256  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

Pickering,  Brown  Deselems,  James  M.  Andrews,  James  \V.  Bate- 
man,  James  McConnell,  James  McMillan,  Leinard  Pickering  and 
Benjamin  R.  Burlington. 

The  appalling  total  is  three  (3)  officers  wounded,  nineteen 
(19)  enlisted  men  killed,  seventeen  (17)  enlisted  men,  mortally 
wounded,  ie.,  died  as  the  result  of  wounds  received  in  the  battle, 
eighty  (80)  other  enlisted  men  wounded,  and  one  hundred  and 
sixteen  (116)  enlisted  men  captured  or  missing — a  grand  total 
loss  of  232  killed,  wounded  and  missing. 

The  return  of  casualties  of  the  army  under  General  Rose- 
crans  from  December  26,  1863  to  January  5,  1863  inclusive,1 
made  up  as  stated  from  nominal  lists,  returns,  etc.,  gives  the 
losses  in  the  loth  Ohio  as  17  killed,  70  wounded  and  128  missing 
or  captured,  or  a  total  loss  of  215.  But  herein  are  given  the  names 
of  each  man  and  the  total  is  17  greater.  The  names  are  taken 
from  the  official  rosters  and  reports  and  corrected  by  reference 
to  diaries  of  Chaplain  Ross,  Lieutenant  Andrew  J.  Gleason  and 
Sergeant  John  G.  Gregory. 

The  17  men  reported  above  as  mortally  wounded,  or  died  as 
the  result  of  wounds  received  in  the  battle,  died  a  day  or  a  few 
weeks  after  the  battle  and  might  perhaps  be  classed  as  among  the 
killed. 

The  number  of  missing  or  captured  include  only  those  who 
were  reported  captured  or  missing  and  not  known  to  be  wounded. 
Those  captured  who  were  also  wounded  are  numbered  among  the 
wounded  and  not  among  the  missing  or  captured.  One  man  re 
ported  among  the  killed  is  Sergeant  William  Addison  Hogue  of 
Company  E.  At  the  time  he  was  reported  among  the  missing, 
but  as  he  was  never  heard  from,  it  is  believed  that  he  was  killed 
and  buried  on  the  field  by  other  troops  without  having  been  rec 
ognized.  That  could  easily  be  accounted  for.  Our  dead  left  un- 
buried  by  the  enemy  had  been  stripped  of  all  their  outer  clothing, 
leaving  nothing  on  their  bodies  by  which  they  could  be  identified. 
The  other  discrepancies  between  the  actual  and  then  reported 
losses  may  have  readily  occurred  as  a  result  of  the  confusion  fol 
lowing  the  battle. 

Surgeon  Clarke  McDermott,  the  medical  director  of  the 
right  wing,  General  McCook's  command,  gives  the  loss  in  killed 
and  wounded  in  the  15th  Ohio,  as  follows:  Killed  17,  wounded 
96,  total  113.2  The  number  of  wounded  given  in  his  report  is 
one  less  than  that  given  above  in  this  history,  while  the  number 
of  killed  is  two  less.  His  report  was  forwarded  to  General 
McCook  January  14,  1863,  several  days  after  General  Rosecrans 

1  W.  R.  R.  20,  part  1-208. 

2  W.  R.  R.  20,  part  1-259. 


CAMPAIGN   AND  BATTLE  OF  STO.XE  RIVER  257 

"Return  of  Casualties"  above  mentioned,  and  is  probably  nearer 
the  truth. 

The  battle  of  Stone  River  was  one  of  the  hardest  and  blood 
iest  contests  of  the  war.  The  losses  in  killed  and  wounded,  in 
proportion  to  the  numbers  engaged,  were  exceeded  in  only  a  very 
few  battles  where  equal  or  greater  numbers  were  engaged.  Gen 
eral  Rosecrans  officially  reports  the  effective  force  of  his  army 
at  the  battle  of  Stone  River  December  31,  1802  as  43.4001  and 
his  percentage  of  loss  as  20.22  per  cent  of  the  forces  engaged. 
But  his  return  of  casualties  above  referred  to  shows  1730  killed, 
7802  wounded  and  3777  captured  or  missing — or  a  total  loss  of 
13,249, 2  which  indicates  a  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  of  nearly 
22  per  cent,  or  a  total  loss  of  over  30  per  cent  of  the  numbers 
engaged.  General  Bragg  officially  reports  37,712  officers  and  men 
present  for  duty,  December  31,  1862,  and  that  his  losses  were 
killed,  1294,  wounded  7945,  missing  1027 — a  total  loss  of 
10,266s — a  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  of  a  little  over  21  per  cent, 
and  a  total  loss  of  27  4-7  per  cent. 

There  are  no  means  at  hand  to  enable  the  writer  to  arrive 
at  the  exact  percentage  of  loss  in  the  15th  Ohio.  General  Rose 
crans'  official  statement  of  the  effective  force  present  December 
31,  1862,  gives  the  number  in  each  brigade,  but  not  the  number  in 
each  regiment.  The  number  in  Willich's  (our)  brigade  was  given 
as  1650.  There  were  five  regiments  in  the  brigade — the  15th  Ohio 
the  49th  Ohio,  the  32nd  Indiana,  the  39th  Indiana  and  the  89th 
Illinois, — all  good  sized  regiments.  Neither  Colonel  Gibson,  who 
made  the  official  report  of  the  battle  for  the  brigade,  nor  either 
of  the  regimental  commanders,  in  his  official  report  of  the  battle, 
gives  the  number  of  men  present  in  his  command  December  31, 
1862.  Gleason  in  his  diary  says  Company  H  went  into  battle  that 
morning  with  about  60  men.  Company  H  was  at  that  time  the 
largest  company  in  the  regiment,  having  received  fourteen  re 
cruits  on  October  26,  1862.  It  is  probable  that  the  regiment,  as 
it  hastily  formed  on  the  morning  of  December  31,  1862,  mustered 
360  officers  and  men.  The  writer  recalls  that  on  the  morning  of 
January  1,  1863,  there  was  a  mere  remnant  of  it  left.  Gleason 
in  his  diary  says  that  when  the  regiment  reformed  after  we  had 
got  back  to  the  Nashville  pike  on  the  evening  of  December  31, 
there  were  present  only  eight  men  of  Company  H,  including 
Lientenant  Updegrove  and  himself.  Other  companies  could  not 
muster  any  more,  but  the  next  day  quite  a  number  returned  and 
we  had  perhaps  a  hundred  or  more  present.  On  the  supposition 
that  the  15th  Ohio  had  360  men  December  31,  1862,  its  percentage 

1  W.  R.  R.  20,  part  1-201. 

2  W.  R.  R.  20,  part,  1-215. 

3  W.  R.  R.  20,  part  1-674. 


258  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

of  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was  32.2  per  cent,  and  its  total  loss 
64.4  per  cent. 

General  Sheridan,  who  commanded  a  division  in  the  right 
wing,  says  in  his  ''Memoirs",  (Pages  241  and  242),  "my  effective 
force  in  the  battle  of  Stone  River  was  4154  officers  and  men", 
(General  Rosecrans  says  5029 ),1  and  that  his  killed  and  wounded 
and  missing  numbered  1633,  or  nearly  40  per  cent.  He  also  says 
that  "in  the  remaining  years  of  the  war,  though  often  engaged  in 
most  severe  contests,  I  never  experienced  in  any  of  my  com 
mands  so  high  a  rate  of  casualties". 

The  writers  of  war  history  and  military  critics  have  generally 
regarded  the  battle  of  Stone  River  as  not  of  much  importance, 
and  have  passed  it  by  without  giving  it  the  attention  it  deserves. 
General  Grant  is  on  record  as  saying  substantially  that  it  led  to 
no  results  and  should  never  have  been  fought.  But  it  is  due  to 
the  men  who  fought  there  to  say  that  on  no  field  of  battle  during 
the  great  war  of  1861,  were  the  courage  and  endurance  of  soldiers 
on  both  sides  more  severely  tested  and  more  steadfastly  main 
tained.  There  was  little  disparity  of  numbers  in  the  opposing 
armies,  and  we  may  claim  that  under  the  circumstances  they  were 
evenly  matched.  It  was  a  life  and  death  struggle  lasting  for  four 
days,  and  it  ended  by  the  practical  exhaustion  of  the  contending 
forces.  The  percentage  of  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  in  the  two 
armies  was  practically  the  same,  as  is  shown, — the  loss  in  our 
army  being  a  little  less  than  22  per  cent  and  that  of  the  enemy 
over  21  per  cent.  Neither  army  can  lay  claim  to  any  superior 
valor  or  skill.  So  far  as  these  are  concerned,  it  was  a  drawn  con 
test.  But  history  should  continue  to  repeat  that  on  no  other  battle 
field  in  its  history  did  American  manhood  show  higher  examples 
of  patriotism  and  devotion  to  duty  than  on  this  bloody  field  of 
Murfreesboro  and  Stone  River. 

Eighty  thousand  one  hundred  and  twelve  men  engaged  in 
the  contest,  and  twenty-three  thousand  five  hundred  and  twelve 
men  were  killed,  wounded  or  missing.  Little  has  been  done  to 
preserve  this  battle  field  and  it  lies  neglected.  In  justice  to  the 
men,  living  and  dead,  who  fought  there,  the  field  should  be  made 
a  national  park  and  the  historic  portions  of  it  should  be  marked 
by  fitting  monuments,  while  there  remain  alive  those  who  could 
see  that  they  are  accurately  placed. 

On  January  5,  burial  parties  were  sent  over  the  field  to  bury 
our  dead.  Some  of  the  other  troops  were  ordered  out  in  pursuit 
of  the  enemy  and  all  the  rations  on  hand  were  issued  to  them. 
We  went  hungry  until  our  burial  parties  returned,  when  some  of 
the  men  brought  some  mutton  they  had  foraged. 

1     W.  R.  R.  20,  part  1-201. 


CAMPAIGN  AND  BATTLE  OF  STONE  RIVER  259 

January  6,  a  little  after  noon,  we  were  formed  in  line 
and  marched  into  Murfreesboro,  crossing  Stone  River  on  the 
railroad  bridge.  We  reached  the  town  about  three  o'clock  and 
marched  through  it  without  halting,  taking  the  Shelbyville  pike. 
When  we  had  gone  about  four  miles  from  the  town  the  brigade 
halted  and  went  into  camp.  The  15th  and  49th  Ohio  were  ordered 
to  go  on  picket  duty  and  marched  about  two  miles  further,  where 
we  were  placed  on  a  line  west  of  the  pike  in  a  thick  woods.  We 
were  forbidden  to  have  fires  at  the  reserves.  At  a  plantation  near 
one  of  the  posts  some  of  the  boys  captured  some  fresh  pork  and 
yams, — a  fine  combination  at  any  time, — but  to  half  starved  men 
nothing  could  have  been  finer.  The  night  passed  without  any 
unusual  incident. 


CHAPTER   XIV. 


A  LONG  PERIOD  OF  APPARENT   INACTIVITY   AT    MURFREESBORO. 

January  7,  1863,  we  were  relieved  from  picket  duty  at  9 
o'clock  A.  M.,  and  returned  to  the  place  selected  for  our  camp. 
It  was  in  a  grove  of  large  oaks,  east  of  the  railroad,  north  of 
the  river  and  not  far  from  the  railroad  bridge.  We  remained 
here  until  January  11,  when  we  moved  through  the  woods  to 
our  rear  to  a  road,  which  we  followed  for  about  a  mile  in  an 
easterly  direction,  crossed  the  river  and  a  mile  further  went 
into  camp  in  a  piece  of  woods  near  General  McCook's  head 
quarters.  That  day  the  enemy  threw  some  shells  at  our 
pickets  and  an  order  was  issued  requiring  us  to  be  in  line  and 
under  arms  before  daylight  each  morning. 

Rations  were  short  and  one  day  two  men  from  each  com 
pany  were  detailed  to  shell  corn  to  be  ground  at  a  horse-mill 
near  camp.  There  was  some  promiscuous  foraging  going  on 
and  some  of  the  men  brought  in  some  fresh  pork. 

The  morning  of  January  10,  the  "German  Reveille" 
was  sounded  quite  early  and  we  were  ordered  out  on  a 
foraging  expedition.  Some  of  the  men  were  not  familiar  with 
the  German  call,  and  had  to  start  without  having  had  their 
breakfasts.  Nothing  unusual  occurred  during  the  expedition. 

January  13,  we  were  ordered  out  to  guard  a  foraging 
train.  We  took  a  westerly  course  on  the  Columbia  pike,  and 
did  not  go  very  far  until  we  found  plenty  of  forage.  We 
stacked  arms  while  the  wagons  were  being  filled,  and  the  men 
went  to  cracking  walnuts  and  hickory  nuts  which  were  plenti 
ful  in  the  woods  near-by.  Quite  a  large  body  of  troops  passed 
us,  going  out  on  a  reconnoissance.  On  the  14th,  in  the 
evening,  we  received  orders  to  start  for  Nashville  at  5  o'clock 
next  morning.  We  started  in  a  pouring  rain,  and  learned 
we  were  to  go  as  guard  for  a  supply  train.  We  reached  the 
wagon  train  on  the  pike  after  a  tiresome  march  through  the 
rain.  We  were  wet  to  the  skin  and  cold,  and  were  permitted 
to  build  fires,  while  the  Colonel  went  to  obtain  further 
information.  AVe  were  about  to  get  into  the  wagons  when  the 
Colonel  returned  and  announced  that  the  order  was  counter 
manded  and  we  returned  to  camp.  The  next  day  a  detail  from 
the  regiment  was  ordered  out  on  another  foraging  expedition, 
and  on  its  return  there  was  loud  complaint  because  Captain 
Dawson,  who  was  in  command,  had  forbidden  private 
foraging.  The  prohibition  was  not  very  strictly  enforced, 


LONG  PERIOD  OF  INACTION  AT  MURFREESBORO  261 

for  Gleason  in  his  diary  reports  that  that  day  the  boys 
brought  in  chickens,  turkeys,  and  honey  in  considerable  quan 
tities,  and  that  one  man  brought  in  an  immense  sausage.  On 
the  24th  we  were  ordered  out  on  battalion  drill,  the  first  drill 
we  had  had  since  the  battle.  Owing  to  the  absence  of  all  the 
field  officers,  the  regiment  was  commanded  by  Captain  J.  C. 
Cummins.  We  went  to  a  near-by  field  and  were  put  through 
some  rather  awkward  and  amusing  maneuvers  by  this  inex 
perienced  battalion  commander,  who  was  much  relieved  when 
it  began  to  rain,  as  it  ended  the  drill. 

That  day  an  order  was  published  saying,  in  substance, 
that  whereas  it  had  come  to  the  knowledge  of  the  General 
that  a  large  number  of  receipts  had  been  given  by  men  for 
bacon  foraged  in  the  country,  it  was  ordered  that  thereafter 
the  men  would  be  prohibited  from  giving  such  receipts  under 
heavy  penalties.  This,  to  some  extent,  stopped  our  supplies 
of  fresh  pork  and  vegetables,  and  we  had  to  reconcile  our 
selves  to  plain  hard  tack  and  flitch,  with  an  occasional  alterna 
tive  of  fresh  beef,  which  were  all  furnished  by  our  own  com 
missary.  On  this  day  company  commanders  were  ordered  to 
make  out  lists  of  all  their  men  who  were  absent  with  or  with 
out  leave  and  give  them  to  Captain  Burns,  who  was  going 
home  on  leave,  with  instructions  to  look  them  up  and  have 
them  returned  to  the  regiment. 

On  the  morning  of  January  30.  before  it  was  light,  we 
started  to  Murfreesboro  to  work  on  fortifications.  We  under 
stood  that  the  place  \vas  to  be  strongly  fortified  as  a  base  for 
supplies,  preparatory  to  another  forward  movement.  We 
made  the  three  miles  to  Murfreesboro  in  good  time.  We 
marched  through  the  town  to  near  the  railroad  and  pike 
bridges  where  a  fort  had  been  commenced  and  were  put  to 
work  throwing  up  intrenchments.  We  saw  several  other  forts 
or  redoubts  also  in  progress,  and  quite  a  large  force  was 
at  work  on  them.  We  worked  in  reliefs  of  one  hour  each 
and  the  time  passed  quite  pleasantly.  We  were  relieved  be 
tween  3  and  4  o'clock  and  marched  back  to  camp,  taking  the 
railroad  track.  In  the  evening  we  had  orders  to  return  next 
day  for  further  work  on  the  fortifications.  Next  day  we 
returned  to  our  work  and  got  back  to  camp  at  5  o'clock  in 
the  evening,  tired  with  work  and  the  marching.  We  were 
glad  the  next  day  was  Sunday,  but  did  not  know  whether  it 
would  be  a  day  of  rest  or  not,  as  it  was  near  our  time  to  go  on 
picket  again.  It  proved  to  be,  indeed,  a  day  of  rest,  and  late 
in  the  evening  came  the  order  to  go  on  picket  duty  the  next 
morning.  The  day  was  much  colder,  with  snow,  and  our  day 


262  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

and  night  on  picket  were  very  uncomfortable.  There  was  no 
untoward  incident  while  we  thus  guarded  the  camp  in  order 
that  others  might  sleep,  and  on  the  morning  of  February  ;5, 
we  were  relieved,  and  returned  to  camp  about  !)  o'clock.  On 
the  morning  of  February  4,  we  had  reveille  at  5  o'clock  and 
stood  at  arms  until  daylight.  At  8  o'clock  we  were  ordered 
out  with  the  brigade  on  a  foraging  expedition.  Three  men 
from  each  company  were  detailed  to  go  in  the  wagons.  We 
took  an  irregular  course  for  the  Shelbyville  pike  and  moved 
out  on  that  until  wre  came  to  an  eminence  where  we  could  see 
several  miles  ahead  of  us.  Some  of  the  men  fancied  they  could 
see  rebels  in  the  distance.  We  marched  on  about  four  miles 
beyond  our  picket  line,  where  our  advance  ran  up  against  the 
enemy's  pickets  and  skirmishing  began.  The  enemy  retreated 
to  a  range  of  hills,  overlooking  our  position  and  giving  them 
quite  an  advantage.  We  had  a  section  of  artillery  with  us 
and  it  was  brought  forward  and  threw  some  shells  at  the 
enemy.  They  replied  with  their  artillery  and  fired  several 
shots,  one  of  which  took  effect  in  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio,  kill 
ing  one  man  and  wounding  two  others.  A  cavalryman  had 
been  wounded  when  the  enemy's  pickets  first  opened  fire. 
The  enemy  did  not  develop  any  large  force,  but  their 
musketry  fire  was  very  annoying.  We  held  our  ground  until 
our  wagons  were  loaded  with  forage  and  then  faced  towards 
camp.  We  marched  in  line  of  battle  with  a  line  of  skirmishers 
in  our  rear,  until  we  met  a  division  of  our  troops  coming  to 
our  assistance.  These  troops  were  formed  on  both  sides  of 
the  road  and  we  passed  through  them.  We  were  told  that 
they  had  been  sent  for  by  General  Johnson,  who  was  with  us, 
and  formed  a  trap  for  the  enemy  in  case  he  should  attempt  to 
pursue  us.  But  the  enemy  was  not  rash  enough  to  pursue 
us  after  dark,  and  the  snare  was  laid  in  vain.  It  was  very 
late  before  we  got  back  to  our  camps.  It  had  been  a  cold, 
snowy  day  and  we  were  very  cold  and  tired.  Wre  all  thought 
the  orders  which  required  us  at  this  time  to  have  reveille  at 
5  o'clock  and  stand  under  arms  until  daylight,  were  very 
foolish.  We  did  not  know  that  Bragg's  army  was  at  Shebyville 
and  Tullahoma,  25  to  30  miles  distant,  and  that  on  January  20, 
he  had  over  49,000  men  present,1  while  General  Rose- 
crans  had  at  Murfreesboro  only  47,478  present  for  duty.2  At  a 
later  period  of  the  war,  under  similar  circumstances,  we 
would  not  only  have  been  under  arms  at  daylight  each  morning, 
but  our  camp  would  have  been  strongly  intrenched. 

On   the   5th   of   February   we  were   permitted   to   rest,   but 

1  See  General  Bragg's  return  of  that  date,  W.  R.  R.  20,  part  2-503. 

2  See  General  Rosecrans'  return  of  same  date,  W.  R.  R.  20,  part  2-343-5. 


LONG  PERIOD  OF  INACTION  AT   MUKFREESBORO  263 

on  the  Gth  at  (5  o'clock  in  the  morning  we  were  started  to 
Murfreesboro  to  again  work  on  fortifications.  We  supposed 
we  were  to  work  on  the  same  redoubt  we  had  before  worked 
on.  but  we  were  marched  down  the  river  and  after  some 
delay,  crossed  it.  and  were  put  to  work  on  an  intrenchment 
on  that  side.  We  worked  until  4  o'clock  but  did  not  get 
back  across  the  river  until  an  hour  later.  While  we  were  waiting 
at  the  river.  Captain  Dawson  got  into  an  altercation  with  a 
drunken  Dutch  pioneer  and  got  severely  pummelled.1  We 
did  not  get  into  camp  until  after  dark. 

Our  camp  from  this  time  on  seems  to  have  been  known 
as  Camp  Sill,  so  named  in  honor  of  General  Sill,  who  was 
killed  in  the  battle  of  Stone  River. 

On  February  7,  we  were  ordered  out  on  picket  duty  and 
started  at  7  o'clock  A.  M.  After  we  were  posted  a  foraging 
expedition  marched  out,  taking  the  same  direction  we  had 
taken  on  the  4th.  Before  long  we  heard  the  boom  of  cannon, 
which  indicated  that  they,  too,  had  found  the  enemy.  When 
they  returned  they  reported  only  two  men  hurt.  There  was 
so  much  cannonading  and  so  many  conflicting  reports,  that 
at  one  time  our  entire  picket  reserve  was  ordered  out  to  the 
line.  Our  posts  this  day  were  all  numbered,  and  it  was 
ordered  that  in  case  of  an  alarm  the  number  of  the  post  was 
to  be  sent  along  the  line.  We  were  not  disturbed  during  the 
night,  and  were  relieved  at  8  o'clock  next  morning  and  re 
turned  to  camp.  Wre  rested  during  the  day,  but  in  the  evening 
received  orders  to  go  out  with  a  foraging  expedition  next 
morning. 

February  9,  wre  marched  at  8  o'clock  going  to  the  left 
front,  instead  of  out  the  Shelbyville  pike  as  before,  and  soon 
found  abundance  of  forage.  As  soon  as  our  train  was  loaded 
we  changed  position  to  guard  a  train  from  General  Davis' 
division  while  it  was  being  loaded.  There  were  about  200 
wagons  in  the  two  trains  and  all  were  loaded.  While  we  were 
guarding  the  trains  the  boys  found  plenty  of  walnuts,  and 
some  did  a  little  private  foraging.  During  the  day  or  night  it 
was  rumored  that  General  McCook  had  been  taken  prisoner 
by  the  enemy,  but  next  morning  the  rumor  was  found  to  be 
false.  On  the  1.1th,  we  were  again  out  on  picket  duty.  On 
the  12th  our  sutler.  Mr.  George  Geiger  of  Columbus,  O.,  fa 
miliarly  known  as  "Old  Gouger,"  arrived  and  was  greeted  with 
shouts  all  over  the  regiment,  as  it  was  then  considered  certain 
that  the  paymaster  was  coming.  He  was  expecting  his  goods 
and  wanted  to  be  here  when  the  men  were  paid  so  as  to  get 

1     (Reason's  Diar3\ 


264  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

his  share,  which  in  the  case  of  many  of  the  men  was  the 
"lions  share".1  That  evening  we  received  orders  to  go  as  escort 
for  a  foraging  expedition  next  morning  at  8  o'clock. 

On  the  13th  we  marched  at  the  appointed  time  and  went 
out  the  same  road  we  took  on  our  last  foraging  expedition. 
We  went,  however,  much  farther — nearly  to  the  hills  which 
bounded  the  valley  on  the  south.  We  found  forage  in  abund 
ance,  soon  loaded  all  our  wagons  and  returned  to  camp  with 
out  being  disturbed  by  the  enemy.  In  our  absence  the  sutlers 
supplies  came  in — five  wagon-loads,  which  caused  much  excite 
ment  in  our  camp.1  On  the  14th  we  signed  the  payrolls  for 
four  months'  pay.  On  the  15th  we  were  ordered  to  get  ready 
for  inspection  at  10  o'clock.  We  got  ready,  but  after  waiting 
an  hour,  were  ordered  to  go  out  on  picket  duty  immediately. 
There  was  considerable  grumbling,  as  it  was  rainy  and  cold, 
but  we  went  all  the  same.  We  were  posted  in  the  same  place  as 
on  our  recent  tours  of  such  duty — out  on  the  Shelbyville  pike. 
In  the  evening  there  were  apprhnsions  of  an  attack,  and  our 
reserves  were  ordered  out  to  the  line,  where  they  remained 
for  an  hour,  and  then  were  permitted  to  go  back  to  the  reserve 
stations.  The  night  passed  without  unusual  incident.  We 
were  not  relieved  until  10  o'clock  the  morning  of  the  16th.  A 
large  foraging  expedition  went  out  while  we  were  waiting  to 
be  relieved.  We  rested  quietly  after  returning  to  camp,  un 
disturbed  by  orders  of  any  kind,  that  day  or  the  next,  but  the 
evening  of  the  l?th  we  received  orders  to  go  out  with  a  forage 
train  next  morning.  We  started  out  the  morning  of  the  18th, 
inarching  on  the  railroad  nearly  to  the  picket  line,  where  we 
waited  for  the  forage  train.  It  was  raining  and  the  roads  were 
so  bad  the  mules  had  about  all  they  could  do  to  draw  the  emp 
ty  wagons.  When  we  came  to  a  creek  we  had  crossed  on  a 
former  similar  expedition,  it  was  so  swollen  that  we  had  to  be 
carried  across  in  the  wagons.  One  poor  mule  fell  in  the 
stream  and  broke  its  leg  and  had  to  be  shot.  The  success  of 
the  expedition  seemed  doubtful,  but  we  finally  found  forage, 
loaded  the  wagons,  and  started  back,  having  a  skirmish  with 
the  enemy  when  we  reached  the  pike,  but  having  no  one  hurt. 
It  was  after  dark  when  we  got  our  train  inside  our  lines.  On 
the  19th  we  had  orders  for  inspection,  but  found  it  was  only  a 
ruse  to  find  out  who  had  fired  off  their  guns  without  orders. 
Some  of  the  men  were  caught  and  as  a  result  had  to  go  on  ex 
tra  duty,  which  they  did  with  a  crest-fallen  air.  Among  them 
were  Haverstick  and  Cook  of  Company  H.2  About  noon  the 
companies  were  formed  and  marched  to  brigade  headquarters 

1  and  2     Gleason's  Diary. 


LONG  PERIOD  OF  INACTION  AT  MURKREESRORO  265 

and  the  men  were  paid  for  four  months'  service.  Many  of  the 
men  set  apart  considerable  sums  to  send  home  by  the  state 
agent  who  was  expected  in  a  day  or  two,  but  before  he  came 
the  sutler  had  proved  the  stronger  attraction.  Gleason  in  his 
diary  of  that  day  notes  the  receipt  of  a  song  entitled,  "Take 
Your  Gun  and  Go,"  from  a  young  lady  who  had  made  it  popu 
lar  by  singing  it  herself.  The  evening  of  the  20th  we  got  or 
ders  to  go  on  picket  duty  next  morning  at  7  o'clock.  The  only 
record  found  of  this  tour  of  duty  is  that  it  rained  hard  most  of 
the  time  and  that  it  was  late  next  morning  before  we  were 
relieved  and  got  back  to  camp.  That  evening,  the  22nd,  we 
learn  from  Gleason's  diary  that  a  number  of  the  officers  and 
men  assembled  in  the  sergeant  major's  tent  and  sang.  The 
books  they  used  were  "The  Jubilee"  and  "The  New  York  Glee 
and  Chorus  Book."  Major  McClenahan,  Gleason  and  the  ser 
geant  major  were  present  and  perhaps  Captain  J.  K.  Brown 
and  others.  Their  voices  are  all  silent  now,  but  one  can  recall 
how  on  many  a  night  they  led  the  chorus  in  some  candle-light 
ed  tent  and  awoke  fond  memories  of  home  and  boyhood  and 
loved  ones  far  away.  Those  of  us  who  remain  owe  a  debt  of 
gratitude  to  these  singers  which  we  can  never  repay.  We 
rested  on  the  23rd,  and  on  the  2-ith  again  went  out  on  a  forag- 
in"  expedition,  and  returned  by  an  eight-mile  march  on  the 
Manchester  pike. 

The  25th  and  26th  were  days  of  hard  rain  and,  fortunately, 
we  were  permitted  to  remain  in  camp.  The  rain  was  so  heavy 
that  it  dripped  through  our  tents  and  made  even  our  rest  uncom 
fortable. 

On  the  27th  we  had  general  inspection  and  in  the  evening 
orders  came  to  go  on  picket  duty  next  morning  at  7  o'clock.  We 
spent  the  day  and  night  of  the  28th  on  picket  duty  with  no  unto 
ward  incident.  There  was  rain  at  intervals,  but  that  was  ex 
pected,  and  the  men  took  it  as  a  matter  of  course.  The  first  day 
of  March,  1863,  was  mild  and  pleasant  and  we  had  a  good  rest 
after  our  day  and  night  of  guard  duty. 

March  2,  Lieutenant  Augustus  L.  Smith,  our  regimental 
quartermaster,  returned  to  the  regiment  after  a  leave  of  absence 
and  brought  with  him  several  of  the  men  who  had  been  taken 
prisoners  at  the  battle  of  Stone  River  and  had  been  exchanged. 
March  3,  we  were  ordered  to  go  out  with  a  forage  train  next 
morning  at  7  o'clock..  We  started  at  the  hour  named,  the  brigade 
being-  under  command  of  the  lieutenant  colonel  of  the  32d  In 
diana.  We  went  by  a  circuitous  route  across  the  fields  and  finally 
reached  the  river,  which  we  crossed  on  a  foot  bridge.  We  soon 
came  out  on  the  Columbia  pike,  which  we  followed.  We  passed 


266  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

Sheridan's  division,  which  we  understood  was  out  on  a  recon 
naissance,  and  having  heard  tiring  before  meeting  them,  thought 
the  prospects  good  for  a  fight.  We  found,  however,  that  the  men 
were  only  emptying  their  rusty  guns.  We  passed  through  Salem 
and  kept  steadily  on  until  we  reached  the  Eagleville  pike,  which 
we  followed  until  we  came  to  a  region  where  forage  seemed  to 
be  abundant.  This  road  had  been  recently  repaired  and  the 
marching  over  it  was  hard.  When  we  halted  to  load  the  wagons 
we  estimated  that  we  had  marched  about  seventeen  miles.  We 
were  posted  to  guard  the  train  while  loading,  and  built  fires,  for 
it  was  very  cold.  We  thought  we  would  remain  there  during 
the  night,  but  after  making  coffee  we  started  back  for  camp.  It 
was  a  long  hard  march  and  it  was  very  late  at  night  when  we 
reached  it.  Some  of  the  men  fell  out  and  did  not  get  in  until 
about  two  o'clock  next  morning.  We  rested  quietly  in  camp 
until  the  morning  of  the  6th,  when  we  were  ordered  out  on  a 
reconnoissance  with  two  days'  rations  in  haversacks.  It  had 
rained  during  the  night  and  was  still  wet  and  disagreeable.  Soon 
after  we  started,  the  clouds  thickened  and  poured  forth  a  deluge 
of  rain.  But  there  was  no  halt  or  turning  back.  Wre  passed  the 
camps  of  Davis'  and  Sheridan's  divisions,  crossed  the  creek  on 
the  Franklin  pike  bridge  and  there  took  a  course  about  parallel 
with  the  Shelbyville  pike,  on  a  mud  road  which  the  rain  did  not 
improve.  We  soon  heard  cannonading  to  our  left.  We  marched 
on  several  miles  without  meeting  opposition  from  the  enemy, 
when  suddenly  we  heard  skirmishing  in  our  front  and  were 
hastily  formed  in  line  of  battle.  We  advanced,  driving  the  enemy 
back,  and  occupied  the  little  village  of  Middleton,  passing  a  dead 
and  a  wounded  rebel  on  the  way.  The  Fifteenth  and  Forty- 
ninth  Ohio  were  deployed  to  support  the  skirmishers,  a  piece  of 
artillery  was  brought  forward  and  swept  the  fields  beyond  our 
line  with  canister.  The  skirmish  line  and  the  cavalry  then  again 
advanced  and  put  the  enemy  to  flight.  We  then  retraced  our 
steps  about  two  miles  and  bivouaced  for  the  night,  drenched  to 
the  skin.  A  heavy  rain  set  in  and  continued  all  night.  For  the 
first  time,  we  really  began  to  appreciate  our  shelter  tents,  which 
we  had  carried  with  us  on  this  march.  In  this  skirmish,  three 
men  of  the  brigade  were  wounded  and  the  enemy's  loss  was  re 
ported  to  be  at  least  twenty  killed  and  wounded.1  When  we  re 
tired  to  go  into  bivouac,  the  enemy  followed  us  closely  and  our 
pickets  had  to  fight  for  their  position.  The  enemy,  however,  soon 
withdrew  and  left  us  undisturbed  the  remainder  of  the  night.  At 
3  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  7th  we  were  awakened  by  the 
guards  and  ordered  to  get  ready  to  move  immediately.  As  our 
regiment  was  the  rear  guard  it  was  nearly  an  hour  before  we 


LONG  PERIOD  OF  INACTION  AT  MUBFREESBOKO  267 

got  started.  It  was  very  dark,  the  roads  were  deep  with  mud 
and  water  and  the  marching  was  difficult.  Company  H  had 
charge  of  one  of  the  howitzers,  and  once  or  twice  it  got  stuck 
fast  in  the  mud  and  delayed  our  progress.1  We  finally  reached 
the  village  of  Salem,  where  we  halted  until  all  the  stragglers  came 
up.  We  then  resumed  our  march  and  reached  camp  about  noon, 
very  tired,  and  wet  from  head  to  foot. 

In  the  afternoon  we  got  orders  to  march  at  a  moment's  no 
tice.  The  order  caused  a  good  deal  of  mutinous  talk.  It  was 
said  that  the  boys  in  the  Thirty-second  Indiana  threatened  to 
stack  arms  if  the  order  came.-  The  order  did  not  come  that 
evening.  If  it  had,  we  would  have  eaten  our  words  and  have 
gone  wherever  ordered,  and  the  Thirty-second  would  have  done 
the  same. 

Next  morning  an  order  came,  not  to  march,  but  to  go  on 
picket.  There  was  some  grumbling,  but  we  went,  had  no  un 
usual  experience  during  the  day  or  night  and  returned  to  camp, 
only  to  receive  an  order  to  pack  up  and  be  ready  to  move  at  a 
moment's  warning.  We  struck  tents,  "packed  up"  and  after 
waiting  for  orders  for  more  than  an  hour,  were  ordered  to  pitch 
tents  and  prepare  for  picket  again  at  9  o'clock  next  morning. 

That  night  we  heard  Major  McClenahan,  Captain  Brown, 
Andrew  ].  Gleason  and  others  singing  again  in  the  sergeant 
major's  tent.  It  seemed  unusual  that  we  should  be  ordered  on 
picket  duty  so  soon  after  being  relieved  from  such  duty,  but 
Gleason  in  his  diary  explains,  that  such  duties  were  unusually 
arduous  at  this  time  because  two  divisions  were  absent  on  some 
expedition.  We  pitched  our  tents  and  had  the  satisfaction  to 
know  that  striking  them  had  given  our  quarters  a  needed  airing. 

Our  picket  duty  on  the  day  and  night  of  the  10th  of  March 
was  quite  arduous.  It  was  rainy  and  disagreeable.  Our  watch 
was  under  instructions  more  guarded  and  careful  than  usual,  and 
the  loss  of  sleep  in  standing  guard  two  nights  in  succession  was 
very  trying.  It  wras  hard  to  keep  awake,  although  we  were 
warned  that  we  might  expect  an  attack  on  the  picket  line  at  any 
time. 

Fortunately,  on  the  morning  of  the  llth,  we  were  relieved 
earlier  than  usual  and  had  almost  the  whole  day  and  all  the  night 
for  sleep  and  rest.  At  6  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  12th  we 
were  again  ordered  out  on  picket  duty  and  returned  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  13th.  On  the  13th,  Aaron  Wortman  of  Co.  H  died  in 
the  brigade  hospital  of  typhoid  fever.  He  was  a  favorite  in  the 
company  and  his  death  was  a  great  shock  to  his  brother  James 
of  the  same  company,  who  had  now  lost  two  brothers  since  he 

1  and  2     Gleason's  Diary. 


268  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

entered  the  service.  The  boys  of  Company  H  built  a  rude  bier  on 
which  to  lay  his  body,  placed  it  in  a  shelter  tent,  and  his  comrades 
stood  watch  over  it  during  the  day  and  night.  Next  morning,  al 
though  the  regiment  was  again  ordered  out  on  picket  duty,  a  de 
tail  of  four  men  was  ordered,  to  dig  the  grave  and  assist  in  the 
last  sad  rites  of  their  deceased  comrade.  At  3  o'clock  on  the 
afternoon  of  March  1-i,  he  was  buried  on  a  knoll  across  the  pike 
from  our  camp,  where  others  had  been  buried.  At  the  grave,  at 
the  request  of  his  brother,  a  hymn  was  sung  and  a  passage  of 
scripture  was  read  by  one  of  the  comrades.  The  grave  was  then 
filled  and  marked  with  some  large  stones.1 

On  the  morning  of  the  15th  the  regiment  was  later  than 
usual  in  being  relieved,  and  it  was  near  noon  when  it  got  back  to 
camp.  We  heard  that  Sheridan's  division  had  returned  from  its 
expedition  and  therefore  did  not  anticipate  a  continuation  of  our 
severe  picket  duty.  After  a  good  rest  we  were  notified  that  we 
would  drill  on  the  morrow. 

The  morrow  was  the  17th  and  at  D  o'clock  we  marched  out 
into  the  field  in  front  of  our  camp  and  were  put  through  various 
battalion  movements.  After  this  we  had  a  sham  battle  with  the 
Thirty-second  Indiana  and  Goodspeed's  battery.  After  two  hours 
of  such  drill  and  maneuvers  we  returned  to  camp,  and  in  the 
afternoon,  put  in  about  the  same  time  in  company  drill. 

It  was  the  last  day  we  spent  in  Camp  Sill.  It  was  a  pleasant 
camp,  well  located  and  fairly  well  drained,  and  the  nine  weeks 
we  spent  there,  although  filled  with  arduous  and  sometimes  very 
exacting  and  trying  duty,  were  among  the  most  pleasant  of  our 
long  experiences. 

When  off  duty  both  officers  and  men  seemed  to  enjoy  them 
selves.  The  landscape  was  attractive  and  the  country  rich  agri 
culturally.  There  were  some  fine  plantations  where  there  were 
young  ladies,  who  were  a  great  attraction  for  both  officers  and 
men.  It  was  quite  common  for  some  of  the  officers  who  had 
the  countersign  to  pass  out-side  our  picket  or  guard  lines  of 
evenings  and  call  on  these  young  women.  It  became  so  common. 
in  fact,  that  General  Rosecrans  found  it  necessary  to  issue  an 
order  forbidding  the  officers  to  go  outside  the  lines  without  a 
written  pass  from  brigade,  division  or  army  headquarters.  Even 
this  order  did  not  altogether  stop  the  practice  and  some  of  the 
officers  both  old  and  young  at  times  disregarded  it.  There  was 
one  plantation  just  outside  our  lines  where  lived  a  family  named 
Winstead  or  Winston  in  which  there  were  a  number  of  bright. 
attractive  young  women.  General  Rosecrans'  orders  did  not  avail 
to  keep  quite  a  number  of  our  own  and  other  officers  of  the  com- 

1     Oleason's  Diary. 


LONG  PERIOD  OF  INACTION  AT  MUUFBEESBORO  269 

mand  from  calling  on  them,  without  having  obtained  the  required 
written  permission,  and  almost  every  pleasant  evening  a  dozen 
or  more  of  them  continued  to  disregard  the  orders.  They  would 
ride  up  to  the  guard,  give  the  countersign,  and  pass  on  out  to 
Winstead's  or  Winston's  where  they  were  always  entertained 
with  true  southern  hospitality.  Lieutenant  Wallace  McGrath  of 
the  Fifteenth  Ohio,  who  was  serving  on  the  brigade  staff,  knew 
of  these  infractions  of  military  discipline,  and  made  up  his  mind 
to  play  a  practical  joke  on  Leiutenant  Green  of  the  same  staff, 
with  whom  he  had  frequently  called  at  Winsteads,  by  having 
him  arrested  while  making  such  a  call.  We  will  let  him  tell  the 
story  in  his  own  words  written  for  this  history  in  1909,  a  short 
time  before  his  death.  He  calls  it 

"THE  ADVENTURE  AT  WINSTEAD'S." 

"Just  outside  the  picket  line  at  Murfreesboro  there  lived  a 
well  to  do  planter  who  counted  two  beautiful  young  daughters 
as  his  most  valuable  possessions,  one  of  whom  was  a  widow  whose 
husband,  an  officer  in  the  confederate  army,  had  been  killed  in 
battle.  The  young  ladies  vied  with  each  other  as  to  which  could 
say  the  most  bitter  things  about  the  Yankees.  They  were  ex 
ceedingly  attractive,  having  many  accomplishments.  Young  offi 
cers,  and  old  ones  too,  their  wives  being  north  of  the  Ohio,  went 
to  see  them." 

"A  few  evenings  after  General  Rosecrans  had  issued  an 
order  that  'no  officer  should  be  absent  from  his  brigade  without 
the  written  permission  of  his  brigade  commander',  a  party  of  six 
officers  from  our  brigade  went  out  to  call  on  the  young  ladies. 
I  have  forgotten  who  they  all  were,  but  remember  that  Lieutenant 
Green  of  our  brigade  staff,  Captain  Goodspeed,  commanding  the 
battery,  and  Captain  Jim  Cummins,  'of  ours'  were  among  them. 
General  Willich  was  then  the  guest  of  the  Confederate  govern 
ment  at  'Hotel  Libby'  and  Colonel  Gibson  was  in  command  of  the 
brigade.  Had  the  Old  Man  (meaning  General  Willich)  been  in 
command  at  that  time,  there  would  have  been  no  adventure  at 
Winstead's  to  tell,  for  he  never  would  have  stood  for  the  like  of 
that.  Colonel  Gibson  knew  what  the  party  were  up  to  and  had 
not  objected  to  their  going  out  of  camp,  but  as  it  was  zvritten  per 
mission  General  Rosecrans'  order  required,  I  saw  a  good  oppor 
tunity  to  play  a  practical  joke.  My  idea  was  to  cend  some  one  to 
represent  an  officer  on  General  Rosecrans'  staff  and  arrest  the 
whole  gang.  I  didn't  send  one  of  our  own  officers  for  fear  Green 
might  know  him,  so  I  decided  on  Fred  Stevenson,  who  was  a 
sergeant  in  the  Thirty-ninth  Indiana.  He  had  lived  in  Columbus, 
Ohio,  where  I  had  known  him  before  the  war." 


270  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

"We  had  a  staff  uniform  belonging  to  Captain  Butler  of  the 
brigade  staff,  who  was  absent  on  leave.  It  was  complete  in  every 
particular, — hat  with  feather  and  ornament,  black  field  in  the 
shoulder  straps,  gilt  cord  on  the  trowser  legs — and  it  fitted  Stev 
enson  very  well.  He  was  a  bright  fellow  and  it  did  not  take  long 
to  explain  to  him  what  I  wanted  to  do,  or  to  thoroughly  enlist 
him  in  the  madcap  enterprise.  He  was  a  little  nervous  for  fear 
Green  might  recognize  him,  for  he  had  been  at  headquarters  to 
see  me  a  number  of  times.  However,  after  getting  into  Butler's 
uniform,  he  said  that  his  own  captain  would  not  know  him." 

"I  instructed  him  thoroughly,  gave  him  the  countersign  and 
told  him  he  was  Captain  Bird  of  General  Rosecrans'  staff.  He 
passed  the  picket  and  the  guard  at  the  house  and  was  announced 
in  a  loud  voice  by  the  colored  butler  as  Captain  Bird  of  the  staff 
of  'Majah  Gineral  Rosecrans'.  Going  in,  he  was  nearly  para 
lyzed  to  find  not  only  the  party  from  our  brigade,  but  six  or  eight 
other  officers  from  other  brigades  of  our  corps  and  one,  a  colonel, 
from  another  corps.  He  was  in  a  fearful  panic  for  fear  Green 
would  recognize  him  and  kept  his  hat  on.  So  General  Rosecrans' 
staff  officer  did  not  make  a  very  favorable  impression.  After 
sitting  a  few  moments  he  pulled  himself  together  and  rising  to 
his  feet,  said,  'Gentlemen,  have  you  written  permission  to  be 
here?'  The  'panic'  was  thereupon  transferred  to  the  other  fel 
lows.  Some  looked  wild,  others  mad,  but  they  were  all  speechless 
for  awhile  and  then  all  confessed  they  had  no  written  permission 
to  be  out  of  camp.  (He  had  decided  he  must  arrest  all  or  none). 
The  colonel  made  the  excuse  that  he  was  sick  and  had  come  out 
to  get  a  bed  in  which  to  sleep.  He  was  really  a  sick  man  and  it 
was  a  shame  to  shake  him  up  in  that  way.  Thereupon  Stevenson 
asked  each  one  for  his  name  and  regiment  and  made  a  show  of 
taking  them  all  down  in  his  book.  Then  going  to  the  door,  as  if 
to  leave,  he  turned  back  and  said,  'Gentlemen,  you  will  consider 
yourselves  in  arrest,  and  report  immediately  to  your  brigade  com 
manders.'  He  then  passed  out,  hurriedly  mounted  his  horse, 
passed  the  pickets  and  rode  rapidly  back  to  brigade  headquarters, 
where  he  changed  his  clothing  and  was  soon  back  in  his  tent  in  the 
camp  of  the  Thirty-ninth  Indiana.  Soon,  the  party,  Green,  Good- 
speed,  Cummins  and  the  three  others  belonging  to  our  brigade 
came  stringing  in  with  woe-begone  countenances,  reported  them 
selves  to  Colonel  Gibson  as  in  arrest,  and  detailed  the  circum 
stances.  Colonel  Gibson,  when  all  were  in,  presented  in  eloquent 
words  the  gravity  of  the  offence,  the  personal  disgrace  of  an  arrest 
for  violation  of 'orders,  and  the  bad  effect  it  would  have  on  the 
men  and  on  the  discipline  of  the  command.  He,  however,  sympa 
thized  with  them  and  said  he  would  try  to  have  some  of  their  per- 


LONG  PERIOD  OF  INACTION  AT  MURFKEESBORO  271 

sonal  friends  appointed  on  the  court  martial  which  would  be 
called  to  try  them.  By  this  time,  the  news  of  the  arrests  had 
spread  through  camp  and  forty  or  fifty  officers  of  the  brigade  had 
come  to  headquarters.  Colonel  Gibson  went  on  discussing  the 
court  martial  and  finally  said,  'If  1  am  directed  to  convene  the 
court  I  will  appoint  anyone  you  want.  Here  is  McGrath,  how 
would  he  do  for  the  president  of  the  court?  He  would  let  you 
all  off.'  This  last  remark  made  them  begin  to  think  that  perhaps 
their  situation  was  not  as  bad  as  they  feared.  Soon  it  dawned 
upon  them  that  a  practical  joke  had  been  played  on  them,  and  they 
were  greatly  relieved.  The  news  went  from  tent  to  tent  among  the 
officers'  quarters  and  all  turned  out  to  enjoy  the  fun.  When  the 
whole  story  was  told,  Stevenson  was  sent  for  and  each  one  of  the 
victims  gave  him  an  order  on  the  sutler  for  a  keg  of  beer.  What 
followed  was  'contrary  to  good  order  and  military  discipline',  and 
over  it  we  will  drop  the  curtain." 

"The  next  morning  we  had  to  skurry  around  to  relieve  the 
minds  of  the  officers  of  other  commands  who  had  been  arrested, 
especially  the  old  colonel  who  was  sick. 

"The  story  soon  found  its  way  to  higher  up  headquarters. 
General  Johnson  pretended  to  scowl  about  it,  but  General  McCook 
and  General  Rosecrans  laughed  heartily  over  it  and  thought  it 
an  excellent  practical  joke,  which  it  was." 

On  March  18,  we  received  orders  to  move  camp  at  8  o'clock. 
We  took  the  Murfreesboro  pike,  which  was  quite  dry  and  dusty, 
reminding  us  of  last  summer's  marches.  Our  regiment  and  bri 
gade  led  the  corps.  Just  before  we  reached  Murfreesboro  we 
turned  to  the  left,  marched  through  a  dirty  old  camp  and  were 
halted  just  west  of  the  town  and  in  plain  view  of  it,  the  fortifica 
tions  and  the  surrounding  camps.  \Ve  pitched  our  tents  on  top 
of  a  fine  knoll  at  the  foot  of  which  was  the  railroad  and  a  creek 
which  supplied  us  with  water.  We  took  much  pains  in  preparing 
the  ground,  as  there  were  good  prospects  for  remaining  for  some 
time.  Our  new  camp  was  designated  as  Camp  Drake  in  honor 
of  Lieutenant  Colonel  Drake  of  the  49th  Ohio,  was  killed  in 
the  battle  of  Stone  River. 

On  the  19th  we  spent  most  of  the  day  in  fixing  up  our  new 
quarters,  and  received  orders  for  inspection  and  review  next  day. 
The  next  day,  the  20th,  we  had  the  inspection  and  review  as  or 
dered.  The  whole  division  was  formed  near  our  brigade  head 
quarters,  our  regiment  being  on  the  extreme  right  of  the  line.  A 
brass  band  had  been  provided  for  the  occasion  which  enlivened 
the  ceremony.  It  was  very  tiresome,  standing  in  line  with  our 
knapsacks  and  all  our  accouterments  on,  while  the  general  passed 
in  front  and  rear  of  the  entire  line.  We  then  marched  in  review 


272  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

and  returned  to  our  camp  where  we  had  inspection  of  our  quar 
ters  by  the  general.  We  were  told  that  our  regiment  and  our  bri 
gade  made  the  finest  appearance  of  any  in  the  line.  On  the 
morning  of  the  21st  we  received  orders  to  get  ready  at  once  to 
go  out  on  picket  duty.  We  had  scarcely  time  to  get  our  breakfasts 
when  the  brigade  and  regimental  calls  both  sounded,  and  we  fell 
in.  There  was  some  cannonading  in  our  front,  but  it  soon  ceased. 
For  some  reason  we  did  not  understand,  our  tour  of  duty  was 
short  and  we  were  ordered  in  to  camp  in  the  evening.  On  the 
22d  we  received  notice  to  be  ready  to  march  at  noon  with  two 
days  rations  and  our  shelter  tents.  Our  whole  division,  we 
learned,  was  included  in  the  order.  We  took  the  road  to  Salem, 
where  we  relieved  Davis'  division  which  had  been  there  on  out 
post  duty  for  two  days.  Soon  after  we  arrived  at  Salem  we  were 
ordered  out  on  picket  duty.  Just  outside  the  line  was.  the  res 
idence  of  one  of  the  Jenkins  family,  and  a  couple  of  pairs  of 
bright  eyes  gazing  from  one  of  the  porticos  attracted  the  notice 
of  the  men  who  were  on  that  part  of  the  line.  There  were  numer 
ous  excuses  made  for  going  to  the  house  during  the  day,  and  in 
the  evening  the  adjutant,  the  sergeant  major  and  Lieutenant 
George  W.  Cummins  made  a  ceremonious  call  and  stayed  so  late 
they  had  difficulty  in  getting  inside  the  lines  again.1  We  were  re 
lieved  the  next  day  at  10  o'clock  and  were  placed  in  the  reserve 
and  posted  near  General  Johnson's  headquarters,  about  a  mile 
from  the  village. 

That  day  we  received  a  mail  and  newspapers  which  said  that 
the  famous  Yazoo  Canal  had  been  finished,  all  but  taking  out 
the  stumps,  that  Morgan  and  Wheeler  had  been  defeated  in 
Tennessee  and  that  the  rebels  had  begun  to  negotiate  for  peace. 
In  the  evening  it  rained,  but  our  shelter  tents  kept  us  compara 
tively  dry. 

The  24th  was  rainy  and  disagreeable,  a  ration  of  whisky  was 
issued,  and  some  of  the  boys  got  more  than  their  share  and  were 
quite  jovial  but  not  disorderly.2 

On  the  25th  the  left  companies  of  the  regiment  were  or 
dered  out  on  picket  duty  and  relieved  a  portion  of  the  49th  Ohio. 
They  were  posted  on  the  left  of  the  pike  and  occupied  a  station 
jointly  with  a  detachment  of  the  32d  Indiana.  It  rained  in  the 
morning,  but  towards  noon  the  clouds  rolled  by  and  were  fol 
lowed  by  high  north  winds  which  made  the  air  quite  cold.  The 
morning  of  the  26th,  the  left  wing  of  our  regiment  was  relieved 
by  the  right  wing  and  a  detachment  of  the  49th  Ohio.  At  two 
o'clock  we  got  orders  to  be  ready  to  move  in  an  hour.  General 
Sheridan  and  staff  arrived  soon  after  this,  our  pickets  were  called 

1  and  2     Gleason's  Diary. 


LONG  PERIOD  OF  INACTION  AT  MUBFREESBOBO  27S 

in  and  we  started  for  our  camp  at  Murfreesboro,  meeting  Sher 
idan's  division  coming  out  to  take  our  places.  The  day  was  clear 
and  warm  and  it  was  a  hot  tiresome  march.  We  reached  camp 
at  4:30  o'clock  P.  M.  and  soon  received  orders  to  go  on  picket 
duty  at  7  o'clock  next  morning.  We  heard  that  General  John 
son,  our  division  commander,  had  been  assigned  to  duty  as  Post 
Commander  of  Murfreesboro.  Seven  large  siege  guns  and  a 
long  train  of  wagons  arrived  this  day. 

It  was  reported'  that  General  Steedman  had  orders  to  in 
trench  at  Triune.  We  could  see  signalling  from  the  court  house 
to  some  point  to  the  westward.  There  were  rumors  of  another 
invasion  of  Kentucky  and  stirring  events  were  expected.  On  the 
morning  of  the  27th  we  started  out  on  picket  early,  taking  the 
Shelbyville  pike  and  being  posted  near  a  house  which  had  been 
General  McCook's  headquarters.  No  disturbance  occurred  dur 
ing  the  day  or  night  and  at  8  o'clock  next  morning  we  were  re 
lieved  and  started  for  camp,  where  we  rested  the  rest  of  the  day. 
March  29,  we  had  our  usual  Sunday  morning  inspection.  March 
30,  we  had  orders  for  review  at  10  o'clock  and  the  men  busied 
themselves  cleaning  their  guns  and  brushing  their  clothing  so  as 
be  in  good  condition  for  the  ceremony.  We  understood  we  were 
to  be  reviewed  by  Colonel  Gibson,  but  when  we  were  formed  in 
line,  to  our  surprise  Generals  Rosecrans  and  McCook  came  into 
view,  and  after  inspecting  a  fortification  near-by  they  came  over 
and  reviewed  us.  General  Rosecrans  gave  us  some  instructions 
about  packing  knapsacks.  We  marched  in  review  before  the  two 
generals  and  then  returned  to  quarters,  which  they  inspected  as 
they  rode  by.  In  the  evening  we  had  dress  parade.  We  had 
dress  parade  again  the  31st  and  got  orders  to  go  on  picket  next 
morning.  We  were  on  picket  the  day  and  night  of  April  1  and 
until  about  11  o'clock  on  the  2d.  On  the  2d  and  3d  we  remained 
in  camp  without  orders  of  any  kind.  On  the  4th  we  had  battalion 
drill  in  the  afternoon  followed  by  dress  parade.  On  the  5th  we 
were  again  ordered  out  to  Salem  on  outpost  duty  and  remained 
there  until  the  10th.  On  the  6th  while  we  were  on  picket  duty 
we  heard  cheering  by  the  troops  on  the  reserve,  and  soon  heard 
that  General  Rosecrans  had  received  a  telegram  from  Washing 
ton  saying  that  Charleston  had  fallen.  On  the  7th  we  recalled  that 
it  was  just  a  year  since  our  first  baptism  of  fire  and  blood  at  the 
battle  of  Shiloh.  On  the  8th  we  heard  firing  away  to  our  right 
which  indicated  that  fighting  was  going  on  in  the  neighborhood 
of  Triune. 

On  the  morning  of  the  9th,  it  was  rumored  that  Hardee's 
corps  was  marching  on  Tribune,  and  that  our  corps  would  march 
to  reinforce  General  Steedman  who  was  in  command  there.  That 


274  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

day  the  boys  captured  quite  a  number  of  squirrels.  We  returned 
to  Camp  Drake  in  the  afternoon  and  on  the  llth  put  in  a  good 
part  of  the  time  drilling.  On  the  12th  we  received  orders  to 
strike  our  Sibley  tents  and  turn  in  all  but  one  for  the  officers. 
Later  the  order  was  countermanded,  but  too  late  to  enable  us  to 
put  them  up  again  that  day.  On  the  morning  of  the  13th,  strange 
to  say,  there  was  no  reveille,  and  all  slept  or  lay  in  their  shelter 
tents  until  they  were  tired.  There  was  a  rumor  in  camp  that 
General  Rosecrans  had  been  ordered  to  Yicksburg,  which  caused 
general  dissatisfaction.1 

On  the  14th  we  got  ready  for  inspection  but  it  begun  to  rain 
and  it  was  postponed.  In  the  forenoon  we  were  paid  off.  The 
Sutler,  as  usual,  was  on  hand.  He  had  several  barrels  of  beer  in 
his  stock  and  the  men  were  eager  to  get  their  share  of  it.  His 
tent  was  full  of  officers  and  the  men  could  not  get  in.  This 
caused  quite  a  disturbance  and  the  men  made  several  attempts  to 
pull  down  the  tent.  It  was  reported  that  the  colonel  got  so  full 
that  he  had  to  be  taken  to  his  quarters.  It  was  a  disgraceful 
spectacle.  There  were  a  number  intoxicated,  and  they  were  not 
all  enlisted  men,  either1  On  the  loth  a  copy  of  the  Mansfield 
Shield  and  Banner  was  brought  into  camp  which  contained  what 
was  thought  to  be  a  disloyal  speech  by  our  old  Colonel,  Moses  R. 
Dickey.  It  created  a  good  deal  of  feeling,  and  the  boys  called  a 
meeting  and  appointed  a  committee  to  express  their  indignation 
over  it.  We  received  orders  to  go  on  picket  next  morning  at 
7  o'clock.  It  was  also  ordered  that  thereafter  when  the  regiment 
went  on  picket  the  men  should  take  their  shelter  tents  with  them 
and  be  ready  to  march  without  returning  to  camp.  On  the  16th 
we  started  at  the  appointed  time,  marched  out  the  Shelbyville 
pike  and  occupied  the  same  position  we.  did  the  last  time.  Three 
deserters  came  into  our  lines,  claiming  to  be  conscripts.  We  were 
relieved  at  8  o'clock  and  had  a  hot  march  into  camp.  From 
Gleason's  Diary  we  learn  that  the  sutler's  beer  was  not  all  gone 
and  that  there  was  a  good  deal  of  drunkenness  as  a  result,  which 
he  greatly  deplored.  In  the  afternoon  there  was  dress  parade. 
After  it  was  over  the  men  of  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  and  some  of 
the  Thirty-second  Indiana  came  over  to  a  meeting  held  in  our 
camp,  at  which  the  speech  of  Colonel  Dickey  in  the  Mansfield 
Shield  and  Banner  was  read  and  a  set  of  resolutions  condemning 
it  adopted  amid  great  enthusiasm.  They  were  also  indorsed  by  the 
Forty-ninth  Ohio  and  some  of  the  Thirty-second  Indiana.2  That 
night  the  singers  met  in  Gleason's  tent  and  sang  the  songs  of 
home, — the  old,  old  songs  of  long  ago.  On  the  18th,  19th  and 
20th  of  April,  we  remained  in  Camp  Drake  drilling  and  perform- 

1  and  2     Gleason's  Diary. 


LONG  PERIOD  OF  INACTION  AT  MUBFBEESBORO  275 

ing  regular  camp  duty.  On  the  21st  we  were  awakened  between 
two  and  three  o'clock  in  the  morning  by  the  adjutant  who  gave 
out  orders  that  we  must  be  ready  to  move  at  7  o'clock  with  three 
day's  rations  and  light  equipage.  We  started  at  the  appointed 
hour,  taking  the  Shelbyville  pike.  We  pushed  on  beyond  the 
picket  line  about  six  miles  when  we  halted  and  made  coffee.  We 
were  then  moved  forward  and  our  regiment  was  sent  out  on 
picket.  Next  day  about  noon  the  pickets  were  called  in  and  we 
moved  back  over  a  hill  where  we  passed  General  Johnson  and 
his  staff,  dismounted.  After  passing  the  7th  milestone  two  of  the 
regiments  of  the  brigade  were  deployed  on  either  side  of  the  pike, 
while  we  halted  in  the  road.  Some  firing  was  heard  in  front. 
After  resting  here  several  hours,  apparently  watching  a  rebel 
force  in  front,  we  moved  up  to  the  right,  leaving  our  fifth  com 
pany  behind  to  guard  the  wagons  and  artillery.  We  had  a  clear 
view  of  the  road  in  front,  but  no  offensive  demonstration  was 
made  by  either  side.  After  holding  our  position  about  an  hour 
we  retired  and  were  followed  by  the  enemy  who  skirmished  with 
our  rear  guard,  until  a  few  well  directed  shots  from  our  artillery 
checked  his  further  advance.  After  reaching  the  north  side  of 
the  hill  we  halted  and  stacked  arms  for  the  night.  The  next  day, 
the  23rd,  we  remained  in  the  same  position  and  all  was  quiet  in 
front.  General  McCook  and  staff  came  out  in  the  evening  and 
it  was  said  we  could  go  back  to  camp  next  day.  We  were  on 
short  rations,  but  fortunately  found  plenty  of  walnuts  which  the 
winter's  frost  had  not  injured.  Next  day,  the  24th,  at  4  o'clock 
we  returned  to  our  camp. 

On  the  25th  the  men  of  the  49th  Ohio  presented  Colonel 
Gibson  with  a  fine  sword  and  saddle.  The  presentation  speech 
was  made  by  a  private  soldier  of  the  49th.  Colonel  Gibson  re 
plied  in  an  eloquent  speech.  Colonel  Larabee  of  a  Wiscon 
sin  regiment  also  made  a  speech.  On  the  26th  we  were  on  picket 
at  our  old  station  on  the  Shelbyville  pike.  We  relieved  the  73d 
Illinois  and  next  morning  were  relieved  by  the  88th  Illinois.  On 
the  28th  we  had  company  drill  in  the  morning  and  in  the  after 
noon  battalion  drill  under  Lieutenant  Colonel  Askew,  who  had 
recovered  from  the  wound  he  had  received  at  the  battle  of  Stone 
River. 

On  the  29th  it  rained  at  intervals  all  day  and  there  was  no 
drill.  The  only  orders  received  were  to  have  pay  rolls  made  out 
and  to  prepare  for  inspection  and  muster  next  morning.  On  the 
30th,  at  morning  roll  call,  the  officers  called  attention  to  President 
Lincoln's  proclamation  setting  the  day  apart  as  a  day  of  fasting 
and  prayer.  Gleason  in  his  diary  says,  "As  we  usually  had  all 
the  fasting  we  thought  good  for  us,  very  few,  if  any,  observed 


276  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

that  part  of  the  programme,  and  being  without  a  chaplain,  I  fear 
very  few  prayers  were  offered,  unless  they  were  silent  ones".  We 
were  not  permitted  to  rest  on  that  day,  for  a  little  after  noon 
we  were  called  into  line  and  started  on  a  march  out  to  Salem 
for  another  tour  of  outpost  duty.  Our  regiment  was  halted  just 
beyond  the  river  to  await  the  coming  up  of  our  battery.  When 
we  reached  Salem  we  were  at  once  ordered  out  on  picket.  We 
were  posted  near  a  ruined  brick  house,  on  the  right  and  in  front 
of  which  were  two  Quaker  guns,  (cannons  made  of  porch 
columns  taken  from  the  house  mounted  on  old  wagon  wheels), 
which  possibly  may  have  made  our  troops  a  little  cautious  when 
they  first  occupied  the  country.  The  house  evidently  was  only 
a  short  time  before  the  abode  of  wealth  and  refinement  and  its 
present  condition  was  a  sharp  commentary  on  the  wickedness  of 
those  who  brought  on  the  war.1  It  made  excellent  quarters  for 
our  picket  reserve.  On  the  morning  of  May  1,  some  refugees 
came  into  our  lines.  They  belonged  to  a  party  which  had  been 
fired  into  by  our  scouts,  who  had  mistook  them  for  rebel  soldiers. 
Shortly  after  this  we  were  relieved  and  marched  back  to  our  post 
in  the  reserve,  where  we  remained  until  the  morning  of  the  4th, 
when  we  were  again  sent  out  on  picket  duty.  That  day,  the  4th, 
Ohio  cavalry  passed  outside  the  picket  lines  and  had  a  little  fight 
with  the  enemy,  bringing  in  three  prisoners. 

In  the  evening  several  scouts  passed  out  through  our  portion 
of  the  picket  line.  The  next  day,  the  5th,  we  were  relieved,  joined 
the  reserve  and  a  little  later  marched  back  to  Camp  Drake,  where 
we  heard  reports  of  General  Hooker's  fighting  at  Chancellors- 
ville,  which  were  very  encouraging. 

On  the  6th,  7th,  8th  and  9th  we  remained  in  camp  drilling 
and  taking  lessons  in  the  school  of  the  soldier.  On  the  9th  we 
heard  that  General  Hooker  had  reached  his  old  camp  after  the 
battle  of  Chancellorsville. 

On  the  10th  we  went  on  picket  duty  and  were  posted  in  the 
usual  position  we  had  occupied  recently  when  on  such  duty.  The 
day  was  warm  and  pleasant  and  some  of  the  men  not  on  duty 
went  fishing  but  caught  no  fish.  The  astounding  news  came  that 
Richmond  had  been  captured  by  Generals  Heintzelman  and 
Stoneman.  WTe  did  not  believe  it  at  all.  The  papers  came  and 
stated  that  General  Heintzelman  would  supercede  General 
Hooker. 

On  May  11,  we  were  relieved  by  the  Thirty-eighth  Illinois, 
got  back  to  camp  in  good  season  and  had  dress  parade  in  the 
evening.  On  May  12,  as  it  was  very  warm,  we  were  excused  from 
drill  in  order  that  the  men  might  cut  brush  and  build  arbors  to 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


LONG  PERIOD  OF  IXACTIOJV  AT  MUBFREESBORO  277 

protect  themselves  from  the  hot  sun.     In  the  afternoon  we  had 
dress  parade  and  in  the  evening  many  of  the  men  went  swimming. 

On  the  13th  and  14th  we  worked  putting  up  arbors  in 
front  of  our  tents  and  had  company  and  battalion  drill  and 
dress  parade.  On  the  15th  and  16th  we  had  brigade  drill  under 
Colonel  Gibson.  On  the  17th  we  were  again  on  picket  duty 
on  the  Shelbyville  pike  and  found  another  brigade  in  our  front, 
which  was  explained  by  the  fact  that  the  enemy  had  been 
making  some  demonstrations  on  that  part  of  the  line.  On  the 
morning  of  the  18th  we  were  called  up  at  daybreak  and  stood 
at  arms.  This  seemed  an  unnecessary  precaution,  as  there 
was  another  brigade  and  two  other  regiments  betwreen  our  re 
serve  and  the  picket  line.  We  were  relieved  by  the  .Twenty- 
seventh  Illinois  and  at  once  started  for  camp.  The  road  was 
very  dry  and  very  dusty.  When  we  got  to  camp  we  received 
orders  to  reduce  our  baggage  and  be  ready  for  brigade  drill 
at  (5 :30  the  next  morning.  We  were  out  on  brigade  drill 
promptly  at  the  hour  designated  and  were  drilled  over  three 
hours.  News  came  of  the  capture  of  Jackson,  Miss.,  by  General 
Grant,  and  as  the  news  came  through  rebel  sources  we  were 
inclined  to  believe  it.  On  the  20th  and  21st  we  were  drilled 
morning  and  afternoon  and  on  the  21st  many  of  the  men 
packed  up  their  extra  clothing  to  send  it  home.  It  was  ru 
mored  that  General  Palmer's  division  had  made  an  advance 
on  the  enemy  to  ascertain  whether  any  of  General  Bragg's 
forces  had  been  sent  to  reinforce  General  Johnston,  whom  Gen 
eral  Grant  was  pressing  sorely  in  Mississippi.  On  the  22nd  we 
heard  that  200  rebel  prisoners  had  been  captured  that  morn 
ing  at  Middleton.  On  the  2;>rd  there  was  some  pleasant  ex 
citement  in  camp  over  the  rumor  that  General  Johnson  had 
said  that  our  division  was  to  remain  as  the  garrison  of  Mur- 
freesboro  and  that  W^illich's  (our)  brigade  was  to  be  mounted. 
Most  important  news  was  received  through  rebel  sources  say 
ing,  that  General  Grant  had  beaten  Pemberton  and  had  driven 
him  across  the  Big  Black  River  towards  Vicksburg.  Such 
news  was  very  cheering  in  contrast  with  the  last  news  from 
our  army  in  the  east. 

At  (S  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  24th  we  were  again 
ordered  to  Salem  on  outpost  duty.  It  was  a  hot,  sultry  day 
and  wagons  were  provided  in  which  to  haul  our  knapsacks. 
On  arrival  at  Salem  we  were  at  once  ordered  out  on  picket 
duty  and  posted  in  the  same  position  as  the  last  time  we  were 
there.  In  the  evening  the  commander  of  the  cavalry  videttes 
in  our  front,  sent  in  word  that  the  enemy  were  in  some  ap 
parent  force  outside  the  lines  and  threatened  an  attack  in  the 


.  .          .  . 

'    -  •  ".-±T 


.  -     - 


Tbe  rao-K  r>:ti_>l-e  e**"ent  of  Mij  2-*,  L-x^.  "sri 

*  je^-erai  WiZSih.    (  J!*CS.S:G  ~  hi- 


-e   ?>:}>   -s-5.- 

•ocTs  test  2n-i  toud  -^  be  -t-2.-  •*,-_.  g-j^c  to  rot  ^.-  h-r   :    -'i 

jst  ^k^-  r^.  in  ti^  smr  SuH-1  kir-  ~*.'    After  s.  ICTT  r^rrjLrk- 
£r  tKroket    rr-giir^i.  be  ssit-i  :  :nr-"  ': 

is*  Trfaesi  be  gc-t_tbe^bri2:^i^  t--.«etber. 
i  bje  *n4  r'.^iie  :-~  :">_fOTr«rd  "03-  tbe  cberr-  of  tb-e  n:en. 
We   ^ert   stg^rr   '".11   packc-r   tbe   t^-th.   -vsr    »t2.tior     "--:'!' 
ze-i  5»o  we  bsbd.  raoct  -bsi.ee-     It  -sra.-  ne^r  tb-  -/rtr!"       i-tr-: 
*tC  c«zr  TriX.±r.    We  ha/i  Is.tf:r  n-f^'-  frotn  v'jc'k.-rbars'  e-nc  rc- 
-      •  "  "  i^.t  s..  " 

-e  ^'  t  ---.••'-  '*.'.  '-JTZL*-  ~ntil  ji2."Iizbt-     ,i.t  >  ; 
w«re-  re-BtTred  22-d  -^esT  back  to  tbe  re-^trvr   .  Tbt   ?!tb 

.          - 

-    -  .  -  -   -  /rr  ' 

S«s&t  oc  tbe  rniren  in  tbt  reaiment  went  to  tbe  brigs.  it  re- 

t-  • 


r.r  fry*-^-'  • :-'  twenty  -r,er.     If  th*  ws^or 

t  apor*>r€d  by  Gen^raJ  feo^ecran-*.  eno*3^h  'er^  t 

—.c:-  to  -jtrrV  ocr  entire  btiga.'ie,    Tbe  30th  *rid  :>I-t  iay- 


of  the  next  d&y 
Ro««3tT2Ji-. 


to  a.  lar^e 


o*rer  the   cosntisa^-i  to  fier.er^I     V/iIlkh    to 
ba^  b*t«a  a_%*%neti   i^y  ?T.:    ind   re^-irr.e-d 
- 
.  »r*te  if  a.*  tiken  :r*  o«?ir  r/ri^de  or;  the  otie-;- 


.     W.  1L  Jt  2 


or  I^ACTJO?;  AT  MTSFKEESIM aac* 

tion  whether  «:>r  not  we  <hc«Tild  be  mounted,  and  the  vote 
nearly  unanimous  in  favor  of  it.     Gleason  says,  ~all  seemed 

tired  of  marching;  afoot.~ 

On  the  3rd  we  received  orders  jto  have  three  days"  rations 
in  haversacks  and  four  of  "bread,  coffee  and  sng'ar  in  knapsacks, 
This  looked  very  much  like  a  forward  movement. 

On  the  4th  the  right  wing;  of  the  regiment  was  detached 
for  picket  duty  and  the  left  wing;  was  ordered  out  on  drill. 
It  was  in  this  drill  that  General  WiHich  first  instructed  us  in 
a  new  movement  which  he  called  ^advance  firing.~  This,  too, 
he  said  he  had  thought  out  when  he  was  in  Libby  prison.. 
h  was  one  of  the  "leetlc  dings"  he  had  promised  to  show  us. 

The  movement  was  quite  simple,  being  a  line  of  battle  in 
four  ranks,  each  rank  advancing  a  few  paces  in  front  and 
firing,  then  stopping  to  load  while  the  other  ranks  advanced 
alternately,  thus  keeping  up  a  steady  advance  and  a  steady  fire 
all  the  time.  At  first  there  was  some  confusion,  caused  by 
some  man  passing  to  the  right  instead  of  to  the  left  of  the  man 
in  front  of  him.  (General  AVillich  said.  Two  men  must  not 
trv  to  go  through  the  same  hole..""  After  practicing  a  short 
time  we  had  no  trouble  in  executing  the  movement  and  aH 
were  much  pleased  with  it.  In  the  afternoon  we  heard  can 
nonading  to  the  front  and  also  to  the  right  toward  Franklin. 
It  was  rumored  that  our  army  was  advancing  on  the  enemy, 
and  that  our  division  was  to  be  left  to  .garrison  Murfreesboro. 
"We  learned  that  Davis"  division  had  moved  out  on  the  Shelby- 
ville  pike  and  found  the  rebels  in  force, 

June  5th  and  f»th  we  had  drill,  company  an-d  battalion, 
under  the  direction  of  Lieutenant  Colonel  Asiew,  and  learned 
that  Colonel  Wallace  was  at  home.  He  had  obtained  orders  to 
go  to  Louisville  to  have  copies  of  the  company  rolls  made  from 
the  payrolls  on  file  in  the  pay  department  there,  to  replace 
those  captured  near  l^a wrenceburg,  Ky,  the  fall  before.  He 
had  taken  the  Sergeant  Major  with  him  to  do  the  clerical 
work,  had  gone  to  Columbus,  1\  and  had  been  appointed  com 
mandant  of  Camp  Chase..  Ouite  a  number  of  men  of  the  Thir 
ty-ninth  Indiana,  and  some  of  our  men,  who  had  been  cap 
tured  at  Stone  River  returned  fee  duty.  It  rained  the  7th, 
and  we  had  no  duties  to  perform  except  the  regular  Sunday 
morning-  inspection. 

It  is  here  noted  that  up  to  the  ^nd  'day  of  February,  lt>^l. 
General  Rosecrans"  army  had  been  officially  designated  and 
known  as  the  Fourteenth  Army  Corps,  On  and  after  that 
date  it  was  'designated  as  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland.  It 
was  divided  into  three  separate  commands.  designated  as  the 


280  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

Right  Wing,  commanded  by  General  A.  McDowell  McCook, 
the  Center,  commanded  by  General  George  H.  Thomas  and 
the  Left  Wing,  commanded  by  General  Thomas  L.  Crittenden. 
The  Right  Wing  was  designated  as  the  Twentieth  Army 
Corps,  the  center  was  designated  as  the  Fourteenth  Army 
Corps,  and  the  left  wing  was  designated  as  the  Twenty-first 
Army  Corps.  Our  brigade  was  designated  as  the  First  Brig 
ade,  Second  Division,  Twentieth  Army  Corps,  and  was  com 
posed  of  the  Fifteenth  Ohio,  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio,  the  Thirty- 
second  Indiana,  the  Thirty-ninth  Indiana  and  the  Eighty-ninth 
Illinois. 

On  the  8th  and  9th  we  had  our  usual  drill  and  on  the  10th 
were  on  picket  duty.  On  the  llth,  the  officers  of  the  brigade 
presented  watches  to  Colonel  Gibson  of  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio 
and  Lieutenant  Colonel  Jones  of  the  Thirty-ninth  Indiana, 
both  of  whom  had  been  in  command  of  the  brigade. 

On  the  12th  we  exchanged  our  rifled  muskets  for  Enfield 
rifles.  On  the  13th  we  had  brigade  drill  under  General 
Willich.  On  the  fourteenth  (Sunday)  we  had  our  usual  in 
spection.  On  the  15th  we  had  battalion  drill.  On  the  16th 
quite  a  number  of  men  who  had  been  captured  at  Stone  River 
reported  for  duty.  Some  of  them  asked  for  a  courtmartial  to 
vindicate  them  of  a  groundless  charge  that  they  had  permitted 
themselves  to  be  captured.  Among  them  were  Lehexv,  Myers 
and  Staurfer  of  Company  H.1  On  the  17th  the  newspapers 
reported  that  Lee's  army  had  crossed  the  Potomac  and  was 
moving  northward,  and  that  General  Hooker  was  trying  to 
head  him  off. 

In  the  afternoon  we  had  brigade  drill  under  General  Wil- 
lich's  direction  and  maneuvered  to  get  possession  of  the 
Franklin  road  bridge  across  Stone  River,  which  was  assumed 
to  be  in  possession  of  the  enemy.  One  great  advantage  and 
benefit  in  brigade  drills  under  General  Willich  was,  that  every 
movement  was  explained  beforehand  and  directed  to  some 
definite  purpose  and  object..  We  were  to  attack  the  enemy  in 
some  assumed  position,  or  we  were  to  be  attacked  by  the  en- 
my  in  front,  flank,  or  rear,  and  were  moved  in  such  a  manner 
as  to  meet  the  attack.  By  this  method  the  drills  were  made 
interesting  and  instructive  to  every  man  in  the  command. 

On  the  morning  of  the  17th  we  were  ordered  out  on  picket 
duty  and  returned  to  quarters  next  day  late  in  the  forenoon. 
After  supper  we  had  brigade  drill.  Next  morning,  the  19th, 
we  had  reveille  at  4  o'clock,  were  out  on  brigade  drill  at  5 
o'clock  and  drilled  three  hours.  In  the  evening  we  had  bat- 


1     Gleuson's  Diary. 


LONG  PERIOD  OF  INACTION  AT  MURFREESBORO  281 

talion  drill  under  Major  McClenahan.  General  Willich's  idea 
was,  that  in  order  to  keep  his  men  healthy  and  fit  they  must  be 
kept  active.  Idleness,  he  said,  bred  discontent  and  disease. 
There  was  perhaps  another  reason  for  our  daily  activity  in 
brigade  and  battalion  maneuvers,  but  of  that  further  along. 
On  the  20th  we  had  battalion  drill  twice  and  General  Willich 
was  present  to  note  and  criticise  our  movements. 

June  21,  was  Sunday,  we  had  our  usual  amount  of  drill 
and  the  evening  of  the  23rd  received  orders  to  march  at  an 
early  hour  next  morning,  with  two  days'  rations  in  haversacks 
and  ten  days'  rations  in  wagons. 

We  had  been  at  Murfreesboro  over  five  months,  and 
while  we  had  not  been  idle,  as  an  army  we  had  accomplished 
nothing.  We  did  not  know  that  a  good  portion  of  this  time 
the  War  Department  and  President  Lincoln  had  been  urging 
General  Rosecrans  to  move  against  the  enemy,  and  that  he 
had  been  claiming  he  had  not  sufficient  force  to  warrant  such 
a  movement.  He  pleaded  for  delay  until  he  had  more  cavalry, 
he  wanted  more  and  more  horses,  and  was  so  importunate 
that  the  W7ar  Department  pointed  out  to  him  that  since  he  had 
taken  command  of  the  army,  he  had  been  furnished  over  thirty 
thousand  additional  horses,  and  this,  too,  to  the  neglect  of 
other  points  but  little  if  any  less  important  than  his  own.1 
May  1,  1863,  General  Meigs,  quartermaster  general,  informed 
him  that  by  his  own  reports  he  had  received  since  December  1, 

1862,  33,057    animals — 7,000   per   month — that   on    March   23, 

1863,  he  had  19,164  horses  and  23,859  mules,  43023  animals  in 
all,  or  one  horse  or  mule  to  every  two  men  in  his  army.2     He 
wanted  a  fleet  of  gunboats  constructed  to  patrol  the  line  of 
the  Cumberland  River,  and  appealed  to  President  Lincoln  to 
interfere  and  order  them  supplied,  and  the  good  President  had 
to  say  to  him  that  he  could  not  take  the  matter  into  his  own 
hands,  "without  producing  inextricable  confusion."8 

He  wanted,  as  importunately,  repeating  carbines  in  such 
quantities,  that  he  was  informed  that  all  the  factories  in  the 
country  could  not  turn  out  enough  to  meet  his  demands.  But 
in  spite  of  what  the  War  Department  considered  unreasonable 
demands,  every  energy  was  directed  to  furnishing  everything 
needed  for  the  complete  organization  and  equipment  of  a  great 
army,  in  the  hope  that  its  strength  would  be  effectively  used 
against  the  common  enemy.  The  inaction  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  and  that  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  were  trying 
the  patience  of  Lincoln's  cabinet  and  Generals  Halleck  and 

1  Halleck  to  Rosecrans,  W.  R.  R.  23,  part  12-284. 

2  W.  R.  R.  23,  part  2-301. 

:j     W.  R.  R.  23,  part  2-58.  Sig.    10 


282  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

Meigs,  but  the  patience  of  Lincoln  himself,  though  sorely 
tried,  was  never  wholly  lost.  He  often  found  excuses  for 
short-comings  that  others  could  not  excuse. 

When  Grant  commenced  the  successful  movement  on 
Vicksburg,  and  fought  the  series  of  battles  which  resulted  in 
the  retirement  of  Pemberton  within  its  fortifications,  there 
were  grave  apprehensions  that  the  inaction  of  Rdsecrans 
would  result  in  Bragg  sending  a  portion  of  his  army  to  re- 
enforce  General  Johnston  who  was  operating  in  Grant's  rear. 
General  Rosecrans  was  repeatedly  urged  to  keep  Bragg's  army 
so  occupied  that  he  would  not  dare  to  detach  any  portion  of  it, 
but  it  seems  little  heed  was  paid  to  such  appeals,  and  that 
Bragg  did  actually  detach  about  15,000  men  of  his  army  and 
sent  them  to  re-enforce  Johnston.  Finally,  President  Lincoln 
himself  felt  called  upon  to  interfere,  and  sent  the  following 
dispatch  : 

"Washington,  May  28,  1863. 
General  Rosecrans, 

Murfreesboro,  Tenn. 

I  would  not  push  you  to  any  rashness,  but  I  am  very  anxious  that 
you  do  your  utmost,  short  of  rashness,  to  keep  Bragg  from  getting  off 
to  help  Johnston  against  Grant."i 

"A.  LINCOLN." 

To  this  message  General  Rosecrans  replied  the  next  day : 
"Dispatch  received.  I  will  attend  to  it."  But  it  seems  nothing 
was  done,  and  on  June  3,  General  Halleck  telegraphed  to 
General  Rosecrans  the  pointed  words :  "Accounts  received 
here  indicate  that  Johnston  is  being  heavily  re-enforced  from 
Bragg's  army.  If  you  cannot  hurt  the  enemy  now,  he  will 
soon  hurt  you."2 

There  was  still  no  serious  movement  against  Bragg's 
army,  and  on  the  8th  day  of  June,  General  Rosecrans  ad 
dressed  the  following  confidential  communication  to  Generals 
Brannan,  Crittenden,  Davis,  Granger,  McCook,  Mitchell,  Neg- 
ley,  Palmer,  Reynolds,  Rousseau,  Sheridan,  Stanley,  Thomas, 
Turchin,  Van  Cleve  and  Wood  —  all  his  corps  and  division 
commanders,3  desiring  an  answer  that  night : 

Head  Quarters,  Army  of  the  Cumberland 

Murfreesboro,  Tenn. 

(Confidential)  June  8,   1863. 

General:  In  view  of  our  present  military  position,  the  general 
commanding  desires  you  to  answer,  in  writing,  according  to  the  best  of 
your  judgment  the  following  questions,  giving  your  reasons  therefor: 

1.  From  the  fullest  information  in  your  possession  do  you  think 
the  enemy  in  front  of  us  has  been  so  materially  weakened  by  detach- 


1  W.    R.    R.,    23,  part   2-369.  3     W.  R.  R.  23,  part  2-394. 

2  W.  R.  R.  23,  part  2-383. 


LONG  PERIOD  or  INACTION  AT  MURFREESBORO  283 

ments  to  Johnston,  or  elsewhere,  that  this  army  could  advance  on  him 
at  this  time,  with  strong  reasonable  chances  of  fighting  a  great  and 
successful  battle? 

2.  Do  you  think  an  advance  of  our  army  at  present  likely  to  pre 
vent  additional  reinforcements  being  sent  against  General  Grant  by  the 
enemy  in  our  front? 

3.  Do  you  think  an  immediate  or  early  advance  advisable?- 

W.  S.  ROSECRANS, 
Major  General  Commanding. 

All  the  generals  above  named  made  answer  by  letter  to 
the  foregoing  questions. 

On  the  12th  of  June  General  Garfield,  chief  of  staff,  in  a 
remarkable  letter  addressed  to  General  Rosecrans,  analyzed 
these  letters  and  stated  his  finding  therefrom  as  follows : 

To  the  question,  whether  the  enemy  in  our  front  had  been 
materially  weakened  by  detachments  sent  to  General  Johnston 
or  elsewhere,  six  answered  that  he  had,  and  eleven  that  he  had 
not. 

To  the  question,  could  our  army  advance  against  the  ene 
my  with  strong  reasonable  chances  of  fighting  a  great  and 
successful  battle,  two  answered  yes  and  eleven  no. 

To  the  question  whether  an  advance  on  our  part  was 
likely  to  prevent  additional  re-enforcements  being  sent  against 
General  Grant  four  answered  yes  and  ten  answered  no. 

To  the  question  whether  an  immediate  advance  was  ad 
visable,  fifteen  answered  no.  Not  one  was  in  favor  of  it. 

To  the  question  whether  an  early  advance  was  advisable 
two  answered  no  and  not  one  favored  it.1 

This  result  is  another  confirmation  of  the  military  maxim 
that,  "Councils  of  War  never  fight." 

General  Garfield  then  took  up  the  questions  himself 
and  submitted  an  estimate  of  the  strength  of  Bragg's  army, 
showing  conclusively  that  it  did  not  exceed,  including  all  arms 
of  the  service  over  41,680  men  and  20  batteries  of  artillery. 
He  then  showed  from  our  own  official  returns  that,  after  leav 
ing  full  forces  to  garrison  Murfreesboro  and  all  important 
posts  in  our  rear,  we  could  throw  against  Bragg's  army  67,137 
bayonets  and  sabers,  not  counting  officers  and  excluding  about 
40  batteries  of  artillery,  probably  double  the  number  the  en 
emy  had. 

He  then  submitted  the  following  considerations: 

1.  Bragg's  army  was   weaker  than   it  had  been  since  the 
battle  of  Stone  River  or  was  likely  to  be  again  for  the  present, 
while  our  army  had  reached  its  maximum  strength : 

2.  That  whatever  might  be  the   result   at   Vicksburg,   the 
determination   of    its   fate   \vould   give   large    reinforcements 

1     W.  R.  R.  23,  part  421. 


284  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

to  General  Bragg.  If  Grant's  army  was  successful  it  would 
take  many  weeks  for  it  to  recover  from  the  shock  and  strain 
of  its  late  severe  campaign,  while  Johnston  would  send  back 
to  Bragg  a  force  sufficient  to  insure  the  safety  of  Tennessee. 

3.  If  Grant  failed  the  same  result  would  inevitably  fol 
low.  He  then  added,  "No  man  can  affirm  with  certainty  the 
result  of  any  battle,  however  great  the  disparity  of  numbers. 
Such  results  are  in  the  hands  of  God.  But  viewing  the  ques 
tion  in  the  light  of  human  calculation,  I  refuse  to  entertain  a 
doubt  that  this  army,  which  in  January  last  defeated  Bragg's 
superior  numbers  cannot  overwhelm  his  greatly  inferior 
force. 

-i.  A  retreat  (on  the  part  of  Bragg)  would  greatly  in 
crease  the  desire  and  opportunity  (on  the  part  of  his  men) 
for  desertion,  and  would  very  materially  reduce  his  physical 
and  moral  strength.  While  it  would  lengthen  our  communica 
tions  it  would  give  us  possession  of  McMinnville,  and  enable 
us  to  threaten  East  Tennessee  and  Chattanooga,  and  it  would 
not  be  unreasonable  to  expect  an  early  occupation  of  the  for 
mer  place. 

5.  But   the   chances   are   more   than   ever   that     a    sudden 
and   rapid   movement   would   compel   a   general    engagement, 
and  the  defeat  of  Bragg  would  be  in  the  highest  degree  disas 
trous  to  the  rebellion. 

6.  The   turbulent   aspect   of   politics     in    the    loyal     states 
renders  a  decisive  blow  against  the  enemy  at  this  time  of  the 
highest  importance  to  the  success  of  the  government  at  the 
polls,  and  in  the  enforcement  of  the  conscription  act. 

7.  The  government    and    the    War    Department     believe 
that  this  army  ought  to  move  upon  the  enemy  ;  the  army  de 
sires  it,  and  the  country  is  anxiously  hoping  for  it. 

8.  Our  true   objective  point    is    the    rebel    army,    whose 
last  reserves  are   substantially  in   the   field,   and  an   effective 
blow  will  crush  the  shell,  and  soon  be  followed  by  the  collapse 
o  fthe  rebel  government. 

9.  You  have  in  my  judgment    wisely    delayed    a    general 
movement  hitherto,  till  your  army  could  be  massed  and  your 
cavalry  could  be  mounted.     Your  mobile   force  can  now  be 
concentrated  in   twenty-four  hours,  and  your  cavalry,  if  not 
equal  in  numerical  strength  to  that  of  the  enemy,  is  greatly 
superior  in  efficiency  and  morale. 

For  these  considerations  I  believe  an  immediate  advance 
of  all  our  available  forces  is  advisable,  and  under  the  provi 
dence  of  God  will  be  successful." 


LONG  PERIOD  OF  INACTION  AT  MURFREESBORO  285 

In  this  communication  General  Garfield  fairly  and  com 
pletely  met  and  disposed  of  every  objection  made  by  the  corps 
and  division  commanders  to  an  immediate  advance.  Why  it 
was  not  at  once  made  will  perhaps  always  remain  an  unsolved 
problem.  But  knowing  now  the  conditions  then  existing  in 
the  two  armies,  there  is  little  reason  to  doubt  that,  if  the  ad 
vance  had  been  made  as  General  Garfield  had  recommended, 
the  days  of  the  rebellion  would  have  been  shortened  and 
there  would  have  been  no  fateful  battle  of  Chickamauga,  no 
battles  of  Lookout  Mountain  and  Missionary  Ridge  and  per 
haps  no  Atlanta  Campaign,  with  its  terrible  one  hundred  days 
of  continued  battle  and  waste  of  human  life. 

General  Bragg  had  sent  large  reinforcements  to  General 
Johnston  and  at  that  time  had  not  been  reinforced  by  General 
Buckner's  force  of  two  batteries  and  near  three  thousand 
infantry,  which  had  been  ordered  to  his  support  June  24,  the 
day  our  advance  was  ordered. 

He  could  have  been  attacked  and  overwhelmed  in  his 
chosen  position  if  General  Garfield's  advice  had  been  at  once 
followed,  and  the  army  had  moved  energetically  forward. 
The  weather  from  the  12th  to  the  24th  of  June  and  indeed 
for  the  period  from  the  first  to  the  24th  was  ideal.  Little 
rain  had  fallen,  the  roads  were  in  fine  condition  and  the  move 
ment  which  was  afterwards  made  failed  because  of  rain  and 
bad  roads.  With  good  weather  and  good  roads  our  army 
would  have  reached  Tullahoma  before  Bragg's,  and  thus 
would  have  compelled  a  battle  which  doubtless  would  have 
resulted  in  Bragg's  defeat. 

Why  the  advance  was  so  long  delayed,  and  why  it  was 
begun  at  the  time  are  not  easy  of  explanation.  There  was 
urgent  entreaty  from  the  War  Department,  which  had  its 
influence,  but  perhaps  one  of  the  determining  factors  in 
deciding  to  advance  was,  that  on  the  19th  General  Burn- 
side  sent  General  Rosecrans  a  dispatch  saying  he  proposed  to 
send  the  principal  part  of  Carter's  division,  with  three  East 
Tennessee  regiments,  to  the  neighborhood  of  Knoxville,  to 
hold  that  part  of  the  country  between  the  Clinch  and  Holston 
Rivers,1  and  a  day  or  two  later  General  Burnside  reported 
great  activity  on  the  part  of  our  forces,  which  had  gone  to 
within  fourteen  miles  of  Knoxville,  had  burned  three  impor 
tant  bridges,  captured  three  pieces  of  artillery,  1000  stand  of 
small  arms  and  over  500  prisoners.2 

1      W.  R.  R.  23,  part  2-438. 
•2     W.  R.  R.  23,  part  1-385. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

THE    TULJLAHOMA    CAMPAIGN,    BATTLE    OF    LIBERTY    GAP ANOTHER 

LONG   PERIOD   OF   INACTIVITY   AND  THE    MARCH    TO 
THE   TENNESSEE   RIVER. 

On  the  morning  of  the  24th  of  June,  18(>i>,  the  drums 
sounded  the  reveille  at  3  o'clock  and  we  soon  received  orders 
to  march  at  5  o'clock.  It  was  a  rainy  morning.  Reaching  the 
West  Fork  we  halted  to  allow  Sheridan's  division  to  pass  to 
our  front.  We  then  followed  it  until  we  reached  the  first 
range  of  hills,  when  we  turned  to  the  left,  striking  one  of  our 
old  foraging  roads,  which  we  followed  to  the  next  range  of 
hills.  There  the  Thirty-ninth  Indiana  (now  mounted)  cap 
tured  a  rebel  outpost  and  our  brigade  formed  line  of  battle, 
the  Fifteenth  Ohio  on  the  right  of  the  road  and  the  Forty- 
ninth  Ohio  on  its  left. 

Several  companies  were  deployed  as  skirmishers  and 
found  the  enemy  in  a  strong  position  in  front  of  what  is  called 
Liberty  Gap.  A  field  piece  was  brought  forward  and  after 
several  rounds  \vere  fired  toward  the  enemy,  our  line  advanced 
but  met  strong  opposition.  Little  headway  was  made  until 
movements  were  directed  on  the  enemy's  flanks,  when  they 
gave  way.  Lieutenant  Smiley  was  brought  back  mortally 
wounded  in  the  abdomen  and  Captain  Danford  was  slightly 
wounded.  Four  men  were  reported  killed  and  several 
wounded.  The  rebels  lost  heavily  before  they  got  out  of 
range  of  our  guns.  We  pursued  them  a  mile  through  the  Gap, 
until  we  came  to  Liberty  Church,  where  we  bivouaced  for  the 
night.  A  reserve  brigade  passed  us  and  established  a  line 
of  pickets  in  a  good  position  after  a  lively  skirmish. 

On  the  morning  of  June  25,  we  were  awakened  at  l> 
o'clock  and  stood  at  arms  until  daylight.  It  was  still  cloudy 
and  raining.  As  soon  as  we  could  get  our  breakfasts  \ve 
moved  out  to  the  front,  where  picket  firing  had  already  begun. 
Moving  up  one-half  mile,  we  turned  to  the  left  into  an  orchard 
where,  after  a  reconnoissance,  we  advanced  to  a  hillside  in 
support  of  the  picket  line  on  the  left.  The  rain  was  falling 
steadily.  In  front  of  our  position  lay  a  dead  rebel  who  had 
probably  been  killed  the  evening  before.  Desultory  firing  was 
going  on  in  front  all  morning.  In  the  afternoon  the  Thirty- 
ninth  Indiana  made  an  attack,  assisted  by  the  artillery,  We 
moved  forward  in  support  of  the  Thirty-second  Indiana,  the 
regiment,  except  the  color  companies,  being  deployed.  When 


THE  TULLAHOMA  CAMPAIGN  287 

the  companies  engaged  were  nearly  out  of  ammunition,  Com 
pany  H  was-  ordered  forward  and  two  men  were  slightly 
wounded  (Scott  and  Johnson).  After  some  severe  fighting  the 
rebels  were  driven  back,  not,  however,  without  heavy  loss  on 
our  left,  which  being  more  in  the  open  fields,  was  more  ex 
posed.  The  men  on  the  left  also  ran  out  of  ammunition.  We 
were  relieved  in  the  evening  and  bivouaced  near  the  position 
we  had  held  that  morning.  The  foregoing  account  of  this 
engagement  is  taken  from  Gleason's  diary. 

Lieutenant  Colonel  Askew,  in  his  official  report  of  the 
engagement,  says : 

"When  we  arrived  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Gap,  on  the 
morning  of  the  24th  instant,  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  Regiment, 
being  in  advance  of  the  column,  Companies  A  and  B,  by  order 
of  the  General  (General  Willich),  were  deployed  as 
skirmishers  on  the  right  of  the  road,  the  left  of  Company  B 
resting  on  the  road,  Company  A  supported  by  Company  F  in 
reserve,  and  Company  B  by  Company  G.  Company  D  was 
afterward,  by  orders  of  the  General,  deployed  to  protect  our 
right  flank.  We  had  moved  forward  but  a  short  distance 
when  our  skirmishers  encountered  the  pickets  of  the  enemy 
and  drove  them  back  on  to  the  brow  of  the  hill  on  the  right  of 
the  Gap,  where  they  met  reserves,  protected  by  a  dense  forest 
which  crowned  the  hill  and  extended  some  distance  down  to 
a  fence,  having  before  them  and  between  us  and  them  open 
fields  for  the  distance  of  600  or  700  yards.  The  position  was 
a  very  strong  one,  as  the  face  of  the  hill,  on  the  summit  of 
which  the  enemy  was  posted,  was  very  steep  and  rocky  and 
was  of  a  convex  shape,  the  convexity  toward  us,  so  that  their 
line  being  extended  around  the  brow  of  the  hill,  they  had  the 
protection  of  the  woods  and  fence  and  their  flank  was  per 
fectly  protected.  Our  skirmishers  were  halted,  and  I  was 
ordered  by  our  General  to  extend  our  line  to  the  right  and 
see  if  we  could  find  the  left  flank  of  the  enemy,  in  pursuance 
of  which  Company  D,  which  had  been  on  the  left  flank,  was 
swung  around  into  the  line  on  the  right  of  Company  A.  Com 
pany  I  deployed  on  the  right  of  Company  D,  Company  E  on 
the  right  of  Company  I,  and  Company  K  in  rear  of  the  right 
of  the  line  in  reserve.  After  making  this  disposition,  we 
moved  forward  a  short  distance  and  found  that  the  enemy's 
left  extended  farther  than  our  right,  and  that  they  were  posted 
with  all  the  advantages  of  their  strong  position.  I  sent 
information  of  this  to  the  General,  when  the  Twenty-ninth 
Indiana  was  sent  to  be  deployed  on  our  right  flank,  their  line 
extending  perpendicularly  to  the  rear.  We  had  to  wait  until 


288  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

they  had  swung  around  into  line  with  us.  In  the  meantime, 
the  left  of  our  line  had  swung  around  and  under  a  galling 
fire  had  gained  the  fence  and  the  edge  of  the  woods.  Com 
pany  B  losing  in  this  two  men  killed  and  five  wounded. 
Lieutenant  Smiley  of  Company  A,  received  a  mortal  wound, 
and  five  men  of  his  company  were  wounded,  one  man  in  Com 
pany  I  and  one  in  Company  D  was  killed.  When  the  Twenty- 
ninth  Indiana  had  got  into  position  on  our  right  the  sup 
porting  companies  were  deployed  into  line,  and  the  whole  line 
moved  forward  across  the  open  field  and  up  the  steep  face 
of  the  hill  at  a  double-quick  pace,  the  enemy  fleeing  before 
them,  Companies  E  and  K  capturing  two  of  the  enemy.  After 
reaching  the  top  of  the  hill,  we  moved  forward  some  distance 
past  Liberty  Church,  but  did  not  again  encounter  the  enemy. 
We  were  relieved  by  the  Seventy-seventh  Pennsylvania." 

"In  the  affair  of  the  25th  instant,  the  next  day  the  Fif 
teenth  Ohio  was  in  reserve  to  the  Thirty-second  Indiana, 
which  was  on  picket  duty.  About  o  o'clock  P.  M.  Lieutenant 
Blume  of  the  General's  staff  informed  me  that  the  enemy  had 
driven  in  the  sentinels  of  the  Thirty-second  Indiana,  and  was 
then  pushing  forward  on  to  the  line.  I  immediately  deployed 
the  battalion  as  skirmishers,  and  moved  forward  to  the  line 
of  the  Thirty-second  Indiana,  which  extended  across  the 
valley  through  which  the  road  runs,  through  a  wheat  field,  on 
the  side  of  the  hill  on  the  right  of  the  road,  and  into  the  woods 
on  the  top  of  the  hill.  We  opened  fire  on  the  enemy,  who 
were  posted  opposite  our  left  on  the  hill  across  the  valley  and 
along  a  fence  around  a  cornfield,  and  about  a  house  in  the 
valley  near  the  road.  We  had  a  good  position,  and  our  men 
were  mostly  under  cover,  so  that  the  enemy  did  us  little 
damage  on  the  left  of  our  line,  although  they  kept  up  a  brisk- 
fire  from  their  line,  from  a  battery  posted  on  a  hill,  a  short 
distance  in  rear  of  their  line,  and  from  a  mountain  howitzer 
posted  on  the  road  near  a  house  in  our  front.  The  right  of 
our  line,  Companies  A,  F,  D  and  H  which  were  in  the  woods 
on  the  top  of  the  hill,  together  with  that  part  of  the  Thirty- 
second  Indiana  and  Eighty-ninth  Illinois,  which  were  on 
picket  duty  there,  encountered  a  very  spirited  attack  of  the 
enemy,  who,  I  have  no  doubt,  designed  to  drive  us  from  the 
summit  of  the  hill  which,  in  their  position,  would  have  made 
our  whole  line  untenable,  and  compelled  us  to  fall  back. 
They  were  gallantly  met  and  repulsed,  and  driven  from  the 
hill  across  the  valley  to  the  hill  beyond.  Company  F  suffered 
severely  in  this  affair,  losing  two  men  killed  and  eight 
wounded.  Company  A  lost  one  man  killed  and  one  wounded. 


THE  TULLAHO.MA  CAMPAIGN  289 

"We  held  this  position  after  the  Thirty-second  Indiana 
and  all  but  one  company  of  the  Eighty-ninth  Illinois  had  been 
relieved  and  withdrawn  to  replenish  their  cartridge  boxes. 
This  part  of  our  line  was  not  relieved  when  the  rest  was,  and 
I  deemed  the  position  so  important  that  I  did  not  withdraw 
those  four  companies  until  after  nightfall,  and  after  1  had 
informed  an  officer  of  one  of  General  Davis'  regiments  which 
had  relieved  the  Eighty-ninth  Illinois,  still  further  on  our 
right,  of  the  importance  of  the  position  ;  that  we  were  out  of 
ammunition,  and  that  the  rest  of  the  brigade  had  been  relieved 
and  moved  off.  We  then  quietly  withdrew  and  joined  the 
brigade." 

"I  have  but  to  add  that  the  conduct  of  the  officers  and 
men  was  gallant  and  soldierly  and  I  think  the  general  (Gen 
eral  Willich)  may  flatter  himself  that  his  unwearied  exer 
tions  in  drilling  and  disciplining  his  brigade,  were  on  these 
days  to  some  extent  rewarded." 

General  Willich  made  a  characteristic  official  report  of 
the  two  days'  engagement. 

He  says :  "At  2  p.  m.,  on  the  25th,  the'  enemy  advanced 
with  strong  skirmish  lines,  which  were  driven  back.  He 
repeated  his  attack,  bringing  up  lines  of  battle,  even  columns, 
and  planting  one  battery  in  front  of  our  left  and  two  small 
pieces  in  the  center,  but  was  not  able  to  break  our  picket  line 
which  was  reinforced  by  our  support  companies,  who  charged 
repeatedly  against  the  forward  pressing  lines  of  the  enemy, 
and  drove  him  as  often  as  he  advanced. 

"About  3  o'clock  the  ammunition  of  the  Thirty-second 
Indiana  volunteers  and  the  Eighty-ninth  Illinois  volunteers 
began  to  give  out,  then  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  volunteers  was 
ordered  to  advance  to  their  support  in  the  front  line.  The 
men  of  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  volunteers  divided  their  ammuni 
tion  with  those  of  the  Thirty-second  Indiana  volunteers  and 
the  Eighty-ninth  Illinois  volunteers.  This,  with  the  ammuni 
tion  taken  from  the  wounded  and  killed,  enabled  these  three 
reigments  to  resist  the  repeated  desperate  efforts  of  the 
enemy.  At  this  time  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  volunteers  advanced. 
I  sent  a  report  to  General  Johnson  that  the  fight  was  becoming 
serious,  and  ordered  Colonel  Gibson  with  the  Forty-ninth 
Ohio  volunteers  forward  as  a  reserve  behind  the  center  of 
my  lines,  and  planted  the  battery  of  Captain  Goodspeed  on 
a  hill  about  100  feet  high,  and  somewhat  to  the  rear  of  our 
lines  from  where  it  opened  fire  against  the  enemy's  batteries 
and  some  buildings  occupied  by  the  enemy's  infantry.  The 
battery  being  compelled  to  fire  over  our  lines,  I  cautioned  the 


290  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

officers  to  take  sufficient  elevation,  and  though  the  skill  of 
our  present  artillery  officers  (among  them  Captain  Simonton, 
Chief  of  Artillery  of  the  Second  Division)  is  generally  known 
and  acknowledged,  some  of  the  shells  fell  into  our  own  lines. 
This  deficiency  is  not  the  fault  of  the  officers,  or  of  the  men. 
or  of  the  splendid  pieces  we  were  supplied  with,  but  has  its 
cause  in  the  Ordnance  Department,  which  does  not  make  it 
impossible  that  a  neglect  in  the  fabrication  of  the  cartridges 
still  exists,  which  had  already  been  discovered  at  the  begin 
ning  of  the  war,  but  appears  not  as  yet,  to  be  corrected.  The 
powder  used  for  the  cartridges  is  of  different  quality,  so  much 
so,  that  the  best  officers,  with  the  most  superior  arms,  and 
served  by  the  most  skillful  men,  can  never  become  certain  of 
the  exact  range  of  their  guns.  Notwithstanding  this,  the  bat 
tery  rendered  efficient  service." 

One  smiles  at  this  amusingly  worded  and  elaborate 
apology  for  the  dropping  among  us  of  a  few  shells  from  our 
own  battery. 

General  Willich  describes  in  glowing  terms  the  move 
ment  of  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  through  the  open  woods  under 
the  command  "Advance  firing."  It  was  one  of  the  move 
ments  he  had  worked  out  when  in  Libby  Prison,  and  he  took 
particular  pride  in  it.  He  says :  "The  regiment  formed  in 
four  ranks.  The  first  rank  delivered  a  volley,  then  the  fourth, 
third  and  second  in  succession  took  the  front  and  delivered 
their  fire,  but  already  to  the  third  volley  the  enemy  did  not 
answer.  He  had  precipitately  left  his  position." 

After  describing  the  various  movements  of  the  t^vo  days' 
engagement,  he  says : 

"To  name  those  who  distinguished  themselves  I  would 
merely  be  obliged  to  copy  the  muster  rolls  of  the  brigade.  It 
is  certain  that  some  officers  and  men  were  placed  in  more 
trying  positions,  and  had  therefore  better  occasion  to  prove 
their  metal  than  others.  Throughout  both  days'  fight  the 
regimental  Commanders — Colonels  Gibson  and  Hotchkiss, 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Askew  and  Major  Glass — had  their  com 
mands  under  perfect  control,  to  which  all  other  good  quali 
ties  expected  from  accomplished  and  experienced  officers 
becomes  serviceable.  In  their  efforts  they  were  well  sup 
ported  by  their  officers  and  men,  who  far  above  the  mere 
martial  courage  which  rushes  headlong  at  the  enemy, 
maneuvered  under  the  heaviest  fire  as  if  on  the  parade  ground, 
obeyed  and  executed  every  order  without  regard  to  danger, 
and  so  kept  up  a  unity  of  order  and  action  which  alone  can 
make  courage  successful.  The  advance  of  the  Forty-ninth 


THE  TULLAHO.MA  CAMPAIGN  291 

Ohio  volunteers  and  the  two  companies  of  the  Thirty-second 
Indiana  volunteers  and  later  of  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  on  the 
right,  which  was  made  in  double-quick  up  a  steep  hill  and 
over  open  ground  against  a  concealed  and  brave  enemy,  was 
heroic.  The  fight  of  the  picket  line  of  the  Thirty-second 
Indiana  and  Eighty-ninth  Illinois  on  the  second  day  against 
the  whole  of  Cleburne's  division,  was  continued  for  hours, 
after  having  been  harassed  during  the  whole  forenoon.  The 
successful  charges  of  single  companies  will  find  few  equals 
in  the  history  of  war.  The  prompt  advance  and  solid  fighting 
of  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  volunteers  and  the  splendid  and  irre 
sistible  charge  of  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  volunteers  are  military 
deeds  worthy  to  be  registered  in  the  annals  of  the  Nation. 
The  battery  came  not  under  close  fire,  but  the  men  served 
their  pieces  so  well  that  they  gave  the  conviction  they  would 
do  the  same  under  cannister  range.  Cheering,  the  men  went 
into  the  fight ;  cheering,  they  held  their  position  partly,  even 
without  ammunition ;  cheering,  they  replenished  their  car 
tridge  boxes,  and  formed,  ready  for  a  new  battle.  The  highest 
ambition  of  a  commander  must  be  satisfied  by  being  associated 
with  such  men,  who  through  patriotism  and  love  for  the  free 
institutions  of  their  country,  have  attained  a  degree  of 
efficiency  which  professional  soldiers  very  seldom  ever  reach. 
Instances — as  when  a  man  wounded  in  two  places  returns  to 
the  front  after  having  his  wounds  dressed,  and  another,  stand 
ing,  without  a  round,  behind  a  tree,  near  two  of  his  dead 
comrades,  and  keeping  his  position  till  he  can  get  some  car 
tridges  and  opened  fire  again — are  anything  but  uncommon." 

Probably  no  one  in  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  or  in  either  of  the 
other  regiments  of  General  Willich's  brigade  at  the  time  saw 
or  read  the  foregoing  official  report.  How  the  hearts  of  the 
men  who  fought  at  Liberty  Gap  would  have  swelled  with 
pride  if  they  could  have  done  so,  and  how  the  hearts  of  those 
now  living  will  warm  towards  their  beloved  brigade  com 
mander,  when  they  now  read  his  words  of  praise  for  their 
valor. 

It  was  no  new  volunteer  officer,  with  only  a  few  months 
military  experience,  who  thus  praised  them,  but  one  who  had 
led  armies  and  fought  battles  on  another  continent,  where 
war  was  a  trade. 

The  men  of  the  brigade,  and  especially  those  of  the  Fif 
teenth  Ohio,  knew  they  had  performed  notable  and  excep 
tionally  gallant  service  at  Liberty  Gap,  and  every  one  who 
was  there  on  the  24th  and  25th  of  June,  1863,  remembers  with 


292  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

pride  their  achievements.  They  have  reason  for  just  pride 
in  the  battle  of  Liberty  Gap. 

They  have  always  regarded  it  as  a  battle  because  of  its 
severity.  General  Johnson,  in  his  report  of  it,  says :  "The 
affair  at  Liberty  Gap  will  always  be  considered  a  skirmish, 
but  few  skirmishes  ever  equalled  it  in  severity."1 

While  the  movements  of  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  were  not 
so  dramatic  or  conspicuous  as  those  of  other  regiments  of 
the  brigade  they  did  the  heaviest  fighting  and  suffered  the 
heaviest  losses.  The  five  regiments  of  the  brigade  lost  in 
killed  and  wounded  five  officers  and  ninety  men.  The  Fif 
teenth  Ohio  lost  in  killed  and  wounded  two  officers  and  thirty 
men,  more  than  one-third  of  the  casualties  in  the  entire 
brigade.2 

The  enemy's  loss  in  these  engagements  was  120  officers 
and  men  killed,  wounded  and  captured.8 

The  following  are  the  names  of  the  killed  and  wounded  in 
our  regiment  at  Liberty  Gap,  so  far  as  they  can  be  learned 
from  the  imperfectly  printed  rosters  of  Ohio  regiments. 

COMPANY  A. 

KILLED. — Lieutenant  Andrew  E.  Smiley  and  William  J. 
Permar. 

WOUNDED. — Sergeant  Joseph  McKinney,  James  W.  Paxton, 
Frank  L.  Schreiber,  John  G.  Decker,  John  A.  McKinney  and 
John  S.  McKinney. 

COMPANY  B. 

KILLED. — William  H.  McFarlarid  and  William  R.  Kirk- 
wood. 

WOUNDED. — Sergeant  John  A.  Green,  Milton  McDowell, 
Franklin  Cowgill,  William  A.  Stewart,  William  Johnson  and 
John  Frazier.  The  latter  died  as  the  result  of  his  wounds  July 
23,  1863. 

COMPANY  D. 

KILLED. — James  Fowler. 
WOUNDED. — Butler  Ramey. 

COMPANY  E. 
WOUNDED. — Captain  Lorenzo  Danford. 

COMPANY   F. 

KILLED. — William  Barnett,  George  Davis  and  George  Riche- 
son. 

WOUNDED. — Lafayette  Hess.  John   Diday,   B.   F.   Richeson, 

1  W.  R.  R.  23,  part  1-485. 

2  W.   R.  R.,   23,  part  1-422 
S     W.  R.  R.,  23,  part  1-592. 


THE  TULLAHOMA  CAMPAIGN  293 

James  E.  Ramage  and  Christoper  Taylor.     Ramage  died  of  his 
wounds  June  28,  1863  and  Taylor  September  14,  1863. 

COMPANY   H. 

WOUNDED. — Pelham  C.  Johnson,  Philip  Beamer  and  Luke 
W.  Scott. 

On  June  26  at  daybreak  we  got  a  supply  of  ammunition 
and  after  breakfast,  as  it  looked  like  rain,  we  put  up  our  shel 
ter  tents.  Some  sharp  firing  was  heard  on  our  left,  but  we 
were  left  undisturbed  until  evening,  wdien  we  were  ordered 
out  on  picket.  We  had  just  got  fairly  posted  when  orders 
came  to  be  ready  to  move  at  sunset.  We  moved  at  dark,  and 
left  large  fires  burning,  we  supposed,  to  mislead  the  enemy. 
We  marched  back  through  the  Gap  about  three  miles.  It 
was  intensely  dark,  the  roads  \vere  deep,  and  \vhen  we  halted 
and  bivouaced  for  the  night  we  were  covered  with  mud  from 
head  to  foot.  We  lay  down  in  our  wet  clothing  and  tried  to 
sleep.  At  daylight  on  the  27th,  the  adjutant  gave  warning 
to  be  ready  to  march  in  half  an  hour.  Our  course  was  over 
intricate  by-roads,  made  very  muddy  by  the  recent  continu 
ous  rains,  and  the  marching  was  unusually  toilsome.  Finally, 
we  came  to  the  Manchester  pike  where  \ve  rested  for  awhile. 
When  we  resumed  our  march  it  was  on  a  road  which  led 
through  Glover's  Gap,  a  strong  position  which  General 
Thomas  had  taken  from  the  enemy.  After  a  tedious  further 
march  we  came  up  with  the  rest  of  our  division  and  bivouaced 
in  a  nice  little  cove.  There  our  trains  came  up  and  some  of 
us  got  a  change  of  clothing.  General  Thomas  was  said  to 
be  far  in  advance,  and  we  heard  cannonading  to  the  left  and 
in  our  front.  Although,  as  before  stated,  General  Thomas  was 
said  to  be  far  in  our  front,  on  the  morning  of  the  28th,  we 
were  awakened  at  3  o'clock  and  stood  to  arms  until  daylight. 
We  received  orders  to  march  at  7  o'clock.  W7e  drew  two 
days'  rations  and  fired  off  our  guns  and  cleaned  them.  The 
brigade  call  sounded  while  some  of  the  men  were  yet  cleaning 
their  guns. 

Our  regiment  led  the  advance  of  the  brigade  but  halted 
opposite  a  house  where  General  McCook  had  his  headquar 
ters,  to  allow  the  trains  and  other  troops  to  pass.  So,  after 
all,  it  appeared  that  we  were  to  act  as  rear  guard.  After  Gen 
eral  McCook  and  staff  had  moved  off,  some  of  the  men  cap 
tured  a  hive  of  bees  somewhere  about  the  premises  and  we 
had  a  feast  of  honey.  We  were  detained  here  several  hours. 
Resuming  our  march  we  passed  through  Beech  Grove,  where 
another  halt  occurred.  After  a  number  of  such  halts  we 
reached  Hoover's  Gap,  where  we  made  coffee,  and  a  mile 


294  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

further  on  went  into  bivouac.  It  was  after  dark  but  we  were 
not  permitted  to  remain  there,  and  resumed  our  muddy, 
sloppy  march  in  the  darkness,  which,  however,  was  slightly 
relieved  by  the  light  of  the  moon.  We  marched  on  through 
mud  and  darkness  over  a  road  so  intricate  that  at  one  time  we 
lost  it.  Some  places  were  almost  impassable.  To  add  to 
our  discomfort  a  heavy  thunderstorm  came  up  and  drenched 
us  to  the  skin  and  made  the  mud  still  deeper  and  the  road 
more  slippery.  Many  men  fell  out  from  sheer  exhaustion.  We 
finally  reached  and  crossed  Duck  River  within  one-half  mile 
of  Manchester,  and  after  some  confusion,  which  came  near 
scattering  the  regiment,  were  halted  and  went  into  bivouac 
just  as  day  was  breaking,  and  slept  until  7  o'clock.  That 
morning,  the  29th,  there  were  various  rumors  as  to  the  where 
abouts  of  the  enemy,  and  it  was  the  general  belief  that  we 
were  to  push  on  immediately  for  Chattanooga  and  try  to  get 
there  in  advance  of  Bragg's  army. 

Orders  were  issued  to  send  all  knapsacks  and  unneces 
sary  baggage  back  with  the  supply  train.  The  wagons  were 
reduced  to  only  five  for  each  regiment.  It  rained  heavily  at 
times  during  the  day  and  we  could  not  get  dry.  Towards 
evening  we  were  reduced  to  half  rations  of  crackers. 

Near  our  camp  were  several  large  mills  and  factories,  the 
power  being  furnished  by  the  falls  in  the  river,  which  were  an 
interesting  sight,  and  furnished  excellent  bathing  facilities  for 
the  men.  In  the  angle  formed  by  Duck  River  and  a  stream 
which  flows  into  it  near  the  bridge  which  there  crossed  them, 
were  some  old  fortifications,  said  to  have  been  thrown  up  by 
De  Soto  for  protection  against  the  Indians.1 

We  lay  in  bivouac  at  Manchester  all  day  June  30.  The 
day  was  warm  and  rainy.  We  had  brigade  inspection  at  0 
o'clock.  There  was  a  report  that  our  forces  had  occupied 
Tullahoma,  but  this  was  later  denied  and  it  was  said  we 
would  have  a  hard  battle  there.  In  the  evening  orders  were 
issued  for  picks  and  shovels  to  be  carried  by  the  men  when 
we  again  moved. 

July  1,  at  11  o'clock  we  marched  for  Tullahoma.  The 
heat  was  oppressive  and,  there  were  several  cases  of  sunstroke 
in  the  brigade.  The  road  was  very  bad  and  the  marching 
very  difficult.  After  a  march  of  two  miles  we  were  halted  for 
a  little  rest.  While  here  an  officer  came  riding  back  and 
announced  the  evacuation  of  Tullahoma  and  its  occupation  by 
our  forces.  It  was  said  the  Thirty-ninth  Indiana,  mounted 
infantry  of  our  brigade,  was  the  first  to  enter  the  place.  We 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


THE  TULLAHOMA  CAMPAIGN  295 

moved  on  two  or  three  miles  further  and  turned  off  the  road 
into  a  large  plantation,  supposing  we  would  remain  there 
over  night.  But  after  we  had  our  suppers  we  moved  on.  We 
found  more  bad  roads  and  swollen  streams  to  cross,  and  made 
slow  progress.  We  were  still  several  miles  from  Tullahoma 
when  night  came  on,  but  the  moonlight  helped  us  to  avoid 
some  of  the  mud-holes.  WTe  reached  Tullahoma  at  11  o'clock, 
and  encamped  on  the  west  side  of  the  towrn  across  the  rail 
road. 

Next  morning  we  saw  some  quite  extensive  fortifications 
which  the  enemy  had  built,  and  which  would  have  cost  us 
many  lives  to  have  taken  by  direct  attack.  We  heard  no 
reveille  and  were  allowed  to  lie  in  our  bivouac  later  than 
usual.  Soon  after  we  were  up,  the  colonel  came  around  and 
cautioned  us  not  to  leave  camp.  The  company  commanders 
were  ordered  to  have  four  roll  calls  during  the  day. 

A  fine  spring  near  the  town  furnished  us  with  excellent 
water  for  drinking  and  cooking  and  a  stream  nearby  afforded 
us  good  opportunities  for  bathing  and  washing  our  clothes. 
During  the  day  our  camp  was  moved  to  a  place  about  one- 
fourth  mile  southwest  of  the  town.  The  ground  was  higher 
than  that  we  had  before  occupied,  but  it  was  covered  with 
undergrowth  and  offal  from  an  abandoned  rebel  camp,  and 
the  stumps  were  so  numerous,  we  could  scarcely  find  places 
for  our  shelter  tents.  The  enemy  had  left  a  number  of  tents 
in  their  hasty  retreat  and  some  of  our  men  got  some  of  them 
and  had  them  pitched  before  night.  At  midnight  we  were 
roused  from  sleep  by  the  adjutant,  and  were  ordered  out  to 
aid  the  supply  train  on  the  Manchester  road.  We  took  only 
our  guns,  haversacks  and  canteens,  but  the  cooks  went  with 
us  carrying  their  coffee  kettles  so  we  could  have  our  break 
fast  wherever  we  might  be.  In  the  darkness  we  took  the 
wrong  road,  but  after  a  long  march  found  our  way  back  to  the 
right  one.  At  daylight,  learning  that  the  train  was  parked  a 
short  distance  ahead  of  us,  we  halted,  prepared  our  breakfasts 
and  had  time  for  a  short  nap  before  the  train  came  up.  When 
a  portion  of  it  had  arrived,  our  left  wing  under  command  of 
Major  McClenahan  went  forward  with  it  as  guard.  Just 
then  a  violent  thunderstorm  came  up  and  the  rain  drenched 
us  thoroughly.  It  also  made  the  roads  much  worse,  and  we 
had  hard  work  getting  the  wagons  through.  On  the  way 
the  boys  did  some  private  foraging  and  brought  in 
pigs  and  chickens.  That  evening  a  dispatch  was  re 
ceived  at  brigade  headquarters  indicating  that  our  troops 


296  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

were  successful  at  Vicksburg,  and  that  a  great  battle  was  in 
progress  in  Eastern  Pennslyvania. 

On  the  morning  of  July  4,  1863,  we  were  still  at  Tulla- 
homa.  No  reveille  sounded  and  we  were  permitted  to  sleep 
until  late.  When  we  got  astir  we  policed  our  streets  and  tried 
to  make  them  cozy  and  comfortable.  Just  before  noon  \ve 
received  notice  that  a  national  salute  would  be  fired  by  Good- 
speed's  Battery  at  12  o'clock  and  that  the  men  would  be 
expected  to  cheer.  The  salute  was  fired  as  ordered,  but  not 
a  cheer  was  heard — probably  because  there  seemed  to  be  no 
one  to  start  it.  After  that  a  ration  of  whisky  was  issued. 
Gleason  in  his  diary  suggests  that  perhaps  this  was  done  to 
arouse  the  patriotism  of  the  men  who  failed  to  cheer  when  the 
salute  was  fired.  Some  firing  was  heard  in  our  front,  and 
many  prisoners  wrere  brought  in.  Tt  was  said  the  woods  \vere 
full  of  them. 

Sunday,  July  5,  the  regular  inspection  \vas  not  required, 
and  we  moved  our  camp  to  a  better  location.  General  Willich 
came  into  our  camp  and  told  us  good  news  from  Gettysburg 
which  brought  the  cheers  which  had  been  held  back  on  the 
glorious  Fourth.  Orders  came  to  go  on  picket  next  day.  The 
morning  of  the  6th  we  started  at  3  :30  o'clock  to  relieve  the 
pickets  covering  a  portion  of  our  front.  There  wras  great  re 
joicing  in  camp  over  the  confirmation  of  the  news  of  Lee's  de 
feat  at  Gettysburg. 

July  7,  we  were  relieved  from  picket  duty  quite 
early  and  marched  back  to  camp  for  breakfast.  General  Wil 
lich  called  the  brigade  together  and  in  his  broken  but  forcible 
English  told  us  of  the  capture  of  Vicksburg  and  of  the  retreat 
of  Lee's  army  from  Gettysburg.  General  Rosecrans  an 
nounced  the  news  officially,  cannon  were  fired  and  there  was 
great  rejoicing.  But  neither  the  official  announcement  by 
General  Rosecrans,  nor  the  firing  of  the  cannon,  created  the 
enthusiasm  which  followed  the  story  told  to  us  in  his  quaint 
way  by  our  dear  old  brigade  commander,  General  Willich. 

Young  as  the  most  of  us  were,  we  appreciated  in  a  general 
way  that  the  capture  of  Vicksburg  permitted  the  "father  of 
waters  to  again  go  unvexed  to  the  sea"  and  cleft  the  Con 
federacy  in  twain,  and  that  the  defeat  of  Lee  at  Gettysburg 
rendered  it  possible  to  destroy  his  army,  if  he  was  vigorously 
pursued,  before  he  could  get  back  to  the  defenses  of  Rich 
mond.  These  results,  accomplished  and  hoped  for,  made  it 
seem  to  some  of  us  that  our  days  of  trial  might  soon  be  over. 
We  did  not  know  what  months  of  weary  marching  and  stub 
born  fighting  were  before  us.  If  the  curtain  had  been  lifted 


THE  TULLAHOMA  CAMPAIGN  297 

and  we  could  have  seen  Chickamauga,  Missionary  Ridge, 
Lookout  Mountain,  the  terrible  winter  at  Strawberry  Plains, 
the  hundred  battles  and  skirmishes  of  the  Atlanta  campaign, 
the  battles  of  Spring  Hill,  Franklin  and  Nashville,  and  the 
terrible  toll  of  life  and  blood  and  tears  and  suffering  they 
would  demand,  the  stoutest  hearts  among  us  would  have 
quailed  and  shrank  back  in  horror.  The  future  was  wisely 
hidden  from  us  and  we  went  forward  obedient  to  the  call  of 
duty. 

We  remained  at  Tullahoma  until  Sunday,  August  16, 
1863,  and  during  that  time  were  engaged  in  the  daily  routine 
of  drill,  inspection,  forage  and  picket  duty.  General  Bragg 
had  got  off  \vith  his  entire  army  and  trains  and  had  crossed 
the  Tennessee  River  on  the  7th  of  July.  General  Sheridan's 
division,  or  a  portion  of  it,  after  some  delay  occupied  Bridge 
port,  and  his  pickets  patrolled  the  north  bank  of  the  river.  So, 
while  we  lay  at  Tullahoma  no  enemy  menaced  our  peace  and 
we  went  our  daily  round  undisturbed. 

The  movement  which  resulted  in  the  enemy's  giving  up 
his  strongly  fortified  positions  at  Shelbyville  and  Tullahoma 
was  a  brilliant  one.  General  Rosecrans'  general  plan  was  to 
threaten  the  enemy's  right,  advance  a  portion  of  his  troops 
to  hold  him  at  Shelbyville,  and  then  turn  his  right  by  con 
centration  of  McCook's  and  Thomas'  Corps  at  Manchester. 
From  Manchester  to  Tullahoma  was  only  twelve  miles,  while 
the  distance  between  Shelbyville  and  Tullahoma  was  near 
twenty  miles.  If  the  concentration  at  Manchester  had  been 
more  prompt,  and  the  movement  had  been  pressed  with  a  little 
more  vigor  and  with  less  disposition  to  augment  the  enemy's 
numbers  as  compared  with  our  own,  we  would  have  been 
concentrated  at  or  near  Manchester  on  the  26th  and  could 
have  advanced  on  Tullahoma  and  taken  it  before  Bragg  could 
have  reached  it.  We  have  already  shown  or  tried  to  show 
that  if  the  movement  had  been  begun  when  General  Garfield 
urged  it,  wre  would  have  had  good  weather  and  good  roads 
and  that  the  movement  w^ould  have  been  successful. 

This  would  have  forced  him  to  give  battle  in  the  open 
and,  with  our  superior  numbers,  we  could  easily  have  beaten 
him  and  perhaps  destroyed  his  army. 

But  the  roads  were  difficult ;  it  rained  constantly,  and 
we  were  encumbered  by  too  much  transportation  and  un 
necessary  bagage,  which  should  have  been  left  behind.  With 
these  encumbrances  our  movements  were  constantly  impeded 
and  the  concentration  at  Manchester  was  delayed  until  the 
27th.  By  that  time  Bragg  had  discovered  our  real  intentions, 


2J>8  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

had  suddenly  abandoned  his  position   at    Shelbyville   and   with 
drawn  his  army  to  Tullahoma. 

Why  we  remained  so  long  at  Tullahoma  we  did  not  then 
know,  and  we  did  not  know  that,  as  at  Murfreesboro,  General 
Rosecrans,  during  our  long  stay  there,  was  being  constantly 
urged  by  the  War  Department  at  Washington  to  press 
forward.  We  now  know  that  he  was  delaying  any  forward 
movement  until  the  railroad  bridges  between  Nashville  and 
Bridgeport  could  be  thoroughly  repaired.  This  road  he  con 
sidered  of  vital  importance  in  supplying  his  army  from  its 
secondary  base  at  Nashville.  General  Sheridan,  in  his  mem 
oirs,  says:  "General  Rosecrans  though  strongly  urged  from 
Washington  to  continue  on,  resisted  the  pressure"  until  he 
could  repair  this  road. 

By  the  16th  of  August  the  road  was  said  to  be  thor 
oughly  repaired  and  on  that  day  wre  broke  our  camp  at  Tulla 
homa,  called  Camp  Read,  and  at  5  o'clock  P.  M.  took  the 
road  leading  south  toward  Elk  River.  Owing  to  the  rain 
the  road  was  in  very  bad  condition  and  our  progress  was 
slow.  Our  brigade  was  in  the  rear,  of  the  column,  and  we 
were  held  back  by  trains  which  were  frequently  stalled  in  the 
mud.  Night  came  on  and  we  were  still  floundering  along  a 
dark  trail  in  the  woods,  with  no  sign  of  civilization  until  we 
came  to  a  valley.  There  we  found  a  better  country  and  better 
roads.  After  following  the  valley  for  several  miles  we  again 
ascended  the  hills  and  midnight  found  us  still  floundering 
along  in  the  mud.  We  reached  Elk  River  about  2  o'clock  a.  m. 
the  17th,  and  there  stacked  arms,  threw  ourselves  on  the 
ground  and  slept  until  daylight.  We  resumed  our  march  at  (5 
o'clock,  taking  a  southwesterly  road  toward  Winchester,  which 
we  reached  at  10  o'clock,  and  passed  through  it  without  halting. 
From  the  village  we  took  a  road  leading  west,  marched  about 
three  and  one-half  miles,  and  then  halted  for  the  night.  Near 
our  camp  we  found  plenty  of  good  ripe  peaches  and  green 
corn  and  helped  ourselves  liberally.  Next  morning,  the  18th, 
we  resumed  our  march  at  4  o'clock,  our  brigade  being  in  the 
advance.  After  a  five-mile  march  we  came  to  the  village  of 
Salem,  Tennessee.  There  we  turned  to  the  left,  leaving  the 
Huntsville  road.  After  a  march  of  near  four  miles  we  came 
to  the  mountains  where  we  made  a  short  halt  by  a  large 
spring  which  gushed  out  from  a  ledge  of  rocks.  Here  two 
of  our  Sergeants,  George  M.  Everett  of  Company  G.  and 
Frank  H.  Riggs  of  Company  I,  received  commissions  as  cap 
tains  in  the  First  Regiment  United  States  Colored  Troops, 
and  left  us.  WTe  resumed  our  march  in  a  short  time,  winding 


THE  TULLAHOMA  CAMPAIGN  299 

through  a  gap  in  the  mountains  and  frequently  crossing  a 
stream,  until  night  came,  when  we  encamped  at  a  spot  where 
we  had  good  bathing  facilities  and  found  plenty  of  green  corn. 
Our  march  next  day,  the  19th,  was  through  the  mountains. 
We  were  the  rear  brigade  of  the  column,  and  were  delayed 
by  the  wagon  train.  At  our  frequent  halts,  however,  we  found 
abundance  of  ripe  peaches,  which  enabled  us  to  put  in  the 
time  agreeably.  We  halted  for  dinner  where  the  road  divided, 
one  branch  going  over  and  the  other  around  the  mountain, 
There  was  a  large  cornfield  and  a  large  peach  orchard  nearby 
from  which  we  helped  ourselves  liberally. 

When  we 'resumed  our  march  we  took  the  road  over  the 
mountain,  and  after  a  hot  and  dusty  march  reached  a  place 
near  its  foot  where  we  encamped  for  the  night.  Company 
H  \vas  sent  out  to  picket  the  mountain  side.  Some  private 
foragers  went  out  and  soon  returned  with  a  supply  of 
chickens,  potatoes  and  honey,  which  they  had  bought  and 
paid  for  in  counterfeit  Confederate  money.1 

The  next  day  \ve  only  moved  about  a  mile  and  then 
halted,  while  the  other  brigades  and  trains  ascended  the 
mountains.  While  waiting  for  orders,  the  orderly  sergeants 
made  out  reports  showing  the  number  of  men  present  for 
duty  in  each  company.  On  the  21st  we  were  ordered  to  march 
at  4:15  in  the  morning.  We  marched  to  the  foot  of  the  moun 
tain  and  there  waited  until  the  trains  got  ready  to  make  the 
ascent.  \Ve  were  divided  into  squads  of  fourteen  men  each, 
and  each  squad  was  assigned  to  a  wagon.  The  mountain  road 
was  quite  steep  and  rocky  and  the  ascent  was  very  laborious. 
The  wagons  \vere  subjected  to  a  severe  strain,  as  well  as  the 
horses  and  men,  who  pulled  and  pushed  them  over  the  steep 
places.  The  cooks  had  been  sent  forward  and  when  we 
reached  the  summit,  we  found  coffee  already  made.  We  had 
barely  time  to  enjoy  it  when  we  were  ordered  forward.  WTe 
moved  along  a  mountain  road  which  we  were  told  would  lead 
us  to  Bellefonte,  Ala.  The  road  was  good  and  we  made 
good  progress.  We  halted  for  the  night,  as  we  supposed, 
at  a  log  church  on  the  mountain,  but  finding  little  or  no  water, 
we  moved  back  about  a  mile  where  water  was  abundant,  and 
there  bivouaced  for  the  night.  Near  our  bivouac  was  the 
home  of  a  Union  man,  who,  with  his  two  sons,  was  in  our 
army.  The  sons  were  at  home  on  a  furlough.  Several  bush- 
wackers  were  captured  that  day,  some  of  them  \vere  identified 
by  the  Union  mountaineers.  Rations  of  whisky  were  issued  to 
the  men.2 


1  and  2     Gleason's  Diary. 


300  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

The  next  day,  August  21,  we  marched  at  •">  :-'>0  A.  M.  The 
roads  were  good,  there  was  little  dust  and  we  made  good  time. 
We  passed  several  groups  of  Union  people  by  the  roadside, 
who  manifested  much  joy  at  again  seeing  the  old  flag.  We 
descended  the  mountain,  which  was  puite  steep,  so  steep,  in 
fact,  that  we  went  almost  at  a  double-quick,  the  six  miles 
down  to  its  foot.  We  afterwards  crossed  over  quite  a  high 
foothill,  followed  it  quite  a  distance  and  halted  for  an  hour  near 
a  large  spring.  During  the  halt  some  of  the  men  found  some 
green  corn  and  peaches  in  the  neighborhood.  The  rest  of  the 
march  it  was  very  warm  and  we  made  frequent  halts.  We 
reached  Belief  onte  at  2  p.  m.,  having  marched  sixteen 
miles.  We  encamped  in  a  shady,  grassy,  bottom,  near  a  good 
spring.  WTe  found  that  the  Second  Brigade  of  our  division 
had  arrived  here  at  3  o'clock  P.  M.  the  previous  da}". 

Our  arrival  at  Bellefonte  completed  the  first  stage  of 
the  movement  of  General  Rosecrans'  army,  which  had  for 
its  objective,  as  stated  by  him  in  his  official  report,1  the  cap 
ture  of  Chattanooga.  The  movement  began,  as  stated  in  this 
report,  on  the  Kith  day  of  August.-  General  Crittenden's 
Twenty-first  Corps  was  to  move  i  nthree  columns — General 
Wood's  division  from  Hillsboro  by  Pelham  to  Therman  in 
Sequatchie  Valley ;  General  Palmer's  division  from  Man 
chester  by  the  most  practical  route  to  Dunlap  ;  General  Van 
Cleve's  division,  with  two  brigades  from  McMinnville  (the 
Third  Brigade  to  be  left  at  that  place  as  a  garrison)  to  Pike- 
ville  at  the  head  of  the  Sequatchie  Valley — Colonel  Minty's 
cavalry  to  move  on  the  left  of  Sparta,  driving  back  Dibrell's 
rebel  cavalry  toward  Kingston  and  then,  covering  the  left 
flank  of  Van  Cleve's  division,  to  proceed  also  to  Pikeville. 

General  Thomas'  Fourteenth  Corps  was  to  move  as  fol 
lows  :  General  Reynolds'  division  from  University  by  \vav 
of  Battle  Creek,  to  take  post  near  its  mouth ;  General  Bran- 
nan's  division  to  follow  him ;  General  Negley's  division  to 
go  by  Tantallon  and  halt  on  Crow  Creek  between  Anderson 
and  Stevenson  ;  General  Baird's  division  to  follow  him  and 
encamp  near  Anderson. 

General  McCook's  Twentieth  Corps  was  to  move  as  fol 
lows  :  General  Johnson's  (our)  division  to  move  by  Salem 
and  Larkin's  Fork  to  Bellefonte ;  General  Davis'  division  by 
Mount  Top  and  Crow  Creek  to  near  Stevenson — General 
Sheridan's  division  was  already  at  Stevenson  and  Bridgeport. 

On  his  arrival  in  the  Sequatchie  Valley  General  Critten- 
den  was  directed  to  send  a  brigade  to  reconnoiter  the  Ten- 

1  W.  R.  R.,  50-47. 

2  W.  R.  R.,  50-50. 


THE  TULLAHOMA  CAMPAIGN  301 

nessee  near  Harrison's  Landing  and  take  post  at  Poe's  Cross 
Roads.  Colonel  Minty  was  to  reconnoiter  from  Washington 
down,  and  take  post  at  Smith's  Cross  Roads,  and  Wilder's 
brigade  of  mounted  infantry  was  to  reconnoiter  from  Harri 
son's  Landing  to  Chattanooga,  and  was  to  be  supported  by 
a  brigade  of  infantry,  which  General  Crittenden  was  to  send 
from  Therman  to  the  foot  of  the  eastern  slope  of  Walden's 
Ridge  in  front  of  Chattanooga.1 

The  three  brigades  of  cavalry  were  to  move  by  Fayette- 
ville  and  Athens  to  cover  the  line  of  the  Tennessee  from 
Whitesburg  up.1  These  movements,  General  Rosecrans  says 
in  the  official  report  above  quoted  from,  were  completed  by 
the  evening  of  August  20.  It  will  be  noticed  that  our  brigade 
did  not  reach  Bellefonte  until  the  afternoon  of  the  22nd,2 
but  it  is  probable  that  the  head  of  our  division  reached  this 
point  on  the  evening  of  the  20th  as  stated.  This  movement 
General  Rosecrans  states  took  his  army  over  the  first  great 
barrier  between  it  and  the  objective  point,  and  placed  it 
opposite  the  enemy  on  the  banks  of  the  Tennessee.3 

1  General  Rosecrans'  Report,  W.   R.   R.,  50-50-51. 

2  Gleason's  Diary. 

3  W.  R.  R.,  50-51. 


CHAPTER   XVI. 


THE    CAMPAIGN    AND   BATTLE   OF   CHICKAMAUGA. 

We  lay  in  camp  at  Bellefonte  until  August  30.  Our 
camp  at  Belle  Fonte  was  named  "Camp  Von  Trebor,"  in 
honor  of  Colonel  Von  Trebor  of  the  Thirty-second  Indiana. 
It  was  very  hot,  and  when  not  engaged  in  picket  duty  and 
the  ordinary  police  duties  of  camp,  the  men  lay  in  the  shade 
and  amused  themselves  in  various  ways.  On  one  or  two 
evenings  the  singers  in  the  regiment,  Major  McClenahan, 
Andrew  J.  Gleason,  Lieutenant  Geiger,  Wilson  Her,  the 
bugler,  and  others,  got  together  and  sang  the  songs,  which 
were  popular,  at  that  time :  "When  this  Cruel  War  Is  Over," 
and  "A  Response  By  a  Soldier/'  and  selections  from  the 
"New  York  Glee  and  Chorus  Book."  One  evening  some  of 
the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  singers  come  over  and  Wilson  Her,  the 
bugler,  got  together  a  quartette  who  sang,  "Come  Where 
My  Love  Lies  Dreaming."1 

When  the  night  came  down  it  wras  pleasant  to  hear  these 
old  songs,  sung  as  they  were  by  voices  of  men  whose  hearts, 
for  the  moment,  were  away  back  in  their  northern  homes,  and 
the  music  as  it  rose  and  swelled,  carried  other  hearts  far  away 
to  loved  ones  who  were  doubtless  waiting  anxiously  for  news 
of  the  next  battle. 

On  the  30th  we  marched  to  Stevenson,  Ala.,  and  went 
into  camp  near  the  place  where  we  had  encamped  from  July 
10  to  17  the  previous  year.  The  old  camp  was  re-visited  and 
was  found  to  be  almost  as  we  had  left  it  more  than  a  year 
before. 

The  next  morning,  the  31st,  we  took  up  our  march  south 
ward,  but  owing  to  a  blockade  of  wagon  trains  did  not  reach 
the  pontoon  bridge  across  the  Tennessee,  only  a  mile  and  a 
half  distant,  until  10  o'clock.  After  crossing  the  long  bridge 
we  marched  about  half  a  mile  and  halted  in  the  woods  near 
a  large  cornfield  which  we  patronized  liberally.  We  got 
notice  that  we  were  likely  to  remain  here  a  few  days,  so  the 
boys  pitched  their  tents  and  began  cleaning  up  generally. 

The  morning  of  September  1,  we  had  reveille  and  roll 
call  and  then  busied  ourselves  about  camp.  Orders  came  to 
turn  over  all  teams  except  three  to  a  regiment,  and  limiting 
officers'  baggage  to  eighty  pounds  each.  We  were  also 
required  to  turn  over  all  tents  except  shelter  tents. 

1     Gleasou's  Diary. 


CAMPAIGN  AND  BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA  303 

September  2,  we  marched  at  8  o'clock,  with  three  days' 
rations  in  haversacks,  towards  Sand  Mountain,  said  to  be 
three  miles  distant.  When  we  reached  the  mountain  we  at 
once  began  its  ascent.  Our  progress  was  slow,  as  we  had  to 
help  the  teams  up  the  steeper  places.  We  reached  the  top 
near  noon  and  marched  about  a  mile  and  went  into  camp. 
We  were  again  in  a  pine  region  similar  to  that  between  luka 
and  Tuscumbia,  which  we  had  marched  through  the  year 
before.  The  sand  and  dust  were  quite  deep  in  some  places. 
]t  was  rumored  that  our  destination  was  Rome,  Georgia. 
Next  morning,  the  3rd,  reveille  sounded  at  3  :30  o'clock,  and 
we  were  soon  again  on  the  march.  Our  course  was  in  a 
southerly  direction,  which  seemed  to  confirm  the  rumor  that 
Rome,  and  not  Chattanooga,  was  our  destination.  We 
crossed  several  mountain  streams,  and  our  march  would  have 
been  quite  comfortable  if  it  had  not  been  for  the  dust.  At 
one  place  we  passed  the  dead  body  of  a  negro  lying  by  the 
roadside.  It  was  afterwards  said  that  he  had  proved  a  false 
guide  and  that  his  life  had  paid  the  penalty  for  his  deceit.1 
We  halted  for  the  night  by  a  mountain  stream  where  corn 
and  peaches  were  abundant.  There  was  a  distillery  nearby, 
abandoned  by  the  owner,  who  left  some  half -fermented 
fruit,  which  some  of  the  boys  tried  to  convert  into 
peach  brandy.  On  the  4th  we  remained  in  camp  until  3  :30 
P.  M.  A  large  cavalry  force  went  forward  while  we  waited. 
We  marched  at  the  hour  last  above  mentioned  but  were 
detained  by  trains  ahead  of  us.  Night  came  on  and  we  made 
the  descent  of  the  mountain  in  the  darkness.  It  was  a  labori 
ous  and  dangerous  march,  but  we  finally  got  safely  down  and 
encamped  at  a  place  called  Winston,  or  Winston's  Gap — a 
cove  which  was  said  to  separate  Sand  Mountain  from  Lookout 
Mountain. 

Wre  lay  in  this  camp  all  day  the  5th,  6th  and  ?th,  our  only 
duties  being  police  and  picket  details.  On  Sunday  the  6th, 
our  new  chaplain,  Randall  Ross,  preached  his  first  sermon  and 
the  same  evening  Wilson  Her,  the  bugler,  brought  some  of 
the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  boys  over  for  a  little  concert.  The 
"music  in  the  air"  attracted  a  large  number  of  listeners  from 
other  regiments. 

On  the  morning  of  the  8th  our  brigade  moved  about  five 
miles  in  the  valley  and  went  into  bivouac,  after  listening  to 
a  talk  from  General  W'illich. 

That  evening  General  Rosecrans  received  a  dispatch  from 
General  Wagner  saying  that  Chattanooga  had  been  evacuated 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


304  FIFTEEXTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

and  that  he  would  occupy  the  place  next  day.1  At  10  P.  M. 
General  Rosecrans  sent  a  message  to  General  Wagner  saying  that 
General  Crittenden  had  been  ordered  to  occupy  Chattanooga  in 
the  morning  early  and  push  forward  in  vigorous  pursuit.  He 
ordered  General  Wagner  to  cross  the  river  immediately,  with  all 
the  forces  under  his  command  in  the  Sequatchie  Valley,  and  re 
port  to  General  Crittenden  to  join  in  the  pursuit.  He  also  ordered 
him  to  supply  his  troops  with  five  days'  rations,  and  other  things 
needed  in  marching  rapidly  over  mountains.2  Numerous  de 
serters  came  in  to  our  lines  and  reported  the  enemy  was  rapidly 
retreating  to  Rome.  These  reports  were  sent  to  General  Rose 
crans,  and  from  such  reports,  which  were  evidently  intended  to 
deceive,  he  evidently  formed  the  opinion  that  the  enemy  was  in 
a  rapid  and  disorganized  retreat,  either  on  Rome  or  Atlanta.  In 
his  official  report  and  in  repeated  public  declarations,  afterwards, 
he  claimed  that  the  advance  of  our  widely  separated  columns 
was  necessary  to  the  occupation  of  Chattanooga,  and  that  the 
capture  of  that  place  was  the  objective  point  of  the  campaign.  If 
this  was  true,  that  Chattanooga  was  the  objective  point  of  the 
campaign,  why  was  not  the  army  concentrated  there  after  he 
knew  of  its  evacuation,  which  we  now  see  could  have  been  done 
in  five  or  six  days  at  furthest.  If  we  had  to  fight  a  battle  to  re 
tain  it,  we  could  have  fought  on  ground  of  our  own  choosing,  and 
there  is  little  doubt  that  the  result  would  have  been  favorable  to 
us.  Instead,  the  official  reports  show  that  the  different  corps  and 
divisions,  on  widely  separated  lines,  were  sent  in  rapid  pursuit  of 
a  supposed  flying  and  demoralized  enemy,  which  in  fact  had  de 
ceived  him,  and  was  concentrating  for  an  attack  on  his  divided 
forces.  This  is  the  truth  as  history  will  record  it,  and  as  revealed 
by  the  now  collected  and  published  official  reports. 

Ignorant  of  what  was  going  on  in  other  parts  of  the  army, 
and  as  to  our  destination  and  the  movements  of  the  enemy,  we 
lay  all  day  on  September  9  in  our  camp  in  Winston's  Valley,  at 
the  foot  of  Lookout  Mountain,  making  ourselves  comfortable, — • 
no  one  dreaming  of  impending  battle.  The  impression  prevailed 
that  all  we  had  to  do  was  to  advance  against  the  enemy  and  he 
would  flee  as  he  had  done  at  Shelbyville  and  Tullahoma.  All 
were  of  the  opinion  that  he  would  fall  back  from  Chattanooga 
and  not  dare  to  give  us  battle.  We  were  soon  to  realize  that  all 
this  was  a  mistake.  Wrhere  we  were  encamped  it  was  25  miles 
to  Lafayette,  23  miles  from  Trenton,  where  General  Rosecrans 
had  his  headquarters,  25  miles  from  where  we  crossed  the  Ten 
nessee  River,  48  miles  from  Rome  and  42  miles  from  Chatta 
nooga. 


1     W.  R.  R..  52-460.  2     \V.  R.  R.,  52-459. 


CAMPAIGN  A^D  BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA  305 

That  morning,  September  9,  at  9  o'clock  General  Rosecrans 
sent  a  dispatch  to  General  McCook  directing  him  to  move  as 
rapidly  as  possible  on  Alpine  and  Summerville,  for  the  purpose 
of  intercepting  the  enemy  in  his  retreat.  General  Thomas  was 
ordered  to  move  on  Lafayette,  and  General  Crittenden  was  to 
follow  from  Chattanooga,  in  pursuit  of  the  supposed  retreating 
enemy.1  That  morning  a  supposed  loyal  citizen  of  Chattanooga 
reported  at  General  Rosecran's  headquarters  that  the  enemy 
was  "badly  demoralized",  "all  feel  that  they  are  whipped",  "one- 
seventh  of  the  troops  mostly  naked" ;  "the  rations  for  three  days 
would  make  one  good  meal",  and  that  if  they  were  pursued  vigor 
ously  they  would  "not  stop  short  of  Atlanta".2  It  is  pretty  evi 
dent  now  that  General  Rosecrans  believed  this  and  similar  stories 
brought  into  our  lines  by  pretended  deserters,  and  that  many  of 
his  subordinate  general  officers  also  believed  them.3 

September  10,  rumors  regarding  the  true  state  of  affairs  in 
Bragg's  army  reached  Rosecrans  but  were  dismissed  as  "hardly 
worthy  of  a  moments  consideration".  4  The  next  day  General 
Crittenden,  sent  a  number  of  dispatches  to  General  Rosecrans, 
saying  "that  the  enemy  had  all  gone  to  Rome,"-5  and  on  the  12th 
at  9 :30  p.  m.  reported,  that  he  believed  "the  enemy  is  run 
ning,,  and  that  he  will  make  no  stand  short  of  Rome."6 
September  12  at  9:50  p.  m.  General  Rosecrans  became 
convinced  that  the  enemy  was  in  heavy  force  near  Lafayette,7 
and  on  the  13th,  he  fully  realized  that  he  had  been  deceived  by 
reports  that  Bragg  was  making  a  disorderly  retreat.  On  that 
morning  at  8:15  our,  McCook's  corps  received  orders  to  march 
to  General  Thomas'  assistance.8 

It  will  be  remembered  that  on  the  eighth  day  of  September, 
we  moved  five  miles  and  went  into  a  new  camp  in  Winston's  Val 
ley.  We  remained  there  on  the  8th  and  9th  and  began  building 
bowers  to  shade  our  tents  and  in  other  ways  making  ourselves 
comfortable. 

The  morning  of  the  10th.  we  received  sudden  orders  to 
march  at  5  o'clock  with  three  days'  rations,  leaving  the  wagons 
behind.  We  passed  through  Davis'  division,  and  marched  through 
a  gap  which  led  to  Lookout  Mountain,  at  the  foot  of  which  we 
waited  for  General  Davis'  division  to  get  out  of  our  way.  We 
then  began  the  ascent,  halting  to  rest  but  once  on  the  way  up. 
When  we  reached  the  summit  we  stacked  arms  and  rested  for 
half  an  hour.  From  a  bluff  nearby  we  had  a  fine  view  of  the 
valley  and  site  of  our  late  camp,  and  of  Sand  and  Raccoon  Moun- 

1  W.  R.  R.  52-488.  5  W.  R.  R.  52-545. 

2  W.  R.  R.  52-481.  6  W.  R.  R.  52-576. 

3  W.  R.  R.   52-508-519.  7  W.  R.  R.  52-577. 

4  W.  R.  R.  52-517.  8  W.  R.  R.   52-598-602. 


306  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

tains.  The  prospect  stretched  away,  far  as  the  eye  could  reach. 
We  resumed  our  march  in  a  northeasterly  course  and  made  good 
progress.  We  soon  came  to  a  place  where  the  road  forked  and 
took  the  fork  leading  southward,  as  we  supposed,  towards 
Rome.  At  noon  we  halted  for  dinner,  enjoyed  a  good  rest,  and 
at  2  P.  M.  resumed  our  march.  Wre  followed  a  mountain  road 
and  crossed  a  considerable  stream  which  ran  through  a  gully  or 
canyon.  Just  before  dark  we  descended  the  mountain  and  en 
camped  on  a  knoll  at  its  foot.  The  road  down  the  mountain  had 
been  blockaded  by  the  enemy  with  rocks  and  fallen  trees  which 
were  removed  by  our  forces  as  we  advanced. 

The  morning  of  September  11,  we  learned  that  we  were 
near  Alpine,  Ga.  We  lay  quietly  in  camp,  resting  after  our  hard 
march  over  the  mountain,  and  some  of  the  boys  went  foraging 
and  brought  in  some  sweet  potatoes.  In  the  evening  there  was 
a  religious  service  in  our  quarters,  conducted  by  Chaplain  Ross 
and  Willison  B.  White  of  Company  A.  Later,  two  bands  in 
Davis'  division  gave  us  some  fine  music.  We  remained  in  our 
camp  near  Alpine  on  the  12th.  The  days  were  warm  and  the 
nights  cool.  There  were  various  rumors  afloat,  one  of  which 
was  that  the  enemy  was  in  force  in  our  front,  and  in  that  of 
General  Thomas  to  our  left  a  few  miles,  and  that  we  were  likely 
to  be  attacked  in  the  morning.  Another  was  that  a  portion  of 
General  Grant's  forces  was  coming  to  reinforce  us.  But  when 
we  learned  that  the  wagon  train  was  ordered  back,  it  was  appar 
ent  that  there  would  be  no  fight  after  all.1  Next  morning  at  6 :30 
we  took  up  our  march  again,  but  were  detained  by  the  ambulance 
train  and  the  artillery.  Our  course  was  up  Lookout  Mountain, 
by  a  different  road  from  that  we  had  traversed  coming  down. 
It  was  more  to  the  eastward,  and  we  reached  the  top  in  good 
time.  The  brigade  halted  for  dinner  and  we  were  told  that  our 
destination  was  Dougherty's  Gap.  and  that  we  were  to  await 
orders  until  it  was  determined  whether  our  way  was  clear.  We 
resumed  our  march  at  1  :30  P.  M.  in  the  same  direction,  and  were 
told  that  orders  had  come  for  us  to  reinforce  General  Thomas, 
who  was  confronted  by  a  large  force  of  the  enemy.  Some  three 
or  four  miles  further  on  we  halted  and  stacked  arms  by  the  road 
side  in  the  woods,  and  word  came  back  that  the  whole  rebel 
column  could  be  plainly  seen  in  the  valley  from  a  position  nearby. 
Many  went  forward  to  see  it,  but  it  turned  out  to  be  a  column 
of  our  own  men.  Resuming  our  march  we  passed  the  road  on 
which  we  ascended  the  mountain,  and,  following  a  road  along 
its  crest  we  came  to  the  gully  or  canvon  before  mentioned.  We 
descended  into  it,  crossed  the  same  deep  stream  we  had  crossed 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


CAMPAIGN  AND  BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA  307 

in  our  march  to  Alpine  and  bivouaced  there  for  the  night.  A 
nest  of  "yellow  jackets"  at  the  road  side  made  it  lively  for  the 
troops  and  trains  coming  from  the  rear.  Next  morning,  the 
14th,  reveille  sounded  at  2  :30  o'clock  and  we  were  ordered  to 
march  at  4.  We  found  to  our  disappointment  that  we  were  to 
retrace  our  steps  to  Winston's  Valley.  We  were  delayed  in 
getting  up  out  of  the  gulch  or  canyon.  Our  road  led  us  nearly 
to  Alpine,  before  we  turned  in  the  direction  of  Winston's,  and 
the  dust  became  so  deep  from  much  travel  that  the  marching  was 
very  disagreeable.  Our  route  to  the  valley  was  more  direct  and 
nearer  by  several  miles  than  the  one  we  had  marched  over  before. 
At  noon  we  halted  for  dinner  beside  a  mountain  stream  near 
where  it  plunged  into  a  chasm  with  a  fall  of  near  100  feet,  and 
formed  a  pool  which  was  said  to  be  fathomless.  The  roaring 
of  the  fall  could  be  heard  for  a  mile  or  more.  On  each  side  of 
the  chasm  were  walls  of  solid  rock  and  few  of  us  had  ever  be 
held  anything  approaching  it  in  grandeur.  Far  down  in  the 
chasm  and  on  projecting  ledges  higher  up,  we  saw  groups  of 
bathers  enjoying  the  magnificent  shower  bath  which  nature  had 
provided.1  Resuming  our  march  we  soon  came  to  the  descent 
of  the  mountain  and  ere  long  were  down  again  in  the  quiet 
Winston's  Valley,  where  we  rested  beside  a  fine  large  spring. 
After  a  short  rest  we  filled  our  canteens  from  the  spring,  pushed 
up  the  valley  by  the  Trenton  road  some  four  miles,  and  encamped 
near  another  fine  spring,  having  marched  since  morning  21  miles. 
The  next  day,  the  fifteenth,  we  had  orders  to  march  at  4:15 
A.  M.,  but  we  did  not  start,  and  it  was  said  we  were  to  rest  and 
await  orders.  During  the  day  some  of  the  men  found  some  wild 
grapes  and  brought  them  into  camp.  There  were  some  details 
made  for  wagon  guards  and  picket  duty,  but  most  of  our  men 
took  a  good  rest.  In  the  evening  we  were  told  that  we  were 
again  to  cross  Lookout  Mountain,  General  Davis'  division  having 
begun  the  march  in  the  afternoon.  Next  morning,  the  16th,  at 
6  o'clock  we  started  on  a  march  back  over  the  same  road  toward 
Lookout  Mountain.  We  halted  at  a  large  spring  to  fill  our  can 
teens,  and  while  there  our  regiment  was  detailed  to  help  the 
wagons  up  the  ascent.  After  following  the  old  familiar  road 
some  distance  we  took  one  leading  north.  It  was  not  so  dusty 
as  our  previous  marches,  but  after  crossing  the  stream  before 
mentioned  water  was  scarce.  We  marched  until  we  reached  the 
head  waters  of  this  stream,  which  we  then  first  learned  was 
Little  River,  and  encamped  there  for  the  night, — our  day's  march 
13  miles.  Some  of  the  men  at  once  set  out  on  foraging  expedi 
tions  and  were  arrested  by  the  provost  guards,  but  one,  Dan 

1     Glea son's  Diary. 


308  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

Norman  of  Company  H,  escaped  arrest,  and  brought  into  camp 
a  bee  hive,  which  h  ehad  bought  with  "fac  simile"  Confederate 
scrip.  After  the  bees  were  smoked  out,  Dan  made  a  free  dis 
tribution  of  the  honey  and  was  pronounced  a  good  fellow.1  That 
night  a  stray  mule  got  among  the  gun  stacks,  knocked  some  of 
them  down  and  almost  caused  a  panic.  We  heard  rumors  during 
the  evening  that  a  cavalry  fight  had  occurred  the  day  before  in 
the  valley  below  near  Lafayette. 

The  next  day,  the  17th,  was  warm  and  dry.  We  were  awak 
ened  about  5  o'clock  and  got  ready  to  march.  Companies  H  and 
G  were  detailed  as  rear  guard  of  the  division  and  remained 
behind  until  the  last  wagon  started.  Sergeant  Evers  of  Company 
H  and  six  men  were  sent  back  as  lookouts,  while  the  companies 
followed  the  train.  We  took  a  northerly  course  through  a  broken 
and  uneven  country.  Our  march  was  irregular,  water  was  scarce, 
and  we  longed  for  the  cool  and  abundant  springs  we  had  enjoyed 
in  the  valley.  We  looked  in  vain  for  sufficient  water  for  coffee. 
We  descended  by  a  long  narrow  road  into  a  valley,  where  we 
drew  rations  from  a  supply  train  and  found  a  stream  of  good 
water.  There  we  filled  our  canteens  and  pushed  ahead  for  the 
front.  It  was  said  there  was  a  fair  prospect  for  a  fight.  Dark 
ness  found  us  climbing  over  foot  hills  and  winding  through  ra 
vines.  General  Willich  told  us  that  the  whole  army  was  ahead 
of  us  in  line  of  battle,  and  that  we  were  going  forward  to  out- 
position.  A  new  moon  afforded  some  light  for  a  while,  but  set 
before  we  reached  the  position  assigned  to  us  on  the  bank  of  a 
sluggish  stream,  which  we  afterwards  learned  was  Chickamauga 
Creek.  We  had  marched  during  the  day  2,5  miles.  After  a  late 
supper  we  lay  down  to  rest  our  tired  limbs,  expecting  an  early 
call  next  morning.  We  found  we  were  not  so  near  the  front  as 
we  supposed,  and  there  were  rumors  that  the  enemy  was  with 
drawing.  WTe  had  not  yet  got  over  the  impression  that  we  were 
still  pursuing  a  fleeing  enemy,  and  really  did  not  expect  a  general 
engagement.  There  was  another  rumor, — that'  General  Bragg 
had  received  reinforcements  from  Virginia  and  elsewhere  and 
was  trying  to  mass  his  forces  and  crush  Crittenden's  and  Thomas' 
corps  before  we  could  come  up  to  their  support,  but  that  he  would 
be  foiled  in  the  attempt.  There  was  a  sprinkle  of  rain  in  the 
night.  Next  morning,  Friday,  September  18,  was  cloudy  and 
cool.  We  had  had  a  fairly  good  nights's  rest  and  were  ready  for 
any  emergency.  Orders  were  issued  for  each  man  to  have  sixty 
rounds  of  cartridges,  and  they  were  issued  after  breakfast.  In 
spection  of  arms  was  ordered  at  9  o'clock,  but  before  the  hour 
came  our  entire  brigade  was  ordered  out  on  picket  duty.  We 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


CAMPAIGN  AND  BATTLE  OF  CHICK  AM  A  UG  A  309 

moved  to  the  front  about  a  mile  and  were  posted  as  pickets,  our 
regiment  being  in  the  reserve.  General  Willich  being  in  tem 
porary  command  of  the  division,  the  command  of  the  brigade 
devolved  on  Lieutenant  Colonel  Askew,  and  Major  McClenahan 
commanded  the  regiment. 

We  heard  considerable  cannonading  far  to  our  left  during 
the  forenoon,  but  all  was  quiet  on  our  front.  We  lay  undisturbed 
until  the  middle  of  the  afternoon,  when  we  were  relieved  by  the 
second  brigade  and  moved  back  about  half  a  mile  where  we  en 
camped,  as  we  supposed,  for  the  night.  We  therefore  made 
beds  of  cedar  boughs  and  got  ready  for  the  night's  rest.  We 
drew  rations  of  fresh  beef  and  the  cooks  went  to  work  to  boil 
it  and  make  coffee.  We  had  barely  time  to  drink  the  coffee 
when  we  were  hurriedly  ordered  out  on  picket  again.  We  moved 
to  the  left  along  the  Chattanooga  road.  A  part  of  our  regiment 
was  posted  in  a  corn  field  where  the  stalks  were  so  high  the  tops 
bent  over  like  saplings.1  \Ve  were  not  disturbed  during  the 
night.  The  next  morning,  Saturday,  September  19,  we  were  all 
aroused  early  and  were  allowed  to  build  fires  to  warm  by,  as  the 
air  was  frosty  and  cold.  Soon  after  day  light  we  had  coffee  and 
at  0  o'clock,  marched  back  past  our  last  camp  and  found  it  de 
serted.  We  were  double  quicked  for  three  or  four  miles  and 
fianally  came  up  to  the  rest  of  the  brigade.  We  then  pushed  on 
at  a  slower  pace.  General  McCook  and  his  staff  overtook  and 
passed  us,  the  General  speaking  cheerily  as  he  rode  by.  The 
road  grew  very  dusty.  Burning  fires  warmed  the  air  and  the 
smoke  from  them  almost  stifled  us  at  times.  The  roar  of  artillery 
ahead  soon  convinced  us  that  the  battle  had  opened  and  that  no 
time  was  to  be  lost.  We  halted  at  a  small  place  called  Gordon's 
Mills  and  filled  our  canteens  at  a  large  spring  by  the  roadside.2 
We  then  pushed  on  and  soon  came  within  hearing  of  musketry 
firing.  We  here  left  the  artillery  and  trains  and  struck  across 
the  woods  and  fields  to  another  road,  which  we  soon  reached 
and  were  given  a  short  rest,  after  which  we  were  ordered  for 
ward  at  double  quick.  Turning  off  the  road  to  the  right  at  the 
Kelly  farm,  we  formed  line  of  battle  in  a  wood.  The  Forty-ninth 
Ohio  and  Thirty-second  Indiana  were  in  the  first  line  and  our 
regiment  and  the  Eighty-ninth  Illinois  were  formed  in  support. 
The  noise  of  the  battle  grew  constantly  louder  to  the  left,  towards 
which  we  shifted,  until  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  finally  sent  out  a 
strong  skirmish  line,  which  soon  became  engaged.  Gleason's 
diary,  from  which  the  main  facts  above  narrated  are  taken,  says: 
"the  skirmish  line  of  the  Forty-ninth  advancing  too  far  at  one 

1  Gleason's  Diary. 

2  Crawfish  Sprinp. 


310  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

time,  was  outflanked  on  the  right  and  had  to  retire  a  short  dis 
tance.  We  then  lay  down  under  a  murderous  fire  of  musketry 
and  artillery  from  the  right  and  suffered  severely.  Big  Phil 
Beamer,  my  file  closer,  was  struck  fatally  in  the  head  by  a  musket 
ball,  and  lay  almost  at  my  side.  Desiring  to  inform  the  lieutenant 
in  command  of  the  company,  I  was  told  that  he  had  gone  back 
severely  wounded  and  that  I  was  left  in  command.  I  had  poor 
Phil,  who  was  still  alive,  but  unconscious,  carried  to  the  rear.1 
The  rebel  fire  was  soon  slackened  by  a  few  broadsides  from 
Goodspeed's  battery,  which  was  ordered  up.  The  Third  Brigade 
of  our  division  (Baldwin's)  now  came  up  on  our  left  and  we 
again  advanced,  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  'advancing  firing/  ac 
cording  to  new  tactics  General  Willich  had  taught  us,  with  such 
signal  effect  that  they  recaptured  Loomis'  battery,  which  had 
been  lost  in  the  morning,  and  the  guns  were  taken  to  the  rear. 
We  then  lay  down  within  range  of  the  enemy's  fire,  but  were 
not  actively  engaged  for  an  hour  or  more. 

While  standing  talking  to  two  or  three  comrades,  we  heard 
a  shot  and  a  minnie  ball  came  shrieking  toward  us.  It  struck  the 
ground  close  to  me,  and,  rebounding,  struck  me  in  the  thigh, 
abrading  the  skin  and  raising  quite  a  lump.  Happy  to  feel  that 
I  was  not  dangerously  hurt,  I  picked  up  the  bullet  and  put  it  in 
my  pocket  to  preserve  as  a  souvenir  of  the  battle.  Toward  eve 
ning  the  enemy  massed  on  our  left  and  front  and  at  twilight 
made  a  furious  assault  on  our  lines.  Our  regiment  was  ordered 
into  the  front  line,  on  the  left  of  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio,  and  we 
had  all  we  could  do  to  maintain  our  position,  as  our  left  was  over 
lapped  by  the  enemy.  It  was  the  liveliest  fight  for  nearly  an 
hour  that  we  had  been  engaged  in.  Hugh  Thompson  was  struck 
here  by  a  spent  cannister  shot  and  stunned  but  recovered  in  a 
short  time.  After  using  my  musket  to  good  purpose  for  some 
time,  firing  at  the  flashes  of  the  enemy's  muskets  and  keeping 
the  men  in  line,  it  became  so  foul  that  a  ball  I  was  ramming  in 
stuck  half  way  down.  WThile  I  was  trying  to  get  it  home  I  was 
struck  by  a  bullet  in  the  right  breast.  Its  course  was  through  the 
muscles  each  side  of  the  arm  pit  across  which  it  plowed  a  fur 
row.  Its  force  while  sufficient  to  pass  entirely  through,  did  not 
knock  me  off  my  feet,  but  feeling  the  blood  running  down  my 
side  I  knew  I  was  badly  "winged"  this  time.  I  left  the  old  dirty 
musket  right  there,  and  feeling  a  sense  of  growing  weakness, 
turned  the  command  of  the  company  over  to  Sergeant  M.  B. 
Evers,  told  Captain  Danford  of  Company  E  of  my  mishap  and 
walked  unaided  to  the  rear.  When  nearly  exhausted,  an  ambn- 

1     Beamer  died  that  night. 


CAMPAIGN  AND  BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA  311 

lance  picked  me  up  and  took  me  to  the  brigade  hospital  near  the 
Kelly  house  where  my  wound  was  dressed.'' 

Gleason  is  mistaken  about  the  battery  the  brigade  cap 
tured,  being  Loomis'  Michigan  Battery.  That  battery  was 
captured  by  the  enemy  but  was  not  retaken.  It  may  have 
been  the  Fourth  Indiana  Battery,  commanded  by  Lieutenant 
Flansburg,  in  Starkweather's  Second  Brigade  of  Baird's 
Division  of  the  Fourteenth  Army  Corps,  five  of  whose  guns 
were  captured  by  the  enemy  that  morning,  but  were  recap 
tured  in  the  afternoon  engagement,  as  shown  by  General  Stark 
weather's  official  report.  He  says,  "In  order  to  save  my  line 
from  total  destruction  a  slow  retirement  was  ordered  to  the 
ridge  directly  to  the  rear.  *  *  *  The  enemy  was  then  struck 
by  some  of  our  troops  in  his  rear  and  on  his  flank,  throwing  him 
into  confusion,  thus  leaving  my  guns  not  withdrawn  untouched, 
and  I  immediately  set  to  work  to  place  my  battery  again  in  fighting 
condition".  General  Willich  in  his  official  report  states  posiv 
tively  that  in  the  charge  our  brigade  made,  which  Gleason  de 
scribes,  "Five  pieces  of  the  enemy's  artillery,  which  had  done  us 
much  damage,  were  taken,  brought  to  the  rear  and  delivered  by 
my  assistant  adjutant  general  at  the  headquarters  of  the 
army.''  Captain  Goodspeed  officially  reports  this  incident  as 
follows :  "The  brigade  having  captured  a  battery  from  the 
enemy,  I  was  ordered  to  haul  the  pieces  off  the  field.  I  sent 
for  my  cassion  teams  and  took  off  three  ten-pounder  Parrott  and 
two  twelve-pounder  Napoleon  guns".  It  appears  from  the  of 
ficial  report  of  Captain  George  A.  Kensel,  chief  of  artillery  of 
Baird's  division,  that  the  Fourth  Indiana  Battery  was  equipped 
with  two  twelve-pounder  light  guns,  two  twelve-pounder  light 
howitzers,  and  two  six  pounder  James  guns.1  These  guns  do 
not  answer  the  description  of  the  guns  Goodspeed  says  he  took 
to  the  rear.  An  examination  of  the  official  reports  of  the  enemy's 
forces  opposed  to  us  fails  to  disclose  what  battery  the  guns  be 
longed  to. 

It  appears  from  the  official  reports  that  the  assault  of  the 
enemy  in  which  Gleason  was  wounded  was  finally  repulsed,  and 
that  afterwards  the  entire  division  was  withdrawn  back  into  the 
Kelly  field  and  placed  in  line, — Baird's  division  on  its  left,  and 
Palmers  on  its  right. 

The  division  was  formed  with  Berry's  formerly  Baldwin's, 
Third  Bridage  on  the  right  and  Dodge's  Second  Brigade  on  the 
left,  with  Willich's  First  (our)  Brigade  as  a  reserve.  Here  we 
bivouaced  during  the  night.  Early  next  morning  the  brigades 
on  the  line  threw  up  a  line  of  breast  works,  in  anticipation  of  a 

1     All  above  mentioned  reports  in  Serial  No.  r>0  W.  R.  R. 


312  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

renewed  attack  by  the  enemy.  There  was  no  firing  until  between 
nine  and  ten  o'clock,  when  a  furious  storm  of  battle  opened  along 
the  line  in  our  front.  The  shells  from  the  enemy's  artillery 
reached  the  Kelley  house,  where  our  wounded  of  the  day  before 
had  been  sent,  and  compelled  their  quick  removal  back  to  Snod- 
grass  hill.1  The  musketry  firing  in  front  of  our  division,  Gen 
eral  Johnson  describes  as  being  the  heaviest  he  had  heard  during 
the  war.-  The  enemy  maintained  its  assult  for  over  an  hour  with 
great  vigor.  At  a  critical  moment  our  brigade,  which  had  been 
in  reserve,  was  ordered  forward.  The  Eighty-ninth  Illinois  and 
Thirty-second  Indiana  passed  over  the  troops  on  the  main  line 
and  charged  the  enemy  who  fell  back  in  disorder.  General  Wil- 
lich  reports  that,  feeling  sure  the  enemy  would  fall  on  our  flank, 
he  ordered  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  back  to  the  support  of  the  battery 
(Goodspeed's),  "where  they  arrived  in  the  brink  of  time,  as  the 
enemy  were  advancing  in  triple  lines  on  the  flank  and  toward  the 
rear.  Goodspeed's  battery  had  changed  front  and  poured  double 
shotted  canister  into  the  enemy's  ranks  and  the  Fifteenth  Ohio 
gave  a  volley  and  formed  on  the  battery  left.  Just  then  the 
Ninth  Ohio  of  General  Brannan's  division  deployed  into  line 
under  a  heavy  fire,  and  with  the  Fifttenth  Ohio  made  a  glorious 
charge.  A  similar  glorious  charge  was  made  on  the  left  flank 
of  the  enemy's  advancing  columns  by  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  and 
Louisville  Legion"  (the  Fifth  Kentucky),  "the  Forty-ninth  Ohio, 
changing  front  by  the  rear  rank,  and  the  enemy  was  driven  back 
with  heavy  loss."  General  Willich  in  his  report  further  says,  "that 
the  very  existence  of  our  army  would  have  been  endangered 
if  this  bold  and  powerful  charge  of  the  enemy  had  succeeded". 
He  says  "the  enemy  was  driven  by  this  charge  of  his  troops  half 
a  mile,  when  he  rallied  and  brought  the  fight  to  a  stand"/'  The 
official  report  of  the  battle  made  at  the  time  by  Lieutenant  Col 
onel  Askew  who  commanded  our  regiment,  is  brief,  modest, 
precise  and  remarkably  clear.  Of  the  action  of  the  regiment  on 
the  first  day,  (the  nineteenth)  he  says:  "We  formed  the  second 
line,  in  rear  of  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio,  which  was  on  the  left.  We 
followed  the  first  line  closely  in  their  brilliant  and  rapid  advance. 
ready  to  support  them  if  necessary,  until  the  brigade  was  halted, 
when  we  were  formed  in  double  column  on  the  center.  We 
were  lying  in  this  position  when  the  enemy  made  the  attack  about 
dark  on  Saturday  evening.  The  stragglers  from  the  first  line, 
of  which  there  was  a  considerable  number,  threw  the  regiment 
into  some  confusion,  but  they  were  soon  rallied,  and  the  regiment 
deployed  into  line  on  the  left  of  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio,  when  the 

1  Cleaso-'s  Dian-  3     Gen.  Willieh's  Report.  W.  K.  R    oO-Mi) 

2  W.  R.  R.   riO-535. 


CAMPAIGN  A.\D  BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA  313 

enemy  was  checked  and  the  firing  ceased".  It  is  at  this  point, 
where  the  regiment  was  at  the  front,  to  the  left  of  the  Forty-ninth 
Ohio,  that  our  regimental  monument  is  located.  Many  members 
of  the  regiment  were  much  disappointed  that  it  was  not  placed 
in  the  Kelly  field,  where  it  rendered  such  brilliant  service  on  the 
second  day,  and  largely  aided  in  preventing  the  capture  of  Good- 
speed's  battery.  Captain  Goodspeed  much  desired  and  made 
strenuous  efforts  to  have  it  located  there.  But  General  Aquila 
Wiley,  one  of  the  Monument  Commission,  insisted  that  on  this 
advanced  line  of  the  first  day's  battle  occurred  the  heaviest 
fighting  and  the  heaviest  losses  on  both  sides,  and  that 
the  regiments  who  took  part  in  the  engagement  on  this 
line  should  have  their  regimental  monuments  so  placed 
as  to  preserve  its  historic  accuracy,  for  here,  the  fiercest 
conflict  of  the  entire  two  days'  struggle  took  place.  The 
matter  was  submitted  to  General  Askew,  and  after  careful  study 
of  the  question  and  an  examination  of  the  official  reports  he  co 
incided  in  opinion  with  General  Wiley  and  the  monument  was 
so  located.  As  a  sort  of  compromise  between  the  two  locations, 
a  plain  and  durable  stone  shaft  was  placed  in  Kelly's  field,  where 
the  regiment  fought  on  the  second  day  and  repelled  the  assault 
on  Goodspeed's  battery.  The  writer  who  has  studied  the  official 
reports  of  both  sides  and  who  has  recently  gone  over  the  field,  is 
convinced  that,  as  time  goes  on,  it  will  be  more  and  more  evident 
that  our  monument  is  in  its  proper  place,  and  that  the  Monument 
Commission  was  most  wise  and  patriotic  in  placing  the  regi 
mental  monuments  of  Johnson's  division  where  they  are,  thus 
recognizing  and  preserving  the  historic  importance  of  that  fierce 
struggle  on  the  evening  of  September  19,  1863.  The  monument 
stands  near  D.  C.  Reed's  field  where  the  regiment  assisted  in  the 
repulse  of  the  night  attack  September  19. 

Its  site  is  one  hundred  feet  south  of  the  graded  road,  and 
two  hundred  feet  directly  in  rear  of  the  monument,  stands  the 
historic  pine  which  still  shows  more  wounds  from  cannon  shot 
than  any  other  tree  on  the  battle  field.1 

Of  the  operations  of  our  regiment  on  the  second  day 
Colonel  Askew  says :  "The  brigade  being  in  reserve  in  rendezv 
ous  position,  we  were  formed  in  double  column  on  the  center,  in 
rear  of  the  Eighty-ninth  Illinois  and  to  the  left  of  the  Forty- 
ninth  Ohio,  fronting  the  line  occupied  by  the  Second  and  Third 
Brigades  of  our  Division.  We  remained  in  this  position  for 
some  time  when  the  brigade  advanced  to  the  first  line  of  bar 
ricades,  deployed  into  line.  There  I  received  an  order  from  the 
General  to  go  to  the  support  of  Captain  Goodspeed's  Battery  and 

1     rhickamaufra  Record  of  the  Ohio  Commission,  page  39.  Sipr.    11 


314  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

to  form  on  its  left.  The  battery  at  that  time  was  near  the  house 
on  the  road,  a  little  to  the  right  and  considerably  to  the  rear  of 
our  line.  I  immediately  moved  by  the  right  flank.  When  the 
head  of  my  column  had  nearly  reached  the  battery,  though  we 
were  still  on  the  right  of  it,  we  received  a  sharp  volley  from  a 
body  of  the  enemy  who  were  advancing  down  the  road  and  on 
the  left  flank  of  our  general  line  of  battle,  and  who  had  driven 
our  troops  that  were  protecting  that  flank  before  them.  I  im 
mediately  halted  and  faced  by  the  rear  rank,  and  gave  the  enemy 
a  volley.  By  this  time  the  Ninth  Ohio  which  had  been  formed 
parallel  to  the  road  and  fronting  our  general  line  of  battle, 
changed  front  forward  on  their  tenth  company,  which  threw 
their  line  in  front  of  ours,  and  this  attack  of  the  enemy  was  re 
pulsed  with  the  assistance  of  two  other  regiments  of  the  brigade, 
which  were  in  line  along  the  barricades,  and  which  faced  I  sup 
posed  by  the  rear  rank  and  gave  the  enemy  a  fire  on  his  flank. 
As  soon  as  possible  I  proceeded  to  form  on  the  left  of  the  battery 
as  before  ordered,  my  right  resting  on  the  road  and  fronting  up 
the  road  in  a  northerly  direction,  and  in  the  direction  from  which 
the  last  attack  was  made.  While  here  General  John  Beatty  came 
to  me  and  informed  me  that  the  enemy  were  again  directly  on 
our  front  and  requested  me  to  advance  the  regiment  with  some 
other  troops  which  were  formed  on  our  right  and  left.  I  told 
him  I  would  do  so  if  I  got  permission  of  the  general.  He  ob 
tained  the  permission  and  we  advanced  through  the  woods,  driv 
ing  the  enemy  before  us,  until  we  reached  the  point  where  the 
field  on  the  right  of  the  road  terminated  and  the  woods  began. 
The  regiments  on  our  right  and  left  having  halted  before  this, 
and  being  considerably  in  advance  of  the  line  without  support, 
I  did  not  deem  it  prudent  to  advance  further  and  the  regiment 
was  halted  here.  I  then  sent  Major  McClenahan  to  inform  the 
general  where  we  were  and  to  ask  for  orders.  The  Major  re 
turned  with  the  order  to  rejoin  the  brigade.  Before  this  order 
was  begun  to  be  executed  the  enemy  again  advanced  to  the  at 
tack.  Our  flanks  being  exposed  we  fell  back  slowly  and  grad 
ually,  firing  in  retreat.  We  fell  back  perhaps  100  yards  in  this 
way,  when  the  enemy  appeared  to  have  been  satisfied  as  he  did 
not  follow  us  up,  I  formed  the  regiment  here  and  moved  back 
over  the  ground  which  we  had  retreated  over,  the  enemy  falling 
back  rapidly  before  us". 

"We  gathered  up  our  wounded  and  then  joined  the  brigade 
near  the  house  (the  Kelly  house)  forming  on  the  left  of  the 
Thirty-second  Indiana  and  fronting  to  the  west". 

"The  movements  of  the  regiment  during  the  remainder  of 
the  day  having  been  with  the  brigade  and  directly  under  the  eye 


CAMPAIGN  AND  BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA  315 

of  the  general,  I  do  not  think  it  necessary  to  go  into  an  extensive 
account  of  it.  I  cannot  speak  in  terms  of  too  high  praise  of  the 
conduct  of  the  officers  and  men  of  the  regiment.  Under  the 
hottest  fire  they  were  cool,  collected  and  determined.  The  men 
fired  deliberately,  never  firing  unless  they  saw  something  to  fire 
at,  and  then  with  good  aim.  Lieutenant  Fowler,  commanding 
Company  F,  a  gallant  officer  was  killed.  Captain  Byrd  and  Lieu 
tenant  Updegrove  both  commanding  companies,  were  wounded. 
Major  McClenahan,  although  quite  unwell,  remained  on  the  field 
to  the  last  and  rendered  gallant  and  efficient  service  in  the  man 
agement  of  the  regiment". 

Major  McClenahan,  in  a  paper  read  at  Monmouth  College, 
Illinois,  giving  the  military  record  of  his  two  brothers  who  were 
graduated  from  that  college  says : 

"At  the  battle  of  Chickamauga,  after  a  march  of  twelve 
miles,  our  division,  on  the  left  flank,  attacked  the  enemy  at  nearly 
sun  down  and  drove  them  about  one  mile  through  timber  as  dusk 
came.  They  turned  suddenly  and  made  a  fierce  charge  and  drove 
us  back  four  or  five  hundred  yards,  when  wre  stopped  and  rallied. 
It  was  quite  dark  by  this  time.  I  went  along  the  regiment  to  see 
what  condition  the  different  companies  were  in.  I  found  my 
brother  William,  who  was  in  the  color  guard,  limping  badly.  He 
was  reported  wounded  or  killed.  Brother  Stewart  with  five  men, 
all  that  were  there  of  Company  B  attempted  to  find  William  by 
going  to  the  front  in  the  line  of  the  colors  and  nearly  ran  into 
the  ranks  of  the  enemy.  We  were  then  withdrawn  and  went  to 
our  starting  place.  I  looked  for  William  in  the  dark  as  best  I 
could  and  found  him  sitting  on  a  log  badly  wounded.  I  placed 
him  on  my  horse  and  took  him  to  the  field  hospital,  where  I  left 
him, — the  last  I  saw  of  him  during  the  war.  *  *  *  The  sec 
ond  day  of  the  battle  we  had  hard  fighting  around  the  horse 
shoe  shaped  field  which  that  part  of  the  battle  assumed.  During 
one  of  the  fierce  charges  made  upon  our  part  of  the  line  my  horse 
was  killed  and  I  was  wounded  by  a  spent  canister  shot.  At  mid 
night  we  retreated  toward  Chattanooga". 

The  ranks  were  sadly  decimated  by  the  two  days'  fight 
ing.  Morris  Cope,  who  was  then  a  corporal  in  Company  F, 
recollects  that  on  Sunday  night,  when  the  regiment  withdrew 
from  the  Kelly  field,  there  were  only  two  officers  and  nine 
men  with  the  company.  He  thinks  the  two  officers  were  Cap 
tain  Danford  and  Lieutenant  Carroll,  and  recalls  that  James 
Hall,  Calvin  Etzler  and  Eugene  Dillon,  besides  himself,  were 
among  the  nine.  He  adds,  "Of  course  all  the  balance  of  the 
company  were  not  killed  ;  some  were  killed,  some  wounded, 
and  some  straved  or  stolen." 


316  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

In  the  confusion  of  the  two  days'  battle,  owing  to  the 
nature  of  the  ground  fought  over  and  the  promiscuous 
minglii-g  of  troops  of  the  different  commands  in  the  various 
charges  and  countercharges,  many  men  became  separated 
from  their  commands  who  afterwards  turned  up  and  rejoined 
their  companies.  Recurring  to  General  Willich's  official 
report  for  further  particulars  of  the  battle,  he  states  that  "on 
the  19th  instant,  at  5:30  A.  M.,  the  brigade  marched  (from  the 
right  of  the  army)  with  the  rest  of  the  division,  the  brigade 
leading,  behind  the  line  of  battle  to  the  left,  to  the  support  of 
General  Thomas.  Arrived  at  a  gap  in  the  line,  I  halted  under 
orders  and  formed  the  brigade,  the  Thirty-second  Indiana, 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Erdelmeyer,  commanding,  and  the  Forty- 
ninth  Ohio,  Major  Gray  commanding,  protected  by  their 
skirmishers  in  front ;  the  Eighty-ninth  Illinois,  Lieutenant 
Colonel  Hall  commanding,  and  the  Fifteenth  Ohio,  Lieuten 
ant  Colonel  Askew,  commanding,  in  the  second  line ;  the 
battery,  under  Captain  Goodspeed,  in  the  rear  of  the  brigade. 
The  ground  being  wooded  and  hilly,  it  would  not  allow  free 
maneuver  for  artillery  and  1  gave  Captain  Goodspeed  in 
structions  to  keep  his  battery  out  of  musket  range  and  in 
rear  of  the  infantry  until  further  orders.  *  *  *  My  skir 
mishers  soon  engaged  the  enemy,  who  opened  with  shell  and 
then  with  canister  from  a  point  right  in  front.  *  *  *  After 
having  reinforced  the  skirmish  line  and  having  brought  to 
bear  two  sections  of  my  battery  and  having  sufficiently 
shaken  the  enemy's  infantry  line,  I  ordered  a  bayonet  charge. 
*  The  charge  was  executed  in  splendid  order  and  with 
such  an  energy  that  everything  was  swept  before  it  for  about 
a  mile.  Five  pieces  of  the  enemy's  artillery,  which  had  done 
us  much  damage,  were  taken,  brought  to  the  rear  and  deliv 
ered  by  my  assistant  adjutant  general  at  the  headquarters  of 
the  army.  Fearful  to  lose  all  connection  with  other  troops, 
I  halted  my  brigade  in  a  good  postion  and  endeavored  to  find 
that  connection.  The  Third  Brigade  was  on  my  left ;  on  the 
left  of  the  Third  Brigade  was  nothing.  Calling  on  General 
Johnson,  commanding  the  division,  and  inquiring  for  our  con 
nection  with  other  troops,  I  was  assured  by  the  division 
inspector  that  a  division  of  another  corps  was  on  our  left. 
Colonel  Rose,  Seventy-seventh  Pennsylvania,  at  my  request, 
reconnoitered  the  right  along  the  enemy's  skirmish  line  and 
reported  the  next  troops  on  our  right  a  mile  distant.  To  the 
left  of  the  Third  Brigade  was  an  open  field  enclosed  by  woods. 
After  some  hours  of  light  skirmishing  in  front,  Colonel  Bald 
win,  commanding  the  Third  Brigade,  communicated  to  me 


CAMPAIGN  AND  BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA  317 

that  the  enemy  was  turning  his  left  flank  toward  the  rear. 
I  advised  him  to  take  his  two  rear  regiments  and  charge  to 
the  rear  and  to  the  left.  At  the  same  time  I  threw  the  Forty- 
ninth  Ohio  along  the  fence  enclosing  the  open  field,  on  the 
right  of  the  First  Ohio  of  the  Third  Brigade.  As  soon  as 
the  enemy  entered  the  open  ground  he  received  a  murderous 
fire  which  he  could  not  stand.  At  the  same  time  Colonel 
Baldwin  attacked  his  right  and  drove  them,  with  great 
slaughter,  before  him,  capturing  two  pieces  of  artillery."  After 
referring  to  the  fact  that  the  attack  and  repulse  of  the  enemy 
"took  place  directly  in  front  of  that  division  of  our  army 
which  had  to  make  connection  with  our  left,  but  which  did 
not  move  along  with  us  in  our  first  advance,  and  thereby 
created  an  opening  of  one  and  one-fourth  miles  to  one  and 
one-half  miles  between  their  front  and  our  own,"  he  goes 
aside  to  intimate  what  would  have  happened  if  that  division 
had  spontaneously  advanced  to  our  support.  He  then  states: 
"As  it  was,  all  I  could  do  Avas  to  keep  my  position  and  be  on 
the  lookout  for  other  attacks  in  the  flank  and  rear."  He  states 
further  that  he  "received  a  written  order  from  General  John 
son  to  fall  back  at  6  :30  P.  M.  to  our  general  line  of  battle. 
With  dusk  the  attack  looked  for  took  place.  The  enemy  had 
succeeded  in  bringing  his  batteries  and  masses  of  infantry 
into  position.1  A  shower  of  canister  and  columns  of  infantry 
streamed  at  once  into  our  front  and  on  both  flanks.  My  two 
front  regiments  were  swept  back  to  the  second  line.  The  line 
for  a  moment  came  into  disorder.  Then  they  received  the 
command,  'Dress  on  your  colors,'  repeated  by  many  men  and 
officers ;  and  in  no  time  the  four  regiments  formed  one  solid 
line,  sending  death  into  the  enemy's  masses,  who  immediately 
fell  back  from  the  front  and  then  did  not  answer  to  a  single 
sound."2 

Of  the  operations  of  the  brigade,  including  our  regiment, 
on  the  next  day,  he  says : 

"On  the  20th  of  September  the  other  two  brigades  of  our 
(Johnson's)  division  were  ordered  into  temporary  breast 
works  erected  during  the  night  in  our  front,  my  brigade  in  re 
serve.  I  took  my  position  in  rendezvous  formation  behind  a 
slope  in  an  open  field  in  rear  of  the  breast  works.  From  here 
I  could  support  the  front  and  be  prepared  for  the  flanks  and 
rear.  After  a  short  stay  in  this  position,  at  9  a.  m.,  I  was  or 
dered  forward  and  directed  by  General  Johnson  to  engage  the 
enemy  immediately  in  our  front.  I  obeyed  and  advanced  the 
Eighty-ninth  Illinois  and  Thirty-second  Indiana  over  the  lines 

1     Cleburne's  Report,  W.   R.   R.,  51-154. 

•1     General  Willich's  Report,  W.   R.   R.,  50-538-9. 


318  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

not  engaged  up  to  the  skirmishers,  with  whom  they  mixed,  and 
helped  to  drive  back  the  charging  enemy.  Feeling  sure  that 
the  enemy  would  fall  on  our  flank,  I  ordered  the  Fifteenth 
Ohio  back  to  the  support  of  the  battery,  where  they  arrived 
in  the  brink  of  time,  the  enemy  advancing  in  triple  lines  on 
the  flank  towards  the  rear.  The  battery  had  changed  front, 
and  Captain  Goodspeed  poured  double-shotted  canister  into 
the  enemy,  who  left  some  of  his  dead  fifty  yards  in  front  of 
the  battery.  The  Fifteenth  Ohio  gave  a  volley  and  formed  on 
the  left  of  the  battery.  The  Ninth  Ohio  (General  Brannan's 
division)  deployed  into  line  under  a  heavy  fire,  and  made,  sup 
ported  by  the  Fifteenth  Ohio,  a  glorious  charge.  The  same 
glorious  charge  was  made  on  the  left  flank  of  the  enemy's 
advancing  columns  by  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio,  with  rear  rank- 
in  front,  supported  by  the  Louisville  Legion  of  the  Third 
Brigade.  The  rebel  columns  Avere  driven  back  with  heavy 
slaughter  and  the  enemy  was  routed.  Our  army,  whose  very 
existence  would  have  been  endangered  by  a  success  of  this 
bold  and  powerful  charge,  was  for  the  time  safe."  *  *  * 
The  enemy  was  driven  for  half  a  mile,  when  he  to  some 
extent  rallied  and  brought  the  fight  to  a  stand.  The  Forty- 
ninth  Ohio  reported  that  their  ammunition  gave  out.  On  my 
inquiry,  Colonel  Berry,  who  commanded  the  Third  Brigade 
after  the  fall  of  Colonel  Baldwin,  declared  he  could  hold  the 
breastworks  with  his  own  command.  At  this,  I  took  the 
Thirty-second  Indiana,  leaving  the  Eighty-ninth  Illinois  in  its 
old  position,  advanced  with  it  through  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio, 
and  charged  and  drove  the  enemy  for  one  and  three-fourth 
miles,  leaving  the  ground  strewn  with  dead  and  wounded  and 
taking  numerous  prisoners.  Then  I  swept  to  the  left  through 
the  woods,  where  I  fell  in  with  the  enemy's  cavalry,  and  on 
the  Chattanooga  road  to  the  open  field  where  my  battery  was 
planted.  Here  I  assembled  my  whole  brigade  and  took  a 
position  in  the  northwest  corner  of  the  field,  which  in  my 
opinion  was  the  most  threatened  point.  My  skirmishers 
caught  some  prisoners  (100)  in  front  of  my  new  line  and  I 
learned  that  a  whole  brigade  of  Longstreet's  corps  was  about 
500  yards  in  my  front,  concealed  and  quietly  lying  down  in 
a  gap  between  the  line  of  battle  of  our  wing  and  General 
Thomas'  position.  The  enemy's  artillery  was  playing  on  my 
brigade,  though  partly  silenced  by  Captain  Goodspeed,  but  I 
could  do  no  more  than  watch  his  intentions.  At  this  time  I 
perceived  heavy  clouds  of  dust  moving  through  the  woods  to 
the  left  of  our  intrenchments.  The  intention  of  the  enemy's 
troops  in  my  front  was  then  clear.  They  would  break  in 


CAMPAIGN  AXD  BATTLE  OF  CHICK  AM  AUGA  319 

with  the  attack  to  be  made  on  our  breastworks  and  cut  their 
defenders  or!  in  the  rear.  I  called  the  attention  of  General 
Johnson  several  times  to  the  approaching  thunder  storm.  Just 
as  it  was  on  the  point  of  breaking  forth,  one  or  two  of  our 
divisions  on  the  right  of  our  breastworks  left  this  position  of 
the  battlefield  under  higher  orders,  each  regiment  cheering  as 
it  went,  which  cheering  did  not  at  all  cheer  us,  who  kept  the 
position  under  a  heavy  fire.  Then  the  storm  broke  loose,  first 
in  small  squads,  then  in  an  unbroken  stream,  the  defenders 
rushed  without  organization  over  the  open  field,  partly  over 
and  through  my  brigade,  which  was  formed  in  two  lines.  At 
the  same  time  the  enemy's  artillery  in  front  of  me  and  in  the 
rear  of  our  lines,  advanced  within  canister  range,  swept  my 
position,  and  entered  into  a  canister  duel  with  Captain  Good- 
speed.  The  enemy's  infantry  did  not  attempt  to  force  me. 
When  the  fugitives  had  reached  the  cover  of  the  woods,  I 
ordered  the  battery  to  retire  and  to  join  the  troops  under 
General  Thomas.  I  then  slowly  withdrew  the  brigade  in  two 
lines,  exposed  to  heavy  artillery  fire,  but  not  pressed  by  the 
enemy's  infantry.  On  the  other  side  of  the  woods,  formerly 
General  Thomas'  ground,  I  took  a  position,  reported  to  Gen 
eral  Thomas  and  received  orders  to  cover  the  retreat  in  con 
nection  wiht  General  Reynolds.  I  sent  my  battery,  which 
had  made  good  its  retreat  without  loss  and  had  faithfully 
waited  for  me,  ahead  on  the  Rossville  road,  took  a  new 
position,  permitted  all  troops  to  pass  and  followed  as  rear 
guard,  driving  many  stragglers  before  us,  and  reached  camp 
unmolested  at  12  p.  m."1 

Usually  in  our  military  operations  the  regiment  was  the 
unit.  Its  several  companies  were  fused  together  as  one  pro 
pelling  force  directed  by  the  regimental  commander.  But 
with  General  Willich  in  command  of  the  brigade,  the  brigade 
was  the  unit.  The  regiments  of  the  brigade  were  skillfully 
commanded,  as  were  the  companies  of  the  regiment,  but  in 
time  of  action  all  looked  to  General  Willich  as  the  directing 
mind,  trusted  him  with  the  utmost  confidence  and  followed 
him  implicitly.  Wre  had  our  company  and  regimental  drills, 
but  the  brigade  drill  was  that  to  which  most  attention  was 
given,  and  it  was  always  given  with  battle  movements  and 
battle  emergencies  in  view.  It  was  probably  with  this  in 
mind  that  Colonel  Askew  made  his  own  report  of  the  battle 
of  Chickamauga  so  meager.  He  says,  as  above  quoted,  that 
"the  movements  of  the  regiment  during  the  remainder  of  the 
day"  (the  second  day  of  the  battle)  "having  been  with  the 
brigade  and  under  the  eye  of  the  general,  I  do  not  think  it  nec- 

1     W.  R.  R.,  50-541. 


320  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

essary  to  go  into  an  extensive  account  of  it."  ( General  Willich 
was  everywhere  directing  and  inspiring  both  officers  and  men. 
Some  of  the  regimental  commanders  in  their  official  reports 
pay  just  tribute  to  his  superior  skill,  courage  and  imperturba 
ble  coolness  under  fire.  Major  W.  D.  Williams  of  Eighty- 
ninth  Illinois,  relates  this  incident  of  the  first  day's  battle. 
The  Eighty-ninth,  in  its  advance  against  the  enemy,  en 
countered  a  heavy  artillery  vfire  and  was  thrown  into  some 
confusion.  At  this  point,  says  Major  Wiliams,  ''General  Wil 
lich  came  forward  and  standing  in  front  of  the  regiment  and 
amid  a  shower  of  bullets  poured  into  us,  complimented  the 
regiment  for  its  impetuous  advance,  calmed  their  excitement, 
instructed  them  how  to  advance  firing,  and  maintain  their 
alignment  with  the  advance  of  the  brigade,  and  by  his  own 
inimitable  calmness  of  manner  restored  order  and  confidence 
in  the  regiment,  and  after  dressing  them  and  drilling  them 
in  the  manual  of  arms  for  a  short  time,  ordered  them  to 
advance  about  thirty  paces  to  the  edge  of  an  open  space. 
They  did  so  in  good  order,  lay  down  and  kept  the  enemy  in 
check  for  the  next  two  hours."  The  same  regimental  com 
mander,  in  complimenting  his  men  on  their  conduct,  further 
says :  "It  remains  for  me  but  to  say  the  men  and  officers  of 
the  Eighty-ninth  Illinois  Infantry  are  in  my  judgment — and 
I  trust,  in  the  judgment  of  my  superiors — worthy  to  belong 
to  the  First  Brigade,  and  to  be  under  the  command  of  such 
a  general  as  A.  Willich.  I  trust  the  time  will  come  when  we 
can  all  sit  by  our  peaceful  firesides  (when  great  command 
shall  have  been  awarded  him)  and  recount  the  time  when  he 
was  our  brigade  commander  standing  in  front  of  our  regiment, 
amid  the  rain  of  bullets  and  shells,  and  drilling  us  into  steadi 
ness  and  confidence."1  Major  S.  F.  Gray,  commanding  the 
Forty-ninth  Ohio  says,  in  closing  his  official  report  of  the 
battle :  "Allow  me  to  congratulate  the  general  commanding 
the  brigade  upon  the  successful  operations  of  his  entire  com 
mand,  its  perfect  organization  from  the  beginning  to  the  end 
of  the  fight,  and  to  tender  to  him  on  the  part  of  every  officer 
and  man  in  my  command  his  heartfelt  thanks,  feeling  that 
we  owe  to  his  superior  courage  and  skill  our  preservation  and 
any  honor  we  may  have  won."2 

Captain  Goodspeed,  in  his  official  report,  says:  "I  feel 
in  duty  bound  to  acknowledge  the  obligations  I  am  under  to 
the  general  commanding  the  brigade  for  the  able  manner  in 
which  he  handled  and  the  care  he  took  of  my  battery."3 

1  Major  W.  D.  Williams'  official  report,  W.  R.  R.,  50-542. 

2  Major  S.  F.  Gray's  official  report,  W.  R.  R.,  50-551. 

3  Captain  Goodspeed's  official  report,  W.  R.  R.,  50-554. 


CAMPAIGN  AND  BATTLE  OF  CHICK  AM  AUGA  321 

One  of  the  most  important  services  rendered  by  the  Fif 
teenth  Ohio  in  the  battle  of  Chickamauga  and  one  which  the 
men  of  the  regiment  remembered  with  just  pride,  was  that 
in  connection  with  the  charge  of  the  enemy  with  the  intention 
of  capturing  Goodspeed's  battery.  It  has  already  been 
detailed  in  the  reports  of  General  Willich  and  Colonel  Askew. 
It  only  remains  to  give  the  incident,  as  related  by  Captain 
Goodspeed  in  his  official  report.  He  says: 

"On  the  morning  of  the  20th  the  brigade  changed 
position,  facing  south.  I  changed  front  with  the  brigade, 
keeping  my  battery  still  in  the  rear  of  the  infantry.  In  this 
position  I  remained  when  the  brigade  was  ordered  into  action. 
At  about  10  A.  M.  one  of  the  enemy's  batteries  opened  on 
me  from  the  left  in  front.  I  changed  front  and  replied  with 
three  pieces,  throwing  shells,  silencing  the  enemy.  At  about 
11  o'clock  a  heavy  column  of  the  enemy  was  discovered  about 
1000  yards  from  my  position.  Crossing  the  road  I  immedi 
ately  changed  front.  At  this  time  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  volun 
teers  came  up  and  was  ordered  to  the  left  of  my  battery.  A 
few  minutes  later,  the  enemy  charged  on  us,  and  got  up  to 
within  fifty  yards.  My  battery  then  opened,  double  shotted 
with  canister,  and  being  gallantly  supported  by  the  Fifteenth 
Ohio,  we  succeeded  in  routing  the  enemy  and  driving  him 
back  with  great  slaughter.  The  enemy  having  disappeared 
from  my  front  and  showing  himself  in  my  rear,  my  battery 
with  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  moved  to  the  small  log  houses  which 
were  temporarily  used  as  hospitals  and  was  faced  to  the  rear. 
At  about  half  past  1  P.  M.,  the  rest  of  the  brigade  having 
formed  near  my  position,  the  enemy  opened  on  me  in  my  new 
front  with  artillery.  I  replied  with  about  fifty  rounds,  when 
he  ceased  firing.  My  battery  remained  in  this  position  until 
nearly  dark,  when  a  general  retreat  began.  The  troops  on 
our  left  giving  way,  the  enemy  threw  shell  and  canister  into 
the  position  of  the  brigade  from  that  side.  I  answered  with 
the  same  projectiles." 

"After  the  other  troops  had  passed  us,  General  Willich 
ordered  the  brigade  to  fall  back.  I  attached  the  prolonges  to 
my  pieces  and  retreated  firing.  The  enemy  closed  from  three 
sides  and  his  batteries  came  so  near  that  we  fired  at  each 
other  with  canister.  Under  orders  I  limbered  up  and  moved 
back  to  a  hill  in  the  rear,  where  I  awaited  the  arrival  of  the 
brigade.  Here  General  Willich  ordered  me  to  move  on  the 
Rossville  road,  and  follow  the  other  troops.  My  battery 
arrived  at  Rossville  at  12  P.  M.  and  went  into  camp." 

It  has  been  already  noted  that  Captain  Goodspeed  wished 


322  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

to  have  the  regimental  monument  of  the  Fifteenth  Ohio 
located  in  the  Kelly  field,  near  the  position  occupied  by  his 
battery  where  it  was  assaulted  on  the  afternoon  of  the  20th 
and  where  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  so  gallantly  aided  in  repelling 
the  assault.  Failing  in  this,  he  largely  aided  in  securing  the 
location  of  the  stone  marker  indicating 'the  position  of  the 
regiment  in  that  trying  moment. 

Further  evidence  of  his  desire  to  have  the  Fifteenth  Ohio 
associated  with  his  battery  in  what  he  regarded  as  its  most 
critical  moment  during  the  entire  engagement,  is  shown  by 
the  following  inscription  on  the  bronze  tablet  near  its 
imposing  monument  in  the  Kelly  field : 

"Battery  A  First  Ohio  Light  Artillery. 
4  James.  2  Napoleons. 

Willich's   Brigade,  Johnson's  Division,   McCook's   Corps. 
"September  20,th,  1863. 

Capt.  Wilber  F.  Goodspeed,  commanding. 

First  Lieut.  Edmund  Belding,  wounded. 

First  Lieut.  Charles  W.  Covill. 

Second  Lieut.  Roland  C.  Day." 

"This  battery  came  into  position  on  this  field  early  in  the 
morning  in  rear  of  its  brigade  reserves.  About  10  o'clock  a 
heavy  Confederate  column  was  discovered  about  1000  yards 
north.  Crossing  the  road  the  battery  changed  front.  A  few 
minutes  later  the  Confederates  charged  on  this  position,  and 
got  within  fifty  yards." 

"The  battery  then  double  shotted  with  canister  and  with 
the  aid  of  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  Infantry  of  the  Brigade,  and 
various  commands,  and  fragments  of  infantry,  they  were 
repulsed  and  driven  with  heavy  loss." 

"The  Confederates  having  disappeared  in  front,  and 
showing  themselves  in  the  rear,  the  battery  moved  to  the 
Kelly  House  and  faced  to  the  rear." 

The  official  reports  bear  striking  testimony  to  the 
courage,  the  coolness,  the  steadiness,  and  the  efficiency  of  the 
officers  and  men  of  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  in  this  memorable 
engagement. 

General  Johnson,  after  paying  deserved  tributes  to 
Colonel  Askew  and  Major  McClenahan  for  their  coolness  and 
distinguished  gallantry,  says : 

"For  individual  mention  of  subaltern  officers  reference 
is  respectfully  made  to  regimental  and  brigade  reports ;  but 
I  take  this  occasion  to  thank  every  officer  and  soldier  in  the 
division  for  their  good  conduct.  No  troops  ever  behaved 


CAMPAIGN  AND  BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA  323 

better.     I  wish  it  were  possible  for  me  to  mention  each  mem 
ber  of  the  division  by  name  in  this  report.." 

General  Willich,  in  characteristic  language,  says  : 

"I  do  not  feel  competent  to  bestow  praise  on  the  officers 
and  men  of  my  command,  for  their  bravery  and  self-denial — 
they  are  above  praise.  They  have  again  and  again  proven 
that  they  are  true  sons  of  the  republic,  who  value  life  only  so 
long  as  it  is  the  life  of  freeman,  and  who  are  determined  to 
make  the  neck  of  every  power,  slaveratic  (sic)  or  monarchial, 
bend  before  the  commonwealth  of  the  freemen  of  the  United 
States  of  America.  Young  and  brave  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Hall,  Eighty-ninth  Illinois,  sealed  dying,  his  political  creed 
with  the  words :  'Tell  my  regiment  to  stand  by  the  flag  of 
our  country.'  Captain  Whitney,  Eighty-ninth  Illinois,  the 
beloved  brother  and  leader  of  his  men  ;  Captain  William  H. 
Rice,  Captain  Spink,  Lieutenant  Adams,  all  Eighty-ninth 
Illinois ;  Captain  Ritter,  Thirty-second  Indiana,  good  and 
brave  to  the  last  moment ;  brave  Lieutenant  Fowler,  Fif 
teenth  Ohio,  and  all  those  brave  men  whose  bodies  now 
molder  in  Southern  ground — they  are  so  many  columns  in 
the  arch  of  this  Republic,  and  every  Northern  traitor  who 
tries  to  make  their  glorious  deaths  useless  for  the  cause  of 
humanity  should  be  led  to  the  little  mound  of  earth  which 
covers  their  remains  and  learn  penitence." 

We  smile  at  the  perfervid  eloquence  of  our  dear  old  gen 
eral,  as  we  often  smiled  at  his  broken  speech,  but  we  know 
there  was  never  any  break  in  his  courage  and  patriotism  nor 
in  his  affection  for  the  men  of  the  old  First  Brigade. 

But  the  most  discriminating  and  the  highest  tribute  paid 
to  the  valor  of  the  men  of  Fifteenth  Ohio,  was  paid  by  our 
beloved  regimental  commander,  Lieutenant  Colonel  Frank 
Askew,  when  he  said  : 

"I  cannot  speak  in  terms  of  too  high  praise  of  the  conduct 
of  the  officers  and  men  of  the  regiment ;  under  the  hottest 
fire  they  were  cool,  collected  and  determined.  The  men 
fired  deliberately,  never  firing  unless  they  saw  something  to 
fire  at,  and  then  with  good  aim." 

The  regiment  went  into  action  with  325  men,  and  lost 
120  killed,  wounded  and  missing.1 

The  following  are  the  names  of  those  killed,  wounded  and 
missing  during  the  engagement,  as  printed  in  the  published 
roster  of  the  regiment  and  gleaned  from  other  sources : 

1     Colonel  Askew's  official  report,  W.  R.  R.  50-550. 


324  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

KILLED,    WOUNDED   AND    MISSING BATTLE    OF    CHICKAMAUGA. 

WOUNDED — FIELD  AND  STAFF — Major  John  McClenahan. 
Sergenat  Major  Oliver  S.  Langon. 

COMPANY  A. 

KILLED  OR  DIED  OF  WOUNDS — Corporal  William  Rice,  Car 
son  E.  Madden,  Thomas  W.  Skuner,  James  M.  McKinney  (died 
of  wounds  Nov.  23,  1863). 

WOUNDED — Sergeant  Wm.  S.  Scott,  Corporal  Benjamin 
Briggs,  Hugh  Gormley,  Emmett  Hart,  Wesley  A.  McDonald, 
Samuel  L.  Patterson,  John  D.  Patterson  (and  captured),  Joseph 
Wood,  Converse  Wylie. 

CAPTURED — Harvey  White  (and  died  in  Andersonville 
prison). 

COMPANY  B. 

WOUNDED — Corporal  Wm.  F.  McClenahan,  Edward  T.  Mer- 
riam,  Jefferson  McDowell,  Spencer  Wiseman. 

CAPTURED — Corporal  John  Hunter,  (and  died  at  Richmond, 
Va.,  Dec.  1863),  Wm.  R.  Kirkwood,  Joseph  Woods,  (and  died 
June  4,  1864  in  Andersonville  prison),  James  B.  King,  John  A. 
Green,  John  Hunter. 

COMPANY  C. 

KILLED  OR  DIED  OF  WOUNDS — Leroy  Fields,  died  Sept.  22, 
1863;  Joseph  S.  Hunt,  died  Nov.  15,  1863. 

\YOUNDED — Captain  John  G.  Byrd,  Sergeant  Harvey  Sipe, 
Corporal  Welcome  Ashbrook,  Charles  C.  Byrd,  William  Carr. 

CAPTURED — Corporal  Andrew  J.  Craven  (died  in  rebel 
prison  Oct.  20,  1864)  ;  George  C.  Early,  Melvin  B.  Lane  (died 
in  Danville,  Va.  prison  March  5,  1865),  Sylvester  H.  Reed. 

COMPANY  D. 

KILLED  OR  DIED  OF  WOUNDS — Wm.  H.  Cravins,  Lorenzo  D. 
Harcomb,  John  Welk,  Nelson  Ellis  (died  of  wounds),  Marvin 
Lumbard  (died  Nov.  20,  1863). 

WOUNDED — Sergeant  Thomas  M.  Straw,  Corporal  Silas 
Jones,  Corporal  Jerry  Driscoll,  Corporal  Wm.  H.  Worley,  Cor 
poral  Wm.  H.  Campbell,  Corporal  John  Caldwell,  (and  captured 
and  died  in  Andersonville  prison  June  17,  1864),  James  W.  Cor- 
win,  John  Hahn,  John  Halliwell,  Amos  E.  Miller,  John  Hesser 
(and  captured). 

CAPTURED — Francis  M.  Carter  (and  died  on  Steamer  Sul 
tana,  April  18,  1864),  J.  D.  Higginbotham,  James  O.  Keller  (and 
died  in  Andersonville  prison,  Oct.  4,  1864),  Thomas  Pagan,  miss 
ing — no  further  record — George  W.  Tricker,  Wm.  R.  White  (and 
died  at  Andersonville  prison,  Nov.  18.  1864). 


CAMPAIGN  AND  BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA  325 

COMPANY  E. 

KILLED— Stephen  Burley. 

WOUNDED — Lieutenant  Samuel  Hilles,  Sergeant  Wm.  G. 
Malin  (and  captured),  Frank  M.  Heaton  (and  captured),  Chas. 
W.  Hall  (and  captured),  James  T.  Maring  (and  captured),  Wm. 
A.  Nichols,  Isaac  Paxton  (and  captured),  Albert  Wagner,  Hugh 
Crymble. 

CAPTURED — Wm.  H.  Satterthwaite. 
COMPANY  F. 

KILLED — Lieutenant  Nicholas  M.  Fowler. 

WOUNDED — Sergeant  James  Scott,  Henry  C.  Bowles,  Chas. 
C.  Boetlicher,  Abram  Ewers,  Leonidas  Harris,  Israel  Kinney, 
Leander  Warren,  Thomas  Collins. 

CAPTURED — Nathan  Watson,  Geo.  \V.  Boston,  Charles  Bran 
don,  John  Brandon  (and  died  in  Andersonville  prison,  June  30, 
1864),  Cyrus  Hurley  (captured  and  died  in  Andersonville  prison, 
June  21,  1864),  James  H.  Knox,  John  Mills,  Samuel  R.  Win- 
grove  (and  died  in  Andersonville  prison,  June  16,  1864). 

COMPANY  G. 

KILLED  OR  DIED  OF  WOUNDS — John  W.  Koons,  died  Sept. 

21.  1863. 

WOUNDED — Levi  Barcus,  Elmer  D.  Nelson  (and  captured), 
William  Wallace  (and  died  of  wounds  Oct.  11,  1863). 

CAPTURED — Joseph  T.  Hanes,  Wilson  Barcus,  Charles  W. 
Myers  (and  killed  or  drowned  on  Steamer  Sultana,  April  18, 
1864). 

COMPANY  H. 

KILLED — Philip  Beamer. 

WOUNDED — Lieutenant!  Jos.  R.  Updegrove,  Sergeant  An 
drew  J.  Gleason,  John  Capper  (and  captured),  Henry  Myers, 
Daniel  Stanton  (and  missing),  Oliver  P.  Shaw,  Hugh  Thompson 
(and  missing),  Robert  Miller  (and  died  of  wounds  Oct.  21, 
1863). 

CAPTURED — Wm.  G.  Balding,  WTm.  W.  Martin  (and  died  in 
Andersonville  prison,  Oct.  26,  1864). 

MISSING — Samuel  F.  Webber. 

COMPANY  I. 

KILLED  AND  DIED  OF  WOUNDS — Wm.  H.  Nyman,  died  Sept. 

22,  1863. 

WOUNDED — Wm.  Ash,  Alva  Anderson,  Chas.  Brown  (and 
captured),  Thomas  Clark  (and  captured),  Samuel  Canter,  Louis 
Kraft,  Wm.  Morgan.  Barnet  Sims  (and  captured). 

CAPTURED — Geo.  L.  Hershiser. 


326  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

COMPANY  K. 

WOUNDED — Corporal  Wm.  Hazlevvood  (and  captured).  Cor 
poral  John  W.  Brown,  Corporal  John  W.  Ridgway,  Wilson  S. 
Van  Curen. 

CAPTURED — Benjamin  Freeman,  John  S.  Hutchinson. 

So  far  as  our  regiment  was  concerned,  although  our  army 
retreated  from  the  field,  we  did  not  feel  defeated,  for  we  had 
repulsed  every  attack  made  on  our  line  in  front,  flank  and 
rear,  and  had  never  advanced  against  the  enemy  that  we  did 
not  drive  him  before  us.  This  was  true  of  the  brigade  and  the 
division.  General  Willich  in  his  official  report  says : 

"Though  our  loss  can  only  be  a  percentage  of  the  loss 
inflicted  on  the  enemy,  in  no  instance  he  resisted  (repelled) 
our  charges,  or  was  able  to  force  our  lines."1  General  John 
son  officially  states,  "It  is  a  source  of  great  pleasure  to  me 
to  know  that  the  Second  Division  did  not  yield  an  inch  ;  that 
it  defeated  every  force,  whether  attacked  or  attacking."1 

The  battle  of  Chickamauga  has  been  called  a  mystery, 
because  of  the  inexplicable  confusion  of  portions  of  both 
armies.  It  was  within  General  Bragg's  power  to  have  defeated 
our  three  corps  separately,  between  the  10th  and  16th  days  of 
September,  before  their  concentration,  but  he  adopted  a  halt 
ing,  hesitating  policy  and  let  the  opportunity  go  by.  Gen 
eral  Longstreet  in  a  letter  to  the  Confederate  Secretary  of 
War,  dated  September  26,  1863,  said : 

"Our  chief  has  done  but  one  thing  that  he  ought  to  have 
done  since  I  joined  his  army.  That  was  to  order  the  attack 
upon  the  20th.  All  other  things  that  he  has  done,  he  ought 
not  to  have  done.  *  *  *  It  seems  that  he  cannot  adopt  and 
adhere  to  any  plan  or  course,  whether  of  his  own  or  some  one 
else."2 

On  the  other  hand  there  were  stupendous  blunders  on  our 
side,  one  of  which,  the  withdrawal  of  Wood's  division  to  our 
right,  evidently  lost  us  the  field.  If  this  division  had  not  been 
withdrawn  and  the  line  on  the  right  had  held,  the  victory 
would  have  been  ours.  We  did  not  know  of  the  disaster  on 
the  right,  at  the  time  it  occurred,  but  fought  on,  in  the  faith  that 
we  would  win  the  battle.  It  was  not  our  fault  that  the  day  was 
lost.  When  we  lay  in  bivouac  near  Rossville,  at  midnight  of 
that  terrible  second  day's  battle,  we  were  comforted  by  this 
thought.  Although  our  army  had  been  defeated  we  were  not 
dismayed,  and  there  was  not  a  man  in  our  ranks  who  was  not 
as  ready  to  again  face  the  enemy  as  he  was  when  the  battle 
began. 

1  General  Willich's  report,  W.  R.  R.  50-541. 

2  W.  R.  R.   53-705. 


CHAPTER    XVII. 

THE  SIEGE  OF  CHATTANOOGA  AND  THE  OPENING  OF  THE  TENNESSEE 

RIVER. 

On  the  morning  of  September  21,  1863,  our  corps  (the 
^Oth)  was  again  re-united  and  formed  in  line  of  battle  cover 
ing  Rossville,  the  left  resting  on  Missionary  Ridge  and  cover 
ing  the  Crawfish  Spring  road,  the  right  extending  toward 
Chattanooga  Creek  and  Lookout  Mountain.1  Our  brigade 
and  regiment  formed  a  portion  of  this  line.  We  expected  the 
enemy  to  renew  his  attack  and  were  ready  for  him,  but  no 
attack  came.  There  was  some  firing  on  the  left  of  our 
position,  but  no  general  attack  was  made.  It  is  now  known 
that  the  enemy  was  too  much  exhausted  and  demoralized  by  the 
two  days'  battle  to  renew  the  advance. 

As  General  Thomas  saw  that  our  position  at  Rossville 
could  easily  be  turned  and  advised  concentration  at  Chatta 
nooga,2  General  Rosecrans  decided  to  withdraw  to  Chat 
tanooga  that  night,  and  at  4:40  p.  m.3  orders  were  issued 
accordingly.  These  orders  were  received  by  General  Thomas 
about  6  o'clock ;  about  9  o'clock  p.  m.  the  movement  began,  and 
by  7  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  22nd,  the  entire  army  was  in 
position  in  front  of  Chattanooga,  its  right  resting  on  the  river 
below  and  its  left  on  the  river  above  the  town.  Our  corps  was 
placed  on  the  left.  General  Thomas'  corps  in  the  center  and 
General  Crittenden's  on  the  right.  Our  regiment  reached 
Chattanooga  at  3  o'clock,  and  after  a  short  rest  began  putting 
tip  breastworks  and  making  other  preparations  to  resist  the 
further  advance  of  the  enemy,  which  we  all  felt  would  not 
long  be  delayed.  We  were  correct  in  our  apprehensions,  for 
by  the  evening  of  the  22d,  the  enemy's  skirmishers  were  in 
touch  with  ours  along  our  entire  front,4  and  skirmishing 
began  on  our  left.  That  day  Companies  A  and  F  were  detailed 
for  picket  duty.5 

Much  to  the  disappointment  of  the  authorities  at 
Washington,  our  troops  on  Lookout  Mountain  were  with 
drawn  and  the  enemy  occupied  it,  thus  getting  control  of 
the  river  and  railroad  below  the  town,  and  cutting  off  the 
routes  over  which  we  had  drawn  our  supplies. 

The  situation  of  our  army  was  extremely  critical.  At  6 
o'clock  that  evening  Mr.  C.  A.  Dana,  Assistant  Secretary  of 

1  General  McCook's  report,  W.   R.   R.,  50-490.         4     W.   R.   R.,   50-161. 

2  General  Thomas'  report,  W.   R.   R.,  50-254.  5     Frank    L.    Schreiber's    Diary. 

3  W.  R.  R.,  50-77. 


328  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

War,  who  was  then  in  Chattanooga,  telegraphed  to  Secretary 
Stanton  that  General  Rosecrans  was  considering  the  question 
of  retreat.  Later,  however,  at  9  :30  the  same  evening,  Dana 
sent  another  telegram  saying,  "General  Rosecrans  has  de 
termined  to  fight  it  out  here  at  all  hazards.1  Dana  also 
reported  General  Rosecrans  as  saying  he  had  fifteen  days 
rations  on  hand,  which  would  last  twenty  days  in  case  of  need ; 
that  we  had  sufficient  ammunition  for  two  days  hard  fighting 
in  the  field,  which  would  last  much  longer  behind  breast 
works,  and  that  our  army  consisted  of  35,000  effectives. - 
Confronting  us  and  pressing  upon  us  at  every  part  of  our 
line  was  Bragg's  army,  which  on  October  7,  as  reported  by 
him  to  the  adjutant  and  inspector  general  of  the  Con 
federate  States  Army,  contained  for  duty,  68,368  infantry, 
cavalry  and  artillery,  including  forty-six  batteries  of  artillery.'5 
The  condition  of  our  army  caused  general  alarm  at  Wash 
ington  and  throughout  the  north,  and  all  the  energies  of  the 
administration  were  aroused  and  directed  towards  sending 
us  relief.  Indeed,  as  early  as  September  15,  when  it  was 
known  at  Washington  that  a  part  of  Lee's  army  at  Richmond 
had  been  sent  to  reinforce  General  Bragg,  General  Halleck 
had  dispatched  to  General  Hurlbut  at  Memphis,  saying  that 
"all  the  troops  that  could  possibly  be  spared  in  Western  Ten 
nessee  and  on  the  Mississippi  River  should  be  sent  without  delay 
to  assist  General  Rosecrans  on  the  Tennessee  River."4  This 
dispatch  was  not  received  by  General  Grant,  who  was  at  New 
Orleans,  until  the  22nd,  when  he  at  once  ordered  General 
Sherman  and  General  McPherson  each  to  send  a  division  of 
his  corps  to  reinforce  General  Rosecrans.5 

Orders  were  sent  to  General  Burnside  to  move  all  his 
troops  toward  Chattanooga  to  support  of  Rosecrans,  and  the 
Eleventh  and  Twelfth  Corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac  were  at  once  started  to  his  assistance.  Secretary  Stan- 
ton,  on  the  23rd,  answering  Mr.  Dana's  telegrams  of  that  date, 
said :  "Every  nerve  is  being  strained  to  strengthen  General 
Rosecrans  and  his  gallant  army.  If  he  holds  his  ground  for 
half  the  time  stated  in  your  telegram  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  ample  reinforcements  must  reach  him  within  that 
period."6  While  the  strength  and  resources  of  the  nation 
were  thus  being  drawn  upon  so  lavishly  for  our  relief,  the 
problem  before  us  was,  how  we  could  subsist  and  hold  the 
enemy  in  check  until  such  relief  came.  We  worked  diligently 

1  W.   R.   R.,   50-197. 

2  Special   report   of  effective   force,   infantry   and  artillery,    Sept.    28,   shows   38,928 

officers  and  men,  VV.  R.  R..  52-915. 

3  W.    R.    R.,    53-733.  5     W.   R.  R.   50-162. 

4  W.   R.   R.,   50-161.  6     W.   R.   R.,  52-792. 


SiEiiK  OF  CHATTANOOGA  329 

on  our  fortifications,  and  soon  made  them  so  formidable  that 
General  Bragg  dared  not  make  an  attack  upon  them.  On 
October  3  he  wrote  to  the  adjutant  general  of  the  Confederate 
States  Army  at  Richmond  that  to  attack  us  in  front,  strongly 
intrenched  as  we  were,  would  be  suicidal.1 

The  steps  taken  for  our  relief  form  an  interesting  chapter 
in  the  history  of  the  times. 

Tt  has  already  been  noted  that  the  Eleventh  and  Twelfth 
Corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  been  sent  at  once  to 
our  relief, — the  Eleventh,  commanded  by  General  Howard, 
and  the  Twelfth  by  General  Hooker — General  Hooker  in  com 
mand  of  the  whole  reinforcement.  About  3000  of  Howard's 
corps  reached  Nashville  the  night  of  September  29th,  and 
Bridgeport  the  next  morning  about  10  o'clock.  The  rest  of 
the  Eleventh  Corps  and  the  Twelfth  Corps  were  following  as 
fast  as  transportation  by  rail  could  be  furnished,  and  were 
scattered  along  the  railroad  from  Louisville  and  points  further 
south  to  Bridgeport,  with  a  view  of  quick  concentration  at 
that  point,  when  events  occurred  which  for  awhile  alarmed 
the  country  and  delayed  such  concentration. 

On  the  night  of  September  29,  a  large  force  of  the  enemy's 
cavalry,  commanded  by  Generals  Wheeler  and  Forrest, 
evaded  the  watchful  eye  of  General  Crook  who  was  guarding 
the  fords  of  the  Tennessee  River  above  Chattanooga,  and 
crossed  the  river  on  his  flanks  near  Washington  and  Kings 
ton.  General  Crook  fought  them  for  an  hour  or  so,  but  as 
they  were  about  to  surround  him,  and  demanded  his  surren 
der,  he  fell  back  to  Smith's  cross  roads,  saving  all  his  train.2 

About  the  same  time  another  large  force  of  the  enemy's  cav 
alry  under  General  Roddey,  crossed  the  river  at  Gunter's 
Landing,  about  twenty-eight  miles  from  Belletonte,  Ala., 
below  Chattanooga.8  Both  of  these  cavalry  commands  were 
directed  towards  breaking  our  lines  of  communication  and 
cutting  off  our  supplies,  hoping  thereby  to  compel  us  to 
abandon  Chattanooga.  On  October  2,  a  detachment  from 
Wheeler's  cavalry  attacked  one  of  our  supply  trains  near 
Anderson's  and  captured  and  destroyed  it.4  The  train  was 
said  to  consist  of  350  wagons  loaded  with  food  and  ammuni 
tion.  About  the  same  time  General  Forrest  with  his  command 
appeared  before  McMinnville,  attacked  and  captured  it,  and 
and  burned  the  railroad  bridge  there/1  Ather  detachments  ap 
peared  at  points  on  the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga  Railroad. 

1  W.    R.    R.,    53-726.  4     W.   R.   R.,   53-79. 

2  W.    R.   R.,   52-953.  5     W    R.  R     53-78 

3  W.    R.    R.,    52-951. 


330  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

burned    bridges    and    stations    and,  for  four  or  live  days,  com 
pletely  blocked  traffic  over  this  line. 

It  was  believed  to  be  the  plan  of  the  rebel  commanders 
to  have  the  forces  of  Wheeler,  Forrest  and  Roddey  effect  a 
junction  somewhere  in  Tennessee  and  then  move  northward, 
burning  bridges  and  trains  and  working  such  havoc  that  our 
army  would  be  starved  into  surrender,  and  the  whole  line  of 
the  Tennessee  River  abandoned.  Fortunately,  the  Twelfth 
Corps  was  arriving  at  Nashville,  and  was  immediately 
distributed  along  the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga  Railroad, 
to  act  as  bridge  and  station  guards  and  to  aid  in  the 
pursuit  and  capture  of  the  raiders.  Our  own  cavalry,  under 
such  skillful  and  bold  leaders  as  General  George  Crook,  Gen 
eral  Edward  McCook,  General  R.  B.  Mitchell  and  others,  gave 
the  enemy's  cavalry  under  Wheeler  and  Forrest  no  rest,  but 
pursued  and  fought  them,  whipping  them  near  Murfreesboro 
and  at  Farmington,  and  finally  driving  them  in  confusion 
across  the  Tennessee  River  before  they  could  effect  a  junction 
with  General  Roddey,  and  General  S.  D.  Lee  who  was  at 
Courtland  with  5000  men  on  the  same  day  Wheeler  crossed 
the  Tennessee  River,  with  orders  to  join  him. 

It  w^as  common  at  that  time  among  the  infantry  to  be 
little  the  cavalry,  but  if  we  had  known  what  tremendous 
efforts  they  wrere  putting  forth  to  prevent  the  destruction  of 
our  cracker  line,  we  would  not  have  done  so.  A  letter  of 
General  Crook  to  General  Garfield,  who  was  still  chief  of 
staff  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  dated  Brownsborough, 
Ala.,  October  18,  gives  some  idea  of  the  severity  of  the  cav 
alry  service  at  that  time.  Garfield  had  received  advices  from 
General  Hooker  that  Wheeler  was  at  Courtland,  that  Roddey 
was  still  north  of  the  Tennessee,  that  both  were  awaiting  or 
ders  to  renew  their  raid,  and  stated  that  it  would  be  splen 
did  to  get  on  his  (Roddey's)  trail  and  capture  or  destroy  him. 
General  Crook  answers  General  Garfield  that  he  had  arrived  at 
Brownsborough  the  day  before,  expecting  to  find  a  train  of  pro 
visions  awaiting  him,  but  that  no  train  was  there,  that  the 
bridge  over  Paint  Rock  River  and  several  culverts  between 
that  stream  and  Brownsborough  had  been  destroyed,  and 
that  the  river  was  so  deep  it  could  not  be  forded  for  several 
days,  and  adds:  ''for  twenty  days  I  have  been  constantly 
marching,  part  of  the  time  in  a  drenching  rain,  and  have  only 
drawn  three  days'  rations  in  that  time.  A  great  many  of  my 
men  are  nearly  naked  ;  a  great  many  of  my  horses  are  bare 
footed  and  worn  out.*  The  command  is  in  a  terrible 
condition."1 

1     W.   R.  K.  53,  page  463-4. 


SIK(,K  OF  CHATTANOOGA  331 

By  this  time  the  broken  railroad  between  Nashville  and 
Chattanooga  had  been  patched  up  and  trains  were  carrying- 
provisions  and  troops  to  Bridgeport,  whence  they  were  car 
ried  over  the  mountain  road  to  Chattanooga  as  fast  as  the 
starving  teams  could  haul  them. 

To  repeated  orders  from  the  War  Department  to  General 
Burnside  to  go  to  the  relief  of  General  Rosecrans  at  Chatta 
nooga,  he  paid  no  attention.  It  was  well  that  he  did  not  go, 
unless  immediately  on  his  arrival  the  enemy  had  been  attacked 
and  driven  from  Lookout  Mountain.  Had  he  done  so,  both  his 
and  Rosecrans'  army  would  have  starved,  as  there  was  not  food 
enough  to  subsist  one  of  them  properly. 

It  has  been  noted  that  on  the  15th  of  September,  General 
Grant  had  been  ordered  to  send  all  the  forces  he  could  spare 
to  reinforce  Rosecrans  on  the  Tennessee  River,  and  that  on  re 
ceipt  of  the  order.  September  22,  he  ordered  three  divisions,  with 
General  Sherman  in  command,  to  move  at  once  toward  Chat 
tanooga.  General  Sherman  was  then  encamped  on  the  Big  Black 
River  about  20  miles  east  of  Vicksburg.  Though  painfully  op 
pressed  by  the  sickness  and  death  of  a  favorite  son,  he  at  once 
set  about  getting  his  troops  on  boats  for  Memphis,  and  went 
there  himself  to  personally  hurry  them  forward.  Memphis  is 
330  miles  from  Chattanooga  at  the  then  western  terminus  of  the 
Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad.  It  was  known  in  Washington 
that  General  Rosecrans'  army  was  on  very  short  rations,  so  Gen 
eral  Sherman  was  ordered  to  move  out  over  this  road,  repairing 
it  and  keeping  it  in  repair,  so  as  to  draw  his  supplies  over  it.  The 
road  ran  through  the  enemy's  country,  infested  by  guerilla 
bands,  which  often  destroyed  a  bridge  immediately  after 
it  had  been  repaired,  and  often  tore  up  the  track  immediately 
after  one  of  Sherman's  detachments  had  passed  over  it.  Besides 
this,  a  remnant  of  Johnston's  army  was  in  striking  distance  of 
some  of  his  detached  columns,  and  he  had  literally  to  fight  his 
way  along.  To  keep  the  road  in  order  after  his  army  had  all 
passed  out  of  Memphis,  so  as  to  get  his  supplies  over  it,  proved  to 
be  literally  impossible.  Fortunately,  the  Tennessee  River  was 
rising,  and  General  Grant  collected  a  fleet  of  transports,  which  he 
loaded  with  supplies,  and  when  the  river  reached  a  boating  stage, 
sent  them  up  the  Tennessee  River  to  Eastport,  convoyed  by 
gun  boats  which  Admiral  Porter  ordered  from  his  fleet.  When 
this  arrangement  had  been  made,  General  Sherman  pressed  for 
ward  with  renewed  energy. 

While  these  great  movements  were  being  made  so  ener 
getically  for  our  relief  we  were  practically  undergoing  a  siege 


332  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

at  Chattanooga.     From  the  diary  of  Frank  L.  Schrieber  \ve  get 
the  folowing  daily  record  of  our  experiences: 

On  September  22  and  23  we  worked  all  day  on  the  fortifi 
cations.  On  the  23rd  there  was  some  cannonading  and  skirmish 
ing.  That  day  General  Rosecrans  came  out  to  the  works  and 
spoke  to  all  the  regiments.  On  the  24th  we  lay  in  reserve  and 
orders  came  putting  us  on  half  rations.  In  the  evening  there  was 
heavy  cannonading,  and  a  few  of  the  enemy's  shells  came  into 
our  camp  but  did  no  harm.  On  the  25th  we  were  called  out  to 
the  line  at  3  a.  m.  and  the  Thirty-second  Indiana  drove  a  body 
of  the  enemy  across  Chattanooga  Creek  in  our  front  and  killed 
several.  On  the  26th,  we  worked  on  the  fortifications  and  drew 
one's  day's  rations  to  last  two.  The  usual  cannonading  and  firing 
continued  during  the  day.  On  the  27th  we  were  called  out  at 
4  a.  m.  and  went  with  the  brigade  to  Chattanooga  Creek  on  picket, 
where  we  were  covered  by  breastworks,  and  exchanged  a  few 
shots  with  the  enemy's  pickets  across  the  creek.  We  were  re 
lieved  by  the  Second  Brigade  and  got  back  to  camp  at  8  p.  m.  At 
10  p.  m.  we  were  called  out,  because  of  unusually  heavy  firing  on 
the  picket  line,  and  a  night  attack  by  the  enemy  was  feared.  On 
the  morning  of  the  28th  a  large  team  of  ambulances  went  out 
side  the  lines  to  bring  in  our  wounded  who  were  still  within- the 
enemy's  lines  and  came  back  in  the  evening.  Our  chaplain.  Rev. 
Randall  Ross,  in  his  diary  says,  "This  evening  will  be  long  re 
membered  by  many.  These  men  had  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the 
rebels  on  the  days  of  the  battle,  and  for  ten  davs  remained  with 
out  their  wounds  dressed,  and  the  only  food  they  received  was 
about  a  handful  of  cornmeal  mixed  in  cold  wrater.  I  will  not  at 
tempt  a  description  of  the  condition  of  these  poor  soldiers  be 
cause  it  is  indescribable  by  pen  or  human  tongue.  It  was  more 
than  some  of  us  could  stand  to  behold,  much  less  to  endure. 
When  will  those,  who  saw  those  clothes  clotted  with  blood,  and 
those  wounds  full  of  worms,  and  smelled  that  terrible  stench 
from  their  undressed  wounds,  forget  these  things  ?" 

October  3,  Mr.  Dana  reported  to  Secretary  Stanton 
that  1742  of  our  wounded  had  been  brought  in  and  that  about 
750  still  remained  in  the  enemy's  hands.1 

On  the  30th  many  of  our  men  got  leave  to  go  to  the  hos 
pital  to  see  their  wounded  comrades  who  were  brought  in  the 
day  before.  We  moved  our  quarters  to  a  better  place  and 
drew  full  rations.  On  October  1 ,  2  and  3  we  worked  on  the 
fortifications.  On  the  3rd  we  heard  of  the  capture  of  one  of 
our  supply  trains  by  the  enemy's  cavalry,  which  in  large  force 
had  crossed  the  Tennessee  River  and  was  threatening  our  com- 


1     W.  R.  R.  50,  page  205. 


SIEGE   OF   CHATTANOOGA  333 

munications.  On  the  4th  we  were  called  up  at  -i  a.  m.  and  an 
hour  later  started  as  guard  for  a  forage  train.  We  rode  in  the 
wagons  and  went  across  the  river  and  up  a  valley  about  35 
miles,  where  we  camped  for  the  night.  We  were  up  at  4 
o'clock  the  next  morning,  loaded  our  train,  and  started  back 
about  8  o'clock.  We  got  some  potatoes.  After  we  had 
marched  about  15  miles  we  went  into  camp  for  the  night,  the 
four  left  companies  of  the  regiment  being  detailed  for  picket 
duty.  It  was  reported  that  the  enemy  was  shelling  Chat 
tanooga.1 

On  this  day  occurred  the  first  general  bombardment  of 
Chattanooga  by  the  enemy.  The  following,  taken  from  a  dis 
patch,  dated  October  5  at  8  p.  m.  sent  by  General  M.  C.  Meigs, 
quartermaster  general  of  the  army,  who  was  then  in  Chat 
tanooga,  to  Secretary  of  WTar  Stanton,  thus  describes  it : 

"The  first  day's  bombardment  of  Chattanooga  is  over,  and 
I  have  not  been  able  to  learn  that  anyone  has  been  injured. 
About  10  A.  M.,  while  watching  the  construction  of  a  pontoon 
bridge,  whose  planks  have  been  sawed  by  the  volunteers  in 
two  steam  sa\v  mills  captured  in  this  town,  and  whose  pon 
toons  have  been  constructed  on  the  river  bank  by  these  same 
volunteers,  I  heard  the  sound  of  heavy  guns.  As  the  firing 
continued  for  some  time,  I  went  to  one  of  the  enclosed  works 
constructing  in  the  defenses  of  this  place  to  find  out  what  it 
was." 

"From  the  sides  of  Lookout  Mountain  on  the  west,  a 
number  of  guns,  one  or  two  of  them  very  heavy,  were  firing 
toward  the  camps  of  Rosecrans'  right.  Also  a  heavy  rifle  was 
firing  slowly  from  the  base  of  Missionary  Ridge  to  the  south, 
and  two  light  rifled  pieces  were  being  run  occasionally  to  the 
crest  or  on  the  side  of  a  knoll  some  600  or  800  yards  distant, 
southeast  of  the  work,  to  which  as  a  good  lookout,  I  had  gone. 
No  shell  had  entered  this  work  when  I  left  at  2.  The  men  said 
one  had  struck  the  parapet  of  a  line  of  defense  a  couple  of  hun 
dred  yards  to  the  right,  and  Bradley's  battery  of  rifled  field 
pieces  fired  one  shot  w^hile  I  was  present,  which  grazed  the 
top  of  the  knoll,  and  for  a  time  quieted  the  rebel  field  pieces 
behind  it.  Two  of  the  shells  burst." 

"Later  in  the  day  the  firing  \vas  more  rapid,  and  more  of 
the  shells  from  the  mountain  burst  in  the  air  over  the  camps 
occupied  by  the  troops.  Eight  or  ten  guns,  if  not  more,  opened 
from  the  mountain.  They  appeared  to  be  planted  singly,  at 
many  yards  intervals  along  the  road  which  wound  up  the 
mountain  side.  I  went  back,  after  watching  the  firing  for  an 

1     Frank  L.  Schreiber's  Diary. 


334  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

hour  or  two,  to  observe  the  progress  of  the  bridge-builders, 
and  toward  sunset  with  General  Wagner,  took  a  position  on 
Cameron's  Hill,  a  high  peak  on  the  bank  of  the  river,  west 
of  Chattanooga,  and  commanding  the  whole  plain  of  Chat 
tanooga.  By  the  sound  I  found  that  the  most  distant  gun, 
some  1500  feet  above  the  river  on  Lookout  Mountain,  was 
distant  from  Cameron's  Hill  3.7  miles  and  the  large  rifle  on 
Mission  Ridge  was  from  the  same  point  just  three  miles  dis 
tant.  This  would  make  their  distance  from  our  extreme  right 
about  two  and  one-half  and  three  miles  respectively." 

"No  one  seems  to  have  made  it  his  business  to  count  the 
number  of  shots  fired  in  the  forenoon.  They  seemed  to  be 
firing  deliberately  and  for  range.  About  2  o'clock  I  counted 
twelve  explosions  in  three  minutes,  some  of  which  may  have 
been  from  our  own  guns,  which  replied  at  intervals.  As  the 
firing  began  at  10  and  ceased  only  at  sunset,  I  presume  that 
some  hundreds  of  shots  were  fired  in  the  seven  hours'  prac 
tice.1  The  large  gun  on  Mission  Ridge  fired  a  conical  shell 
about  six  inches  in  diameter.  The  base  of  one  was  picked  up 
and  carried  to  headquarters." 

"The  negro  boys  about  the  camps  continued  their  games 
of  marbles,  and  the  men  stood  on  the  parapets  and  places  of 
the  intrenchments  watching  the  shots  and  speculating  upon 
their  effect.  The  men  are  indifferent  to  distant  artillery  fire, 
and  expose  themselves.  Some  severe  casualties  will,  if  this 
shelling  continues,  result  from  this  practice.  The  rebels  did 
not  show  themselves  much."2 

The  result  of  this  bombardment  was  the  wounding  of  one 
artillery  man  in  Negley's  division.3 

The  night  of  October  5  was  very  cold.  On  the  morning  of 
October  6  we  resumed  our  march  back  to  camp  at  Chat 
tanooga.  When  we  reached  the  river  the  water  was  running 
over  the  bridge  on  which  we  had  crossed  on  our  way  out,  and 
we  had  to  leave  the  wagons  and  teams  on  the  north  side  of  the 
river. 

On  the  morning  of  the  7th,  the  following  congratulary  ad 
dress  by  General  Rosecrans  was  read  to  the  regiment : 

Headquarters  Department  of  the  Cumberland, 

Chattanooga,  Oct.  2,  1863. 
Army  of  the  Cumberland: 

You  have  made  a  grand  and  successful  campaign.  You  have  driven 
the  rebels  from  Middle  Tennessee. 

You  crossed  a  great  mountain  range,  placed  yourselves  on  the 
banks  of  a  broad  river,  crossed  it  in  the  face  of  a  powerful  opposing 
army,  and  crossed  two  other  great  mountain  ranges  at  the  only  practic- 

1  Cox's   10th  Indiana  Battery  flred  some  75  shots,  W.  R.  R.,  53-103. 

2  W.  R.  R.  53-102. 

3  W.   R.   R.,   50-208. 


SiEt;K   01    CHATTANOOGA  335 

able  passes,  some  40  miles  between  extremes.  You  concentrated  in  the 
face  of  superior  numbers,  fought  the  combined  armies  of  Bragg,  which 
you  drove  from  Shelbyville  and  Tullahoma,  of  Johnson's  Army  from 
Mississippi,  and  the  tried  veterans  of  Longstreet's  corps,  and  for  two 
days  held  them  at  baj7,  giving  them  blow  for  blow  with  heavy  interest. 
When  the  day  closed  you  held  the  field,  from  whijch  you  withdrew  in 
the  face  of  over  powering  numbers,  to  occupy  the  point  for  which  you 
set  out — Chattanooga. 

You  have  accomplished  the  great  work  of  the  campaign.  You 
hold  the  key  of  East  Tennessee,  of  North  Georgia,  and  of  the  enemy's 
mines  of  coal  and  niter. 

Let  these  achievements  console  you  for  the  regret  you  experience, 
that  arrivals  of  fresh  hostile  troops  forbade  your  remaining  on  the 
field  to  renew  the  battle  for  the  right  of  burying  your  gallant  dead,  and 
caring  for  your  brave  companions  who  lay  wounded  on  the  field.  The 
losses  you  have  sustained,  though  heavy,  are  slight  considering  the 
odds  against  you  and  the  stake  you  have  won.  You  hold  in  your  hands 
the  substantial  fruits  of  victory,  and  deserve  and  will  receive  the  honor 
and  plaudits  of  a  grateful  nation,  which  asks  nothing  of  even  those 
who  have  been  fighting  us,  but  obedience  to  the  constitution  and  laws 
established  for  our  common  benefit. 

The  general  commanding  earnestly  begs  every  officer  and  soldier 
of  this  army  to  unite  with  him  in  thanking  Almighty  God  for  His 
favor  to  us.  He  presents  his  hearty  thanks  and  congratulations  to  all 
the  officers  and  soldiers  of  this  command  for  their  energy,  patience 
and  perseverance,  and  the  undaunted  courage  displayed  by  those  who 
fought  with  such  unflinching  resolution. 

Neither  the  history  of  this  war  nor  probably  the  annals  of  any 
battle  furnish  a  loftier  example  of  obstinate  bravery  and  enduring  re- 
sistence  to  superior  numbers,  when  troops,  having  exhausted  their  am 
munition,  resorted  to  the  bayonet  so  many  times  to  hold  their  position 
against  such  odds  as  did  our  left  and  center  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
20th  of  September  at  the  battle  Cickamauga. 

W.   S.  ROSBCRANS, 
Major  General,  Commanding.1 

On  the  8th  there  was  cannonading,  and  in  the  evening 
some  of  our  batteries  threw  a  few  shells  onto  Lookout 
Mountain.  At  8  P.  M.  we  were  ordered  out  on  picket.  Some 
of  our  outposts  were  within  twenty  yards  of  the  enemy's  picket 
line.  On  the  9th  the  regiment  was  relieved  from  picket  duty  and 
sent  back  to  the  second  line  of  defense  at  7  P.M., and  enjoyed  a 
good  night's  rest.  October  10,  General  McCook,  our  corps 
commander,  took  leave  of  us  and  started  for  Indianapolis. 
October  11,  was  Sunday  and  our  chaplain.  Rev.  Randall  Ross, 
preached  at  10  a.  m.  and  again  at  5  p.  m.  Ninety  men  of  the 
regiment  were  detailed  to  work  on  the  fortifications.  On  the 
12th,  six  companies  of  the  regiment  worked  on  fortifications. 
Frank  L.  Schreiber,  from  whose  diary  these  notes  are  taken, 
says  that  on  this  day,  he,  John  G.  Gregory  and  J.  D.  Fleming 
of  Company  A  built  a  house  for  themselves,  and  that  the 

1     W.  R.   R.,  50-78. 


336  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

weather  was  cold.  October  13  the  regiment  had  orders  to 
move  at  5  a.  m.  which  order  was  countermanded  on  account 
of  rain.  It  was  election  day  in  Ohio,  and  the  Ohio  soldiers  in 
our  army  exercised  the  privilege  of  voting,  which  had  been 
conferred  on  them  by  law.  The  candidates  for  governor  in 
Ohio  were  John  Brough  and  Clement  L.  Vallandigham,  and 
the  lines  were  sharply  drawn  between  those  who  supported 
and  those  who  were  opposed  to  the  war.  Schreiber  in  his 
diary  says  that  there  were  only  five  votes  in  the  regiment  in 
favor  of  Vallandigham  and  that  one  of  them  was  cast  by  Lieu 
tenant  Storer  of  his  company. 

From  October  llth  to  19th,  inclusive,  the  regiment  did  its 
full  share  of  picket  puty  and  working  on  fortifications,  no  un 
usual  incident  occurring. 

On  the  20th  of  October,  Scheiber  states  that  our  whole 
army  changed  position,  that  our  brigade  was  consolidated 
with  the  Third  Brigade  of  Davis'  division,  with  General  Wil- 
ich  in  command  of  the  brigade,  and  General  Wood  in  command 
of  the  division,  and  that  we  moved  about  one  mile  to  the  left 
of  our  former  position. 

The  order  for  the  consolidation  Schreiber  refers  to  above 
was  dated  the  9th  of  October. 

After  the  battle  of  Chickamauga  there  were  loud  com 
plaints  of  the  conduct  of  some  of  our  General  Officers  who 
commanded  troops  on  the  right  of  the  line  in  the  engagement 
of  the  20th.  That  portion  of  the  line  was  routed  and  driven 
from  the  field,  and  some  one  had  to  bear  the  blame.  Generals 
McCook  and  Crittenden  seem  to  have  been  the  two  officers 
selected  as  the  chief  offenders,  and  public  clamor  demanded 
their  retirement.  A  careful  study  of  the  official  reports  shows 
no  ground  for  the  contumely  which  was  heaped  upon  them  at 
the  time.  When  the  right  was  driven  in  disorder  on  that  fatal 
second  day  of  the  battle,  believing  that  our  army  was  beaten, 
and  being  cut  off  from  the  rest  of  the  army,  they  made  their 
way  back  to  Chattanooga,  as  General  Rosecrans  did.  There 
was  no  question  as  to  their  courage  and  fidelity.  Both  had 
shown  superior  skill  and  coolness  in  battle  on  the  hotly-con 
tested  fields  of  Shiloh,  Perryville  and  Stone  River,  and  both 
were  men  of  worth  and  good  reputation  as  military  men. 
Courts  of  inquiry  afterwards  vindicated  them  from  all  the 
charges  brought  against  them,  except  error  of  judgment  in 
leaving  the  field  when  they  did.  But  some  victims  were  need 
ed  to  satisfy  the  public,  and  they  were  relieved.  Their  two 
corps  were  consolidated  into  one,  which  was  designated  as  the 
Fourth  Army  Corps,  and  General  Gordon  Granger — who  rose 


SIEUK   OF   CHATTANOOGA  337 

to  sudden  fame  on  September  20  because  General  Steedman's 
division  of  his  reserve  corps  arrived  on  the  field  at  a  critical 
moment,  and  not  long  afterwards  sank  into  eclipse — was  ap 
pointed  to  command  it.  The  order  making  the  consolidation 
above  mentioned  added  to  our  brigade  (composed  of  the  Fif 
teenth  Ohio,  Forty-ninth  Ohio,  Thirty-second  Indiana  and 
Eighty-ninth  Illinois)  the  Eighty-seventh  Indiana  and  the 
Third  Brigade  of  the  First  Division  of  the  Twenty-first  Corps, 
composed  of  the  Twenty-fifth  Illinois,  Thirty-fifth  Illinois, 
Eighth  Kansas  and  Fifteenth  Wisconsin.  The  new  brigade 
was  designated  as  the  ''First  Brigade  Third  Division, 
Fourth  Army  Corps,1  a  designation  it  retained  until  the 
close  of  the  war.  It  seems  that  shortly  after  this 
order  was  issued  the  Eighty-seventh  Indiana  was  attached 
to  the  Second  Brigade,  Third  Division,  Fourteenth  Corps, 
and  the  Sixty-eighth  Indiana  was  assigned  to  our  brigade. 
The  new  position  to  which  wre  were  removed  was  known  as 
Fort  Wood  and  we  occupied  it  until  November  23,  the  day  of 
the  assault  on  and  capture  of  Orchard  Knob,  which  will  be 
hereafter  described. 

On  the  21st  and  22nd  we  wrorked  on  fortifications.  By 
this  time  we  had  received  and  placed  in  position  on  our  works 
some  heavy  siege  guns,  and  about  a  dozen  shots  were  fired  by 
them.  The  weather  had  turned  cold,  rains  were  frequent  and 
it  was  very  disagreeable.  On  the  24th  we  went  on  picket  at 
5:30  o'clock  A.  M.  Schreiber  in  his  diary  says  that  on  this 
day  General  Grant  arrived  to  take  command.  He  really 
arrived  the  night  before.  The  coming  of  General  Grant  and 
his  taking  command  at  Chattanooga  was,  on  the  whole,  cheer 
ing  to  the  officers  and  soldiers  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumber 
land.  The  rank  and  file  of  the  army  had  not  got  entirely  over 
their  admiration  and  fondness  for  General  Rosecrans.  They 
remembered  Stone  River  and  Liberty  Gap  and  the  Tullahoma 
campaign,  and  in  spite  of  the  known  incident  of  his  quitting 
the  battlefield  of  Chickamauga  and  going  back  to  Chatta 
nooga,  leaving  General  Thomas  to  work  out  the  salvation  of 
the  army,  they  were  not  yet  ready  to  transfer  that  admiration 
and  attachment  to  another.  Their  faith  in  Rosecrans  had, 
however,  been  materially  weakened  and  there  were  few  tears 
when  he  was  relieved. 

The  mistakes  of  General  Rosecrans  during  the  recent 
campaign  and  battle  of  Chickamauga  were  well  known  and 
duly  weighed  at  Washington,  and  probably  the  change  in  our 
chief  commander  would  have  come  sooner,  if  it  had  not  been 

i    w.  R.  R.,  5.1-210. 


338  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

for  Lincoln's  kindness  of  heart,  and  the  fear  that  to  super 
sede  him  immediately  after  the  battle  would  not  be  well 
received  by  his  army.  There  was  evidently  a  fear  at  Wash 
ington  that  General  Rosecrans  would,  in  a  momentary  panic, 
relinquish  Chattanooga  and  try  to  save  the  bulk  of  his  army 
by  a  retreat  across  the  mountains,  which  would  have  resulted 
in  irretrievable  disaster.  We  have  already  referred  to  a  dis 
patch  of  Mr.  Charles  A.  Dana  to  Secretary  Stanton  saying 
that  Rosecrans  was  about  to  retreat  from  Chattanooga,  and 
one  a  few  hours  later  in  which  it  was  stated  that  he  had 
changed  his  mind  and  would  hold  his  position.  Mr.  Lincoln 
was  evidently  very  uneasy  over  General  Rosecrans'  condition 
of  mind,  sent  him  extracts  from  rebel  newspapers  stating  that 
their  claimed  victory  at  Chickamauga  was  not  so  great  as  was 
first  reported,  and  also  called  his  attention  to  the  fact  that 
their  loss  of  general  officers  was  greater  than  ours. 

On  the  3rd  of  October  General  Rosecrans  sent  the  followr- 
ing  dispatch  to  Mr.  Lincoln  : 

"If  we  can  maintain  the  position  in  such  strength  that 
the  enemy  are  obliged  to  abandon  their  position,  and  the 
elections  in  the  great  states  go  favorably,  would  it  not  be 
well  to  offer  a  general  amnesty  to  all  officers  and  soldiers  in 
rebellion?  It  would  give  us  moral  strength,  and  weaken  them 
very  much."1  This  dispatch  must  have  been  a  little  dis 
heartening  to  the  good  President.  While  he,  the  Secre 
tary  of  War,  and  in  fact  every  one  in  authority  was 
straining  every  nerve  to  help  General  Rosecrans,  he  seems 
not  to  have  been  thinking  of  helping  himself.  He  was  wait 
ing  until  reinforcements  came  in  sufficient  numbers  as  to 
oblige  the  enemy  to  abandon  his  position.  There  was  no  talk 
of  war  against  the  enemy  in  this  dispatch,  nor  of  attacking 
and  defeating  him.  If  he  obligingly  abandoned  his  position, 
the  President  was  to  throw  an  amnesty  proclamation  after 
him. 

In  his  kindness  of  heart,  the  President  answered  this  dis 
patch  as  follows : 

"War  Department, 
October  4,  1863,  11:30  A.  M. 

Yours  of  yesterday  received.  If  we  can  hold  Chattanooga  and 
East  Tennessee  I  think  the  rebellion  will  dwindle  and  die.  I  think  you 
and  Burnside  can  do  this,  and  hence  doing  so  is  your  main  object.  Of 
course,  to  greatly  damage  or  destroy  the  enemy  in  your  front  would 
be  a  greater  object,  because  it  would  include  the  former  and  more;  but 
it  is  not  so  certainly  in  your  power.  I  understand  the  main  body  of 
the  enemy  is  very  near  you — so  near  that  you  could  'board  at  home,' 
so  to  speak,  and  menace  or  attack  him  any  day.  Would  not  the  doing 

1     W.   R.   R.,   53-57. 


SIEGE  OF   CHATTANOOGA  339 

of  this  be  your  best  mode  of  counter-acting  his  raids  on  your  communi 
cations?  But  this  is  not  an  order.  I  intend  doing  something  like  what 
you  suggest  whenever  the  case  shall  appear  ripe  enough  to  have  it  ac 
cepted  in  the  true  understanding,  rather  than  as  a  confession  of  weak 
ness  and  fear. 

A.  LINCOLN."! 

Was  ever  rebuke  administered  so  gently  and  kindly  and 
yet  so  effectively?  Lincoln's  words  in  this  brief  dispatch 
were  like  the  Saracen's  sword — so  keen  they  figuratively  cut 
off  the  adversary's  head  without  his  knowing  it. 

Mr.  Charles  A.  Dana,  assistant  secretary  of  war,  was 
still  in  Chattanooga,  and  was  reporting  almost  daily  the  con 
dition  of  the  army  and  freely  giving  his  opinions  of  the 
capabilities  of  its  officers.  He  seems  to  have  been  sent  to 
Rosecran's  army  to  observe  everything  going  on  and  report 
it  to  Washington.  He  was  a  man  of  great  ability,  strict 
probity,  fearless  and  free  spoken,  and  careless  of  military 
reputations.  His  dispatches  which  are  made  public  in  the 
W'ar  of  the  Rebellion  Records  are  good  reading,  but  one  feels 
that  his  judgments  of  men  and  measures  were  sometimes  mis 
taken,  and  sometimes  harsh  and  unjust.  But  they  had 
great  weight  with  the  War  Department  and  Mr.  Lincoln,  and 
doubtless  had  great  influence  with  them.  On  October  12,  in 
a  long  dispatch  to  Secretary  Stanton,  he  sharply  criticized 
General  Rosecrans  for  giving  up  Lookout  Mountain,  and 
stated  that  both  Generals  Garfield  and  Granger  had  pro 
tested  against  it,  and  had  contended  that  seven  regiments 
could  have  held  it  against  the  whole  power  of  the  enemy,  but 
that  "Rosecrans,  who  is  sometimes  as  obstinate  and  inacces 
sible  to  reason  as  at  others  he  is  irresolute,  vacillating  and 
inconclusive,  pettishly  rejected  all  their  arguments,  and  the 
mountain  was  given  up."  Thus  ensued  the  situation  which 
he  describes:  "Our  animals  starved  and  the  men  with  starva 
tion  before  them,  and  the  enemy  bound  to  make  desperate 
efforts  to  dislodge  us." 

He  winds  up  the  dispatch  by  saying  that  "In  the  midst  of 
this,  the  commanding  general  devotes  that  part  of  the  time 
which  is  not  employed  in  pleasant  gossip,  to  the  composition 
of  a  long  report  to  prove  that  the  Government  is  to  blame  for 
his  failure.  It  is  my  duty  to  declare  that  while  few  persons 
exhibit  more  estimable  social  qualities,  I  have  never  seen  a 
public  man  possessing  talent  with  less  administrative  power, 
less  clearness  and  steadiness  in  difficulty  and  greater  practical 
incapacity  than  General  Rosecrans.  He  has  inventive  fertility 
and  knowledge,  but  he  has  no  strength  of  will  and  no  con- 

1     W.  R.  R.  53,  page  79. 


340  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

centration  of  purpose.  His  mind  scatters  ;  there  is  no  system 
in  the  use  of  his  busy  days  and  restless  nights,  no  courage 
against  individuals  in  his  composition,  and,  with  great  love  of 
command,  he  is  a  feeble  commander.  He  is  conscientious  and 
honest,  just  as  he  is  imperious  and  disputatious ;  always  with 
a  stray  vein  of  caprice  and  an  overweening  passion  for  the  ap 
probation  of  his  friends  and  the  public  outside." 

"Under  the  present  circumstances,  I  cosider  this  army  to 
be  very  unsafe  in  his  hands ;  but  do  know  of  no  man  except 
Thomas  who  could  now  be  safely  put  in  his  place."1 

This  dispatch  of  Dana's  must  have  hastened  action  at 
Washington,  for  four  days  later,  on  October  16,  the  Military 
Division  of  the  Mississippi,  consisting  of  the  Departments  of 
the  Cumberland,  Ohio  and  Tennessee,  were  created,  General 
Grant  was  assigned  to  the  command,  and  General  Thomas  was 
ordered  to  take  command  of  the  Department  of  the  Cumber 
land  in  place  of  General  Rosecrans,  who  was  relieved.2  The 
recall  of  General  Rosecrans  had  doubtless  been  considered 
before  this.  On  September  29,  General  Halleck,  then  General 
in  Chief,  had  sent  word  to  General  Grant  who  was  then  at 
Vicksburg,  recovering  from  a  fall  from  his  horse,  that  some 
able  commander  like  Sherman  or  McPherson  should  be 
selected  to  command  the  troops  sent  to  Rosecran's  relief,  and 
that  as  soon  as  Grant  was  able  he  should  himself  go  to  Mem 
phis  and  take  direction  of  the  movement.-'5  It  is  quite  proba 
ble  that  at  this  time  General  Grant  believed  that  General 
Sherman  would  relieve  General  Rosecrans  as  commander  of 
the  Department  of  the  Cumberland,  for  on  September  30,  he 
wrote  General  Sherman  a  letter  in  which,  among  other  things, 
he  said  : 

"I  hope  you  will  be  in  time  to  aid  in  giving  the  rebels  the 
worst  or  best  thrashing  they  have  had  in  this  war.  I  have 
constantly  had  the  feeling  that  I  should  lose  you  from  this 
command  entirely.  Of  course  1  do  not  object  to  seeing  your 
sphere  of  usefulness  enlarged,  and  think  it  should  have  been 
enlarged  long  ago,  having  an  eye  to  the  public  good  alone. 
But  it  needs  no  assurance  from  me,  General,  that  taking  a 
more  selfish  view,  while  I  would  heartily  approve  such  a 
change,  I  would  deeply  regret  it  on  my  own  account.  I  have 
no  intentions  in  the  world  upon  which  to  base  the  idea  of 
such  a  change  as  is  referred  to  being  made  except  my  own 
feelings.  I  may  be  wrong  and  judge  Rosecrans  from  a  preju- 

1  W.  R.  R.,  50-214. 

2  W.  R.  R.,  53-404. 

3  W.  R.  R.,  52-923. 


SiKGK     <)!•     CHATTA.XOOCA  341 

diced  view,  instead  of  impartially,  as  1  would  like  to  try 
to  do."1 

But  other  plans  were  being  considered  of  which  General 
Grant  had  then  no  knowledge.  On  the  3rd  of  October,  Gen 
eral  Halleck  sent  a  dispatch  to  General  Grant  at  Vicksburg 
ordering  him  to  report  at  Cairo,  111.  He  did  not  receive  this 
dispatch  until  the  !)th.  ( )n  that  day  he  started  for  Cairo,  with 
his  staff,  and  on  the  loth  reported  from  Columbus,  Ky.,  that  he 
was  on  the  way.-  General  Sherman  who.  with  tremendous 
energy,  was  pressing  his  corps  eastward  along  the  Memphis 
and  Charleston  Railroad,  fighting  off  the  enemy's  cavalry  and 
repairing  the  road  as  he  went,  had,  it  seems,  other  ideas  as 
to  who  would  be  selected  to  repair  the  disaster  at  Chicka- 
niauga.  and  relieve  the  critical  and  dangerous  situation  at  Chat 
tanooga.  On  the  10th  of  October,  after  Grant  had  taken  boat 
at  Yicksburg  for  Memphis,  Sherman  sent  a  dispatch  ad 
dressed  to 

"General    Grant, 

Expected  Hourly  at  Memphis." 

In  which  he  said:  "I  feel  sure  you  will  be  ordered  to  Nash 
ville  to  assume  a  general  command  over  all  the  forces 
operating  in  the  southwest,  say  Rosecrans  your  center,  Burn- 
side  left  wing,  and  Sherman  right. ":!  Again  on  the  14th 
of  October  from  Corinth,  Miss,  he  sent  another  dispatch  saying: 
"Accept  the  command  of  the  great  army  of  the  center;  don't 
hesitate.  By  your  presence  at  Nashville  you  will  unite  all 
discordant  elements  and  impress  the  enemy  in  proportion. 
All  success  and  honor  to  you"4  and  on  the  15th  of  October 
still  another  dispatch,  in  which  he  said  : 

"I  am  very  anxious  you  should  go  to  Nashville,  as  fore 
shadowed  by  Halleck,  and  chiefly  as  you  can  harmonize  all 
conflicts  of  feeling  that  may  exist  in  that  vast  crowd.  Rose 
crans  and  Burnside  and  Sherman,  with  their  subordinates, 
would  be  ashamed  of  petty  quarrels  if  you  were  behind  and 
near  them — between  them  and  Washington. "•"' 

General  Grant  arrived  at  Cairo,  October  1.6,  at  once 
reported  his  arrival  to  General  Halleck,  and  on  the  17th  re 
ceived  orders  to  go  at  once  to  the  Gait  House  at  Louisville, 
Ky.,  where  he  would  meet  an  officer  of  the  War  Department 
from  whom  he  would  receive  instructions.  He  at  once  started 
by  rail,  by  way  of  Indianapolis.  Just  as  the  train  was  pulling 
out  from  that  place,  a  messenger  came  running  up  to  stop  it, 
saying  the  Secretary  of  War  was  coming  into  the  station  and 

1  W.   R.   It.,   r,2,  94.1.  4     W.  R.  R.  53-354. 

2  W.   R.   R.,   .-,3-375.  5     W.  R.  R.  53-380. 

3  W.    R.    R.,    53-236. 


342  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  A^D  CAMPAIGNS 

wished  to  see  General  Grant.  The  secretary  came  aboard  the 
train,  accompanied  by  Governor  B rough  of  Ohio,  and  accom 
panied  General  Grant  to  Louisville.  It  was  the  first  time  General 
Grant  had  met  the  great  war  secretary.  Up  to  that  time  no 
hint  had  been  given  him  of  what  he  was  expected  to  do,  ex 
cept  a  suggestion  in  a  dispatch  from  General  Halleck  that  he 
had  better  go  to  Nashville  and  superintend  the  operation  of 
troops  sent  to  relieve  Rosecrans.  Soon  after  the  train  started, 
the  Secretary  of  War  handed  him  two  orders,  saying  he  might 
take  his  choice  of  them.  The  two  were  identical  in  every  par 
ticular  except  one.  Both  created  the  Military  Division  of  the 
Mississippi,  with  General  Grant  in  command  ;  one  left  the 
Department  of  the  Cumberland  under  command  of  General 
Rosecrans,  the  other  relieved  General  Rosecrans,  and  placed 
General  Thomas  in  command  of  that  department.  General 
Grant  accepted  the  latter.1 

A  day  or  two  after  the  receipt  of  such  order.  ( ieneral 
Grant  received  from  General  Halleck  the  following  letter  of 
instructions  which  throws  much  light  on  the  then  existing 
situation  and  the  operations  which  preceded  it.  The  letter 
is  as  follows : 

Headquarters  of  the  Army 

Washington,  D.  C.,  October  20,  1863. 
Major  General  Grant, 

Louisville. 

General:  In  compliance  with  my  promise,  I  now  proceed  to  give 
you  a  brief  statement  of  the  objects  aimed  at  by  General  Rosecran's 
and  General  Burnside's  movements  into  East  Tennessee,  and  of  the 
measures  directed  to  be  taken  to  attain  these  objects. 

It  has  been  the  constant  desire  of  the  government,  from  the  be 
ginning  of  the  war  to  rescue  the  loyal  inhabitants  of  East  Tennessee 
from  the  hands  of  the  rebels,  who  fully  appreciated  the  importance  of 
continuing  their  hold  upon  that  country.  In  addition  to  the  large 
amount  of  agricultural  products  drawn  from  the  upper  valley  of  the 
Tennessee,  they  also  obtained  iron  and  other  materials  from  the  vicin 
ity  of  Chattanooga.  The  possession  of  East  Tennessee  would  cut  off 
one  of  their  most  important  railroad  communications  and  threaten 
their  manufacturies  at  Rome,  Atlanta,  etc.  When  General  Buell  was 
ordered  into  East  Tennessee  in  the  summer  of  1862,  Chattanooga  was 
comparatively  unprotected,  but  Bragg  reached  there  before  Buell,  and 
by  threatening  his  communications,  forced  him  to  retreat  on  Nash 
ville  and  Louisville.  Again,  after  the  battle  of  Perryville,  General 
Buell  was  urged  to  pursue  Bragg's  defeated  army,  and  drive  it  from 
East  Tennessee.  The  same  was  urged  upon  his  successor,  but  the  late 
ness  of  the  season  and  other  causes  prevented  further  operations  after 
the  battle  of  Stone  River. 

Last  spring  when  your  movements  on  the  Mississippi  River  had 
drawn  out  of  Tennessee  a  large  force  of  the  enemy,  I  again  urged 
General  Rosecrans  to  take  advantage  of  that  opportunity  to  carry  out 


1     General  Grant's  Memoirs,  Vol.   2,  page  18-19. 


SIECK  OF  CHATTANOOGA  343 

his  projected  plan  of  campaign.  General  Burnside  being  ready  to 
cooperate,  with  a  diminished  but  still  efficient  force.  But  he  could  not 
be  persuaded  to  act  in  time,  preferring  to  be  still  till  your  campaign 
should  be  terminated.  I  represented  to  him  but  without  avail,  that  by 
this  delay  Johnston  might  be  able  to  reinforce  Bragg  with  the  troops 
then  operating  against  you. 

When  General  Rosecrans  finally  determined  to  advance,  he  was 
allowed  to  select  his  own  lines  and  plans  for  carrying  out  the  objects 
of  his  expedition.  He  was  directed,  however,  to  report  his  movements 
daily,  till  he  crossed  the  Tennessee,  and  to  connect  his  left  with  Gen 
eral  Burnsides'  right.  General  Burnside  was  directed  to  move  simul 
taneously,  connecting  his  right,  as  far  as  possible,  with  General  Rose- 
cran's  left,  so  that,  if  the  enemy  concentrated  on  either  army,  the 
other  could  move  to  its  assistance.  When  General  Burnside  reached 
Kingston  and  Knoxville  and  found  no  considerable  number  of  the 
enemy  in  East  Tennessee,  he  was  instructed  to  move  down  the  river 
and  cooperate  with  General  Rosecrans. 

These  instructions  were  repeated  some  fifteen  times,  but  were  not 
carried  out,  General  Burnside  alleging  as  an  excuse  that  he  believed 
that  Bragg  was  in  retreat  and  that  General  Rosecrans  needed  no  re 
inforcements.  When  the  latter  had  gained  possession  of  Chattanooga 
he  was  directed  not  to  move  on  Rome  as  he  proposed,  but  simply  to 
hold  the  mountain  passes,  so  as  to  prevent  the  ingress  of  the  rebels  into 
East  Tennessee.  That  object  accomplished,  I  considered  the  campaign 
as  ended,  at  least  for  the  present.  Future  operations  would  depend 
upon  the  ascertained  strength  and  movements  of  the  enemy.  In  other 
words,  the  main  object  of  the  campaign  were  the  restoration  of  East 
Tennessee  to  the  Union,  and  by  holding  the  two  extremities  of  the 
valley  to  secure  it  from  rebel  invasion. 

The  moment  I  received  reliable  information  of  the  departure  of 
Longstreet's  corps  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  I  ordered  forward 
to  General  Rosecrans  every  available  man  in  the  Department  of  Ohio, 
and  again  urged  General  Burnside  to  move  to  his  assistance.  I  also 
telegraphed  to  General  Hurlbut,  Sherman  and  yourself  to  send  forward 
to  General  Rosecrans  all  available  troops  in  your  department.  If  these- 
forces  had  been  sent  to  General  Rosecrans  by  Nashville,  they  could  not 
have  been  supplied;  I  therefore  directed  them  to  move  by  Corinth  and 
the  Tennessee  River.  The  necessity  of  this  has  been  proved  by  the 
fact  that  the  reinforcements  sent  to  him  from  the  Army  of  the  Po 
tomac,  have  not  been  able,  for  the  want  of  railroad  transportation,  to 
reach  General  Rosecran's  army  in  the  field. 

In  regard  to  the  relative  strength  of  the  opposing  armies,  it  is 
believed  that  General  Rosecrans  when  he  moved  against  Bragg  had 
double,  if  not  treble  his  force.  General  Burnside,  also,  had  more  than 
double  the  force  of  Buckner.  Even  when  Bragg  and  Buckner  united, 
Rosecrans  army  was  greatly  superior  in  numbers.  Even  the  eighteen 
thousand  men  sent  from  Virginia  under  Longstreet,  would  not  have 
given  the  enemy  the  superiority.  It  is  now  ascertained  that  the  greater 
part  of  the  prisoners  parolled  by  you  at  Vicksburgh,  and  by  General 
Banks  at  Port  Hudson,  were  illegally  and  improperly  declared  ex 
changed,  and  forced  into  the  ranks  to  swell  the  rebel  numbers  at  Chicka- 
mauga.  This  outrageous  act,  in  violation  of  the  laws  of  war,  of  the 
cartel  entered  into  by  the  rebel  authorities,  and  of  all  sense  of  honor, 
gives  us  a  useful  lesson  in  regard  to  the  character  of  the  enemy  with 
whom  we  are  contending.  He  neither  regards  the  rules  of  civilized 
warfare,  nor  even  his  most  solemn  engagements.  You  may,  therefore 


344  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

expect  to  meet  in  arms  thousands  of  unexchanged  prisoners,  released 
by  you  and  others,  on  parole  not  to  serve  again  till  duly  exchanged. 

Although  the  enemy  by  this  disgraceful  means  has  been  able  to 
concentrate  in  Georgia  and  Alabama  a  much  larger  force  than  we  anti 
cipated,  your  armies  will  be  abundantly  able  to  defeat  him.  Your  dif 
ficulty  will  not  be  in  the  want  of  men,  but  in  the  means  of  supplying 
them  at  this  season  of  the  year.  A  single  track  railroad  can  supply 
an  army  of  sixty  or  seventy  thousand  men,  with  the  usual  number  of 
cavalry  and  artillery;  but  beyond  that  number,  or  with  a  large  mounted 
force,  the  difficulty  of  supply  is  very  great. 

I  do  not  know  the  present  condition  of  the  road  from  Nashville 
to  Decatur,  but,  if  practicable  to  repair  it,  the  use  of  that  triangle  will 
be  of  great  assistance  to  you.  I  hope  also  that  the  recent  rise  of  water 
in  the  Cumberland  and  Tennessee  Rivers  will  enable  you  to  employ 
water  transportation  to  Nashville,  Eastport  or  Florence. 

If  you  recover  the  passes  of  Lookout  Mountain,  which  should  never 
have  been  given  up,  you  will  be  able  to  use  the  railroad  and  river  from 
Bridgeport  to  Chattanooga.  This  seems  to  me  a  matter  of  vital  im 
portance,  and  should  receive  your  early  attention. 

I  submit  this  summary  in  the  hope  that  it  will  assist  you  in  fully 
understanding  the  objects  of  the  campaign,  and  the  means  of  attaining 
these  objects.  Probably  the  Secretary  of  War,  in  his  interviews  with 
you  at  Louisville  has  gone  over  the  same  ground. 

Whatever  measures  you  may  deem  proper  to  adopt  under  existing 
circumstances,  you  will  receive  all  possible  assistance  from  the  authori 
ties  at  Washington.  You  have  never  heretofore,  complained  that  such 
assistance  has  not  been  afforded  you  in  your  operations,  and  I  think 
you  will  have  no  cause  of  complaint  in  your  present  campaign. 
Very  respectfully 

Your  obedient  servant, 

H.  W.  HALLECK,! 
General-in-Chief." 

General  Grant  relates  that  the  day  of  his  arrival  in  Louis 
ville  was  spent  with  Secretary  Stanton,  going  oxer  the  mili 
tary  situation  of  the  country,  and  that  by  the  evening,  all 
matters  of  discussion  seemed  exhausted  and  he  and  Mrs. 
Grant,  who  was  with  him,  went  to  spend  the  evening  with 
relatives  in  the  city.  In  the  course  of  the  evening-,  Mr.  Stan- 
ton  received  a  dispatch  from  Mr.  C.  A.  Dana  at  Chattanooga, 
saying,  that  unless  prevented,  Rosecrans  would  retreat,  and 
advising  peremptory  orders  against  his  doing  so. 

On  the  receipt  of  Dana's  dispatch  Stanton  at  once  sent 
for  General  Grant,  who  says:  "Finding  I  was  out  he  became 
nervous  and  excited,  inquiring  of  every  person  he  met, 
including  guests  of  the  house,  wether  they  knew  where  I  was, 
and  bidding  them  find  me,  and  send  me  to  him  at  once.  About 
11  o'clock  I  returned  to  the  hotel,  and  on  my  way,  when  near 
the  house,  every  person  met  was  a  messenger  from  the  Secre 
tary,  apparently  partaking  of  his  impatience  to  see  me.  I 
hastened  to  his  room  and  found  him  pacing  the  floor  rapidly 

1     W.  R.  R.,  54-667. 


SIEGE  OF  CHATTANOOGA  345 

in  his  dressing  gown.  Saying  the  retreat  must  be  prevented 
lie  showed  me  the  dispatch.  I  immediately  wrote  an  order 
assuming  command  of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi 
and  telegraphed  it  to  General  Rosecrans.  I  then  telegraphed 
to  him  the  order  from  Washington  assigning  Thomas  to  the 
command  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  ;  and  to  Thomas 
that  he  must  hold  Chattanooga  at  all  hazards."1  General 
Grant  also  inquired  in  the  same  telegram  how  long  present 
supplies  would  last  and  the  prospect  for  keeping  them  up  and 
the  same  night  received  the  following  reply  from  General 
Thomas : 

"Chattanooga,  Tenn., 
Major  General  Grant:  October  19,  1863. 

Two  hundred  and  four  thousand  four  hundred  and  sixty-two  ra 
tions  in  store  houses,  ninety  thousand  to  arrive  tomorrow,  and  all  the 
trains  were  loaded  which  had  arrived  at  Bridgeport  up  to  the  16th — 
probably  three  hundred  wagons.  I  will  hold  the  town  till  we  starve. 

G.   H.   THOMAS, 
Major  General." 

It  seems  the  order  to  General  Thomas  to  hold  Chatta 
nooga  at  all  hazards  was  not  sent  until  the  day  after  the 
order  assigning  him  to  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Cum 
berland.  It  is  dated  October  19,  1863,  at  11  :30  P.  M.2 

On  the  morning  of  the  20th  at  1  :30  A.  M.  General 
Thomas  sent  another  dispatch  about  supplies,  saying:  "If 
the  wagons  now  on  the  road  arrive  safe  we  are  all  right  till 
November  1,  at  least." 

General  Grant  arrived  at  Chattanooga  on  the  evening 
of  October  23rd.  The  situation  at  that  time  was  ex 
tremely  critical,  owing  to  the  shortness  of  supplies,  and 
it  was  rumored  that  a  large  detachment  of  Bragg's 
army  was  about  to  cross  the  Tennessee  on  our  left  and 
interpose  itself  between  us  and  Burnside  at  Knoxville. 
The  situation  of  the  army  at  that  time  is  thus  described  by 
General  Rosecrans  in  a  dispatch  to  General  Halleck,  dated 
October  .18,  at  7:30  P.  M. 

"Enemy  in  front.  Rumor  of  his  moving  a  corps  up  as  if 
to  cross  at  Washington.  River  at  stand.  Our  pontoon  bridge 
restored.  Boats  for  a  second  under  way.  Roads  horrid. 
Forage  and  animals  failing."8 

There  had  been,  up  to  about  this  time,  great  suffering 
among  the  troops  because  of  insufficient  food.  Chaplain  Ross, 
in  his  personal  recollections  of  these  days,  says : 

1  General  Grant's  Memoirs,  Vol.  2.  page  19-26 

2  See  W.  K.  R.,  53-455-479. 

3  YV.   R.   R.   53-455.  Sig\    12 


346  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

"During  this  time  (the  days  of  the  siege)  there  was  an 
immense  amount  of  labor  performed  by  our  soldiers  in  build 
ing  fortifications,  and  other  necessary  labor,  and  it  was  done 
under  the  most  trying  circumstances.  There  was  a  degree 
of  patient  endurance  and  unmurmuring  suffering  manifested 
by  our  men  that  has  no  parallel  in  the  histories  of  armies. 
For  fuel  we  had  to  cut  down  the  parks  and  groves  around 
and  in  the  city.  We  then  cut  the  stumps  level  with  the 
ground  and  finally  grubbed  up  the  roots  for  fuel.  So  scarce 
were  the  provisions  that  I  have  seen  men  sitting  'round  pick 
ing  the  corn  out  of  the  mud  where  the  mules  and  horses  were 
fed,  and  washing  and  eating  it.  I  saw  them  wash  the  entrails 
of  beeves  and  eat  them.  I  saw  them  eat  the  flesh  of  the  mules 
that  had  died  for  want  of  forage,  as  hundreds  of  them  did.  I 
saw  them  gather  up  and  eat  the  rotten  crackers  in  the  sweep 
ings  of  the  commissary,  when  hauled  out  and  thrown  away. 
Yet  in  the  midst  of  it  all,  ask  these  men  if  they  were  willing 
to  fall  back  and  evacuate  Chattanooga  and  give  it  over  again 
to  the  rebels,  and  they  would  have  answered  with  an  em 
phatic  'No!'  We'll  starve  first.'  ' 

Colonel  McClenahan,  in  the  paper  read  at  Monmouth 
College,  before  quoted  from,  says : 

"For  the  next  two  weeks  (after  the  retreat  from  Chicka- 
mauga)  we  had  a  starving  time.  Officers  and  men  fared  the 
same.  My  horse  had  to  be  guarded  while  he  ate,  to  prevent 
the  hungry  soldiers  from  stealing  the  corn  from  him.  When 
the  guard  was  withdrawn  the  soldiers  would  pick  up  the 
scattered  grains,  and  wash  and  parch  them  for  food  for 
themselves." 

General  Grant,  in  his  Memoirs,  describes  the  condition  of 
affairs  as  they  impressed  him  on  his  arrival  at  Chattanooga. 
After  observing  that  if  Rosecrans,  after  he  had  skillfully 
maneuvered  Bragg  out  of  Chattanooga,  ''had  stopped  then 
and  intrenched,  and  made  himself  strong,  then  all  would  have 
been  right  and  the  mistake  of  not  moving  earlier  partially 
compensated,"  and  that,  "a  retreat  from  Chattanooga  at  that 
time  would  have  been  a  terrible  disaster."  involving  not  only 
"the  loss  of  a  most  important  strategic  position  to  us,"  but 
also  "the  loss  of  all  the  artillery  still  left  with  the  army  of 
the  Cumberland,  and  the  annihilation  of  the  army  itself,  either 
by  capture  or  demoralization,"  he  says : 

"All  the  supplies  for  Rosecrans  had  to  be  brought  from 
Nashville.  The  railroad  between  this  base  and  the  army 
was  in  possession  of  the  government  to  Bridgeport,  the  point 
at  which  the  road  crosses  to  the  south  side  of  the  Tennessee 


STEI.I:  OF  CHATTANOOGA  347 

River ;  but  Bragg,  holding  Lookout  and  Raccoon  Mountains 
west  of  Chattanooga,  commanded  the  railroad,  the  river  and 
the  shortest  and  best  wagon  roads,  both  north  and  south  of 
the  Tennessee,  between  Chattanooga  and  Bridgeport.  The 
distance  between  these  two  places  is  but  twenty-six  miles  by 
rail ;  but  owing  to  the  position  of  Bragg,  all  supplies  for 
Rosecrans  had  to  be  hauled  by  a  circuitous  route  north  of  the 
river  and  over  a  mountainous  country,  increasing  the  dis 
tance  to  over  sixty  miles.  This  country  afforded  but  little 
food  for  his  animals,  nearly  10,000  of  which  had  already 
starved  and  not  enough  were  left  to  draw  a  single  piece  of 
artillery,  or  even  the  ambulances  to  convey  the  sick.  The 
men  had  been  on  half  rations  of  hard  bread  for  a  considerable 
time,  with  but  few  other  supplies  except  beef  driven  from 
Nashville  across  the  country.  The  region  along  the  road 
became  so  exhausted  of  food  for  the  cattle  that  by  the  time 
they  reached  Chattanooga  they  were  much  in  the  same  con 
dition  of  the  few  animals  left  alive  there — 'on  the  lift !'  Indeed, 
the  beef  was  so  poor  that  the  soldiers  wfere  in  the  habit  of 
saying,  with  a  faint  facetiousness,  that  they  were  living  on 
'half  rations  of  hard  bread  and  beef  dried  on  the  hoof!  Nothing 
could  be  transported  but  food  and  the  troops  were  without 
sufficient  shoes  or  other  clothing  suitable  for  the  advancing 
season.  *  *  The  fuel  within  the  Federal  lines  was  ex 

hausted,  even  to  the  stumps  of  trees.  There  were  no  teams 
to  draw  it  from  the  opposite  bank  where  it  was  abundant. 
The  only  way  of  supplying  fuel  for  some  time  before  my 
arrival  had  been  to  cut  trees  on  the  north  bank  of  the  river 
at  a  considerable  distance  up  the  stream,  form  rafts  of  it,  and 
float  it  down  with  the  current,  effecting  a  landing  on  the 
south  side  within  our  lines  by  use  of  paddles  or  poles.  It 
would  then  be  carried  on  the  shoulders  of  the  men  to  their 
camps."1 

When  General  Grant  arrived  at  Chattanooga  we  were  in 
rather  better  condition  as  to  food  than  we  had  been  some 
time  before,  but  we  were  still  in  a  very  critical  condition  as 
to  supplies,  and  owing  to  the  death  of  so  many  horses  by 
starvation,  and  the  weakness  of  those  left,  wre  were  in  no  con 
dition  for  any  general  offensive  movement  against  the  enemy 
in  our  front.  The  raid  of  the  rebel  cavalry  on  our  communi 
cations  had  halted  the  movement  of  a  part  of  Hooker's  two 
corps,  and  particularly  his  transportation,  and  he  could  do 
nothing  toward  restoring  our  communication  with  our  base 
of  supplies  at  Nashville  until  his  transportation  came  up. 

1     Grant's  Memoirs,  Vol.   2-24-25. 


348  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

General  Rosecrans,  previous  to  General  Grant's  arrival,  had 
already  matured  plans  for  a  movement  intended  to  open  up 
our  communications,  but  for  some  reason  it  had  not  been 
begun.  General  Grant  on  his  way  from  Louisville  had  doubt 
less  learned  the  condition  of  affairs  at  Nashville  and  Bridge- 

o 

port,  and  he  had  traveled  the  sixty  miles  of  mountain  road 
over  which  we  were  then  drawing  our  supplies.  He  realized 
that  the  first  problem  before  him  was  to  open  what  our  boys 
called  "the  cracker  line,"  and  set  himself  resolutely  to  solve 
it.  On  the  26th,  three  days  after  his  arrival,  he  made  his 
first  report  to  'General  Halleck.  He  said,  that  so  long  as  the 
weather  remained  clear  it  would  be  barely  possible  to  supply 
the  army  from  Bridgeport,  but  that  when  the  winter  rains 
set  in,  it  would  be  impossible :  that  the  fortifications  of  Chat 
tanooga  were  being  rapidly  completed  and  when  done,  a  large 
part  of  the  troops  could  be  moved  back  nearer  to  their  sup 
plies ;  that  a  railroad  from  Bridgeport  to  Jasper  was  being 
built  by  the  soldiers  at  Bridgeport  and  would  be  finished  in 
about  two  weeks,  which  would  shorten  the  distance  to  sup 
plies  twelve  miles,  and  avoid  the  worst  part  of  the  road ;  that 
General  Thomas,  before  his  arrival,  had  set  on  foot  a  plan  for 
getting  possession  of  the  river  from  a  point  below  Lookout 
Mountain  to  Bridgeport:  arid  that  if  it  should  be  successful, 
as  he  thought  it  would  be,  the  question  of  supplies  would  be 
fully  settled.  He  states  in  the  report  that  he  was  appre 
hensive  that  the  enemy  would  move  a  large  force  up  the 
river  and  force  a  passage  between  Blythe's  Ferry  and  Cotton 
Port,  and  that  if  he  did,  that  we  were  in  no  condition  to  fol 
low  him  ;  that  to  provide  against  such  a  movement,  he  had 
directed  General  Thomas  to  strengthen  the  forces  at  McMinn- 
ville  by  a  regiment  of  cavalry:  that  as  soon  as  the  forti 
fications  were  defensible  he  would  send  a  division  there  ;  and 
that  he  had  ordered  General  Sherman  to  move  eastward  toward 
Stevenson,  without  stopping  to  guard  anything,  with  a  view 
to  having  his  forces  for  use  in  case  the  enemy  should  attempt 
such  a  movement.  In  this  report  he  tentatively  outlines  his 
plan  of  operations,  if  the  enemy  should  not  move  as  appre 
hended.  In  view  of  subsequent  movements  a  month  later  this 
plan  is  well  worth  noting.  He  says : 

"When  Sherman  gets  well  up,  there  will  be  force  enough 
to  insure  a  line  for  our  supplies  and  enable  me  to  move 
Thomas  to  the  left,  thus  securing  Burnside's  position  and  give 
a  stronghold  on  that  part  of  the  line,  from  wrhich  I  suppose  a 
move  will  finally  have  to  be  made  to  turn  Bragg.  I  think 
this  will  have  to  be  done  from  the  northeast.  This  leaves  a 


SiK(iK   OK   CHATTANOOGA  349 

gap  to  the  west  for  the  enemy  to  get  into  Middle  Tennessee 
by,  but  he  has  no  force  to  avail  himself  of  this  opportunity 
with,  except  cavalry,  and  our  cavalry  can  be  held  ready  to 
oppose  this.  I  will  endeavor  to  study  up  my  position  well, 
and  post  the  troops  to  the  best  of  my  judgment,  to  meet  all 
contingencies.  I  will  also  endeavor  to  get  the  troops  in  a 
state  of  readiness  for  a  forward  movement  at  the  earliest 
possible  day." 

One  cannot  help  comparing  this  report  with  the  reports 
which  Rosecrans,  had  been  sending  to  the  War  Department 
and  to  Mr.  Lincoln,  and  to  be  impressed  with  its  quiet  con 
fidence.  Where  before  there  was  irresolution  and  apprehen 
sion  bordering  on  panic,  there  was  now  fixedness  of  purpose, 
a  clear  comprehension  of  the  situation,  and  an  assurance  that 
its  difficulties,  though  great,  would  be  courageously  met  and 
overcome. 

It  will  have  been  noticed  that  General  Grant  had  sent 
orders  to  General  Sherman  to  drop  the  work  of  repairing  the 
Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad,  as  he  moved  eastward, 
and  to  hasten  the  march  of  his  troops  to  Stevenson.  How 
such  orders  were  sent,  is  told  in  Sherman's  Memoirs  as 
follows : 

"I  was  still  busy  in  pushing  forward  the  repairs  to  the 
railroad  bridge  at  Bear  Creek  and  in  patching  up  the  many 
breaks  between  it  and  Tuscumbia,  when,  on  the  27th  of  Octo 
ber,  as  I  sat  on  the  porch  of  a  house,  I  was  approached  by  a 
dirty,  black  haired  indiviual  with  mixed  dress  and  strange 
demeanor,  who  inquired  for  me,  and,  on  being  assured  that 
1  was  in  fact  the  man,  he  handed  me  a  letter  from  General 
Blair  at  Tuscumbia,  and  another  short  one,  which  was  a  tele 
graph  message  from  General  Grant  at  Chattanooga,  addressed 
to  me  through  General  Crook,  commanding  at  Huntville,  Ala 
bama,  to  this  effect :  'Drop  all  work  on  Memphis  and  Charles 
ton  Railroad,  cross  the  Tennessee,  and  hurry  eastward  with  all 
possible  dispatch  toward  Bridgeport,  till  you  meet  further 
orders  from  me.'  ' 

"The  bearer  of  this  message  was  Corporal  Pike,  who 
described  to  me  in  his  peculiar  way,  that  General  Crook  had 
sent  him  in  a  canoe ;  that  he  had  paddled  down  the  Tennessee 
River,  over  Muscle  Shoals,  was  fired  at  all  the  way  by 
guerillas,  but  on  reaching  Tuscumbia  he  had  providentially 
found  it  in  possession  of  our  troops.  He  had  reported  to 
General  Blair,  who  had  sent  him  on  to  me  at  luka."1 

The  plans  for  regaining  possession  of  the  river  and  rail- 

1     General   Sherman's  Memoirs,  Vol.   1,  page  337. 


350  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

road  between  Chattanooga  and  Bridgeport,  and  thus  re-open 
ing  our  line  of  supplies,  was  originated  by  General  W.  F. 
Smith,  who  had  recently  been  appointed  chief  engineer  of  the 
department.  He  says,  on  the  19th  of  October  he  was  instructed 
by  General  Rosecrans  to  reconnoiter  the  river  in  the  vicinity  of 
Williams  Island  (about  nine  miles  down  the  river  from  Chat 
tanooga),  with  a  view  to  making  the  island  a  cover  for  a  steam 
boat  landing  and  store  houses,  and  began  the  examination  near 
the  lower  end  of  the  island.  Following  the  river  up,  he 
found  on  the  opposite  bank,  above  the  head  of  the  island,  a 
sharp  range  of  hills,  whose  base  was  washed  by  the  river. 
He  says :  "This  range  extended  up  the  river  nearly  to  Look 
out  Creek  and  was  broken  at  Brown's  Ferry  by  a  narrow 
gorge,  through  which  ran  the  old  road  to  the  ferry,  and  also 
flowed  a  small  creek.  The  valley  between  this  range  of  hills 
and  Raccoon  Mountain  was  narrow  and  a  lodgment  effected 
there  would  give  us  the  command  of  the  Kelley's  Ferry  road 
and  seriously  interrupt  the  communications  of  the  enemy  up 
Lookout  Valley  and  down  to  the  river  on  Raccoon  Mountain. 
The  ridge  at  the  time  seemed  thinly  picketed,  and  the  evi 
dences  were  against  the  occupation  of  that  part  of  the  valley 
by  a  large  force  of  the  enemy,  and  it  seemed  quite  possible 
to  take  by  surprise  what  could  not  have  been  carried  by 
assault,  if  heavily  occupied  by  an  opposing  force."  He  further 
says,  that  a  few  days  after  this  reconnoissance.  Generals 
Grant  and  Thomas  visited  Brown's  Ferry  with  him,  and  were 
agreed  as  to  the  importance  of  the  position  by  itself,  and 
especially  in  connection  with  the  movements  to  be  made  from 
Bridgeport  to  open  the  river.1 

As  early  as  October  23,  General  Thomas  had  directed  General 
Hooker,  who  wras  at  Bridgeport  in  command  of  the  Eleventh 
and  Twelfth  Corps,,  to  leave  one  division  of  the  Twelfth  Corps 
to  guard  the  railroad  from  Murfreesboro  to  Bridgeport,  and 
concentrate  the  remainder  of  that  corps  at  Stevenson  to  move 
with  the  Eleventh  Corps  on  the  south  side  of  the  Tennessee 
River.2  On  Saturday,  the  24th,  General  Hooker  was  ordered 
to  leave  General  Slocum  at  Bridgeport  to  command  the 
division  of  the  Twelfth  Corps  assigned  to  guard  the  railroad 
between  that  point  and  Murfreesboro,  and  to  concentrate  the 
Eleventh  Corps  and  one  division  of  the  Twelfth  Corps  at 
Bridgeport,  preparatory  to  crossing  the  Tennessee  River  and 
moving  up  the  south  side  to  take  possession  of  Rankin's 
Ferry  between  Shellmound  and  Running  Water  Creek.  He 
was  cautioned  to  look  well  to  his  right  flank,  which  might 

1  W.  R.  R.,  54-77. 

2  W.   R.  R.,  54-42. 


SIEGE  OF  CHATTANOOGA  351 

be  approached  by  four  roads,  and  was  informed  that  General 
Palmer,  with  two  brigades  from  the  army  at  Chattanooga, 
would  leave  there  at  2  P.  M.  for  Rankin's  Ferry  and  would 
reach  there  Monday  evening;  that  troops  from  Chattanooga 
would  also  co-operate  with  him  at  Brown's  Ferry :  and  that 
the  object  of  the  movement  was  to  hold  the  roads  from 
Rankin's  Ferry  via  Whiteside  to  Brown's  Ferry  and  gain 
possession  of  the  river  as  far  as  Brown's  Ferry.  He  was 
ordered  to  report  by  telegraph  when  he  was  ready  to  move.1 
In  the  meantime  General  Smith  was  placed  in  command  of 
the  expedition  to  seize  Brown's  Ferry  and  the  position  there, 
heretofore  described,  and  set  about  preparing  for  it  with 
unusual  energy  and  skill.  About  fifteen  hundred  men  under 
command  of  General  Hazen  were  to  be  placed  in  fifty  pontoon 
and  two  flat  boats  and  floated  down  the  river  at  night,  pass 
ing  the  enemy's  skirmishers  for  seven  of  the  nine  miles,  while 
the  remainder  of  General  Hazen's  brigade  and  General 
Turchin's  brigade  and  three  batteries  under  Major  Menden- 
hall,  were  to  move  to  the  point  where  the  landing  was  to  be 
effected,  concealing  themselves  in  the  woods  until  the  boats 
arrived. 

General  Hooker,  when  he  received  the  order  to  move 
south  of  the  river,  evidently  doubted  the  wisdom  of  the  move 
ment,  for  on  the  evening  of  the  24th  he  dispatched  to  General 
Thomas  that  he  had  been  informed  that  the  direct  route  from 
Bridgeport  to  Brown's  Ferry  was  not  practicable  for  wagons, 
and  in  order  to  take  artillery  to  that  point  it  would  be  neces 
sary  to  take  the  road  to  within  two  miles  of  Trenton,  and  from 
there  turn  down  Lookout  Creek  Valley ;  that  there  were 
several  bridal  paths  leading  from  the  crest  of  Lookout  Moun 
tain  into  the  valley  between  Trenton  and  the  river,  and  that 
infantry  could  descend  the  north  slope  of  the  mountain  at 
many  points :  and  if  this  was  the  case,  from  his  knowledge  of 
the  means  at  hand  at  Chattanooga,  there  was  nothing  to  pre 
vent  Bragg  from  detaching  two-thirds  of  his  force  to  thwart 
the  object  of  the  proposed  movement.2 

Apparently  General  Hooker  did  not  then  realize  that  Generel 
Grant  was  at  Chattanooga,  and  proposed  to  keep  Bragg  too  busy 
to  permit  him  to  detach  any  large  portion  of  his  troops  from  his 
immediate  front.  He  was  also,  perhaps,  not  aware  that  on  Octo 
ber  23,  General  W.  F.  Smith,  chief  engineer  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland,  had  told  Mr.  Dana,  Assistant  Secretary  of  War, 
that  one  more  day's  work  would  make  the  interior  line  of 

1  W.  R.  R.,  54-43. 

2  W.   R.  R.,  54-44. 


352  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

fortifications  at  Chattanooga  temporarily  safe  with  a  garrison 
of  10,000  men.1 

Mr.  Dana,  in  a  dispatch  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  October 
23,  says  that  Hooker  showed  no  zeal  in  the  enterprise.1  Air. 
Dana  went  to  Bridgeport  to  be  with  Hooker's  column  during 
the  movement,  and  on  the  morning  of  October  27th,  from 
that  point,  sent  another  dispatch  to  Stanton,  saying,  among 
other  things : 

"Hooker  came  here  from  Stevenson  last  night.  He  is  in 
an  unfortunate  state  of  mind  for  one  who  has  to  co-operate— 
fault-finding,  criticising,  dissatisfied.  No  doubt  the  chaos  of 
Rosecran's  administration  is  as  bad  as  he  describes,  but  he 
is  quite  as  truculent  toward  the  plan  he  is  now  to  execute  as 
towards  the  impotence  and  confusion  of  the  old  regime."2 

General  Hooker's  dispatch  seems  to  have  made  no  im 
pression  on  Generals  Grant  and  Thomas,  and  on  the  25th 
orders  were  given  to  him  for  the  concentration  at  Bridge 
port  as  directed,  and  on  the  same  day  at  JO  P.  M.,  he  reported 
that  he  would  be  in  readiness  to  move  at  sunrise  on  the  27th. 
On  the  26th,  he  received  orders  to  commence  the  movement 
the  next  morning,  and  to  open  and  secure  the  railroad  and 
wagon  road  from  Bridgeport  to  Rankin's  Ferry  and  thence 
as  far  towards  Chattanooga  as  he  could.  He  was  informed  in 
the  same  dispatch  that  General  Palmer  would  co-operate  with 
him  at  Rankin's  Ferry,  and  that  a  co-operating  force  would 
cross  at  Brown's  Ferry  and  take  possession  of  the  bank 
there.:i  These  co-operating  movements  began  as  ordered 
and  were  carried  out  with  great  energy,  courage  and  skill. 
They,  and  especially  that  under  command  of  General 
W.  F.  Smith,  were  among  the  most  brilliant  episodes  of 
the  war.  It  would  be  out  of  place  in  this  history  to 
describe  them,  or  the  march  of  Sherman  from  Memphis,  which 
was  almost  a  continuous  skirmish  from  the  time  he  started 
until  he  crossed  the  Tennessee — the  skirmishes  sometimes, 
as  at  Cane  River,  approaching  the  dignity  of  a  battle — be 
cause,  as  a  regiment  we  had  no  part  in  them.  Indeed,  the 
most  of  this  chapter  may  be  subject  to  the  same  criticism. 
But  it  is  well  for  the  beleaguered  troops  at  Chattanooga,  of 
which  our  regiment  was  a  part,  to  know  that  while  they  were 
holding  on  with  starvation  staring  them  in  the  face,  their 
comrades  of  other  commands,  were  marching  and  fighting  and 
enduring  hard  toil  and  privation  in  order  that  they  might  be 
relieved.  The  movements  above  mentioned  were  brilliantly 


1  W.  R.  R.  54-69. 

2  W.  R.  R.  54-72. 

3  W.  R.  R.  54-47. 


SIEUE   or   CHATTANOOGA 


353 


successful  and  the  objects  sought  by  them  were  fully  attained, 
not,  however,  without  hard  fighting  and  considerable  loss  of 
life ;  and  on  the  evening  of  October  28,  General  Grant  was 
able  to  telelgraph  to  General  Halleck  at  Washington  as 
follows : 

"General  Thomas'  plan  for  securing  the  river  and  south 
side  road  thence  to  Bridgeport  has  proven  eminently  success 
ful.  The  question  of  supplies  may  now  be  regarded  as  set 
tled.  If  the  rebels  give  us  one  \veek  more  time,  I  think  all 
danger  of  losing  territory  now  held  by  us  will  have  passed 
away,  and  preparations  may  commence  for  offensive 
operations."1 

1     W.  R.  R.,  54-56. 


CHAPTER  XVII I. 


LOOKOUT    MOUNTAIN    AND    MISSIONARY    RIDGE. 

While  these  movements  were  going  on  our  regiment  was 
performing  its  daily  round  of  fatigue  and  picket  duty,'  still 
hoping  that  relief  would  come.  The  fighting  at  or  near 
Brown's  Ferry  by  General  Smith's  expedition  must  have  been 
heard  by  our  troops  in  Chattanooga,  for  Frank  L.  Schreiber, 
in  his  diary  of  October  27,  says:  ''We  heard  some  cannonad 
ing  on  our  right."  He  also  says  that  on  "the  28th  we  heard 
heavy  fighting  a  few  miles  down  the  river,  and  that  the  rebels 
had  a  battery  planted  on  Lookout  Mountain."  Again  on  the 
29th,  he  reports  that  "firing  was  kept  up  all  night,  and  was 
heavy  between  1  and  3  o'clock  this  morning."  This  firing  was 
evidently  the  engagement  at  Wauhatchie  between  General 
Hooker's  forces  and  the  rebel  forces  under  General  Long- 
street,  and  was  a  part  of  the  movement  heretofore  described. 
Schreiber  also  reports  some  firing  down  the  river  on  the  30th. 
On  the  29th  General  Rosecrans'  farewell  address  was  read 
to  the  regiment  at  roll  call.  It  is  here  given  in  full,  as  follows  : 

"Hdqrs.  Dept.  of  the  Cumberland 

General  Orders  Chattanooga,  Tenn.,  October  19,  1863. 

No.  242 

The  General  commanding  announces  to  the  officers  and  soldiers 
of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  that  he  leaves  them  under  orders  of 
the  President.  Major  General  George  H.  Thomas,  in  compliance  with 
orders,  will  assume  the  command  of  this  army  and  department.  The 
chiefs  of  all  the  staff  departments  will  report  to  him  for  orders. 

In  taking  leave  of  you,  his  brothers  in  arms,  officers  and  soldiers, 
he  congratulates  you  that  your  new  commander  comes  to  you  not  as  he 
did,  a  stranger,  General  Thomas  has  been  identified  with  this  army 
from  its  organization.  He  has  led  you  often  in  battle.  To  his  known 
prudence,  dauntless  courage,  and  true  patriotism,  you  may  look  with 
confidence  that  under  God  he  will  lead  you  to  victory.  The  general 
commanding  doubts  not  you  will  be  as  true  to  yourselves  and  your 
country  in  the  future  as  you  have  been  in  the  past.  To  the  division 
and  brigade  commanders  he  tenders  his  cordial  thanks  for  their  valu 
able  aid  and  hearty  cooperation  in  all  he  has  undertaken.  To  the 
chiefs  of  the  staff  departments  and  their  subordinates,  whom  he  leaves 
behind,  he  owes  a  debt  of  gratitude  for  their  fidelity  and  untiring  de 
votion  to  duty. 

Companions  in  arms,  officers  and  soldiers,  farewell  and  may  God 
bless  you. 

W.   S.  ROSECRANS, 
Major  General."i 

1      W.   R.   R.,  53-478. 


LOOKOUT  MOUNTAIN  AND  MISSION  AH  Y  RIDGE  355 

On  the  27th  of  October  Frank  L.  Schreiber,  together 
with  three  other  men  of  the  regiment,  was  detailed  for  duty 
with  the  Twenty-fourth  Pennsylvania  Battery  and  served 
with  it  until  November  18,  when  he  returned  to  the  regiment 
which  still  occupied  its  camp  at  Fort  Wood.  From  his  diary 
we  learn  that  the  weather  during  this  period  was  cold,  with 
a  good  deal  of  rain.  October  30  he  erports  some  firing 
down  the  river,  and  that  the  regiment  went  out  on  picket 
duty.  Sunday,  November  1,  he  reports  that  he  "went  to 
church  at  the  regiment  and  that  there  was  some  firing  on  Look 
out  Mountain."  November  2,  he  says  he  "built  a  chimney  for 
our  tent,  going  to  town  for  wood  and  brick,"  that  the 
rebels  threw  a  few  shells  into  our  camp  from  Lookout  Moun 
tain,  but  did  no  harm,  that  some  mail  was  received  and  that 
in  the  evening  orders  were  issued  to  prepare  for  a  fight.  On 
the  3rd  he  was  on  guard  from  2  o'clock  to  5  o'clock  in  the 
morning ;  after  that  he  went  to  town  to  get  a  plank  with 
which  to  make  a  port  hole  for  one  of  the  battery  guns ;  that 
he  was  on  guard  again  from  2  to  6  o'clock  in  the  evening,  and 
that  there  was  some  cannonading  during  the  day.  On  the 
4th  he  says  he  took  two  horses  to  pasture,  and  that  there 
was  heavy  cannonading  around  Lookout  Mountain  in  the 
evening.  On  the  5th  he  reports  that  we  drew  three-quarter 
rations.  So  it  seems  that  although  the  question  of  supplies  had 
been  settled  by  the  movements  on  October  27  and  28,  as 
Grant  had  reported,  they  were  not  yet  coming  forward  in 
such  quantities  as  to  warrant  the  issue  of  full  rations.  On  the 
5th,  6th,  7th  and  8th  he  reports  the  usual  cannonading,  and 
that  on  the  night  of  the  8th  he  stood  guard  over  the  battery 
guns.  November  9th  he  went  with  a  detail  across  the 
river  to  the  upper  boat  landing  to  get  some  old  artillery  har 
ness.  They  found  that  the  harness  had  been  hauled  to 
the  ferry  and  went  there  and  camped  for  the  night.  The  next 
morning  they  loaded  the  harness  and  started  with  it,  but  the 
mules  could  not  pull  the  load.  They  then  sent  for  some  of 
the  artillery  horses,  and  with  their  aid  they  got  the  load  along 
slowly  and  reached  camp  about  sunset,  where  they  again 
drew  three-fourths  rations  of  hard  bread.  The  nights  of 
November  9,  10,  11,  12  and  13,  he  reports  as  very  cold.  On 
these  days  he  reports  the  usual  cannonading,  and  the  same 
on  the  14th.  On  the  34th  the  troops  were  paid  off.  This  was 
regarded  as  a  good  sign,  as  the  paymasters,  it  was  believed, 
would  not  venture  into  camp  with  their  treasure  if  there  was 
danger  of  its  capture.  On  the  16th  he  reports  "nothing  going 
on  of  importance." 


356  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

These  notes  from  Frank  Schreiber's  diary  are  interesing 
of  themselves,  but  more  interesting  because  they  throw  light 
on  the  conditions  of  the  army  at  that  time.  They  disclose 
the  ceaseless  activity  made  necessary  by  the  immediate 
presence  of  the  enemy  who,  knowing  we  were  expecting  rein 
forcements,  would  probably  resort  to  some  desperate  attempt 
to  destroy  us  before  such  reinforcements  would  reach  us. 
On  the  morning  of  the  17th,  Schreiber  reports  that  we  were 
aroused  by  heavy  cannonading  up  the  river :  that  the  enemy 
had  attempted  "to  throw  a  raft  in  the  river,"  but  had  failed 
to  do  so. 

In  General  Grant's  first  report  to  Washington  after  tak 
ing  command,  he  expressed  an  apprehension  that  the  enemy 
would  attempt  to  throw  a  large  force  across  the  Tennessee 
River  between  Blythe's  Ferry  and  Cotton  Port,  and  stated 
that  if  he  did,  we  were  in  no  condition  to  follow  him.  But  so 
far  as  known,  there  was  no  serious  attempt  of  this  kind  on 
the  part  of  the  enemy.  The  cannonading  heard  up  the  river 
by  Schreiber,  may  have  been  a  feint  on  the  part  of  the  enemy 
to  cover  some  other  movement,  possibly  that  of  the  detach 
ment  of  a  force  under  Longstreet  to  operate  against  Burn- 
side  at  Knoxville — a  movement  which  was  then  well  under 
way. 

While  our  troops  were  still  holding  on,  employed  as 
Scheiber  describes,  General  Grant  was  preparing  for  aggres 
sive  action  against  the  enemy.  The  supply  line  being  opened, 
efforts  were  made  to  practically  reclothe  the  army  which  was 
much  in  need  of  shoes  and  clothing  suitable  for  winter  that 
was  near  at  hand,  and  to  get  the  horses  and  mules  in  condi 
tion  for  another  campaign.  A  suggestion  of  General  Halleck 
to  General  Grant,  that  all  animals  not  actually  needed  at  Chat 
tanooga  be  sent  to  Bridgeport  where  the  forage  was,  instead 
of  hauling  the  forage  to  them  at  Chattanooga,1  was  at  once 
carried  out.  The  suggestion  was  made  to  General  Grant  on 
October  22,  and  on  October  24,  the  morning  after  his  arrival 
at  Chattanooga,  he  telegraphed  to  General  Halleck  that  all 
animals  that  could  be  spared  would  go  back  the  next  day. 
This  suggestion  seems  so  simple  and  practical,  the  wonder  is 
it  was  not  thought  of  before. 

Another  of  General  Halleck's  suggestions,  made  in 
his  general  letter  of  instruction  to  General  Grant  on  the  latter's 
taking  command  of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi, 
was  the  reconstruction  of  the  railroad  between  Nashville  and 
Decatur.  General  Grant  soon  realized  that  he  would  soon 

1     W.   R.   R.,  54-698. 


LOOKOUT  MOUNTAIN  AND  MISSIONARY  RIDGE  357 

nede  this  road  as  well  as  the  road  from  Nashville  to 
Bridgeport,  to  supply  his  army  after  General  Sherman's  troops 
should  arrive,  and  promptly  took  steps  to  have  it  recon 
structed.  On  the  10th  of  November  he  telegraphed  to  Gen 
eral  Hurlbut  at  Memphis  directing  him  to  have  rails  and 
chairs  on  railroads  from  Memphis  to  Humboldt,  Tenn.,  from 
Memphis  to  Grenada,  Miss.,  and  from  the  Central  Railroad 
south  of  Grand  Junction,  taken  up  and  shipped  by  river  to 
Nashville  with  all  dispatch.  The  commanding  officer  at  Cor 
inth,  Miss.,  was  ordered  to  do  the  same  thing  from  the  rail 
road  south  of  that  point,  except  that  he  was  to  send  the  rails 
and  chairs  to  Hamburg,  to  b'e  sent  by  river  to  Reynoldsburg 
on  the  Tennessee  River.1 

It  fell  to  the  lot  of  General  Grenville  M.  Dodge, 
commanding  a  division  in  Sherman's  army,  to  do  this 
work,  which  was  one  of  the  most  marked  evidences  of  the 
general  efficiency  of  the  soldiers  in  the  western  armies. 
General  Grant  refers  to  it  in  his  Memoirs  as  follows :  "Sher 
man's  force  made  an  additional  army,  with  cavalry,  artillery 
and  trains  all  to  be  supplied  by  the  single  track  road  from 
Nashville.  All  indications  pointed  also  to  the  probable  neces 
sity  of  supplying  Burnside's  command  in  East  Tennessee, 
25,000  more,  by  the  same  route.  A  single  track  could  not  do 
this.  I  gave,  therefore,  an  order  to  Sherman  to  halt  General 
Dodge's  command,  about  8000  men,  at  Athens  and  subse 
quently  directed  the  latter  to  arrange  his  troops  along  the 
railroad  from  Decatur  north  towards  Nashville  and  to  rebuild 
that  road.  The  road  from  Nashville  to  Decatur  passes  over 
a  broken  country,  cut  up  with  innumerable  streams,  many  of 
them  of  considerable  width,  and  writh  valleys  far  belowr  the 
roadbed.  All  the  bridges  over  these  had  been  destroyed  and 
the  rails  taken  up  and  twisted  by  the  enemy.  All  the  cars  and 
locomotives  not  carried  off  had  been  destroyed  as  effectually 
as  they  knew  ho\v  to  destroy  them.  All  bridges  and  culverts 
had  been  destroyed  between  Nashville  and  Decatur,  and 
thence  to  Stevenson  \vhere  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  and 
the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga  roads  unite.  The  rebuilding 
of  this  road  wrould  give  us  two  roads  as  far  as  Stevenson  over 
which  to  supply  the  army.  From  Bridgeport,  a  short  distance 
farther  east,  the  river  supplements  the  road.  General  Dodge, 
besides  being  a  most  capable  soldier,  was  an  experienced 
railroad  builder.  He  had  no  tools  to  work  with,  ex 
cept  those  of  the  pioneers, — axes,  picks  and  spades.  With  these 
he  was  able  to  intrench  his  men  and  protect  them  against  small 

1     W.   R.   R.,  Vol.   56,  page   113. 


358  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

parties  of  the  enemy.  As  he  had  no  base  of  supplies  until  the 
road  could  be  completed  back  to  Nashville,  the  first  matter  to 
consider  after  protecting  his  men  was  the  getting  in  of  food  and 
forage  from  the  surrounding  country.  He  had  his  men  and  teams 
bring  all  the  grain  they  could  find  or  all  they  needed,  and  all  the 
cattle  for  beef,  and  such  other  food  as  could  be  found.  Millers 
were  detailed  from  the  ranks  to  run  the  mills  along  the  line  of 
the  army.  When  the  mills  were  not  near  enough  to  the  troops  for 
protection,  they  were  taken  down  and  moved  up  to  the  line  of 
the  road.  Blacksmith  ships,  with  all  the  iron  and  steel  found  in 
them  were  moved  up  in  like  manner.  Blacksmiths  were  detailed 
and  set  to  work  making  the  tools  necessary  in  railroad  and  bridge 
building.  Axemen  were  put  to  work  getting  out  timber  for 
bridges  and  cutting  fuel  for  locomotives  when  the  road  should 
be  completed.  Car  builders  were  set  to  work  repairing  the  loco 
motives  and  cars.  Thus  every  branch  of  railroad  building,  mak 
ing  tools  to  work  with,  and  supplying  the  workmen  with  food, 
was  all  going  on  at  once,  and  without  the  aid  of  a  single  mechanic 
or  laborer  except  what  the  command  itself  furnished.  But  rails 
and  cars  the  men  could  not  make  without  material,  and  there  was 
not  rolling  stock  enough  to  keep  the  road  we  already  had  worked 
to  its  full  capacity.  There  were  no  rails  except  those  in  use. 
To  supply  these  deficiencies  I  ordered  eight  of  the  ten  engines 
General  McPherson  had  at  Vicksburg  to  be  sent  to  Nashville, 
and  all  the  cars  he  had  except  ten.  I  also  ordered  the  troops  in 
West  Tennessee  to  points  on  the  river  and  on  the  Memphis  and 
Charleston  road,  and  ordered  the  cars,  locomotives  and  rails  from 
all  the  railroads,  except  the  Memphis  and  Charleston,  to  Nash 
ville.  The  military  manager  of  railroads  also  was  directed  to 
furnish  more  rolling  stock  and  as  far  as  he  could  bridge  material. 
General  Dodge  had  the  work  assigned  him  finished  within  forty 
days  after  receiving  his  orders.  The  number  of  bridges  to  re 
build  was  one  hundred  and  eighty-two,  many  of  them  over  deep 
and  wide  chasms,  the  length  of  road  repaired  was  one  hundred 
and  two  miles."1 

These  preparations  for  supplying  the  army  were  taken  none 
too  soon.  The  apprehended  movement  of  the  enemy  took  the 
form  of  an  attempt  to  turn  Burnside's  left  flank  and  destroy  him 
before  reinforcements  could  reach  him.  On  November  3,  Gen 
eral  Longstreet  with  two  divisions  (General  McLaw's  and  Gen 
eral  Hood's)  was  detached  from  Bragg's  Army  in  front  of  Chat 
tanooga,  and  directed  to  drive  the  enemy  out  of  East  Tennessee 
or  capture  him.2  Later  General  Wheeler  with  three  brigades  of 

1  Grant's  Memoirs,  Vol.   2,  page  47. 

2  Longstreet's    Report,    W.    R.    R.,    54-456. 


LOOKOUT  MOUNTAIN  AND  MISSIONARY  RIDGE  359 

cavalry  was  directed  to  join  him.  There  was  some  delay  in  the 
expedition's  starting.  It  finally  got  off,  but  moved  slowly.  On 
the  fifth  of  November,  General  Thomas  J.  Wood,  commanding 
our  division,  reported  to  headquarters  that  one  of  his  spies  had 
just  come  in  and  reported  that  four  divisions  of  Bragg' s  Army 
had  been  sent  up  the  Tennessee  River  to  operate  against  Burn- 
side.1 

General  Grant  became  convinced  of  the  truth  of  this 
report  on  November  7,  and  at  once,  addressed  an  order  to  General 
Thomas,  saying,  that  news  from  General  Burnside,  with  informa 
tion  gained  by  a  deserter  "is  of  such  a  nature  that  it  becomes  an 
imperative  duty  for  your  forces  to  draw  the  attention  of  the 
enemy  from  Burnside  to  your  own  front.  *  *  I  deem  the 

best  movement  to  attract  the  enemy  to  be  an  attack  on  the 
northern  end  of  the  Missionary  Ridge,  with  all  the  force  you 
can  bring  to  bear  against  it,  and  when  that  is  carried,  to  threaten, 
and  even  attack,  if  possible,  the  enemy's  line  of  communications 
between  Dalton  and  Cleveland.  Rations  should  be  ready  to  issue 
a  sufficiency  to  last  four  days  the  moment  Missionary  Ridge  is 
in  our  possession ;  rations  to  be  carried  in  haversacks.  Where 
there  are  not  horses  to  move  the  artillery  mules  must  be  taken 
from  the  teams,  or  horses  from  ambulances ;  or  if  necessary, 
officers  dismounted  and  their  horses  taken.  In  view  of  so  many 
troops  (of  the  enemy)  being  taken  from  this  valley  and  from 
Lookout,  Howard's  Corps  of  Hooker's  command  can  be  used  in 
this  movement.  Immediate  preparations  should  be  made  to  carry 
these  directions  into  execution.  The  movement  should  not  be 
made  one  moment  later  than  tomorrow  morning.  You,  having 
been  over  this  country,  and  having  had  a  better  opportunity  of 
studying  it  than  myself,  the  details  are  left  to  you."2 

On  the  same  day  General  Grant  telegraphed  Generals  Hal- 
leek  and  Burnside  that  he  had  given  the  orders  above  quoted.3 

The  order  contemplated  an  attack  by  General  Thomas  on 
the  north  end  of  Missionary  Ridge,  moving  along  the  south  bank 
of  the  Tennessee  River  and  by  Citico  Creek,  a  movement  which 
had  been  suggested  by  General  W.  F.  Smith.  Generals  Thomas, 
Smith  and  Brannan  reconnoitered  the  ground  from  the  heights 
opposite,  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Tennessee,  found  that  Citico 
Creek  and  the  country  adjacent  had  been  wrongly  laid  down  on 
maps,  and  that  no  operation  for  the  seizure  of  Missionary  Ridge, 
such  as  proposed,  could  be  undertaken  with  the  forces  under 
General  Thomas'  command.4 


1  W.  R.  R.  56-50.  3     W.   R.   R..   56-74-76. 

2  W.  R.  R.  56-73.  4     Dana  to  Stanton,  W.  R.  R.  55-58. 


360  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

After  this  reconnoissance  General  Thomas  reported  to  Gen 
eral  Grant  that  he  could  not  possibly  comply  with  the  order. 
General  Grant  in  his  memoirs  says  that  General  Thomas  per 
sisted  in  declaring  that  he  could  not  move  a  single  piece  of  artil 
lery,  that  he  could  not  possibly  comply  with  the  order,  so  that 
nothing  was  left  for  him,  General  Grant,  to  do,  but  to  answer 
Washington  dispatches  as  best  he  could,  and  urge  General  Sher 
man's  forces  forward.1 

On  the  same  day  he  gave  the  above  order  to  General  Thomas, 
he  sent  word  to  General  Sherman  that  the  enemy  had  moved  a 
large  part  of  his  force  against  Burnside,  that  he  had  to  make  an 
immediate  move  toward  his  line  of  communications  and  that  he 
was  anxious  to  see  Sherman's  old  corps  on  hand  at  the  earliest 
moment.2 

Sherman's  advance  would  be  at  Fayetteville,  Tenn.,  about 
100  miles  from  Bridgeport  on  the  eighth.  The  continuous  rains 
had  swollen  the  streams  and  made  the  roads  difficult,  and  his 
progress  was  necessarily  slow.  Added  to  this,  he  was  virtually 
living  off  the  country.  In  a  characteristic  letter,  dated  Elkton  on 
the  Elk  River,  November  6,  -and  addressed  to  General  George 
Crook  who  was  at  Maysville,  Alabama,  in  command  of  a  cavalry 
division,  he  said : 

"I  found  Elk  200  yards  wide,  four  and  a  half  feet  deep  and 
running  very  swift.  I  could  have  passed  horses  and  men,  but 
artillery  and  wagons  would  have  bothered  me.  To  wait  for  a  fall 
would  have  been  precarious  and  to  bridge  would  have  delayed 
me,  so  I  turned  at  Rogersville  and  came  through  by  this  route. 
But  yesterday  rain  caught  me  down  in  the  rugged  valley  of  Elk, 
and  I  had  to  bridge  Richland  Creek.  I  have  two  divisions  here, 
and  have  sent  back  orders  for  the  other  three  division  to  come 
round  to  Fayetteville  by  way  of  Pulaski.  I  will  be  at  Fayette 
ville  early  day  after  tomorrow.  *  *  *  I  find  plenty  of  corn, 
cattle,  hogs,  etc.,  on  this  route,  but  I  don't  think  there  will  be 
much  left  after  my  army  passes.  I  never  saw  such  greedy 
rascals  after  chickens  and  fresh  meat.  I  don't  think  I  will  draw 
anything  for  them  but  salt.  I  don't  know  but  it  would  be  a  good 
plan  to  march  my  army  back  and  forth  from  Florence  and 
Stevenson,  to  make  a  belt  of  devastation  between  the  enemy  and 
our  country."  He  asked  General  Crook  to  tell  General  Grant  he 
was  "moving  steadily  and  rapidly  as  possible  to  Fayetteville  and 
Winchester.3 

It  appears  that  General  Grant  readily  acquiesced  in  General 
Thomas'  representations  that  it  was  impossible  to  carry  out  his 

1  Grant's  Memoirs,  Vol.  2,  page  50.  3     W.    R.    R.,    56-69. 

2  W.   R.   R.,  56-79. 


LOOKOVT  MOUNTAIN  AND  MISSIONARY  RIDUK  361 

order  directing  an  attack  on  the  8th.  Such  an  attack,  under 
the  circumstances,  would  have  been  extremely  hazardous  and 
might  not  have  succeeded.  With  General  Sherman's  army  pres 
ent  he  evidently  thought  there  would  be  no  doubt  that  a  success 
ful  attack  could  be  made  from  the  north  side  of  the  Tennessee. 

He  was  in  constant  communication  with  General  Burn- 
side,  and  did  not  believe  him  to  be  in  such  dire  straits  as  was 
feared  at  Washington.  In  his  memoirs  he  says :  "All  of  Burn- 
side's  dispatches  showed  the  greatest  confidence  in  his  ability 
to  hold  his  position  as  long  as  his  ammunition  held  out",  and 
that  "he  even  suggested  the  propriety  of  abandoning  the  territory 
south  and  east  of  Knoxville,  so  as  to  draw  the  enemy  further 
from  his  base  and  make  it  more  difficult  for  him  to  get  back  to 
Chattanooga  when  the  battle  should  begin."1  So  on  the  8th, 
General  Grant  telegraphed  to  General  Halleck  that  General 
Thomas,  could  not  make  the  movement  for  several  days  yet,2 
and  to  General  Burnside  that  Thomas  would  not  be  able  to  make 
the  attack  proposed  until  Sherman  got  up,  but  would  drive  the 
enemy  from  the  west  side  of  Lookout  and  move  a  column  up 
the  valley,  which  might  have  the  effect  of  withholding  any  move 
ment  of  the  enemy's  troops  against  him,  Burnside,  until  a  larger 
force  could  be  collected  and  a  greater  effort  made  to  force  the 
enemy  back.8  It  seems  that  this  movement  was  also  deferred 
until  Sherman  should  arrive,  though  there  were  some  demonstra 
tions  against  the  enemy  on  the  west  side  of  Lookout. 

In  the  meantime,  General  Grant  matured  plans  for  the  at 
tack,  still  adhering  to  his  original  plan  of  turning  Bragg's  right 
by  a  movement  against  the  northern  end  of  Missionary  Ridge. 
Grant  in  his  memoirs  says  his  orders  for  the  battle  were  all  pre 
pared  in  advance  of  Sherman's  arrival,4  but  they  were  not  really 
issued  until  November  18.  By  that  time  a  crisis  had  been  reached. 
The  enemy  had  closed  in  on  General  Burnside  at  Knoxville  and 
he  was  virtually  besieged,  with  no  prospect  of  relief  until  rein 
forced  from  the  army  at  Chattanooga.  There  was  a  fear  at 
Washington  that  he  would  attempt  to  abandon  his  position,  which 
would  probably  have  resulted  in  the  destruction  of  his  army. 
These  fears  were  communicated  to  General  Grant  by  General 
Halleck  on  the  14th  and  16th  of  November.5  General  Grant  on 
the  14th  telegraphed  General  Burnside,  describing  the  movements 
he  was  about  to  make  for  his  relief,  and  on  the  15th  sent  him  the 
following  dispatch : 

"I  do  not  know  how  to  impress  upon  you  the  necessity  of 

1  Grant's  Memoirs,  Vol     2,  page   50  4     Grant's   Memoirs,  Vol.    2,  page   52 

2  W.    R.   R.,   r,6-84.  5      \V.    R.    R.    56-145-163. 

3  W.  R.  R.,  56-88. 


362  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

holding  on  to  East  Tennessee  in  strong  enough  terms.  Accord 
ing  to  the  dispatches  of  Mr.  Dana  and  Colonel  Wilson,1  it  would 
seem  that  you  should,  if. pressed  to  do  it,  hold  on  to  Knoxville 
and  that  portion  of  the  valley  which  you  will  necessarily  possess. 
Holding  to  that  point,  should  Longstreet  move  his  whole 
force  across  the  Little  Tennessee  an  effort  should  be  made 
to  cut  his  pontoons  on  that  stream  even  if  it  sacrificed  half  of 
the  cavalry  of  the  Ohio  Army.  By  holding  on  and  placing  Long- 
street  between  the  Little  Tennesse  and  Knoxville  he  should  not 
be  allowed  to  escape  with  an  army  capable  of  doing  anything 
this  winter.  I  can  hardly  conceive  of  the  necessity  of  retreating 
from  East  Tennessee.  If  I  did  so  at  all,  it  would  be  after  losing 
most  of  the  army,  and  the  necessity  would  suggest  the  route,  I 
will  not  attempt  to  lay  out  a  line  of  retreat.  *  *  I  would 

not  think  it  advisable  to  concentrate  a  force  near  Little  Ten 
nessee  to  resist  the  crossing,  if  it  would  be  in  danger  of  cap 
ture,  but  I  would  harrass  and  embarrass  progress  in  every  way 
possible,  reflecting  on  the  fact  that  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  is  not 
the  only  army  to  resist  the  onward  progress  of  the  enemy."2  On 
the  17th  General  Grant  again  telegraphed  General  Burnside  as 
follows : 

"Your  dispatch  received.  So  far  you  are  doing  exactly 
what  appears  to  me  right.  I  want  the  enemy's  progress  retarded 
at  every  foot  all  it  can  be,  giving  up  each  place  only  when  it 
becomes  evident  it  can  not  be  held  without  endangering  your 
force  to  capture".3 

On  the  18th  at  9:10  p.  m.  Burnside  telegraphed  to  Grant 
saying  that  skirmishing  had  commenced  at  10  o'clock  that 
morning,  that  the  troops  were  all  within  the  fortifications  and 
that  they  had  every  hope  of  repelling  an  assault  if  one  was 
made.4 

This  dispatch  from  General  Burnside  was  the  last  received 
from  him  before  the  battle  of  Missionary  Ridge.  Reports  came 
that  he  was  surrounded,  and  his  communications  with  the  out 
side  world  were  for  a  time  suspended.  There  were  very  grave 
fears  of  his  capture,  although  Mr.  Dana,  who  left  Knoxville 
on  the  fourteenth,  reported  that  his  position  at  that  place  was 
safe.5  As  before  stated,  General  Grant  issued  his  orders  for 
the  movement  against  Bragg's  army  at  Chattanooga  on  Novem 
ber  18.  His  instructions  to  General  Thomas  were  as  follows: 


1  General  Grant  had  sent  them  to  Knoxville  to  observe  and  report  conditions  there, 

i!  General  Grant's  official  report,  W    R    K    5.">-H<> 

3  W,    R.    R.,    56-177. 

4  W.   R.   R.,  56-182. 

5  W.   R.  R.,  56-190. 


LOOKOUT  MOUNTAIN  AND  MISSIONARY  RIDGE  363 

"Major  General  George  H.  Thomas:" 

"All  preparations  should  be  made  for  attacking  the  enemy's  posi 
tion  on  Missionary  Ridge  by  Saturday  (the  21st)  at  daylight.  Not  be 
ing  provided  with  a  map  giving  names  of  roads,  spurs  of  the  mountain 
and  other  places,  such  definite  instructions  cannot  be  given  as  might 
be  desirable.  However,  the  general  plan,  you  understand,  is  for  Sher 
man,  with  the  force  brought  with  him,  strengthened  by  a  division  from 
your  command,  to  effect  a  crossing  of  the  Tennessee  River  just  below 
the  mouth  of  Chichamauga,  his  crossing  to  be  protected  by  artillery 
from  the  heights  on  the  north  bank  of  the  river  (to  be  located  by  your 
chief  of  artillery),  and  to  secure  the  heights  from  the  northern  ex 
tremity  to  about  the  railroad  tunnel  before  the  enemy  can  concentrate 
against  him.  You  will  cooperate  with  Sherman.  The  troops  in  Chat 
tanooga  Valley  should  be  well  concentrated  on  your  left  flank,  leaving 
only  the  necessary  force  to  defend  fortifications  on  the  right  and  cen 
ter,  and  a  movable  column  of  one  division  in  readiness  to  move  wher 
ever  ordered.  This  division  should  show  itself  as  threatingly  as  pos 
sible  on  the  most  practical  line  for  making  an  attack  up  the  valley. 
Your  effort  will  then  be  to  form  a  junction  with  Sherman,  making  your 
advance  well  toward  the  northern  end  of  Missionary  Ridge,  and  mov 
ing  as  near  simultaneously  with  him  as  possible.  The  juncture  once 
formed,  and  the  ridge  carried,  communications  will  be  at  once  estab 
lished  between  the  two  armies  by  roads  on  the  south  bank  of  the  river. 
Further  movements  will  then  depend  on  those  of  the  enemy.  Lookout 
Valley,  I  think,  will  be  easily  held  by  Geary's  division  and  what  troops 
you  may  still  have  there  belonging  to  the  old  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 
Howard's  corps  can  then  be  held  in  readiness  to  act  either  with  you 
at  Chattanooga  or  with  Sherman.  It  should  be  marched  on  Friday  night 
to  a  position  on  the  north  side  of  the  river,  not  lower  down  than  the  first 
pontoon  bridge,  and  there  be  held  in  readiness  for  such  orders  as  may 
become  necessary.  All  these  troops  will  be  provided  with  two  days 
cooked  rations  in  haversacks  and  100  rounds  of  ammunition  on  the 
person  of  each  infantry  soldier.  Special  care  should  be  taken  by  all  of 
ficers  to  see  that  ammunition  is  not  wasted,  or  unnecessarily  fired  away. 
You  will  call  on  the  engineer  department  for  such  preparations  as  you 
may  deem  necessary  for  carrying  your  infantry  and  artillery  over  the 

"D.  S.  GRANT 
Major  General."! 

General  Sherman,  upon  the  arrival  of  whose  army  depended 
any  effective  movement  to  relieve  General  Btirnside,  arrived  at 
Bridgeport  at  6:15  P.  M.  November  13,  his  advance  division 
(Ewings)  being  only  a  short  distance  behind  him,  at  Stevenson, 
and  was  directed  to  assemble  the  Fifteenth  army  corps  at  Bridge 
port.  This  would  take  two  or  three  days  at  least,  for  one  of  his 
divisions  (John  E.  Smith's)  was  coming  across  the  mountains 
by  Battle  Creek,  which  would  take  two  days,  and  another 
(Blair's)  was  still  back  near  Paint  Rock  creek.2  Other  por 
tions  of  his  army  were  still  further  behind  on  -their  march. 

The  next  day  General  Sherman  visited  General  Grant  at 
Chattanooga,  and  in  his  memoirs  reports  his  impressions  as  fol 
lows : 

1      W    R.   R.,   r.5-31.  2     W.    R.    R.,    56-139-140. 


364  £  IFTEEXTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

"The  next  morning  (the  fifteenth)  we  walked  out  to  Fort 
Wood,  a  prominent  salient  of  the  defences  of  the  place,  and 
from  its  parapet  we  had  a  magnificent  view  of  the  panorama. 
Lookout  Mountain,  with  its  rebel  flags  and  batteries,  stood  out 
boldly,  and  an  occasional  shot  fired  toward  Wauhatchie  or  Moc 
casin  Point  gave  life  to  the  scene.  *  *  *  All  along  Mis 
sionary  Ridge  were  the  tents  of  the  rebel  beleaguering  force ; 
the  lines  of  trench  from  Lookout  up  toward  the  Chickamauga 
were  plainly  visible ;  and  rebel  sentinels  in  a  continuous  chain, 
were  walking  their  posts,  in  plain  view,  not  a  thousand  yards 
off.  'Why',  said  I,  'General  Grant  you  are  besieged' ;  and  he 
said  'It  is  too  true' ;  up  to  that  moment  I  had  no  idea  things  were 
so  bad.  The  rebel  lines  actually  extended  from  the  river,  below 
the  town,  to  the  river  above,  and  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland 
was  closely  held  to  the  to\vn  and  its  immediate  defenses.  Gen 
eral  Grant  pointed  out  to  me  a  house  on  Missionary  Ridge 
where  General  Bragg's  headquarters  were  known  to  be.  He 
also  explained  the  situation  of  affairs  generally,  that  the  mules 
and  horses  of  Thomas's  army  were  so  starved  that  they  could 
not  haul  his  guns ;  that  forage,  corn  and  provisions,  were  so 
scarce  that  the  men  in  hunger  stole  the  few  grains  of  corn  that 
were  given  to  favorite  horses ;  that  the  men  of  Thomas's  Army 
had  been  so  demoralized  by  the  battle  of  Chickamauga  that  he 
feared  they  could  not  be  got  out  of  their  trenches  to  assume  the 
offensive";  (which  fear  was  nobly  dispelled  a  few  days  later)  ; 
"that  Bragg  had  detached  Longstreet  with  a  considerable  force 
up  into  East  Tennessee,  to  defeat  and  capture  Burnside ;  that 
Burnside  was  in  danger,  etc.;  and  that  he  (Grant)  was  ex 
tremely  anxious  to  attack  Bragg  in  position,  to  defeat  him,  or 
at  least  force  him  to  recall  Longstreet.  The  Army  of  the  Cum 
berland  had  so  long  been  in  the  trenches  that  he  wanted  my 
troops  to  hurry  up,  to  take  the  offensive  first;  after  which  he 
had  no  doubt  the  Cumberland  Army  would  fight  well''.1  The 
same  days,  Generals  Grant,  Sherman,  Thomas,  W.  F.  Smith, 
Brannan  and  others,  crossed  to  the  north  bank  of  the  Tennessee 
and  reconnoitered  the  ground,  and  especially  the  point  where 
Sherman  was  to  make  the  attack  at  the  northern  end  of  Mis 
sionary  Ridge.  That  night  Sherman  got  a  rough  boat,  manned 
by  four  soldiers,  to  take  him  down  to  Bridgeport  where  he  ar 
rived  by  daylight  next  morning,  and  at  once  started  his  troops 
toward  Chattanooga.2 

The  attack  on  Missionary  Ridge  by  Sherman's  and  Thomas' 
armies  acting  in  conjunction,  was  ordered  to  be  made  at  daylight 

1  Sherman's  Memoirs,  Vol.   1,  page  361. 

2  Sherman's   Memoirs,   Vol.    1,   page   363. 


LOOKOUT  MOUNTAIN  AND  MISSIONARY  RIDGE  365 

on  Saturday  the  twenty-first.  But  General  'Sherman's  con 
fessed  mistake  in  not  ordering  his  troops  to  leave  their  heavy 
trains  behind  them,  greatly  retarded  their  progress,  and  before 
they  were  all  across  the  river,  heavy  rains  came,  raised  the  river, 
and  the  enemy  sent  heavy  rafts  down  the  river  and  broke  the 
bridges  at  Chattanooga  and  Brown's  Ferry.  The  delay  was 
such  that  the  force  with  which  General  Sherman  was  to 
make  the  attack  on  the  northern  part  of  Missionary  Ridge  did 
not  get  into  position  until  the  twenty-third.  Indeed,  one  division 
of  the  Fifteenth  Corps,  that  of  General  Osterhaus,  temporarily 
commanded  by  General  Chas.  R.  Woods,  did  not  get  up  at  all. 
In  the  meantime,  incidents  occurred  which  gave  our  portion 
of  the  line  something  to  do.  On  the  twentieth  General  Bragg 
sent  under  flag  of  truce  to  General  Grant  the  following  com 
munication  : 

"Headquarters  Army  of  the  Tennessee, 

In  the  Field,  Nov.  20,  1863. 
"Maj.  Gen.  U.  S.  Grant, 

Commanding  U.  S.  Forces,  etc. 

Chattanooga. 

As  there  may  still  be  some  non-combatants  in  Chattanooga,  I  deem 
it  proper  to  notify  you  that  prudence  would  dictate  their  early  with 
drawal. 

I  am  General. 

Very  respectfully,   your  obedient  servant, 

BRAXTON  BRAGG." 

General  Grant,  it  appears,  paid  no  attention  to  this  note, 
regarding  it  as  merely  a  ruse  to  cover  some  movement  other 
than  an  attack  on  our  position.  On  the  twenty-second  a  deserter 
from  the  rebel  army  came  into  our  lines  and  reported  Bragg 
falling  back.  This  report  and  the  note  from  General  Bragg 
above  given  determined  General  Grant  to  direct  General  Thomas 
early  on  the  morning  of  the  twenty-third,  to  drive  in  the  enemy's 
pickets  and  make  him  develop  his  lines.  The  order  for  the 
movement  was  given  to  General  Thomas,  who  at  once  directed 
General  Gordon  Granger,  then  commanding  the  Fourth  Corps, 
to  throw  one  division  of  the  corps  forward  in  the  direction  of 
Orchard  Knob  and  hold  a  second  division  in  supporting  dis 
tance,  to  discover  the  position  of  the  enemy  and  saying,  that 
Howard's  and  Baird's  commands  would  be  ready  to  co-operate 
if  needed.1  General  Granger  selected  our  division  (General 
Thomas  J.  Wood's)  for  this  important  service. 

Orchard  Knob  at  that  time  and  the  ground  to  right  and 
left  of  it  and  between  it  and  Fort  Wood,  where  our  division  lay 
behind  intrenchments,  is  thus  described  by  General  Granger  in 
his  official  report : 

1      W.   R.   R.,  55-128. 


366  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

"Orchard  Knob  is  a  rugged  hill  rising  100  feet  above  the 
Chattanooga  Valley,  lying  between  Fort  Wood,  a  work  on  our 
exterior  line  of  defense  northeast  of  Chattanooga  and  Mission 
Ridge,  being  distant  from  the  former  point  one  and  three-quarter 
miles  and  about  one  mile  from  the  ridge.  The  ascent  of  the 
knob  is  very  steep  save  on  the  side  to  the  right,  looking  south, 
where  the  ground,  gradually  sloping  from  the  summit,  makes 
a  dip  or  gorge,  and  rises  on  the  other  side  to  nearly  the  same 
height  as  the  knob ;  from  this  point  running  off  in  a  south 
western  direction  for  over  one-half  of  a  mile,  turning  to  the 
right,  is  a  rough  rocky  ridge,  which  is  covered  with  a  sparse 
growth  of  timber.  Along  the  crest  of  this  ridge  the  enemy  had 
made  breast  works  of  logs  and  stone  and  a  line  of  rifle  pits. 
Along  the  base  of  Orchard  Knob,  on  the  side  toward  Chat 
tanooga,  was  another  line  of  rifle  pits,  which  extended  beyond 
the  knob,  on  our  left  more  than  one  mile,  following  the 
curvature  of  Citico  Creek,  and  yet  to  the  left  of  its  termination, 
and  on  the  other  side  of  the  creek  ran  two  additional  and  paral 
lel  lines.  A  heavy  belt  of  timber,  ranging  from  one-fourth  to 
three-fourths  of  a  mile  in  width  lay  between  our  lines  and 
Orchard  Knob,  covering  the  front  of  the  knob  and  the  line  of 
the  ridge,  and  serving  the  enemy  as  a  mask  for  his  position  and 
movements.  Between  this  timber  and  Chattanooga  were  open 
fields,  some  of  which  being  low  and  swampy  were  difficult  to 
cross  with  troops.  Through  them  runs  the  Atlantic  and  Western 
Railroad,  which,  as  it  approaches  the  river,  bends  towards  the 
north  end  of  Missionary  Ridge  where  it  passes  through  the  tun 
nel." 

At  noon  on  the  twenty-third,  General  Granger  sent  the  above 
order  he  had  received  from  General  Thomas  to  General  Wood 
accompanied  by  the  following  order: 

"Brig.  Gen  T.  J.  Wood, 

Commanding  Third  Division,  Fourth  Army  Corps. 

November  23,  1863,  12  M. 

Brigadier  General  Wood  with  his  division  will,  as  soon  as  possible, 
carry  out  the  foregoing  instructions,  and  will  be  supported  by  General 
.Sheridan's  division,  to  be  posted  along  near  the  line  of  railroad,  its 
right  resting  about  midway  between  Moore's  road  and  the  Brush  Knob, 
in  front  of  Lunette  Palmer. 

Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.  GRANGER, 
Major  General  Commanding."! 

In  pursuance  of  these  orders,  at  one  o'clock,  the  troops  des 
ignated  to  take  part  in  the  movement  moved  out  of  the  intrench- 
tnents  and  formed  in  line  facing  the  enemy's  position.  Our 

1     W.  R.  R.  55-254. 


LOOKOUT  MOUNTAIN  AND  MISSIONARY  RIDGE  367 

division  was  formed  with  our  brigade  (General  Willich's)  on 
the  left,  General  Hazen's  brigade  on  the  right,  while  General 
Samuel  Beatty's  brigade  was  in  reserve  in  their  rear,  to  be  used 
in  protecting  our  left  flank,  should  it  be  found  necessary.  Our 
brigade  was  selected  to  carry  Orchard  Knob,  "which  was  the 
citidel  of  the  line  of  the  enemy's  intrenchments".1  Our  regi 
ment  held  the  position  of  honor,  the  right  of  the  front  line  of 
the  advancing  column,  connecting  on  the  right  with  the  left  of 
Hazen's  brigade.  To  our  left,  were  our  old  comrades  of  the 
Forty-ninth  Ohio,  then  came  the  Twenty-fifth  Illinois,  and  to 
their  left  was  the  Thirty-fifth  Illinois.  In  the  second  line  in 
column  doubled  on  the  center  were,  from  right  to  left,  the 
Thirty-second  Indiana,  Eighty-ninth  Illinois,  Sixty-eighth  In 
diana  and  Fifteenth  Wisconsin.  At  1 :30  o'clock,  at  a  bugle 
signal  from  division  headquarters,  the  line  moved  impetuously 
forward,  across  the  2100  yards  of  intervening  space  between 
Fort  Wood  and  the  knob.  General  Wood  in  his  official  report 
says :  "General  Willich  was  ordered  to  direct  his  brigade  on 
the  knob  and  General  Hazen  his  brigade  on  the  intrenchments 
on  the  right  of  it.  So  soon  as  the  skirmishers  moved  forward 
the  enemy  opened  fire.  Across  the  open  field  and  through  the 
woods  the  skirmishers  kept  up  a  sharp  rattling  fire,  steadily  and 
rapidly  driving  in  the  enemy.  As  the  knob  and  intrenchments 
were  neared  the  fire  became  hotter,  the  resistance  of  the  rebels 
more  determined;  but  the  majestic  advance  of  our  lines  was  not 
for  a  moment  stayed.  Finally  Willich's  brigade,  which  had  met 
with  less  opposition  than  Hazen's,  having  arrived  quite  near 
the  knob,  'by  a  bold  burst',  ascended  its  steep  acclivity,  crowned 
its  summit  and  it  was  ours".2 

In  the  meantime  Hazen's  brigade  was  meeting  with  stub 
born  resistance  from  the  enemy  on  our  right,  but  pressed  on 
through  a  destructive  fire,  and  soon  afterwards  poured  over 
the  enemy's  barricades.  As  soon  as  the  knob  and  barricades 
were  carried  General  Granger,  commanding  the  corps,  joined 
General  Wood  on  Orchard  Knob.  The  extensiveness  and  com 
pleteness  of  our  success  was  at  once  seen  by  these  officers  and 
reported  to  General  Thomas,  who  ordered  that  the  position  be 
held  and  intrenched.  So.  "after  resting  a  few  minutes  we 
began  to  erect  a  barricade  or  breast-work  of  logs  and  stones 
and  whatever  loose  material  we  could  find  on  the  knob.  As 
soon  as  we  began  to  work  the  enemy  opened  on  us  with  his 
batteries  from  the  top  of  Mission  Ridge  and  also  from  the  bat 
teries  at  its  foot,  and  although  their  firing  was  rapid,  and  con- 

1  General  Wood's  Official  Report,  W.   R.   R.,  55-255. 

2  W.  R.  R.  r,r>-255. 


368  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

tinued  until  nearly  dark,  it  did  not  materially  interfere  with  the 
progress  of  our  work,  so  that  by  the  morning  of  the  twenty- 
fourth  we  had  erected  a  very  good  protection  against  the  fire 
of  the  infantry".1  The  position  gained  was  considered  of  great 
importance,  as  with  these  heights  in  our  possession,  a  column 
marching  to  turn  Missionary  Ridge  would  be  secure  from  flank 
attack.2  Mr.  Dana  in  the  same  dispatch  to  Secretary  Stanton 
describes  the  movement  as  "a  spectacle  of  singular  mag 
nificence".  General  Wood  in  his  official  report  describes  it  as 
follows : 

"At  1  :30  P.  M.,  the  arrangements  were  all  completed,  the 
troops  were  in  position,  and  the  reserve  ammunition  and  ambu 
lance  trains  in  rear  of  Fort  Wood.  Then,  at  the  bugle  signal, 
the  magnificient  array,  in  exact  lines  and  serried  columns  moved 
forward.  It  scarcely  ever  falls  to  the  lot  of  man  to  witness 
so  grand  a  military  display.  Every  circumstance  that  could 
heighten  the  interest  of,  or  impart  dramatic  effect  to,  the  scene 
was  present.  On  the  ramparts  of  Fort  Wood  were  gathered 
officers  of  high  rank  covered  with  honors  gathered  on  other 
fields.  There  were  also  officers  distinguished  for  scientific  at 
tainments,  and  rare  administrative  ability.  Troops  in  line  and 
column  checkered  the  broad  plain  of  Chattanooga.  In  front 
plainly  to  be  seen  was  the  enemy  so  soon  to  be  encountered  in 
deadly  conflict.  My  division  seemed  to  drink  in  the  inspiration 
of  the  scene  and  when  the  'advance'  was  sounded,  moved  for 
ward  in  the  perfect  order  of  a  holiday  parade.  It  has  been  my 
good  fortune  to  witness  on  the  Champ  de  Mars  and  on  Long 
Champs  reviews  of  all  arms  of  the  French  service,  under  the 
eye  of  the  most  remarkable  man  of  the  present  generation.  I 
once  saw  a  review,  followed  by  a  mock  battle,  of  the  finest 
troops  of  El  Re  Galantuomo.  The  pageant  was  held  on  the 
plains  of  Milan,  the  queen  city  of  Lombardy,  and  the  troops  in 
the  sham  conflict  were  commanded  by  two  of  the  most  dis 
tinguished  officers  of  the  Piedmontese  service,  Cialdini,  and  an 
other  whose  name  I  cannot  now  recall.  In  none  of  these  dis 
plays  did  I  ever  see  anything  to  exceed  the  soldierly  bearing, 
and  the  steadiness  of  my  division,  exhibited  in  the  advance  of 
Monday  afternoon,  the  twenty-third.  There  was  certainly  one 
striking  difference  in  the  circumstances  of  these  grand  displays. 
The  French  and  Italian  parades  were  peaceful  pageants ;  ours 
involved  the  exigencies  of  stern  war ;  certainly  an  immense  dif 
ference."3 

But  this  movement,  grand  and  imposing  as  it  certainly  was. 

1  Colonel  Aske\v's  Official  Report,  W.  R.   R..  55-275.  3     W.   R.   R.,   55-254. 

2  Mr.  Dana's  dispatch  to  Stanton,  W.  R.   R.,  55-65. 


LOOKOUT  MOUNTAIN  AND  MISSIONARY  RIDGE  369 

was  only  preliminary  to  the  grander  and  more  imposing  move 
ments  which  were  soon  to  follow. 

While  we  were  thus  engaged,  General  Sherman  was  ener 
getically  concentrating  his  troops  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Ten 
nessee  River,  preparatory  to  his  attack  on  the  north  end  of 
Missionary  Ridge.  His  movements  had  been  further  delayed 
by  the  breaking  of  bridges  as  before  stated,  and  also  by  the 
fact  that  the  artillery  from  our  part  of  the  army,  which  was 
needed  to  protect  the  crossing  of  his  troops,  could  not  be  moved 
until  horses  from  Sherman's  divisions  had  been  sent  to  move  it. 
But  at  midnight  on  the  twenty-third,  while  we  were  bivouacing 
on  Orchard  Knob,  Sherman's  leading  brigade  under  General 
Giles  A.  Smith,  embarked  in  poontoons  in  North  Chickamauga 
Creek,  and  dropping  down  the  Tennessee  River,  landed  on  the 
south  bank,  jus^  above  the  mouth  of  the  South  Chickamauga, 
and  captured  the  rebel  pickets.  The  remainder  of  General 
Morgan  L.  Smith's  and  the  whole  of  the  division  of  General 
John  E.  Smith  were  ferried  across  by  daylight  and  immediately 
set  to  work  digging  rifle  pits  to  cover  the  bridge,  which  was  to 
be  at  once  built  to  bring  over  other  troops.  This  bridge  was 
finished  by  1  P.  M.  on  the  twenty-fourth,  the  troops  were  at  once 
put  in  motion,  and  the  crest  of  the  north  end  of  Missionary 
Ridge  was  gained  without  serious  opposition  a  little  before  4 
o'clock,  and  at  once  strongly  fortified. 

While  Sherman  was  thus  struggling  against  great  obstacles 
and  fighting  his  way  to  the  position  above  named.  General  Hooker 
in  pursuance  of  orders  from  General  Grant,  was  moving  against 
the  enemy  on  Lookout  Mountain  and  fighting  what  is  now 
known  as  "the  battle  above  the  clouds".  This  movement  of 
General  Hooker's  was  not  contemplated  as  a  part  of  the  plan 
of  battle  at  first  decided  on  by  General  Grant.  His  plan  was  to 
throw  an  overwhelming  force  against  the  northern  end  of  Mis 
sionary  Ridge,  leaving  only  a  sufficient  force  west  of  Lookout 
Mountain  to  hold  the  enemy  there  in  check.  But  Osterhaus* 
division  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps,  temporarily  commanded  by  Gen 
eral  Charles  R.  Woods,  which  Sherman  was  very  anxious  to 
have  as  part  of  the  attacking  column,  was  for  some  reason  so 
delayed  that  he  decided  to  make  the  attack  without  it.  There 
upon,  by  direction  of  General  Grant,  at  10  P.  M.  November  23, 
General  Hooker  was  ordered,  that  if  Osterhaus'  division  did 
not  get  across  the  river  by  daybreak  next  morning,  it  was  to 
report  to  him,  and  in  that  event,  he.  Hooker,  was  directed  to 
try  to  take  the  point  of  Lookout  Mountain.1  Osterhaus'  divi 
sion  did  not  get  across  the  river  by  daybreak  next  morning,  and 

1     W.  R.  R.  55-105. 


370  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

so  reported  to  General  Hooker,  who  at  about   11  o'clock  began 
the  attack  on  Lookout,  as  ordered. 

In  addition  to  the  line  of  breastworks  on  Orchard  Knob 
which  we  had  thrown  up,  we  also,  built  epaulements  for 
artillery,  and  Captain  Bridge's  battery  of  four  three  and 
one-half  inch  Rodman  guns  and  two  Napoleons,  was  brought 
up  on  the  knob.  During  the  twenty-fourth,  besides  some 
picket  duty,  we  had  nothing  to  do  but  to  lie  around  and 
await  developments  and  orders.  Generals  Grant,  Thomas  and 
Granger  found  the  knob  an  admirable  position  from  which  to 
view  the  field  and  to  direct  the  grand  movements  going  on,  and 
all  were  there  in  person.  These  men  were  keenly  and  anxiously 
studied  by  our  officers  and  men,  and  their  movements,  gestures 
and  manners  were  critically  observed.  General  Wood  in  his 
official  report  before  mentioned  says :  "During  the  twenty-fourth 
the  division  was  quiet,  remaining  in  undisturbed  possession  of 
the  important  acquisitions  of  the  previous  afternoon.  The 
enemy,  in  full  view  and  sheltered  behind  his  rifle  pits  at  the  base 
of  Missionary  Ridge,  made  no  effort  to  retrieve  his  losses.  An 
occasional  shot  from  the  skirmishers,  and  the  booming  of  a  gun 
from  Orchard  Knob,  varied  the  monotony  of  the  day.  We  had 
ample  opportunity  to  watch  with  eager  interest  the  brilliant 
operations — though  miles  away  from  us — of  General  Hooker's 
command  for  the  possession  of  Lookout  Mountain,  and  when 
the  morning  sun  of  Wednesday  had  dispelled  the  mist  from  the 
mountain  top  and  displayed  to  our  view  the  banner  of  the  free 
and  the  brave  flying  from  the  topmost  peak  of  Lookout  Moun 
tain,  loud  and  long  were  the  joyous  shouts  with  which  my  divi 
sion  made  the  welkin  ring".1 

The  night  battle  of  Hooker's  forces  on  Lookout  Mountain 
was  a  wonderful  spectacle,  as  witnessed  from  Orchard  Knob. 
It  lasted  until  10  P.  M.  A  full  moon  made  their  battle  field  as 
plain  as  if  it  were  day,  the  blaze  of  their  camp  fires  and  the 
flashes  of  their  guns  displaying  brilliantly  their  position  and  the 
progress  of  their  advance.2 

By  the  operations  of  the  twenty-fourth,  above  detailed, 
that  night  our  forces  maintained  an  unbroken  line,  with  open 
communications,  from  the  north  end  of  Lookout  Mountain, 
through  Chattanooga  Valley  to  the  north  end  of  Missionary 
Ridge,  and  General  Grant  gave  orders  for  our  advance  all  along 
the  line  at  daylight  the  next  morning.  His  order  to  General 
Thomas  was  as  follows : 


1  W.  R.  R.,  55-257. 

2  \V.  R.  R.,  55-67. 


LOOKOUT  MOUNTAIN  AND  MISSIONARY  RIDGE  371 

"Hdqrs.  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi, 

Chattanooga,  Tenn.,  November  24,  1863. 
Maj.  Gen.  George  H.  Thomas, 

Commanding  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 

General:  General  Sherman  carried  Missionary  Ridge  as  far  as 
the  tunnel,  with  only  slight  skirmishing.  His  right  now  rests  at  the 
tunnel  and  on  top  of  the  hill;  his  left  at  Chickamauga  Creek.  I  have 
instructed  General  Sherman  to  advance  as  soon  as  it  is  light  in  the 
morning,  and  your  attack,  which  will  be  simultaneous,  will  be  in  co 
operation. 

Your  command  will  either  carry  the  rifle  pits  and  ridge  directly  in 
front  of  them,  or  move  to  the  left,  as  the  presence  of  the  enemy  may 
require.  If  Hooker's  present  position  on  the  mountain  can  be  main 
tained  with  a  small  force,  and  it  is  found  impracticable  to  carry  the  top 
from  where  he  is,  it  would  be  advisable  for  him  to  move  up  the  valley 
with  all  the  force  he  can  spare  and  ascend  by  the  first  practicable  road. 

Very  respectfully, 

U.    S.   GRANT, 
Major  General  Commanding."! 

At  6 :30  P.  M.  the  same  day  General  Thomas  instructed 
General  Granger,  "to  have  everything  ready  for  an  offensive 
movement  early  tomorrow  morning",  and  such  orders  were 
communicated  to  General  Sheridan2  and  presumably  to  General 
Wood.  Early  on  the  morning  of  the  twenty-fifth  the  troops  at 
Orchard  Knob  saw  the  stars  and  stripes  floating  from  the  top 
of  Lookout  Mountain  and  knew  that  General  Hooker's  night 
battle  had  been  a  glorious  victory.  Soon  it  was  known  that  Sher 
man  was  advancing  against  the  northern  end  of  Missionary 
Ridge.  Long  columns  of  the  enemy  could  be  seen  from  Orchard 
Knob,  marching  along  the  ridge  towards  Sherman's  position, 
and  soon  their  guns  and  Sherman's  could  be  heard  opening  the 
battle.  We  knew  that  our  comrades  of  the  Army  of  the  Ten 
nessee  were  deliberately  drawing  the  firecest  forces  of  the  enemy 
to  their  battle  front,  and  were  impatient  to  get  into  the  fight  and 
do  our  part.  Generals  Grant.  Thomas,  Granger,  W'ood  and  other 
high  officers  were  on  Orchard  Knob,  aides  and  orderlies  were 
hurriedly  coming  and  going,  and  the  signal  flags,  over  where 
Sherman's  troops  were  fighting,  were  wig-wagging  reports  of 
his  progress.  On  the  twenty-fourth  our  regiment  had  been  re 
lieved  from  duty  on  the  first  line  by  the  Thirty-second  Indiana 
and  took  their  places  on  the  second  line,  but  on  the  morning  of 
the  twenty-fifth  we  again  took  our  position  in  the  first  line,  the 
Thirty-second  Indiana  resuming  its  place  in  the  second  line. 
Our  brigade  was  formed  from  right  to  left  as  follows :  First 
line,  the  Fifteenth  Ohio,  Forty-ninth  Ohio,  Twenty-fifth  Illinois 
Thirty-fifth  Illinois ;  second  line.  Thirty-second  Indiana,  Eighty- 

1  W.  R.  R.,  55-44. 

2  W.  R.  R.,  55-137. 


372  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

ninth  Illinois,  Eighth  Kansas,  Sixty-eighth  Indiana,  with  the 
Fifteenth  Wisconsin  as  a  last  reserve.1  We  were  thus  again  on 
the  right  of  the  line  of  the  brigade,  with  our  brave  and  tried 
comrades  of  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  on  our  left,  and  our  equally 
brave  and  tried  comrades  of  the  Thirty-second  Indiana  support 
ing  us  in  the  rear.  On  our  right  in  close  touch  were  the  gallant 
men  of  Hazen's  brigade.  The  front  of  our  regiment  was  covered 
by  Company  A  ( Capt.  J.  C.  Cummins),  and  Company  B  (Lieu 
tenant  A.  L.  Smith)  as  skirmishers,  supported  by  Company  F 
(Captain  Amos  Glover),  and  Company  G  (Captain  A.  R.  Z. 
Dawson)  in  reserve,  all  under  command  of  Major  John 
McClenahan.2 

At  9  o'clock  the  pickets  covering  our  front  were  moved 
forward  and  drove  the  enemy's  pickets  back  to  their  rifle  pits 
at  the  foot  of  Missionary  Ridge.3  "As  the  day  progressed  the 
interest  which  attracted  every  eye  and  absorbed  every  feeling 
was  that  involved  in  the  attempt  of  General  Sherman's  command 
to  effect  a  lodgment  on  Mission  Ridge  near  the  tunnel."4  The 
signal  for  our  advance, — six  guns  fired  in  rapid  succession  from 
Orchard  Knob, — had  been  agreed  upon  and  was  known  as  early 
as  11  o'clock  A.  M. 

The  men  along  the  line  awaited  it  like  hounds  in  leash,  eager 
to  be  let  loose  on  the  quarry.  The  conflict  on  the  left  seemed  to 
deepen,  and  more  and  more  of  the  enemy  in  our  front  along 
Missionary  Ridge  were  detached  and  hurried  to  their  right  to  be 
flung  against  Sherman's  advancing  columns.  Finally,  "at  twenty 
minutes  before  4  P.  M."  says  Granger,  "the  booming  of  the  big 
guns  on  Orchard  Knob  awoke  the  echoes  on  Lookout  Mountain 
and  Walden  and  Missionary  Ridges,  and  before  they  had  died 
away  our  advance  was  begun." 

The  story  of  this  charge  on  Missionary  Ridge  has  been 
eloquently  told  by  many  who  witnessed  it,  but  herein  are  pre 
sented  only  the  official  reports  of  our  regimental  brigade,  divi 
sion  and  corps  commanders,  an  extract  from  the  report  of  General 
Thomas,  and  the  personal  experiences  of  some  members  of  the 
Fifteenth  Ohio,  who  were  active  participants  in  it.  Colonel 
Askew  in  his  official  report  says :  "When  the  signal  for  the 
general  advance  was  given  *  *  *  we  moved  forward  with 
the  whole  line,  taking  the  double  quick  step  as  soon  as  we 
reached  the  open  ground  in  front  of  the  first  line  of  the  enemy's 
works  at  the  foot  of  Mission  Ridge.  The  skirmishers,  with  the 
supporting  companies  deployed  with  them,  went  into  the  works 

1  General  Willich's  Report,  W.  R.  R.,  55-264. 

2  Colonel  Askew's  Report,  W.  R.  R.,  55-275. 

3  General  Willich's  Report.  W.   R.   R..   55-264. 

4  General    Wood's  Report.  W.  R.  R.,  55-275. 


LOOKOUT  MOUNTAIN  AND  MISSIONARY  RIDGE  373 

at  the  foot  of  the  ridge  meeting  with  very  little  resistance  from 
the  few  infantry  of  the  enemy,  who  occupied  these  works  *  *  * 
our  skirmishers  were  soon  followed  by  the  regiment  in  line, 
which,  as  we  neared  the  foot  of  the  ridge,  was  exposed  to  a  very 
heavy  fire  from  artillery  and  infantry,  posted  behind  the  works 
on  the  top  of  the  ridge,  the  artillery  fire  doing  us  but  little  dam 
age,  however,  as  they  shot  over  us.  Here,  everyone  being  con 
siderably  exhausted  by  the  rapid  pace  at  which  we  had  reached 
the  foot  of  the  ridge,  and  under  the  protection  of  the  log  huts, 
which  had  been  the  camp  of  the  enemy,  most  of  the  command 
halted,  and  rested  for  a  moment  before  undertaking  the  difficult 
task  of  climbing  the  steep  face  of  the  ridge,  'crowned  with  bat 
teries  and  encircled  with  rifle  pits'.  However,  the  stouter  ones 
soon  pushed  out,  followed  by  the  whole  command  and  slowly 
and  stubbornly  began  to  climb  the  hill,  exposed  all  the  while 
to  a  deluge  of  grape  and  canister  from  the  batteries  and  musket 
balls  from  the  rifle  pits.  Still  on  they  went,  a  stage  at  a  time, 
picking  off  any  of  the  enemy  who  dared  show  his  head  above 
their  works.  Finally  the  works  were  reached,  and  with  a  yell, 
the  men  went  over  them,  and  in  among  the  terror-stricken  and 
confused  enemy,  many  of  whom  threw  down  their  arms,  yielded 
themselves  prisoners  and  were  sent  to  the  rear.  Those  who  at 
tempted  to  escape  were  pursued  down  the  eastern  slope  of  the 
ridge  and  many  of  them  captured.  Pieces  of  artillery  and 
caissons,  which  the  enemy  were  attempting  to  get  off  down  the 
road — which  leaves  the  summit  of  the  ridge  where  this  com 
mand  gained  -it  and  runs  down  the  eastern  slope  of  the  ridge  to 
the  valley — were  pursued,  some  of  the  horses  shot,  and  the 
artillerists  driven  off  or  captured.  The  command  being  by  this 
time  very  much  scattered,  and  fearing  that  there  might  be  an 
attempt  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  to  regain  the  ridge,  I  caused 
the  rally  to  be  sounded  and  in  as  short  time  as  possible  we  were 
reorganized  and  ready  for  any  movement,  offensive  or  defensive 
and  awaited  orders.  While  resting  here.  Captains  Dawson,  Car 
roll  and  Pettit  were  sent  with  details  from  the  regiment  to  bring 
up  the  artillery  and  caissons  which  \ve  had  compelled  the  enemy 
to  abandon.  They  returned  with  five  pieces  of  artillery  and 
several  caissons.  Shortly  after  this  I  received  the  order  to  join 
the  brigade  on  the  top  of  the  ridge,  which  we  did,  and  our  opera 
tions  for  the  day  were  ended".1 

General  Willich  in  his  official  report,  says:  "At  11  A.  M.  I 

received  an   order  to  prepare   for  an  advance,   and  to  advance 

toward  Missionary  Ridge  at  the  signal  of  six  rapid  cannon  shots. 

I  understand   since  that  the  order  was  given   to  take  only  the 

i    w.  R.  R.,  .—,-27-;. 


374  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

rifle  pits  at  the  foot  of  the  ridge;  by  what  accident  I  am  unable 
to  say,  I  did  not  understand  it  so ;  I  only  understood  the  order 
to  advance.  On  the  given  signal  the  brigade  advanced  in  quick 
time,  but  shell  and  spherical  case  fell  very  thick,  and  all  the 
regiments  double  quicked  until  they  reached  the  rebel  rifle  pits 
and  camps  at  the  foot  of  the  ridge,  driving  the  enemy's  infantry 
before  them,  all  his  artillery  being  on  the  crest  of  the  ridge. 
It  was  evident  to  everyone  that  to  stay  in  this  position  would 
be  certain  destruction  and  final  defeat ;  every  soldier  felt  the 
necessity  of  saving  the  day  and  the  campaign  by  conquering, 
and  every  one  saw  instinctively  that  the  only  place  of  safety  was 
the  enemy's  works  on  the  crest  of  the  ridge.  My  Adjutant  Cap 
tain  Schmitty,  was  already  at  the  extreme  left,  and  Ordnance 
Officer,  Lieutenant  Foot(  who  on  this  occasion  was  wounded 
by  a  shell)  was  sent  to  different  regiments.  I  myself  with  my 
Inspector,  Lieutenant  Green  went  to  the  Eighth  Kansas,  and 
the  command  forward  was  soon  heard  all  along  the  lines,  though 
I  verily  believe  that  even  without  any  command  the  regiments 
would  have  stormed,  as  a  great  number  of  skirmishers  were 
already  climbing  up  the  ridge  before  the  command  was  given. 
The  part  of  the  ridge  which  fell  to  the  share  of  my  brigade 
formed  a  kind  of  crescent ;  two  roads,  one  on  the  right,  one  on 
the  left,  leading  up  the  hill,  there  joining  with  the  roads  on  the 
crest  of  the  ridge  and  forming  the  main  road  to  Chickamauga 
station;  the  only  good  line  of  retreat  of  the  enemy.  The  ascent 
was  (in  the  closer  quarters)  defended  by  one  battery  to  the 
right  and  two  batteries  to  the  left,  on  two  different  rallying  points. 
Many  men  fell  down  exhausted  in  climbing  up  under  the  enemy's 
fire,  some  fainted,  but  irresistible  was  the  general  advance. 
What  so  often  is  uttered  in  eloquent  speeches,  in  comfortable 
salons,  in  State  Houses  and  in  halls  of  Congress  'Victory  or 
Death',  was  here  an  uncomfortable  reality.  The  i*ight  of  the 
brigade  reached  first,  and  mounted  the  enemy's  breast  works, 
consisting  of  men  from  all  the  regiments  of  the  center  and  right. 
From  these  works  they  had  to  charge  the  rallying  enemy  and 
received  the  fire  from  the  batteries  on  the  right  and  on  the  left. 
The  battery  on  the  right  was  taken  in  a  very  few  moments  by 
the  right  of  mine  and  the  left  of  General  Hazen's  brigade.  The 
Thirty-second  Indiana  and  Sixth  Ohio,  claim  the  honor  of  being 
the  first  to  plant  their  colors  on  the  crest ;  but  a  few  moments 
(elapsed)  and  all  the  colors  of  the  brigade  were  in  the  enemy's 
works.  The  Thirty-fifth  Illinois  and  Twenty-fifth  Illinois,  sup 
ported  by  the  Sixty-eighth  Indiana  and  a  portion  of  the  Eighth 
Kansas,  took  the  first  battery  on  the  left,  drove  the  enemy  from 


LOOKOUT  MOUNTAIN  AND  MISSIONARY  RIDGE  375 

the  guns  and  passed  it.  This  battery  was  afterwards  claimed 
as  a  trophy  of  another  command.  Lieutenant  Colonel  Chandler, 
carrying  his  regimental  colors  after  seven  color  sergeants  had 
been  killed  or  wounded,  the  colors  receiving  more  than  thirty 
bullet  holes,  planted  them  on  the  works  where  they  were  soon 
joined  by  those  of  the  Sixty-eighth  Indiana,  Eighty-sixth  In 
diana  and  Fifty-ninth  Ohio  ( the  two  latter  of  General  Samuel 
Beatty's  brigade).  Here  Lieutenant  Colonel  Chandler  wheeled 
the  Thirty-fifth  Illinois  and  Sixty-eighth  Indiana  and  portions 
of  the  Eighty-sixth  Indiana  and  Fifty-ninth  Ohio  to  the  left, 
and  charged  the  enemy  in  the  flank,  while  the  other  regiments 
of  the  brigade  followed  the  fleeing  enemy  down  the  east  slope 
of  the  ridge  and  took  from  him  five  pieces  of  artillery  and  eight 
caisson,  which  had  already  reached  on  their  flight,  a  half  to 
three-quarters  of  a  mile  from  the  crest.  Colonel  Chandler  fol 
lowed  up  the  charge  in  the  flank  of  the  enemy  for  one  and  one- 
half  miles,  joined  by  men  of  Generals  Beatty's  and  Baird's  com 
mands,  who  had  gained  the  crest  in  the  wake  of  the  charge.  I 
then  recalled  my  regiments  from  the  pursuit,  and  received  orders 
from  General  Grant  in  person  to  reform  the  brigade  on  the  crest 
for  further  eventualities,  which  I  did.  Our  trophies,  credited 
to  my  brigade  are  five  pieces  of  artillery,  eight  caissons,  1200 
stand  of  small  arms,  two  battle  flags,  and  between  300  and  400 
prisoners,  though  properly  it  is  entitled  to  more.  It  should  be 
a  rule  that  no  command  has  a  right  to  claim  a  trophy  which  it 
finds  and  from  which  it  does  not  drive  the  enemy  by  force  of 
arms".1 

General  Thomas  J.  Wood,  who  was  for  so  long  a  time  our 
beloved  division  commander,  describes  our  assault  on  Missionary 
Ridge  so  clearly  and  comprehensively  in  his  official  report  that 
the  historian  is  loth  to  omit  a  line  of  it.  He  says : 

"I  was  ordered  to  advance  and  carrying  the  enemy's  intrench- 
ments  at  the  base  of  Mission  Ridge  and  hold  them.  The  signal 
for  the  advance  was  to  be  six  guns,  fired  in  rapid  succession 
from  the  battery  on  Orchard  Knob.  The  necessary  instructions 
were  given  to  the  brigade  commanders.  *  *  *  Mission 
Ridge  is  an  elevated  range  with  an  average  altitude  of  several 
hundred  feet  above  the  general  level  of  the  country,  running 
from  northeast  to  southwest.  The  part  of  it  assaulted  by  my 
dvision  *  *  *  is  about  four  miles  from  Chattanooga  and 
about  a  mile  from  Orchard  Knob.  Between  the  latter  and  the 
base  of  Mission  Ridge  there  is  a  broad  wooded  valley.  Of 
course  this  had  to  be  traversed  before  the  intrenchments  at  the 

1      W.   R.   R.,  55- 263. 


376  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

base  of  the  ridge  could  be  assaulted.  So  soon  as  my  troops  be 
gan  to  move  forward  the  enemy  opened  a  terrific  fire  from  his 
batteries  on  the  crest  of  the  ridge.  The  batteries  were  so  posted 
as  to  give  a  direct  and  cross  fire  on  the  assailing  troops.  It 
would  not,  perhaps,  be  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  the  enemy 
had  fifty  pieces  of  artillery  disposed  on  the  crest  of  Mission 
Ridge.  But  the  rapid  firing  of  all  this  mass  of  artillery  could 
not  stay  the  onward  movement  of  our  troops.  They  pressed 
forward  with  dauntless  ardor,  and  carried  the  line  of  entrench 
ments  at  the  base  of  the  ridge.  The  assault  was  so 
rapid  that  a  considerable  number  of  prisoners  were  captured  in 
the  intrenchments.  When  the  first  line  of  intrenchments  was 
carried,  the  goal  for  which  we  had  started  was  won.  Our  orders 
carried  us  no  further.  We  had  been  instructed  to  carry  the 
line  of  intrenchments  at  the  base  of  the  ridge  and  there  halt. 
But  the  enthusiasm  and  impetuosity  of  the  troops  were  such  that 
those  who  first  reached  the  intrenchments  at  the  base  of  the 
ridge  bounded  over  them,  and  pressed  on  up  the  ascent  after 
the  flying  enemy.  Moreover,  the  intrenchments  were  no  pro 
tection  against  the  enemy's  artillery  on  the  ridge.  To  remain 
would  be  destruction — to  return  would  be  both  expensive  in  life 
and  disgraceful.  Officers  and  men  all  seemed  impressed  with 
this  truth.  In  addition,  the  example  of  those  who  commenced 
to  ascend  the  ridge  so  soon  as  the  intrenchments  were  carried, 
was  contagious.  Without  waiting  for  an  order  the  vast  mass 
pressed  forward  in  the  race  for  glory,  each  man  anxious  to  be 
the  first  on  the  summit.  The  enemy's  artillery  and  musketry 
could  not  check  the  impetuous  assault.  The  troops  did  not  halt 
to  fire.  To  have  done  so  would  have  been  ruinous.  Little  was 
left  to  the  commanders  of  the  troops  than  to  cheer  on  the  fore 
most — to  encourage  the  weaker  of  limb,  and  to  sustain  the  very 
few  who  seemed  to  be  faint  hearted.  To  the  eternal  honor  of 
the  troops,  it  should  be  recorded  that  the  laggards  were,  indeed, 
few  in  number.  The  interval  which  elapsed  between  the  carry 
ing  of  the  intrenchments  at  the  base  of  the  ridge  and  the  crown 
ing  of  the  summit  must  have  been  one  of  intense  and  painful 
anxiety  to  all  who  were  not  participants  in  the  assault.  The 
ascent  of  Mission  Ridge  was  indeed  an  effort  to  try  the  strongest 
limbs  and  stoutest  hearts.  But  surprise  and  anxiety  were  not  of 
long  duration.  Upward  steadily  went  the  standard  of  the  Union 
(borne  onward  by  strong  arms,  upheld  by  stout  hearts)  and 
soon  it  was  seen  flying  on  the  crest  of  Mission  Ridge.  Loud 
indeed  were  the  shouts  with  which  this  spectacle  was  received. 
Some  of  the  first  troops  on  the  crest  of  the  ridge  pressed  forward 
in  pursuit  of  the  fleeing  enemy  immediately  in  front  of  them. 


LOOKOUT  MOUNTAIN  AND  MISSIONARY  RIDGE  377 

while  others  (with  great  good  sense  on  the  part  of  their  brigade 
commanders)  were  deployed  to  the  right  and  left  to  clear  the 
ridge  and  relieve  the  pressure  on  the  troops  that  had  not  gained 
the  summit.  The  good  effect  of  the  flank  attacks  was  almost 
instantaneously  apparent,  and  soon  the  entire  crest  was  occupied 
by  our  troops.  Mission  Ridge  was  ours.  *  *  *  The  assualt 
on  Mission  Ridge  is  certainly  one  of  the  most  remarkable 
achievements  that  have  ever  occurred.  Military  history  would 
probably  be  ransacked  in  vain  for  a  parallel.  With  so  much  of 
physical  obstacle  to  overcome,  with  so  much  armed  resistence 
encountered,  probably  no  assault  was  ever  so  eminently  success 
ful.  In  fifty  minutes  from  the  time  the  advance  commenced  the 
first  flags  were  seen  flying  on  the  crest  of  the  ridge.1 

General  Granger  in  his  official  report  describes  the  topo 
graphy  of  the  battle  ground  much  as  General  Wood  does,  and  adds 
that  "in  front  of  Mission  Ridge  the  enemy  had  cleared  away  the 
timber  for  a  distance  of  from  300  to  500  yards,  so  as  to  leave  no 
obstruction  to  a  direct  and  enfilading  fire  from  them."  He  de 
scribes  the  preliminaries  to  the  advance  and  the  advance  itself 
as  follows :  "At  daylight  the  next  morning,  November  25,  Major 
General  Sherman,  having  crossed  the  Tennessee  River  at  the 
designated  points,  gained  possession  of  the  northern  end  of  the 
ridge  near  the  railroad  tunnel.  Long  columns  of  the  enemy 
could  be  seen  before  sunrise  moving  towards  that  point,  and  it 
was  not  late  in  the  day  before  their  guns,  with  General  Sher 
man's  briskly  replying,  were  heard  opening  the  battle.  For 
hours  my  command,  from  behind  their  breast  works,  anxiously 
and  impatiently  watched  this  struggle  of  their  brothers  in  arms 
awray  off  to  their  left,  on  the  northern  end  of  the  ridge.  They 
saw  these  veterans  from  Vicksburg  coming  to  their  relief  and 
engaging  the  same  enemy  who  had  beleaguered  them  for  nine 
long  weeks,  holding  them  in  their  defensive  works  by  strong 
lines  of  circumvallation  that  rested  upon  Lookout  Mountain  and 
Mission  Ridge  and  in  the  Cattanooga  Valley,  and  that  stretched 
like  an  iron  crescent  from  the  river  on  their  right  to  the  river 
on  their  left.  As  the  day  wore  on,  their  impatience  of  restraint 
gathered  force  and  their  desire  to  advance  became  almost  un 
controllable  ;  at  last  came  the  order  to  move.  General  Sherman 
was  unable  to  make  any  progress  in  moving  along  the  ridge 
during  the  day,  as  the  enemy  had  massed  in  his  front,  therefore, 
in  order  to  relieve  him,  I  was  ordered  to  make  a  demonstration 
upon  the  works  of  enemy  directly  in  my  front,  at  the  base  of 
Mission  Ridge.  I  accordingly  directed  Major  General  Sheridan 
and  Brigadier  General  Wood  to  advance  their  divisions  at  a 

1     W.   R.  R.   55-257-258.  Sig.    13 


378  FlBTEENTH    OHIO   VOLUNTEERS    AND    CAMPAIGNS 

given  signal,  moving  directly  forward  simultaneously  and 
briskly,  to  attack  the  enemy,  and,  driving  him  from  his  rifle  pits, 
to  take  possession  of  them.  At  twenty  minutes  before  4  P.  M. 
six  guns,  the  signal  agreed  upon,  were  fired  in  rapid  succession, 
and  before  the  smoke  had  cleared  away  these  two  divisions, 
(Sheridan  on  the  right  and  Wood  on  the  left)  had  cleared  the 
breast  works  that  had  sheltered  them  for  two  days,  and  were 
moving  forward.  They  were  formed  in  the  following  order: 
first  a  double  line  of  skirmishers  *  *  *  then  the  line  of 
battle  by  brigades,  commencing  on  the  extreme  right  with 
Colonel  Sherman's  brigade,  then  Colonel  Marker's,  then  General 
Wagner's,  then  General  Hazen's,  then  General  Willich's  and 
next,  on  the  extreme  left  General  Beatty's;  following  this  line 
were  the  reserves  in  mass.  *  *  *  At  the  moment  of  the 
advance  *  *  *  Mission  Ridge  blazed  with  the  fire  from  the 
batteries  which  lined  its  summit.  Not  less  than  fifty  guns  opened 
at  once,  throwing  a  terrible  shower  of  shot  and  shell.  The 
enemy,  now  taking  the  alarm,  commenced  to  move  troops  from 
both  extremities  of  the  ridge  for  the  purpose  of  filling  up  the 
works  below  and  around  these  batteries.  In  the  meantime  the 
troops  holding  the  woods  were  driven  back  to  the  works  at  the 
base  of  the  ridge,  their  pursuers  rapidly  following.  Here  they 
halted  and  made  a  stout  resistence,  but  our  troops,  by  an  im 
petuous  assault,  broke  this  line  in  several  places;  then  scaling 
the  breast  works  at  these  points,  opened  a  flank  and  reverse  fire 
upon  them,  which  throwing  them  into  confusion,  caused  their 
precipitate  flight.  Many  prisoners  were  left  in  our  hands,  and 
we  captured  a  large  number  of  small  arms.  My  orders  had  now 
been  fully  and  successfully  carried  out,  but  not  enough  had  been 
done  to  satisfy  the  brave  troops  who  had  accomplished  so  much. 
Although  the  batteries  at  short  range,  by  direct  and  enfilading 
fire,  were  still  pouring  down  upon  them  a  shower  of  iron,  and 
musketry  from  the  hillside  and  thinning  their  ranks,  they  dashed 
over  the  breast  works,  through  the  rifle  pits,  and  started  up  the 
ridge.  They  started  without  orders  along  the  whole  line  of 
both  divisions  from  right  to  left  and  from  left  to  right,  simul 
taneously  and  with  one  accord,  animated  with  one  spirit  and 
with  heroic  courage.  Eagerly  they  rushed  forward  to  a  danger 
before  which  the  bravest,  marching  under  orders,  might  tremble. 
Officers  caught  the  enthusiasm  of  the  men  and  the  men  in  turn 
were  cheered  by  the  officers.  Each  regiment  tried  to  surpass 
the  other  in  fighting  its  way  up  a  hill  which  would  try  those  of 
stout  limb  and  strong  lungs  to  climb,  and  each  tried  to  place  its 
flag  first  on  the  summit.  Above  these  men  was  an  additional 
line  of  rifle  pits,  filled  with  troops.  What  was  on  the  summit 


LOOKOUT  MOUNTAIN  AND  MISSIONARY  RIDGE  379 

of  the  ridge  they  knew  not.  and  did  not  stop  to  inquire.  The 
enemy  was  before  them ;  to  know  that  was  sufficient.  *  * 
I  sent  my  assistant  adjutant  general  to  inquire  first  of  General 
Wood  and  then  of  General  Sheridan,  whether  the  troops  had 
been  ordered  up  by  them ;  and  to  instruct  them  to  take  the  ridge 
if  possible.  In  reply  to  this  General  Wood  told  him  that  the 
men  had  started  up  the  ridge  without  orders,  and  that  he  could 
take  if  it  he  could  be  supported.  In  the  meantime  an  aide-de 
camp  from  General  Sheridan  had  reported  to  me  that  the  general 
wished  to  know  whether  the  order  that  had  been  given  to  take 
the  rifle  pits  'meant  those  at  the  base  of  the  ridge  or  those  on 
top'.  My  reply  was  that  the  order  had  been  to  take  those  at 
the  base.  Conceiving  this  to  be  an  order  to  fall  back  to  these 
rifle  pits,  and  on  his  way  to  General  Sheridan  so  reporting  it  to 
General  Wagner,  commanding  Second  Brigade  of  Sheridan's 
division,  this  brigade  was  withdrawn  from  a  position  which  it 
had  gained  on  the  side  of  the  ridge  to  the  rifle  pits,  which  were 
being  raked  by  the  enemy's  artillery,  from  this  point,  starting 
again  under  a  terrible  fire,  made  the  ascent  of  the  ridge.  My 
assistant  adjutant  general,  on  his  way  to  General  Sheridan,  re 
ported  to  me  General  Wood's  reply,  but  by  my  instructions  went 
no  further  with  the  message  which  I  had  given  him,  as  I  had 
already  sent  Captain  Avery,  my  aide-de-camp,  directly  to  Gen 
eral  Sheridan,  with  orders  to  go  ahead  and  take  the  ridge  if 
he  could.  I  had  also  in  the  meantime  sent  all  the  rest  of  my 
staff  officers,  some  of  them  to- deliver  similar  messages  to  Gen 
eral  Sheridan  and  General  Wood — fearing  the  first  messages 
might  not  get  through — and  others  to  order  up  the  reserves  and 
every  man  that  remained  behind  to  the  support  of  the  troops 
starting  up  the  ridge.  *  *  *  Through  the  shower  of  musket 
shot  that  came  from  above,  climbing  up  the  ridge  over  rocks  and 
felled  timber,  my  command  marched  upward.  In  just  one  hour, 
(General  Wood  says  fifty  minutes)4  from  the  time  of  leaving 
Orchard  Knob  it  was  driving  the  enemy  from  his  last  line  of 
breastworks  and  rifle  pits  and  capturing  his  batteries.  *  *  * 
The  bold  and  successful  attempt  to  storm  Mission  Ridge,  the 
results  which  followed,  the  short  time  consumed  in  beating  back 
the  enemy,  and  the  fruits  of  victory  render  this  one  of  the  most 
remarkable  battles  of  the  age.  The  ridge  was  taken  after  a  hard 
struggle,  and  those  who  looked  on  from  below  were  unable  to 
tell  which  division  or  what  regiment  first  reached  its  summit, 
for  along  my  whole  line  many  regiments  appeared  to  dash  over 
the  breastworks  on  the  crest  at  the  same  moment.  Although  it 
took  but  one  hour  to  gain  the  ridge,  my  command  lost  20.21 

1     Pace  377  ante. 


380  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

per  cent  of  the  forces  engaged  in  killed  and  wounded.  .  ,We 
captured  thirty-one  pieces  of  artillery  and  3812  prisoners.''1 

General  Thomas  in  his  official  report  says : 

"Instructions  were  sent  to  General  Hooker  to  be  ready  to 
advance  on  the  morning  of  the  twenty-fifth  from  his  position 
on  the  point  of  Lookout  Mountain  to  the  Summertown  road  and 
endeavor  to  interrupt  the  enemy's  retreat,  if  he  had  not  already 
withdrawn,  which  he  was  to  ascertain  by  pushing  a  reconnois- 
sance  to  the  top  of  Lookout  Mountain.  The  reconnaissance  was 
made  as  directed,  and  having  ascertained  that  the  enemy  had 
evacuated  during  the  night,  General  Hooker  was  then  directed 
to  move  on  the  Rossville  road  with  the  troops  under  his  com 
mand  (except  Carlin's  brigade  which  was  to  rejoin  its  division), 
carry  the  pass  at  Rossville  and  operate  on  the  enemy's  left  and 
rear.  Palmer's  and  Granger's  troops  were  held  in  readiness  to 
advance  directly  on  the  rifle  pits  in  their  front  as  soon  as 
Hooker  could  get  into  position  at  Rossville.  In  retiring  on  the 
night  of  the  twenty-fourth,  the  enemy  had  destroyed  the  briges 
over  Chattanooga  Creek  on  the  road  leading  from  Chattanooga 
to  Rossville,  and  in  consequence  General  Hooker  was  delayed 
until  after  2  P.  M.  in  effecting  the  crossing  of  the  creek.  About 
noon  General  Sherman  becoming  heavily  engaged  by  the  enemy, 
they  having  massed  a  strong  force  in  his  front,  orders  were 
given  for  General  Baird  to  march  his  division  within  supporting 
distance  of  General  Sherman.  Moving  his  division  promptly 
in  the  direction  indicated,  he  was  placed  in  position  to  the  left 
of  Wood's  division  of  Granger's  corps.  Owing  to  the  difficul 
ties  of  the  ground,  his  troops  did  not  get  in  line  with  Granger's 
until  about  2  :30  p.  m.  Orders  were  then  given  him.  however, 
to  move  forward  on  Granger's  left  and  within  supporting  dis 
tance,  against  the  enemy's  rifle  pits  on  the  slope  and  at  the  foot 
of  Missionary  Ridge.  The  whole  line  then  advanced  against 
the  breastworks  and  soon  became  warmly  engaged  with  the 
enemy's  skirmishers ;  these,  giving  way,  retired  upon  their  re 
serves,  posted  within  their  works.  Our  troops  advancing  steadily 
in  a  continuous  line,  the  enemy,  seized  with  panic,  abandoned 
the  works  at  the  foot  of  the  hill  and  retreated  precipitately  to 
the  crest,  where  they  were  closely  followed  by  our  troops,  who, 
apparently  inspired  by  the  impulse  of  victory,  carried  the  hill 
simultaneously  at  six  different  points  and  so  closely  on  the  heels 
of  the  enemy  that  many  of  them  were  taken  prisoners  in  the 
trenches.  We  captured  all  their  cannon  and  ammunition  before 
they  could  be  removed  or  destroyed".2 

1  W.   R.   R.,   55-257. 

2  W.    R.    R.,    55-127. 


LOOKOUT  MOUNTAIN  AND  MISSIONARY  RIDGE  381 

Lieutenant  Colonel  John  McClenahan  who  was  then  Major 
of  the  Fifteenth  Ohio,  and,  as  before  stated,  was  in  command 
of  our  skirmishers,  in  a  paper  read  at  Monmouth  College,  Illi 
nois,  gave  his  recollections  of  the  battle  as  follows : 

''The  Army  of  the  Cumberland  was  directed  to  storm  the 
ridge  (Missionary  Ridge),  and  I  was  ordered  to  take  command 
of  the  division's  skirmish  line.  I  asked  General  Willich  where 
we  should  stop.  He  replied  'I  don't  know,  at  H —  -  Hades,  I 
expect'.  The  skirmish  line  pushed  across  the  valley  to  the  foot 
of  the  ridge.  We  found  we  could  not  stop  there  but  were  forced 
to  mount  the  ridge  half  way,  where  we  halted  to  await  the  line 
of  battle  then  approaching  the  valley.  The  approach  of  the  army 
crossing  the  valley  was  the  grandest  sight  I  saw  during  the  war. 
50,000  men,  the  whole  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  Hooker's 
corps  on  the  right  and  Howard's  corps  on  the  left,  in  line  of 
battle,  with  the  line  of  reserves  in  column  behind, — all  plainly  in 
sight  at  one  time — each  regiment  slightly  V  shaped  with  the 
colors  at  the  apex — the  enemy's  cannon  firing  over  our  heads 
from  the  ridge  above  us,  and  the  heavy  guns  of  Fort  Wood  firing 
over  our  army  at  the  enemy  above.  Soon  as  our  battle  lines 
arrived,  we  pushed  forward  on  up.  The  enemy  abandoned  their 
works  and  we  captured  the  ridge  after  determined  and  hard 
fighting." 

Major  Joseph  N.  Dubois,  who  was  adjutant  of  the  regi 
ment  at  the  time,  in  a  letter  dated  May  9,  1909,  at  Dallas, 
Texas,  where  he  now  resides,  says : 

"You  will  recall  the  charge  on  Mission  Ridge,  how  we 
pressed  up  the  gully  until  we  came  to  the  works ;  how  the 
men  lifted  the  front  ones  up  so  they  could  reach  the  top 
of  the  breastworks ;  how,  when  Captain  J.  C.  Cummins  was 
lifted  over,  he  being  in  my  judgment  the  first  man  on  top,  and 
received  the  wound  that  caused  his  death.  I  was  within 
five  feet  of  him  at  the  time,  but  did  not  stop  to  see  him,  but 
soon  got  together  a  score  of  the  boys  from  the  different  com 
panies  and  pushed  over  the  top,  and  shot  the  front  artillery 
horses  of  the  retreating  enemy  as  they  were  attempting  to 
escape  down  a  road  on  the  opposite  side,  thus  causing  them 
to  lose  a  large  quantity  of  artillery.  Then,  indeed,  in  my 
enthusiasm,  did  I  pray  for  daylight,  for  if  we  had  had  two 
hours  more,  we  would  have  compelled  a  large  surrender." 

Washington  J.  Vance  of  Company  K,  a  short  time  before 
his  death  in  1910,  related  his  experience  in  the  capture  of  the 
enemy's  artillery,  and  remembered  that  he  and  others  fired  at 
and  brought  down  some  of  the  horses  of  the  enemy's  artillery 
which  was  trying  to  escape,  and  that  he  and  T.  C.  McColley 


382  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

of  Company  G,  captured  two  of  the  horses  and  rode  them  up 
to  where  General  Willich  was  surrounded  by  the  men  of  the 
brigade,  and  saying :  "My  poys,  you  kills  me  mit  joy,  you 
kills  me  mit  joy." 

January  25,  1909,  Lieutenant  Samuel  C.  McKirahan,  then 
a  non-commissioned  officer  of  Company  F,  wrote  a  letter 
from  Los  Angeles,  Cal.,  recalling  his  experiences  at  Orchard 
Knob  and  Missionary  Ridge,  as  follows : 

"November  23,  we  marched  out  in  front  of  Fort  Wood 
and  formed  in  line,  as  some  thought,  for  dress  parade. 
We  were  ordered  to  advance,  and  hardly  before  we  knew  it, 
our  regiment  and  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  had  possession  of 
Orchard  Knob,  Avhere  General  Grant  established  his  head 
quarters.  From  that  position  we  witnessed  Hooker's  men 
charging  the  face  of  Lookout  Mountain  on  the  24th.  Next 
forenoon  we  saw  the  rebs  marching  along  on  Mission  Ridge 
going  to  our  left  against  Sherman,  who  had  crossed  the  Ridge 
and  was  threatening  their  rear.  I  was  but  a  few  feet  from 
General  Grant  when  Sherman  opened  up  communication,  and 
reported  that  the  rebels  were  pushing  him  back.  Soon  after 
this  four  companies  of  our  regiment,  A,  B,  F  and  G,  were 
ordered  out  on  the  skirmish  line.  A  short  time  after  this  our 
Major  and  Bugler  came  to  us  (we  were  supporting  Company 
A)  and  said  they  were  ordered  there;  they  didn't  know  what 
for.  We  had  not  long  to  wait.  First  a  shot  was  fired  from 
headquarters,  and  then  all  along  the  line  came  the  bugle  call 
to  go  forward.  That  is  all  the  order  we  had,  all  we  got.  In 
fact,  we  didn't  want  any  more — you  know  the  result. 

When  the  skirmishers  had  climbed  up  about  two-thirds 
or  three-fourths  of  the  way,  we  came  to  a  halt  and  for  the 
first  time  I  thought  of  looking  back.  I  was  surprised  to  see 
we  had  no  support.  I  said  to  one  of  Company  A,  'What  are 
we  going  to  do  up  here?  Why  don't  they  send  us  support? 
They  can  easily  capture  this  little  line.'  Just  then  Company 
A's  man  said,  'Look!  Yonder  they  come.'  As  they  came 
across  the  valley  on  double  quick,  flags  unfurled,  arms  at 
right  shoulder  shift,  their  bright  barrels  glistening  as  the  sun 
shone  on  them,  it  certainly  was  a  grand  and  inspiring  sight. 
As  they  approached,  the  skirmishers,  with  a  shout,  arose  as 
one  man,  and  we  were  soon  climbing  over  the  rebel  w^orks  on 
top  of  the  ridge.  Thomas  B.  Jackson  of  Company  F,  claimed 
the  honor  of  being  the  first  man  in  the  works  in  our  front.1 
The  Johnnies  hardly  began  to  move  their  artillery  until  we, 
the  skirmishers,  were  inside  their  works.  The  country  being 

1     Morris  Cope,  then  a   noncommissioned  officer  of  Company   E  thinks   that  Jackson 
was  the  first  man  of  the  regiment  inside  the  works. 


LOOKOUT  MOUNTAIN  AND  MISSIONARY  RIDGE  383 

very  rugged  and  broken  we  took  cross-cuts  and  captured  men, 
horses  and  guns.  I  remember  so  well  Company  F  boys  fol 
lowing  an  outfit  of  that  kind  quite  a  distance  and  coming 
back  with  the  whole  shooting  match,  riding  the  horses  and 
compelling  the  rebs  they  had  taken  prisoners  to  march  back 
on  foot.  Of  course  we  had  a  jollification  when  General  Wil- 
lich  came  up.  With  hat  in  hand,  as  usual,  and  laughing,  he 
said:  'Look!  As  I  was  coming  up  the  hill  I  saw  a  son-of-a- 
gun  stopped  behind  a  stump,  and  jumped  on  him  and  kicked 
him,  and  see,  I  broke  all  my  spurs.'  About  that  time  there 
was  a  great  shout  from  the  Company  F  boys,  and  General 
Willich  came  running  and  said  :  'What !  What  is  de  matter 
now?'  Captain  Glover  said:  'Best  news  of  all,  General,  our 
company  cook  has  brought  us  two  big  kettles  of  hot  coffee.' 
And  so  he  had.  Away  back  in  camp  at  Fort  Wood,  Dave 
Mills,  our  cook,  as  soon  as  he  saw  us  start  up  the  ridge,  left 
camp  with  the  hot  coffee  and  followed  on  after  until  he 
reached  us  and  delivered  the  goods." 

Colonel  Askew  concludes  his  official  report  of  the  part 
the  Fifteenth  Ohio  took  in  the  grand  movements  and  battles 
described  in  this  chapter  as  follows : 

"I  desire  to  call  the  attention  of  the  General  to  the  gallant 
conduct  of  Sergeant  Ward,1  our  brave  color  bearer,  who, 
while  climbing  up  the  ridge  with  the  colors  ,in  advance  of  the 
regiment,  received  a  severe  wound.  The  colors  were  taken 
up  by  Corporal  Norton,  one  of  the  color  guard,  and  borne  on 
up,  and  we  have  the  gratification  of  knowing  were  among  the 
first  planted  on  the  enemy's  works.  Robert  B.  Brown,  a  pri 
vate  of  Company  A,  also  deserves  special  mention  for  having 
captured  a  flag  of  the  enemy.  Major  McClenahan  and  Adju 
tant  Dubois  *  *  *  fully  sustained  their  reputation  as 
brave  men  and  good  officers,  which  they  had  gained  on  other 
battlefields.  Captain  J.  C.  Cummins  (who  had  his  arm  shot 
away  after  he  had  gained  the  top  of  the  ridge),  Captain 
Glover,  Captain  Dawson,  Captain  Carroll,  Captain  G.  W. 
Cummins,  Captain  Pettit,  and  Captain  Byrd  (who  was  again 
wounded,  having  just  rejoined  the  regiment  from  an  absence 
on  account  of  wound  received  at  Chickamauga)  were  con 
spicuous  for  their  gallantry,  and  were  with  their  men,  cheer 
ing  them  on.  The  subalterns  of  the  regiment  bore  themselves 
well  and  rendered  valuable  service.  Lieutenant  Sanders,  who 
was  killed,  although  lately  promoted,  gave  promise  of  being 
as  good  an  officer  as  he  was  an  excellent  soldier.  *  * 

1  regret  that  on  account  of  the  already  voluminous  ex 
tent  of  this  report  I  cannot  furnish  you  the  names  of  every 


384  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

non-commissioned  officer  and  private  of  this  regiment  who 
participated  in  the  assault  on  Mission  Ridge,  but  I  hope  that 
measures  may  be  taken  to  have  their  names  preserved  and 
recorded,  so  that  in  after  days,  when  their  labors  shall  have 
been  rewarded  with  the  blessings  of  peace,  they  may  be  able 
to  point  with  pride  to  the  fact  that  they  were  among  the 
heroes  of  Mission  Ridge. 

Our  loss  was  as  follows : 

KILLED. — Commissioned   officers,   one ;   enlisted   men,   three. 

WOUNDED. — Commissioned  officers,  two ;  enlisted  men, 
eighteen ;  total,  twenty-four".1 

Their  names  as  gleaned  from  the  official  rolls  and  rosters 
are  as  follows : 

KILLED,     WOUNDED    AND     MISSING,     MISSIONARY    RIDGE,     NOVEMBER 

25,  1863. 

COMPANY  A. 

KILLED  OR  DIED  OF  WOUNDS  RECEIVED  IN  BATTLE. — Captain 
James  C.  Cummins  (wounded  and  died  of  wounds  February  19, 
1864. 

WOUNDED. — Samuel  Rankin. 

COMPANY  B. 
KILLED. — Simon  Sines,  Clark  Sears. 

COMPANY  c. 

WOUNDED. — Captain  John  G.  Byrd,  Sergeant  William  A. 
Ward,  Joseph  P.  Moulton,  William  C.  Markward,  Richard  L. 

Wreim  COMPANY  D. 

WOUNDED. — Oscar  Davis,  Henry  C.  Nagle. 

COMPANY  E. 
WOUNDED. — William  R.  Davis,  William  H.  Hays. 

COMPANY   F. 

WOUNDED. — James  K.  Barker,  Asbury  Welsh. 

COMPANY   G. 

WOUNDED. — H.  P.  Hagerman,  George  H.  Stone,  William 
S.  Williams.  COMPANY  H. 

WOUNDED. — Sergeant  Joseph  S.  Lehew,  Henry  J.  Flagg, 
Christian  M.  Haverstick. 

COMPANY  K. 

KILLED. — Lieutenant  Frank  W.  Sanders,  Balaam  Norris. 

The  battle  of  Missionary  Ridge  was    probably  the  most 

spectacular   engagement    during   the   war.      The    setting   was 

1     W.  R.  R.   55,  page  275. 


LOOKOUT  MOUNTAIN  AND  MISSIONARY  RIDGE  38& 

superb.  The  day  was  clear  and  fine,  and  the  whole  line  of 
our  advance  could  be  plainly  seen  from  Chattanooga.  Non- 
combatants  who  witnessed  our  charge  on  the  ridge  spoke  and 
wrote  of  it  as  something  almost  miraculous.  The  enemy's 
position  on  the  crest  of  the  ridge,  fortified  as  it  was,  with 
more  than  fifty  cannon  in  position  to  defend  it,  seemed  im 
pregnable.  General  Willich,  when  first  told  that  we  were 
expected  to  assault  it,  said :  "Veil,  I  makes  my  vill."  It 
is  quite  evident  from  the  official  reports  that  some  general 
officers  doubted  the  wisdom  of  a  direct  assault,  and  that  Gen 
eral  Grant,  who  had  given  the  order  for  such  assault  simul 
taneously  with  General  Sherman's  attack  on  the  north  end  of 
the  ridge,  possibly  withheld  its  execution,  hoping  Sherman's 
success  on  the  left  and  Hooker's  advance  on  the  Rossville  road, 
would  make  it  unnecessary.  General  Bragg  in  his  official  report 
says  :  "Such  was  the  strength  of  our  position  that  no  doubt  was 
entertained  of  our  ability  to  hold  it.  *  *  *  The  position  was  one 
which  ought  to  have  been  held  by  a  line  of  skirmishers  against 
any  assaulting  column,  and  wherever  resistence  was  made  the 
enemy  fled  in  disorder  after  suffering  heavy  loss.  Those  who 
reached  the  ridge  did  so  in  a  condition  of  exhaustion  from  the 
great  physical  effort  in  climbing,  which  rendered  them  power 
less,  and  the  slightest  effort  would  have  destroyed  them."1 

Mr.  Chas.  A.  Dana,  Assistant  Secretary  of  War,  witnessed 
the  assault,  and  telegraphed  Secretary  Stanton  :  "The  storm 
ing  of  the  ridge  by  our  troops  was  one  of  the  greatest  miracles 
in  military  history.  No  man  who  climbs  the  ascent  by  any 
of  the  roads  that  wind  along  its  front  can  believe  that  18,000 
men  were  moved  up  its  broken  and  crumbling  face  unless  it 
was  his  fortune  to  witness  the  deed.  It  seems  as  awful  as  a 
visible  interposition  of  God."2. 

The  whole  moving  force  seemed  to  be  inspired  with  a 
noble  rage,  which  spurned  death  and  any  obstacle  however 
great.  The  whole  valley  resounded  with  cheers,  and  even  the 
wounded,  whose  voices  were  not  silenced,  joined  in  the  cheer 
ing.  Major  William  M.  Clark,  Surgeon  of  the  Fifteenth  Ohio, 
relates  that  a  boy  of  not  more  than  18  or  19  years  came  back 
with  one  arm  hanging  limp  at  his  side,  cheering,  and  swinging 
his  cap  with  the  other.  He  examined  him  and  found  that  the 
limp  arm  was  literally  shot  off,  that  the  shot  had  knocked  him 
down  and  that  in  falling,  his  coat  sleeve  had  been  twisted  so 
as  to  stop  the  flow  of  blood,  and  in  this  condition  he  had 
started  back  down  the  ridge,  cheering  and  waving  his  cap. 

Mr.  Dana  must  have  partaken  of  the  enthusiasm,  for  at 

1  W.  R.  R.   55-6fi 

2  W.  R.  R.  55-69. 


386  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

4:30  P.  M.,  he  telegraphed  to  Secretary  Stanton  :  "Glory  to 
God.  The  day  is  decisively  ours;  Missionary  Ridge  has  just 
been  carried  by  a  magnificent  charge  of  Thomas'  troops,  and 
rebels  routed."1 

After  the  battle,  it  seems,  almost  every  regiment,  brigade 
and  division  of  our  corps  were  "so  covetous  of  honor"  as  to 
be  "the  most  offending  souls  alive."  All  made  claim  to  having 
first  planted  its  colors  on  the  crest  of  the  ridge,  and  nearly  all 
made  claim  to  the  trophies  of  victory — the  captured  cannon 
and  prisoners.  General  Willich  strongly  intimates  that  other 
commands  laid  claim  to  some  of  the  cannon  our  brigade  cap 
tured,  and  General  Sheridan  openly  charged  that  General 
Hazen  had  taken  and  claimed  credit  for  eleven  cannon  which 
his  division  had  captured.2  General  Willich  in  his  official 
report  only  claims  the  capture  of  five  pieces  of  artillery  by 
our  brigade.  But  Colonel  Askew,  as  will  be  remembered,  re 
ported  the  capture  of  five  pieces,  and  that  he  "sent  Captains 
Dawson,  Carroll  and  Pettit  to  bring  up  the  artillery  and 
caissons  which  we  had  compelled  the  enemy  to  abandon,'* 
who  "returned  with  five  pieces  of  artillery  and  several  cais 
sons."  Colonel  Nodine  of  the  Twenty-fifth  Illinois,  reports 
the  capture  of  "one  James  rifled  cannon  and  seven  caissons 
loaded  with  ammunition"  f>  Colonel  Chandler,  Thirty-fifth 
Illinois,  reports  the  capture  of  two  cannon  by  his  regiment  ;4 
Colonel  Erdelmeyer  of  the  Thirty-second  Indiana,  says  his 
regiment  captured  five  pieces  of  artillery  with  caissons  ;•""' 
Colonel  Martin  of  the  Eighth  Kansas,  officially  reports  that 
his  regiment  "assisted  in  capturing  and  hauling  off  several 
pieces  of  artillery  and  caissons,  which  the  enemy  were  trying 
to  run  off"  ;6  Colonel  Gray  of  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio,  says  his 
regiment  contributed  to  the  capture  of  "several  pieces  of 
artillery."7 

It  is  not  strange  that  these  conflicting  claims  should 
have  been  made.  In  climbing  the  ridge  the  lines  of  regiments 
were  broken,  the  reserves  in  the  second  line  pressed  forward 
into  first  line,  and  all  were  eager  to  be  first  in  the  enemy's 
works.  General  Wood  in  his  official  report  treats  these  con 
flicting  claims  fairly  and  justly  as  follows: 

"As  is  not  at  all  singular,  there  is  a  difference  of  opinion 
as  to  what  troops  first  crowned  the  summit  of  Mission  Ridge. 
All  the  different  divisions  engaged  in  the  assault  set  up  claims 
to  this  honor.  The  brigades  of  the  same  division  (I  know  it 

1  W.  R.  R.  55-68.  5  W.  R.  R.  55-271. 

2  W.  R.  R.  55-192.  6  W.  R.  R.  55-274. 

3  W.  R.  R.  55-266.  7  W.  R.  R.  55-278. 

4  W.  R.  R.  55-268. 


LOOKOUT  MOUNTAIN  AND  MISSIONARY  RIDGE  387 

is  so  in  my  division)  have  conflicting  claims,  and  in  like  man 
ner  the  regiments  of  the  same  brigade  lay  claim  to  the  honor. 
Each  commander,  observing  of  course,  his  own  troops  more 
closely  than  others,  is  disposed  to  think,  with  all  honesty, 
that  his  command  was  first  on  the  crest.  While  I  am  liable 
to  be  mistaken,  I  sincerely  think  a  considerable  portion  of 
my  division  were  the  first  troops  that  reached  the  summit ; 
but  I  am  not  able  to  discriminate  with  certainty  which  one 
of  the  three  brigades  was  first  up.  The  truth  is,  parts  of  each 
brigade  reached  the  crest  almost  simultaneously,  and  where 
injustice  might  be  done  I  do  not  think  it  advisable  to  make 
a  decision  on  the  conflicting  claims.  In  fact,  I  do  not  con 
sider  myself  competent  to  do  so.  I  was  much  more  interested 
in  getting  to  the  top  of  the  ridge  than  in  seeing  who  reached 
there  first.  Happily,  it  is  a  question  which  does  not  require 
to  be  definitely  settled.  The  strong  position  of  the  enemy 
wras  carried,  and  it  matters  little  what  particular  regiment, 
brigade  or  division,  was  the  first  on  the  summit.  Where  all 
strove  so  arduously  to  dc  well  he  who  was  first  up  can  only 
be  considered  more  fortunate,  not  more  deserving,  than  his 
comrades."1 

As  to  conflicting  claims  in  regard  to  the  capture  of  artil 
lery,  he  says : 

"There  is,  I  believe,  some  conflict  of  claim  between  Gen 
erals  Willich  and  Hazen  as  to  the  priority  of  capture  of  two 
pieces  of  artillery,  and  I  think  they  have  both  included  them 
in  their  reports  of  captures.  Without  pretending  to  decide 
which  of  the  two  has  the  better  claim,  which  I  am  really  not 
able  to  do  (nor  is  it  at  all  important  the  question  should  be 
decided),  but  making  the  correction  to  avoid  counting  two 
pieces  twice,  the  reports  of  the  brigade  commanders  show  an 
aggregate  capture  of  twenty-nine  pieces  of  artillery  by  my 
division,  all  field  guns.  In  regard  to  the  conflict  between 
Generals  Hazen  and  Willich,  it  may  be  remarked  that  it  is  not 
at  all  strange  such  differences  of  opinion  should  exist  in 
regard  to  occurrences  on  the  battlefield,  as  by  reason  of  the 
turmoil  of  the  conflict,  it  is  often  impossible  to  mark  distinctly 
the  exact  order  and  precedence  of  events,  and  when  also  two 
regiments  may  arrive  simultaneously  at  the  same  place  and 
each  honestly  thinks  itself  the  first  there." 

It  is  a  dangerous  thing  for  a  regimental  historian  to  enter 
the  field  of  inquiry  so  ably  covered  by  others,  and  attempt 
to  discuss  the  still  open  question,  whether  or  not  specific 
orders  were  given  for  the  assault  on  Missionary  Ridge.  Claim 

1     W.  R.  R.,  55-259. 


388  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

is  made  that  no  such  orders  were  given,  and  that  the  rank 
and  file,  by  a  patriotic  impulse  moved  forward,  without  orders, 
and  carried  the  ridge.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  claimed  that 
such  order  was  given,  that  it  was  a  part  of  the  orderly  plan 
of  battle  devised  by  General  Grant,  and  was  made  in  pur 
suance  of  such  order.  Notwithstanding  the  conflicting  record 
evidence  on  this  question,  we  are  constrained  to  believe  that 
the  rank  and  file  did  no  violence  to  General  Grant's  orders 
or  wishes  in  assaulting  the  ridge,  even  without  orders  from 
their  immediate  commanders. 

Shortly  after  the  battle  it  was  charged  that  the  assault 
was  unnecessarily  delayed,  and  that  by  reason  of  such  delay 
the  enemy  could  not  be  successfully  pursued,  his  way  of  re 
treat  cut  off,  and  larger  portions  of  his  troops  captured,  which 
would  have  been  the  case  if  the  assault  had  been  made  an 
hour  earlier.  Mr.  Dana  in  a  dispatch  to  Secretary  Stanton, 
dated  8  P.  M.  the  day  of  the  battle,  says: 

"The  rebels  having  sent  the  great  mass  of  their  troops  to 
crush  Sherman,  Grant  gave  orders  at  2  P.  M.  for  an  assault 
upon  their  lines  in  front  of  Thomas,  but  owing  to  the  fault  of 
Granger,  who  devoted  himself  to  firing  a  battery  instead  of 
commanding  his  corps,  Grant's  order  was  not  transmitted  to 
the  division  commanders,  until  he  repeated  it  an  hour  later. 
Accordingly  it  was  not  executed  until  after  4  P.  M.,  when  the 
nearness  of  night  rendered  it  impracticable  to  followr  up  and 
complete  the  victory."1 

M.  V.  Sheridan,  who  was  an  aide  on  the  staff  of  his 
brother,  General  .Sheridan,  in  Hearst's  Magazine  of  March, 
1914,  says  that  after  we  had  taken  the  line  of  Orchard  Knob, 
he  was  ordered  to  report  to  General  Granger,  which  he  did, 
and  adds:  "I  found  General  Granger  enjoying  himself  hugely. 
He  always  had  the  idea  that  he  had  a  wonderful  eye  for  artil 
lery.  So  I  now  found  him  going  from  gun  to  gun  of  Fort 
Wood's  great  siege  guns,  sighting  each  at  the  ridge,  and 
watching  with  much  satisfaction  the  results  of  the  shots.  Just 
as  I  reached  him,  General  Grant  and  General  Thomas  ap 
proached,  and  after  watching  for  a  moment,  General  Thomas 
very  testily  ordered  :  'Pay  more  attention  to  your  corps,  sir.' ' 

General  Grant,  in  his  Memoirs  states,  that  late  in  the 
afternoon,  Sherman's  condition  was  getting  so  critical  that  he 
decided  not  to  await  the  arrival  of  General  Hooker's  troops, 
which  he  expected  to  see  crossing  the  ridge  in  the  neighborhood 
of  Rossville,  and  which  was  to  be  the  signal  for  the  movement 
against  Missionary  Ridge,  and  directed  General  Thomas  to 

1     W.  R.  R.,  55-68. 


LOOKOUT  MOUNTAIN  AND  MISSIONARY  RIDGE  389 

order  the  charge  at  once.  He  says  he  "watched  eagerly  to  see 
the  effect  and  became  impatient  at  last  that  there  was  no 
indication  of  any  charge  being  made.  The  center  of  the  line, 
which  was  to  make  the  charge,  was  near  where  Thomas  and 
I  stood,  but  concealed  from  view  by  an  intervening  forest. 
Turning  to  Thomas  to  inquire  what  caused  the  delay,  I  was 
surprised  to  see  Thomas  J.  Wood,  one  of  the  division  com 
manders  who  was  to  make  the  charge,  standing  talking  to 
him.  I  spoke  to  General  Wood,  asking  why  he  did  not  charge 
an  hour  before.  He  replied  very  promptly  that  this  was  the 
first  he  had  heard  of  it,  but  that  he  had  been  ready  all  day 
to  move  at  a  moment's  notice.  I  told  him  to  make  the  charge 
at  once.  He  was  off  in  a  moment,  and  in  an  incredible  short 
time  cheering  was  heard  and  he  and  Sheridan  were  driving 
the  enemy's  advance  before  them  towards  Missionary  Ridge."1 
The  hour  thus  lost  may  have  prevented  the  almost  total 
destruction  of  Bragg's  army.  It  wrill  be  remembered  that  our 
Major  Dubois  in  his  reminiscent  letter  before  quoted,  says  he 
prayed  for  one  hour  more  of  daylight.  General  Sheridan,  in  his 
Memoirs,  says  that  he  pursued  the  flying  and  demoralized 
enemy  until  dusk,  and  then  went  back  to  ask  for  more  troops 
to  follow  up  the  enemy.  He  found  Granger  in  command, 
General  Thomas  having  gone  back  to  Chattanooga.  He  says : 

"Granger  was  at  Bragg's  late  headquarters  in  bed.  I 
informed  him  of  my  situation  and  implored  him  to  follow  me 
up  with  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  but  he  declined,  saying 
that  he  thought  we  had  done  well  enough.  I  still  insisting,  he 
told  me  finally  to  push  on  to  the  crossing  of  Chickamauga 
Creek,  and  if  I  encountered  the  enemy  he  would  order  troops 
to  my  support.  I  returned  to  my  division  about  12  o'clock 
at  night,  got  it  under  way  and  reached  the  crossing  about 
half  a  mile  from  the  station  at  2  o'clock  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  26th,  and  then  found  the  bridge  destroyed,  but 
that  the  creek  was  fordable.  I  did  not  encounter  the 
enemy  in  any  force,  but  feared  to  go  farther  without 
assistance.  This  I  thought  I  might  bring  up  by  practicing  a 
little  deception,  so  I  caused  two  regiments  to  simulate  an 
engagement  by  opening  fire,  hoping  that  this  would  alarm 
Granger  and  oblige  him  to  respond-  with  troops,  but  my 
scheme  failed.  General  Granger  afterwards  told  me  that  he 
had  heard  the  volleys,  but  suspected  their  purpose,  knowing 
that  they  were  not  occasioned  by  a  fight,  since  they  were  two 
regular  in  their  delivery.  *  *  *  I  thought  an  active  pursuit 

1     Grant's  Memoirs,  Vol.   2,  page  78. 


390  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

would  almost  certainly  complete  destruction  of  Bragg's 
army."1 

If  the  assault  on  Missionary  Ridge  had  been  made  an  hour 
earlier  with  the  same  results,  it  is  quite  possible  that  im 
mediate  pursuit  by  the  whole  army  would  have  followed,  and 
that  we  would  have  compelled  the  surrender  of  a  great  por 
tion  of  the  opposing  forces.  Even  as  it  was,  if  more  of  our 
commanding  officers  had  shown  a  little  more  of  Sheridan's 
indomitable  spirit  and  energy,  the  results  he  predicts  would 
doubtless  have  been  achieved.  It  was  a  moonlight  night,  the 
troops  were  not  greatly  fatigued  and  the  enthusiasm  of  vic 
tory  would  have  carried  them  forward  to  further  victories. 
But  the  rank  and  file  of  the  army  probably  thought  with 
General  Granger  that  we  had  done  well  enough,  and  the  troops 
on  the  ridge,  after  recounting  the  day's  experiences  and  glori 
fying  over  them,  lay  down  and  slept. 

In  the  general  jollification  over  capturing  Missionary 
Ridge  wre  had  forgotten  that  our  movement  was  only  one  step 
towards  the  relief  of  General  Burnside  at  Knoxville,  whose 
position  had  become  extremely  critical.  This  was  recalled 
next  morning,  when  we  received  orders  to  be  ready  to  at  once 
march  to  his  relief. 


1     Sheridan's  Memoirs,  Vol.  1,  pages  315-318. 


CHAPTER    XIX. 

THE    MARCH    FOR    THE   RELIEF   OF    KNOXVILLE    AND   RE-ENLISTMENT 
AS    VETERAN    VOLUNTEERS. 

As  stated  in  the  preceding  chapter,  the  battles  of  Lookout 
Mountain  and  Missionary  Ridge  had  in  view,  not  only  the 
defeat  of  Bragg's  army  before  Chattanooga,  but  also  the  relief 
of  General  Burnside,  who  was  closely  beseiged  at  Knoxville. 
It  was  General  Grant's  plan,  if  the  movement  against  Bragg 
at  Chattanooga  was  successful,  to  at  once  send  a  heavy  col 
umn  to  General  Burnside's  relief,  and  on  the  evening  of  the 
25th  he  directed  General  Thomas  to  detach  General  Granger 
with  a  force  of  20,000  men,  taking  no  wagons,  or  but  few,  with 
him,  and  move  up  the  south  side  of  the  Tennessee  River 
towards  Knoxville.  The  Steamer  Chattanooga,  loaded  with 
rations,  was  to  accompany  the  expedition  which  was  to  get 
off  by  the  27th.1  Having  given  such  orders  General  Grant 
joined  the  forces  which  were  pursuing  the  retreating  enemy. 
After  such  orders  were  given  and  General  Sherman's  advance 
had  gained  possession  of  the  Dalton  and  Cleveland  Railroad, 
thus  cutting  Longstreet  off  from  direct  communication  with 
Bragg,  it  was  thought  he  would  retreat  from  East  Tennessee 
and  that  the  movement  of  General  Granger's  forces  for  Burn- 
side's  relief  would  not  be  necessary.2  General  Grant's  in 
formation,  however,  was  that  Longstreet  was  still  holding 
fast  at  Knoxville,  that  General  Burnside  had  only  rations  suf 
ficient  to  last  until  December  o,  when,  unless  relieved,  he  must 
either  surrender  or  retreat,  and  that  the  latter  was  impossi 
ble.3  General  Hooker  and  Thomas  had  reports  from  citizens 
and  deserters  that  Longstreet  was  about  to  abandon  the 
siege — one  report  being  that  General  Hardee  had  said  that 
Longstreet  was  in  an  extremely  critical  position.4  But  on  the 
2?th  at  1  p.  m..  General  Grant,  who  was  then  at  Ringgold, 
telegraphed  to  General  Thomas,  who  was  at  Chattanooga : 
"I  think  it  best  not  to  rely  on  statements  of  citizens 
altogether.  You  will,  therefore,  direct  Granger  to  start  at 
once,  marching  as  rapidly  as  possible,  to  the  relief  of  Burn- 
side.  Should  he  obtain  satisfactory  evidence  that  Longstreet 
has  abandoned  the  siege  of  Knoxville,  he  will  return  at  once."5 
Our  regiment  had  gone  out  on  picket  duty  late  on  the 
evening  of  the  25th,  and  was  relieved  at  8  o'clock  next  morn- 

1  W.  R.  R.,  55-45.  4     Hooker  to  Grant,  W.  R.  R.  55-47 

2  Dana  to  Stanton,  W.   R.   R.   55-70.  5     W.  R.  R.55-47. 
:$     Grant  to  Granger,  W.  R.  R.  55-49. 


392  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

ing.  The  next  evening  it  was  ordered  back  to  our  old  cam]) 
at  Fort  Wood,  which  was  reached  about  midnight.  The  next 
day  we  had  orders  to  be  in  readiness  to  move  at  any  moment. 
The  next  day,  the  28th,  we  turned  over  all  our  cartridges 
except  forty  rounds  per  man,  and  at  3  P.  M.  fell  in,  left  our 
camp  at  Chattanooga  and  marched  five  miles  and  went  into 
camp.  The  next  day  we  marched  to  Ringgold,  only  eight 
miles.1  General  Grant  in  his  official  report  says  that  he 
returned  to  Chattanooga  on  the  28th  and  found  Granger 
had  not  got  off,  and  that  he  did  not  have  the  number  of  men 
he  had  directed  and  besides  that,  he  moved  with  reluctance 
and  complaint.  "- 

On  the  29th  he  addressed  the  following  letter  directly  to 
General  Granger,  hoping  to  spur  him  into  greater  energy  and 

activity : 

Chattanooga,  November  29,  1863. 
Maj.  Gen.  Gordon  Granger, 

Commanding  Fourth  Corps: 

It  is  now  ascertained  that  up  to  the  26th  instant,  Longstreet  had 
not  abandoned  the  siege  at  Knoxville.  Now  that  Bragg's  army  has 
been  driven  from  Chattanooga,  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  he  will 
abandon  the  siege  until  forced  to  do  so  by  reinforcements  sent  to  Burn- 
side's  aid,  when  he  will  probably  take  up  his  march  eastwards  to  re 
join  Lee  about  Richmond,  but  where  he  can  still  threaten  Bast 
Tennessee.  On  the  23rd  instant  General  Burnside  telegraphed  that  his 
rations  would  hold  out  ten  or  twelve  days;  at  the  end  of  this  time 
unless  relieved  from  the  outside,  he  must  surrender  or  retreat.  The 
latter  is  an  impossibility.  You  are  now  going  for  the  purpose  of  re 
lieving  this  garrison.  You  see  the  short  time  in  which  relief  must 
be  afforded  or  be  too  late,  and  hence  the  necessity  for  forced  marches. 
I  want  to  urge  upon  you  in  the  strongest  possible  manner  the  necessity 
of  reaching  Burnside  in  the  shortest  time.  Our  victory  here  has  been 
complete  and  if  Longstreet  can  be  driven  from  East  Tennessee,  the 
damage  to  the  Confederacy  will  be  the  most  crushing  they  have  ex 
perienced  during  the  war.  This  important  task  is  now  entrusted  to 
you  and  it  is  expected  you  will  do  your  part  well.  Use  as  sparingly  as 
possible  of  the  rations  you  take  with  you.  Replenish  all  you  can  from 
what  you  find  on  the  road,  giving  receipts  in  order  that  settlements  may 
be  made  with  loyal  people  hereafter.  Deeming  what  is  here  said  suffi 
cient  to  show  you  the  importance  of  great  promptitude  in  the  present 
movement,  I  suscribe  myself. 

U.  S.  GRANT, 

Major   General. "3 

General  Grant  after  writing  this  letter  must  have  doubted 
its  efficacy  in  moving  General  Granger  to  greater  activity, 
for  on  the  same  day,  November  29,  he  wrote  to  General  Sher 
man,  giving  him  the  latest  news  from  Burnside  and  saying 
that  it  was  evident  Longstreet  had  determined  to  starve  the 
garrison  into  surrender.  In  this  letter  he  also  says : 

1  Diary  of  William  McConnell.  3     W.  R.  R.  55-49. 

2  Grant's  official  report,  W.  R.  R.  55-35. 


THE  MAKCH  FOR  RELIEF  OF  KNOXVILLE  393 

"Granger  is  on  the  way  to  Burnside's  relief,  but  1  have 
lost  all  faith  in  his  energy  and  capacity  to  manage  an  expedi 
tion  of  the  importance  of  this  one.  1  am  inclined  to  think, 
therefore,  that  I  shall  have  to  send  you.  Push  as  rapidly  as 
you  can  to  the  Hiawassee  and  determine  for  yourself  what 
force  to  take  with  you  from  that  point,  which  you  wrill  select 
in  conjunction  with  the  forces  now  with  you.  In  plain  words, 
you  will  assume  command  of  all  the  forces  now  moving  up 
the  Tennessee,  including  the  garrison  at  Kingston,  and  from 
that  force  organize  what  you  deem  proper  to  relieve  Burn- 
side.  The  balance  send  back  to  Chattanooga.  *  *  *  I  will 
only  add  that  the  last  advices  from  Burnside  himself  indi 
cated  his  ability  to  hold  out  only  to  about  the  3rd  of 
December."1 

So,  before  we  were  well  under  way,  our  corps  commander, 
who  had  been  selected  to  command  this  important  expedition, 
was  superceded  and  General  Sherman  was  put  in  his  place.  On 
November  30,  General  Sherman  sent  word  to  General  Granger 
that  he  had  been  directed  to  assume  command  of  the  expedi 
tion  against  Knoxville,  that  he  had  a  copy  of  General  Grant's 
instructions  to  him,  Granger,  that  they  were  full  and  explicit 
and  that  he,  Sherman,  could  only  renew  General  Grant's  orders 
therein  contained  to  push  on  with  the  utmost  expedition.  He 
further  ordered  General  Granger  to  cross  the  Hiawassee  the 
morning  (December  1)  and  march  for  Athens,  thence  to  Kingston 
and  thence  on  to  Knoxville.  He  also  directed  General  Granger, 
should  he  arrive  at  Kingston  first,  to  do  everything  possible  to 
cross  the  troops  expeditiously.2  On  the  evening  of  the  same 
day  General  Granger  dispatched  to  Generals  Grant  and  Thomas 
that  he  had  reached  Kincannon's  Ferry  on  the  Hiawassee  at 
3  p.  m.  that  day  and  that  the  roads  were  horrid  and  marches 
difficult  and  laborious,  that  a  steamer  with  flats  had  arrived  and 
that  the  army  was  crossing  the  Hiawassee  as  rapidly  as  possible. 
He  also  said  that  he  proposed  to  move  directly  to  Kingston, 
cross  the  Hiawassee  River  and  attack  Longstreet's  right  flank, 
and  that  he  hoped  to  reach  Kingston  December  3  and  be  in  front 
of  Knoxville  by  the  5th  or  6th  at  latest.3'  The  dispatch  was 
doubtless  sent  before  he  received  General  Sherman's  order  as 
suming  command  of  the  expedition.  On  the  same  day  General 
Sherman  ordered  General  Blair,  commanding  two  divisions  of 
the  15th  corps,  to  march  at  once  for  Kingston  4  It  appears  that 
General  Howard  with  two  divisions  of  the  Eleventh  corps  was 
also  ordered  to  join  the  expedition.  General  Howard  at  2:15 

1  W.  R.  R.  55-49.  3     W.  R.  R.  56-279. 

2  W.  R.  R.  56-279.  4     VV.  R.  R  56-278. 


394  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

p.  in.  on  the  30th  reported  the  arrival  of  the  head  of  his  column 
at  Charleston,  several  miles  south  of  Kincannon's  Ferry  on  the 
Hiawassee,  and  that  he  found  on  his  arrival  that  the  railroad 
bridge  was  partly  destroyed  and  the  pontoon  bridge  swung  to 
the  other  side  of  the  river,  that  the  railroad  bridge  could  be  re 
paired  so  that  the  infantry  could  cross  on  it  that  afternoon  which 
was  being  done,  that  one  regiment  had  been  sent  across  and  as 
soon  as  the  bridge  was  repaired  a  brigade  would  follow.1  General 
Granger  the  same  day  sent  orders  to  the  commanding  officer  at 
Kingston  to  hold  his  command  in  readiness  to  move  upon  Knox- 
ville  at  a  moment's  warning,  stating  that  his,  Granger's,  troops 
would  reach  Kingston  at  the  latest  by  December  3.  He  also 
directed  such  commanding  officer  to  gather  in  as  much  forage 
and  subsistence  as  he  possibly  could,  to  make  every  possible  ar 
rangement  for  the  crossing  of  the  Tennessee  River  at  Kingston 
by  the  troops  as  soon  as  they  should  arrive  and  to  send  out  spies 
and  scouts  to  gain  all  possible  information  of  the  whereabouts, 
intentions  and  movements  of  Longstreet's  army  and  send  their 
reports  by  courier.2  At  the  same  time  he  sent  orders  to  General 
Thos.  J.  Wood  saying  that  every  preparation  would  be  made  for 
crossing  our  division  over  the  Hiawassee  as  soon  as  possible,  that 
the  crossing  would  continue  all  night  and  that  General  Sheridan's 
division  which  was  ahead  of  ours,  would  probably  be  across  by 
one  o'clock  that  night.3 

On  December  1,  at  5  p.  m.  it  seems  that  General  Thomas 
had  received  General  Granger's  dispatch  of  the  30th  and  at  once 
sent  him  word  that  General  Sherman  was  on  his  right  and  had 
orders,  on  uniting  his  forces  with  his.  Granger's,  to  assume  the 
direction  of  affairs.  On  the  same  day  General  Sherman  sent 
orders  to  General  Granger  announcing  his  arrival  at  Athens  and 
directing  him,  Granger,  to  move  by  the  most  practicable  route 
directly  for  Philadelphia  and  Loudon  and  to  send  the  steam  boat 
to  Kingston  with  a  small  guard,  there  to  await  further  orders.1 
So  it  seems  that  General  Granger's  plan  to  cross  the  Tennessee 
River  and  attack  Longstreet's  right  flank,  was  set  aside  and  that 
the  relieving  army  was  to  concentrate  at  Loudon  instead  of  at 
Kingston. 

On  the  same  day,  evidently  before  receiving  General  Sher 
man's  order  to  move  directly  to  Loudon,  General  Granger  had 
ordered  General  Sheridan  to  proceed  to  Knoxville  without  delay, 
assume  command  of  all  the  forces  at  Kingston  and  make  every 
preparation  for  crossing  the  Fourth  corps  and  the  command  of 
General  Sherman  "now  en  route  for  that  place.''4 

1  W.  R.  R.   56,  page  282.  3     W.  R.  R.  56,  page  282. 

2  W.   R.   R.   56,  page   281.  4     W.  R.  R.  56-299. 


THE  MARCH  FOR  RELIEF  OF  KISOXVILLE  395 

The  same  day  General  Sherman  who  was  at  Athens,  issued 
orders  directing  the  several  divisions  in  his  immediate  command 
to  move  at  early  dawn  the  next  morning,  prepared  to  make  a 
forced  march  on  London.  The  march  was  to  be  in  the  following 
order:  First,  the  Eleventh  Corps,  General  Howard  in  command, 
Second,  the  division  commanded  by  General  Jeff.  C.  Davis, 
Third,  the  Fifteenth  Corps,  General  F.  P.  Blair  commanding.  All 
the  cavalry  was  to  be  massed  under  command  of  Colonel  Long 
and  march  at  2  o'clock  a.  m.  between  General  Howard's  and 
General  Davis'  commands,  prepared  to  leave  the  column  and 
dash  forward  to  secure  the  bridge  at  Loudon.  The  head  of  the 
infantry  column  was  to  await  at  Philadelphia  a  report  from  the 
cavalry  as  to  conditions  at  Loudon.1  While  these  movements 
were  going  on  amid  some  confusion,  General  John  G.  Foster, 
who  had  arrived  at  Cumberland  Gap  November  30,  and  had 
taken  command  of  the  troops  there  (about  3000  infantry  and 
2000  cavalry),  at  his  own  suggestion,  was  directed  by  General 
Grant  to  move  on  Knoxville  by  way  of  Tazewell  and  Maynard- 
ville.2  On  the  first  of  December  he  had  reached  Tazewell,  and 
it  was  through  him  that  the  War  Department  at  Washington 
and  General  Grant  at  Chattanooga,  got  any  information  at  all 
of  the  situation  of  General  Burnside's  command  at  Knoxville. 

At  9  o'clock  p..  m.,  December  1,  General  Sherman  who  was 
at  Charleston,  dispatched  to  General  Grant  that  Mr.  Dana  and 
Colonel  Jas.  H.  Wilson  had  arrived  the  night  before  and  brought 
Grant's  message  of  the  29th :  that  he  had  already  crossed  the 
Hiawassee  and  was  marching  for  Loudon  and  Knoxville:  that 
he  had  sent  a  messenger  down  to  the  mouth  of  the  Hiawassee  to 
communicate  with  General  Granger,  but  thought  he  could  beat 
him  in  moving  fast ;  that  he  would  have  Burnside  hear  his  guns 
if  possible  on  the  3rd  or  4th  at  'furthest,  and  adds  this  character 
istic  outburst : 

''Recollect  that  East  Tennessee  is  my  horror.  That  any 
military  man  should  send  a  force  into  East  Tennessee  puzzles 
me.  Burnside  is  there  and  must  be  relieved,  but  when  relieved, 
I  want  to  get  out,  and  he  should  come  out  too.  I  think,  of  course, 
its  railroad  should  be  absolutely  destroyed,  its  provisions  eaten 
up  or  carried  away,  and  all  troops  brought  out.  Cumberland 
Gap  should  be  held  simply  as  an  outpost  of  Kentucky.  But 
Burnside  must  be  relieved  first  and  these  other  things  after."3 

This,  as  will  be  seen,  was  in  frank  opposition  to  the  plans 
of  the  administration  and  of  General  Grant. 

1  W.  R.  R.,  r>6-300. 

2  W.  R.   R.,   ">fi-283-2J>6. 
:j     W.  R.  R.,  56-297. 


396  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

On  the  morning  of  December  2,  it  appears  from  the  official 
reports  and  correspondence  that  our  Corps,  General  Granger's, 
was  at  Decatur,  fifteen  miles  to  the  left  of.  Sherman's  column, 
and  was  directed  to  move  thence  on  Philadelphia:1  that  at  4  p.  m. 
that  day  the  first  division  (Sheridan's)  had  arrived  at  Prigmore's 
Farm :  that  his  troops  would  reach  Philadelphia  early  next  day 
and  that  his  advance  would  be  in  Loudon  sometime  during  the 
day.  At  sunset  on  the  2nd,  General  Jeff.  C.  Davis  with  his 
division  went  into  camp  eighteen  miles  from  Loudon  and  would 
resume  the  march  to  that  place  at  day  light  next  morning.  - 

On  December  2,  the  advance  of  General  Howard's  Corps 
had  reached  the  immediate  vicinity  of  Loudon  and  he  reported 
his  progress  to  General  Sherman.  General  Sherman  on  that 
date  (no  hour  is  given)  dispatched  to  General  Howard,  saying, 
he  took  it  for  granted  that  the  enemy  would  destroy  the  bridge 
on  our  approach  and  escape  on  the  other  side  of  the  river, 
and  that  on  the  whole  he  did  not  object  to  it,  as  he  would 
then  be  within  the  narrow  peninsula  between  the  Holston  and 
Clinch,  we  holding  Kingston  and  Knoxville.  but  that  it  was  all 
important  to  know  that  the  bridge  was  substantially  destroyed 
before  pushing  eastward.  He  therefore  directed  him,  General 
Howard,  at  day  break  next  day  to  display  his  forces  at  Loudon 
to  feel  the  enemy,  and  if  necessary  to  attack,  him  in  force.  He 
also  stated  that  he  proposed  to  turn  the  division  (Davis')  follow 
ing  Howards  corps,  to  the  east  toward  Morgantown  ford  or 
build  a  bridge  and  push  directly  for  Knoxville,  leaving  the  other 
troops  to  follow  as  soon  as  it  was  learned  that  the  bridge  at 
Loudon  was  destroyed  and  could  not  be  relaid.  General  Sher 
man  also  directed,  if  the  morning  was  quiet,  that  it  would  be 
well  to  fire  some  artillery  in  the  direction  of  Knoxville  as  the 
sound  might  reach  Burnside  and  'give  him  comfort. 

The  above  movements  were  ordered  by  General  Grant  and 
General  Sherman  in  the  hope  that  the  forces  under  Longstreet 
would  be  caught  between  the  Holston  and  Clinch  Rivers  and 
compelled  to  retreat  up  the  valley  towards  Lynchburg,  that 
our  troops  in  West  Virginia  would  be  reinforced  and  a  column 
strong  enough  to  be  effective  would  interpose  between  Long- 
street  and  Lynchburg,  cut  off  his  retreat  and  destroy  or  capture 
his  army.  This  hope,  however,  was  dispelled  on  December  3 
when  General  Halleck  telegraphed  to  General  Grant  that  the 
forces  in  West  Virginia  were  not  strong  enough  to  cut  off 
Longstreet's  retreat,  that  orders  were  given  General  Meade  some 
time  before  to  cut  the  railroad  at  Lynchburg  so  as  to  separate 

1  W.  R.  R.  56-312. 

2  W.  R.  R.  56-313. 


THE  MAKCH  FOR  RELIEF  OF  KNOXVILLE  397 

Longstreet  from  Lee,  but  that  nothing  had  been  done  and  that 
nothing  was  likely  to  be  done  by  the  army  of  the  Potomac  in 
this  campaign.1  All  that  was  left  therefore  for  the  armies  march 
ing  for  the  relief  of  Knoxville  to  do,  was  to  relieve  General 
Burnside  and  drive  Longstreet  so  far  up  the  valley  that  he  would 
uo  longer  be  a  menace  to  East  Tennessee. 

On  the  same  day.  General  Foster,  whose  advance  from 
Cumberland  Gap  had  reached  Tazewell,  reported  that  he  was 
completely  held  in  check  by  Wheeler's  and  Jones'  cavalry,  which 
was  stronger  than  his  force,  that  Longstreet  would  retreat  by 
road  leading  through  Rutledge  or  Rogersville,  and  advised  Gen 
eral  Granger  that  the  best  point  for  him  to  stiike  the  retreating 
column  with  his  cavalry  was  at  Blain's  Crossroads.2  At  noon  on 
the  3rd  General  J.  H.  Wilson  reported  to  General  Sherman  that 
he  had  just  forded  the  river  at  Morgantown  and  had  found  it 
deep,  uneven  and  rapid,  and.  in  fact  impracticable  for  anything 
but  cavalry,  that  the  stream  was  at  least  "300  jards  wide,  that 
little  material  was  at  hand  for  bridges  and  suggested  that  if  any 
boats  had  been  saved  at  Loudon  the  crossing  of  the  infantry 
and  artillery  would  better  be  made  there.3 

Our  Corps  (the  4th)  on  the  evening  of  December  3  was 
at  Fork  Creek,  about  6  miles  from  Philadelphia,  and  from  that 
point  General  Granger  dispatched  to  General  Sherman,  that  in 
the  morning  he  would  move  his  troops  to  Loudon  to  meet  the 
steamboat  Paint  Rock  and  get  some  rations,  as  his  command  was 
entirely  out,  that  in  the  meantime  he  would  do  all  in  his  power 
to  gather  in  wheat  and  corn  and  have  it  ground,  that  in  case 
the  steamboats  Paint  Rock  and  Dunbar  (which  had  been  ordered 
to  Loudon)  arrived  promptly  with  a  sufficient  number  of  flats, 
he  suggested  that  the  whole  command  should  proceed  to  Loudon 
and  cross  the  river  there,4  and  adds :  "In  case  our  troops  are 
caught  in  a  cold  rain  in  these  mountains  at  this  inclement  season 
of  the  year,  many  of  them  must  perish  and  many  more  become 
disabled,  without  the  means  of  sheltering,  feeding  or  otherwise 
providing  for  their  comfort."5 

In  answer  to  this  dispatch  General  Sherman  replied  on 
same  day  saying  the  river  was  a  more  formidable  obstacle  than 
he  had  supposed  and  ordering  Granger  to  halt  his  column  where 
he  then  was  and  keep  a  staff  officer  at  the  river  to  advise  him 
when  the  bridge  would  be  completed.  At  the  same  time  he  sent 
the  same  word  to  General  Howard  and  asked  if  the  cavalry 
had  gone  to  Burnside.  He  also  said  it  would  take  some  time  to 

1  W.  R.  R.,  56-315.  4     W.  R.  R.,  56-31G. 

2  W.  R.  R.,  56-315-316.  5     W.  R.   R.,  56-317 

3  W.  R.  R.,  56-316. 


398  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

build  the  bridge  and  in  the  meantime  that  we  must  advise  Burn- 
side  that  we  were  near.1 

When  General  Howard  with  his  command  reached  Loudon 
he  found  the  pontoon  bridge  across  the  river  destroyed,  all  rail 
road  cars  destroyed  and  48  of  them  and  their  engines  run  into 
the  river.  On  reporting  to  General  Sherman  he  was  directed 
to  spend  the  day  there,  refresh  and  follow  by  the  Morgantown 
road  in  the  morning.2 

On  the  same  day,  December  3,  at  one  o'clock  p.  m.,  our 
division,  which  was  then  five  miles  from  Philadelphia,  received 
orders  from  General  Granger  saying  that  the  advance  of  the 
corps  had  arrived  at  that  place  and  that  we  would  push  on  to 
Morgantown  that  night,  that  all  the  troops  were  moving  to 
Knoxville  on  the  south  side  of  the  Tennessee,  and  we  should 
move,  leaving  Philadelphia  to  our  left,  and  pass  through  either 
Madisonville  or  Rockville  to  Marysville,  and  thence  on  to  Knox 
ville.3  On  receipt  of  this  order  General  Wood  acknowledged  it, 
promised  prompt  obedience  and  added,  "Should  Longstreet  re 
main  much  longer  at  Knoxville  he  may  be  captured." 

December  4,  General  Sherman  issued  the  following  order : 

"Headquarters  Army  in  the  Field, 

Little  Tennessee,  December  4,  1863. 

I.  The  troops  now  marching  for  the  relief  of  the  army  in  Knox 
ville   will   for   the   purpose   of   maneuver   and   battle,   be   arranged    as 
follows: 

Right  Wing:  Fourth  Army  Corps,  two  divisions,  General 
Granger. 

Center:     Fifteenth  Army  Corps,  two  divisions,  General  Blair. 

Left  Wing:  Eleventh  Army  Corps,  two  divisions,  General 
Howard. 

The  division  commanded  by  General  Jeff.  C.  Davis  will  constitute 
the  reserve  and  will  be  habitually  in  support  of  the  center.  The  cavalry 
under  Colonel  Long  will  act  under  the  special  orders  of  the  command 
ing  general. 

II.  The  whole  army  will  move  direct  on  the  enemy  at  Knoxville 
and  fight  them  at  the  earliest  possible  moment.    The  center  will  cross 
the  bridge  at  Morgantown  and  move    via   Marysville.      The    left   wing 
will  follow  and  march  by  the  road  directly  west  of  Baker's  Creek  to 
Utica,  Louisville  and  Little  River.  The  right  will  then  cross  and  move 
to  the  main  Madisonville  and  Knoxville  road.     At  Marysville  all  must 
communicate  and  then  march  by  concentric  roads  on  Knoxville.     The 
reserve  will  cross  the  bridge  last  and  close  up  on  the  center. 

III.  As   time   is   all   important,   every   commander   will   at  once 
place  his  troops  convenient  to  the  bridge,  or  assure  himself  he  can  reach 
it  as  soon  as  his  turn  comes.     Every  soldier  should  have  all  his  am 
munition  on  his  person,  cautioned  to  use  it  with  great  prudence,  three 
days'  cooked  meat  and  bread,  if  to  be  had.    If  rations  are  not  to  be  had, 

1  W.  R.  R.,  56-317. 

2  W.  R.  R.,  56-319. 

3  W.  R.  R.,  56-319. 


THE  M.XKCH  KOK  RELIEF  OF  KNOXMLLE  399 

the  men  will  cheerfully  live  on  meal  till  their  fellows  in  Knoxville  are 
released  from  their  imprisonment. 

IV.  In  case  of  battle  each  commander  must  fight  his  command 
offensively.  There  must  be  no  delay  in  the  attack,  only  using  the 
proper  precaution  to  cover  it  with  a  good  line  of  skirmishers,  but  we 
must  be  quick  and  prompt  to  attack.  When  the  head  of  either  column 
is  In  Knoxville,  then  new  combinations  will  be  made. 

By  order  of  Maj.  Gen.  W.  T.  Sherman. 

R.   M.   SAWYER, 
Assistant  Adjutant  General. "i 

After  this  order  was  given,  and  on  the  same  day,  General 
Howard  who  was  at  London,  reported  that  he  could  cross  the 
river  at  Davis  Ford  about  six  miles  from  that  place  and  thus 
save  ten  miles  of  march  with  no  loss  of  time2  and  was  authorized 
to  do  so.  General  Granger  was  informed  of  this,  and  was  di 
rected  to  move  so  that  at  early  dawn  on  the  5th  his  leading  di 
vision  should  occupy  the  bridge.-'1  At  4  o'clock  p.  m.  on  the  4th, 
General  Wood  proposed  to  cross  the  bridge  at  daylight  next 
morning.4 

That  night,  or  the  next  day,  General  Sherman  received 
word  that  Longstreet  had  raised  the  siege  of  Knoxville,  had  re 
treated  up  the  valley  and  that  our  cavalry  had  entered  the  place. 
He  at  once  issued  orders  stating  that  the  object  of  the  expedition 
had  been  accomplished,  that  the  enemy  was  in  retreat  and  ordered 
General  Granger  to  move  on  the  6th  as  far  as  Little  River, 
there  go  into  camp  and  report  in  person  to  General  Rurnside  for 
orders.5 

It  was  now  learned  that  General  Longstreet  had  attacked  one 
of  the  fortifications  at  Knoxville  on  November  29  and  had  been 
signally  repulsed,  but  had  held  on  until  a  dispatch  from  General 
Grant  to  General  Burnside,  which  it  was  intended  should  fall 
into  his  hands.6  was  captured  by  some  of  his  men  and  hastened 
his  retreat  toward  Rogersville,7  December  3.  Our  regiment's 
part  in  the  march  so  far  was  not  distinguished  from  that  of  other 
regiments  in  the  brigade  division  or  corps,  but  we  were  not  be 
hind  them  in  the  vigor  and  energy  which  characterized  all  the 
troops  of  the  expedition.  It  was  a  hard  march  over  bad  roads, 
we  had  no  tents  and  had  virtually  to  live  off  the  country  through 
which  we  marched.  Our  itinerary  given  the  diary  of  William 
McConnell  was  as  follows : 

"On  the  28th  of  November,  left  camp  at  Chattanooga  and 
marched  five  miles.  Sunday,  November  29,  marched  to  Ringgold 
eight  miles ;  November  30,  marched  through  Georgetown  to 

1  W.  R.  R.,  56-330.  5  VV.  R.  R.  56-340. 

2  W.  R.  R.  56-331.  t>  W.  R.  R    56-273 

3  W.  R.  R.  56-329.  7  W.  R.  R.  56-819 

4  W.  R.  R.  56-331. 


400  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEEUS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

Harris'  Landing,  twenty-three  miles;  December  1,  marched  to 
Kincannon's  Ferry,  crossed  the  Hiawassee  and  went  into  camp, 
distance  about  three  miles ;  on  the  2nd,  marched  through  Decatur, 
about  twenty  miles ;  on  the  3rd,  marched  to  Sweetwater, 
twenty  miles ;  on  the  4th,  marched  fifteen  miles,  and  on  the  5th, 
started  at  daylight,  crossed  the  Little  Tennessee  river,  passed 
through  Morgantown  and  went  fifteen  miles."  McConnell  adds 
to  his  report  of  this  day:  "Had  no  rations." 

We  were  then  about  twenty-two  miles  from  Knoxville.  On 
the  6th  we  went  on  through  Marysville,  marching  about  eleven 
miles,  and  went  on  picket.  The  next  day  we  marched  through 
Rockford  and  after  a  ten  mile  tramp,  during  which  we  lived 
wholly  on  what  we  could  get  in  the  country  along  our  line  of 
march,  we  arrived  at  Knoxville  and  went  into  camp  about  one 
mile  from  the  town. 

It  was  soon  learned  that  General  Burnside  had  not  been  in 
such  dire  straits  as  he  had  caused  the  authorities  at  Washington 
and  General  Grant  to  believe. 

General  Sherman  in  his  memoirs  says,  that  on  the  morning 
of  December  6,  with  General  Granger  and  some  of  his  staff,  he 
rode  into  Knoxville  and  found  General  Burnside  and  staff  domi 
ciled  in  a  large  fine  mansion  looking  very  comfortable,  that  after 
walking  with  General  Burnside  along  his  lines  and  examining 
the  salient  known  as  Fort  Sanders,  they  returned  to  General 
Burnside's  headquarters  and  sat  down  to  a  good  dinner,  embrac 
ing  roast  turkey.  He  further  says  : 

"There  was  a  regular  dining  table  with  clean  table  cloth, 
dishes,  knives,  forks,  spoons,  etc.,  etc.  I  had  seen  nothing  of 
this  kind  in  my  field  experiences  and  could  not  help  exclaiming 
that  I  thought  'they  were  starving'  etc.,  but  Burnside  explained 
that  Longstreet  had  at  no  ime  fully  invested  the  place,  and  that 
he  had  kept  communication  open  with  the  country  on  the  south 
side  of  the  river  Holston,  more  especially  with  the  French  Broad 
settlements,  from  whose  Union  inhabitants  he  had  received  a 
good  supply  of  beef,  bacon  and  corn  meal.  Had  I  known  this, 
I  would  not  have  hurried  my  men  so  fast,  but  until  I  reached 
"Knoxville  I  thought  our  troops  there  were  actually  in  danger  of 
starvation."1 

Captain  Orlando  M.  Poe,  General  Burnside's  Chief  En 
gineer,  in  his  official  report  of  the  operations  at  Knoxville  during 
the  siege,  says : 

"The  question  of  supplies  during  the  siege  was  second  to 
none  in  importance.  The  failure  of  the  enemy  to  close  the 

1     Sherman's  Memoirs,  Vol.   1,  page  368. 


THE  MARCH  FOR  RELICT'  OF  KNOXVILLE  401 

Sevierville  road  and  French  Broad  river,  enabled  us  even  to 
accumulate  a  quantity  of  commissary  stores.  I  was  told  that  it 
was  officially  reported  at  the  beginning  of  the  siege,  that  we  had 
on  hand  full  supplies  for  only  one  day  and  a  half.  Yet  after 
nineteen  days  siege  we  had  accumulated  to  such  an  extent  over 
the  lines  just  referred  to,  that  we  had  provisions  enough  to  last 
ten  days.1 

At  the  meeting  at  Burnside's  headquarters,  reported  by  Gen 
eral  Sherman.  General  Burnside  stated  that  General  Granger's 
troops  would  be  all  he  would  need  to  drive  General 
Longstreet  out  of  East  Teneessee,  and  General  Sherman  there 
upon  directed  General  Granger  to  report  to  General  Burnside 
and  at  once  started  back  to  Chattanooga,  taking  with  him  the 
troops  of  the  15th  corps  under  General  Blair,  General  Davis' 
division,  and  the  llth  corps  under  General  Howard.  General 
Sherman  says  that  General  Granger  "unreasonably  remonstrated 
against  being  left  at  Knoxville"  complaining  bitterly  of  what  he 
thought  was  hard  treatment  to  his  men  and  himself,  that  his 
language  and  manner  produced  on  his  mind  a  bad  impres 
sion,  and  was  one  of  the  causes  which  led  to  his  being  relieved 
as  a  corps  commander  in  the  campaign  of  the  next  spring.2 

The  officers  and  men  of  the  4th  corps  if  they  had  had  the 
opportunity  would  doubtless  have  joined  General  Granger  in 
such  remonstrance.  They  would  certainly  have  done  so,  if  they 
had  known  of  the  hardships  and  privations  which  they  were 
compelled  to  undergo  to  so  little  purpose  during  the  next  few 
weeks. 

The  regiment  remained  in  camp  about  one  mile  from  Knox 
ville  from  the  7th  until  the  16th  of  December,  subsisting  on 
half  rations,  pieced  out  by  individual  foraging  on  occasions,  and 
doing  the  usual  routine  of  camp  and  picket  duty.  On  the  even 
ing  of  the  15th  orders  to  march  were  received  and  on  next  morn 
ing  the  division  crossed  the  Holston  River,  passed  through  Knox 
ville,  marched  fifteen  miles  and  halted  six  miles  from  Lane's 
(Blain's)  Crossroads. ><?  It  was  a  rainy  day  and  night  and  very 
disagreeable.  We  remained  at  this  place  until  the  25th. 

When  General  Longstreet  retired  from  before  Knoxville, 
he  marched  to  Rogersville  and  when  there  decided  to  send  back 
to  General  Bragg,  Martin's  cavalry,  but  a  telegram  from  Jefferson 
Davis  gave  him  discretionary  power  as  to  his  movements  and  he 
therefore  retained  such  cavalry.  Learning  that  General  Sherman 
with  the  fifteenth  and  eleventh  corps  had  started  back  to  Chat 
tanooga,  he  decided  to  advance  against  the  forces  which  had 

1  W.  R.  R.,  54-322.  3     McConnell's  Diary. 

2  Sherman's  Memoirs,  Vol.  1,  page  36S. 


402  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

followed  him  from  Knoxville.1  Our  March  toward  Blain's 
Cross  Roads  was  to  reinforce  the  troops  which  had  followed 
Longstreet  and  against  which  he  was  again  advancing. 

There  was  heavy  cannonading  on  the  24th,  which  was  prob 
ably  the  cavalry  fight  between  Longstreet's  cavalry  and  that  of 
General  Sturgis  near  Mossy  Creek.2  General  Sheridan,  who  was 
in  command  of  the  forces  in  advance  of  us,  thought  General 
Longstreet  was  about  to  bring  on  a  general  engagement,  but  it  was 
only  a  deoonstration  to  deceive  us  as  to  his  real  movement  to 
Lynchburg.3 

On  the  morning  of  December  25,  part  of  our  brigade  moved 
four  miles  to  Strawberry  Plains  and  in  the  afternoon  our  regi 
ment  and  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  followed.  In  the  evening  there 
was  a  call  for  mechanics  to  work  on  the  bridge  across  the 
Holston  River.4 

General  Grant  visited  Knoxville  about  this  time  and  decided 
that  it  would  be  better  to  supply  the  troops  at  Knoxville  by  way 
of  Chattanooga,  than  as  formerly  through  Cumberland  Gap,  and 
gave  orders  to  rebuild  and  re-equip  the  railroad  between  Knox 
ville  and  Chattanooga. 

On  the  26th  of  December,  our  men  set  to  work  to  build  log 
huts  to  shelter  themselves  from  the  winter  rains  and  snows,  and 
on  the  27th,  although  it  was  Sunday  and  very  wet,  there  was  a 
large  detail  sent  across  the  Holston  River  to  work  on  the  rail 
road.  On  the  twenty-eighth  the  weather  was  cold  and  windy. 
The  men  stood  around  camp  fires,  their  eyes  smarting  with  the 
smoke  of  the  green  timber,  trying  to  keep  warm. 

At  about  nine  o'clock  the  regiment  was  formed  to  hear  an 
important  order  read.  It  was  the  order  proposing  our  re-enlist 
ment  as  veteran  volunteers.  There  never  was  a  more  inoppor 
tune  time  to  present  such  a  proposition  to  the  troops  of  our 
command. 

Sheridan  in  his  Memoirs  describes  the  condition  of  the 
troops  at  that  time  as  follows : 

"On  arriving  at  Knoxville,  an  inspection  of  my  command 
showed  that  the  shoes  of  many  of  the  men  were  entirely  worn 
out,  the  poor  fellows  having  been  obliged  to  protect  their  feet 
with  a  sort  of  moccasin  made  from  their  blankets,  or  from  such 
other  material  as  they  could  procure.  About  six  hundred  were 
in  this  condition,  and  plainly  not  suitably  shod  to  withstand  the 
frequent  storms  of  sleet  and  snow.  *  *  Midwinter  was 

now  upon  us  and  the  weather  in  this  mountain  region  of 
East  Tennessee  was  very  cold,  snow  often  falling  to  the  depth 

1  Longstreet's  report,  W.  R.  R.,  54-468.        3     Sheridan's  Memoirs,  Vol.  1,  page  335. 

2  W.  R.  R.,  54-625.  4     Mcronnell's  Diary. 


THE  MARCH  FOR  RELIEF  OF  KNOXVILLE  403 

of  several  inches.  The  thin  and  scanty  clothing  of  the  men 
afforded  little  protection  and  while  in  bivouac  their  only  pro 
tection  was  the  ponchos  with  which  they  had  been  provided  be 
fore  leaving  Chattanooga;  there  was  not  a  tent  in  the  command. 
*  *  *  Every  command  in  the  army  was  suffering  to  the  same 
extent  as  mine." 

To  ask  men  suffering  the  privations  and  enduring  the  hard- 
ships  above  described  to  forego  their  release  from  such  trials, 
which  would  surely  come  in  a  few  months,  and  to  re-enlist  for  a 
further  term  of  three  years  or  during  the  war,  was  putting  their 
patriotism  to  a  very  severe  test. 

Detachments  from  the  regiment  worked  on  the  railroad  on 
the  29th,  30th  and  31st  days  of  December,  1863.  The  weather 
during  these  three  days  was  pleasant,  but  on  the  evening  of  the 
31st  it  began  to  rain  and  during  the  night  it  grew  very  cold.  The 
next  day,  New  Years  Day,  1864,  will  long  be  remembered  as  one 
of  the  coldest  New  Years  Days  on  record.  John  G.  Gregory  in 
his  diary  says,  "The  coldest  morning  this  winter.  Wind  blew 
briskly  all  day.  All  we  can  do  to  keep  from  freezing.  Veteran 
volunteering  progressing  slowly.  Our  third  New  Year  in  the 
service.  In  strong  hopes  that  ere  another  rolls  around  we  may 
all  be  safely  at  home,  with  peace  and  plenty.  Almost  given  up 
the  notion  of  reenlisting."  That  night  he  records  that  he  had  to 
get  up  in  the  night  to  warm  his  feet,  that  next  day  the  men  did 
nothing  but  get  wood  and  keep  up  fires,  and  that  one-half  pound 
of  corn  meal  was  issued  to  each  man. 

On  the  3rd  of  January  both  he  and  Wm.  McConnell  report 
that  the  brigade  was  formed  in  column  and  that  General  Willich 
made  a  speech  on  the  subject  of  re-enlistment  as  veteran  volun 
teers,  in  which  he  stated  that  the  regiment  which  first  re-enlisted 
would  be  the  first  sent  home  on  furlough.  McConnell  says  that 
General  Willich  made  this  speech  at  one  o'clock  in  the  afternoon 
and  that  at  four  o'clock  it  was  reported  that  the  regiment  had  the 
full  complement  of  re-enlistments  to  entitle  it  to  organize  as  a 
veteran  volunteer  regiment.  Gregory  reports  the  same  day  that 
"our  regiment  reports  its  quota  first." 

The  weather  continued  very  cold,  but  the  men  were  kept 
busy,  working  on  the  railroad,  or  on  the  bridge  across  the  Hols- 
ton.  On  the  5th  of  January,  an  order  was  published  requiring 
all  men  who  did  not  re-enlist  to  report  to  the  68th  Indiana.  Greg 
ory  this  day  reported  that  18  men  of  Company  A  would  not 
re-enlist,  that  it  was  thought  the  regiment  would  soon  be  ordered 
to  the  front  and  adds,  "I  wonder  how  much  longer  Old  Grant  is 
going  to  keep  us  here  without  clothing." 


404  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

It  has  already  been  stated  in  an  extract  from  General  Sher 
man's  Memoirs  that  on  the  6th  of  December  at  Burnside's  head 
quarters,  General  Granger  unreasonably  remonstrated  against 
being  ordered  to  remain  in  East  Tennessee.  Two  days  after 
wards,  on  December  8,  when  General  Sherman  was  on  his  way 
back  to  Chattanooga,  General  Granger  addressed  a  letter  to 
General  Burnside,  stating  in  substance,  that  the  object  of  our  ex 
pedition  had  been  accomplished,  that  Knoxville  had  been  relieved, 
that  the  enemy  was  in  full  retreat  with  no  possibility  of  return 
ing,  that  many  of  his  troops  were  without  shoes,  blankets,  over 
coats,  or  shirts,  were  entirely  destitute  of  shelter,  that  such 
clothing  as  they  had  was  the  light  blouse  and  pantaloon  for  sum 
mer  wear,  and  for  these  reasons  he  "respectfully,  and  most  per 
sistently  and  urgently"  asked  leave  to  withdraw  his  troops  to 
Chattanooga.1 

December  9,  he  despatched  to  General  Thomas  at  Chattan 
ooga  saying: 

"I  think  Burnside  is  retaining  us  here  beyond  all  reason. 
The  weather  is  fine  and  we  would  now  return  without  much  suf 
fering,  but  the  moment  it  rains  the  roads  will  become  impas 
sable  and  great  suffering  must  ensue  among  our  officers  and  men, 
who  are  without  shelter,  badly  clad  and  not  half  fed."  He  also 
states  in  a  general  way  that  Burnside  had  enough  troops  without 
his  command.2 

On  the  10th,  General  John  G.  Foster  relieved  General  Burn- 
side  at  Knoxville  and  telegraphed  to  General  Grant  that  he  had 
just  arrived,  that  Longstreet  had  given  out  that  he  would  make 
a  stand  at  Bristol,  that  he,  Foster,  proposed  to  advance  with  all 
his  available  forces  and  atack  him  there,  that  General  Granger 
was  impatient  to  return  to  Chattanooga,  and  asked  if  he  should 
retain  him  for  that  purpose.3  General  Grant  answered  this  dis 
patch  on  the  12th  saying:  ''Drive  Longstreet  to  the  farthest 
point  east  you  can.  Retain  Granger  as  long  as  may  be  neces 
sary." 

On  the  same  day,  December  12,  General  Granger  addressed 
a  letter  to  General  Foster,  in  which  he  said  : 

"As  is  well  known  to  you,  the  troops  under  my  command 
marched  immediately  after  a  hard  battle  of  three  days  duration 
from  Chattanooga  to  Knoxville  to  relieve  their  suffering  and 
beseiged  brethren.  They  came  hurriedly,  with  scarcely  any 
transportation,  no  shelter,  and  many  of  them  destitute  of  shoes, 
overcoats,  or  even  shirts,  for  the  exigency  was  urgent  and  we 
expected  to  be  detained  on  this  service  but  a  few  days.  Not  one 

1  W.  R.  R.,  56-338.  3     W.  R.  R.  56-372. 

2  W.  R.  R.  riG-365. 


THE  MARCH  IOR  RELIEF  OF  K>'OXVILLE  405 

of  my  officers  has  a  change  of  clothing.  For  more  than  three 
months  these  men  have  been  living  on  less  than  half  rations. 
In  their  hurried  forced  march  hither  they  have  subsisted  off  the 
country,  and  now  the  have  but  limited  quantities  of  bread  and 
meat.  They  are  weak  and  growing  feeble  in  consequence  of  all 
this.  Never  have  troops  more  cheerfully  borne  privations,  but 
it  is  certain,  unless  they  can  speedily  have  some  means  of  shelter, 
more  than  half  of  them  must  fill  the  hospitals,  from  there  only  to 
be  discharged  by  death.  In  addition  to  all  the  deficiencies  of 
food  and  clothing,  the  storms  of  winter,  so  long  delayed,  have 
at  last  evidently  set  in,  and  the  prospect  for  men  who,  with  all 
the  advantages  of  fine  weather  and  good  fires,  have  not  been  able 
to  keep  from  shivering,  is  sufficiently  deplorable.  The  climate 
in  its  extreme  variableness  is  extremely  trying  to  northern  con 
stitutions.  While  we  are  enduring  these  privations  of  food, 
clothing  and  shelter,  one  half  or  two  thirds  of  this  city  is  occu 
pied  by  the  worst  kind  of  rebels,  who  are  only  constrained  by 
circumstances  from  acting  as  our  bitterest  foes.  While  our 
soldiers  are  enduring  the  furious  peltings  of  the  pitiless  storm, 
these  vipers  to  the  Government  we  are  trying  at  such  cost  of  life 
and  suffering  to  maintain,  are  living  in  a  state  of  affluence  and 
plenty.  I.  therefore,  suggest,  as  a  fitting  notice  of  their  friends 
treason,  and  at  the  same  time  in  some  degree  to  ameliorate  the 
condition  of  our  men,  that  these  people  be  as  closely  packed  to 
gether  as  possible,  and  that  their  houses,  so  vacated,  be  turned 
over  to  the  officers  and  men  of  this  command."1 

On  the  same  day  he  sent  to  General  Grant  a  copy  of  the 
letter  he  had  addressed  to  General  Burnside  on  December  8,2 
and  wrote  to  General  Thomas  making  the  same  appeal.3 

December  13,  General  Halleck  telegraphed  to  General  Grant 
saying  that  Richmond  papers  of  the  day  before  stated  that  Long- 
street  was  preparing  to  hold  Rutledge,  that  his  cavalry  had 
passed  through  Pound  Gap  to  Mt.  Sterling,  Kentucky,  burning 
that  place  and  capturing  money  and  supplies  and  threatening 
Cumberland  Gap ;  that  if  this  was  true,  and  Longstreet  was 
establishing  himself  in  East  Tennessee,  he  asked  if  it  would  not 
be  unsafe  to  withdraw  Sherman's  forces  from  the  neighborhood 
of  Knoxville  until  the  enemy  was  driven  from  East  Tennessee ; 
he  said  further  that  "the  holding  of  East  Teneessee  and  the  pre 
vention  of  the  enemy  from  getting  supplies  there,  is  deemed  of 
the  greatest  importance,"  and  added :  "Moreover,  as  General 
Meade's  operations  have  failed  to  produce  any  results,  Lee  may 

1  W.  R.  R.  56-392. 
•1  W.  R.  R.  56-393. 
3  W.  R.  R.  56-391. 


406  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

send  by  rail   reinforcements   to   Longstreet   without   our  know 
ing  it."1 

Of  course,  if  General  Halleck's  information  was  correct, 
General  Grant  could  not  safely  order  the  return  of  the  Fourth 
corps  to  Chattanooga.  General  Foster  on  the  13th  answered 
General  Granger's  letters  of  the  12th,  saying  he  appreciated 
the  gallantry  and  devotion  of  the  troops  in  our  corps,  that 
he  was  awaiting  orders  from  General  Grant  to  know  what 
was  to  be  done  and  that  upon  their  receipt  immediate  action 
would  be  taken  to  insure  the  prompt  return  of  the  troops  to 
Chattanooga,  or  their  movement  up  the  railroad  to  attack  the 
enemy.  He  added  that  all  the  buildings  in  the  town  that  could 
be  had  had  been  taken  for  hospitals,  and  that  he  could  not 
comply  with  the  request  to  quarter  them  in  the  town.  Later, 
the  same  day,  he  stated  that  since  his  letter  of  that  morning 
he  had  learned  that  some  of  the  buildings  taken  for  hospitals 
had  not  been  occupied,  that  they  could  be  at  once  utilized  as 
shelter  for  a  portion  of  the  troops  and  that  General  Carter 
would  designate  them.  That  he  could  probably  accommodate 
3000  men,  and  that  officers  "would  be  billetted  in  secesh  fam 
ilies  by  him."2 

It  does  not  appear  that  the  offer  to  quarter  the  men  of 
our  command  in  houses  in  Knoxville  was  accepted,  as  we 
crossed  the  river  on  the  15th,  and  were  hurried  forward  to  meet 
the  enemy,  as  before  related.  On  the  14th  our  division  com 
mander,  General  Wood,  forwarded  for  the  information  of  the 
commanding  general  of  the  corps  and  other  higher  command 
ers,  a  report  of  Surgeon  W.  W.  Blair,  Medical  Director  of  the 
Division,  which  was  as  follows : 

"Having  just  returned  from  a  personal  inspection  of  the 
men  in  this  command,  I  have  the  honor  to  report  that  I  find 
them  exceedingly  destitute  of  clothing.  The  entire  outfit  of 
many  soldiers  consists  of  a  blouse,  worn  as  a  shirt,  a  pair  of 
pants,  well  worn,  a  pair  of  shoes,  and  in  some  instances  not 
even  those,  an  oil  or  woolen  blanket  and  a  hat  or  cap.  As 
one  of  the  results  of  this  exposure,  I  find  the  men  attacked 
with  rheumatism,  with  diarrhea  and  with  fever  of  a  typhoid 
character.  I  deem  it  therefore  my  duty  to  bring  to  your  no 
tice  the  fact  that  continuance  of  this  exposure  will,  without 
doubt,  seriously  impair  the  efficiency  of  this  command."3 

General  Wood,  in  forwarding  this  report,  said : 

"It  is  very  evident  from  Surgeon  Blair's  report  that,  if 
the  command  be  left  much  longer  in  its  present  exposed, 

1  W.  R.  R.  56-396. 

2  W.  R.  R.  56-400-401. 
8     W.  R.  R.  56-409. 


THE  MARCH  FOR  RELIEF  OF  KXOXVILLE  407 

unprotected  and  unprovided  condition,  the  ordinary  military 
commanders  will  be  relieved  soon  of  the  further  care  of  very 
many  of  the  men,  as  they  will  have  been  placed  by  Generals 
Rheumatism,  Diarrhea,  Pneumonia  and  Typhoid  Fever  be 
yond  the  reach  of  further  human  care.  For  reasons  not  nec 
essary  to  be  given  in  detail  here,  but  which  are  well  known 
to  the  higher  commanders,  the  troops  of  the  Fourth  Army 
Corps — at  least  the  Second  and  Third  Divisions — have  not 
been  supplied  with  clothing  since  the  march  from  Middle  Ten 
nessee  in  August  last.  Clothing  was  beginning  to  arrive  at 
Chattanooga  when  we  marched  from  there  on  the  28th  ultimo, 
but  we  were  not  allowed  to  remain  there  long  enough  to  derive 
any  advantage  from  this  supply.  After  fighting  a  great  battle 
we  were  hurried  off  to  the  relief  of  the  beleaguered  .garrison 
of  Knoxville.  We  came  cheerfully  and  with  alacrity,  not  only 
as  a  matter  of  duty,  but  as  a  work  of  love.  But  the  siege  being 
raised  (the  enemy  having  retreated)  and  it  being  apparent 
that  further  active  operations  in  this  field  for  some  time  to 
come  are  impossible,  we  ask  now  that  immediate  and  effective 
measures  be  taken  to  supply  our  wants.  The  men  are  not  only 
destitute  of  clothing,  but  men  and  officers  are  suffering  for 
want  of  sufficient  protection  in  tents,  and  both  are  suffering 
from  want  of  variety  in  rations.  When  we  marched  from 
Chattanooga  we  were  allowed  but  one  wagon  to  each  regi 
ment  to  transport  baggage  and  shelter  for  the  use  of  the  line 
officers  and  men  ;  of  course,  so  limited  an  amount  of  trans 
portation  allowed  us  to  bring  but  a  very  limited  amount  of 
protection.  We  supposed  we  should  be  allowed  to  return  to 
our  supplies  as  soon  as  the  siege  should  be  raised  and  I  know 
of  no  other  effectual  remedy  but  to  allow  us  to  return  to  them 
at  once.  With  the  difficulties  of  transportation  with  which 
we  are  surrounded,  I  do  not  believe  the  whole  transporting 
power  can  do  more  than  keep  the  troops  supplied  with  sub 
sistence.  The  country  can  do  little  more  in  the  way  of  afford 
ing  supplies.  The  local  stock  of  subsistence  is  well  nigh  ex 
hausted,  even  to  the  infliction  of  great  want,  perhaps  starva 
tion,  on  its  inhabitants.  These  evils  certainly  require  an  im 
mediate  remedy."1 

General  Granger  at  once  referred  General  Wood's  com 
munication  to  department  headquarters  for  the  consideration 
of  the  commanding  general  and  indorsed  it  as  being  substan 
tially  correct  and  as  "affording  conclusive  proof  of  the  impos 
sibility  of  further  offensive  operations  until  clothing,  shelter 
and  subsistence,  forage  and  transportation,  are  provided  for 

1      W.   R.   R.,  r,6-40S. 


408  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

the  troops  and  animals.''1  These  representations  seem  to  have 
impressed  General  Grant,  for  on  December  15.  he  tele 
graphed  General  Foster  that  as  soon  as  he  deemed  his  position 
secure  he  should  order  the  Fourth  Corps  to  return  to  Chat 
tanooga.2  On  the  same  day  General  Foster  telegraphed  to 
General  Grant  that  his  information  was  of  such  a  nature  that 
he  was  pushing  the  Fourth  Corps  to  Blain's  Cross  Roads  to 
meet  a  reported  advance  of  General  Longstreet  and  to  cover 
and  protect  trains  coming  from  Cumberland  Gap,  and  that  if 
Longstreet  had  been  reinforced  from  Virginia,  he  would  take 
up  the  most  advantageous  position  and  accept  battle. :} 

It  was  this  reported  advance  of  Longstreet  which  led  to 
our  movement  from  Knoxville  on  the  15th  and  16th  of  De 
cember  as  previously  described. 

It  seems  from  the  correspondence  of  that  time  that  the 
authorities  at  Washington  deemed  it  of  vital  importance  that 
Longstreet  should  be  driven  from  East  Tennessee,  and  that  the 
Fourth  Corps,  notwithstanding  its  wretched  condition  as  to 
clothing  and  shelter,  was  absolutely  essential  to  the  success 
of  such  movement.  General  Grant  showed  this  feeling.  On  the 
17th  of  December,  he  reported  to  General  Halleck  that  three 
steamers  were  employed  in  carrying  supplies  from  Chat 
tanooga  to  Knoxville  and  that  two  others  were  being  built, 
and  adds : 

"If  Longstreet  is  not  driven  from  the  valley  entirely  and 
the  road  destroyed  east  of  Abingdon,  I  do  not  think  it  unlikely 
that  the  last  great  battle  of  the  war  will  be  fought  in  East 
Tennessee."4 

On  the  same  day  he  telegraphed  to  General  Foster  giv 
ing  him  information  about  the  building  of  additional  boats, 
and  saying,  "Collect  all  the  stores  you  can  in  East  Tennessee 
this  winter.  A  great  battle  may  be  fought  in  East  Tennessee 
next  spring  and  stores  must  be  collected  for  the  subsistence 
of  a  large  army.'*"' 

On  the  same  day,  he  telegraphed  another  message  to 
General  Foster  as  follows :  "Keep  General  Granger's  forces 
as  long  as  it  may  be  necessary  to  do  so,  but  order  them  back 
when  you  feel  your  position  perfectly  secure.  If  you  find  it 
necessary  for  the  efficiency  of  his  command,  relieve  him  from 
duty  and  order  him  to  Cincinnati  to  report  to  me  by  letter 
and  place  Sheridan  in  command  of  his  corps."*' 

There  seems  to  have  been  wretched  mismanagement  of 
the  movements  intended  to  drive  Longstreet  out  of  East  Ten- 

1  W.  R.  R.   56-409.  4     W.  R.  R.  r>6-430. 

2  W.  R.  R.  56-415.  5      W.  R.  R.  56-433. 

3  W.  R.  R.  56-416.  6     W.  R.  R.  56-433. 


THE  MARCH  FOR  RELIEF  OF  KNOXVILLE  409 

nessee  until  Grant  went  to  Knoxville  and  took  personal  con 
trol.  Sheridan  in  his  Memoirs  says,  that  after  the  troops 
from  Chattanooga  arrived  in  the  vicinity  of  Knoxville  and 
General  Sherman  had  returned  to  Chattanooga,  the  operations 
in  East  Tennessee  constituted  a  series  of  blunders  lasting 
through  the  entire  winter,  and  that  when  his  division  was 
finally  ordered  back  to  London,  Tenn.  and  took  the  road  for 
that  point,  it  was  with  few  regrets ;  for  a  general  disgust 
prevailed  regarding  our  useless  marches  during  the  winter.1 

On  the  18th  of  December,  General  Grant  went  to  Nash 
ville  in  order  to  give  more  direct  attention  to  the  movements 
of  the  enemy  at  various  points  on  the  Mississippi  River,  leav 
ing  General  Thomas  to  act  in  his  stead  in  all  matters  in  East 
Tennessee  requiring  immediate  attention.2 

On  the  20th  he  received  word  from  General  Foster  that 
Longstreet  would  probably  attempt  to  hold  the  east  end  of 
the  East  Tennessee  valley,  and  so  reported  to  General  Halleck 
at  Washington.  The  War  Department  and  the  Administra 
tion,  as  before  stated,  had  made  the  possession  of  all  of  East 
Tennessee  one  of  the  important  and  indispensable  require 
ments  of  the  campaign  in  the  Tennessee  valley,  and  kept 
pressing  it  upon  the  attention  of  Generals  Grant  and  Foster. 
With  this  in  view  tremendous  efforts  were  made  to  supply  the 
army  at  Knoxville,  and  to  reinforce  it  from  the  east  and  from 
detachments  scattered  about  in  Kentucky. 

After  the  battle  at  Missionary  Ridge,  General  Grant  had 
communicated  to  Mr.  C.  A.  Dana,  Assistant  Secretary  of 
\Var,  a  plan  for  a  winter  campaign  in  Alabama,  and  on  the 
12th  of  December  had  asked  Mr.  Dana  to  go  to  Washington 
to  lay  it  before  Mr.  Lincoln,  Secretary  Stanton  and  General 
Halleck.3  On  the  2 1st  of  December,  Mr.  Dana  wrote  that  he 
had  had  several  conversations  with  these  officials  about  the 
proposed  Alabama  campaign,  and  that  it  met  the  approval  of  all 
of  them,  not  only  because  it  would  keep  the  army  active  during 
the  otherwise  useless  weather  of  the  winter,  but  because  it 
appeared  to  be  well  conceived  and  as  certain  of  producing  the 
desired  effect,  as  any  plan  would  be.  Dana  reported  that  the 
Secretary  of  War  had  said,  "If  it  succeeds  Bragg's  army  be 
come  prisoners  of  war  without  our  having  the  trouble  of  pro 
viding  for  them,"  and  added  "You  would  be  authorized  to 
proceed  immediately  with  its  execution  but  for  the  anxiety 
which  seems  to  exist  respecting  East  Tennessee.  If  Long- 
street  were  expelled  from  that  country,  you  could  start  for 
Mobile  at  once."4  On  the  same  day  General  Halleck  wrote 

1  Sheridan's  Memoirs,  Vol.  I,  page  335-337.          3     W.  R.  R.  55-73. 

2  W.  R.  R.  56-437.  4     W.  R.  R.  56-457.  Sig.    14 


410  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

to  General  Grant  saying  in  substance,  that  the  driving  of 
Longstreet  from  East  Tennessee  was  the  first  matter  to  be 
considered.1 

December  23,  General  Halleck  telegraphed  to  General 
Grant  saying  among  other  things,  "I  am  directed  to  call  your 
attention  particularly  to  Longstreet's  army.  Fears  are  ex 
pressed  that  Foster  and  Wilcox  are  not  able  to  cope  with  it, 
and  unless  it  is  driven  out  of  East  Tennessee  new  raids  will 
be  made  into  Kentucky."  General  Grant  replied  on  the  same 
day  saying,  that  as  soon  as  he  could  get  some  necessary  muni 
tions  forwarded  to  Knoxville  he  would  go  there  in  person,2 
and  on  the  24th  he  telegraphed  to  Secretary  Stanton,  "I  will 
go  to  Knoxville  in  person  immediately.  If  Longstreet  is  not 
driven  from  East  Tennessee,  it  shall  not  be  my  fault.  ":j  Gen 
eral  Grant  arrived  at  Knoxville  December  31  and  was  there 
for  more  than  a  week.  As  a  result  of  his  visit,  a  campaign 
against  Longstreet  was  organized  and  by  the  middle  of  Janu 
ary  he  was  finally  driven  from  East  Tennessee  and  moved  to 
Lynchburg,  Va.  After  that  General  Grant's  proposed  cam 
paign  in  Alabama  was  abandoned,  and  the  immediate  plan 
ning  and  direction  of  the  campaigns  in  the  west  passed  into 
other  hands. 

Of  course  the  rank  and  file  did  not  know  the  reason  for 
their  being  held  at  Knoxville  and  Strawberry  Plains  with  in 
sufficient  clothing  and  shelter  during  such  intensely  severe 
weather.  They  supposed  there  was  some  urgent  necessity 
for  it,  and  bore  the  severe  privations  with  becoming  fortitude. 
Judging  from  the  daily  records  in  the  diaries  of  Wm.  McCon- 
nell  and  John  G.  Gregory,  Generals  Granger  and  Wood  were 
the  chief  complainers.  Their  men  accepted  the  situation  and 
managed  to  get  through  without  the  calamitous  results  which 
their  commanding  generals  predicted  would  surely  follow 
their  unusual  exposure. 

It  will  be  noted  that  the  foregoing  narrative  traced  the 
movements  and  employments  of  the  regiment  up  to  include 
January  5,  1864,  when  John  G.  Gregory  railed  out  against 
"Old  Grant"  keeping  us  at  Strawberry  Plains  without  cloth 
ing.  We  learn  from  the  diaries  of  both  John  G.  Gregory  and 
Wm.  McConnell,  that  on  January  6,  it  snowed  all  forenoon, 
that  the  men  worked  on  the  bridge  over  the  Holston  River  and 
that  at  2  o'clock  p.  m.  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  started  for  home 
on  veteran  furlough,  that  regiment  having  re-enlisted.  Greg 
ory,  after  noting  that  the  Forty-ninth  had  started,  said  :  "Our 

1  W.  R.  R.  56-458. 
•2  W.  R.  R.  56-472. 
3  W.  R.  R.  56-479. 


THE  MARCH  FOR  RELIEF  OF  KNOXMLLE  411 

time  will  come  next."  Gregory,  as  before  stated,  was  not  at 
all  sure  he  would  join  the  'veterans.  He  was  a  thoughtful, 
conscientious  and  patriotic  soldier,  but  he  realized  better  per 
haps  than  most  of  his  comrades,  what  it  meant  to  bind  himself 
to  stay  with  the  fighting  forces  of  the  Union  until  the  war 
ended.  January  7,  was  cloudy  and  cold  and  our  men  or  a  por 
tion  of  them  were  again  detailed  to  work  on  the  bridge.  That 
evening  Gregory  records  that  all  in  Company  A,  his  company, 
who  had  not  re-enlisted  as  veterans,  held  a  council  and  that  as 
a  result  six  more  re-enlisted  and  two  more  promised  to  do  so 
and  adds  :  "We  expect  to  have  some  very  perilous  times  during 
the  next  three  years."  On  the  8th  he  says :  "All  our  company 
are  veterans  except  three,  Wm.  Dodds,  R.  W.  Thompson  and 
John  Wilson."  William  McConnell  says  the  day  was  cold  and 
that  Company  L  remained  in  camp  and  rebuilt  the  chimneys  to 
their  shanties.  On  January  9,  details  from  both  Companies 
A  and  I  were  at  work  on  the  bridge.  McConnell  notes  that 
his  company  got  the  clothing  which  had  been  sent  to  Nashville 
the  summer  before.  Gregory  states  that  he  was  out  boat- 
riding  in  the  evening.  January  10,  according  to  Gregory's 
diary,  was  the  coldest  of  the  year  and  ice  was  floating  thick 
in  the  river,  but  the  usual  detail  of  men  was  made  for  work 
on  the  bridge.  January  11,  Gregory  notes  that  his  company 
elected  officers,  but  that  the  election  would  be  contested  as 
invalid.  January  12,  a  detail  from  the  regiment  were  at  work 
on  the  bridge.  Gregory  states  that  the  men  were  "dissatis 
fied  because  they  have  been  kept  lying  here  so  long."  McCon 
nell  records  that  in  the  evening  an  engine  passed  over  the 
bridge  the  men  had  been  building. 

January  13,  Company  I  had  an  election  of  officers,  and 
McConnell  notes  the  return  of  Trego,  Barnett  Sims,  Gardner 
and  Nazor  to  the  regiment.  Gregory  says  there  was  snow  in 
the  morning  and  that  orders  came  to  make  out  descriptive  rolls 
of  all  the  non-veterans,  who  were  to  be  sent  to  the  Sixty- 
eighth  Indiana,  as  before  stated ;  he  says :  "Only  one  from 
our  company,  R.  W.  Thompson."  He  also  states  that  one-half 
the  company  were  at  work  on  the  bridge  and  that  Lieutenant 
Hanson  fell  into  the  river.  He  adds,  "We  expect  to  leave  for 
Chattanooga  tomorrow."  This  expectation  was  realized,  for 
the  next  morning  the  division  and  brigade  moved  to  the  front 
with  the  troops  which  were  to  drive  Longstreet  out  of  East 
Tennessee,  leaving  our  regiment  behind.  The  non-veterans 
were  transferred  to  the  Sixty-eighth  Indiana,  and  at  3  o'clock 
p.  m.  the  regiment  started  home  on  veteran  furlough.  The 
regiment  marched  four  miles  toward  Knoxville  and  encamped 
for  the  night. 


412  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

The  hardships  and  privations  of  the  East  Tennessee  cam 
paign  were  now  all  forgotten.  The  men's  faces  and  thoughts 
were  turned  homeward,  and  even  Gregory's  rather  pessimistic 
diary  at  once  grows  brighter.  He  says  that  when  the  regiment 
went  into  camp  in  the  evening  he  "bought  some  meal  and 
got  it  baked  and  had  a  chat  with  some  pretty  girls,"  and  only 
the  next  day  he  tells  that  he  "stopped  at  a  house  and  bought  a 
canteen  of  milk  from  a  pretty  girl." 

On  the  15th,  the  regiment  marched  to  Knoxville  on  the 
railroad  track,  distance  12  miles,  where  it  arrived  at  noon.  It 
drew  two  days'  rations  and  at  2  o'clock  started  for  Kingston, 
marching  nine  miles,  making  the  day's  march  twenty-one 
miles. 

The  next  day  ,the  16th,  the  regiment  resumed  its  march 
and  tramped  17  miles.  The  homeward  march  for  the  first 
three  or  four  days  seems  to  have  been  a  sort  of  go  as  you 
please  affair.  On  the  16th,  Gregory  says  that  he  and  "Pete" 
Gardner  stopped  at  a  house  and  got  supper,  and  McConnell 
says  he  bought  a  hound  to  take  home.  On  the  17th  the  regi 
ment  reached  Kingston,  crossed  the  river  and  went  into  camp 
having  marched  17  miles.  McConnell  says  he  stopped  at  a 
private  house  and  got  dinner,  and  we  learn  from  Gregory's 
diary  that  some  of  the  men  hati  considered  the  project  of  mak 
ing  a  raft  and  trying  to  get  back  to  Chattanooga  by  floating 
down  the  Tennessee  River.  This,  however,  was  abandoned, 
and  those  who  were  considering  it  decided  to  march  down 
the  river  until  they  came  to  a  boat.  Gregory  in  his  record 
for  this  day  says  that  some  of  the  men  of  the  regiment  cap 
tured  a  rebel  spy  under  a  bed. 

January  18,  the  regiment  marched  thirteen  miles  to  John 
son's  Mills,  and  there  encamped  for  the  night.  It  was  a  rainy 
and  disagreeable  day  and  the  marching  was  difficult.  The 
next  morning  at  7  o'clock  the  march  was  resumed  and  Mc 
Connell  says  "we  went  four  miles  and  halted  on  top  of  a 
hill,  and  in  the  afternoon  crossed  the  Tennessee  River."  Greg 
ory  says  we  "marched  four  miles  to  a  ferry,  got  our  dinners 
on  the  south  side  and  then  crossed  over  in  a  ferry  boat  be 
longing  to  a  company  of  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  and  camped  on 
the  river."  He  also  says  that  there  was  a  report  that  General 
John  Morgan  was  after  us.  Frank  L.  Schreiber,  who  had  re 
joined  the  regiment,  on  the  evening  of  the  13th,  had  re-enlisted 
on  the  morning  of  the  14th,  and  was  with  the  regiment  on  this 
march,  says  that  on  the  19th  the  regiment  resumed  its  march 
at  9  o'clock,  went  to  the  ferry  and  was  going  into  camp  for 
the  night  when  Colonel  Burt  sent  a  dispatch  asking  us  to  re 
turn  to  Kingston,  as  General  John  Morgan  was  making  a  raid 


THE  MARCH  FOR  RELIEF  OF  KXOXVILLE  413 

on  the  place.  This  does  not  seem  to  have  impressed  our 
officers  very  much,  for  all  three  diaries  agree  in  stating  that 
we  crossed  the  river  and  encamped  for  the  night  and  next 
morning  at  7  o'clock  resumed  our  homeward  march.  On  the 
20th,  the  regiment  marched  20  miles,  passing  through  Sluphur 
Springs,  and  went  into  camp  about  two  and  one-half  miles 
from  Washington.  Both  Gregory  and  Schreiber,  in  their 
diaries,  state  that  about  one-half  of  Company  A  was  ordered 
out  on  the  hunt  of  some  bushwackers  who  were  said  to  be 
infesting  the  neighborhood.  Schreiber  says  two  of  the  bush 
wackers  were  captured,  but  nothing  could  be  proved  against 
them  ;  that  one  of  them  was  a  rebel  soldier,  who  was  kept  and 
that  the  other  was  let  go.  Gregory  says  four  were  captured 
and  that  he  wished  they  would  hang  them.  The  day  was 
pleasant  and  the  regiment  inarched  20  miles. 

On  the  21st,  the  regiment  started  at  7  o'clock  in  the  morn 
ing,  passed  through  Washington  and  Smith's  Cross  Roads, 
and  came  to  the  same  road  Schreiber  remembered  to  have 
foraged  on  the  fall  before,  while  we  were  at  Chattanooga. 
The  regiment  marched  IS  miles  and  at  -'3  o'clock  went  into 
camp  on  Sale  Creek.1 

January  22  the  weather  was  fine  and  the  march  was 
resumed  at  daylight.  The  near  approach  to  Chattanooga 
seemed  to  quicken  the  pace,  for  Schreiber  says  the  men 
marched  very  fast.  That  night  the  regiment  encamped  on 
North  Chickamauga  Creek,  having  marched  16  miles.  Greg 
ory  notes  that  the  Colonel  and  Adjutant  Avent  on  into  Chat 
tanooga,  probably  to  report  the  arrival  of  the  regiment  and  to 
select  a  camping  ground  for  it.  On  January  23,  the  march 
was  resumed  at  daylight.  The  distance  to  Chattanooga,  13 
miles,  was  soon  covered.  The  Tennessee  River  was  crossed  at 
the  ferry  and  Schreiber  in  his  diary  noted  that  the  pontoon 
bridge  had  been  partly  washed  away.  The  regiment  arrived 
at  Chattanooga  at  10  o'clock  a.  m.,  marched  through  the  town 
and  was  placed  in  camp  on  Signal  Hill.2 

The  first  and  most  trying  stage  of  the  home  journey  was 
completed  and  a  feeling  of  profound  thankfulness  was  felt  by 
many.  There  was  to  be  no  further  marching,  railroad  com 
munication  northward  was  uninterrupted,  and  there  was  to  be 
no  more  suffering  for  want  of  food,  clothing  and  shelter.  The 
next  day,  the  24th,  was  Sunday.  There  was  no  special  duty 
to  perform  and  the  men  slept  late.  In  the  evening  good  Chap 
lain  Ross  preached  a  short  discourse,-"  and  doubtless  in  his 

1  Frank  L.   Schreiber's  Diary. 

2  Schreiber's  Diary. 

3  Schreiber's  and  Gregory's  Diaries. 


414  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

prayer  rendered  devout  thanks  to  the  good  Providence  which 
had  watched  over  the  regiment  and  had  led  it  into  pleasanter 
places. 

We  remained  at  Chattanooga,  with  no  special  duties  to 
perform,  until  February  4th.  The  men  spent  the  time  visiting 
friends  in  other  regiments  and  points  of  interest  in  and  about 
Chattanooga,  especially  Lookout  Mountain  and  Missionary 
Ridge.  On  January  30,  Colonel  Askew  formed  the  regiment 
and  told  us  that  we  were  to  have  an  election  of  field  officers. 
Such  election  was  held  that  afternoon,  but  neither  Gregory. 
Schreiber  nor  McConnell '  give  the  result.  On  the  first  of 
February  the  regiment  was  paid  off.  Three  hundred  and  two 
men  had  re-enlisted  for  three  years  more  or  until  the  war 
ended,  and  on  the  4th  day  of  February  at  4  o'clock  in  the 
morning  they  started  for  Ohio  to  enjoy  the  promised  30  days' 
furlough.  The  train  was  delayed  by  a  car  off  the  track  and 
the  regiment  did  not  get  to  Stevenson  until  10  o'clock.  There 
the  men  got  dinner  and  at  5:30  p.  m.  started  for  Nashville, 
traveling  all  night  and  reaching  that  place  at  8  o'clock  the 
next  morning.  The  regiment  lay  at  Nashville  until  that  even 
ing  and  Gregory  in  his  diary  says  quite  a  number  of  the  men 
got  intoxicated.  At  dark  the  regiment  left  for  Louisville  in 
freight  cars  and  traveled  all  night,  reaching  Louisville  at  2 
o'clock  p.  m.  on  the  6th.  It  remained  in  Louisville  all  day  the 
?th,  and  until  1  o'clock  p.  m.  of  the  8th,  when  it  crossed  the 
Ohio  River  on  a  ferryboat.  It  left  Jeffersonville,  Ind.,  at  (> 
o'clock  that  evening,  again  traveled  all  night  and  reached  Cin 
cinnati  at  1  o'clock  on  the  9th,  where  it  was  taken  care  of  at 
the  Sanitary  Fair.  It  left  Cincinnati  about  4  o'clock  p.  m.  and 
arrived  at  Columbus  about  2  o'clock  a.  m.,  the  10th,  and  was 
escorted  to  Todd  Barracks.  There  the  regiment  separated, 
each  officer  and  man  going  to  his  home,  but  with  orders  to 
reassemble  at  Columbus  at  the  expiration  of  the  30  days' 
furlough. 


CHAPTER  XX. 

THE  ATLANTA  CAMPAIGN — ROCKY  FACE  AND  RESACA. 

While  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  and  the  other  regiments  who  had 
re-enlisted  as  Veterans  were  enjoying  their  furloughs,  important 
events  were  occuring  which  were  to  bring  the  great  war  to  an  end 
and  restore  constitutional  government  to  the  country. 

Shortly  after  General  Grant's  visit  to  Knoxville,  mentioned 
in  a  former  chapter,  he  established  his  headquarters  at  Nashville 
and  set  himself  to  the  task  of  placing  his  troops  in  position  from 
which  they  could  move  to  advantage,  and  in  collecting  necessary 
supplies,  so  as  to  be  ready  to  move  upon  the  enemy  on  the  first 
appearance  of  good  weather  in  the  spring.  He  expected  to  re 
tain  the  command  he  then  had  and  to  move  against  Atlanta.  He 
also  hoped  to  make  a  campaign  against  Mobile,  after  Atlanta 
had  fallen  to  occupy  that  place  permanently,  and  to  cut  off  Lee's 
army  from  the  west  by  way  of  the  road  running  through  Au 
gusta  to  Atlanta  and  thence  south-west.  He  was  purposing  to 
hold  Atlanta  with  a  small  garrison  and  expected  to  push  through 
to  Mobile,  if  that  city  was  in  our  possession ;  if  not,  to  Savannah, 
and  in  this  manner  to  get  possession  of  the  only  road  that  would 
then  be  left  to  the  enemy.1 

The  bill  restoring  the  grade  of  Lieutenant  General  of  the 
Army  was  passed  February  26,  1864.  and  General  Grant  was  ap 
pointed  to  the  position.  On  the  9th  day  of  March  following,  his 
commission  was  handed  to  him  by  President  Lincoln,  and  on  the 
llth,  orders  were  issued  placing  him  in  command  of  all  the 
armies  in  the  field.  He  at  once  had  General  Sherman  advanced 
to  the  position  he  had  vacated,  General  McPherson  to  the  com 
mand  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  and  General  Logan  made 
commander  of  McPherson's  Corps.  Happily,  General  Thomas 
was  left  undisturbed  as  Commander  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumber 
land.  General  Grant  then  returned  to  his  headquarters  at  Nash 
ville,  where  he  met  General  Sherman,  and  on  March  18,  the  two 
Generals  on  whom  the  ultimate  success  of  our  armies  depended, 
journeyed  together  to  Cincinnati,  in  order,  as  General  Grant  says, 
that  they  could  talk  over  matters  of  mutual  interest  without 
losing  any  more  time  from  his  new  command. 

It  would  be  of  profound  interest  could  we  know,  all  that 
occurred  on  that  eventful  journey  from  Nashville  to  Cincinnati. 
General  Grant  in  his  memoirs  says,  that  the  first  point  that  he 

1     Grant's  Memoirs. 


416  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

wished  to  discuss  with  General  Sherman  was  particularly  about 
the  co-operation  of  the  two  armies  when  the  spring  campaign 
should  open.  Among  the  minor  points  discussed  was  the  restor 
ation  to  duty  of  officers  who  had  been  relieved  of  important 
commands,  namely,  McClellan,  Fremont  and  Burnside  in  the 
east,  and  Buell,  McCook,  Negley  and  Crittenden  in  the  west. 
General  Grant's  charity  was  as  broad  as  his  patriotism,  and  both 
were  broad  enough  to  prompt  him  to  seek  opportunity  for  these 
rejected  General  Officers,  in  which  they  might  still  serve  the 
country  and  regain  part  of  their  lost  prestige. 

General  Grant  states  that  he  agreed  to  see  the  Secretary  of 
War  and  urge  the  restoration  to  command  of  these  officers,  and 
did  so.  He  particularly  recommended  General  Buell  for  such 
restoration  and  states  that  Secretary  Stanton  afterwards  told 
him  he  had  offered  Generalr  Buell  an  assignment,  but  that  the 
latter  had  declined  it,  saying,  it  would  be  a  degradation  to  accept 
the  assignment  offered.  That  he  afterwards  understood  that 
General  Buell  had  refused  to  serve  under  either  General  Sherman 
or  General  Canby,  because  he  had  once  ranked  them  both,  and 
adds : 

"The  worst  excuse  a  soldier  can  make  for  declining  service 
is  that  he  once  ranked  the  Commander  he  is  ordered  to  report  to/' 
General  Grant  also  says  that  "there  could  have  been  no  difference 
of  opinion  (between  himself  and  General  Sherman)  as  to  the 
first  duty  of  the  armies  of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Missis 
sippi.  Johnson's  army  was  the  first  objective,  and  that  important 
railroad  center,  Atlanta,  the  second."1  The  occupation  of  Mobile 
and  Savannah,  as  before  related,  were  a  part  of  his  ultimate 
plans. 

General  Sherman  in  his  Memoirs  confirms  in  part  what 
took  place  during  this  journey,  and  adds  some  facts  in  connection 
with  General  Buell's  declination  to  re-enter  the  service.  He  says 
that  General  Crittenden  also  refused  service  under  an  officer  he 
had  once  ranked,  and  that  our  General  McCook  accepted  a  com 
mand  under  General  Canby,  in  which  he  rendered  valuable  and 
patriotic  service.2 

So,  while  as  before  stated,  our  regiment  was  on  furlough, 
the  plans  for  the  great  campaign  in  the  west  on  which  we  were 
about  to  enter  were  fully  outlined  and  decided  upon. 

On  the  18th  day  of  March,  1864,  the  very  day  of  the  im 
portant  conference  between  Generals  Grant  and  Sherman,  our 
regiment,  recruited  to  nearly  its  full  strength,  marched  to  the 

1  Grant's  Memoirs,  Vol.  2,  page  121.     See  also  General  Sherman's  Memoirs,  Vol.   2, 

page   6-7. 

2  General  Sherman's  Memoirs,  Vol.   2,  page  6-7. 


ROCKY  FACE  AND  RESACA  417 

east  front  of  the  Capitol  at  Columbus,  where  it  turned  over  to 
Governor  John  Brough  the  old  battle  torn  flag  it  had  carried  at 
Chickamauga  and  Missionary  Ridge,  and  received  a  new  one, 
which  was  presented  by  the  patriotic  women  of  Rix's  Mills, 
Muskingum  County,  Ohio.  The  presentation  speech  was  made 
by  Rev.  David  Boyd  and  Lieutenant  Colonel  Askew  received  it 
for  the  regiment  and  promised  that  it  should  not  suffer  dis 
honor.1  The  regiment  then  marched  to  the  railroad  station 
where  at  5  o'clock  p.  m.  it  took  cars  for  Cincinnati  on  its  way 
to  the  front.  We  reached  Cincinnati  at  3  o'clock  on  the  morning 
of  the  19th  and  were  quartered  on  Fifth  Street.  At  9  o'clock 
next  morning  we  embarked  on  the  steam  boat  War  Eagle  for 
Louisville,  Ky.,  where  we  arrived  at  11  o'clock  that  night  and 
were  given  quarters  on  Sixth  Street.  We  remained  at  Louis 
ville  all  day  the  21st,  and  at  7  o'clock  the  morning  of  the  22nd 
left  for  Nashville,  where  we  arrived  at  5  o'clock  p.  m.  and  were 
quartered  in  the  Zollicoffer  Building.  We  remained  there  until 
the  morning  of  the  25th.  It  was  announced  that  we  would  be 
expected  to  march  to  Chattanooga,  as  the  cars  were  all  needed 
for  transporting  supplies  to  that  place  preparatory  to  our  grand 
forward  movement. 

Some  of  the  regimental  officers  had  neglected  to  provide 
themselves  with  horses  while  at  home,  expecting  to  find  suitable 
mounts  at  Nashville.  In  this  they  were  disappointed,  and  the 
surgeon  and  adjutant  had  to  content  themselves  with  two 
scrawny,  scraggy  specimens,  which  were  the  laughing  stock  of 
the  regiment.  Each  of  these  officers  provided  himself  with  a 
large  pair  of  saddle  bags  in  which  to  carry  a  change  of  under 
clothing,  and  when  these  bags  were  strapped  on  their  saddles  the 
horses  looked  like  winged  skeletons.  The  adjutant  humorously 
named  his  beast  "Pegasus"  and  Doctor  Clark  countered  by 
calling  his  steed  "Rosinante".  The  horses  had  both  seen  hard 
campaigning  and  were  probably  among  those  which  had  barely 
escaped  starvation  in  the  Chattanooga  campaign  the  fall  before. 

On  the  morning  of  March  25  at  9  o'clock  we  moved  out  on 
the  Murfreesboro  Pike,  and  commenced  our  march  to  Chattan 
ooga.  As  we  passed  out  of  the  city  the  rain  began  to  pour.  The 
prospect  was  not  at  all  pleasant  and  was  quite  depressing  to  our 
new  recruits.  After  a  march  of  about  8  miles  we  turned  off  the 
pike,  put  up  our  shelter  tents  and  bivouaced  for  the  night.2 

Next  morning,  the  26th,  at  7  o'clock  we  resumed  our  march 
and  reached  Stewart's  Creek,  12^  miles,  about  noon,  where  we 

1  For  the  history  of  this  flag  see  proceedings  of  36th  Annual  Reunion  of  the  Regi 

ment,   1911. 

2  Win.  McConnell's  Diary. 


418  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

went  into  camp  and  remained  until  next  day.  The  weather  was 
fair  and  warm  and  the  men  had  an  opportunity  to  dry  their  wet 
clothing  and  write  letters  home. 

The  next  morning  was  Sunday,  but  it  was  a  day  of  only 
partial  rest.  At  7  o'clock  we  resumed  our  march  and  in  about 
10  miles  reached  Murfreesboro.  Just  before  reaching  the  town 
the  band  of  the  Sixty-fourth  Ohio,  which  was  with  us,  took  po 
sition  at  the  head  of  the  regiment  with  our  own  band,  and  we 
marched  through  the  town  with  our  colors  flying  and  keeping 
time  to  the  music.  Our  own  band  was  new  and  had  little 
practice  but  it  played  one  march  quite  creditably.1  We  marched 
through  the  place  without  halting  and  pitched  our  tents  on  Stone 
River,  near  our  old  camp  (Camp  Sill)  of  the  year  before.  Re 
ligious  services  were  held  in  our  camp  by  a  volunteer  chaplain 
who  came  out  from  Murfreesboro  to  conduct  them.  It  was 
understood  we  were  to  remain  here  until  supplies  and  clothing 
needed  for  our  march  were  provided.  The  next  day,  March  2S, 
such  supplies  and  clothing  were  received  and  issued.  Among 
the  articles  issued  were  axes  and  hatchets.  In  the  evening  there 
was  a  heavy  thunderstorm  accompanied  by  rain  which  flooded 
the  camp  and  made  some  of  the  tents  untenable. 

March  29,  reveille  sounded  at  day  light  and  we  started  again 
on  our  southward  march.  The  bad  weather  had  been  very  trying 
to  the  new  recruits  and  we  were  compelled  to  leave  quite  a 
number  of  them  in  the  hospital  at  Murfreesboro.  We  took  the 
Shelly ville  Pike,  marched  18  miles  and  went  into  camp  about 
sun  set,  four  miles  from  the  town,  near  some  old  intrenchments 
abandoned  by  the  enemy  the  year  before.  There  was  a  keen 
wind  blowing,  betokening  more  rain,  and  the  boys  pulled  dry 
grass  for  bedding  and  made  themselves  comfortable  for  the 
night. 

March  30  at  7  o'clock  we  resumed  our  march  over  an  un 
dulating  region.  We  were  to  pass  through  Shelbyville,  which 
we  had  left  to  our  right  in  our  advance  from  Murfreesboro  the 
year  before.  We  had  heard  that  it  was  one  of  the  finest  towns 
in  Middle  Tennessee  and  that  the  greater  part  of  the  people 
there  were  loyal  to  the  Union.  As  we  passed  through  the  place 
both  these  reports  were  confirmed.  As  we  neared  the  town, 
from  many  of  the  farm  houses  handkerchiefs  and  small  flags 
were  waved  from  doors  and  windows.  Our  band  had  now  two 
pieces  in  its  repertoire,  which  it  player  as  we  marched  through 
the  town,  and  many  a  pretty  face  beamed  from  the  houses  on 
our  line  of  march,  as  our  bright  new  flag  and  tidy  uniforms 
caught  their  eyes.2 

1  and  2     Gleason's  Diary. 


ROCKY  FACE  AND  RES  AC  A  419 

We  stopped  at  Duck  River,  about  a  mile  south  of  the  town, 
to  fill  our  canteens,  and  then  took  the  road  to  Tullahoma.  The 
country  grew  more  hilly  as  we  progressed.  We  halted  at  10  a.  m. 
for  dinner  and  then  pressed  forward  over  hills  and  through 
hollows ; — a  rougher  road  than  those  we  had  encountered  on 
our  march  up  to  this  time.  \Ve  met  a  party  of  soldiers  surveying 
a  military  road  and  passed  a  school  house,  where  a  light  haired 
handsome  schoolmarm  was  presiding  over  about  twenty  flaxen 
haired  children.  They  kept  their  seats  as  we  marched  by  the 
open  door,  which  spoke  well  for  the  discipline  of  the  school  and 
the  tact  of  the  fair  school  mistress.  Gleason,  in  his  diary,  says 
this  school  reminded  him  of  the  North  more  than  any  thing  he 
had  yet  seen  on  the  march,  and  in  part  accounted  for  the  strong 
Union  sentiment  manifested  by  the  people  of  that  region.  We 
finally  found  a  favorable  camping  place,  on  a  piece  of  table  land 
not  far  from  Tullahoma,  where  there  was  a  stream  of  good 
water,  and  halted  for  the  night,  having  marched  during  the  day 
about  20  miles.  On  the  morning  of  March  31,  we  continued  our 
march  a  few  miles,  passing  through  Tullahoma  and  encamping 
about  one  mile  beyond  the  town,  where  we  were  to  remain  dur 
ing  the  balance  of  the  day.  We  drew  rations  and  prepared  to 
resume  our  march  next  day.  The  morning  of  April  1,  1864, 
was  rainy  and  cold,  but  we  resumed  our  march  at  the  usual 
time.  The  road  was  muddy  and  slippery  and  most  of  the  men 
were  permitted  to  march  on  the  railroad  track,  that  ran  near  the 
road  and  which  was  higher  and  dryer.  After  a  toilsome  tramp 
of  about  14  miles  we  passed  through  the  town  of  Decherd  and 
went  into  camp  about  a  mile  beyond  it.  It  was  reported  that 
some  of  the  men  had  boarded  a  train  for  Chattanooga.  April 
2,  we  marched  to  Cowan  Station  on  the  Nashville  and  Chattan 
ooga  Railroad,  distant  about  6  miles,  and  went  into  camp  at  the 
foot  of  the  mountain  we  were  to  cross  in  order  to  reach  Stev 
enson.  There  we  drew  two  days  rations  which  were  to  last 
until  we  reached  that  place,  said  to  be  thirty  miles  distant. 

The  morning  of  April  3,  was  frosty  and  pleasant  and 
we  began  the  ascent  of  the  mountain  about  7  o'clock.  The  ascent 
was  not  difficult,  except  in  places  where  the  roads  had  been  made 
rough  by  the  recent  rains.  After  passing  the  summit  we  again 
took  advantage  of  the  railroad  track  and  after  a  march  of  10 
miles  halted  for  the  night,  in  order  that  our  wagon  might  over 
take  us.  It  rained  steadily  all  night.  Next  morning,  April  4, 
the  reveille  sounded  and  it  was  understood  we  were  to  continue 
our  march  to  Stevenson,  although  the  Colonel  was  reported  as 
saying  we  would  stop  midway  if  we  could  procure  rations.  We 

1     Gleason's   Diary. 


420  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

resumed  our  march  about  7  o'clock,  and  the  road  being  very  wet 
and  slippery,  the  whole  regiment,  except  the  officers  who  were 
mounted,  took  the  railroad  track  down  the  mountain.  The  rail 
road  track  was  also  difficult  in  places,  and  there  was  a  good 
deal  of  straggling,  notwithstanding  that  Captain  Dawson  who 
was  in  immediate  command  of  the  marching  column,  did  his 
best  to  prevent  it  and  thereby  earned  the  soubriquet  of  "old 
close  'em  up."  There  was  a  brief  halt  for  dinner  and  we  again 
pressed  forward,  passing  one  or  two  small  stations  by  the  way. 
The  valley  widened  as  we  neared  Stevenson.  When  we  were 
within  a  mile  of  that  town  we  halted  at  a  place  which  the  colonel 
had  selected  for  our  camp  and  supposed  we  would  remain  there 
for  the  night.  The  colonel  and  the  adjutant  rode  on  into  Stev 
enson.  The  adjutant  soon  returned  with  an  order  to  march  on 
to  Stevenson,  where  we  should  be  ready  to  take  cars  for  Chat 
tanooga  in  twenty-five  minutes.  No  time  was  lost  in  obeying  the 
order,  for  it  was  what  everybody  wished.  When  we  arrived  at 
the  station  we  found  that  our  train  was  made  up  of  flat  cars 
loaded  with  bridge  iron,  upon  which  the  men  seated  themselves 
contentedly.  It  was  bad,  but  better  than  marching  afoot,  as  we 
were  ready  to  testify. 

\Ve  were  delayed  two  or  three  hours  in  starting,  during 
which  time  we  were  served  with  bread,  ham  and  hot  coffee  from 
the  Soldiers  Home  nearby.  It  was  near  dark  when  we  got 
started  and  we  didi  not  reach  Chattanooga  until  about  9  o'clock. 
Upon  arriving  there  we  were  marched  through  muddy  streets  to 
a  brick  building  called  the  Soldiers  Home,  where  we  were 
crowded  into  the  third  story  for  the  night.  The  quarters  were 
close  and  uncomfortable,  but  Gleason  says,  "we  thought  it  a 
great  deal  better  than  lying  out  in  the  rain  and  mud." 

The  next  morning  the  regiment  was  given  a  breakfast  of 
soft  bread,  boiled  pork  and  coffee  by  the  Sanitary  Commission. 
It  then  formed  in  line  and  marched  to  the  outskirts  of  the  city 
and  was  placed  in  camp  on  a  hillside  near  a  wooden  Catholic 
Church.  Here  we  remained  until  the  morning  of  April  8.  The 
weather  was  cloudy  and  cold,  but  the  men  made  themselves 
comfortable  and  there  was  time  for  cleaning  up,  waiting  letters 
home  and  visiting  points  of  interest.  Here  it  was  first  ordered 
that  the  band  should  play  just  after  reveille  and  be  followed  by 
morning  roll  call.  It  was  a  pleasant  innovation  and  we  began  to 
appreciate  that  our  regimental  band  was  a  valuable  aid  to  our 
enjoyment.  On  the  night  of  the  6th,  the  Gleason  boys.  Major 
McClenahan  and  some  other  singers  met  in  Doctor  Clark's  tent 
and  sang  old  songs.  It  was  pleasant  to  think  that  this  pleasure 
of  former  campaigns  was  to  be  continued. 


ROCKY  FACE  AND  RESACA  421 

On  the  morning  of  April  8,  there  was  a  thunderstorm  and 
a  heavy  rain  and  the  order  to  strike  tents  and  march  to  the  rail 
road  station  was  a  most  unwelcome  one.  Roll  call  was  omitted 
and  after  a  hurried  breakfast  we  packed  up  in  the  rain  and  at 
(5  :30  A.  M.  were  off  for  the  station.  There  were  not  cars  enough 
to  accommodate  every  one  inside  and  some  had  to  ride  on  top. 
After  the  usual  delay  we  moved  out  on  the  East  Tennessee  and 
Virginia  Railroad,  our  destination  being  Loudon,  about  100  miles 
distant,  where  it  was  said  our  division  and  brigade  were  en 
camped.  Just  after  we  passed  through  Cleveland,  Tenn.,  our 
train  stopped  and  looking  ahead  we  saw  a  freight  train  off  the 
track.  We  were  told  it  had  been  blown  off  the  track  by  a  tor 
pedo,  planted  by  some  villain  the  previous  night.  However,  the 
damage  was  soon  repaired  and  we  passed  on  through  Charles 
ton,  Athens  and  Sweet  Water.  As  we  were  Hearing  Loudon 
we  heard  that  our  division  was  marching  for  that  place,  so  we 
disembarked  and  went  into  camp  near  the  Tennessee  River  and 
not  far  below  the  railroad  bridge.  We  had  barely  time  to  pitch 
our  tents  when  a  thunderstorm  broke  over  us,  accompanied  by 
a  hard  rain  which  continued  all  night.  On  the  ninth  the  weather 
was  threatening  and  the  men  remained  in  quarters  most  of  the 
day.  There  was  a  convalescent  camp  just  across  the  river  from 
which  a  number  of  our  men  rejoined  the  regiment, — among  them. 
Sergeant  Scott  and  W.  J.  Rhodes  of  Company  H.1 

We  remained  in  camp  at  Loudon  all  day  April  10.  It  was 
Sunday  and  our  good  old  Chaplain,  Randall  Ross,  held  religious 
services.  Just  before  darke  our  non-veterans,  who  had  been  tem 
porarily  attached  to  the  Sixty-eighth  Indiana,  rejoined  the  regi 
ment  and  we  learned  from  them  that  our  division  had  arrived 
at  Loudon.  That  night  there  was  singing  in  Doctor  Clark's  tent 
and  the  music  blended  with  the  musical  ripple  of  the  waters  of 
the  Tennessee.  There  was  a  soft  rain  falling  on  the  morning 
of  April  11,  but  there  was  the  usual  reveille,  music  by  the  band 
and  roll  call,  and  then,  an  order  to  have  the  recruits  drill  at  9 
o'clock. 

WTe  were  getting  the  recruits  out  ready  for  drill  when  the 
bugle  sounded  "the  assembly".  The  drill  was  postponed,  of 
course,  and  we  struck  tents  and  marched  to  the  railroad  station 
and  took  cars  for  Cleveland,  Tenn.  We  left  in  such  a  hurry 
that  we  had  to  leave  some  of  our  rations  and  some  of  our  men 
behind.  The  train  was  made  up  of  box  cars  and,  as  the  weather 
was  mild,  many  of  the  men  preferred  to  ride  on  top  rather  than 
on  the  inside  of  the  cars.  Those  who  were  compelled  to  ride 
inside  were  the  more  fortunate  as  it  afterwards  proved,  for  as 

1     Gleason's  Diarv. 


422  FIFTEEXTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

the  train  was  nearing  Athens  a  number  of  the  cars  left  the  track 
and  some  of  them  turned  completely  over.  It  was  a  frightful 
spectacle  as  seen  from  the  rear  car,  and  when  the  train  was 
brought  to  a  full  stop  wounded  men  were  scattered  along  the 
railroad  on  both  sides  of  the  track.  About  thirty  were  severely 
wounded  and  many  more  were  knocked  breathless,  or  were 
slightly  wounded  and  soon  recovered.  News  of  the  accident  was 
sent  to  Athens  and  a  relief  party  came  out  from  the  village, 
among  whom  was  Governor  Andrew  Johnson  of  Tenn.  The 
officers  and  men  who  were  uninjured  hastened  to  the  relief  of 
the  injured  and  soon  they  were  all  placed  in  a  car  and  taken  to 
Athens  for  further  treatment.  Fortunately,  no  one  was  killed 
and  most  of  the  wounded  afterwards  returned  to  duty.  An  ex 
amination  of  the  track  disclosed  that  the  ties  were  rotten  and 
that  the  rails  had  parted  and  thrown  the  cars  from  the  track. 
The  track  was  repaired  in  a  few  hours  and  our  train  reached 
Cleveland  shortly  after  dark  and  we  went  into  camp  in  the  out 
skirts  of  the  town.  The  night  was  warm  and  many  of  the  men  did 
not  pitch  their  tents.  They  were  sorry  for  it  before  morning, 
for  it  began  to  rain  in  the  night  and  they  were  compelled  to  rise 
and  pitch  their  tents  in  the  rain. 

We  remained  in  camp  at  Cleveland  until  April  20.  The  Nin- 
ty-ninth  Ohio  had  been  stationed  here  for  some  time,  one  com 
pany  being  quartered  in  the  Court  House  as  Provost  Guards. 
Frank  Kerr  a  member  of  this  company  from  Van  Wert,  an  old 
"typo",  was  printing  a  small  newspaper  called  "The  Battle  Flag", 
which  was  quite  creditable.1  The  men,  thinking  we  would  prob 
ably  remain  here  some  days,  began  to  make  "permanent  improve 
ments"  to  their  quarters,  as  the  weather  was  cloudy  and  cold. 
We  began  to  lick  the  new  recruits  into  shape  by  daily  drills.  On 
the  fifteenth,  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  came  up  and  went  into  camp 
near  us.  This  was  very  gratifying  to  officers  and  men  of  both 
commands,  for  they  had  not  been  separated  so  long  since  we 
were  united  together  in  the  same  brigade  at  Camp  Nevin  in  1861. 
Of  course,  there  was  a  general  exchange  of  visits  between  the 
two  old  regiments  and  warm  and  cordial  were  the  greetings. 

On  the  sixteenth  of  April  our  old  division  arrived,  having 
marched  through  from  Loudon,  and  moved  on  some  six  miles 
west  to  a  place  called  McDonald's  Station.  As  soon  as  we  were 
fairly  settled  at  Cleveland,  the  singers  got  together  and  almost 
every  evening  their  voices  were  heard  above  the  hubbub  and 
laughter  of  the  camp.  We  held  a  dress  parade  the  evening  of 
the  seventeenth, — the  first  since  our  return  from  veteran  fur 
lough.  On  the  twentieth  at  7  o'clock  A.  M.,  we  packed  up  and 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


ROCKY  FACE  AND  RESACA  423 

marched  toward  McDonald's  Station  taking  a  road  parallel  to 
the  railroad.  Upon  reaching  the  camp  of  our  division,  we  filed 
into  a  large  open  field  and  were  placed  in  camp,  closely  followed 
by  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio.  Shortly  after  this  a  mail  came  in, 
bringing  quite  a  number  of  commissions  for  officers  who  had 
been  promoted.  Those  receiving  them  were  all  called  to  the 
colonel's  tent  and  congratulated.  On  the  twenty-first  orders  for 
daily  drill  were  issued  as  follows:  Company  drill  at  7  A.  M., 
battalion  drill  at  9  A.  M.,  and  brigade  drill  at  2  P.  M.  Orders 
were  also  issued  reducing  to  the  ranks  all  non-commissioned  of 
ficers  who  had  not  enlisted  as  veterans  and  filling  their  places 
with  veterans.  It  was  a  bitter  degradation  to  a  number  of  ser 
geants  who  had  failed  to  re-enlist.  They  had  earned  their  pro 
motions  by  gallant  conduct  and  it  now  seems  like  a  needless  in 
justice.  There  was,  however,  another  side  to  it.  At  the  critical 
moment  they  shrank  from  further  sacrifice,  while  their  succes 
sors  did  not.  The  latter  were  therefore  deemed  the  more  worthy. 
On  the  twenty-second  new  Springfield  rifles  were  issued  to  the 
men  and  we  got  notice  that  we  would  remove  our  camp  next 
day  to  get  away  from  the  dust  which  began  to  be  quite  annoying. 
On  the  twenty-third  both  our  regiment  and  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio 
moved  their  camps  to  a  pine  forest  about  one  mile  south  of  our 
old  ones,  which  we  found  much  more  comfortable.  On  the 
twenty- fourth  an  order  was  issued  reducing  the  sergeant  major, 
quartermaster  sergeant  and  hospital  steward  to  the  ranks  and 
appointing  Andrew  J.  Gleason.  Company  H,  John  W.  Wilson. 
Company  G  and  Willison  B.  White,  Company  A  to  the  respective 
vacancies.  An  order  wras  also  issued  detailing  two  men  from 
each  company  to  form  a  company  of  pioneers,  to  be  commanded 
by  Lieutenant  J.  Alonzo  Gleason.  The  remaining  days  of  April 
were  occupied  with  drill  and  target  practice,  the  issue  of  better 
arms  and  equipment,  and  other  preparations  for  the  campaign 
upon  which  we  were  about  to  enter.  Gleason  in  his  diary  notes 
that  a  supply  of  whiskey  arrived  on  the  twenty-eighth  at  the 
brigade  commissary's  "and  produced  unusual  merriment  among 
the  shoulder  strapped  gentry,  who  partook  of  it".  On  the  twenty- 
eighth  orders  were  received  for  a  general  review  the  next  day. 
The  review  took  place  as  ordered  and  the  reviewing  officer  was 
General  O.  O.  Howard,  who  had  succeeded  General  Granger  in 
command  of  our  corps.  It  was  the  first  time  we  had  had  an  op 
portunity  to  see  him  at  close  quarters.  We  noticed  that  he  had 
only  one  arm.  the  left,  and  that  he  managed  his  horse  with  con 
siderable  skill.  On  the  whole  he  made  a  very  favorable  impres 
sion. 

On  the  thirtieth,  shortly  after  the  arrival  of  a  train  we  heard 


424  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

cheering,  which  gradually  but  quickly  came  nearer,  and  almost 
before  we  were  aware  of  it,  our  dear  old  brigade  commander, 
General  Willich,  was  in  our  midst.  A  wildly  cheering  crowd 
was  about  him.  As  he  sat  on  his  horse,  some  had  hold  of  his 
strirrups  and  others  of  his  bridle  reins,  while  he  joked  and  talked 
with  "his  poys,"  as  he  called  them.  He  made  a  little  speech  in 
which  he  said  he  had  arrived  just  in  time  to  lead  us  in  a  forward 
movement  which  would  begin  in  a  few  days.  He  had  been  absent 
for  some  months  and  it  was  said  he  had  undergone  an  operation 
for  cancer  of  the  lip  at  a  Cincinnati  hospital.  We  were  all  over 
joyed  to  see  him  again.  The  same  day  we  had  notice  that  the 
paymaster  was  in  camp  and  would  pay  us  off  as  soon  as  the  rolls 
were  prepared. 

There  was  every  indication  of  an  early  movement  against 
the  enemy,  and  the  usual  letter  writing  on  such  occasions  was 
seen.  Surplus  baggage  was  sent  to  the  rear  and  we  were  literally 
being  stripped  for  the  great  encounter.  Our  army,  which  was 
now  commanded  by  General  Sherman,  was  posted  as  follows : 
The  Army  of  the  Cumberland  under  command  of  General 
Thomas  at  and  about  Ringgold,  Ga.,  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  under 
command  of  General  Schofield  at  and  near  Cleveland,  Tenn.,  and 
the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  commanded  by  General  McPherson 
at  and  near  Gordon's  Mills  on  the  Chickamauga.  The  enemy 
was  at  Dalton,  holding  Taylor's  or  Rocky  Face  Ridge,  the  Buz 
zard's  Roast  Pass,  the  line  of  Mill  Creek  to  the  North,  and  his 
line  of  railway  back  toward  Atlanta.  It  will  be  remembered  that 
General  Grant,  in  his  personal  conference  with  General  Sherman 
when  the  two  rode  together  from  Nashville  to  Cincinnati,  said 
that  one  of  the  important  matters  discussed  was  how  the  armies 
of  the  east  and  west  could  co-operate,  and  it  is  quite  probable 
that  each  assured  the  other  that  he  would  keep  the  enemy  in  his 
front  too  fully  occupied  to  permit  any  part  of  its  force  from 
being  sent  to  operate  against  the  other.  With  this  in  view,  it 
was  arranged  that  both  armies  would  move  against  the  enemy  on 
the  same  day,  May  5,  1864.  Grant's  army  from  Culpepper,  Va., 
and  Sherman's  from  Chattanooga.1  The  organization  of  our 
corps  at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign  was  as  follows :  General 
Howard  commanding  the  corps,  General  Stanley  the  first  divi 
sion.  General  Newton  the  second  division  and  General  T.  J. 
W'ood  the  third  division.  The  three  brigades  of  the  third  (our) 
division  were  commanded  respectively  by  Generals  Willich, 
Hazen  and  Samuel  Beatty. 

Our  brigade,  the  First,  when  the  capaign  was  opened  was 
made  up  of  the  following  regiments  :  the  Thirty-fifth  and  Eighty- 

1     W.  R.  R.,  72-62. 


ROCKY  FACE  AND  RESACA  425 

ninth  Illinois,  the  Fifteenth  and  Forty-ninth  Ohio,  the  Thirty- 
second  Indiana  and  the  Fifteenth  Wisconsin.  The  Twenty-fifth 
Illinois  joined  the  brigade  June  6,  and  the  Eighth  Kansas 
June  2S.1 

On  May  1,  all  surplus  baggage  was  sent  to  the  railroad  sta 
tion,  to  be  sent  to  and  stored  at  Bridgeport,  and  on  the  second 
all  unserviceable  arms  were  packed  in  boxes  and  sent  to  division 
headquarters.  That  day  the  brigade  was  ordered  out  to  drill  as 
a  brigade,  but  was  soon  dismissed  by  General  Willich  and  regi 
mental  drill  was  substituted. 

On  the  morning  of  May  3,  1864,  the  bugler  sounded  the 
reveille  and  the  Colonel's  voice  was  heard  directing  that  com 
pany  commanders  be  notified  that  we  would  march  promptly  at 
12  o'clock.  It  was  the  signal  for  the  opening  of  the  memorable 
Atlanta  campaign.  Rations  were  drawn  for  three  days  and 
promptly  at  noon  we  started  on  our  march.  We  moved  out, 
marching  past  the  Widow  Tucker's  house,  —  division  head 
quarters, — and  taking  a  road  leading  southward  toward  Ringgold, 
Georgia,  as  we  supposed.  From  a  citizen  we  learned  that  we 
were  seventeen  miles  from  Ringgold  and  twenty-three  miles 
from  Chattanooga. 

After  marching  about  ten  miles  we  halted  at  the  intersec 
tion  of  two  roads  where  we  biouvaced  for  the  night.  The  advance 
brigade  of  our  division  had  preceded  us  and  were  in  camp  in  a 
pleasant  location.  Wre  were  soon  also  in  camp  and  made  our 
selves  comfortable  for  the  time  being.  That  evening  we  heard 
the  sound  of  Gleason's  violin  from  the  non-commissioned  staff's 
tent.  Orders  came  to  have  reveille  next  morning  at  4  o'clock 
and  to  be  ready  to  march  at  5  :30. 

On  the  morning  of.  May  4  the  little  valley  where  we  were 
encamped  rang  with  bugles  calling  us  to  prepare  for  another 
day's  march.  We  \vere  not  long  in  packing  up  and  getting  our 
breakfast  and  at  sunrise  the  assembly  sounded  and  we  moved  out. 
The  sun  came  up  red  and  fiery,  seen  through  the  smoke  of  num 
berless  campfires,  betokening  bloody  work  ahead.2  All,  however, 
was  as  quiet  as  if  {he  enemy  were  two  hundred  miles  away. 

Our  course  continued  in  a  southerly  direction  through  a 
sparsely  settled  wooded  region  until  we  came  to  a  place  where 
the  roads  forked — one  branch  leading  to  Ringgold  and  the  other 
to  Tunnel  Hill.  We  took  the  latter.  The  air  was  cool  and 
bracing  and  we  marched  rapidly  without  discomfort.  We 
reached  Catoosa  Springs  about  10  o'clock  and  found  our  advance 
brigades  encamped  there.  We  passed  about  a  mile  beyond  the 

1  \V.  R.  R.  72-92-  note. 

2  GGleason'a  Diary. 


426  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

springs,  where  the  Thirty-second  Indiana  was  sent  out  as  pickets. 
We  encamped  partly  in  a  narrow  valley  and  partly  on  a  hillside. 
The  southern  side  of  the  valley  was  a  steep  ridge  which  formed 
our  front  and  picket  line.  It  was  said  that  the  enemy  was  close 
at  hand  and  it  looked  like  we  would  soon  have  serious  work  to 
do,  though  as  yet  we  had  heard  very  little  firing.  On  the  morn 
ing  of  the  fifth  we  had  orders  to  pitch  our  tents  in  order,  which 
indicated  that  we  would  remain  in  camp  at  least  for  a  day.  The 
sun  was  hot  and  the  men  sought  the  shelter  of  their  tents  and 
rested.  The  Fifty-second  Ohio  having  moved  into  camp  near 
us,  there  was  visiting  between  the  two  regiments,  both  regiments 
having  companies  from  Belmont  and  Van  Wert  Counties.  In 
the  evening  we  received  orders  to  have  reveille  early  next  morn 
ing  and  to  relieve  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  on  picket.  We  also  drew 
three  day's  rations  and  were  admonished  that  they  might  be  all 
we  would  get  for  five  days.  It  was  reported  that  we  would 
advance  against  the  enemy  in  the  morning.  All  the  wagons  were 
ordered  back  to  Ringgold,  except  one  for  brigade  headquarters. 
In  the  late  evening  when  the  candles  were  lighted  in  the  thou 
sands  of  tents,  the  Gleason  boys,  Major  McClenahan,  Doctor 
Clark  and  others  sang  several  selections  from  "The  Bugle  Call" 
and  thus  added  to  the  harmony  of  the  soft,  balmy  May  night. 

On  the  morning  of  May  6,  we  heard  the  reveille  sounding 
from  the  camps  all  about  us  before  our  own  bugler,  Wilson 
Her,  "Pete",  we  called  him,  got  fairly  awake.  He  was  a  little 
startled  at  being  behind  time  and  the  blast  he  blew-  was  so  loud 
and  shrill  that  no  one  in  our  camp  was  left  asleep.  A  few  weeks 
after  this  he  blew  another  similar  blast  amid  far  different  sur 
roundings. — the  last  he  ever  sounded — but  we  will  come  to  this 
later  on.  The  right  wing  of  the  regiment  went  out  on  picket  and 
the  left  wing  remained  in  camp  all  day.  A  mail  came  and 
brought  news  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  also  advancing 
against  the  enemy.  It  was  again  reported  that  we  would  move 
next  morning  and  later  came  an  order  to  have  reveille  at  3  :30 
A.  M.  and  be  ready  to  march  at  5  o'clock. 

While  we  were  thus  lying  in  our  camp  at  Catoosa  Springs, 
our  comrades  of  the  other  divisions  and  corps  of  our  great  army 
were  closing  in  on  the  enemy  which,  as  stated  in  the  beginning 
of  this  chapter,  was  at  Dalton  in  position  covered  by  Rocky  Face 
Ridge.  This  position  was  strongly  fortified,  as  was  also  Buz 
zards  Roost  Gap  through  which  passed  the  Chattanooga  and 
Atlanta  Railroad.  General  McPherson  was  moving  from  Gor 
don's  Mills  by  the  way  of  Ships  Gap,  Villanow  and  Snake  Creek- 
Gap  directly  on  Resaca.  General  Schofield  was  passing  down 


ROCKY  FACE  AND  RESACA  427 

from  the  north  and  General  Thomas,  commanding  our  army,  was 
moving  against  Tunnel  Hill. 

General  Sherman  arrived  in  our  camp,  at  the  headquarters 
of  the  Fourth  Corps,  at  about  nine  o'clock  on  the  morning  of 
May  6  and  our  division  commanders  called  to  see  him.  While 
there  he  gave  General  Howard  general  orders  and  instructions 
in  reference  to  our  movements.  At  12:30  P.  M.  our  corps  re 
ceived  orders  to  march  the  morning  of  the  seventh,  at  daybreak 
on  Tunnel  Hill,  the  object  being  to  drive  the  enemy  from  that 
place  should  he  be  in  force.  Our  corps  was  to  take  him  in  flank 
while  the  Forteenth  Corps,  General  Palmer,  should  attack  in 
front.  General  Schofield  commanding  the  Army  of  the  Ohio 
had  been  ordered  to  march  on  Varnell's  Station  and  to  feel  to 
ward  our  left,  while  General  Edward  M.  McCook,  commanding 
the  first  division  of  cavalry,  was  ordered  to  move  under  directions 
of  General  Howard.  The  orders  for  our  corps  were  as  follows : 
The  first  division,  General  Stanley,  was  to  lead,  moving  via  the 
Alabama  or  old  Federal  Road,  the  first  road  to  the  right  after 
leaving  Ben  Clark's,  our  division  was  to  follow,  and  the  second 
division,  General  Newton,  was  to  move  via  Burke's  Mill  to  Doc 
tor  Lee's  house. 

It  was  the  intention  to  find  out  first  whether  the  enemy  oc 
cupied  the  Tunnel  Hill  range  in  force.  If  not,  the  hill  was  to 
be  taken  by  the  first  division,  in  connection  with  General 
Palmer's  corps,  the  Fourteenth,  which  was  moving  directly  on 
the  place  from  Ringgold.  The  third  division  (ours)  was  to  form 
on  the  left  of  the  first,  and  the  second  division  was  to  be  massed 
in  reserve  opposite  our  left,  to  cover  our  left  flank  and  await  the 
arrival  of  General  Schofield's  corps,  the  Twenty-third,  which  was 
now  ordered  to  move  and  take  position  with  its  right  resting  at 
Doctor  Lee's  house  and  its  left  at  Ellidge's.  If  the  enemy  was 
found  in  force  at  Tunnel  Hill,  the  ridge  was  to  be  taken  at  the 
most  accessible  points  and  then  we  were  to  change  front  toward 
the  tunnel.1 

The  morning  of  May  7,  the  bugles  began  sounding  reveille 
at  2  :30  o'clock  and  continued  until  3  :30  A.  M.  when  our  own 
bugle  sounded  the  same  call  and  we  arose  and  prepared  to  march 
at  daybreak.  Our  pickets  came  in  and  we  were  all  ready  to 
march  by  the  appointed  time.  We  were  delayed,  however,  by 
other  troops  passing  until  near  8  o'clock,  when  we  moved  out, 
taking  a  road  leading  in  an  easterly  direction  through  a  gap  in 
the  hills.  We  supposed  it  to  be  the  Dalton  road.  There  was  a 
report  current  that  we  would  meet  the  enemy  today,  but  the 
silence  which  prevailed  during  the  morning  did  not  indicate  his 

1     Fullerton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R..  72-841-2. 


428  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS. 

near  presence  and  we  began  to  think  he  had  "skedaddled".  Our 
march  was  slow,  with  frequent  halts,  and  we  soon  began  to  hear 
an  occasional  boom  from  a  big  gun  away  to  the  front,  but  the 
reports  were  not  frequent  enough  to  indicate  any  serious  engage 
ment.  At  noon  we  halted  and  made  coffee  and  after  thirty 
minutes  rest  were  ordered  forward  to  occupy  Tunnel  Hill,  which 
had  been  taken  by  our  advance  troops.  We  reached  the  village 
after  a  march  of  about  two  miles  and  halted  a  short  time  before 
beginning  the  ascent  of  the  hill.  Near  our  halting  place  a  gal 
lows  had  been  erected  and  a  new  grave  dug.  These  were  said 
to  have  been  prepared  for  the  execution  of  a  spy  but  for  some 
reason  had  not  been  used.1  We  ascended  the  hill  and  were 
formed  in  line  on  the  left  of  our  division, which  extended  along 
its  crest  about  a  mile,  and  made  ourselves  comfortable  for  the 
night.  The  next  morning  our  bugler  did  not  arouse  us  until 
after  daylight.  While  we  were  having  a  late  breakfast,  we  heard 
the  "general"  call  in  another  brigade  and  were  quite  in  a  flurry 
thinking  our  call  would  at  once  follow.  It  did  not,  however,  and 
an  aide-de-camp  came  to  notify  us  to  be  ready  to  move  at  any 
time.  Wre  struck  tents  and  awaited  orders.  The  enemy  oc 
cupied  a  high  eminence  across  a  little  valley  which  we  were  told 
was  Taylor's  or  Rocky  Face  Ridge.  At  8  :30  our  assembly  call 
sounded  and  we  formed  in  double  column  in  support  of  the 
Fortyninth  Ohio.  That  regiment  moved  down  the  slope  in  front 
until  it  reached  the  foot  of  the  hill,  where  it  moved  quite  a  dis 
tance  to  the  right  and  skirmishing  began.  We  had  little  to  do 
for  several  hours,  except  to  lie  on  our  arms  and  watch  the  skir 
mishers  who  seemed  to  be  gaining  some  ground.  W'hile  thus 
occupied  a  staff  officer  rode  up  and  announced  that  General 
Grant  had  won  a  victory  over  Lee  on  the  Rapidan.  The  news 
caused  cheering  all  along  the  line,  bands  played  national  airs  and 
a  big  gun  on  a  hill  to  our  right  roared  defiance  across  the  valley 
to  the  rebels  on  the  ridge.2 

After  this  our  regiment  was  moved  about  one-half  mile  to 
the  right,  where  we  saw  one  of  our  signal  flags  waving  from  the 
northern  point  of  Rocky  Face  and  knew  that  some  troops  of 
Newton's  division  had  effected  a  lodgment  there.  The  regiment 
was  formed  in  column  by  division  and  thus  formed  we  bivouaced 
for  the  night,  with  orders  to  be  under  arms  at  four  o'clock  next 
morning. 

On  the  morning  of  May  9,  we  were  under  arms  as  ordered 
and  ready  for  any  emergency.  Skirmishing  began  to  the  right 
and  left  of  us  about  6  o'clock,  and  soon  on  the  right  we  heard 
volleys  of  musketry  and  cheering  by  our  men  which  indicated  a 

1  and  2     Gleason's  Diary. 


ROCKY  FACE  AND  RESACA  429 

charge.  At  9  o'clock  we  moved  down  the  hill  in  column  still 
supporting  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio,  which  was  advancing  in  line  of 
battle.  Still  in  advance  of  them  was  the  Eighty-ninth  Illinois 
deployed  as  skirmishers.  We  moved  down  the  hill  and  across 
an  open  field  at  the  base  of  Rocky  Face  and  began  the  ascent  of 
the  ridge,  which  was  thickly  wooded.  After  going  a  short  dis- 
ance  we  were  halted  and  lay  on  our  arms  for  three  or  four  hours. 
In  crossing  the  open  field  above  mentioned  Brown  Deselms  of 
Company  K  was  severely  wounded, — the  first  casualty  of  the 
campaign  in  our  regiment.  While  we  lay  in  this  position  the 
company  cooks  served  coffee  and  the  men  filled  their  canteens. 
After  this  the  three  left  companies  under  Major  McClenahan 
were  sent  forward  to  relieve  a  portion  of  the  picket  line.  While 
here  General  Willich  took  post  with  our  regiment  and  the  old 
adjutant  general  of  the  brigade,  Captain  Carl  Schmitty,  rejoined 
us.  About  3  o'clock  the  brigade  signal  sounded  and  the  part  of 
the  brigade  not  on  picket  moved  quite  a  distance  to  the  right. 
We  had  to  pass  across  an  open  field,  where  all  were  exposed  to 
the  fire  of  rebel  sharpshooters  posted  in  ledges  of  rocks  on  the 
ridge,  and  two  men  of  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  were  killed  and 
several  wounded.  While  moving  to  the  right  we  saw  in  the  vaJ- 
ley  to  our  rear  an  officer  mounted  on  a  splendid  dun  horse.  The 
horse  was  wounded  and  became  uncontrollable.  At  each  leap  a 
stream  of  blood  gushed  from  his  flanks,  and  thus  leaping,  horse 
and  rider  passed  out  of  our  sight.  In  about  an  hour  our  regi 
ment  was  ordered  back  to  the  left  to  relieve  the  Eighty-ninth 
Illinois  on  the  picket  and  skirmish  line.  Continual  firing  had 
been  going  on  all  day  and,  night  coming  on,  it  was  very  difficult 
to  withdraw  the  men  under  fire.  However,  by  taking  advantage 
of  the  trees,  the  relieving  line  approached  within  calling  distance 
of  the  skirmishers  and  then  advanced  as  the  others  retired,  each 
picket  sheltering  himself  as  best  he  could.  We  had  sent  a  detail 
for  rations  but  it  was  so  difficult  to  reach  the  picket  line  in  the 
darkness  that  they  were  not  brought  up.  There  was  a  heavy 
charge  on  the  right  about  sunset. 

In  our  front  at  Rocky  Face  the  hill  rose  to  a  perpendicular 
cliff  of  rocks  about  one  hundred  feet  high.  We  could  not  climb 
it  nor  could  the  enemy  descend  it.  The  enemy  held  its  summit 
and  we  held  its  foot  with  our  skirmish  or  picket  line.  The  woods 
were  quite  dense  and  we  could  not  see  the  enemy  nor  could  they 
see  us.  Any  noise  or  movement  on  our  part  was  followed  by  a 
rattling  fire  from  the  enemy  and  our  men  fired  back  at  the  points 
from  which  the  shots  seemed  to  come  .  Occasionally  we  would 
hear  a  shrill  rebel  voice  calling  out,  "Look  out  Yanks !  here  comes 
a  stone."  and  a  big  rock  would  come  crashing  down  through  the 


430  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERVS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

trees  above  our  heads.  This  would  be  answered  by  a  volley, 
aimed  at  the  point  whence  the  rock  came.  All  through  the  night 
we  were  annoyed  by  the  frequent  "zt"  of  the  enemy's  bullets 
from  the  ridge  and  there  was  little  rest  for  any  of  us. 

At  4  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  May  10,  all  were  under  arms. 
The  adjutant  went  to  brigade  headquarters  to  ask  that  we  be 
relieved  early  so  we  could  get  rations.  As  before  stated,  because 
of  the  great  difficulty  in  getting  to  the  picket  line  the  evening 
before,  rations  were  not  brought  up  and  the  men  were  hungry. 

We  had  great  difficulty  in  being  relieved  from  picket  duty 
when  daylight  came.  Our  men  were  so  near  the  enemy  they 
could  not  leave  their  cover  without  becoming  targets  for  his 
sharpshooters  who  were  watching  our  every  movement.  The 
Forty-ninth  Ohio,  who  relieved  us,  had  the  same  trouble.  The 
difficulty,  however,  was  overcome  by  each  individual  choosing 
his  own  route  to  the  rear.  The  men  of  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  in 
relieving  us  took  the  same  course  and  the  relief  was  accomplished 
with  little  or  no  injury  to  either  regiment. 

Our  regiment  when  relieved  went  back  to  our  position  of 
the  day  before.  After  breakfast  we  took  stock  of  cartridges  on 
hand  and  the  adjutant  made  a  detail  of  men  to  go  back  to  the 
ammunition  wagon  and  bring  up  a  fresh  supply.  The  enemy 
had  got  a  better  range  on  our  position  and  their  bullets  were 
quite  annoying.  While  we  were  eating  our  dinner  one  whizzed 
just  above  our  heads  and,  passing  through  a  shelter  tent,  buried 
itself  in  a  haversack  which  a  man  inside  was  using  as  a  pillow. 
We  would  not  have  minded  the  bullets  so  much  if  we  could  have 
returned  the  fire.  We  heard  great  cheering,  which  began  on  our 
right  and  rolled  down  the  line,  and  were  told  that  General  Grant 
had  fought  a  great  battle,  driving  Lee's  army  from  the  field,  and 
was  in  hot  pursuit  of  the  defeated  enemy.  There  were  the  usual 
rumors  in  regard  to  our  own  movements.  One  was  that  General 
Hooker  was  in  Dalton  and  another  that  General  McPherson  was 
at  Resaca,  all  of  which  were  received  with  due  allowance.  There 
was  heavy  cannonading  on  our  immediate  right,  on  both  sides  of 
the  line,  but  we  noticed  no  perceptible  advantage  to  either  side. 

During  the  afternoon  two  officers  came  walking  along  in 
rear  of  the  regiment,  telling  the  men  some  doubtful  stories  and 
asking  numerous  questions,  which  led  to  the  suspicion  that  they 
were  spies,  although  they  represented  themselves  to  be  members 
of  General  Thomas'  staff.  The  adjutant  followed  them  to  the 
field  below  where  he  saw  them  looking  at  the  ridge  with  a  field 
glass,  but  allowed  them  to  go  unmolested.  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Askew,  however,  was  not  satisfied  and  directed  him  to  go  back 
and  conduct  them  to  General  Willich's  headquarters.  Colonel 


ROCKY  FACE  AND  RESACA  431 

Wallace,  who  had  just  awakened  from  a  nap,  confirmed  the  order 
and  went  with  the  adjutant,  but  the  supposed  spies  had  disap 
peared  over  the  hill  toward  Tunnelton.1  In  the  evening  we  had 
orders  to  relieve  the  Thirty-second  Indiana  on  the  line,  but  later 
were  moved  to  the  brigade  rendezous  where  we  put  in  the  night. 

The  morning  of  May  11,  we  had  reveille  at  the  usual  hour 
and  while  at  roll  call  a  man  in  Company  A  was  slightly  wounded. 
After  breakfast  we  received  orders  to  march  in  an  hour.  The 
Adjutant  made  a  report  of  our  casualties  up  to  this  time,  and  al 
though  we  had  been  under  fire  for  two  or  three  days,  they  only 
summed  up  six  men,  one  severely  and  five  slightly  wounded. 
About  10  o'clock  we  moved  back  to  Tunnel  Hill,  went  into  camp 
near  the  position  that  we  first  occupied  and  pitched  tents  in  regu 
lar  order,  as  if  \ve  were  to  remain  there  for  some  time.  The 
firing  had  been  quite  brisk  in  the  morning  but  slackened  up  dur 
ing  the  day.  We  learned  that  the  Sixty-fourth  Ohio  had  suf 
fered  severe  losses  in  taking  the  north  end  of  Rocky  Face  two 
days  before  and  that  Colonel  Mcllvaine  had  been  killed.  General 
Willich's  quarters  were  quite  near  and  we  noticed,  by  certain 
signs,  that  something  unusual  was  on  his  mind.  Before  long  he 
called  the  regimental  commanders  together  and  evidently  im 
parted  some  news  of  great  moment.-  At  night  we  received 
orders  to  have  reveille  at  2  :30  o'clock  and  to  relieve  the  pickets 
at  4  o'clock  next  morning. 

The  news  that  General  Willich  had  imparted  was  doubtless 
that  General  McPherson  was  through  Snake  Creek  Gap  and 
was  on  the  enemy's  flank.  What  troubled  the  General  was  the 
doubt  about  what  the  enemy  would  do.  Would  he  fall  on  our 
corps  and  try  to  destroy  us,  would  he  demonstrate  with  a  small 
force  in  our  front  to  hold  us  there  and  with  his  main  force  try 
to  overwhelm  McPherson,  or  would  he  retreat?  There  was 
evidently  apprehension  that  he  would  do  the  first,  and  try  !o 
defeat  our  army  in  detail.  There  was  real  danger  in  the  situation 
and  all  the  general  officers  of  our  corps  were  apprehensive  that 
the  enemy  would  concentrate  and  try  to  overwhelm  us.  General 
Howard  says  that  when  it  was  learned  that  General  McPherson 
was  through  Snake  Creek  Gap,  General  Sherman  at  once  sent 
the  rest  of  General  Thomas'  army  after  him,  leaving  him,  General 
Howard,  with  the  Fourth  Corps  and  General  Stoneman's  divi 
sion  of  cavalry  to  hold  the  enemy  in  our  front  and  protect  our 
base  of  supplies,  and  that  General  Johnston  "terrified  him"  for 
two  days,  till  our  skirmishing  amounted,  at  times,  almost  to  a 
battle.3 


1  and  '2     (Reason's  Diary. 

3     The  Struggle  for  Atlanta,  The  Century,  Vol.   12-442. 


432  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

The  morning  of  May  12  we  relieved  the  pickets  along 
our  front  at  Rocky  Face.  After  daybreak  the  usual  sharpshoot- 
ing  was  resumed,  and  in  Company  D,  Newton  Kennedy  was 
killed  and  Samuel  S.  Steel  was  wounded.  Two  of  our  batteries 
on  Tunnel  Hill  frequently  sent  shells  up  among  the  enemy  on 
the  ridge.  What  the  effect  was  we  could  not  tell,  except  that 
after  a  round  or  two  their  picket  firing  ceased  for  a  while.  While 
we  were  thus  engaged  on  picket  duty,  the  rest  of  our  brigade 
moved  rapidly  to  the  left,  where  it  was  reported  the  enemy  was 
concentrating  against  General  Newton's  division.  Our  Surgeon, 
Doctor  Clark,  brought  to  headquarters  a  rumor  that  General 
Hooker's  corps  had  gained  the  railroad  near  Dalton,  had  driven 
the  enemy  into  his  fortications  at  Resaca,  that  we  would  be  able 
to  reach  Atlanta  first,  and  that  General  Grant  had  defeated  Lee's 
army  in  another  battle.  Late  in  the  evening  we  were  relieved  by 
the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  and  joined  the  brigade,  which  we  found 
about  three  miles  to  the  left,  strongly  intrenched.  In  fact  the 
bulk  of  our  division  and  General  Newton's  division  were  stretched 
across  the  valley  in  echelon  by  brigade,  each  line  strongly  fortified, 
and  we  were  momentarily  expecting  to  be  attacked.  There  were 
reports  that  Wheeler's  rebel  cavalry  had  captured  Cleveland  and 
were  threatening  our  base  of  supplies  at  Ringgold.  The  situa 
tion  was  so  grave  that  we  got  little  sleep  that  night. 

The  morning  of  May  13  we  were  moved  forward  to  a 
line  of  works  in  our  front  and  expected  to  remain  there  during 
the  day.  In  a  short  time,  however,  we  were  ordered  back  to 
Tunnel  Hill.  We  started  and  had  marched  about  a  mile  when 
we  learned  that  the  enemy  had  abandoned  Rocky  Face  Ridge. 
We  at  once  retraced  our  steps,  marched  past  our  late  position 
and  soon  turning  to  the  right,  followed  a  road  leading  through 
a  narrow  gap  in  the  rear  of  Rocky  Face  in  the  direction  of 
Dalton.  That  place  was  reported  to  have  been  evacuated  by 
the  enemy.  As  we  marched  up  the  valley  we  noticed  that  the 
enemy's  field  works  were  quite  extensive  and  formidable. 

We  reached  Dalton  about  noon  and  found  it  abandoned  and 
dirty.  The  wind  blew  dust  from  the  streets  in  great  clouds  and 
we  were  glad  to  get  quickly  through  the  town  and  out  into  the 
country.  We  here  met  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio,  which  had  marched 
by  another  road.  A  mile  from  the  town  we  came  to  a  large 
spring,  issuing  out  of  a  hill  in  a  stream  large  enough  to  run  a 
mill,  and  halted  to  refill  our  canteens.  In  passing  through  Dal 
ton  the  men  found  large  quantities  of  peanuts.  Gleason,  in  his 
diary  says,  "the  boys  also  found  a  large  amount  of  tobacco,  which 
was  confiscated  from  the  stores,  as  well  as  every  thing  else  which 
was  desirable".  After  marching  until  supper  time  we  halted 


ROCKY  FACE  AND  RESACA  433 

for  coffee  and  then  pushed  on  two  or  three  miles  and  bivouaced 
for  the  night — making  our  days  march  about  fifteen  miles.  The 
enemy,  \ve  were  told,  was  close  at  hand. 

At  about  2  o'clock  the  morning  of  May  14,  the  Adjutant 
made  a  detail  of  men  to  go  for  rations  and  at  4  o'clock  another 
detail  to  draw  and  issue  cartridges.  Our  brigade  was  detained 
several  hours  by  failure  of  our  supply  wagons  to  come  up.  While 
we  waited  for  them  a  squad  of  85  rebel  prisoners  passed  to  the 
rear  under  guard.  Our  regimental  band,  wrhich  had  been  left 
behind  at  Tunnel  Hill,  here  came  up  and  when  we  resumed  our 
march  it  played  some  inspiring  music.  Our  course  was  almost 
due  south  along  or  near  an  old  railroad  grade  until  we  reached 
the  edge  of  a  tableland,  where  we  found  a  long  line  of  log  breast 
works,  evidently  built  by  the  enemy.  Here  we  left  the  main  road 
and  turned  to  the  left,  marching  inside  of  a  line  of  works  for 
some  distance.  We  then  marched  on  a  road  through  the  woods 
until  we  reached  an  opening  where  our  brigade  formed  in  line 
of  battle.  A  sharp  cavalry  fight  took  place  on  our  right.  While 
we  were  forming  General  Wood  came  riding  by  with  some  mem 
bers  of  his  staff  and  called  out  to  the  adjutant,  "Lieutenant 
Copie,  tell  General  Willich  to  throw  out  a  cloud  of  skirmishers— 
a  cloud  of  skirmishers."  The  cavalry  fight  was  soon  over  and  for 
a  brief  time  there  was  an  oppressive  silence.  Suddenly  cannon 
ading  opened  up  to  our  right,  followed  by  musketry,  and  the 
battle  raged  furiously  for  an  hour  or  more.  It  was  apparent 
that  our  lines  were  advancing  steadily.  Two  or  three  times  we 
saw  columns  of  smoke  arising,  which  indicated  burning  buildings. 

When  the  firing  had  worked  well  to  our  front  and  left,  we 
changed  direction  a  little  to  the  right  and  moved  forward  over  a 
range  of  wooded  hills.  General  Hazen's  brigade  was  on  our 
immediate  left  as  we  advanced,  and  the  writer  was  much  im 
pressed  by  its  steadiness  and  soldierly  bearing  and  by  the  cool 
ness  of  its  commander.  As  we  approached  the  enemy's  lines, 
our  brigade  was  crowded  out  of  line  by  the  troops  on  our  right 
and  left  and  was  placed  in  reserve.1  In  the  late  afternoon  we 
were  ordered  forward  into  the  front  line,  relieving  Colonel 
Reilly's  brigade  of  General  Cox's  division  of  the  Twenty-third 
Corps.2  This  restored  us  to  our  proper  place  in  the  line,  imme 
diately  on  the  right  of  General  Hazen's,  Second  brigade,  and 
we  at  once  barricaded  our  front  as  well  as  we  could  under  the 
circumstances.  Our  line  was  along  a  range  of  hills,  opening  on 
a  plantation  thickly  covered  with  a  short  growth  of  young  pines. 
The  enemy's  worlds  were  visible  about  two  hundred  yards  to 

1  General  Wood's  report,  W.  R.  R.  72-374. 

2  General  Wood's  report,  W.  R.  R.   72-375. 


434  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

our  front  and  our  men  kept  up  a  well  directed  fire  on  them  until 
our  ammunition  was  exhausted,  when  we  were  relieved  by  the 
Eighty-ninth  Illinois  and  retired  to  the  woods  in  our  rear  for 
the  night.  While  the  regiment  was  on  the  front  line,  lying 
down  and  firing  at  the  enemy,  the  adjutant  went  on  to  the  line 
and,  rising  to  obtain  a  better  view  of  the  enemy's  works,  was 
suddenly  caught  by  Lieutenant  Dubois  and  pulled  to  the  ground 
with  a  sharp  reproof  for  his  carelessness.  Just  at  this  moment 
Sergeant  David  E.  Livenspire  of  Company  I  rose  to  get  better 
aim,  when  a  rifle  ball  pierced  his  heart  and  he  fell  dead  with  a 
smile  on  his  lips.  The  adjutant's  stay  on  the  firing  line  was 
short,  for  he  was  soon  ordered  back  to  hurry  up  a  fresh  supply 
of  ammunition.  On  his  way  back  he  passed  a  pathetic  little 
group  which  he  has  never  forgotten.  Two  of  the  group  were 
digging  a  shallow  grave,  another  was  sorrowing  over  his  mortally 
wounded  brother,  who  was  not  yet  dead,  and  for  whose  body  the 
grave  was  being  dug.  Passing  further  on,  he  saw  two  men  carry 
ing  on  a  stretcher  a  wounded  lieutenant  colonel,  whom  he 
thought  was  Lieutenant  Colonel  Barnes  of  the  Ninety-seventh 
Ohio.  He  afterwards  learned  that  Colonel  Barnes  was  not 
wounded  in  the  battle,  and  has  often  wondered  who  the  dark 
bearded  officer  wass  whom  he  saw  carried  off  the  field  that  day. 

The  adjutant  succeeded  in  getting  the  ammunition  needed, 
the  cartridge  boxes  were  replenished  and  after  a  supper  of  raw 
bacon  and  hard  bread  we  bivouaced  for  the  night.  Early  on  the 
morning  of  the  15th,  it  was  announced  that  the  whole  line  would 
advance  at  8  o'clock,  but  the  order  never  came.1  The  adjutant 
made  out  a  list  of  casualties  of  the  day  before,  which  showed  two 
men.  Sergeant  Livenspire  of  Company  I,  and  Charles  Baldwin, 
of  Company  D,  killed,  and  twelve  others  wounded. 

Firing  had  opened  on  our  front  quite  early.  Our  brigade 
lay  in  reserve,  expecting  to  be  called  at  any  time.  The  pioneers 
of  the  brigade  went  to  work  on  intrenchments.  A  battery  on  our 
left  fired  an  occasional  shot  and  two  batteries  on  our  front  and 
right  belched  forth  from  time  to  time.  The  enemy  made  several 
charges  on  our  rifle  pits  during  the  forenoon,  but  were  signally 
repulsed.  The  pioneers  worked  all  forenoon,  cutting  roads  for 
the  artillery,  throwing  up  earth  works  and  felling  trees  so  as  to 
give  our  artillery  unobstructed  range.  While  we  were  eating 
our  noon  luncheon,  the  adjutant  general  of  the  brigade  came  up 
and  told  our  colonel  that,  in  the  advance  proposed,  our  regiment 
would  be  in  the  third  line  in  rear  of  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  and 
Eighty-ninth  Illinois.  Generals  Howard  and  Wood  rode  along 
our  line  that  morning  and  the  former  pointed  out,  it  was  said, 

1     General  Wood's  report,  W.  R.  R.(  72-375. 


ROCKY  PACE  AND  RESACA  435 

a  place  where  20  guns  were  to  be  placed,  to  be  opened  out  all  at 
once  on  the  enemy.1  About  noon  General  Howard  received  an 
intimation  that  an  attack  was  to  be  made  on  the  enemy's  right 
by  the  Twentieth  Corps,  and  an  order  to  observe  closely  its 
effect  on  the  enemy's  center,  nearly  opposite  our  position,  and 
if  any  weakening  or  shaking-  of  his  lines  was  observed,  to 
attack  vigorously. 

With  this  in  view  our  brigade  received  orders  to  change 
direction  and  we  took  our  position  in  the  rear  of  the  Forty- 
ninth  Ohio  and  Eighty-ninth  Illinois,  which  we  were  to  sup 
port  and  which  occupied  a  line  of  log  breastworks  on  a 
wooded  hill.  While  lying  in  this  position  General  Wood  and 
staff  were  immediately  to  our  rear.  An  aide  brought  word 
that  General  Hooker's  troops  on  our  left  had  taken  one  of 
the  enemy's  'batteries.  There  had  been  heavy  firing  on  our 
left,  but  General  Wood  had  observed  that  General  Hooker's 
attack  had  caused  no  perceptible  weakness  of  the  enemy  in 
our  immediate  front.  Still,  with  a  view  of  ascertaining  more 
certainly  the  condition  of  the  enemy  confronting  us,  he 
ordered  an  advance  of  our  brigade  and  the  brigade  of  General 
Hazen.  The  front  line  advanced  only  a  short  distance  when 
a  teriffic  direct  and  cross  fire  of  musketry  and  artillery 
swept  over  the  open  field  which  divided  the  two  opposing 
armies,  and  showed,  to  use  General  Wood's  language,  "that 
wherever  else  the  enemy  might  be  weak,  there,  certainly,  he 
was  in  full  force."  He  adds  that:  "fortunately,  the  condition 
and  strength  of  the  enemy  were  discovered  before  our  two 
brigades  were  deeply  or  dangerously  committed  to  the 
assault,  which  enabled  them  to  be  withdrawn  without  the 
very  heavy  loss  which  at  one  time  seemed  so  imminent."2 

General  Willich  was  deeply  impressed  by  the  serious 
work  involved  in  the  above  described  movement  and,  rigged 
out  in  his  full  brigadier  general's  uniform,  including  his 
yellow  sash,  he  went  out  to  the  front  line  to  see  for  himself 
the  obstacles  to  be  overcome.  While  so  engaged  he  was  shot 
by  a  rebel  skirmisher,  the  ball  penetrating  his  right  shoulder 
and  side.  As  he  was  carried  back  on  a  stretcher  through  our 
lines,  the  men  crowded  about  him  in  sincere  grief.  A  thought 
less  young  officer^  ordered  them  back,  thinking  they  would 
annoy  him,  and  received  a  severe  rebuke  from  the  wounded 
general.  He  was  evidently  suffering  severe  pain,  but  he 
loved  "his  poys,"  as  he  called  them,  and  as  they  crowded 

1  Gleason's  Diary. 

2  General  Wood's  Report,  W.  R.  R.   72-375. 

3  The  Adjutant. 


436  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

about  him,  he  exhorted  them  in  broken  English  to  do  their 
duty  as  well  without  him  as  if  he  were  present. 

Just  at  this  time  the  batteries  of  General  Newton's 
division  on  our  right  began  tiring  by  volley,  pouring  a  perfect 
storm  of  shot  and  shell  into  the  enemy's  lines.  The  noise 
was  deafening  and  we  thought  at  first  that  the  enemy  was 
attacking  that  part  of  the  line  in  force.  But  it  turned  out 
only  to  be  the  attempted  destruction  of  a  battery  of  the  enemy 
which  had  become  annoying. 

After  this  cannonade  ceased,  our  pioneers  were  set  to 
work  throwing  up  epaulements  for  some  heavy  field  guns 
on  a  knoll  to  our  left  which  commanded  the  enemy's  works, 
and  afterwards  were  sent  out  to  the  skirmish  line  to  dig  pits 
for  the  better  protection  of  our  skirmishers.  They  returned 
about  midnight.  The  adjutant  had  borrowed  some  tools 
from  the  battery,  which  had  in  the  meantime  been  posted 
behind  the  epaulements  before  mentioned,  and  with  a  small 
squad  of  men  started  to  return  them. 

Our  regiment  at  this  time,  except  Company  H,  which  was 
on  the  picekt  line,  lay  about  200  feet  back  of  the  line  of  works 
in  a  little  cove  or  depression — the  men  sleeping  on  their  arms. 
The  adjutant  and  his  squad  had  just  returned  the  tools  to 
the  battery  and  were  passing  in  front  of  and  below  the  big- 
guns  behind  the  epaulements  before  mentioned,  when 
the  enemy  opened  a  brisk  fire.  The  big  guns  at  once 
opened  a  fire  above  the  heads  of  the  adjutant  and  his 
squad,  who  were  knocked  to  their  knees  by  the  unex 
pected  explosions,  and  firing  began  all  along  the  line.  The 
adjutant,  fearing  the  men  on  the  line  would  forget  our 
skirmishers  and  kill  or  wound  them  before  they  could  get 
back,  ran  along  the  line  calling  out  not  to  fire  until  the 
skirmishers  came  in.  The  men  in  the  works  and  behind  them 
in  the  woods  seemed  in  a  panic  and  some  of  them  commenced 
firing  their  guns  in  almost  any  direction.  The  adjutant 
caught  one  fellow  who  seemed  half  asleep  and  gave  him  a 
severe  smack  with  his  sword,  which  seemed  to  awaken  him, 
and  he  rushed  forward  to  the  works.  Our  regiment,  awakened 
from  a  sound  sleep,  was  a  perfect  babel  of  confusion.  Even 
the  officers  had  lost,  or  seemed  to  have  lost,  all  sense  of 
direction,  and  the  men  \vere  yelling  and  some  of  them  firing 
their  guns  in  the  air.  The  adjutant  rushed  among  them  and 
called  out:  "This  way  to  the  works!"  and  by  a  common 
impulse  they  followed  him  without  command  and  distributed 
themselves  along  and  behind  the  breastworks.  It  was  dif 
ficult  to  make  them  understand  that  thev  must  reserve  their 


ROCKY  FACE  AND  RESACA  437 

fire  until  the  skirmishers  were  in,  as  they  were  shivering  with 
excitement  and  cold,  for  the  night  was  chill.  It  was  thought 
that  it  was  a  night  attack  by  the  enemy  and  our  guns  opened 
all  along  the  line.  But  the  enemy's  advance,  if  it  really  was 
an  advance,  was  soon  checked.  The  fire  slackened  and  then 
ceased,  and  soon  all  was  quiet,  and  the  men  not  on  picket 
returned  to  their  rest.  We  had  one  man,  John  Bevo  of  Com 
pany  H,  killed  in  this  night  broil. 

The  next  morning,  May  16,  we  found  that  during  the 
night  the  enemy  had  abandoned  his  position  at  Resaca,  had 
crossed  the  Oostenaula  River,  and  was  retreating  southward. 
Our  losses  since  the  campaign  opened  had  been  as  follows : 
At-  Rocky  Face,  killed,  Newton  Kennedy  of  Company  D, 
Wounded,  Samuel  S.  Steel  and  Harmon  H.  Brewer  of  Com 
pany  D,  John  C.  Jones  Company  E,  Riley  Cook  Company  H, 
and  Brown  Deselms  of  Company  K.  Besides  these  there 
were  three  of  four  men  in  Companies  A  and  G  who  were 
reported  as  being  hit,  but  their  wounds  were  so  slight  they 
were  not  officially  noted. 

At  Resaca  the  killed  were  Sergeant  David  E.  Livinspire 
of  Company  I,  Charles  Baldwin  of  Company  D,  and  John 
Bevo  of  Company  H,  and  the  wounded,  Corporals  John  D. 
Fleming  and  John  A.  McKinney  and  Peter  Hammond  of  Com 
pany  A,  Sergeant  David  A.  Thomas  of  Company  B,  James 
Bernard  of  Company  F  ;  William  Stough,  Louis  Gothier  and 
Walker  A.  Smith  of  Company  G,  and  Sergeant  George  M. 
Scutchall,  Henry  Beamer  and  Walker  A.  Smith  of  Company 
H.  Louis  Gothier  of  Company  G,  above  mentioned,  died  of 
his  wounds  at  Resaca  May  18,  1864,  three  days  after  he  was 
wounded. 

So  the  summary  is  actually  as  follows  : 

At  Rocky  Face — Killed,  1 ;  wounded,  5 ;  and  at  Resaca, 
killed,  4;  wounded,  11. 

There  were  camp  rumors  to  the  effect  that  some  one  had 
blundered,  or  the  enemy  would  not  have  been  permitted  to 
escape  us  at  Resaca.  It  was  known  throughout  our  part  of 
the  army  that  General  McPherson's  force,  supported  by  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland,  except  our  corps,  was  through 
Snake  Creek  Gap  and  to  the  enemy's  right  and  rear,  before 
he  left  our  front  at  Rocky  Face  Ridge.  W7hy  the  advantage 
thus  gained  was  not  pressed  we  could  not  understand.  It  is 
now  known  that  we  had  the  opportunity  to  defeat  and 
practically  destroy  Johnston's  army.  The  situation  is  well 
described  in  the  official  report  of  General  Cleburne,  who  com 
manded  a  division  of  Johnston's  army.  He  says  that  while 


438  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

at  Dug  Gap,  "Receiving  orders  during  the  night  (the  night 
of  May  10,  1864),  I  inarched  on  the  morning  of  the  llth, 
starting  at  7  o'clock  upon  the  Sugar  Valley  road  in  the  direc 
tion  of  Resaca.  This  movement  was  rendered  necessary  by 
the  untoward  circumstance  of  Snake  Creek  Gap  not  being 
adequately  occupied  to  resist  the  heavy  force  thrown  against 
it  under  the  sagacious  and  enterprising  McPherson,  which 
opened  up  on  our  rear  and  line  of  communication,  from  which 
it  was  distant  at  Resaca  only  five  miles.  Why  it  was  neg 
lected  I  cannot  imagine.  General  Mackall,  Johnston's  Chief 
of  Staff,  told  me  it  was  the  result  of  a  flagrant  disobendience  of 
orders,  by  whom  he  did  not  say.  Certainly  the  commanding 
general  never  could  have  failed  to  appreciate  its  importance. 
Its  loss  exposed  us  in  the  outset  of  the  campaign  to  a  terrible 
danger,  and  on  the  left  forced  us  to  retreat  from  a  position 
where,  if  he  adhered  to  his  attack,  we  might  have  detained 
the  enemy  for  months,  destroying  vast  numbers  of  his  men, 
perhaps  prolong  the  campaign,  until  the  wet  .season  would 
have  rendered  operations  in  the  field  impracticable.  As  it  was, 
if  McPherson  had  hotly  pressed  his  advantage,  Sherman  sup 
porting  him  strongly  with  the  bulk  of  his  army,  it  is  impos 
sible  to  say  what  the  enemy  might  not  have  achieved — more 
than  probable,  a  complete  victory.  But  McPherson  faltered 
and  hung  back,  indeed,  after  penetrating  to  within  a  mile  of 
Resaca,  he  actually  returned,  because,  as  I  understand,  he 
was  not  supported  and  feared  if  we  turned  back  suddenly 
upon  him  from  Dalton,  he  would  be  cut  off,  as  doubtless 
would  have  been  the  result."1 

General  Sherman,  in  his  official  report  says,  that  by 
reason  of  the  operations  of  our  part  of  the  army  at  Rocky 
Face  and  Buzzards  Roost,  General  McPherson  was  enablea 
to  march  within  a  mile  of  Resaca  almost  unopposed,  that  he 
found  Resaca  too  strong  to  be  carried  by  assault,  and 
although  there  were  many  good  roads  leading  from  north  to 
south,  endangering  his  left  flank  from  the  direction  of  Dalton, 
he  could  find  no  road  by  which  he  could  rapidly  cross  o\^er  the 
railroad,  and  accordingly  fell  back  and  took  a  strong  position 
near  the  east  end  of  Snake  Creek  Gap.  I  was  somewhat  dis 
appointed  at  the  result,  but  still  appreciated  the  advantage 
gained,  and  on  May  10,  ordered  General  Thomas  to  send 
General  Hooker's  corps  to  Snake  Creek  Gap  to  support  Gen 
eral  McPherson,  and  to  follow  with  another  corps  (the  Four 
teenth,  General  Palmer),  leaving  General  Howard  with  the 
Fourth  Corps  to  continue  to  threaten  Dalton  in  front,  while 

1     W.  R.  R.,  74-721. 


ROCKY  FACE  AND  RESACA  439 

the  rest  of  the  army  moved  rapidly  through  Snake  Creek 
Gap.1  It  will  thus  be  seen  that  General  Sherman  only  mildly 
expresses  the  keen  disappointment  he  must  have  felt  in 
McPherson's  failure  to  press  his  great  advantage.  General 
Howard  in  his  article,  "The  Struggle  for  Atlanta,"2  relates 
that  on  May  G,  at  a  conference  between  Generals  Sherman  and 
Thomas  at  which  he,  General  Howard,  was  present,  General 
Thomas  urged  that  the  skirmishing  and  demonstrations  be 
fore  Rocky  Face  and  Buzzard's  Roost  be  given  to  Generals 
Schofield  and  McPherson,,  while  he  (Thomas)  with  his  strong 
army  should  pass  through  Snake  Creek  Gap  and  seize  John 
ston's  communications,  and  that  if  he  was  permitted  to  do 
so,  he  felt  sure  of  victory. 

Sherman,  says  Howard,  "hesitated  to  put  his  main  army 
twenty  miles  away  beyond  a  mountain  range  on  the  enemy's 
line,  lest  he  should  thereby  endanger  his  own,"  and  adds  that 
"in  less  than  a  week  he  ran  even  greater  risk."  General  How 
ard  further  relates  that :  "On  May  9,  when  McPherson  passed 
through  Snake  Creek  Gap  and  out  into  Sugar  Valley,  he 
found  the  Gap  unoccupied,  and  so  with  Kilpatrick's  small 
cavalry  detachment  ahead,  followed  closely  by  Dodge's  Six 
teenth  Corps  with  Logan's  Fifteenth  Corps  well  closed  up, 
he  emerged  from  the  mountains  on  the  morning  of  May  9  at 
the  eastern  exit.  The  cavalry  advanced,  stumbled  upon  Con 
federate  Cavalry,  which  had  run  out  of  Resaca  to  watch  this 
doorway."  That  "Kilpatrick  followed  up  the  retreating  Con 
federates  with  dash  and  persistency,  till  they  found  shelter 
behind  the  deep  cut  works  and  guns  at  Resaca."  General 
Howard  further  says : 

"In  plain  view  of  these  works,  though  on  difficult  ground, 
Logan  and  Dodge  pressed  up  their  men  under  orders  from 
McPherson  to  drive  back  the  enemy  and  take  the  railroad. 
And,  pray,  why  were  not  these  orders  carried  out?  McPher 
son's  answer,  in  a  letter  sent  that  night  to  Sherman  :  'They 
(probably  Polk's  men)  displayed  considerable  force  and  opened 
on  us  with  artillery.  After  skirmishing  among  the  gulches 
and  thickets  till  nearly  dark,  and  finding  that  I  would  not 
succeed  in  cutting  the  railroad  before  dark,  or  in  getting  to 
it,  T  decided  to  withdraw  the  command  and  take  up  a  position 
for  the  night  between  Sugar  Valley  and  the  entrance  to  the 
Gap.'  At  the  first  news  Sherman  was  much  vexed  and 
declared,  concerning  McPherson's  failure  to  break  the  enemy's 
main  artery  :  'Such  an  opportunity  does  not  occur  twice  in 
a  single  life — still  he  was  perfectly  justified  by  his  orders.'  '':! 

1  W.    R.    R.,   72-63-64.  1     Century  Magazine.  Vol.   12,  page  44:,. 

2  Century  Magazine,  Vol.    12,  page  443. 


440  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

General  Sherman  in  a  letter  to  General  Grant  dated  June 
18,  1864,  says:  "My  first  movement  against  Johnston  was 
really  fine,  and  I  now  believe  I  should  have  disposed  of  him 
at  one  blow  if  McPherson  had  crushed  Resaca,  as  he  might 
have  done,  for  then  it  was  garrisoned  only  by  a  small  brigade, 
but  McPherson  was  a  little  over-cautious  lest  Johnston,  still 
at  Dalton,  might  move  against  him  alone ;  but  the  truth  is 
1  got  all  of  McPherson's  army,  23,000,  eighteen  miles  to 
Johnston's  rear  before  he  knew  they  had  left  Huntsville."1 

It  is  plain  now  that  Resaca  was  a  lost  opportunity.  It  is 
perhaps  idle  now  to  speculate  on  what  would  have  been  the 
result  if  McPherson  had  held  his  ground  and  pressed  the 
advance  he  had  gained.  Hooker  and  Palmer  and  Schofield 
were  closely  following  him  up  and  if  Johnston  had  broken 
away  from  Dalton  we  would  have  been  close  on  his  heels 
and  the  campaign  for  Atlanta  might  have  been  ended  then  and 
there.  It  is  perhaps  well  we  did  not  know  of  this  lost  oppor 
tunity.  All  we  did  know  was  that  the  enemy  was  in  retreat 
and  that  we  should  soon  follow  him. 


1     W.  R.  R.  75-507. 


ALEXIS  COPE 

Adjutant    of   the    Fifteenth    Ohio    Volunteers,    during    the    Atlanta 
Campaign  and  Hood's  Invasion  of  Tennessee. 


CHAPTER  XXI. 

THE  ATLANTA  CAMPAIGN — ADAIRSVILLE,  CASSVILLE,  NEW  HOPE 
CHURCH,  PICKETT'S  MILL. 

On  the  morning  of  May  16,  1864,  when  it  was  known  that 
the  enemy  had  escaped  us  at  Resaca,  orders  were  given  for 
immediate  pursuit  by  our  whole  army — General  Thomas  di 
rectly  on  the  heels  of  the  enemy,  General  McPherson  by  Lay's 
Ferry  and  General  Schofield  by  obscure  roads  to  the  left.  Gen 
eral  McPherson  got  across  the  Oostensaula  on  the  16th,  but  as 
the  enemy  had  destroyed  the  railroad  bridge  at  Resaca,  leaving 
only  one  bridge  on  which  to  cross  the  river,  our  part  of  the 
army  did  not  get  across  until  the  17th.  General  Schofield  had 
more  trouble  and  had  to  make  a  wide  circuit  by  Fite's  and 
Field's  ferries  across  the  Conesauga  and  Coosawattie  Rivers, 
which  form  the  Oostensaula.  On  the  17th,  all  the  armies  moved 
south,  by  as  many  roads  as  could  be  found,  except  General 
Davis'  division,  which  was  sent  southwest  along  the  west  bank 
of  the  Oostensaula  to  seize  Rome  and  destroy  the  arsenal 
there.1 

It  was  with  a  feeling  of  regret  that  we  heard  the  enemy 
had  gone  from  our  front,  but  his  position  was  very  formidable 
and  so  well  fortified  that  to  attack  it  in  front  would  have  in 
volved  a  great  sacrifice  of  life,  with  great  risk  of  failure.  Or 
ders  were  given  to  have  the  men  discharge  and  clean  their 
guns  and  not  to  leave  the  camp,  as  we  would  soon  move.  Not 
withstanding  this  order  some  of  the  men  went  forward  to  the 
enemy's  abandoned  works  in  the  front,  where  they  saw  that 
our  fire  had  been  very  damaging.  Before  they  returned  we 
received  orders  to  march  into  the  town.  We  reached  the  town 
about  10  o'clock  and  found  it  quite  strongly  fortified.  There 
were  some  strong  earth  works  and  every  building  had  port 
holes  for  musketry.  We  saw  where  on  May  9th  McPher- 
son's  cannon  had  made  some  holes  in  the  walls  besides 
the  portholes  above  mentioned,  and  when,  for  a  time,  the 
town  was  at  his  mercy.  The  railroad  bridge  had  been 
destroyed  and  the  other  bridge  partially  burned.  The 
latter  had  to  be  repaired  before  any  troops  could  cross. 
In  the  meantime  our  men  helped  themselves  from  the 
commissary  stores  the  enemy  had  left  behind  in  his  retreat. 
After  a  wait  of  two  or  three  hours  we  crossed  the  river  on  a 

1     General   Sherman's  official  report,  W.  R.  R.,  72-65.  Sig".    15 


442  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AXD  CAMPAIGNS 

very  shaky  bridge  and  marched  after  the  enemy.  As  we 
were  leaving  the  river  we  heard  the  whistle  and  rumble  of  one 
of  our  railroad  trains  coining  into  Resaca.  We  marched  about 
five  miles  beyond  Resaca  and  went  into  camp.  The  enemy 
was  close  at  hand  and  the  skirmishers  \vere  firing  as  we  drew 
our  blankets  over  us  for  the  night.  The  weather  had  been 
fine  for  three  or  four  days,  but  on  the  morning  of  May  IT  it 
was  foggy  and  raining.  Very  little  firing  was  heard  in  our 
front,  although  the  prisoners  we  captured  had  said  they  would 
fight  us  at  Calhoun,  which  was  only  about  a  mile  from  our 
front. 

After  drawing  three  days'  rations,  at  7  :45  o'clock  a.  m.  we 
marched  on,  crossing  the  railroad  and  taking  what  seemed  a 
main  traveled  road  and  soon  reached  Calhoun,  the  county 
seat  of  Gordon  County.  We  found  the  town  a  larger  place 
than  we  expected.  While  we  \vere  resting  by  the  roadside 
General  Sherman  and  staff  rode  by  on  their  way  to  the  front. 
The  most  noticable  thing  we  saw  in  Calhoun  was  a  monument 
to  a  General  Nelson  in  the  courthouse  yard.  After  leaving 
Calhoun  we  followed  the  railroad  and  made  slow  progress. 
We  found  the  wayside  strewn  with  old  papers  and  letters 
which  our  advance  had  probably  captured,  read  and  thrown 
aside.  Gleason  in  his  diary  says  he  picked  up  a  fe\v  but  found 
none  of  sufficient  interest  to  be  worth  keeping.  After  cross 
ing  Oathkaloga  Creek  our  advance  halted  for  dinner  about 
11  o'clock.  Skirmish  and  some  artillery  firing  had  been  heard 
some  distance  in  the  front  during  the  forenoon,  but,  as  yet, 
there  were  no  indications  that  the  enemy  was  making  a  de 
cided  stand.  By  the  time  our  dinner  was  over  the  troops  in 
advance  were  well  out  of  our  way  and  we  moved  rapidly 
until  wre  overtook  them.  Quite  a  scare  was  occasioned  by 
some  teamsters  riding  up  to  our  line  and  saying  that  the  en 
emy  had  fired  upon  and  captured  four  wagons  belonging  to 
our  telegraph  corps.  Upon  investigation  it  was  found  that 
our  teamsters  had  unintentionally  been  stampeded  by  some  of 
our  own  men.  The  teamsters  were  given  a  sound  reprimand 
by  Colonel  Gibson,  who  was  now  in  command  of  our  brigade. 
"Such  a  reprimand,"  says  Gleason,  "as  only  Colonel  Bill  Gib 
son  could  give,"  and  sent  back  to  their  wagons.  Arriving 
writhin  three  miles  of  Adairsville,  word  came  that  the  enemy 
had  turned  and  were  advancing  upon  us.  We  at  once  formed 
line  to  meet  them  and  barricaded  our  position  with  rails.  The 
report,  however,  was  not  confirmed.  The  fighting  seemed  to 
be  a  brisk  skirmish  and  an  artillery  duel.  While  it  was  going 
on  we  saw  the  smoke  from  a  burning  building  to  our  left  front. 


ADAIRSVILLE.  CASSMLLE,  PICKETT'S  MILL  443 

The  rebel  battery  was  soon  silenced  by  our  guns  and  we 
bivouaced  where  we  were  for  the  night,  having  marched  eight 
miles  during  the  day.  While  the  brigade  was  barricading  its 
line,  the  adjutant  rode  over  to  the  right  to  reconnoiter  and 
came  near  riding  into  the  enemy's  line,  mistaking  it  for  our 
own.  He  discovered  his  mistake  in  time  and  turning  his 
horse  made  his  way  back  hurriedly  under  a  shower  of  rebel 
bullets. 

The  morning  of  May  18  there  was  a  dense  fog  and 
we  did  not  move  until  7  o'clock.  When  wre  moved  out  we 
crossed  a  stream  on  a  rail  bridge  and  marched  straight  for 
Adairsville,  which  the  enemy  had  abandoned  the  night  before. 
There  we  halted  for  about  three  hours  and  before  leaving 
the  place  had  our  dinners.  General  Sherman  had  assembled 
his  army,  corps  and  division  commanders  at  Adairsville,  evi 
dently  for  consultation,  and  the  council  was  not  over  when 
we  moved  on.1  We  here  met  the  Fifteenth  Corps  and  as 
they  marched  by  our  men  exchanged  greetings  with  the  Forty- 
sixth  Ohio  and  other  regiments  in  which  they  had  acquaint 
ances  and  friends.  The  council  of  war  which  Gleason  men 
tions  in  his  diary,  was  probably  caused  by  reports  brought 
by  rebel  prisoners  wre  had  captured,  that  General  Johnston 
had  decided  to  stand  and  give  us  battle  at  or  near  Kingston. 
Kingston  was  at  the  junction  of  railroads  leading  respectively 
to  Rome  and  Atlanta  and  near  the  Etowah  River.  It  was  a 
point  of  great  strategical  importance  and  its  abandonment 
meant  the  abandonment  of  the  entire  line  of  the  Etowah 
River.  \Ve  arrived  within  about  three  and  one-half  miles  of 
Kingston  and  ascended  a  hill  to  our  right  where  we  bivouaced 
for  the  night.  We  had  to  get  our  supply  of  water  from  a 
spring  at  the  foot  of  the  hill  and  found  it  quite  difficult.  We 
did  not  pitch  our  shelter  tents,  but  spread  them  over  our 
blankets  to  keep  off  the  heavy  dew.  From  our  high  position 
we  could  see  the  camp  fires  of  our  mighty  army  all  about  us 
and  felt  comforted  by  the  knowledge  that  we  were  all  together 
again  and  ready  to  take  up  the  gage  of  battle  we  were  told  the 
enemy  had  decided  to  offer.  There  was  some  skirmishing  as 
we  took  position,  but  it  soon  quieted  down  until  there  was 
only  an  occasional  shot  on  the  picket  line.  Taps  sounded  won 
derfully  sweet  that  night  and,  sweeter  than  all,  was  the  Ger 
man  tattoo,  sounded  by  the  buglers  of  our  own  brigade. 

The  morning  of  May  19  was  quite  foggy,  but  it  soon  be 
gan  to  clear  up  and  orders  came  to  move.  General  Stanley's 
division  moved  out  first  and  apparently  met  with  little  opposi- 

1      (Reason's  Piarv. 


444  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

tion.  When  our  turn  came  we  marched  in  columns  of  eight 
men  abreast.  The  road  soon  became  blocked  with  marching 
troops  and  our  progress  was  slow  and  unsteady.  At  8  o'clock 
brisk  artillery  firing  opened  on  our  left  and  we  were  halted  at 
the  railroad  about  two  miles  from  Kingston.  But  we  soon 
pushed  on  and  at  9  o'clock  entered  the  town,  which  the  enemy 
had  abandoned.  We  found  it  a  lovely  little  place,  with  two 
churches,  a  stone  railway  station  and  a  number  of  tasteful 
dwellings.  We  marched  through  it  with  flags  flying  and  our 
band  playing  "Hail  Columbia,"  and  were  halted  at  its  further 
side  for  a  short  time.  A  mile  beyond  the  town  we  passed  a 
large  hospital  near  a  fine  spring.  Considerable  skirmish  firing 
was  heard  to  our  right  across  a  stream  of  some  size,  and  we 
presently  left  the  road  and  moved  to  the  left  through  the 
woods  toward  Cassville.  We  soon  ascended  a  hill  which  over 
looked  a  wide  open  valley  where  we  could  plainly  distinguish 
the  contending  lines.  The  enemy  seemed  to  be  trying  to  save 
a  large  wagon  train  wihch  was  being  shelled  by  our  artillery. 
It  was  quite  a  lively  fight,  in  which  Stanley's  division  was 
engaged,  and  which  ended  in  the  retreat  of  the  enemy  closely 
followed  by  our  troops.  While  the  pioneers  wrere  busy  build 
ing  a  bridge  across  a  small  creek,  we  made  coffee.  Soon  an 
other  brigade  took  our  place  and  we  moved,  on.  After  march 
ing  two  or  three  miles  we  came  to  a  place  where  large  masses 
of  troops  were  assembled  on  the  open  plain  and  forming  for 
battle  in  the  midst  of  beautiful  fields  of  waving  wheat,  ripen 
ing  for  the  harvest.  As  we  halted  for  a  moment  a  column  of 
our  troops  inarched  by  us  to  our  left,  led  by  a  large  drum  corps 
as  its  only  music.  The  time  was  perfect  and  the  men  moved 
with  such  spirit  and  precision  as  to  provoke  a  cheer.  The  scene 
was  wonderfully  imposing  and  those  who  witnessed  it  can  never 
forget  it.  The  day  was  fine  and  seldom  in  all  our  experience  was 
it  possible  to  behold  the  "pomp  and  panoply  of  glorious  war" 
to  better  advantage.  Brigades,  divisions  and  corps  were  soon 
in  their  proper  places  and  the  heavy  lines  of  battle  and  col 
umns  moved  forward  a  mile  or  more  across  those  beautiful 
wheat  fields.  The  skirmish  firing  was  quite  heavy  in  front 
and  we  fully  expected  to  close  with  the  enemy.  Soon,  how 
ever,  we  were  halted  and  bivouaced  for  the  night,  while  the 
troops  in  the  front  line  began  fortifying  their  position.  That 
we  did  not  engage  the  enemy  then  and  there  was  a  great  dis 
appointment,  for  we  were  never  in  better  fighting  condition, 
never  in  better  spirits  and  never  more  confident  of  victory. 

We  were  very  near  a  general  engagement  on  that  19th 
day  of  May,  1864,  which,  if  fought,  would  probably  have  been 


ADAIRSVILLE,  CASSVILLE,  PICKETT'S  MILL  445 

decisive  of  the  campaign.  General  Johnston  in  his  official 
report  says,  that  French's  division  of  Folk's  corps,  which  had 
been  in  the  rear,  joined  his  army  on  the  18th  day  of  May.  On 
the  morning  of  the  19th  when  half  the  Federal  army  was  near 
Kingston,  the  two  corps  at  Cassville  (Folk's  and  Hood's)  were 
ordered  to  advance  against  the  troops  which  had  followed 
them  from  Adairsville,  Hood's  leading  on  the  right ;  that  when 
Hood's  Corps  had  advanced  some  t\vo  mlies,  one  of  his  staff 
officers  reported  to  him  that  the  enemy  was  approaching  on 
the  Canton  road,  in  the  rear  of  the  right  of  our  original  posi 
tion,  and  that  he  then  drew  back  his  troops  and  formed  them 
across  that  road.  He  further  says,  "When  it  was  discovered 
that  the  officer  was  mistaken,  the  opportunity  had  passed,  by 
the  near  approach  of  the  two  portions  of  the  Federal  army. 
Expecting  to  be  attacked  I  drew  up  the  troops,  in  what  seemed 
to  be  an  excellent  position — a  bold  ridge  immediately  in  rear 
of  Cassville,  with  an  open  valley  before  it.  The  fire  of  the  en 
emy's  artillery  commenced  soon  after  the  troops  were  formed, 
and  continued  until  night.  Soon  after  dark  Lieutenant  Gen 
erals  Polk  and  Hood  together  expressed  to  me  decidedly  the 
opinion,  formed  upon  the  observation  of  the  afternoon,  that 
the  Federal  artillery  would  render  their  positions  untenable 
the  next  day,  and  urged  me  to  abandon  the  ground  imme 
diately  and  cross  the  Etowah.  Lieutenant  General  Hardee, 
whose  position,  I  thought,  was  weakest,  was  confident  he 
could  hold  it.  The  other  officers  were  so  earnest,  however, 
and  so  unwilling  to  depend  on  the  ability  of  their  corps  to  de 
fend  the  ground,  that  I  yielded,  and  the  army  crossed  the 
Etowah  on  the  20th,  a  step  which  I  have  regretted  ever 
since."1 

General  Sherman,  in  his  report,  says  that  "near  Adairs 
ville"  (on  the  17th)  "we  again  found  signs  of  the  rebel  army, 
and  of  a  purpose  to  fight,  and  about  sunset  of  that  day,  Gen 
eral  Newton's  division  in  the  advance  had  a  pretty  sharp  en 
counter  with  his  rear  guard,  but  the  next  morning  he  was 
gone,  and  we  pushed  on  through  Kingston  to  a  point  four 
miles  beyond,  where  we  found  him  again  in  force  on  ground 
comparatively  open  and  well  adapted  to  a  grand  battle.  We 
made  the  proper  dispositions,  General  Schofield  approaching 
Cassville  from  the  north,  to  which  point  General  Thomas  had 
also  directed  General  Hooker's  Corps,  and  I  had  drawn  Gen 
eral  McPherson's  army  from  Woodland  to  Kingston  to  be  in 
close  support.  On  the  19th  the  enemy  was  in  force  about 
Cassville  with  strong  forts,  but  as  our  troops  converged  upon 

1     W.   R.   R.   74-615-616. 


446  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

him,  he  again  retreated  in  the  night  time,  across  the  Etowah 
River,  burning  the  road  and  railroad  bridges  near  Carters- 
ville,  but  leaving  us  in  complete  possession  of  the  valuable 
country  above  the  Etowah  River."1 

On  the  night  of  May  .19  and  the  morning  of  May  20  the 
enemy  left  our  front  and  retreated  across  the  Etowah  River. 
The  morning  of  May  20  was  foggy,  but  the  fog  soon  lifted  and 
the  weather  became  clear  and  warm.  We  got  word  that  we 
would  not  move  that  day  and  so  made  ourselves  comfortable. 
We  heard  cannonading  some  distance  to  the  front  and  sup 
posed  the  guns  were  fired  by  some  of  our  troops  who  were 
in  pursuit  of  the  enemy.  Report  came  that  our  railroad  train 
had  come  into  Kingston,  and  soon  after  we  heard  the  whistle 
of  an  engine,  and  a  train  ran  past  us  to  the  front.  On  the  21st 
and  22nd  we  remained  in  our  bivouac  of  the  20th.  There  were 
rumors  that  we  were  to  go  on  an  expedition,  with  three-fifths' 
rations  for  20  days,  cutting  loose  from  our  lines  of  communica 
tion,  with  North  Carolina  or  Atlanta  as  the  objective  point. 

Sunday  the  22nd,  religious  services  were  held  in  a  grove  of 
live  oaks  near  our  regimental  cam]),  and  Surgeon  Clark  and 
the  Gleason  boys  led  the  singing.  It  was  rumored  that  Ave 
would  move  the  next  morning,  but  no  orders  to  that  effect 
came.  On  the  morning  of  May  23  we  received  orders  to  march 
at  noon,  but  when  the  hour  came  the  road  was  occupied  by  the 
Twentieth  Corps  and  we  had  to  wait  until  it  got  by.  A  little 
after  1  o'clock  we  moved  out  taking  a  road  leading  in  a 
southerly  direction,  crossing  the  railroad  nearly  at  right  an 
gles.  We  were  provided  with  three  days'  rations  which  were 
to  last  five.  Orders  directed  that  no  straggling  was  to  be 
permitted.  It  was  rumored  that  we  were  to  try  to  reach  At 
lanta  by  a  flank  movement.  After  marching  about  five  miles 
and  once  getting  on  the  wrong  road,  we  took  a  direct  course 
over  a  hill  to  a  road  leading  to  Gillem's  bridge  over  the  Eto 
wah  River.  We  followed  this  road  to  the  bridge,  crossed  the 
river  on  it,  and  continued  our  march.  South  of  the  river  we 
marched  through  some  of  the  finest  country  we  had  yet  seen. 
It  bore  few  marks  of  the  bloody  and  ruinous  struggle  which 
was  being  waged  elsewhere,  yet  it  was  now  destined  to  re 
ceive  its  full  share  of  the  blighting  curse  which  must  fall  alike 
upon  all  rebellious  soil.2  After  we  crossed  the  river  we  had  a 
hot  dusty  march  of  five  miles  and  just  as  darkness  fell  we 
crossed  Euharlee  Creek  and  encamped  in  the  edge  of  a  little 
village  near  a  mill.  As  no  regular  foraging  parties  had  been 
organized,  the  men  did  some  individual  foraging,  with  the 

1  W.  R.  R.  72-6f>. 

2  (JlCiison's  Diary. 


ADAIKSVILLE,  CASSVILLE,  PICKETT'S  MILL  447 

result  that  a  good  supply  of  fresh  pork  was  added  to  our 
rations. 

The  morning  of  May  24  we  resumed  our  march  at  7 
o'clock,  moving  steadily  in  a  southwesterly  direction  until  we 
reached  a  range  of  hills.  Here  the  artillery  seriously  impeded 
our  progress  and  we  halted  in  a  large  field.  Our  men  con 
fiscated  a  large  quantity  of  smoking  tobacco,  which  they 
found  nearby.  Colonel  Gibson  heard  of  it  and  ordered  it 
equally  distributed  among  the  regiments  of  the  brigade.  All 
the  men  in  the  brigade  who  had  pipes  soon  filled  them  and 
those  who  had  none  made  them  out  of  corn  cobs,  there  being 
abundant  cane  for  stems  all  along  the  road.1  Our  march  now 
was  through  beautiful  groves  of  yellow  pines  which  were  quite 
thick  on  the  hills.  The  road  was  so  crooked  we  could  not 
tell  our  exact  course,  but  it  seemed  more  to  the  east  than 
yesterday.  We  marched  steadily  on  over  the  hills  until  6 
o'clock  in  the  evening,  when  we  descended  to  a  small  stream 
and  encamped  on  a  hillock  nearby.  As  we  were  pitching  our 
tents  a  thunder  storm  was  approaching.  It  soon  broke  above 
us  and  continued  for  two  or  three  hours.  But  the  men  were 
secure  in  their  shelter  tents  and  so  escaped  the  downpour — 
all  except  the  commissary  men,  who  were  issuing  beef  and 
who  were  thoroughly  drenched.2  We  had  marched  during 
the  day  eleven  miles.-''  The  advance  of  our  corps  was  about 
one  mile  from  Burnt  Hickory  on  the  Dallas  road. 

The  morning  of  May  25  our  army  was  directed  to  march 
on  Dallas,  our  corps  to  follow  General  Geary's  and  General 
William's  divisions  of  the  Twentieth  Corps.  General  New 
ton's  division  of  our  corps  was  to  march  at  9  a.  m.,  General 
Stanley's  at  9  :30  a.  m.  and  ours  at  10  a.  m.  At  10  o'clock  a.  m. 
our  brigade  bugle  sounded  and  we  moved  out,  our  regiment 
being  the  advance  of  our  brigade.  We  first  marched  north  a 
quarter  of  a  mile  by  mistake,  then  retracing  our  steps, 
marched  in  the  opposite  direction  across  woods  and  fields, 
until  we  reached  a  by-road  \vhich  ran  parallel  with  the  Dallas 
road.  Here  we  were  delayed  for  two  hours  by  other  troops 
of  our  corps  which  were  passing.  The  two  other  divisions 
of  our  corps  were  in  advance  of  us  on  the  same  road  and 
Hookers  Corps  still  in  advance  of  them.  When  the  road  was 
clear  we  pushed  on  rapidly.  Several  details  were  made  from 
the  regiment  to  guard  trains  and  intersecting  roads.  About 
5:30  p.  m.  we  heard  heavy  artillery  firing  at  the  front,  which 
was  so  continuous  that  we  knew  we  had  met  the  enemy  in 
force.  It  continued  for  about  an  hour  and  the  road  being  then 

1  Gleason's   Diary.  3     Gregory's   Diary. 

2  Gleason's   Diary. 


448  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEEBS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

cleared  of  trains  we  advanced  more  rapidly.  A  thunder  storm 
was  coming  up  about  that  time  and  the  thunder  from  the 
clouds  mingled  with  that  of  our  cannon.  In  the  midst  of  the 
din  there  was  one  mighty  peal  of  thunder — so  loud,  so  deep,  so 
profound,  that  we  were  awre-stricken.  It  made  our  heavy 
guns  sound  like  the  snapping  of  matches  in  comparison.  It 
was  comforting,  as  well  as  awe  inspiring,  for  it  made  us  re 
member  that  God  was  on  His  throne  and  still  watching  over 
His  world.  No  one  who  heard  that  peal  of  thunder  could  ever 
forget  it.  At  dusk  we  crossed  Pumpkin  Vine  Creek  on  a 
bridge  which  had  been  saved  by  Hooker's  men,  after  the  en 
emy  had  set  it  on  fire.  We  soon  began  to  meet  large  numbers 
of  wounded  men  from  Hooker's  corps  and  were  told  that  they 
had  run  into  an  ambuscade  where  they  met  a  murderous  cross 
fire  of  both  artillery  and  musketry.1  It  soon  became  quite 
dark  and  began  to  rain.  For  several  hours  we  made  but  little 
headway.  The  road  sides  were  crowded  with  wounded  men. 
Large  numbers  of  stragglers  had  built  fires  which  blinded  us 
and  made  the  darkness  almost  impenetrable,  but  we  stumbled 
along  a  muddy  road  through  a  dense  forest.  About  11 
o'clock  w-e  were  halted,  stacked  arms  along  the  roadside  and 
lay  down  on  the  wet  ground,  with  orders  to  be  ready  to  move 
at  3  o'clock  next  morning. 

The  general  movement  of  our  armies  on  May  25,  1804,  as 
partially  related  above,  is  described  in  General  Thomas's  offi 
cial  report  as  follows : 

"On  the  25th  the  first  division  of  the  cavalry  (McCook's) 
moved  on  the  road  leading  to  Golgotha,  preceding  Butter- 
field's  division  of  the  Twentieth  Corps.  The  balance  of  Gen 
eral  Hooker's  command  advanced  on  the  road  leading  to 
Dallas,  running  south  of  the  one  used  by  Butterfield's  division. 
Howard's  corps  followed  Hooker's  and  in  rear  of  Howard's, 
Palmer's.  About  11  a.  m.  General  Geary's  division  of  the 
Twentieth  Corps,  being  in  advance,  came  upon  the  enemy  in 
considerable  force,  at  a  point  about  four  and  a  half  miles  from 
Dallas,  the  country  on  both  sides  of  the  road  being  thickly 
wooded  and  covered  with  undergrowth.  Geary  skirmished 
heavily  with  the  enemy,  slowly  driving  him,  until  Butterfield's 
and  William's  divisions  came  up  and  relieved  Geary's  troops. 
Soon  after  the  arrival  of  Williams,  about  3  p.  m.  the  column 
was  again  put  in  motion,  William's  division  in  advance,  and 
although  heavily  engaged  drove  the  enemy  steadily  before  it 
into  his  intrenchments.  Our  loss  was  heavy,  but  it  is  believed 
that  the  loss  of  the  enemy  was  much  greater.  Shortly  after  3 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


ADAIRSVILLE,  CASSVILLE,  PICKETT'S  MILL  449 

p.  m.  the  head  of  Howard's  column  got  within  supporting  dis 
tance  of  Hooker's  corps,  and  Newton's  division  was  placed  in 
position  on  Hooker's  left  about  6  p.  m.  and  by  morning  the 
whole  of  Howard's  corps  was  in  position  on  the  left  of 
Hooker's."1 

The  morning  of  May  '36,  a  little  before  o  o'clock,  the 
brigade  bugler  sounded  reveille  and  we  heard  Colonel  Gibson 
caution  him  not  to  repeat  it.  Our  bugler  was  also  cautioned 
not  to  play.  The  Aujutant  and  Sergeant  Major  went  along 
the  line  and  called  on  the  men  to  rise  and  we  were  soon  ready 
for  an  emergency. 

But  little  firing  was  heard  during  the  morning  and  we 
were  given  ample  time  to  get  our  breakfasts.  We  waited, 
expecting  to  be  called  on  every  moment,  for  over  an  hour  be 
fore  orders  came.  Our  brigade  then  marched  out  in  advance, 
our  regiment  being  in  the  rear.  We  marched  about  two  miles 
on  a  road  leading  a  little  east  of  south,  when  we  formed  in 
line  of  battle  facing  east,  along  the  crest  of  a  ridge  overlooking 
quite  an  opening  in  the  woods.  While  moving  into  position 
the  enemy's  presence  was  made  known  by  bullets  whizzing 
over  our  heads.  General  Wood  in  person  superintended  the 
placing  of  our  brigade  in  position  and  when  he  rode  away  gave 
directions  to  keep  close  watch  on  our  front  and  await  further 
orders.  The  men  at  once  set  to  work  building  breastworks  of 
logs  and  earth,  but  General  Wood  told  us  it  was  of  no  use,  as 
the  line  would  soon  advance.  He  had  barely  left  us  when  the 
adance  was  sounded  and  a  brisk  exchange  of  shots  began  on 
the  skirmish  line. 

The  rebel  skirmish  line  seemed  to  be  stronger  than  was 
anticipated,  as  our  skirmish  line  failed  to  advance.  The 
skirmishers  still  kept  up  a  desultory  fire  which  gradually 
slackened  and  our  men  resumed  the  building  of  a  barricade 
to  cover  our  front.  Generals  Sherman,  Thomas,  Howard  and 
Wood  came  along  our  part  of  the  line  about  noon  and  ex 
amined  our  position  carefully.  Dinner  was  brought  up  to  the 
line  by  the  company  cooks.  We  had  barely  time  to  swallow 
it,  when  we  were  ordered  by  the  generals  to  advance  under 
their  observation.  We  moved  forward  with  little  opposition 
to  a  point  where  a  good  position  for  a  battery  was  uncovered 
on  our  left,  and  the  Sixth  Ohio  was  moved  forward  and  placed 
in  such  position.  The  battery  opened  with  e  fleet  and  we  saw 
the  enemy's  troops  get  up  and  make  to  the  rear.  Our 
skirmishers  gradually  worked  round  to  the  left  of  the  enemy's 
position  in  our  front,  about  200  yards  distant,  and  they  were 

1     W.  R.  R.,  72-143. 


450  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

permitted  to  retire  almost  unmolested.1  The  battery  to  our 
left  now  began  throwing  shells  at  the  enemy's  main  line  and 
a  battery  of  the  enemy  replied  quite  vigorously.  A  man  in 
Company  B  was  severely  wounded  by  one  of  its  shells.  This 
same  evening  Major  James  P.  Hampson  of  the  One  Hundred 
and  Twenty-fourth  Ohio,  a  very  popular  young  officer,  well 
known  in  our  division,  was  fatally  wounded  and  died  the  next 
day.  The  rebel  battery  was  finally  silenced  and  night  came  on 
rather  quietly.  Our  regiment  was  ordered  to  relieve  the 
Thirty-second  Indiana  on  the  skirmish  line  and  did  so  with 
five  companies.  The  other  five  companies  were  placed  in 
reserve  behind  the  works.  Our  ammunition  was  replenished, 
we  drew  three  days'  rations,  and  thus  made  ready  for  the 
morrow.  The  day  and  the  night  were  clear  and  warm  and 
the  night  was  still,  except  for  occasional  shots  between  the 
pickets  of  the  opposing  armies.  We  did  not  know  that  on 
the  morrow  we  would  undergo  the  severest  trial  of  our  entire 
service. 

The  morning  of  May  27  dawned  clear  and  gave  promise 
of  a  bright  warm  day.  Our  skirmishers  were  relieved  by  the 
Twenty-ninth  Illinois  and  the  regiment  retired  a  short  dis 
tance  to  the  rear  of  the  front  line.  The  timber  had  been 
cleared  away  at  a  point  in  our  line  and  a  battery  of  Parrot 
guns  was  placed  in  position  and  opened  on  the  enemy  wrhose 
lines  were  in  plain  sight,  and  apparently  did  some  execution. 
The  enemy's  battery  which  \ve  thought  was  silenced  yester 
day  again  opened  on  us,  but  was  soon  silenced  again.  Our 
brigade  was  soon  relieved  and  moved  about  one  mile  to  the 
left  where  we  rejoined  our  division  in  the  rear  of  the  Twenty- 
third  Corps.  The  operations  of  the  26th  had  disclosed  the 
position  of  the  enemy  in  our  front,  and  it  was  decided  to  make 
a  general  attack.  His  position,  however,  was  so  strong  that 
it  was  decided,  if  possible,  to  find  and  attack  his  right  flank 
with  a  view  of  turning  his  position.  Our  division  was  selected 
to  make  this  attack.  We  received  our  orders  about  noon  and 
at  once  began  our  movement  towards  the  enemy's  right.  The 
country  over  which  we  moved  was  quite  rough,  thickly 
wooded  and  covered  with  a  thick  growth  of  underbrush, 
which  made  our  progress  difficult  and  laborious.  Our  expe 
dition,  as  we  understood,  was  intended  to  surprise  the  enemy 
and  yet,  strange  to  relate,  our  brigade  commander  decided  to 
have  all  orders  given  by  the  bugle.  This  gave  the  enemy 
immediate  and  continuous  notice  of  our  movement  every  step 
of  the  way.  To  the  men  in  the  ranks  who  quickly  compre- 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


ADAIKSVILLE,  CASSVILLE,  PICKETT'S  MILL  451 

hended  the  purpose  of  our  movement,  this  use  of  the  bugle 
was  universally  condemned.  More  than  one  officer  and  man 
exclaimed:  "If  we  are  expected  to  surprise  the  enemy,  why 
don't  they  stop  those  d — d  bugles?"  But  on  we  went,  our 
bugles  blowing.  Even  when  wre  halted  for  a  short  rest,  the 
bugles  sounded  the  long  drawn  ouj  note  which  commanded 
us  to  stop.  The  afternoon  was  almost  consumed  by  this 
difficult  and  tiresome  inarch.  We  finally  came  to  an  open 
timbered  space,  near  a  road  which  wound  up  a  hill  toward 
the  enemy's  supposed  position,  and  came  to  a  halt  on  the 
right  of  the  road.  There  was  a  house  to  the  left  of  the  road 
where  it  began  to  climb  the  hill.  It  was  reported  that  we  had 
found  the  enemy's  right  flank.  Here  we  rested  for  about  an 
hour  in  a  fervidly  hot  sun.  Generals  Howard'  and  Wood 
came  up  to  our  position  and  stopped  for  a  while.  There  was 
a  sudden  and  sharp  rattle  of  carbines  in  our  front  and  a  little 
to  our  left,  and  .almost  immediately  following  it  came  an 
order  to  us  to  advance. 

The  horses  of  the  lieutenant  colonel  and  adjutant 
which  had  been  left  behind  when  we  started  on  our  surprise 
party  had,  in  the  meantime,  been  brought  up,  and  they 
mounted  them.  The  regiment  was  formed  in  line  and 
advanced  up  through  the  open  \vooded  space  before  men 
tioned,  our  colors  floating  in  a  brisk  breeze,  which  caught  them 
as  we  neared  the  top  of  the  slope.  Here  we  saw  an  open 
cleared  space  to  our  front.  Suddenly  a  battery  of  the  enemy, 
who  was  strongly  posted  across  the  open  space  a  few  hundred 
yards  away,  opened  on  our  colors.  The  first  shot  wounded 
Lieutenant  Thomas  C.  Davis  of  Company  C,  and  a  number 
of  the  color  guard,  and  the  regiment  momentarily  halted.  A 
terrific  fire  of  musketry  opened  on  our  left,  where  General 
Hazen's  brigade  was  charging,  and  we  received  an  order  to 
move  to  the  left  across  the  road  to  the  shelter  of  the  woods. 
The  horses  of  the  field  and  staff  \vere  quickly  sent  to  the 
rear  and,  singular  to  relate,  we  were  thrown  into  dire  con 
fusion  by  conflicting  or  misunderstood  orders  of  our  regi 
mental  commander,  Colonel  Wallace.  Before  the  disorders 
were  corrected,  the  bugler,  Wilson  S.  Her,  with  quick,  sharp, 
clear  notes,  sounded  the  advance1  and  we  charged  forward 
into  the  woods  and  across  a  steep  ravine  toward  the  enemy's 
position — the  left  wing  of  our  regiment  on  the  right  of  our 
colors,  and  the  right  wing  on  their  left.2  The  writer,  who 
was  then  adjutant  of  the  regiment,  confesses  to  a  momentary 

1  It  was   his   last  blast.      Seizing  the   musket   of   a    comrade,    who   had   fallen,   he 

joined  in  the  charge  and  received  his  death  wounds. 

2  See  Colonel  Askew's  report,  W.  R.  R.,  72-406-9. 


452  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

fit  of  complete  demoralization  over  its  disorganized  condition 
when  it  went  into  action.  But  there  was  no  diminution  in 
the  courage  of  the  men  in  the  ranks,  and  they  rushed  forward 
through  the  woods  and  down  into  the  ravine  and  across  it, 
under  a  murderous  fire  of  artillery  and  musketry  from  a  line 
they  could  not  see.  They  pressed  forward  up  the  side  of  the 
ravine,  found  the  enemy  on  its  further  edge,  in  a  position  too 
strong  to  be  successfully  attacked,  and  held  on  until  night 
fall  and  until  their  ammunition  was  exhausted.  They  then 
retired  to  the  rear  and  closed  up  their  fearfully  decimated 
ranks.  While  we  were  holding  on,  on  the  other  side  of  the 
ravine  and  within  a  few  feet  at  some  points  of  the  enemy's 
works,  we  suffered  from  a  severe  cross  and  enfilading  fire 
from  both  the  enemy's  right  and  left.  This  fire  did  little 
damage  to  the  men  closest  to  the  enemy's  line  in  our  im 
mediate  front,  but  was  killing  the  wounded  who  were  lying  in 
the  ravine  and  on  its  slopes  to  our  rear. 

The  brigade  commander,  Colonel  Gibson,  was  not  with 
the  charging  line,  but  Captain  Cyrus  Askew  of  the  Fifteenth 
Ohio,  a  member  of  his  staff,  was,  and  the  adjutant  appealed 
to  him  to  go  to  the  rear,  report  this  deadly  cross  fire  and  ask 
that  troops  be  sent  in  on  our  right  and  left  to  check  it.  For 
some  reason  Captain  Askew  declined  to  go,  but  suggested 
that  the  adjutant  himself  go.  The  adjutant  started  to  the 
rear  and  as  he  passed  into  the  ravine  saw  Captain  J.  R.  Upde- 
grove  of  Company  H,  his  face  and  neck  crimsoned  with 
blood  from  a  wound  behind  the  ear.  The  adjutant  examined 
his  wound,  saw  it  was  serious  and  urged  him  to  go  to  the 
rear.  He  was,  for  the  moment,  mentally  unbalanced  and 
insisted  on  remaining  with  his  company,  but  the  adjutant 
sent  for  Lieutenant  J.  A.  Gleason,  who  was  in  command  of 
the  Pioneers,  to  take  command  of  the  company  and  went"  on. 
Passing  up  the  slope  of  the  ravine  to  the  rear  it  seemed  almost 
impossible  to  escape  the  bullets  and  shells  of  the  enemy.  The 
minnie  balls  seemed  thick  as  hornets  about  a  nest  which  had 
been  suddenly  disturbed,  and  a  shell  seemed  to  explode  near 
him  almost  every  step.  But  he  soon  reached  the  thicker 
woods  beyond  the  ravine,  where  he  found  Colonel  Gibson 
and  General  Wood  and  attempted  to  explain  to  them  the 
situation  in  front.  They  were  both  laboring  under  terrible 
stress  of  excitement.  Just  then  General  Howard  rode  up 
and  seeing  that  the  adjutant  had  just  come  from  the  front, 
asked  him  particularly  about  conditions  on  the  firing  line. 
The  adjutant  reported  the  conditions  and  the  genaral  said : 


ADAIRSMLLE.  CASSMLLE,  PICKETT'S  MILL  453 

"Go  back  and  tell  the  men  that  I  will  have  troops  sent  in  both 
on  their  right  and  left  as  soon  as  I  can  get  them." 

The  adjutant  started  back  and  had  gone  a  few  paces 
when  one  of  the  enemy's  shells  exploded  apparently  right  over 
these  officers.  General  Howard's  horse  whirled  round  and 
the  general,  putting  his  armless  sleeve  before  his  eyes,  ex 
claimed:  "I  am  afraid  to  look  down!  I  am  afraid  to  look 
down!"  The  adjutant  at  once  turned  back  and  told  the  gen 
eral  that  the  shell  had  only  torn  off  the  heel  of  his  boot.  The 
general  thought  it  had  taken  off  his  leg  and  seemed  much 
relieved  when  he  knew  that  only  his  boot  was  injured.  When 
the  adjutant  returned  to  the  firing  line  he  struck  it  where  the 
Fifteenth  Wisconsin  of  our  brigade  was  still  holding  on,  and 
by  a  rapid  fire  was  keeping  the  enemy  down  behind  their 
works.  If  a  head  showed  itself  above  the  enemy's  barricade 
it  at  once  became  a  target  for  the  riflemen  of  our  line.  The 
adjutant  passed  on  to  the  right,  hoping  to  find  the  Fifteenth 
Ohio.  It  was  then  growing  dark.  Failing  to  find  the  Fif 
teenth  Ohio,  the  adjutant  went  to  the  rear  and  found  it  gath 
ering  together  its  scattered  remnants,  near  the  house  we  had 
noticed  when  we  were  resting  just  before  the  attack.  There 
had  been  fearful  losses,  how  great  no  one  could  tell,  but  those 
who  were  left  closed  up  their  ranks  and,  together  with  the 
remnants  of  the  other  regiments  of  the  brigade,  moved  to  a 
position  on  a  line  which  had  been  established  along  a  ridge 
to  our  right  front.  It  was  very  dark  and  near  midnight  be 
fore  we  got  into  position  and  protected  our  line  by  intrench- 
ments.  As  we  were  out  of  ammunition,  the  adjutant  took  a 
detail  of  two  men  from  each  company  and  started  out  to  find 
the  ammunition  train.  Where  it  was  no  one  could  tell.  The 
woods  were  thick  and  dark,  but  after  stumbling  about  in  the 
darkness  for  an  hour  or  more  the  train  was  found.  Each  one 
of  the  twenty  men  took  a  box  of  cartridges  on  his  shoulder 
and  the  detail  finally  got  back  to  the  line.  After  the  cartridges 
were  distributed  and  the  adjutant  was  about  to  drop  down 
for  a  little  rest,  he  heard  Colonel  Wallace,  who  was  lying 
near  by,  groaning.  He  said  he  had  fallen  over  a  rock  as  we 
charged  down  into  the  ravine  and  had  wrenched  his  back. 
He  complained  of  being  cold,  although  wrapped  up  in  his 
overcoat  and  blankets.  The  adjutant  at  once  took  his  own 
blankets,  spread  them  over  the  colonel  and  then  sank  down 
in  the  rank  reeking  weeds  without  covering,  and  slept  from 
sheer  exhaustion. 

Gleason,  who  was  then  sergeant  major  of  the  regiment, 
wrote  in  his  diary  at  the  time  an  account  of  the  affair  and 


454  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

his  personal  experiences,  which  are  here  reproduced.  He  says 
that  when  the  division  was  lying  in  the  rear  of  the  Twenty- 
third  Corps,  as  before  related,  the  adjutant  directed  him  to 
take  his,  the  adjutant's,  horse  and  ride  back  and  hurry  up  the 
cooks  so  we  could  have  something  to  eat  before  the  move 
ment  began.  That  he  did  so,  and  finding  his  mess  (the  non 
commissioned  staff  who  were  non-combatants  and  kept 
habitually  in  the  rear)  at  dinner,  he  sat  down  and  ate  with 
them,  while  the  company  cooks  were  getting  ready.  That 
when  he  got  back  he  found  that  the  regiment  had  started 
and,  leaving  the  adjutant's  horse  with  his  orderly,  he  hastened 
on  to  overtake  the  regiment  and  found  it  when  it  had  marched 
about  a  mile  toward  the  left.  He  then  proceeds  as  follows : 

"The  country  being  quite  rough  made  a  great  deal  of 
maneuvering  necessary  to  keep  in  line,  which  was  quite 
laborious.  A  large  part  of  the  afternoon  was  consumed  in 
this  way  before  we  finally  halted  in  a  clear  space  with  rough 
timber  land  in  our  front  and  rested  about  an  hour.  There 
Generals  Howard  and  Wood  rode  along  and  gave  the  order 
to  advance,  when  skirmishing  began  at  once  in  the  woods 
in  front.  Some  time  previous  to  this,  a  sharp  rattle  of  car 
bines  had  been  heard  to  our  left,  indicating  that  our  movement 
had  been  discovered  by  rebel  cavalry.  Before  we  advanced 
the  rebels  shelled  the  woods  vigorously,  one  shell  bursting  in 
Company  C's  ranks,  injuring  several  men,  while  we  were  yet 
on  the  reserve.  We  were  soon  ordered  to  double  quick  and 
soon  became  exposed  to  a  galling  cross-fire  of  musketry  and 
artillery.  I  followed  the  left  of  the  regiment  until  a  halt  was 
made,  dropping  behind  a  convenient  log  until  it  moved  on, 
when  I  reluctantly  left  my  natural  breastwork.  Moving  for 
ward  to  the  crest  of  a  ridge,  a  severe  cross-fire  was  encoun 
tered  and  the  line  advanced  into  a  ravine  close  to  the  rebel 
works,  where  it  met  with  a  decided  check,  and  having  little 
protection,  was  in  a  literal  slaughter-pen.  Here  fell  gallant 
Sergeant  Ambers  Norton,  our  color  bearer,  with  his  life  blood 
staining  the  flag  a  deeper  crimson,  and,  one  by  one,  all  the 
color  guard,  with  one  exception,  were  either  killed  or 
wounded.  Company  H,  the  left  color  company,  seemed 
almost  annihilated.  Orderly  Mumaugh,  Sergeant  Miller, 
Corporal  Updegrove,  and  several  others  were  killed,  while 
Captain  Updegrove  and  many  of  his  men  were  wounded. 
The  only  protection  available  was  to  lie  close  to  the  ground, 
or  seek  cover  behind  trees  and  rocks — by  no  means  plenty — 
until  the  fire  had  slackened.  No  supports  had  come  up  and 
our  bugle  had  sounded  the  recall  as  soon  as  it  was  apparent 


ADAIKSVILLE,  CASSVILLE,  PICKETT'S  MILL  455 

the  works  could  not  be  carried.  A  galling  cross-tire  scorched 
the  ravine  and  ridge  alike,  rendering  it  almost  useless  to  seek 
shelter  of  tree  or  rock.  1  noticed  two  men  taking  shelter 
behind  a  medium  sized  tree,  on  the  brink  of  the  ravine,  and 
when  one  of  them  was  hit  in  the  hand  by  a  minnie  ball  and 
retired  to  the  rear,  I  crept  to  his  place  behind  the  other.  He 
was  leaning  against  the  tree  and  would  not  lie  clown,  although 
he  was  not  firing.  In  a  few  minutes  a  ball  came  from  the 
left  and  struck  him  squarely  in  the  temple,  with  that  peculiar 
'spat/  which  once  heard,  is  at  once  recognized  as  the  passage 
of  a  bullet  through  flesh  and  bone.  It  killed  him  so  suddenly 
that  he  never  changed  his  position,  and  had  I  not  heard  the 
shot  strike  and  been  spattered  by  his  blood  and  brains,  I 
might  have  believed  him  still  untouched.  He  was  a  stranger 
to  me,  evidently  from  another  regiment,  and  being  past  all 
human  aid,  I  soon  left  him,  going  to  another  tree  where  I 
could  get  a  better  view  of  the  front.  To  my  surprise  not  a 
soul  was  visible.  The  woods  were  full  of  smoke,  and  I 
thought  the  line  could  not  be  far  away.  The  rebel  lire  still 
swept  the  ground  like  a  hailstorm  and  I  deemed  it  better  to 
quietly  await  further  developments  than  to  try  to  get  away, 
although  our  bugle  kept  blowing  the  recall.  It  was  now  past 
sunset  and  the  woods  were  growing  dark,  when  a  wounded 
man  belonging  to  Company  I,  of  our  regiment,  came  from  the 
left  front,  painfully  limping  toward  the  rear  and,  seeing  me, 
asked  me  to  help  him.  as  he  was  nearly  exhausted.  I  at  once 
arose  and  taking  his  roll  of  blankets  in  one  hand  and  his  arm 
in  the  other,  led  him  to  the  rear  as  rapidly  as  his  condition 
would  permit.  He  was  severely  wounded  in  the  thigh.  Pass 
ing  on  to  the  right,  I  soon  gained  the  shelter  of  the  ridge,  and 
near  its  foot  passed  Major  McClenahan,  with  a  bugler,  watch 
ing  for  stragglers  from  the  front  and  having  the  recall  blown 
at  intervals.  Alas !  Too  many  of  our  brave  comrades  lay 
up  that  bloody  ravine,  forever  beyond  the  sound  of  bugle ; 
many  more  were  so  badly  wounded  as  to  be  helpless,  and 
others  were  so  close  to  the  rebel  works  that  they  dared  not 
stir  until  darkness  shielded  them.  Pausing  for  an  instant,  I 
srave  Major  McClenahan  the  little  information  I  possessed 
and  passed  on  with  my  charge.  We  moved  more  slowly  now, 
as  we  were  safer  from  the  enemy's  shot  and  shell,  which  still 
swept  the  forest  like  a  besom.  I  fell  in  with  stragglers  from 
all  regiments  of  the  brigade  and  division.  Nearly  every  regi 
ment  seemed  to  have  lost  all  formation  in  the  mad  and  futile 
charge  into  the  angle  of  the  enemy's  works,  but  I  met  no  one 
that  I  knew." 


456  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

Gleason  relates  that  he  helped  his  wounded  comrade 
nearly  a  mile  to  the  rear,  where  he  turned  him  over  to  another 
comrade  and  returned  to  where  the  brigade  was  re-forming, 
near  the  place  where  we  began  the  advance,  and  that  he 
accompanied  the  regiment  to  the  position  on  the  ridge  to  our 
right  in  the  woods,  as  before  described.  He  adds  the  follow 
ing  comment  on  the  day's  operations,  which  fairly  expresses 
the  opinions  of  our  men  at  that  time: 

"It  seemed  to  be  the  prevailing  opinion  that  some  one 
(whether  General  Howard  or  General  Wood  was  not  quite 
clear)  had  made  a  blunder,  and  a  costly  one  for  our  division, 
in  attacking  where  we  did.  The  supposed  object  was  to  strike 
the  rebels  in  flank  beyond  the  protection  of  their  works,  which 
would  have  been  then  taken  in  reverse.  There  had  been 
ample  time  for  reconnoitering,  even  after  the  rebel  cavalry 
had  discovered  our  approach.  But  the  blow  was  delivered  at 
the  very  strongest  part  of  their  line,  after  giving  them  ample 
time  to  reinforce  it.  The  battle,  while  covering  only  our 
division  front,  was  decidedly  our  bloodiest  so  far,  and  Com 
pany  H  (Gleason's  company)  lost  four  killed  and  sixteen 
wounded,  so  far  as  known,  besides  several  missing,  who  it 
was  feared  had  also  been  killed,  or  left  severely  wounded  in 
the  ravine  or  on  its  bloody  slopes.  The  losses  of  Company 
H  were  the  heaviest  of  any  company  in  the  regiment,  and  all 
had  suffered  terribly.  This  is  surely  not  war,  it  is  butchery". 

The  writer's  recollection  is  that  there  was  not  time,  be 
tween  hearing  the  carbine  shots  and  our  advance,  to  recon 
noitre  and  determine  the  enemy's  position  and  strength,  but 
there  was  ample  time  to  do  so  before.  In  so  difficult  a 
country,  so  thickly  wooded  that  an  enemy  was  easily  con 
cealed,  it  seems  almost  incredible  that  a  great  mass  of  troops 
should  have  been  sent  blindly  forward  without  first  determin 
ing  the  position  of  the  enemy  and  his  probable  strength. 
While  we  were  resting  on  the  hillside  to  the  right  of  the  road, 
there  was  plenty  of  time  to  send  forward  a  strong  skirmish 
line,  which  would  have  found  the  enemy's  main  line  and  dis 
closed  his  strength.  But  we  were  ordered  to  take  the  enemy 
by  surprise  and  this  caution  was  neglected.  It  was  a  blunder, 
and  a  fearful  one,  as  all  afterwards  admitted.  General  Wood, 
long  after  the  war,  privately  admitted  and  grieved  over  it, 
but  insisted  that  he  was  not  responsible  for  it.  General  Ful- 
lerton,  chief  of  staff  of  the  Fourth  Corps  at  the  time,  says: 
''General  Wood  was  instructed  not  to  attack  the  enemy  if 
he  found  him  protected  by  intrenchments,"  but  as  General 


ADAIRSMLLE,  CASSVILLE,  PICKETT'S  MILL  457 

Howard  was  present  when  the  attack  was  ordered,  he  doubt 
less  acted  under  General  Howard's  personal  directions. 

The  battle  was  only  an  incident  in  the  great  campaign  for 
the  capture  of  Atlanta,  but  it  was  a  battle  in  which  the  losses, 
in  some  of  the  regiments  of  our  brigade,  were  heavier  than  in 
any  battle  during  their  entire  service  and  seems  to  demand 
that  it  shall  be  treated  fully  in  this  history.  The  writer,  there 
fore,  adds  to  his  own  and  Gleason's  personal  recollections  of 
it,  the  accounts  of  it  given  in  the  reports  of  our  corps,  division, 
brigade  and  regimental  commanders,  and  in  the  reports  of 
Generals  Cleburne  and  Wheeler,  who  were  in  immediate  com 
mand  of  the  opposing  forces. 

General  Howard,  in  his  report,  says,  that  on  May  27, 
General  Stanley  moved  to  the  left  of  General  Newton,  and 
relieved  General  Wood's  division  preparatory  to  the  latter 
making  an  assault  on  the  enemy's  line,  at  a  point  which  Gen 
eral  Sherman  had  designated  ;  that  a  careful  reconnoissance, 
made  by  General  Thomas  and  himself,  showed  that  the  enemy 
was  then  prepared  to  bring  a  cross-fire  of  artillery  and  mus 
ketry  upon  that  position,  and  the  assault  was  abandoned. 
''Therefore,  I  was  directed  to  move  General  Wood  farther  to 
the  left,  and  beyond  all  troops,  and  endeavor  to  strike  the 
enemy's  flank.  Johnson's  division,  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps, 
was  sent  to  me  as  a  support.  I  have  omitted  to  say  that  the 
Twenty-third  Corps,  General  Schofield  commanding,  was  al 
ready  in  position  on  the  left  of  the  Fourth.  Therefore,  I  se 
lected  a  field  on  the  extreme  left  and  rear  of  the  Twenty-third 
Corps,  which  was  pretty  well  concealed  from  the  enemy  by  in 
tervening  woods,  and  in  this  massed  the  troops.  Wood's  divi 
sion  on  the  right  formed  in  column,  six  lines  deep,  and  John 
son's  on  the  left,  with  a  brigade  front.  The  advance  from 
this  position  commenced  at  11  a.  m.  and  in  an  easterly  direc 
tion.  The  columns  moved  forward  with  very  little  interrup 
tion  for  nearly  a  mile.  I  thought  we  must  have  reached  the 
enemy's  flank,  whereupon  General  Wood  wheeled  his  com 
mand  toward  the  right  until  he  was  faced  nearly  south.  A 
brigade  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  General  McLean's,  de 
ployed  so  as  to  form  a  junction  with  General  Wood  on  his 
right.  The  latter  pressed  forward  his  skirmishers,  until  a 
large  open  field  was  reached.  Here  it  was  discovered  that  the 
enemy's  works  were  still  in  our  front.  Immediately  the  skir 
mishers  were  withdrawn,  and  the  column  moved  rapidly  by 
the  left  flank,  at  least  another  mile  to  the  eastward.  The 
ground  was  carefully  reconnoitered  by  General  Wood  and 
myself.  We  still  found  a  line  of  works  to  our  right,  but  they 


458  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

did  not  seem  to  cover  General  Wood's  front,  and  they  were 
new,  the  enemy  still  being  hard  at  work  on  them.  I  gave  a 
little  time  for  the  troops  of  Wood's  division  to  rest,  and  for 
Johnson's  to  form  a  little  retired  on  his  (Wood's)  left.  From 
the  position  now  occupied  by  the  troops,  woods  more  or  less 
open,  extended  up  to  the  enemy's  apparent  flank.  A  road 
skirted  the  woods  opposite  our  right,  running  perpendicular  to 
the  enemy's  lines.  Another  road  ran  obliquely  to  the  left  and 
in  rear  of  Johnson's  position.  McLean's  brigade  was  sent  to 
a  place  in  full  view  of  the  enemy's  works,  a  little  to  the  right 
of  the  point  of  attack,  with  a  view  to  attract  the  enemy's  at 
tention  and  draw  his  fire.  As  soon  as  everything  was  in  readi 
ness  at  about  5  p.  m.  General  Wood  commenced  his  advance, 
Hazen's  brigade  leading.  The  entire  column  marched  briskly 
forward,  driving  in  the  enemy's  sgirmishers,  and  vigorously 
assaulting  his  main  line.  Complaint  came  immediately  that 
the  supporting  column,  under  General  Johnson,  was  not  far 
enough  advanced.  General  Johnson  was  directed  to  push  for 
ward  a  brigade  to  Hazen's  left.  He  answered  that  he  would  do 
so,  and  that  it  would  soon  be  in  position.  General  Wood 
became  very  heavily  engaged,  so  as  to  necessitate  moving 
forward  his  supporting  lines,  and  he  found  strong  works 
in  his  front  except,  perhaps,  opposite  his  two  left  regi 
ments.  Colonel  Schribner,  who  commanded  General  John 
son's  advance  brigade,  finding  his  own  left  fired  into. 
from  across  Pickett's  Mills  Creek,  halted  and  threw  some 
troops  across  it  for  his  own  protection.  This  delay,  oc 
curring  at  precisely  the  same  time  with  Wood's  assault, 
was  unfortunte,  for  it  enabled  the  enemy,  with  his  re 
serve,  to  force  back  the  left  of  Wood's  line,  and  bring  an 
enfilading  and  reverse  fire  upon  his  troops.  Again,  by  some 
mistake  of  orders,  McLean's  troops  did  not  show  themselves 
to  the  enemy,  nor  open  any  fire  to  attract  his  attention  on 
Wood's  right,  so  that  the  enemy  was  able  to  pour  a  cross 
fire  of  artillery  and  musketry  into  his  right  flank.  Under  these 
circumstances,  it  soon  became  evident  that  the  assault  had 
failed,  and  that  the  troops  must  be  withdrawn  with  care,  in 
order  to  bring  off  our  wounded  and  to  prevent  a  successful 
sally  of  the  enemy,  from  his  works.  General  Johnson  formed 
his  troops  in  rear  of,  and  to  the  left  of  the  entire  position,  while 
General  Wood  carefully  withdrew  his  division,  and  formed 
on  a  ridge  farther  to  the  right.  General  McLean  having  been 
requested  to  push  farther  to  the  right,  in  order  to  make  con 
nection  with  the  rest  of  the  army,  disregarded  the  request  and 
moved  off  at  once  by  the  road,  leaving  these  two  divisions 


ADAIRSVILLE.  CASSVILLE,  PICKETT'S  MILL  459 

isolated.  He  (McLean)  alleged  in  excuse  that  his  men  were 
entirely  without  rations.  Our  losses  were  very  heavy,  being 
upward  of  1400  killed,  wounded  and  missing,  in  General 
Wood's  division  alone.  Though  the  assault  was  repulsed,  yet 
a  position  was  secured  near  Pickett's  Mills,  of  the  greatest 
importance  to  the  subsequent  movements  of  the  army,  and  it 
has  been  subsequently  ascertained  that  the  enemy  suffered 
immensely  in  the  action,  and  regarded  it  as  the  severest  attack 
made  during  the  campaign.  Johnson  and  Wood  made  strong 
intrenchments  during  the  night.1 

General  Wood,  in  his  official  report  describes  the  march 
through  the  woods,  to  find  the  enemy's  right  flank,  and  then 
says : 

"When  all  these  movements,  so  well  calculated  to  try  the 
physical  strength  of  the  men,  were  concluded,  and  the  point 
gained  from  which  it  was  believed  that  the  column  could 
move  directly  on  the  enemy's  flank,  the  day  was  well  spent. 
It  was  nearly  4  p.  m.  The  men  had  been  on  their  feet  since 
early  daylight,  and  of  course  were  much  worn.  The  column 
was  halted  a  few  moments  to  readjust  the  lines,  and  to  give 
the  men  a  brief  breathing  space,  and  to  give  the  division, 
which  was  to  protect  and  cover  the  left  flank  of  the  column, 
time  to  come  up  and  take  position.  At  4  p.  m.2  precisely  the 
order  was  given  to  attack,  and  the  column  with  its  front  well 
covered,  moved  forward.  And  never  have  troops  marched  to  a 
deadly  assault,  under  the  most  adverse  circumstances  with 
more  firmness,  with  more  truly  soldierly  bearing,  and  with 
more  distinguished  gallantry.  On,  on,  through  the  thickest 
jungle,  over  exceedingly  rough  and  broken  ground  and  ex 
posed  to  the  sharpest  direct  and  cross-fire  of  musketry  and 
artillery  on  both  flanks.  The  leading  brigade,  the  Second, 
moved  (followed  in  close  supporting  distance  by  the  other 
brigades)  right  up  to  the  enemy's  main  line  of  works.  Under 
the  unwavering  steadiness  of  the  advance,  the  fire  from  the 
enemy's  line  of  works  began  to  slacken  and  the  troops,  behind 
those  works,  first  began  perceptibly  to  waver  and  give  way, 
and  I  have  no  hesitation  in  saying  that  as  far  as  any  opposi 
tion,  directly  in  front  was  concerned,  though  that  was  terri 
ble  enough,  the  enemy's  strongly  fortified  position  would  have 
been  forced.  But  the  fire,  particularly  on  the  left  flank  of  the 
column  which  was  at  first  only  en  echarpe,  became  as  the  col 
umn  advanced  enfilading,  and  finally  took  the  first  line  of  the 
column  in  reverse. 

1  W.   R.   R.,   72-193-5. 

2  The   writer  thinks   it  was   a   half   hour   later,   though   General   Wood   was   usually 

very  accurate  in  his  statements. 


460  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

It  was  from  this  fire  that  the  supporting  and  covering  di 
vision  should  have  protected  the  assaulting  column,  but  it 
failed  to  do  so.  Under  such  a  fire  no  troops  could  maintain 
the  advantage  ground  which  had  been  gained,  and  the  lead 
ing  brigade,  which  had  driven  everything  in  its  front,  was 
compelled  to  fall  back  a  short  distance  to  secure  its  flanks, 
which  were  crumbling  away  under  the  severe  fire,  by  the  ir 
regularities  of  the  ground.  (It  is  proper  to  observe  here  that 
the  brigade  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  which  was  ordered  to 
take  post  so  as  to  cover  the  right  flank  of  the  assaulting  col 
umn,  by  some  mistake  failed  to  get  into  a  position  to  accom 
plish  this  purpose.)  From  the  position  taken  by  Hazen's 
brigade,  when  it  retired  a  short  distance  from  the  enemy's 
works,  it  kept  up  a  deadly  fire,  which  was  very  galling  to  the 
foe.  The  brigade  was  engaged  about  fifty  minutes.  It  had  ex 
pended  the  sixty  rounds  of  ammunition,  taken  into  action  on 
the  men's  persons.  It  had  suffered  terribly  in  killed  and 
wounded,  and  the  men  were  much  exhausted  by  the  furious- 
ness  of  the  assault.  Consequently  I  ordered  this  brigade  to  be 
relieved  by  the  First  Brigade,  Col.  William  H.  Gibson,  Forty- 
ninth  Ohio,  commanding.  So  soon  as  the  First  Brigade  had 
relieved  the  Second  Brigade,  I  ordered  Colonel  .Gibson  to  re 
new  the  assault.  I  hoped  that  with  the  shorter  distance  the 
brigade  would  have  to  move,  after  beginning  the  assault,  to 
reach  the  enemy's  works,  and  with  the  assistance  of  the  knowl 
edge  of  the  ground  which  had  been  gained,  a  second  effort 
might  be  more  successful  than  the  first  had  been.  I  also 
trusted  some  cover  had  been  provided  to  protect  the  left  flank 
of  the  column.  This  had  been  partially  but  by  no  means 
effectually  done.  At  the  signal  to  advance  the  First  Brigade 
dashed  handsomely  and  gallantly  forward  up  to  the  enemy's 
works.  Men  were  shot  down  at  the  very  base  of  the  parapet. 
But  again  the  terrible  fire  on  the  flanks,  and  especially  the 
enfilading  fire  from  the  left,  was  fatal  to  success.  In  addition 
the  enemy  had  brought  up  fresh  troops  and  greatly  strength 
ened  the  force  behind  his  intrenchments.  This  fact  had  been 
plainly  observed  by  our  troops,  and  was  subsequently  fully 
corroborated  by  prisoners.  The  First  Brigade,  after  getting  so 
near  to  the  enemy's  works,  and  after  almost  succeeding,  was 
compelled,  like  the  Second  Brigade,  to  fall  back  a  short  dis 
tance,  some  seventy  or  eighty  yards,  to  seek  shelter  under 
cover  of  the  irregularities  of  the  surface.  It  maintained  a 
sturdy  contest  with  the  enemy,  confining  him  to  his  works,  till 
its  ammunition  was  expended  *  *  *  The  First  Brigade 
had  suffered  very  severely  in  the  assault.  This  fact,  connected 


ADAIRSVILLE.  CASSVILLE,  PICKETT'S  MILL  461 

with  the  expenditure  of  its  ammunition,  induced  me  to  order 
this  brigade  to  be  relieved  by  the  Third  Brigade,  Colonel 
Knefler,  Seventy-ninth  Indiana,  commanding.  Colonel  Knef- 
ler  was  simply  ordered  to  relieve  the  First  Brigade  and  hold 
the  ground  without  renewing  the  assault.  The  purpose  of 
holding  the  ground  was  to  cover  bringing  off  the  dead 
and  wounded.  Colonel  Knefler's  brigade  at  once  engaged 
the  enemy  sharply  and  confined  him  to  his  works.  This 
was  a  work  of  much  difficulty.  The  ground  was  unfavor 
able  for  the  use  of  stretchers,  darkness  was  coming  on 
apace,  and  the  whole  had  to  be  done  under  the  fire  of 
the  enemy.  Of  course,  under  such  circumstances  the  work 
could  not  be  done  with  that  completeness  so  desirable,  and 
subsequent  evacuation  of  the  enemy  showed,  from  the  numer 
ous  graves  outside  his  lines,  that  many  who  were  at  first  re 
ported  missing  were  killed.  When  the  Second  Brigade  was 
relieved  by  the  First  Brigade,  a  portion  of  the  former  retained 
their  position  near  the  enemy's  works.  So  also  when  the  First 
Brigade  was  relieved  by  the  Third  Brigade,  a  portion  of  the 
former  held  on  near  to  the  enemy's  works.  These  gallant 
officers  and  soldiers  remained  on  the  field  bravely  keeping  up 
the  conflict  till  the  Third  Brigade  was  dra\vn  off  at  10  p.  m. 
About  10  p.  m.  the  enemy,  rushing  over  his  works,  pressed 
forward  rapidly,  with  demoniac  yells  and  shouts,  on  Colonel 
Knefler's  Brigade.  In  the  long  conflict  which  the  brigade  had 
kept  up,  it  had  expended  its  ammunition  to  within  the  last 
two  or  three  rounds.  Reserving  its  fire  till  the  advancing  foe 
was  only  some  fifteen  paces  distant,  the  Brigade  poured  in  a 
terrible  and  destructive  volley,  and  was  then  handsomely  and 
skillfully  withdrawn,  with  the  portions  of  the  other  brigades 
that  had  remained  on  the  field.  The  enemy  was  brought  to 
a  dead  halt  by  the  last  volley.  Not  the  slightest  pursuit  was 
attempted.  This  ended  the  bloody  conflict.  It  was  opened 
precisely  at  4  :30  p.  m.  and  raged  in  the  height  of  its  fury  till 
7  p.  m.  From  this  hour  till  10  p.  m.  the  conflict  was  still  kept 
up,  but  not  with  the  unabated  fury  and  severity  of  the  first 
two  and  a  half  hours  of  its  duration.  Fourteen  hundred  and 
fifty-seven  officers  and  men1  were  placed  hors  du  combat  in 
the  action.  It  may  be  truly  said  of  it,  that  it  was  the  best 
sustained  and  altogether  the  fiercest  and  most  vigorous  assault 
that  was  made  on  the  enemy's  intrenched  positions  during 
the  entire  campaign.  The  attack  was  made  under  circum 
stances  well  calculated  to  task  the  courage  and  prove  the  man 
hood  of  the  troops.  They  had  made  a  long  and  fatiguing 

1     The  number  was  12  more.     See  W.  R.  R.,  72-393. 


462  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

march  of  several  hours'  duration,  on  that  day  immediately 
preceding  the  attack.  The  assault  was  made  without  any  as 
sistance  or  cover  whatever  from  our  artillery,  as  not  a  single 
piece  could  be  carried  with  us,  on  a  strongly-intrenched  posi 
tion,  held  by  veteran  troops  and  defended  by  a  heavy  fire  of 
musketry  and  artillery.  Yet  at  the  command,  the  troops,  un 
der  all  these  adverse  circumstances,  moved  to  the  assault  with 
a  cheerful  manliness  and  steadiness — more,  warming  up  with 
the  advance,  moved  with  a  gallantry  and  dash  that  nearly 
made  the  effort  a  complete  success.  After  the  troops  had  all 
been  drawn  off  and  between  10  o'clock  in  the  evening  and  '<? 
o'clock  of  the  following  morning  the  entire  division  \vas  com 
fortably  encamped,  and  by  daylight  was  securely  intrenched."1 

This  latter  precaution,  General  Wood  says,  was  to  guard 
against  a  sudden  attack  by  overwhelming  numbers,  as  we  were 
in  a  measure  isolated  from  the  greater  part  of  the  army.  Gen 
eral  Wood  afterwards  reported  that  he  had  twice  visited  the 
battlefield  of  Picket's  Mill,  after  its  evacuation  by  the  enemy, 
and  examined  it  closely.  That  the  numerous  single  graves  and 
several  lines  of  trenches,  capable  of  containing  from  twenty- 
five  to  forty  bodies,  on  the  battlefield  outside  the  enemy's  in- 
trenchments,  explain  where  most  of  the  255  missing  on  that 
day  went  to,  and  adds  that  the  enemy  have  never  pretended 
they  made  any  material  capture  of  prisoners.2 

Colonel  Charles  T  .Hotchkiss,  of  the  Eighty-ninth  Illinois, 
who  made  the  report  of  the  movements  of  our  brigade  in  this 
action,  says,  that  when  the  movement  to  find  and  turn  the 
enemy's  right  flank  \vas  begun,  the  brigade  was  formed  in  two 
lines,  with  the  Eighty-ninth  Illinois  on  the  right,  the  Thirty- 
second  Indiana  on  the  left  and  the  Fifteenth  Wisconsin  in  the 
center  of  the  first  line ;  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  on  the  right,  the 
Forty-ninth  Ohio  on  the  left  and  the  35th  Illinois  in  the  center 
of  the  second  line,  and  that,  closely  following  Hazen's  bri 
gade,  we  arrived  at  a  point  near  Pickett's  Mill  about  2  :30  p.  m. 
and  found  the  enemy  in  considerable  force  protected  by  barri 
cades,  hastily  but  strongly  built  of  logs  on  the  crest  of  a  con 
siderable  ridge  and  supported  by  artillery,  planted  so  as  to 
enfilade  the  approaches  and  ravines  in  his  immediate  front, 
over  and  through  which  a  force  attempting  to  dislodge  him 
would  have  to  pass.  He  then  adds : 

"About  4  p.  m.  Hazen's  brigade  gallantly  charged  close 
up  to  the  enemy's  works,  but  being  unable  to  carry  them,  in 
obedience  to  orders,  the  first  line  of  this  (our)  brigade,  closely 
followed  by  the  second  line,  moved  forward  in  fine  style  and 

1     W.   R.   R.,   72-377  to  380. 
•2     W.  R.  R.,  72-387. 


ADAIRSMLLE.  CASSVILLE,  PICKETT'S  MILL  463 

with  its  accustomed  dash  to  his  support,  and  we,  in  turn,  by 
a  portion  of  Knefler's  brigade,  but  the  enemy  being  unex 
pectedly  found  in  force,  comprising,  according  to  his  own 
statement,  the  veteran  troops  of  both  Cleburne's  and  Bate's 
divisions  it  was  impossible  to  dislodge  him.  Our  troops,  how 
ever,  stubbornly  maintained  their  position,  close  up  to  his 
works,  in  some  places  we  occupying  one  side  of  his  barricade 
and  he  the  other,  giving  an  effective  fire,  and  receiving  in  re 
turn  a  heavy  direct  and  enfilading  musketry  and  artillery  fire, 
until  dark,  when  our  troops,  under  orders  fell  back.  This  bri 
gade  being  withdrawn  about  8  p.  m.  moved  about  400  yards 
to  the  right,  taking  and  strongly  intrenching  a  position  about 
250  yards  from  the  enemy's  works,  connecting  on  the  right 
with  Knefler's  brigade,  and  on  the  left  with  Hazen's  brigade, 
our  front  being  a  little  west  of  south.  On  account  of  the  con 
stant  and  effective  firing  of  the  enemy,  we  were  unable  to  bury 
our  dead,  and  part  of  our  wounded  fell  into  his  hands,  to 
gether  with  a  considerable  number  of  prisoners,  who  were  en 
deavoring  during  the  darkness  of  the  night,  to  remove  our 
wounded.  Our  casualties  were  very  large,  being, 

killed  105,  wounded  484,  missing  114.     Total  703."] 

Colonel  Askew,  who  reported  officially  the  part  our  regi 
ment  took  in  the  action  says : 

"In  the  battle  of  Pickett's  Mills,  on  the  2Uh  of  May,  we 
occupied,  as  I  understand  it,  the  right  of  the  second  line  of  the 
brigade,  in  the  rear  of  the  Eighty-ninth  Illinois.  Upon  mov 
ing  to  the  position  to  attack,  about  5  p.  m.  the  right  wing  of 
the  regiment  emerged  from  woods,  into  an  open  field,  directly 
in  front  of  the  position  of  the  enemy,  who  immediately  opened 
on  us  from  a  battery  to  our  front  and  right.  I  immediately 
threw  out  Company  A,  Lieutenant  Hanson,  as  skirmishers  to 
cover  that  part  of  our  front  and  right  flank,  and  sent  word  to 
Colonel  Wallace,  who  was  near  the  left  of  the  regiment,  that 
our  right  was  thrown  out  into  an  open  field  with  none  of  our 
troops  in  front,  and  nothing  connecting  with  our  right  to  pro 
tect  us  from  an  attack,  in  that  direction,  and  that  the  enemy 
was  strongly  posed  in  a  line  of  works  on  the  farther  edge  of 
the  open  field,  on  rising  ground  from  us  and  apparently  en 
veloping  our  right  flank.  We  soon  received  orders  from 
Colonel  Gibson,  commanding  the  brigade,  to  refuse  our  regi 
ment  to  protect  the  right  flank.  This  disposition  was  partly 
made  when  the  line  was  ordered  forward.  In  the  advance  the 
regiment  was  thrown  into  some  confusion,  as  we  were  moving 
by  the  left  flank,  at  the  time  the  order  to  advance  came,  and 

1     W.   R.   R.,   72-392-393. 


464  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

by  some  means  or  other,  to  me  unknown,  the  line  was  broken 
near  the  center,  and  in  moving  forward  the  right  wing,  with 
the  exception  of  Company  A,  moved  in  such  a  direction,  that 
it  came  to  the  attack  to  the  left  of  the  left  wing  of  the  regi 
ment.  Upon  receiving  the  order,  however,  the  men  moved 
forward  with  spirit  and  determination  under  a  terrible  fire 
from  the  artillery  and  small  arms  of  the  enemy  posted  behind 
their  works.  The  fire  was  so  hot  and  well  directed  and  deci 
mated  our  ranks  so  rapidly,  that  that  the  advance  was  checked 
within  a  short  distance  of  the  enemy's  works,  where  we 
were  compelled  to  seek  such  shelter  from  the  storm  of 
shot  as  the  nature  of  the  ground  acorded.  It  soon  be 
came  evident  that  the  attack  had  failed,  and  the  recall 
was  sounded,  by  the  brigade  bugle,  about  6  p.  m.  As 
I  could  not  find  Colonel  Wallace  on  the  field  (I  learned 
afterward  that  he  had  been  injured  by  a  fall,  and  had 
gone  or  been  taken  off)  I  did  not  think  it  prudent  to  withdraw 
then,  as  it  was  still  daylight,  and  an  attempt  to  withdraw  then 
would  have  exposed  us  to  great  risks ;  besides  we  would  have 
been  compelled  to  leave  nearly  all  our  wounded  in  the  hands 
of  the  enemy.  I  waited  until  dark,  then  sent  out  parties  to 
gather  up  the  wounded,  and  carry  them  to  the  rear.  After 
we  had  carried  off  all  we  could  find,  we  quietly  withdrew  and 
joined  the  brigade.  Our  loss  in  this  battle  was  Captain  Upde- 
grove,  Company  H,  severely  wounded  ;  Lieutenant  Davis,  Com 
pany  C,  wounded  in  foot;  Lieutenant  Leiter,  Company  I,  lost 
right  hand ;  Color  Sergeant  Ambers  Norton,  Company  D, 
was  killed,  and  five  of  the  color  guard  successively  killed  or 
wounded,  with  the  colors.  They  were  finally  brought  off  by 
Sergeant  David  D.  Hart  of  Company  I,  then  one  of  the  color 
guard.  Our  loss  of  enlisted  men,  including  these,  was  19 
killed,  61  wounded  and  19  missing.  The  missing  were  mostly 
wounded,  whom  we  were  unable  to  find  in  the  darkness." 

General  Cleburne  and  General  Joseph  Wheeler  are  the 
only  officers  on  the  Confederate  side  whose  reports  of  the  en 
gagement  are  at  hand.  General  Cleburne  says  that  at  2  or  3 
o'clock  on  the  26th  of  May  his  division  arrived  on  the  extreme 
right  of  the  Confederate  line,  where  he  was  sent  to  support 
General  Hindman,  that  at  that  point  their  lines,  which  had  a 
general  bearing  of  North  and  South,  retired  for  a  few  yards  to 
the  east.  That  on  the  continuation  of  this  line  he  placed  Folk's 
brigade  of  his  division  in  and  diagonally  across  it  upon  a 
ridge ;  that  on  Folk's  right  he  placed  Hotchkiss'  artillery,  con 
sisting  of  four  Napoleons,  four  Parrott  guns  and  four  howit 
zers,  and  that  supporting  Hotchkiss  on  the  right,  was  one 


ADAIRSVILLE.  CASSMLLE,  PICKETT'S  MILL  465 

regiment  of  Govan's  brigade,  and  that  the  remainder  of  his 
division  (consisting  of  eight  regiments  of  Govan's  brigade, 
Lowrey's  brigade  of  five  regiments  and  Granbury's  brigade  of 
eight  regiments),  were  disposed  in  rear  as  a  second  line  in 
support  of  Hindman's  right  brigades  and  his  own  front  line, 
and  that  intre'nchments  were  thrown  up  in  the  afternoon  of 
the  26th  and  on  the  morning  of  the  27th.  That  the  position  in 
the  main  was  covered  with  trees  and  undergrowth,  which 
served  as  a  screen  along  their  lines,  concealed  them,  and  were 
left  standing  for  that  purpose.  He  then  states  that  on  the 
morning  of  the  27th  at  about  7  o'clock  he  sent  Govan's  bri 
gade  to  the  north  front  on  a  reconnoissance  with  directions 
to  swing  to  the  left  in  his  advance.  That  while  on  this  recon 
noissance  Govan,  from  time  to  time,  sent  him  word  that  the  en 
emy  was  moving  to  the  right — his  own  left.  That  at  11  a.  m. 
Govan  came  in,  leaving  his  skirmishers  about  three-quarters 
of  a  mile  in  front,  and  that  he  placed  him  on  the  right  of  Polk, 
where  he  covered  himself  in  rifle  pits.  He  then  adds  : 

"About  -i  p.  m.  hearing  that  the  enemy's  infantry  in  line  of 
battle  were  pressing  the  cavalry  (Wheeler's)  on  my  right 
(they  had  already  driven  in  my  skirmishers)  I  placed  Gran- 
bury  on  Govan's  right.  He  but  had  just  gotten  into  position, 
and  a  dismounted  cavalry  force,  in  line  behind  a  few  discon 
nected  heaps  of  stones  loosely  piled  together  had  passed  be 
hind  him,  when  the  enemy  advanced.  He  showed  himself 
first — in  the  edge  of  an  open  field  in  front  of  Govan,  about  400 
yards  across,  where  he  halted  and  opened  fire.  From  a  point 
on  the  ridge  where  Govan's  right  and  Granbury's  left  met, 
there  made  off  a  spur,  which  at  about  100  yards  from  it  turned 
sharply  to  the  northeast,  running  then  in  a  direction  almost 
parallel  with  it  (the  ridge)  and  maintaining  about  an  equal 
elevation.  Between  this  spur  and  the  parent  ridge,  beginning 
in  front  of  Granbury's  left  was  a  deep  ravine,  the  side  of  which 
next  to  Granbury's  was  very  steep,  with  occasional  benches 
of  rock  up  to  a  line  within  thirty  or  forty  yards  of  Granbury's 
men,  where  it  flattened  into  a  natural  glacis.  This  glacis  was 
well  covered  with  well-grown  trees  and  in  most  places  with 
thick  undergrowth.  Here  was  the  brunt  of  the  battle,  the 
enemy  advancing  along  this  front  in  numerous  and  constantly 
reinforced  lines.  His  men  displayed  a  courage  worthy  of  an 
honorable  cause,  pressing  in  steady  throngs  within  a  few  paces 
of  our  men,  frequently  exclaiming,  'Ah !  damn  you,  we  have 
caught  you  without  your  logs.'  Now,  Granbury's  men,  need 
ing  no  logs,  were  awaiting  them,  and  throughout  awaited  them 
with  calm  determination,  and  as  they  appeared  upon  the  slope 


466  FlB'TEENTH    OHIO    VOLUNTEERS    AND    CAMPAIGNS 

slaughtered  them  with  deliberate  aim.  The  piles  of  the  dead 
on  this  front,  pronounced  by  the  officers  in  this  army  who  have 
seen  most  service  to  be  greater  than  they  had  ever  seen  be 
fore,  were  a  silent  but  sufficient  eulogy  upon  Granbury  and  his 
noble  Texans.  In  the  great  execution  here  done  upon  the 
enemy,  Govan,  with  his  two  right  regiments,  disdaining  the 
enemy  in  his  own  front,  who  were  somewhat  removed,  and 
Key  with  two  pieces  of  artillery  ran  by  hand  by  my  order  to  a 
convenient  breach  in  our  breast  works,  materially  aided  Gran- 
bury  by  a  right  oblique  fire  which  enfiladed  the  masses  in  his 
front.  In  front  of  a  prolongation  of  Granbury's  line  and  abut 
ting  upon  his  right  was  a  field  about  300  yards  square.  The 
enemy  driving  back  some  cavalry  at  this  point,  advanced  com 
pletely  across  the  field  and  passed  some  forty  or  fifty  yards 
in  its  rear.  Here,  however,  they  were  confronted  by  the 
Eighth  and  Nineteenth  Arkansas  (consolidated),  commanded 
by  Colonel  Baucum  hastily  sent  by  Govan  upon  Granbury's 
request  and  representation  of  the  exigency.  In  a  sweeping 
charge  Baucum  drove  the  enemy  from  the  ridge  in  his  front, 
and  with  irresistible  impetuosity  forced  him  across  the  field 
and  back  into  the  woods  from  which  he  had  at  first  advanced. 
Here  he  (Baucum)  fixed  himself  and  kept  up  a  heavy  fire, 
aided  by  a  deadly  enfilade  from  the  bottom  of  the  ravine  in 
front  of  Granbury.  When  Baucum  was  about  to  charge, 
Lowrey  of  my  division,  who  had  been  hastened  up  from  his 
distant  position  up\vard  of  a  mile  and  a  half  from  my  right  as 
finally  established,  came  into  line,  throwing  his  regiments  in 
successively  as  they  unmasked  themselves  by  their  flank 
march.  His  arrival  was  most  opportune,  as  the  enemy  was  be 
ginning  to  pour  around  Baucum's  right.  Colonel  Adams  with 
the  Thirty-third  Alabama,  which  was  the  first  of  Lowrey's 
regiments  to  form  into  line,  took  position  on  Baucum's  right 
and  advanced  with  him,  his  seven  left  companies  being  in  the 
field  with  Baucum  and  his  four  others  in  the  \voods  to  the 
right.  Baucum  and  Adams,  finding  themselves  suffering  from 
the  enemy's  direct  and  oblique  fire,  withdrew,  passing  over 
the  open  space  of  the  field  behind  them.  The  right  companies 
of  Adams,  which  were  in  the  woods,  retired  to  a  spur,  which 
rises  from  the  easterly  edge  of  the  field,  about  200  yards  from 
its  southerly  edge,  where  Baucum's  and  Adam's  left  companies 
rested.  Here  they  halted,  Captain  Dodson  with  fine  judgment, 
perceiving  the  importance  of  the  position — it  would  have 
given  the  enemy  an  enfilading  fire  on  Granbury,  which  would 
have  dislodged  him — and  making  his  company  the  basis  of 
alignment  for  the  remainder  of  Lowrey's,  now  coming  into 


ADATRSVILLE.  CASSVILLE,  PICKETT'S  MILL  467 

position.  This  retrograde  movement  across  the  field  was  not 
attended  with  loss,  as  might  have  been  expected,  the  enemy 
not  advancing  as  it  was  made.  It  was  mistaken,  however,  for 
a  repulse  and  some  of  my  staff  officers  hearing  that  my  line 
had  broken,  hastened  forward  Quarle's  brigade  of  Stewart's 
division,  just  then  providentially  sent  up  by  General  Hood 
to  re-establish  it.  Lowrey,  being  under  the  same  impression, 
detached  his  two  right  regiments  (which  had  not  been  en 
gaged)  under  Colonels  Tison  and  Hardcastle,  and  had  them 
quickly  formed  in  support  of  Baucum  and  Adams.  The  error, 
however,  was  soon  discovered  and  my  line  being  ascertained  to 
remain  in  its  integrity,  Quarle's  brigade  was  conducted  to  the 
rear  of  Lowrey  and  formed  as  a  second  line.  The  Fourth 
Louisiana,  Colonel  Hunter,  finding  itself  opposite  an  interval 
between  the  two  regiments  of  Lo\vrey's  line(  caused  by  Bau- 
cum's  resting  closer  upon  Granbury  on  his  return  from  the 
advance  than  he  had  done  at  first)  under  the  immediate  super 
intendence  of  General  Quarles,  advanced  with  great  spirit  into 
the  field,  halted  and  delivered  a  very  effective  fire  on  the 
enemy  in  his  front.  After  some  minutes  Quarles  withdrew 
this  regiment,  and  formed  it  behind  the  field,  where  they  con 
tinued  their  fire  across  it.  *  *  *  During  these  movements 
the  battle  continued  to  rage  on  Granbury's  front,  and  was  met 
with  unflagging  spirit.  About  the  time  of  Quarles  getting 
into  position  night  came  on,  when  the  combat  lulled.  For 
some  hours  afterwards  a  desultory  dropping  fire,  with  short 
vehement  bursts  of  musketry,  continued,  the  enemy  lying  in 
great  numbers  immediately  in  front  of  portions  of  my  line,  and 
so  near  it  that  their  footsteps  could  be  distinctly  heard.  About 
10  p.  in.  1  ordered  Granbury  and  Lowrey  to  push  forward 
skirmishers  and  scouts,  to  learn  the  state  of  things  in  their 
respective  fronts.  Granbury,  finding  it  impossible  to  advance 
his  skirmishers  until  he  had  cleared  his  front  of  the  enemy  ly 
ing  up  against  it,  with  my  consent,  charged  with  his  whole 
line.  Wathall,  with  his  brigade  of  Hindman's  division,  whom 
I  sent  to  his  support,  taking  his  place  in  line  as  he  stepped  out 
of  it.  The  Texans,  their  bayonets  fixed,  plunged  into  the  dark 
ness,  with  a  terrific  yell  and  with  one  bound  were  upon  the 
enemy,  but  they  met  with  no  resistence.  Surprised  and  panic- 
stricken,  many  fled,  escaping  in  the  darkness,  others  sur 
rendered  and  were  brought  into  our  lines  *  *  *  During 
the  progress  of  the  battle  much  service  was  rendered  by  the 
rifle  battery  and  the  two  remaining  howitzers  of  Key's  battery, 
in  position  on  Folk's  right.  They  were  trained  in  enfilade 
upon  the  enemy's  reserves  massed  behind  the  hill,  in  front  of 


468  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

the  spur  we  occupied.  I  regretted  I  did  not  have  more  guns 
for  this  service.  I  had  sent  the  Napoleon  guns  to  the  right, 
where  they  were  unable  to  find  positions,  and  so  were  useless. 
During  these  operations,  Polk  was  not  engaged,  but  it  was  a 
source  of  strength  and  confidence  to  the  rest  of  the  division  to 
know  that  he  had  charge  of  the  weakest  and  most  delicate 
part  of  our  lines."1  Cleburne  gives  his  losses  as  85  killed,  363 
wounded,  and  states  that  they  took  160  of  our  men  prisoners. 
He  closes  his  report  by  saying :  "This  battle  was  fought  at  a 
place  known  as  the  'Pickett  Settlement/  and  about  two  miles 
northeast  of  New  Hope  Church."2 

From  General  Cleburne's  report  we  learn  that  we  were 
confronted  at  the  beginning  by  the  four  brigades  of  his  own 
division,  and  Hotchkiss's  artillery — four  Napoleon  guns,  four 
Parrot  guns  and  four  Howitzers,  and  that  during  the  engage 
ment,  he  was  reinforced  by  Quarle's  brigade  of  Stewart's  divi 
sion,  and  Walthall's  brigade  of  Hindman's  division.  General 
Cleburne,  of  course,  only  reports  concerning  the  movements 
and  action  of  his  own  division  and  of  the  troops  of  Stewart's 
and  Hindman's  divisions  sent  to  his  support,  and  one  gets  the 
impression  from  reading  it  that  these  were  the  only  Confed 
erate  troops  actively  engaged  in  the  battle.  But  from  the  re 
port  of  General  Joseph  Wheeler,  commanding  the  cavalry 
corps  of  General  Johnston's  army,  we  learn  that  his  troops  had 
quite  an  important  part  in  the  engagement.  From  this  report 
it  appears  that  almost  the  entire  cavalry  force  of  the  enemy 
was  on  its  right  and  covering  its  right  flank,  and  that  a  portion 
of  it  was  actively  engaged  in  the  action.  He  says : 

"May  27,  General  Cleburne's  division  of  infantry,  having 
been  formed  on  the  right  of  our  infantry  line,  I  placed  portions 
of  Hannon's  and  Allen's  small  cavalry  brigades  of  Kelley's 
division  upon  General  Cleburne's  right  flank.  They  were  dis 
mounted  and  intrenchments  thrown  up  extending  on  the  pro 
longation  of  General  Cleburne's  line,  for  a  distance  of  about 
800  yards.  The  enemy  having,  during  the  morning  and  the 
preceding  day,  made  several  attacks  on  the  pickets  on  the 
Burnt  Hickory  road,  I  had  placed  General  Martin's  command 
in  position  to  oppose  the  enemy,  who  were  menacing  that 
point,  leaving  a  space  of  about  two  miles  between  General 
Martin's  left  and  General  Kelley's  right,  which  was  filled  by  a 
line  of  skirmishers  from  General  Humes'  command,  which  was 
held  in  reserve  to  move  to  any  point  which  might  be  attacked. 
About  3  o'clock  this  line  of  skirmishers  was  driven  in  by  a 
force  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  advancing  up  Pumpkin  Vine 

1  W.   R.   R.,   74-724-6. 

2  W.  R.  R.,  74-725-726. 


ADAIRSVILLE,  CASSVILLE,  PICKETT'S  MILL  469 

Creek  by  Widow  Pickett's  house.  I  immediately  galloped  to 
this  point  and  found  a  squadron  moving  by  General  Hume's 
direction,  to  reinforce  the  picket.  On  arriving  at  the  creek 
I  soon  observed  that  a  considerable  force  of  infantry  was  be 
fore  us,  and  I  directed  General  Humes  to  bring  one  brigade 
(dismounted)  to  that  point,  and  to  prolong  his  other  brigade 
upon  its  right  to  fill  the  gap  between  said  position  and  General 
Martin's  left.  These  dispositions  were  made  under  a  warm 
fire  from  the  enemy.  At  this  moment  I  received  information 
that  General  Martin's  line  was  being  attacked,  and  at  the  same 
time  that  Granbury's  brigade  of  infantry  was  moving  up  to 
relieve  General  Kelley,  whom  I  ordered  to  move  to  the  right 
and  close  upon  General  Humes.  While  making  this  move 
ment  and  before  it  was  completed,  the  enemy  moved  a  column 
up  a  ravine,  between  Kelley's  right  and  Hume's  left.  I  or 
dered  a  regiment  from  Humes'  to  oppose  them,  which  was 
promptly  placed  in  position,  but  finding  it  was  warmly 
pressed,  General  Humes  reinforced  it  with  another  regiment 
from  his  command.  While  this  movement  was  going  on, 
Hazen's  Federal  infantry  brigade  charged  our  line,  but  was 
repulsed  by  a  counter  charge  of  Humes'  and  Kelley's  com 
mands. 

My  command  captured  32  prisoners,  including  one  com 
missioned  officer,  whom  they  turned  over  to  Lowrey's  infantry 
brigade,  which  was  just  forming  to  their  right  to  relieve  Gen 
eral  Humes'  command.  On  the  arrival  of  General  Lowrey's 
brigade.  General  Humes  moved  to  the  right  in  front  of  the 
temporary  breast  works  thrown  up  during  the  engagement. 
Ouarle's  brigade  also  reported  to  me  during  the  fight,  but  too 
late  to  join  in  the  action.  The  enemy  we  fought  proved  to  be 
General  Wood's  division  of  Howard's  corps,  General  Howard 
having  moved  to  that  position  to  turn  our  right  flank."1 

General  Wheeler  reports  the  losses  in  Kelley's  and 
Humes'  divisions  between  May  6  and  May  31,  at  52  killed, 
242  wounded  and  33  missing,2  and  it  is  probable  that  a  consid 
erable  part  of  such  losses  occurred  in  the  engagement  at 
Pickett's  Mill. 

General  Cleburne's  and  General  Wheeler's  reports  were 
made  respectively  on  May  30  and  June  1,  within  three  or  four 
days  after  the  engagement,  and  the  reports  of  our  corps,  divi 
sion,  brigade  and  regimental  commanders,  not  until  in  Sep 
tember,  after  the  close  of  the  Atlanta  campaign.  The  lapse 
of  nearly  four  months,  between  the  engagement  and  the  date 
of  our  officers'  official  reports,  which  were  filled  by  other  im- 


1      W.  R.  R.  74-048. 
•2     W.  R.  R.   74-049. 


470  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

portant  movements  and  battles,  may  in  part  account  for  their 
apparent  conflicts. 

We  are  indebted  to  the  report  of  General  Cleburne  for  the 
clearest  and  most  satisfactory  description  of  the  enemy's  posi 
tion  and  the  general  lay  of  the  ground  we  fought  over. 

It  is  clear  from  an  examination  of  these  reports  that  the 
enemy  knew  of  our  movement  to  attack  and  turn  his  right 
flank  as  early  as  11  o'clock  that  morning  and  had  made  prepa 
rations  for  it.  It  is  also  clear  that  his  position  and  probable 
strength  had  not  been  ascertained  by  our  corps  and  division 
commanders  when  they  ordered  the  attack.  It  is  also  made 
plain  that  the  troops  which  were  expected  to  support  our  divi 
sion,  on  the  right  and  left  flanks,  did  not  do  -so,  and  that  we 
were  recklessly  sent  against  a  concealed  enemy  of  unknown 
numbers  and  strength  behind  intrenchments,  prepared  to  meet 
us  at  a  point  wrhere  we  were  subjected  to  a  murderous  direct 
fire  of  musketry  and  an  equally  murderous  cross-fire  of  ar 
tillery  from  our  right  flank.  It  is  also  clear  that  we  were  piled 
into  the  ravine  in  front  of  Granbury's  line,  brigade  after 
brigade,  line  upon  line,  and  that  once  in,  it  was  as  disastrous  to 
fall  back,  as  it  had  been  to  advance,  until  the  darkness  cov 
ered  us.  It  is  also  apparent  that  all  efforts  on  the  part  of  our 
corps  commander,  after  we  had  made  the  assault,  to  relieve 
us  from  the  enfilading  fire  on  the  right  and  left  absolutely 
failed.  Johnson's  division,  which  was  to  come  up  on  our  left, 
was  kept  back  by  Wheeler's  dismounted  cavalry,  and  General 
McLean's  brigade  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  which,  according 
to  General  Howard,  was  to  engage  the  enemy's  attention  on 
our  right  flank,  did  absolutely  nothing. 

It  is  painful  to  reflect  that  the  ordinary  precautions  us 
ually  preceding  such  an  assault  were  neglected,  and  that  after 
it  failed  there  were  no  troops  in  close  enough  support  to  re 
trieve  the  disaster.  Even  when  our  division  was  formed  late 
at  night  in  the  woods,  in  momentary  expectation  of  a  sortie 
by  overwhelming  numbers  of  the  enemy  and  we  were  isolated 
from  the  rest  of  the  enemy,  General  McLean,  on  being  re 
quested  to  form  his  brigade  on  our  right,  refused  to  do  so  and 
marched  to  the  rear,  his  only  excuse  being  that  his  men  were 
out  of  rations.1 

General  Wood's  report,  above  quoted  from,  describes  the 
assault  as  having  been  made  with  orderly  precision,  and  states 
that  General  Hazen's  brigade  first  became  engaged,  fought  for 
fifty  minutes  and  then  was'  relieved  by  our  brigade ;  that  we 
renewed  the  assault  and  having  also  failed,  were  in  turn  re- 

1     General   Howard's  report,  W.   R.   R.,   72-195. 


ADAIKSVILLE,  CASSVILLE,  PICKETT'S  MILL  471 

lieved  by  Knefler's  brigade.  The  reports  of  brigade  com 
manders  and  officers  who  were  on  the  firing  line,  and  the  recol 
lection  of  those  who  actively  participated  in  the  engagement, 
do  not  confirm  General  Wood's  statements,  but  show,  to  the 
contrary,  that  our  brigade  and  General  Knefler's  brigade  were 
thrown  after  each  other  in  quick  succession,  following  General 
Hazen's  brigade,  into  that  awful  ravine.  According  to 
General  Cleburne's  report,  our  troops  showed  themselves 
first  in  front  of  General  Govan,  in  an  open  field  about 
-iOO  yards  across,  and  opened  fire.1  These  troops  were 
undoubtedly  the  companies  of  our  regiment,  which  re 
ceived  the  first  fire  from  the  enemy's  artillery,  as  before 
described,  and  it  was  shortly  after  this,  that  we  heard 
the  terrific  firing  which  told  us  of  Hazen's  charge.  It 
was  only  a  very  few  minutes,  almost  immediately  after 
Hazen's  charge,  that  our  brigade  also  charged.  That  spur, 
running  sharply  to  the  northeast  from  the  point  where  the 
lines  of  Govan  and  Granbury  met,  and  then  continued 
parallel  to  the  ridge  where  the  main  line  of  the  enemy,  was 
formed,  was  a  natural  flank  protection  to  the  enemy,  made 
doubly  efficient  by  the  deep  ravine  in  front  of  it.  The  twelve 
guns  of  Hotchkiss's  artillery,  posted  just  on  Govan's  left, 
swept  its  front  from  the  enemy's  left,  and  Wheeler's  dis 
mounted  cavalry  swept  it  from  their  right.  There,  just  in 
front  of  Granbury's  line  on  the  edge  of  the  ravine, 
covered  by  a  thick  growth  of  large  trees  and  undergrowth, 
concealing  his  men,  was  that  natural  "glacis,"  over  which 
our  men  had  to  pass  to  reach  his  position.  Here  was 
the  great  slaughter,  as  our  men  were  shot  down  by  the  con 
cealed  foe  the  moment  they  appeared  upon  this  glacis.  The 
grim  satisfaction  with  which  General  Cleburne  describes  the 
piles  of  our  dead  in  front  of  Granbury's  line,  "pronounced  by 
the  officers  of  his  army  to  be  greater  than  any  had  ever  seen 
before"  and  his  regret  that  he  did  not  have  more  rifled  cannon, 
in  addition  to  his  four  Parrotts  and  four  Howitzers,  with 
which  to  enfilade  our  lines  and  kill  our  men  in  Granbury's 
front,  add  new  horrors  to  the  recollections  of  that  terrible 
clay.  The  reports  above  quoted  from  show  prompt,  cordial 
and  vigorous  co-operation  among  the  different  commands  of 
the  enemy's  army  and  a  painful  lack  of  it  among  our  troops. 
After  the  engagement  there  was  a  disposition  to  blame  some 
one  for  our  disaster,  and  the  blame  was  in  some  instances 
wrongly  placed.  General  Hazen  tries  to  make  it  appear 

1      W.  R.  R.  74-724. 


472  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

that  he  was  not  properly  supported  by  our  brigade.  He  says 
in  his  official  report,1  that  it  was  forty  minutes  after  begin 
ning  the  attack,  when  he  met,  for  the  first  time,  the  troops 
of  the  line  in  his  rear.  He  also  says,  "I  will  here  say,  that  the 
Thirty-second  Indiana,  the  first  regiment  I  saw  coming  to  my 
support,  did  so  in  detached  fragments,  and  not  as  a  regiment. 
None  of  the  other  troops,  except  about  50  men  of  the  Forty- 
ninth  Ohio,  advanced  as  far  as  my  lines  during  their  desperate 
and  unsupported  battle."  If  General  Hazen  had  taken  the 
pains  to  learn  the  real  position  and  conduct  of  the  troops  of 
our  brigade  (and  he  had  ample  time  to  do  so,  as  his  report 
was  not  made  until  September  15,  1864),  he  would  never  have 
written  this  libel  on  the  Thirty-second  Indiana  and  Forty- 
ninth  Ohio  and  the  other  troops  of  our  brigade.  If  he  had 
done  so,  he  would  have  learned  that  the  Thirty-second  In 
diana,  a  small  regiment,  had  been  almost  decimated  in  its 
advance  into  the  deadly  ravine  in  Granbury's  front,  and  that 
the  Forty-ninth  Ohio,  which  had  advanced  to  the  attack  with 
a  little  over  400  men,  had  already  left  203  officers  and  men  on 
its  deadly  slopes. 

The  fact  is,  that  when  General  Hazen's  brigade  advanced  it 
changed  direction  to  the  left,2  and  our  brigade  came  into  action 
on  its  right,  our  regiments  slightly  over  lapping  its  right,  that 
his  desperate  encounter  was  with  Kelley's  and  Hume's  dismount 
ed  cavalry  of  Wheeler's  Corps  and  Lowrey's  infantry  brigade, 
while  ours  was  with  Granbury's  brigade,  supported  by  the  en 
filading  fire  of  Hotchkiss's  artillery  on  Govan's  right.  General 
Wheeler,  in  his  official  report,  says,  that  ''Hazen's  Federal  In 
fantry  Brigade  charged  our  line,  and  was  repulsed  by  a  counter 
charge  of  Hume's  and  Kelley's  commands."  It  will  be  remem 
bered  that  our  brigade  was  much  nearer  the  enemy's  line  than 
Hazen's  when  the  assault  was  begun,  our  regiment  being  only 
about  400  yards  from  it,  and  that  we  became  immediately  en 
gaged  at  the  moment  of  the  advance. 

We  were  too  fully  occupied  in  our  front  to  go  to  Hazen's 
relief,  and  his  repulse  but  added  to  our  difficulties,  for  it  left 
our  left  flank  exposed  to  the  enfilading  fire  from  Wheeler's  dis 
mounted  cavalry,  when  we  were  already  suffering  from  a  similar 
enfilading  fire  from  Hotchkiss's  terrible  rifled  guns  and  how 
itzers  on  our  right  flank.  General  Hazen  complains  justly  be 
cause  Scribner's  brigade  of  Johnson's  division  failed  to  support 
him  on  the  left,  but  it,  too,  was  enveloped  on  its  left  by  Wheeler's 
dismounted  cavalry.  The  fault  was  with  those  high  in  command, 

1  W.  R.  R.,  72-423. 

2  See  his  report,  W.  R.  R.  72-423. 


ADAIRSYILLE,  CASSMI.LE,  PICKETT'S  MILL  473 

who  failed  to  ascertain  the  position  and  strength  of  the  enemy, 
before  sending  us  to  the  slaughter.  With  them  must  rest  the 
blame. 

No  troops  ever  went  into  action  with  more  spirit  and  vigor, 
or  sustained  an  unequal  combat  with  more  courage  and  fortitude. 
The  losses  were  appalling.  In  the  space  of  a  little  over  an 
hour  our  division  sustained  a  loss  of  near  1500  officers  and  men. 
The  losses  in  our  brigade  of  six  regiments  (two  of  them  small) 
were  703.  In  Hazen's  brigade  of  eight  regiments,  467.  in 
Knefler's  brigade  of  seven  regiments,  301. l 

The  names  of  the  killed,  wounded,  captured  and  missing  in 
the  Fifteenth  Ohio,  as  shown  by  the  printed  rosters,  are  as  fol 
lows  : 

COMPANY  A. 

WOUNDED — Corporal  James  W.  Paxton,  John  Mitchell,  Ed 
ward  Richardson,  Samuel  B.  Few,  Solomon  Hammond,  Joseph 
S.  Brown. 

COMPANY  B. 

KILLED — David  Priestly. 

WOUNDED — Sergeant  John  A.  Green,  Henry  M.  McCoy. 

COMPANY  C. 

WOUNDED — Lieutenant  Thomas  C.  Davis,  Sergeant  Alfred 
C.  Hurd,  (died  of  wounds  at  Altoona,  Ga.  June  14,1864),  Ser 
geant  George  Thompson  (and  captured),  Corporal  John  C. 
Iback  (and  captured),  James  M.  Barrett  (and  captured  and  died 
in  rebel  prison).  Corporal  Benjamin  F.  Leehman  (and  died  of 
wounds  May  28,  1864),  Corporal  Smith  Walker  (and  died  of 
wounds  at  Chattanooga,  Tenn.  July  4,  1864),  Welcome  Ash- 
brook,  Samuel  C.  Burke,  Daniel  C.  Courtwright,  Geo.  M.  Cham 
bers  (and  died  in  Andersonville  prison),  Nathaniel  M.  Grice 
(and  died  of  wounds  May  28,  1864)  William  D.  Hammell, 
Adonis  McMath,  and  Wilson  S.  Her,  (died  of  wounds  at  Chat 
tanooga.) 

CAPTURED — Corporal  William  E.  Shedd. 

COMPANY  D. 

KILLED — Sergeant  Ambers  Norton,  Corporal  Charles  H. 
Huffman,  William  H.  Campbell. 

WOUNDED — Sergeant  Jasper  N.  Welch,  Corporal  John  S. 
Albert,  Corporal  Oliver  C.  Brown,  Corporal  Daniel  Logan,  Jona 
than  M.  Embody  (and  died  in  hospital  at  Jeffersonville,  Ind. 
June  24,  1864),  Oswald  E.  Gravel.  John  F.  Hickman,  Isaac 
Leith  (and  died  May  28,  1864),  William  Shepperd,  Peter  Worley 
(and  died  of  wounds  June  4,  1864). 

1     W.    R.    R.,    72-387.  Sig'.    16 


474  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

MISSING — John    Harriett,    Daniel    K.    Pridmore,    John    A. 

Schriver.  _  _ 

COMPANY  E. 

KILLED — Sergeant  George  B.  Hutchinson,  Corporal  Samuel 
McMillan,  Thomas  Anderson,  Thomas  Wood,  James  N.  Booth, 
James  Anderson,  Jno  D*  Roscoe. 

WOUNDED — Sergeant  Hugh  Hawkins,  Corporal  Isaac  W. 
Knight,  John  Michener,  Joseph  Durbin  (and  died  in  rebel  hos 
pital)  John  C.  Jones  (and  died  of  wounds  June  30,  1864),  Jos. 
E.  Stewart,  Hugh  Crymble,  John  Elliott. 

CAPTURED — William  Young  (and  died  in  Andersonville 
prison  February  16,  1865). 

MISSING — James  M.  Booth  and  John  D.  Roscoe. 
COMPANY  F. 

KILLED — Corporal  Joseph  A.  Jones. 

WOUNDED — Elihu  B.  Rowles   (and  died  May  28,  1864). 
COMPANY  G. 

WOUNDED — Smith  A.  Walker,  Richard  Newland. 
COMPANY  H. 

KILLED — Sergeant  Nathaniel  Mumaugh,  Sergeant  Casper 
Miller,  Corporal  James  L.  Updegrove,  John  F.  McCullough, 
Amos  Yohe. 

WOUNDED — Captain  Joseph  R.  Updegrove,  Sergeant  George 
M.  Scutchall,  Sergeant  Joseph  S.  Lehew,  Corporal  Cornelius 
Linn,  David  Capper  (and  died  of  wounds  at  Ackworth,  Ga. 
June  7,  1864),  Eli  Timbers,  Cyrus  Bowers,  Orin  Lewis,  Adam 
Black,  James  A.  Jackson,  Pelham  C.  Johnson  (and  died  at  Ack 
worth,  Ga.  June  7,  1864),  George  Miles  (and  captured  and  died 
at  Altoona,  Ga.  June  7,  1864),  Parker  I.  Rhoads,  John  A. 
Roberts,  Hiram  Shirtlefr",  Wm.  J.  Rhoads,  James  Wortman  (and 
captured). 

CAPTURED — Simon  Hamilton.  William  H.  Dougherty  (and 
died  in  Andersonville  prison  Aug.  24,  1864). 

MISSING — Corporal  Enoch  H.  Butts,  Emery  S.  Edson,  Wil 
liam  J.  Lewis. 

COMPANY  I. 

KILLED — Corporal  Isaac  Kerr,  Ezra  Eckis. 

WOUNDED — Lieutenant  Colin  P.  Leiter,  Sergeant  Thomas 
C.  Cory,  Samuel  L.  Cline,  Benjamin  F.  Gallatin,  Joseph  E.  Meek, 
Caleb  Zouvers,  Bugler  Wilson  S.  Her  (and  died  of  wounds  at 
Chattanooga,  Tenn.  September  14,  1864),  John  Hilborn. 

CAPTURED — Thomas  S.  Collins  (and  died  in  Andersonville 
prison  July  19,  1864),  Michael  R.  Hill,  William  Shaw  (and  died 
in  Andersonville  prison  September  9,  1864.) 

COMPANY  K. 

WOUNDED — John  G.  Sherwood. 


CHAPTER  XXII. 

THE  ATLANTA  CAMPAIGN  FROM  PICKET'S  MILLS  TO  BALD  KNOB. 

On  the  morning  of  May  28,  1864,  the  Adjutant  was  awak 
ened  by  one  of  the  enemy's  shells  exploding  in  the  trees  over  his 
head,  and  went  at  once  to  work  preparing  a  list  of  the  casualties 
in  the  regiment  the  day  before.  Some  of  the  companies  had 
been  almost  marvelously  protected  by  the  inequalities  of  the 
ground  while  others  had  suffered  terribly.  In  Company  H,  out 
of  49  men  carrying  guns  who  had  gone  into  action,  only  22  re 
mained,  a  loss,  including  Captain  Updegrove,  of  56  percent. l 
The  enemy  threw  a  number  of  shells  into  our  line  about  sunrise 
and  wounded  two  or  three  men  of  the  brigade.  Desultory  firing 
was  kept  up  during  the  day,  but  no  assault  was  made  on  our  po 
sition.  About  10  a.  m.  our  regiment  relieved  the  Forty-ninth 
Ohio  in  the  first  line  and  sent  out  two  companies  as  pickets.  Fir 
ing  was  heard  both  in  our  front  and  rear  during  the  day.  That 
in  our  rear  it  was  said  was  caused  by  Stoneman's  cavalry  fight- 
its  way  into  position  on  our  left  flank.  We  learned  afterwards 
that  we  were  to  hold  the  position  we  had  gained  the  day  before 
as  a  basis  for  a  movement  of  our  entire  army  to  the  left.  This 
movement  was  devised  in  order  to  regain  possession  of  the  rail 
road  which  we  had  left  when  we  crossed  the  Etowah  River  at 
Kingston  and  moved  south  toward  Dallas.  It  was  only  part  of 
General  Sherman's  plan  to  get  the  enemy  out  of  the  Allatoona 
Pass,  which  was  too  strong  a  position  to  be  carried  by  a  front 
attack.  In  pursuance  of  such  general  plan,  on  the  28th,  General 
McPherson  was  about  to  move  to  the  left  and  relieve  General 
Thomas,  who  was  to  move  still  further  to  the  left,  when  his 
lines  were  suddenly  attacked  and  the  movement  was  delayed  for 
a  few  days.2  Later  in  the  day  we  reinforced  our  picket  line, 
which  had  been  changed  to  some  extent,  by  two  more  companies. 
Picket  firing  continued  all  day  and  all  night,  but  as  we  had  not 
been  out  of  hearing  of  such  firing  for  four  weeks  we  had  become 
accustomed  to  it,  and  many  of  them  men  not  on  duty  lay  down  be 
hind  our  works  and  slept.  The  adjutant  found  time  during  the 
day  to  visit  the  wounded  at  the  field  hospitals,  where  the  sur 
geons  with  rolled  up  sleeves  had  worked  all  the  night  before  and 
were  still  at  work,  cutting  off  legs  and  arms  and  otherwise  try 
ing  to  relieve  the  wounded  men.  Among  those  the  adjutant  re 
calls  was  the  regimental  bugler,  Wilson  S.  Her,  whose  sunny  dis- 

1  Gleason's  Diary. 

2  Sherman's  Report,  \V.  R.   R.   72-66. 


476  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

position  and  cheerful  manners  endeared  him  to  everyone  who 
knew  him.  When  he  had  blown  that  loud,  sharp,  clear  bugle 
note  which  commanded  us  to  charge  forward,  he  had  seized  the 
musket  of  a  comrade  who  had  fallen  and  had  gone  forward  with 
the  line.  He  too  was  soon  laid  low  by  bullet  wounds  in  his  arm 
and  leg.  His  arm  had  been  amputated  and  although  suffering 
from  pain  he  was  cheerful  as  ever,  said  he  would  soon  be 
back,  and  added,  "Adjutant,  a  bugler  only  needs  one  arm." 
Poor  fellow,  he  died  of  that  terrible  gangrene  at  Chattanooga  a 
few  days  later. 

A  terrible  depression  pervaded  the  ranks  this  day.  It  was 
partially  relieved  by  the  arrival  of  a  mail  which  brought  letters 
from  home,  by  the  constant  fire  of  the  enemy's  pickets  and  occa 
sional  shells  from  his  batteries.  If  it  had  not  been  for  these 
and  the  activities  made  necessary  by  the  enemy's  immediate  pres 
ence,  this  depression  would  have  been  almost  unbearable.  Many 
of  the  very  flower  of  our  young  comrades  had  been  killed  or 
fatally  wounded,  and  there  were  some  whose  fate  was  unknown, 
as  the  enemy  still  held  the  ground  where  the  battle  was  fought. 
Word  came  late  in  the  evening  that  the  enemy  had  made  an  at 
tack  on  General  McPherson's  position  and  had  been  more  severe 
ly  punished  than  we  had  been  the  day  before.  It  was  Saturday, 
and  Gleason  in  closing  his  diary  for  the  day  says:  "Night  came 
on  with  the  usual  amount  of  desultory  firing  and  we  retired  to 
rest  at  the  close  of  another  eventful  week.  May  God  forbid 
that  I  should  be  compelled  to  witness  events  more  painful  than 
those  of  this  week."1 

Quite  an  alarm  occurred  during  the  night,  the  whole  brigade 
being  called  to  arms  by  the  stentorian  voice  of  Colonel  Gibson, 
who  had  heard  (or  imagined)  some  unusual  noise,  and  there  was 
a  general  uproar  all  through  the  camp.  There  was  very  little 
firing,  but  men  were  rushing  here  and  there,  some  yelling  at  the 
tops  of  their  voices,  evidently  just  roused  from  sleep  and  imagin 
ing  the  whole  rebel  army  right  upon  us.  It  was  soon  known  that 
it  was  only  an  unreasonable  panic  and  was  caused  by  a  disordered 
dream  of  Colonel  Gibson.  Gleason  described  the  scene  as  above 
and  says  "it  was  not  to  be  wondered  that  the  men's  minds  should 
also  be  in  a  similar  wrought  up  condition  after  passing  through 
such  a  hell  as  we  did  when  we  were  led  into  such  a  slaughter 
pen."  It  was  a  long  time  before  the  buzz  of  the  men's  voices 
and  the  firing  which  broke  out  to  our  left  subsided  sufficiently 
to  permit  one  to  sleep.2 

Next  morning,  the  29th,  the  company  cooks  began  to  arrive 
at  daylight  with  coffee  for  the  men  on  the  line  and  we  soon  had 

1  and  2     Gleason's  Diary. 


FROM  PICKETT'S  MILL  TO  BALD  KNOB  477 

our  breakfasts.  A  revised  list  of  our  losses  on  the  27th,  prepared 
by  Gleason  under  the  direction  of  the  adjutant,  showed  18  killed, 
64  wounded  and  17  missing,  99  in  all,  but  there  were  conflicting 
reports  as  to  three  or  four  men.  Gleason  in  his  diary  records  that 
Captain  Hartsough  of  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  told  him  that  he, 
Hartsough,  had  been  on  the  field  of  the  27th  until  9  o'clock  at 
night,  had  picked  up  our  regimental  colors  from  the  side  of  our 
dead  color  sergeant,  and  had  given  them  into  the  hands  of  Cor 
poral  Hart,  one  of  the  color  guard,  who  was  trying  to  recover 
them.1 

During  the  afternoon  of  the  29th  there  was  an  alarm  caused 
by  sharp  musketry  on  our  immediate  right  and  our  men  hurried 
into  the  breastworks.  But  there  was  no  advance  by  the  enemy  in 
force  and  the  alarm  was  soon  over.  There  was  also  heavy  ar 
tillery  firing  to  our  right,  but  it  soon  subsided.  In  the  late  evening 
one  of  our  batteries  was  placed  in  position  on  our  line  and  open 
ed  on  the  enemy's  position.  It  was  soon  joined  by  another  battery 
a  little  to  our  right,  and  for  a  half  hour  there  was  lively  artillery 
firing.  The  enemy's  artillery  did  not  respond.  There  was  an 
unusual  amount  of  firing  all  through  the  night,  which  was  not 
conducive  to  sound  sleep. 

There  was  the  usual  increase  in  amount  of  picket  firing  at 
early  dawn  the  morning  of  the  30th,  but  it  soon  lessened  to  the 
accustomed  desultory  fire.  We  lay  along  our  line  of  works  dur 
ing  the  day,  no  untoward  or  unusual  event  occuring.  There 
was  a  point  on  our  general  line  to  the  right  of  our  brigade  where 
one  could  have  a  clear  view  of  the  enemy's  works  near  the  scene 
of  our  bloody  encounter  of  the  27th,  and  many  of  our  men  got 
permission  to  visit  it.  The  thought  that  some  of  our  dead  were 
still  lying  there,  perhaps  unburied,  made  them  long  to  go  there, 
but  the  enemy  still  held  the  ground  and  it  was  impossible. 

About  sunset  an  order  came  to  be  ready  to  move  in  a  short 
time,  as  our  lines  were  to  be  changed.  As  soon  as  it  became 
dark  we  marched  by  the  left  flank  about  one  fourth  of  a  mile 
and  took  position  on  the  right  of  Hazen's  brigade.  Here  our 
brigade  formed  in  line  and  at  once  began  fortifying  our  position 
by  carrying  logs  and  throwing  up  earth  in  front  of  them.  The 
pioneers  were  on  hand  and  assisted  in  the  work.  We  erected 
a  pretty  strong  defense  of  breastworks,  sent  out  Companies  D 
and  H  as  pickets  and  then  biouaced  for  the  night.  Picket 
firing  continued  along  other  portions  of  the  line  but  there  was 
little  in  our  front,  as  the  woods  were  so  dense  there  our  pickets 
could  not  see  the  enemy's  pickets  and  the  enemy  could  not  see 
ours. 


1     Gleason's  Diarv. 


478  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

On  the  morning  of  May  31,  we  resumed  work  on  our  breast 
works.  Word  came  that  we  might  be  attacked  in 
force  and  soon  every  man  was  in  his  place  along  the  works  and 
on  the  lookout  for  the  enemy.  Sharper  picket  .firing  began  on 
the  left,  gradually  extended  to  our  front  and  thence  along 
our  whole  line.  Companies  C  and  I  had  just  relieved  Companies 
D  and  H  and  soon  came  running  in  followed  by  whizzing  bullets, 
which  indicated  an  advance  by  the  enemy.  The  orderly  sergeant 
of  Company  C  was  hit  in  the  face  and  a  private  of  Company  I 
was  hit  in  the  body.1  As  soon  as  the  pickets  were  in  our  men 
poured  a  volley  into  the  woods  in  our  front,  but  its  effect  was  not 
perceptible.  The  attack  seemed  general  all  along  our  line  to  the 
left  and  heaviest  in  front  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  which  was 
on  our  right.  It  ended  in  about  an  hour,  but  the  enemy's  sharp 
shooters  from  their  picket  or  skirmish  line  continued  to  annoy 
us  from  an  advanced  position  which  they  had  taken  after  the 
retirement  of  our  pickets.  One  man  in  Company  D  was  severely 
wounded  inside  our  breastworks.  A  number  of  men  of  the 
Eighty-ninth  Illinois  armed  with  Spencer  rifles  were  sent  after 
these  sharp-shooters  and  drove  them  back,1  and  our  pickets  were 
soon  ordered  back  to  the  position  they  held  when  the  attack 
commenced.  This  attack  was  made  by  General  Loring's  division 
of  the  Confederate  Army,  which  suffered  severely.2  There  was 
anticipation  of  a  night  attack  on  our  front,  and  at  one  time  the 
picket  firing  became  so  sharp  that  we  thought  the  attack  was  be 
gun.  But  it  soon  subsided  to  the  usual  desultory  night  firing 
and  our  awakened  men  returned  to  their  slumbers. 

On  June  1,  there  was  the  usual  amount  of  sharp  shooting 
by  the  pickets  in  our  front  and  in  the  afternoon  considerable 
artillery  firing  on  our  immediate  right.  Our  pioneers  were  en 
gaged  in  cutting  a  road  for  artillery  up  the  hill  side.  The  Thirty- 
second  Indiana  in  cutting  down  a  large  tree  for  breastwork  ma 
terial  by  mistake  caused  it  to  fall  on  a  row  of  stacked  guns, 
knocking  them  to  pieces/0'  It  was  currently  reported  that  our 
army  was  being  gradually  moved  to  the  left.  There  were  sev 
eral  sharp  bursts  of  picket  firing  during  the  night  but  they  caused 
no  uneasiness.  Fortunately  for  our  movements  there  had  been 
no  rain  since  May  26  and  the  weather  had  been  warm.  On  June 
2,  there  was  a  violent  thunderstorm  just  before  noon,  with  vivid 
lightning  and  loud  peals  of  thunder,  followed  in  the  afternoon  by 
a  furious  hailstorm,  which  played  havoc  with  some  of  the  shelter 
tents.  Assistant  Surgeon  W.  J.  Kelley  and  Chaplain  Ross  came 
in  from  the  field  hospital  and  reported  all  our  wounded  doing 

1  Gleason's  Diary. 

2  General  Wood's  report,  W.   R.  R.   72-380. 

3  Gleason's  Diary. 


FROM  PTOKETT'S  MILL  TO  BALD  Kxon  479 

well,  except  Johnson  of  Company  H,  whose  thigh  bone  had  been 
fractured.1  Artillery  firing  was  heard  to  our  left  and  it  was 
rumored  that  General  Hooker  had  forced  the  enemy  back  on  that 
part  of  their  line.  It  was  also  reported  that  the  railroad  bridge 
over  the  Etowah  had  been  repaired  so  that  cars  could  soon  reach 
the  front.  We  had  been  fighting  on  three  fourths  rations  and 
this  gave  promise  of  full  rations  at  an  early  day,  if  we  got  pos 
session  of  the  railroad  east  of  Allatoona.  On  the  evening  of 
June  2,  we  were  relieved  from  our  position  on  the  first  line  by 
the  Thirty-second  Indiana  and  retired  to  a  second  line  of  works 
which  had  been  recently  constructed. 

An  amusing  alarm  occurred  during  the  night.  About  mid 
night  there  was  a  sudden  increase  of  the  usual  picket  firing,  when 
the  colonel  of  the  Thirty-second  Indiana  sprang  to  his  feet  and 
shouted  "To  Arms!"  and  Colonel  Wallace  of  our  regiment  with 
a  loud  voice  cried  out  "Fix  Bayonets!"  The  firing  suddenly  les 
sened  and  we  had  a  good  deal  of  merriment  over  the  panic  of  the 
two  colonels.1  June  3.  some  of  the  higher  officers  conceived  the 
idea  of  drawing  the  enemy  into  an  attack  on  our  intrenched  line. 
Accordingly  in  pursuance  of  orders,  between  9  and  10  o'clock, 
a.  m.,  our  tents  were  all  struck,  our  pickets  were  withdrawn  and 
officers  and  men  concealed  themselves  behind  our  main  line  of 
works.  All  were  admonished  to  keep  strict  silence  until  the 
enemy  appeared  in  force  and  we  were  then  only  to  fire  when 
ordered  to  do  so.  It  was  a  strange  scene,  the  men  with  guns 
ready,  crouching  behind  the  works  and  waiting  for  the  expected 
attack.  The  silence  was  intense  and  the  suspense  was  nerve- 
racking  in  the  extreme.  The  ruse  however  was  not  successful. 
The  enemy  did  not  take  the  bait  and  after  waiting  in  painful 
silence  until  near  one  o'clock  the  idea  was  abandoned  and  our 
pickets  were  sent  back  to  their  posts.  In  the  evening  we  relieved 
the  Thirty-second  Indiana  on  the  front  line  and  had  just  taken 
position  when  it  began  to  rain.  There  was  the  usual  picket  fir 
ing  during  the  night,  most  of  it  probably  caused  by  the  excited 
imaginations  of  the  men  on  both  sides,  who  would  fire  with  very 
little  or  no  cause.  One  shot  would  often  start  a  lively  fusilade 
which  would  cause  the  men  behind  the  works  to  be  called  up  to 
the  line  to  meet  an  expected  attack  of  the  enemy.  If  however 
the  pickets  remained  at  their  posts,  the  alarm  soon  ceased  and  the 
men  behind  the  works  resumed  their  broken  rest.  But  when,  as 
was  often  the  case,  the  pickets  came  running  in  pell-mell  over  the 
works,  the  alarm  lasted  longer.  One  alarm  of  the  latter  kind 
occurred  about  4  a.  m.,  June  -i  and  the  singing  of  rebel  bullets 
over  our  heads  made  it  easy  to  imagine  that  the  enemy  were 


480  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

making  an  early  morning  assault.  The  men  quickly  seized  their 
guns,  lined  up  behind  the  intrenchments  and  awaited  the  ex 
pected  assault.  It  proved  to  be  another  false  alarm.  The  pickets 
were  admonished  and  sent  back  to  their  posts  and  the  men  be 
hind  the  works  turned  in  for  a  little  more  rest. 

When  we  rose  the  morning  of  June  4,  a  soft  rain  was  falling 
and  the  men  who  were  not  on  duty  sought  the  shelter  of  their 
dog  tents,  hoping  to  remain  undisturbed  during  the  day.  But 
soon  came  an  order  to  the  Thirty-second  Indiana,  directing  it  to 
move  to  the  right  across  a  ravine  and  our  regiment  was  ordered 
to  join  them  on  the  left  as  soon  as  we  were  relieved  by  a  regi 
ment  of  Hazen's  brigade. 

We  were  told  that  the  line  of  our  division  was  to  be  ex 
tended  so  as  to  relieve  Davis'  division  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps 
so  it  could  be  sent  elsewhere.  We  completed  our  part  of  the 
movement  by  9  o'clock  a.  m.  and  found  ourselves  in  a  better  po 
sition  than  before,  but  we  had  to  hold  it  with  a  single  line  of 
troops.  Just  at  the  right  of  our  new  position  were  three  grim 
"dogs  of  war",  masked  by  green  branches  and  keeping  silent 
vigil  over  the  ravine  below.  That  night  there  was  only  one 
alarm.  The  men  quickly  lined  up  behind  the  works,  but  the  ex 
pected  attack  did  not  take  place.  Next  morning,  June  5,  th<; 
usual  picket  firing  continued  and  we  supposed  the  enemy  was 
still  in  force  in  our  front.  But  on  sending  out  a  reconnoitering 
party  at  8  o'clock,  we  found  that  they  had  decamped  during  the 
night.  A  detail  from  each  company  was  at  once  sent  out  to  the 
battel  field  of  the  27th  to  try  to  get  trace  of  our  dead  and  missing 
comrades.  They  soon  returned  and  reported  that  our  dead  had 
all  been  buried  by  the  enemy.  The  men  spent  the  day  in  general 
relaxation.  A  mail  came  in  bringing  letters  and  papers  from 
home.  Sergeant  Major  Gleason  at  the  adjutant's  request  made 
out  the  descriptive  roll  of  Wilson  S.  Her,  and  the  adjutant  took 
it  to  him  at  the  field  hospital,1  whence  he  was  to  be  taken  to 
Chattanooga  as  soon  as  railroad  communication  was  reestablish 
ed.  That  night  we  went  to  rest  early  and  slept  undisturbed  by 
war's  alarms. 

The  morning  of  June  6,  was  warm  and  sultry.  The  reveille 
was  sounded  by  the  bugle  before  day-break  and  we  had  orders 
to  be  ready  to  march  at  sunrise.  It  was  about  an  hour  after  sun 
rise  when  we  started,  our  regiment  being  the  fourth  from  the 
head  of  our  brigade.  Our  course  was  mainly  eastward.  We 
halted  at  10  a.  m.  and  found  the  entire  division  resting  in  a  large 
field,  waiting  for  the  completion  of  a  bridge  across  Allatoona 
creek.  We  did  not  have  to  wait  long  until  we  were  again  on  the 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


FROM  PICKETT'S  MILL  TO  BALD  K.XOB  481 

march.  After  crossing  Allatoona  creek  our  division  moved 
across  the  fields  to  the  left  and  thence  on  a  road  to  the  left  of  the 
Ackworth  Road  and  about  11  a.  m.  was  placed  in  camp.  It  was 
formed  in  two  lines,  the  left  resting  on  the  Big  Shanty  Road 
and  the  right  a  little  refused.1  General  Stanley's  division  was 
immediately  on  our  left  across  the  road.  Our  regiment  was  as 
signed  its  proper  place  and  we  remained  here  the  rest  of  the  day 
and  during  the  night.  The  day  was  fair  and  many  suffered  from 
the  intense  heat.  While  we  were  resting  near  Pickett's  Mill  on 
the  5th,  the  grand  movement  of  our  entire  army  to  the  left  which 
began  June  1,  was  practically  completed,  General  McPherson's 
army  having  that  day  marched  in  rear  of  our  line  to  the  left.2 
After  this  grand  movement  had  given  us  possession  of  the  roads 
leading  back  to  Allatoona  and  Ackworth,  General  Stoneman's 
and  General  Garrard's  cavalry  were  sent  against  Allatoona  pass, 
the  former  to  the  east  and  the  latter  to  the  west  end  of  it. 
We  thereby  gained  possession  of  the  pass3  and  our  cracker  line 
was  safe.  Our  camp  on  the  6th  of  June  was  about  two  miles 
from  Ackworth  which  was  occupied  by  our  troops.  There  we 
remained  until  June  10.  During  this  time  General  Sherman  in 
person  visited  Allatoona  pass  and  designated  it  as  a  secondary 
base  for  supplies.4  The  bridge  across  Etowah  River  was  being 
rebuilt.5 

The  morning  of  June  ?,  the  men  were  allowed  to  sleep  until 
after  sunrise.  It  was  an  unusual  experience.  There  was  no 
sound  of  cannon  or  small  arms  to  disturb  our  slumbers,  the  first 
respite  we  had  had  from  these  sounds  since  the  campaign  began 
and  the  only  one  we  had  during  its  continuance.  When  the  men 
were  called  up  some  of  them  found  they  had  only  hard  tack  and 
coffee  for  breakfast  and  others  had  nothing.  When  a  detail  was 
made  to  clean  up  quarters  some  of  the  men  protested,  saying 
they  should  not  be  required  to  work  without  rations.  Some  of 
the  men  went  foraging  and  brought  in  some  green  apples  and 
half  ripe  mulberries.  However,  the  supply  trains  came  up  dur 
ing  the  day  and  we  had  full  rations  for  supper.  A  part  of  the 
rations  was  fresh  beef  which  was  so  tough  and  lean  the  common 
remark  was  "that  the  beeves  were  so  poor  they  had  to  shoot 
them  to  prevent  their  starving  and  that  they  had  to  prop  them  up 
to  shoot  them."6  Gleason  also  says  a  supply  of  whisky  was  is 
sued  during  the  evening,  that  some  of  his  mess  got  boozy,  as  did 
also  most  of  the  regimental  band,  and  that  the  latter  started  out 
to  serenade  Colonel  Gibson  and  kept  up  a  din  until  quite  late. 

1  Fullerton's  Diary,  W.  R.  R.  72-872. 

2  Fullerton's  Diary,  W.  R.  R.  72-871. 

3  and  4     General  Sherman's  Report,  W.  R.  R.  72-66. 

5  General  Howard's  Report,  W.  R.  R.  72-196. 

6  Gleason's  Diary. 


482  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

June  <S  Colonel  Wallace  sent  in  application  for  leave  of  ab 
sence  and  went  to  the  hospital  at  Ackworth.  It  was  generally 
believed  he  would  never  return  to  the  regiment.  News  came  that 
Sergeant  David  Capper  and  Pelham  C.  Johnson  of  Company  H. 
had  died  in  the  field  hospital.  Late  in  the  evening  we  received 
orders  to  be  ready  to  march  at  6  o'clock  the  next  morning.  There 
were  heavy  showers  the  morning  of  June  10.  The  reveille  sound 
ed  at  4  o'clock  and  we  made  ready  for  another  forward  move 
ment.  It  was  to  be  part  of  a  grand  general  movement  by  our 
entire  army,  as  our  communications  to  the  rear  were  now  secure 
and  supplies  were  ample.  General  McPherson  was  ordered  to 
move  toward  Marietta,  his  right  on  the  railroad.  General 
Thomas  on  Kennesaw  and  Pine  Mountains  and  General  Scho- 
field  off  toward  Lost  Mountain ;  the  cavalry  were  to  protect  our 
flanks  and  our  communications  to  the  rear.  General  F.  P.  Blair 
had  joined  us  with  two  divisions  of  the  17th  Corps  and  Garrard's 
cavalry,  which  about  made  up  for  our  losses  so  far  in  the  cam 
paign.  They  of  course  became  a  part  of  General  McPherson's 
Army  of  the  Tennessee.  General  Sherman  in  his  official  report 
describes  the  military  situation  as  follows : 

"Kenesaw,  the  bold  and  striking  twin  mountain,  lay  before 
us,  with  a  high  range  of  distant  hills  trending  off  to  the  north 
east,  terminating  to  our  view  in  another  peak  called  Brush  Moun 
tain.  To  our  right  was  a  smaller  hill  called  Pine  Mountain  and 
beyond  it  in  the  distance,  was  Lost  Mountain.  All  these,  though 
linked  in  a  continuous  chain,  present  a  sharp,  conical  appearance, 
prominent  in  the  vast  landscape  that  presents  itself  from  any  of 
the  hills  that  abound  in  that  region.  Kenesaw,  Pine  Mountain 
and  Lost  Mountain  form  a  triangle.  Pine  Mountain  the  apex  and 
Kenesaw  and  Lost  Mountain  the  base,  covering  perfectly  the 
town  of  Marietta  and  the  railroad  back  to  the  Chattahochee. 
On  each  of  these  peaks  the  enemy  had  his  signal  station  ;  the 
summits  were  crowned  with  batteries,  and  the  spurs  were  alive 
with  men  busy  in  felling  trees,  digging  pits  and  preparing  for 
the  grand  struggle  impending.  The  scene  was  enchanting,  too 
beautiful  to  be  disturbed  by  the  harsh  clamor  of  war;  but  the 
Chattahoochee  lay  beyond  and  I  had  to  reach  it."1 

As  above  stated  \ve  were  to  be  ready  to  march  at  6  o'clock 
but  a  later  order  directed  us  to  march  at  8  o'clock.  Our  corps 
was  to  march  on  the  main  road  to  Marietta,  which  crossed  the 
railroad  at  Kenesaw7  Station  and  then  passed  on  east  of  the 
mountain  to  Marietta.  General  Stanley's  division  was  first,  Gen 
eral  Newton's  second  and  ours  third.  Stanley  and  Newton  were 
to  move  at  7  a.  m.  and  our  division  at  8  a.  m.  The  ambulance 

~~1       W.   R  .K.    72-67. 


FROM   PICKETT'S  MILL  TO  BALD  Kxon  483 

train  of  each  division  was  to  follow  in  rear  of  the  division  to 
which  it  was  attached.1  Our  regiment  moved  promptly  with  the 
brigade  and  division  at  8  o'clock  and  marched  about  a  half  mile, 
when  we  were  halted  just  as  a  heavy  thunder  storm  broke  over 
us.  Here  we  rested  for  an  hour  and  were  then  told  we  would  not 
move  for  an  hour  and  a  half.  We  resumed  our  march  at  2 
o'clock  in  a  heavy  rain.  We  passed  some  breastworks  which 
Hooker's  men  had  thrown  up  where  we  halted  for  a  short  time. 
We  then  marched  about  a  mile  and  went  into  a  camp  in  an  open 
field.  We  were  formed  in  double  column  near  a  thick  wood 
which  concealed  a  line  of  breastworks.  It  was  understood  we 
were  waiting  for  the  Fourteenth  Corps  to  come  upon  our  left. 
There  was  skirmishing  and  cavalry  fighting  in  front  and  we 
heard  the  "boom"  of  artillery.  We  rested  in  the  open  field  dur 
ing  the  night.  Prisoners  taken  during  the  day  reported  the 
enemy  strongly  fortified,  their  line  extending  from  Kenesaw  to 
Lost  Mountain. 

June  11  was  spent  in  being  shifted  from  place  to  place  along 
our  line.  There  was  considerable  cannonading  from  a  battery  of 
heavy  guns  in  our  front  and  some  scattering  shots  from  the 
enemy's  skirmish  line  showed  they  were  nearer  then  we  supposed. 
Our  last  position  during  the  day  and  where  we  bivouaced  during 
the  night  was  just  in  rear  of  the  troops  of  Newton's  division. 
The  country  was  very  thickly  wooded.  There  were  heavy  rain 
storms  during  the  day  and  the  roads,  such  as  we  tried,  were 
very  deep  with  mud. 

The  morning  of  the  12th  it  was  raining  steadily,  but  we 
were  ordered  into  line  and  marched  to  the  front  and  left  about 
a  mile.  Here  our  brigade  was  formed  behind  some  unfinished 
works  and  went  to  work  to  strengthen  them,  the  pioneers  as 
sisting.  Here  we  pitched  our  tents  in  regular  order.  Owing  to 
the  bad  condition  of  the  roads,  rations  had  not  been  brought  up 
and  some  of  the  men  were  entirely  without  food.2  June  13, 
there  was  no  change  in  our  lines  and  there  was  little  picket  fir 
ing.  It  rained  all  day.  The  14th  of  June,  there  was  a  general 
right  wheel  of  Newton's  and  our  division,  which  advanced  the 
left  of  the  corps  about  three  fourths  of  a  mile  toward  Pine  Top 
Mountain.  Our  regiment  and  brigade  had  orders  early  in  the 
day  to  be  ready  to  move  at  any  time,  but  it  was  not  until  near 
noon  that  our  movement  began.  Skirmishing  began  soon  after  we 
moved  out.  Our  regiment  crossed  a  deep  ravine  and  formed 
along  the  crest  of  a  ridge.  Company  A  was  sent  out  to  relieve 
the  skirmishers  of  the  Thirty-second  Indiana.  Our  regiment 

1  Fullerton's  Journal,   W.   R.   R.    72-874. 

2  Gleason's  Diary. 


484  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

was  the  extreme  left  of  our  division  and  on  the  immediate  right 
of  Baird's  division  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps.  Late  in  the  after 
noon  we  moved  to  the  left  and  occupied  a  line  of  works  built 
for  artillery.  We  found  the  position  a  hot  one.  The  enemy's 
bullets  came  singing  among  us  and  wounded  two  men.  Our 
skirmishers  were  ordered  to  advance  and  clear  our  front,  but 
met  with  such  a  heavy  fire  from  an  unseen  force  that  they 
halted  and  we  could  not  get  them  forward.  Just  then  General 
Howard  and  staff  rode  up.  The  General  dismounted  and  very 
much  to  our  surprise  started  through  the  woods  to  the  skirmish 
line.  Two  or  three  of  his  staff  hurriedly  dismounted  and  start 
ed  after  him  but  he  ordered  them  back.  He  went  alone  to  the 
picket  line,  told  Lieutenant  Hanson  that  if  the  men  would  rush 
the  enemy's  lines  they  would  probably  only  find  a  few  men  be 
hind  a  pile  of  rails.  The  line  was  at  once  ordered  forward  and 
found  the  situation  just  as  General  Howard  had  predicted.  A 
few  men  behind  a  pile  of  rails  had  been  holding  the  whole 
skirmish  line  in  check.  The  men  of  Company  A  suffered  se 
verely  in  the  rush.  Lieutenant  Andrew  L.  Hadden,  a  lovable 
young  officer,  and  Robert  M.  Brown  were  killed  and  Wm.  Alex 
ander,  Albert  G.  Fleming  and  James  F.  McGee  were  wounded.1 

Just  before  sunset  we  moved  a  little  to  the  left  and  threw 
up  defenses  for  the  night.  During  the  day  there  was  much  artil 
lery  firing,  our  batteries  being  instructed  to  open  fire  whenever 
the  enemy  showed  any  force.2  A  shot  from  the  Fifth  Indiana 
Battery,  Captain  Simonson,  posted  to  our  right,  struck  and  killed 
General  Leonidas  Polk  of  the  Confederate  Army. 

The  next  morning  June  15,  at  8  o'clock,  we  moved  forward 
across  a  ravine  and  found  the  enemy's  works  abandoned.  There 
was  an  order  for  a  general  advance  of  our  corps  at  2  o'clock  p. 
m.  We  were  to  move  southward  to  the  left  of  Pine  Top,  New 
ton's  division  in  advance,  then  Stanley's,  and  Wood's  to  follow 
at  2  :30  p.  m.  Our  corps  was  to  be  supported  on  the  right  by 
Hooker's  corps  and  on  the  left  by  Palmer's.  There  was  such  a 
decided  resistence  to  our  advance  by  the  enemy's  skirmishers  and 
the  woods  were  so  thick,  that  the  advance  was  slow.  At  4 :30  p. 
m.  Newton's  skirmishers  drove  the  enemy  from  a  wooded  hill 
in  front  about  one  mile  from  where  the  line  started.  The  cap 
ture  of  the  hill  was  reported  to  General  Thomas  who  ordered 
the  entire  line  to  press  forward  as  far  as  it  could.  The  line 
moved  forward  and  occupied  the  hill.  At  6  p.  m.  our  skirmishers 
advanced  to  a  second  ridge  about  twenty-five  yards  from  the 
enemy's  main  line  of  works,  but  at  6:15  p.  m.  were  driven  back 

1  John   G.    Gregory's   Diary. 

2  General  Howard's  report,   72-196. 


FROM  PICKETT'S  MILL  TO  BALD  KNOB  485 

by  the  main  line  of  the  enemy  which  came  out  of  their  works. 
Our  skirmishers  were  reinforced  and  were  able  to  hold  a  posi 
tion  about  seventy-five  yards  from  the  enemy's  line.  Here 'our 
advance  was  ordered  by  General  Thomas  to  halt  for  the  night 
and  throw  up  intrenchments.  The  Fourth  Corps'  position  was, 
Newton  on  the  left,  Stanley  on  the  right  and  our  division 
(Wood's)  in  reserve  in  rear  of  Stanley's  right.  The  hill  that  our 
main  line  was  now  on  was  on  the  line  of  ridges  which  connects 
Lost  Mountain  and  Kenesaw  Mountain  and  from  which  the 
waters  flow  into  the  Chattahoochee.1 

As  our  division  was  practically  in  reserve  we  had  little  part 
in  the  hazards  of  this  movement.  From  a  point  on  our  left  we 
could  see  the  rebel  batteries  firing  on  our  line  from  a  ridge.  On 
the  right  was  a  high  knoll  where  rebel  signal  flags  were  waving. 
Late  in  the  evening  we  moved  forward  and  soon  reached  the 
abandoned  works  of  the  enemy.  They  were  very  strong  and  well 
built,  having  traverses  for  protection  against  a  flanking  fire.  We 
congratulated  ourselves  that  we  did  not  have  to  attack  them  in 
front.  They  had  apparently  been  occupied  for  several  days,  as 
bark  shanties  had  been  erected  in  their  rear  as  a  shelter  from  the 
rain.  To  obtain  the  bark  the  trees  had  been  peeled  for  some 
distance  from  the  ground.  One  large  tree  thus  stripped  of  its 
bark  bore  the  record  of  General  Folk's  death  the  day  before.2 

On  June  16.  while  other  portions  of  the  army  were  advanc 
ing  their  lines  and  strengthening  the  points  gained  we  were  still 
lying  in  reserve.  We  attributed  this  to  our  terrible  losses  on  the 
27th  of  May  and  were  not  averse  to  having  other  troops  take 
the  lead.  Indeed,  we  felt  that  so  far  in  the  campaign  we  had 
done  more  than  our  share  of  hard  fighting.  The  day  was  clear 
and  bright  and  we  enjoyed  the  rest.  Many  of  the  men  walked 
to  the  summit  of  Pine  Top  not  far  away  and  were  well  repaid 
by  the  splendid  views  it  afforded.  We  could  see  to  the  south  the 
western  extremity  of  Kenesaw  Mountain  and  beyond  it  a  large 
brick  building,  said  to  be  a  military  school  near  Marietta.  We 
coul(J  also  see  the  enemy's  works  in  that  direction.  Signal  flags 
were  sending  messages  along  their  lines  and  we  saw  one  of  their 
batteries  firing  at  our  line  and  a  wagon  train  moving  to  their 
rear.  Gleason  picked  up  a  scrap  from  the  "Memphis-Atlanta 
Appeal,"  containing  a  list  of  Union  prisoners  in  the  Atlanta  hos 
pital  and  found  the  names  of  two  of  our  regiment,  George  Miles 
of  Company  H  (who  died  June  7)  and  George  Thompson  of 
Company  C.  In  the  evening  orders  were  issued  for  the  regular 
monthly  inspection  the  next  morning.  Some  of  the  men  fired 

1  General  Fullerton's  Diary,  W.  R.  R.  72-878. 

2  Gleason's  Diary. 


486  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

off  their  guns  without  orders  and  were  arrested  and  fined.1  The 
next  morning,  June  17,  the  brigade  "assembly"  was  blown  and 
we  struck  tents,  marched  to  the  left  some  distance  and  halted 
behind  a  strong  double  line  of  works  which  the  enemy  had 
abandoned.  While  here  Generals  Sherman,  Thomas,  Howard 
and  others  rode  forward  to  examine  the  position.  We  were  soon 
ordered  to  advance  in  support  of  the  Eighty-ninth  Illinois  which 
was  deployed  as  skirmishers.  We  moved  forward  about  half  a 
mile  to  the  edge  of  a  clearing,  where  the  89th  Illinois  found  and 
engaged  the  enemy's  skirmishers.  We  soon  changed  direction 
to  the  left  and  moved  forward  some  distance  and  again  halted. 
There  we  remained  most  of  the  afternoon.  We  heard  heavy 
cannonading  and  cheering  to  the  left  which  lasted  about  half  an 
hour,  supposed  to  be  General  McPherson's  troops  making  an 
advance.  Our  division  and  General  Newton's  were  held  in  check 
by  a  rattling  fire  from  the  woods  beyond  an  irregular  shaped 
open  filed  in  our  front.  A  number  of  batteries  were  brought 
forward  to  the  line  and  shelled  the  woods  for  an  hour.  One  of 
the  batteries  was  quite  near  our  position  and  our  Lieutenant  Col 
onel,  (Askew),  who  was  quite  irascible  that  day,  got  into  an 
altercation  with  Captain  Lyman  Bridges  chief  of  artillery  of  the 
corps.  Askew  denounced  the  waste  of  ammunition  in  shelling 
the  woods,  said  the  artillery  did  no  good  any  way  and  that  the 
infantry  had  to  do  the  real  fighting.  Captain  Bridges  stoutly 
defended  the  artillery  and  the  contention  became  so  warm  that 
General  Wood  threatened  both  officers  with  arrest  and  thus 
stopped  the  quarrel.  After  the  woods  had  been  thoroughly 
shelled  the  skirmish  lines  of  both  divisions,  strongly  reinforced, 
charged  across  the  open  field  and  were  followed  by  the  main 
lines.  The  enemy  was  driven  from  his  rifle  pits  and  we  held 
and  fortified  the  position  from  which  we  had  driven  them.  Here 
we  remained  during  the  night.  There  were  two  alarms  during 
the  night  and  after  that  it  began  raining.  Some  of  the  men  had 
not  put  up  their  shelter  tents  and  had  to  get  up  before  daybreak 
and  put  them  up  in  a  hard  shower. 

The  morning  of  June  18,  the  Thirty-second  Indiana  moved 
out  early  to  relieve  the  pickets  of  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  and  soon 
the  whole  line  moved  forward  and  found  the  enemy  still  in 
force.  General  Hazen's  brigade  on  our  immediate  left  charged 
a  line  of  the  enemy's  works  and  took  a  number  of  prisoners.  Our 
pioneers  threw  up  epaulements  for  artillery  and  we  soon  had 
several  big  guns  playing  on  the  enemy  with  good  effect.  It  was 
understood  we  were  to  go  on  picket  in  the  evening  and  we  made 
fires  to  dry  our  blankets  and  tents.  At  6  o'clock  our  brigade 

1     Gleason's   Diary. 


FKOM  PICKETT'S  MILL  TO  BALD  K.xon  487 

moved  by  the  right  flank  to  a  road  where  we  crossed  a  slough 
on  a  pole  bridge  and  then  filed  off  just  forward  of  the  slough, 
which  extended  along  the  front  of  the  brigade.  Seven  com 
panies  of  the  regiment  were  sent  out  on  the  skirmish  line,  three 
remaining  under  shelter  of  the  bank.  The  position  of  the  three 
companies  was  safe  from  fire  from  the  front  but  not  from  the 
rear,  as  two  men  in  Company  A  were  wounded  by  a  shell  from 
one  of  our  own  batteries.  Firing  was  kept  up  along  the  skir 
mish  lines  until  after  dark  when  it  slackened  until  only  an  occa 
sional  shot  told  of  the  presence  of  the  enemy.  The  pickets  were 
watchful  and  the  men  on  the  reserve  soon  slept  unconscious  of 
the  enemy  and  of  the  rain  which  pattered  down  all  night.  About 
three  or  four  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  19th,  Lieutenant 
Joseph  N.  Dubois,  commanding  Company  E,  sought  the  adjutant 
and  reported  that  the  enemy  was  falling  back.  He  asked  permis 
sion  to  take  his  company  out  to  the  front  of  the  picket  line  and 
said  he  could  gather  in  a  number  of  the  enemy's  stragglers.  The 
adjutant,  took  him  to  the  colonel  who  at  first  refused  Dubois' 
request,  as  it  was  very  hazardous,  but  finally  yielded  under 
promise  of  Dubois  that  he  would  proceed  cautiously.  Lieuten 
ant  Dubois  at  once  led  his  men  to  the  front  through  the  picket 
line  and  forming  them  in  line  went  on  and  on,  gathering  up 
stragglers  until  his  prisoners  were  more  in  number  than  the  men 
in  his  command.  One  of  his  sergeants,  Calvin  Etzler,  mildly 
protested  against  further  risk,  when  Dubois  curtly  said,  "If  you 
are  afraid  you  can  go  back,"  Etzler,  a  brave  soldier,  touched  to 
the  quick  by  the  insinuation,  retorted,  "I  will  follow  you  to  hell", 
and  moved  on  with  the  line.  Gaining  the  crest  of  a  little  knoll 
they  were  confronted  by  a  long  rebel  skirmish  line  moving  back 
upon  them.  But  Dubois  did  not  lose  his  coolness  or  courage.  He 
at  once  about  faced,  ordered  his  prisoners  to  double  quick  to  the 
rear,  followed  them  at  the  same  pace  and  brought  the  prisoners 
all  into  our  lines  with  their  guns. 

Peter  B.  Cupp  of  Company  H  had  followed  Dubois'  com 
pany  outside  the  lines,  and  had  gone  with  them  a  certain  dis 
tance  and  then  turned  back.  He  missed  direction  in  returning 
and  suddenly  came  upon  two  rebel  officers  and  seventeen  men. 
evidently  a  picket  reserve  which  had  not  been  notified  of  their 
army's  retreat.  As  Cupp  knew  Dubois  was  still  further  toward 
the  enemy  he  at  once  demanded  their  surrender.  He  told  them 
our  men  were  between  them  and  their  command,  and  that  they 
were  already  within  our  lines.  As  Cupp  was  coming  from  their 
rear,  they  believed  his  statement  and  surrendered.  Cupp  proudly 
marched  them  into  our  lines  as  prisoners  of  war  and  thus  became 
the  hero  of  the  hour.  The  prisoners  taken  by  Cupp  were  Captain 


488  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

S.  Yates  Levy,  Lieutenant  Cunningham  and  seventeen  men  of 
the  First  Georgia  Volunteers.  These,  the  prisoners  brought  in 
by  Dubois  and  a  few  others  taken  by  Sergeant  Scott  of  Company 
G  and  others,  swelled  our  captures  that  morning  to  about  eighty.1 
The  enemy  had  evidently  left  in  haste  and  many  more  captures 
might  have  been  made  if  the  other  troops  along  the  picket  line 
had  been  as  watchful  and  diligent.  At  6  a.  m.  the  morning  of  the 
19th,  our  corps  was  ordered  to  march  for  Marietta — General 
Stanley's  division  to  lead,  General  Wood's  to  follow,  Standley's 
and  General  Newton's  to  follow  Wood's.  At  6 :40  a.  m.  our 
corps  was  on  its  way  and  at  7  a.  m.  came  upon  the  enemy  posted 
on  a  line  of  ridges  just  west  of  Marietta.  Stanley  at  once  formed 
in  line  of  battle  and  Wood's  (our)  division  moved  up  to  his 
support.2  Our  regiment  moved  forward  as  far  as  the  abandoned 
rebel  works,  where  we  halted  to  await  the  coming  up  of  the  rest 
of  our  brigade,  which  had  remained  behind  to  draw  rations. 
Skirmishing  had  been  going  on  for  some  time  in  our  front.  There 
was  heavy  cannonading  during  the  afternoon.  We  finally  re 
ceived  orders  to  remain  in  our  position  during  the  night  and 
made  ourselves  as  comfortable  as  possible  under  the  circum 
stances.  There  had  been  heavy  rains  during  the  day.  Orders 
came  to  General  Wood  to  relieve  General  Stanley's  division  at 
5  o'clock  next  morning.  At  the  same  time  Stanley  was  to  move 
to  the  left  and  relieve  General  Hooker's  right  division,  which 
joined  him  on  the  left.3  There  was  skirmishing  all  along  the 
line  all  night. 

The  morning  of  June  20,  we  were  called  at  four  o'clock  and 
after  a  hurried  breakfast  moved  out  past  Stanley's  division  hos 
pital  where  we  struck  a  travelled  road  which  we  followed  about 
a  mile  and  relieved  a  part  of  General  Hooker's  corps.  The 
troops  we  relieved  occupied  a  line  of  unfinished  works  which  our 
men  completed.  A  battery  of  heavy  guns  was  brought  up  in  the 
afternoon  and  placed  in  position  just  to  the  right  of  our  line, 
where  it  opened  out  on  the  enemy.  The  enemy's  artillery  at  once 
replied  and  their  shells  flew  thick  and  fast  over  our  heads,  some 
of  them  exploding  in  our  line,  but  no  one  was  injured  by  them. 
There  was  very  heavy  skirmish  firing  all  this  time  and  the 
enemy's  bullets  whistled  past  over  our  heads  constantly.  One 
man  in  Company  I  was  wounded  back  of  our  line.  Our  position 
was  very  much  exposed,  being  quite  close  to  the  enemy,  whose 
works  were  plainly  seen.  But  we  had  strong  breastworks  in  our 
front  and  the  ground  descended  back  of  them  so  that  we  were 
sheltered  from  the  enemy's  fire.  Our  works  ran  along  a  ridge. 

1  Gleason's  Diary. 

2  Fuller-ton's  Journal,  W.   R.   R.    72-882. 

3  Fullerton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.   72-883. 


FROM  PICKETT'S  MILL  TO  BALD  K^OB  489 

Immediately  in  our  front  there  was  an  open  cleared  space,  which 
descended  rapidly  toward  the  enemy  and  rose  to  a  rounded  emin 
ence  which  was  sparsely  covered  by  dead  trees.  On  this  emin 
ence,  which  we  afterwards  called  "Bald  Knob",  the  enemy  had 
strong  rifle  pits  well  manned,  and  it  was  from  this  point,  about 
500  yards  distant,  that  we  were  receiving  a  most  constant  and 
annoying  fire.  To  the  right  of  the  open  space  woods  extended 
down  to  the  right  of  Bald  Knob  and  beyond  it.  Back  of  Bald 
Knob  a  short  distance  was  the  enemy's  main  line  where  his  bat 
teries  were  posted.  From  the  front  of  our  regimental  line  we 
had  a  good  view  both  to  our  front  and  left.  At  4  p.  m.  our 
artillery  opened  and  General  Stanley's  division  advanced  and 
drove  the  enemy  from  Bald  Knob  in  our  front.  This  occurred 
about  5 :40  p.  m.  At  6  p.  m.  the  enemy  advanced  and  drove 
Kirby's  brigade  from  Bald  Knob  back  to  its  main  line.  We  wit 
nessed  all  this  fighting  from  our  regimental  front.  The  firing 
continued  until  after  dark  and  we  saw  the  flashes  of  the  guns  of 
the  opposing  forces  and  heard  their  reports  but  were  not  called 
on  to  take  part.  The  right  of  our  line  was  threatened  at  the 
same  time  and  word  came  that  the  enemy  was  moving  to  attack 
us  in  force.  The  attack  however  was  not  made.  That  night  the 
Forty-ninth  Ohio  was  placed  out  in  the  woods  to  our  right  in 
support  of  the  battery  to  the  right  of  our  line  and  we  slept  in 
the  depression  behind  our  works,  leaving  enough  men  in  them 
to  guard  against  surprise.  Picket  firing  continued  all  night  with 
out  abatement.  It  rained  hard  nearly  all  day. 

The  morning  of  June  21,  broke  cloudy  and  dark,  with  a  cold 
drizzling  rain  falling.  It  was  a  morning  that  made  one  feel 
dismal  and  depressed.  There  was  some  firing  of  artillery  and 
the  enemy's  sharpshooters  on  Bald  Knob  were  doubly  annoying, 
after  they  had  re-captured  it  from  Kirby's  brigade.  We  supposed 
there  was  some  movement  on  foot  but  received  no  orders. 
About  11  a.  m.  Colonel  Askew  and  the  adjutant  were  standing 
near  the  left  of  our  line  of  works,  when  General  Howard  came 
from  the  left  along  the  line.  When  they  saluted  him  he  stopped 
and  said  "Colonel,  I  want  you  to  take  your  command  and  assault 
and  carry  that  knob  and  hold  and  fortify  it.  After  you  have 
carried  it  I  will  have  the  pioneers  of  the  brigade  report  to  you. 
Make  your  dispositions  and  be  ready  to  advance  when  you  re 
ceive  the  order".  He  then  passed  on.  The  colonel  and  adjutant 
were  both  surprised  that  General  Howard  had  .selected  one  regi 
ment  to  do  what  an  entire  brigade  had  tried  to  do  the  day  before 
and  failed.  But  the  task  was  assigned  and  we  had  to  set  our 
teeth  and  attempt  it.  Colonel  Askew  at  once,  accompanied  by 
the  adjutant,  passed  to  the  right  of  the  line  and  down  into  the 


490  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

woods  to  the  right  of  the  open  space  in  front  of  the  knob,  to 
reconnoiter  the  position.  While  so  engaged  he  quietly  observed 
that  General  Kirby  had  failed  to  hold  the  knob  the  day  before, 
because  the  enemy  attacked  him  from  the  woods  to  the  right, 
and  that  in  order  to  hold  it  we  would  have  to  make  a  lodgment 
in  those  woods.  He  then  and  there  told  the  adjutant  that  when 
the  order  to  move  came  he  would  march  the  regiment  by  the 
left  flank  down  into  the  woods  where  we  then  were.  That  the 
four  left  companies  would  be  sent  at  a  double  quick  against  the 
knob,  and  when  they  had  carried  it,  the  six  right  companies 
would  rapidly  deploy  by  the  right  flank  on  the  left  company 
and  dash  forward  into  the  woods  to  the  right  of  the  knob.  When 
the  colonel  and  adjutant  returned,  the  latter  saw  the  company 
officers  and  told  them  of  General  Howard's  orders  and  of  the 
dispositions  for  the  attack  as  above  related.  They  were  all 
deeply  impressed  by  the  gravity  of  the  task  imposed  on  the  regi 
ment,  for  all  had  witnessed  the  capture  of  the  knob  by  General 
Kirby's  brigade  and  his  subsequent  repulse.  Soon  the  men  in 
the  ranks  knew  about  it  and  realized  that  we  had  a  difficult  and 
dangerous  job  before  us.  There  was  less  talking  than  usual. 
and  one  could  see  that  the  men  were  soberly  considering  the  situa 
tion  and  nerving  themselves  for  the  conflict.  The  cooks  came 
up  at  noon  with  coffee  which  all  drank  in  unusual  silence. 
Oliver  Cope,  a  private  soldier  in  Company  E,  came  to  the  adju 
tant  and  asked  to  be  excused  from  going  into  the  fight.  When 
asked  why  he  wished  to  be  excused  he  said,  "I  know  I  will  be 
killed  if  I  go  into  this  charge.  I  have  no  right  to  ask  such  a 
thing,  but  I  have  been  in  every  battle  and  skirmish  the  regiment 
has  been  in  since  the  war  began,  have  always  done  my  duty  and 
think  I  ought  to  be  excused  under  the  circumstances".  The  ad 
jutant  tried  to  rally  him  saying,  it  was  a  dismal  day  and  one 
naturally  felt  gloomy  and  depressed,  and  that  his  idea  of  being 
killed  was  only  a  fancy.  Rut  he  persisted  and  the  adjutant  sent 
him  to  the  colonel,  who  kindly  but  firmly  refused  his  request. 

While  we  were  forming  for  the  movement,  General  Howard 
took  position  near  the  battery  on  our  right  and  at  his  order  the 
artillery  opened  out  on  the  enemy  and  thoroughly  shelled  his 
lines  in  our  front.  In  a  short  time  we  received  orders  to  ad 
vance.  We  crossed  our  breastworks  and  moved  down  into  the 
woods  a  short  distance  in  the  formation  above  described.  At 
the  proper  moment,  Companies  B  and  G  commanded  respectively 
by  Lieutenant  Augustus  L.  Smith  and  Captain  Andrew  R.  Z. 
Dawson,  wheeled  into  line  and  dashed  down  the  hill  into  the  open 
space,  closely  followed  by  Companies  E  and  K  commanded  re 
spectively  by  Lieutenant  Joseph  N.  Dubois  and  Captain  Chand- 


FROM  PICKETT'S  MILL  TO  BALD  KNOB  491 

ler  W.  Carroll.  The  company  commanders  led  their  companies 
in  the  charge  and  it  seemed  to  be  a  race  among  them  to  see 
which  company  should  gain  the  top  of  the  knob  first.  The 
enemy  in  the  rifle  pits  on  the  knob  poured  a  deadly  fire  at  our 
rapidly  advancing  troops,  but  in  the  excitement  they  shot  high 
and  most  of  their  bullets  went  over  our  men's  heads.  The 
charge  was  so  impetuous  and  swift  that  the  enemy  were  liter 
ally  run  over  and  many  were  captured  in  their  rifle  pits.  One 
Confederate  soldier  shot  one  of  our  men  after  his  comrades  had 
surrendered  and  paid  the  penalty  with  his  life.  We  had  no 
time  to  look  after  the  prisoners  and  they  went  to  the  rear  into 
Colonel  Kirby's  lines  and  were  claimed  by  him.  We  had  no 
sooner  gained  the  knob  when  the  enemy's  artillery  opened  out 
and  poured  a  storm  of  shot  and  shell  on  us  from  their  main  line 
about  600  yards  distant.  Notwithstanding  this  fire  Companies 
H,  Lieutenant  Vesper  Dorneck,  C,  Captain  John  C.  Byrd  and  I, 
Captain  George  W.  Cummins,  together  with  the  pioneers  of  the 
brigade  who  had  been  ordered  to  report  to  Colonel  Askew  for 
that  purpose,  set  to  work  to  fortify  the  position  gained.  In  the 
meantime  the  right  companies  of  the  regiment  had  rapidly  moved 
forward  into  the  woods  to  the  right  of  the  knob  where  they 
met  the  enemy  in  force.  Colonel  Askew  and  the  adjutant  were 
standing  together  just  in  rear  of  the  crest  of  the  knob,  when 
Major  McClenahan,  who  had  command  on  the  right,  came  out 
of  the  woods  to  the  right  and  reported  that  our  men  were  hard 
pressed  and  he  feared  could  not  hold  their  ground  unless  rein 
forced.  By  direction  of  the  colonel  the  adjutant  at  once  hur 
ried  back  to  our  main  line  to  report  the  situation  and  ask  for 
help.  He  could  not  find  Colonel  Gibson  who  he  supposed  was 
in  command  of  the  brigade,  nor  any  of  the  brigade  staff.  While 
looking  for  them  he  came  upon  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  who  were 
resting  in  a  little  cove  or  depression  in  the  woods,  having  been 
on  duty  all  the  night  before.  He  explained  the  situation  to 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Samuel  F.  Gray  who  was  in  command  of 
the  regiment  and  appealed  to  him  for  help.  Colonel  Gray  said 
his  regiment  had  been  on  duty  all  the  right  before  and  that  he 
would  not  move  a  step  for  any  other  regiment  but  the  Fifteenth 
Ohio.  He  at  once  called  to  his  men  to  fall  in  and  the  adjutant, 
the  writer,  led  the  regiment  down  through  the  woods  to  the 
right  of  the  Fifteenth  Ohio.  On  the  way  down  through  the 
woods  two  men  of  the  Fifteenth  Ohio,  one  of  whom  was  George 
W.  Murdock  of  Company  E,  who  were  carrying  back  a  wounded 
comrade  to  the  rear,  called  to  the  adjutant,  who  turned  aside 
for  a  moment  and  saw  that  the  wounded  man  was  Oliver  Cope. 
A  bullet  had  shattered  his  jaw  and  pierced  his  breast,  and  his 


492  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

life  blood  was  fast  ebbing  away.  His  presentiment  had  proved 
true.  The  adjutant  directed  the  men  carrying  him  to  take  him 
to  the  field  hospital,  where  he  died  shortly  after  they  reached  it. 
Seven  companies  of  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  had  moved  into  the 
woods  to  the  right  of  the  knob  and  had  held  their  ground  against 
the  Fifteenth  and  Thirty-seventh  Tennessee  regiments  of  Bate's 
division  of  the  Confederate  Army  which  had  been  sent  to  drive 
them  back,  and  probably  would  have  yielded  had  not  the  Forty- 
ninth  Ohio  voluntarily  come  to  their  relief. 

The  official  reports  of  commanding  officers  as  a  rule  take 
care  to  state  formally  that  everything  was  done  in  obedience  to 
orders  of  their  superiors.  In  this  instance,  Colonel  Gray  in  his 
official  report  says  he  moved  by  order  of  Colonel  Nodine  com 
manding  the  brigade,  but  the  real  facts  are  as  before  stated. 
Colonel  Gray  does  say,  however,  that  "Seeing  the  skirmishers 
of  that  regiment  (the  Fifteenth  Ohio)  closely  pressed,  I  ex 
ceeded  my  orders  and  changed  the  direction  of  my  line  and 
charged  the  position,  driving  with  the  assistance  of  the  Fifteenth 
Ohio,  the  enemy  from  it".1  Having  conducted  the  Forty-ninth 
Ohio  to  the  relief  of  our  right  companies,  as  above  stated,  the 
adjutant  rejoined  Colonel  Askew  just  back  of  the  crest  of  the 
captured  knob.  The  battle  scene  was  one  of  the  most  brilliant 
and  spectacular  in  which  we  had  been  engaged.  General  Howard 
afterwards  made  this  attack  on  Bald  Knob  the  subject  of  an 
article  published  in  the  Pittsburgh  Dispatch  of  May  13,  1894, 
entitled  "My  Most  Thrilling  Adventure  During  the  War".  This 
testimony  from  an  officer  of  high  rank  who  had  been  at  Fair 
Oaks,  who  had  commanded  a  corps  at  Gettysburg,  and  whose 
troops  had  assaulted  and  captured  Fort  McAllister,  confirms  its 
brilliancy.  Two  or  three  batteries  of  the  enemy  posted  in  their 
main  line  of  works  from  600  to  700  yards  distant,  says  Colonel 
Askew,2  were  pouring  a  terrific  fire  upon  the  knob  where  our 
three  companies  and  the  pioneers  of  the  brigade  were  fortifying 
it.  The  sharp  rattle  of  musketry  mingled  with  the  cheers  of  the 
combatants  resounded  from  the  woods  to  our  right.  The  bat 
teries  on  our  main  line  to  the  right  were  pouring  shot  and  shell 
into  the  enemy's  works  and  above  it  all  rose  the  dun  smoke  of 
battle.  It  was  all  wonderfully  impressive,  but  most  impressive 
of  all,  was  the  coolness  and  interpidity  of  our  men.  There  were 
a  number  of  dead  trees  on  the  knob  and  when  a  shot  or  shell 
would  strike  them,  huge  branches  would  be  knocked  off  and 
fall  over  our  men  who  were  at  work.  It  was  noticed  that  one 
of  the  enemy's  shells  struck  a  large  limb  of  one  of  these  trees 

1  W.   R.   R.   72-414. 

2  W.  R.  R.  72-409. 


FROM  PICKETT'S  MILL  TO  BALD  KNOB  493 

about  40  feet  from  the  ground  and  left  its  mark  in  the  shape 
of  a  half  moon.  In  about  the  space  of  time  it  would  take  to  re 
load  and  re-fire  the  piece,  another  shell  came  over  and  passed 
through  this  half  moon,  just  knocking  a  little  dust  out  of  it. 
This  incident  seemed  to  disprove  the  theory  that  a  cannon  shot 
would  never  strike  twice  in  the  same  place.  A  large  dead  tree 
stood  just  in  front  of  the  line  of  works  we  were  constructing 
and  it  was  necessary  to  cut  it  down  and  use  it  as  a  part  of  our 
defensive  works.  As  it  was  exposed  to  the  fire  of  both  the  artil 
lery  and  musketry  of  the  enemy  and  the  work  of  cutting  it 
down  extremely  hazardous,  volunteer  axmen  were  called  for. 
At  once  Sergeants  Washington  J.  Vance,  Company  K,  and  Vin 
cent  T.  Trego.  Company  I  and  two  others  whose  names  the 
writer  cannot  now  recall,  responded  and  stepped  out  with  axes 
and  chopped  the  tree  down  amid  a  perfect  storm  of  cannon  shot 
and  bullets  evidently  directed  against  them.  Once  when  a  shell 
struck  the  tree,  Sergeant  Trego  paused  a  moment  and  said,  ''Hold 
on  there  Johnny,  I  commenced  on  this  tree  first".  The  tree  was 
thrown  in  the  exact  position  needed  for  our  defensive  works 
and  the  four  stalwart  men  retired  behind  the  crest  uninjured. 
In  all  the  writer's  experience  he  recalls  no  instance  of  more  cool 
heoric  courage  than  was  shown  by  these  four  men  in  cutting 
down  that  tree  on  Bald  Knob.  Sergeant  Vance  often  spoke  of 
this  incident  and  although  he  was  a  hero  in  many  battles  he 
cherished  this  incident  as  the  proudest  in  his  career.  When 
the  enemy  had  been  driven  back  in  the  woods  and  our  position 
was  secure,  General  Howard,  General  Wood  and  a  number  of 
their  staff  officers  rode  up  to  the  knob  where  Colonel  Askew 
and  the  adjutant  were  standing.  General  Howard  was  glowing 
with  satisfaction  over  the  success  of  the  movement  and  saluting, 
Colonel  Askew  said,  "Colonel  you  took  the  knob  right  out  of 
their  teeth".1  Among  the  staff  officers  who  were  with  General 
Howard  was  Captain  Lyman  Bridges,  with  whom  Colonel  Askew 
had  the  altercation  a  day  or  two  before.  He  could  not  forbear 
and  called  out,  "Colonel,  I  see  you  paid  your  respects  to  the 
artillery  today".  The  colonel  at  once  stiffened  up  and  said: 
"No  sir,  not  a  damned  man  hurt". 

There  was  great  rejoicing  in  our  regiment  over  the  success 
of  our  day's  fighting.  We  felt  that  our  regiment  had  been  se 
lected  to  perform  an  unusually  difficult  and  dangerous  piece  of 
work  and  that  it  had  succeeded  beyond  expectation.  But  we  had 
done  so  at  a  great  loss.  Our  casualties  were  twelve  men  killed  and 
Lieutenants  Hanson  of  Company  A  and  Donner  of  Company  E 
and  forty  men  wounded.  Late  in  the  afternoon  we  were  relieved 

1     Gleason's  Diary  and  Author's  recollection. 


494  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

for  a  short  time  in  order  to  care  for  our  dead  and  wounded 
and  were  then  posted  in  line  to  the  right  of  Bald  Knob  where 
we  threw  up  a  line  of  works  and  covered  our  front  by  Company 
A  Sergeant  Gardner  commanding,  and  Company  F  Lieutenant 
Glover  commanding,  as  skirmishers.  Here  we  bivouaced  for  the 
night. 

The  following  are  the  names  of  the  killed  and  wounded  in 
the  engagement  at  Bald  Knob,  as  gleaned  from  the  official  pub 
lished  rosters. 

KILLED. — Benoni  Ledman,  Company  A ;  William  O'Brien 
and  Henry  C.  Nagle,  Company  D  ;  Oliver  J.  Cope  and  George 

A.  Todd,   Company  E ;  Isaac  H.  Green,  Company  F ;  Thomas 
Hudson,   Charles  W.   Craycraft,   Charles  Laport,  and  John   \V. 
Wilcox,    Company   G ;   William   J.    Rhoades,    Company   H ;   and 
Samuel  W.  Wilson,  Company  K. 

WOUNDED. — Lieutenant  Thomas  N.  Hanson,  James  W.  An 
derson,  Benjamin  Briggs,  Charles  E.  McKinney,  Hugh  McWhir- 
ter,  Samuel  M.  Thompson,  Sergeant  Robert  S.  McClenahan  and 
Luther  Brown,  Company  A :  James  E.  Ash,  Company  B ;  Augus 
tus  Bevington  and  Geo.  F.  Bowers,  Company  D ;  Lieutenant 
Oliver  Donner,  Sylvester  C.  Brown,  Robert  Applegarth  and 
Joseph  Clegg,  Company  E ;  Joseph  Ebright,  Christopher  Hinkle 
and  Wilson  S.  Piper,  Company  F;  Sergeant  Henry  G.  Palmer, 
Sergeant  Phillip  Youngblood,  Francis  R.  Burnham,  Nathan  Bar 
rett,  Levi  Barcus,  Theodore  Coss,  John  Cole,  Joseph  Frazier, 
John  Kennedy  and  James  F.  Meaner,  Company  G;  Sergeant 
Franklin  Armstrong  and  Harrison  Ball,  Company  H  ;  Sergeant 
Thos.  C.  Cory,  Sergeant  David  Snyder,  Sergeant  David  D.  Hart, 
Corporal  Barnet  Sims  and  Newton  F.  Mickey,  Company  I ;  and 
Sergeant  David  Smith,  Sergeant  Eber  T.  Fort,  Corporal  William 

B.  Drum,   Stephan   Bricker  and  John   G.   Sherwood,   Company 
K — twelve  killed  and  forty-two  wounded.      A    number    of    the 
wounded    died   of    their  wounds   within   a   few   days   after   the 
engagement. 

We  were  all  very  proud  of  our  achievements  at  Bald  Knob. 
It  was  an  instance  where  as  a  regiment  we  had  been  distinguished 
above  all  other  regiments  of  the  brigade  and  division  and  where 
we  had  most  notably  earned  the  distinction.  Our  fame  as  a  regi 
ment  in  this  instance  we  felt  was  secure.  But  in  1887,  when  the 
Century  Magazine  was  publishing  its  great  series  of  War  Papers, 
there  appeared  one  written  by  General  Howard,  our  old  corps 
commander,  entitled,  "The  Struggle  for  Atlanta"1  (heretofore 
quoted  from),  in  which  he  said  alluding  to  our  operations  in 
June  in  front  of  Kenesaw  Mountain,  "Again  another  (Kirby's 

1     Century,  Vol.  12,  page  442. 


FKO.M   Pit  KETT'S  MILL  TO  BALD  KNOB  495 

brigade)  having  lost  Bald  Knob  in  a  skirmish,  retook  it  by  a  gal 
lant  charge  in  line,  under  a  hot  fire  of  artillery  and  infantry, 
and  intrenched  and  kept  it". 

Upon  reading  this  statement  the  writer  at  once  wrote  to 
Colonel  Askew,  calling  his  attention  to  the  article,  and  asking  him 
to  write  to  General  Howard  and  have  him  recall  or  correct  this 
statement.  Colonel  Askew  had  lost  all  his  papers  on  his  way 
home  after  the  regiment's  final  muster  out  and  shrank  from  a 
controversy  with  General  Howard.  The  writer  thereupon  on 
July  7,  1887.  wrote  to  General  Howard  relating  his  recollections 
of  Bald  Knob  substantially  as  given  in  this  history  and  asked 
him  to  make  the  proper  correction.  General  Howard  replied 
July  14.  1887,  saying  "I  will  look  up  all  the  data  I  have  and 
make  correction  as  soon  as  I  have  opportunity.  I  think  you 
must  be  mistaken  as  to  the  extent  of  the  force  operating  to  re 
take  the  hill  for  it  would  be  necessary  for  even  more  than  one 
brigade  to  cover  the  whole  ground,  and  further,  I  have  an  indis 
tinct  recollection  that  I  desired  much  to  give  the  discomfitied 
troops  an  opportunity  to  regain  what  they  had  lost.  *  * 

Was  not  Colonel  Nodine  commanding  Willich's  brigade  at  the 
time?  If  so  my  official  account  is  corroborated  by  your  letter, 
provided  you  allow  for  Kirby's  operations  to  the  left  of  Colonel 
Askew's  position".1  In  concluding  his  letter  General  Howard 
suggested  that  the  writer  prepare  an  article  giving  his  personal 
recollections  of  Bald  Knob,  but  he  did  not  have  the  assurance  to 
go  into  print  in  contradiction  to  so  distinguished  an  officer  as 
General  Howard  and  in  course  of  time  concluded  that  his 
memory  after  the  lapse  of  twenty-three  years  was  wholly  unre 
liable.  Nearly  six  years  afterwards  the  official  reports  of  the 
Atlanta  campaign  were  placed  in  the  writer's  hands  and  he  saw 
that  every  material  fact  he  had  stated  to  General  Howard  in 
his  letter  of  July  7,  1887,  was  confirmed  by  the  reports  of  Colonel 
Askew,  Fifteenth  Ohio,  Colonel  Gray,  Forty-ninth  Ohio,  Colonel 
Williams,  Eighty-ninth  Illinois,  Colonel  Johnson,  Fifteenth  Wis 
consin,  by  Colonel  Hotchkiss,  who  made  the  official  report 
of  the  brigade,  General  Wood,  commanding  the  division, 
and  in  part  by  the  report  of  General  Howard  himself.  Even 
the  report  of  Colonel  Kirby  was  a  negative  confirmation, 
for  there  were  no  casualties  reported  in  his  brigade  that  day. 
After  reading  these  reports  the  writer.  April  18,  1893,  again 
wrote  to  General  Howard,  enclosing  copy  of  his  (the  writer's) 
letter  of  July  7,  1887,  and  again  calling  the  general's  atten 
tion  to  the  incident,  and  the  above  named  official  reports. 
In  this  second  letter  to  General  Howard  the  writer  stated 


1     Letter  in  writer's  possession. 


496  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

that  Colonel  Askew  had  suggested  that  when  General  How- 
and  was  giving  personal  directions  to  him  (Askew)  to  assault 
and  retake  Bald  Knob  he  may  have  thought  he  was  talking  to 
Colonel  Kirby,  "as  they  were  both  tall  and  slim."  General 
Howard  answered  this  second  letter  as  follows : 

"Headquarters  Department  of  the  East, 

Governor's  Island,  New  York,  May  4,  1893. 
Capt.  Alexis  Cope, 

Sec'y.,  etc.,  Ohio  State  University, 

Columbus,  Ohio. 
My  Dear  Captain: 

You  appear  to  be  thoroughly  right  by  the  record.  Still  my  recol 
lection  is  that  more  than  one  brigade  stood  with  me  by  the  large  bat 
tery,  following  up  the  movement  of  the  first  line. 

I  did  think  the  tall  officer  with  whom  I  conversed  and  to  whom 
I  gave  orders  was  Colonel  Kirby.  It  was  too  bad  to  have  made  such  a 
mistake.  Colonel  Askew  is  certainly  deserving  of  the  first  place  in 
mention  of  that  remarkable  attack  and  success.  As  the  Century  doesn't 
wish  any  more  from  me,  could  you  not  write  a  brief  rectification  and 
send  it  to  the  editor? 

Very  truly  yours, 

O.  0.  HOWARD,! 
Maj.  Genl.  U.  S.  Army." 

The  writer  was  still  averse  to  appearing  among  the  distin 
guished  authors  of  War  Papers  and  did  not  act  upon  General 
Howard's  suggestion.  He  sees  now  that  it  was  a  mistake.  But 
he  prepared  a  paper  giving  the  facts  above  stated  and  presented 
it  to  the  regimental  association  of  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  and  the  then 
survivors  of  the  regiment  knew  that  the  correction  had  been 
made.  General  Howard  afterwards  wrote  an  article,  which  has 
already  been  mentioned,  for  the  Christian  Herald,  and  which 
was  reproduced  in  the  Pittsburgh  Dispatch  of  May  13,  1894, 
headlined  as  follows : 

Capture  of  Bald  Knob. 


General  Howard  Tells  of  His  Most  Thrilling  Adventure  During 

the  War. 


The  Air  Thick  With  Bullets. 


A  Terriffic   Mountain   Top   Charge   That   Reformed   Sherman's 

Line. 

A  Combat  That  Marked  a  Crisis. 


In  this  article  he  made  full  amends  for  the  mistake  he  made 
in  his  Century  war  paper,  "The  Struggle  for  Atlanta."     A  short 

1     Original  letter  in  writer's  possession. 


FKOM  PICKETT'S  MILL  TO  BALD  KNOB  497 

time  before  his  death  the  writer  wrote  to  him  and  asked  for  a 
copy  of  the  article.  On  September  11,  1909,  he  answered  from 
Burlington,  Vermont,  saying :  "I  take  pleasure  in  enclosing  here 
with  my  old  Mss.  on  the  capture  of  Bald  Knob,  which  after 
using  please  return  to  me.  The  Mss.  is  in  my  own  hand  writing 
and  may  be  difficult  for  you  to  read.  I  do  not  find  any  reference 
to  what  was  really  the  case  concerning  Col.  Askew.  He  was 
tall  and  I  took  him  to  be  Colonel  Kirby,  the  brigade  commander, 
when  I  spoke  to  him  at  the  right  moment  and  asked  him  if  he 
could  not  charge  then  and  take  the  Bald  Knob.  He  assured  me 
in  a  single  sentence  that  he  could  do  so,  and  I  was  surprised  that 
the  brigade  commander,  as  I  supposed  him  to  be,  should  charge 
with  so  few  men.  It  was  thus  that  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  led  the 
assault  and  crowned  the  height.  Of  course  the  two  brigades 
followed  immediately  and  supported  the  charge"  *  * 

A  few  days  after  this  manuscript  was  received  General 
Howard  died  and  his  son,  Major  Charles  Howard,  at  the  request 
of  the  writer,  gave  him  the  original  manuscript  and  he  holds  it 
as  one  of  his  most  valued  possessions.  The  following  extracts 
from  the  manuscript  fitly  close  the  history  of  the  regiment's  cap 
ture  of  Bald  Knob. 

"In  my  corps  in  Stanley's  division  we  had  a  very  brave, 
handsome  prepossessing  young  brigade  commander,  General 
Kirby.  Stanley  had  great  confidence  in  him  and  his  command, 
but  unfortunately  the  afternoon  of  the  twentieth  of  June,  as 
Sherman  was  pressing  Johnston  all  along  his  front,  and  also 
trying  to  turn  his  flank,  a  Confederate  force,  coming  with 
Bedouin  velocity,  made  a  tremendous  demonstration  against  iny 
foremost  division  and  Kirby's  brigade  was  knocked  out  of  posi 
tion.  An  open  space  fringed  with  woods  was  taken  from  him, 
Confederat  cannons  put  behind  epaulements  in  the  best  places, 
and  long  lines  of  intrenchments  speedily  dug  and  filled  with  gray 
coats,  in  and  out  of  the  woods.  We  called  the  highest  point  of 
this  ground  which  Kirby  had  lost  "Bald  Knob". 

"The  night  of  the  twentieth  of  June  was  a  sorry  one  in  our 
camp.  *  *  *  The  continuity  of  General  Sherman's  long  line 
had  been  broken.  The  wedge  had  entered  the  block  and  would 
soon  be  driven  home.  Stanley,  Kirby  and  myself  were  mortified. 
Generals  Sherman  and  Thomas  were  worried  lest  Johnston 
should  follow  up  his  advantage,  break  across  our  center  defenses 
and  roll  up  in  shameful  defeat  our  lines  in  good  earnest.  I  told 
General  Thomas,  'Tomorrow,  General,  I  will  retake  Bald  Knob'. 
'All  right,  General  Howard  go  ahead'  ". 


498  FIFTEENTH   OHIO  VOLTNTEEKS   AND  CAMPAIGNS 

"Parts  of  the  two  divisions,  Stanley's  and  Thomas  John 
Wood's,  were  opposite  the  lost  position.  They  each  sent  me  a  bri 
gade,  Colonel  Nodine's  on  the  right  and  Colonel  Kirby's  on  the 
left.  *  *  *  Colonel  Askew  put  his  regiment,  then  desig 
nated  for  skirmish  duty,  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  Volunteers,  out  in 
advance  of  all  others  arriving.  He  and  his  adjutant  say  that  I 
probably  thinking  him,  Askew,  to  be  Colonel  Kirby,  gave  him 
direct  orders,  but  Colonel  Kirby  was  ready  with  support. 
Colonel  Gray's  Forty-ninth  Ohio  Infantry  stood  close  behind  the 
Fifteenth  Ohio". 

*     #     * 

"Before  the  action  I  rode  down  the  slopes  from  my  night 
bivouac,  having  with  me  three  or  four  members  of  my  staff,  till 
I  came  to  one  of  those  strong  works  which  were  made  to  protect 
four  cannon  of  our  heaviest  calibre — the  work  being  made  in  the 
edge  of  a  wood  was  made  first  of  large  logs,  leaving  apertures 
(embrasures)  for  the  cannon's  fire.  Then  the  dirt  was  dug  up 
inside  and  thrown  over  the  logs,  making  a  good  wide  embank 
ment.  Lastly  short  blocks  were  put  crosswise  on  the  work  and 
a  series  of  huge  logs  stretched  from  block  to  block.  This  last 
contrivance  was  intended  to  protect  the  heads  of  the  men  who, 
with  rifles  in  hand,  were  "supporting"  the  cannon.  Along  the 
work  here  and  there  a  tree  was  left  standing.  Our  cannon  fire 
had  begun  before  I  arrived,  shelling  the  Bald  Hill  and  the  fringes 
of  trees,  and  replying  to  the  lively  Confederate  batteries.  The 
latter  were  abundant  and  arranged  so  as  to  hinder  an  advance 
of  Yankees.  I  ascended  the  artiller  works  and  stood  (exposed 
to  the  Confederate  fire)  leaning  against  one  of  the  trees.  *  *  * 
For  a  few  moments  I  was  reminded  of  the  Gettysburg  cannon 
ade.  The  enemy's  gunners  had  this  battery  well  in  view  and 
range.  Shells  screamed  and  cracked  in  the  air  over  my  head- 
solid  shot  struck  our  embankment,  and  little  rifle  balls  whizzed 
and  whistled  as  they  sped  with  lightning  swiftness.  My  officers 
protested,  'You'll  get  killed'.  *  *  *  'What's  the  good  of  such 
exposure'.  Some  were  inclined  to  seize  me  by  force  and  put  me 
under  shelter.  But  I  said  T  know  what  I  am  doing'.  I  had  a 
very  distinct  purpose.  In  plain  view  before  me  were  the  Fif 
teenth  Ohio  men,  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  also,  and  Kirby's  brigade 
which  had  lost  the  knob,  the  pioneers  and  other  men.  I  wanted 
every  man  to  feel  that  this  combat  marked  a  crisis,  and  that  I 
did  not  ask  the  soldiers  to  encounter  a  danger  that  I  did  not 
share  with  them,  so  I  determinedly,  with  set  teeth  stood  there 
before  them  and  participated  in  their  excitement". 

"Many  descriptions  of  that  prompt  advance  by  our  brave 
Union  men  lie  before  us.  It  was  as  resolute  as  Pickett's  charge 


FROM  PICKETT'S  MILL  TO  BALD  KNOB  499 

at  Gettysburg — it  was  as  unique  as  Jackson's  onset  at  Chan- 
cerlorville.  *  *  *  Colonel  Askew  says  'At  the  signal  four 
companies  dashed  forward  in  splendid  style  and  with  such 
rapidity  that  the  astonished  enemy  had  hardly  time  to  get  off— 
we  captured  twenty  or  thirty  in  their  works'.  He  applies  like 
language  to  the  six  companies  on  his  right  which  struck  for  and 
cleared  the  troublesome  woods.  Askew  instantly  set  his  men  at 
work  'to  fortify  and  hold  the  knob'  according  to  'General 
Howard's  instructions'.  *  *  *  'This  we  did  under  a  ter 
rific  fire  from  two  or  three  batteries  of  the  enemy,  posted  in  their 
main  line  of  works  from  GOO  to  700  yards  distant'.  Meanwhile 
the  firing  in  the  woods  grew  worse  and  worse,  for  the  Confed 
erates  had  sent  thither  the  Fifteenth  and  Thirty-seventh  Tennes 
see.  But  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio,  backing  up  our  men  already  there, 
prevented  a  Confederate  recapture.  Askew  adds  'our  loss  was 
Lieutenant  (Hanson)  Company  A  wounded.  Lieutenant  (Don- 
ner.  Company  E,  severely  wounded,  nine  enlisted  men  killed  and 
forty-four  wounded'  ". 

"Lieutenant  Colonel  Gray  of  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio,  writes: 
T  executed  my  orders,  changed  the  direction  of  my  line  and 
charged  the  position  (a  wooded  eminence)  driving  with  the  as 
sistance  of  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  the  enemy  from  it.  *  *  * 
our  loss  *  *  *  was  one  officer  killed  and  thirteen  enlisted  men 
wounded.''  "General  Wood,  the  division  commander,  reports: 
'At  noon  of  the  following  day  (June  21)  the  corps  commander. 
(General  Howard)  arranged  an  attack,  embracing  part  of  the 
First  Brigade,  Kirby's)  of  the  first  division  and  part  of  the  First 
Brigade  ( Willich's)  (the  Fifteenth  and  Forty-ninth  Ohio)  of 
my  division.  The  Fifteenth  Ohio  dashed  gallantly  forward,  car 
ried  the  hill  which  had  been  lost  and  intrenched  itself  on  it  under 
a  heavy  fire  of  the  enemy'  ". 

"Kirby  moved  in  conjunction  and  did  nobly,  but  the  rapidity 
of  Nodine's  gallant  charge,  led  by  Askew,  whose  adjutant,  then 
Lieutenant  Alexis  Cope,  has  furnished  me  the  detail  in  which 
he  bore  no  small  part,  outstripped  Kirby's  longer  line  so  that 
General  Stanley  says,  Kirby's  losses  that  day  were  not  severe". 

*     *     # 

"As  soon  as  the  half  hour's  preliminary  cannonade  was 
ended,  and  the  signal  agreed  upon  for  a  charge  was  given,  all 
of  the  men  moved — some  faster  and  some  slower  right  into  the 
teeth  of  the  whirlwind.  The  instant  I  saw  them  sweeping  up  the 
last  ascent,  I  descended  from  the  'top  log'  (of  the  battery  epaule- 
ments),  mounted  my  horse  before  my  staff  could  get  to  me, 
and  galloped  into  the  midst  of  these  foremost  men 
and  was  with  them  whilst  the  air  was  full  of  the  missiles  of 


oOO  FIFTEENTH   OHIO  VOLU.NTKKUS   AND  CAMPAIGNS 

death.  They  had  crowned  the  height,  they  had  recovered  the 
lost  ground,  they  had  restored  the  continuity  of  Sherman's  lines 
and  fo  ronce  I,  their  corps  commander,  fully  shared  their  feel 
ings  of  enterprise,  of  danger,  of  ultimate  security  and  of  glory". 
"I  was  closer  beset  at  Fair  Oaks,  having  had  my  brother 
Charles  near  me  badly  wounded,  my  three  horses  shot,  and  my 
right  arm  shattered  by  two  painful  wounds,  yet  no  adventure 
has  ever  thrilled  me  like  that  spirited  charge  of  the  Fifteenth 
Ohio  men  under  Colonel  Askew,  when  we  recaptured  that  Bald 
Knob  along  the  lines  of  Muddy  Creek  in  plain  sight  of  the  Twin 
Mountains  of  Georgia,  all  on  the  twenty-first  day  of  June,  1864". 

NAMES  OF  KILLED  AND  WOUNDED  IN  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS 
DURING  MONTH  OF  JUNE,  1864,  IN  OPERATIONS  ABOUT  KENE- 
SAW  MOUNTAIN,  INCLUDING  PINE  TOP,  BALD  KNOB,  AND 
OTHER  MINOR  AFFAIRS. 

COMPANY  A. 

KILLED. — Lieutenant  Andrew  L.  Hadden,  Robert  M. 
Brown. 

WOUNDED. — Lieutenant  Thomas  N.  Hanson,  Joseph  S. 
Brown,  Samuel  M.  Thompson,  William  L.  Brown,  Benjamin  B. 
Birggs,  Jas.  W.  Anderson,  Hugh  McWhirter,  Albert  G.  Flem 
ing,  Charles  E.  McKinney,  William  Alexander,  James  T.  McGee. 

COMPANY  B. 

WOUNDED. — Sergeant  Robert  S.  McClenahan,  James  E. 
Ash,  Charles  H.  Williams. 

COMPANY  D. 

KILLED. — William  O'Brien,  Matthias  Howell,  Henry  S. 
Nagle,  John  Grouse. 

WOUNDED. — Lieutenant  David  A.  Geiger,  George  F.  Bow 
ers,  Georgge  F.  Johns,  Clearchus  Reed,  Augustus  Bevington, 
Oscar  Davis. 

COMPANY  E. 

KILLED. — Oliver  J.  Cope,  George  A.  Todd,  David  Wallace. 

WOUNDED. — Lieutenant  Oliver  Donner,  Allen  Wade,  Syl 
vester  C.  Brown,  Robert  Applegarth,  Samuel  Bell,  Calvin 
Etzler,  Josephus  Clagg,  James  E.  Tipton. 

COMPANY  F. 

KILLED. — Sergeant  Lafayette  Hess,  Isaac  Green. 

WOUNDED. — Wilson  S.  Piper,  Samuel  Early,  David  Mills, 
Christopher  Hinkle,  William  H.  Davis,  Nathan  Downs,  John  C. 
Fletcher,  Andrew  Garloch,  Josiah  D.  Glover,  Dixon  M.  Hays. 
Joseph  McMillan,  Leander  Warren,  Joseph  Ebright,  Crawford 
E.  Welsh. 


FROM  PICKETT'S  MILL  TO  BALD  KNOB  501 

COMPANY  G. 

KILLED. — Charles  V.  Craycraft,  Thomas  Hudson,  John  \V. 
Wilcox,  Charles  Laport. 

WOUNDED. — Sergeant  Henry  G.  Palmer,  Sergeant  Philip 
Youngblood,  Nathan  Barrett,  Theodore  Coss,  Francis  R.  Burn- 
ham,  Joseph  Frazier,  Levi  Barcus,  James  F.  Meaner,  John  Ken 
nedy,  John  Cole. 

COMPANY   II. 

WOUNDED. — William  J.  Rhodes. 

COMPANY   I. 

WOUNDED. — Sergeant  David  Synder,  Sergeant  David  D. 
Hart,  Sergeant  Thomas  C.  Cory. 

COMPANY   K. 

KILLED. — Samuel  W.  Wilson. 

WOUNDED. — Sergeant  David  Smith,  Corporal  Eber  T.  Fort, 
William  B.  Drum,  Stephen  Bricker,  John  G.  Sherwood,  John 
Irwin. 


CHAPTER   XXIII 

THE  ATLANTA  CAMPAIGN — FROM  BALD  KNOB  TO  THE 
CHATTAHOOCHEE. 

The  last  preceding  chapter  closed  with  a  description  of  the 
engagement  at  Bald  Knob  and  left  the  regiment  formed  in  line 
to  the  right  of  the  captured  knob  with  Companies  A  and  F  cov 
ering  our  front  as  pickets.  Our  line  was  very  close  to  the 
enemy's  main  line  of  works  and  our  pickets  had  a  hard  night 
of  it.  There  was  constant  firing  during  the  night  and  four  men 
of  Company  A  were  wounded.  The  next  morning,  June  22, 
1864,'  we  were  relieved  on  the  first  line  by  the  Eighty-ninth 
Illinois  and  retired  to  a  second  line  of  works  a  few  rods  behind 
the  first  line.  In  front  of  our  line  were  open  woods  and  the 
ground  gradually  ascended  towards  the  enemy's  works.  It 
would  have  been  easy  for  the  enemy  to  make  a  sudden  dash 
down  through  the  woods  over  our  line  of  intrechments,  if  we 
had  been  for  a  moment  off  our  guard.  So  we  constructed  a 
double  line  of  works,  not  only  to  guard  against  a  sudden  sur 
prise,  but  to  provide-  a  place  where  the  men  of  the  second  line 
could  rest  and  sleep  in  some  security.  During  the  22nd,  both 
of  our  lines  of  intrenchments  were  strengthened  and  rifle  pits 
were  dug  to  protect  our  skirmishers.  Besides  the  strong 
picket  force  in  our  front  we  required  one-third  of  the  men 
in  our  front  line  to  be  constantly  on  duty  day  and, night.  The 
position  was  so  extremely  critical  that  the  officers  usually 
slept  in  their  boots  with  swords  at  their  sides.  As  the  brigade 
remained  in  this  position  for  ten  days,  all  voted  it  one  of  the 
most  trying  decades  in  our  experience.  On  the  22nd  there  was 
a  great  deal  of  firing  in  our  front,  both  musketry  and  artillery, 
and  fighting  was  going  on  on  our  right.  Picket  duty  was  more 
than  usually  hazardous.  Early  on  the  morning  of  June  23,  our 
regiment  relieved  the  Eighty-ninth  Illinois  in  the  first  line  and 
Companies  C  and  H  were  sent  out  to  relieve  the  pickets.  It 
looked  very  much  as  if  we  should  continue  to  hold  our  posi 
tion,  as  the  enemy  were  very  strongly  intrenched  in  our  front 
and  behind  them  were  the  frowning  battlements  of  Kenesaw 
Mountain.  On  this  day  Colonel  Gibson  returned  and  as  rank 
ing  officer  resumed  command  of  the  brigade.  The  regimental 
officers  met  in  his  tent  and  orders  were  published  requiring 
us  to  advance  our  skirmish  line  in  co-operation  with  General 
Hazen's  skirmishers  on  our  immediate  right.  Our  batteries 
pounded  the  enemy's  position  with  shot  and  shell  for  about 


FKOM  BALD  KNOB  TO  THE  CHATTAHOOCHEE  503 

half  an  hour  when  we  reinforced  our  skirmish  lines  by  Com 
panies  D  and  F,  Companies  C  and  H  being  already  on  the 
picket  line.  All  moved  rapidly  forward  and  drove  the  enemy's 
skirmishers  from  their  pits.  But  General  Hazen's  men  did 
not  move  forward  on  our  right  and  wre  were  caught  by  an  en 
filading  fire  and  suffered  severly,  losing  three  men  killed  and 
Lieutenant  Geiger  and  seventeen  enlisted  men  killed  and 
wounded. 

That  night  the  pioneers  were  sent  out  to  dig  rifle  pits  and 
erect  barricades  for  the  better  protection  of  the  pickets. 

The  morning  of  June  21,  we  retired  to  the  second  line  of 
works  and  our  place  on  the  front  line  was  again  taken  by  the 
Eighty-ninth  Illinois.  A  brook  of  running  water  just  in  rear 
of  our  position  furnished  us  with  water  for  drinking,  cooking 
and  bathing.  We  seldom  inquired  where  our  water  came  from 
or  whether  it  was  pure  or  impure ;  we  knew  nothing  then 
about  germs  or  microbes,  and  if  it  was  moderately  clear  and 
cold  we  were  grateful.  From  a  point  near  our  position  we 
could  plainly  see  the  opposing  troops  moving  about  inside 
their  works,  apparently  paying  little  attention  to  our  sharp 
shooters  ;  the  batteries  on  our  part  of  the  line  were  quiet  and 
it  seemed  almost  as  if  a  truce  had  been  agreed  upon.  From 
a  hill  behind  our  position  we  could  see  a  building  said  to  be 
in  Marietta  and  the  enemy's  works  on  Kenesaw  and  on  two 
smaller  eminences  which  our  artillery  was  shelling.  Bridge's 
battery.  First  Illinois  Artillery,  of  four  heavy  guns,  had  been 
placed  in  position  on  Bald  Knob  to  our  immediate  left.  In 
the  afternoon  General  Thomas  and  several  other  officers  came 
riding  up  to  the  rear  of  Bald  Knob.  General  Thomas  dis 
mounted  and  slowly  climbed  up  the  knob  to  look  out  over 
the  ground  in  its  front.  Quite  a  number  of  officers  of  our 
brigade,  including  the  writer,  were  attracted  to  that  part  of  the 
line  by  his  presence  and  at  a  respectful  distance  also  ascended 
the  knob  and  stood  behind  the  works.  General  Thomas 
looked  through  one  of  the  embrasures  with  his  field  glasses 
and  turning  to  one  of  the  artillery  officers  said,  ''Lieutenant, 
suppose  you  fire  a  shot  or  two  and  see  if  they  are  still  there." 
The  officer  had  the  shots  fired  as  ordered  and  there  \vas  an 
immediate  response.  The  enemy's  batteries  opened  with  a 
furious  storm  of  shot  and  shell,  one  of  which  dismounted  one  of 
our  guns.  General  Thomas  at  once  trotted  down  the  hill  to 
his  horse,  his  heavy  form  shaking  with  laughter,  and  saying, 
"they  are  still  there."  On  the  morning  of  the  25th  when  we 
again  relieved  the  Eighty-ninth  Illinois  on  the  front  line,  our 
men  were  cautioned  not  to  unduly  expose  themselves,  as  the 


504  FIFTEENTH   OHIO  VOLUNTEERS   AND   CAMPAIGNS 

Eighty-ninth  Illinois  the  day  before  had  several  men  wounded 
inside  the  works.  An  order  for  the  regular  monthly  inspection 
was  issued  and  also  an  order  requiring  an  estimate  of  clothing 
needed.  As  the  blank  forms  required  for  the  estimate  were 
eight  miles  to  the  rear  at  Big  Shanty,  Sergeant  Major  Gleason 
was  sent  for  them,  riding  the  adjutant's  horse.1  There  was 
sharp  picket  firing  during  the  day. 

Sunday  morning,  June  26,  our  good  Chaplain  Randall 
Ross  came  up  from  the  hospital  bringing  a  supply  of  station 
ery  and  tracts.  There  was  service  by  the  Chaplain  of  the 
Twenty-fifth  Illinois.  We  were  relieved  on  the  front  and 
skirmish  lines  by  the  Eighty-ninth  Illinois  and  the  men  of 
our  regiment  engaged  in  writing  letters,  bathing,  washing 
their  clothing  and  preparing  for  rain  which  was  threatened. 
During  the  morning  there  was  a  truce  along  the  lines  of  our 
brigade  and  the  enemy  buried  some  of  their  dead,  who  had 
fallen  in  the  recent  fighting.2  After  the  truce  was  ended, 
picket  firing  was  resumed  as  fierce  as  ever.  Shortly  after 
this  two  of  our  men  came  from  the  front,  bearing  on  a 
stretcher  a  stalwart  Confederate  who  had  been  severely 
wounded  a  day  or  two  before.  'He  was  a  shocking  spectacle. 
His  black  hair  was  matted  above  his  white  unshorn  face,  his 
wounds  were  festering  and  his  clothing  was  in  rags.  Our 
men  were  bearing  him  back  to  our  hospital  where  he  could 
receive  attention.  Who  he  was  and  what  was  his  fate  one 
cannot  tell. 

In  the  afternoon  there  was  furious  cannonading  all  along 
the  line.  Colonel  S.  F.  Gray  and  the  adjutant  were  standing 
together  just  to  the  left  of  our  line  of  works  behind  a  large 
tree  which  sheltered  them  from  the  enemy's  bullets,  whose 
zt.  zt.  was  unusually  annoying,  when  a  Captain  of  Artillery, 
riding  a  fine  horse,  came  galloping  up.  Behind  him  was  his 
battery,  the  horses  at  full  run.  The  officer  had  dark  hair  and 
beard  and  we  thought  it  was  Captain  Goodspeed,  whose  bat 
tery  was  formerly  attached  to  our  brigade.  He  quickly  un- 
limbered  his  guns  preparatory  to  opening  fire  on  the  enemy. 
We  at  once  started  towards  him  and  Colonel  Gray  called  out : 
"Goodspeed,  you  don't  know  what  you  are  doing!  You  can't 
live  there  a  minute !"  The  officer,  however,  paid  no  attention 
to  Colonel  Gray's  warning  and  we  then  saw  he  was  not  Cap 
tain  Goodspeed.  He  placed  his  guns  in  line  in  a  small  open 
space  between  the  left  of  our  intrenchments  and  Bald  Knob 
and  commenced  firing  by  file,  giving  the  signal  for  the  dis 
charge  of  each  piece  by  clapping  his  hands.  He  was  a  splen- 

1     Gleasons  Diary. 

•2     Frank  L.  Schreiber's  Diary. 


JOHN  McCLENAHAN 

Lieutenant  Colonel  of  the  Regiment  from  July  24,  1864  to  its  final 
muster  out.  He  was  with  the  regiment  from  its  organization,  and  was 
present  in  all  its  campaigns  and  battles. 


FROM  BALD  KNOB  TO  THE  CHATTAHOOCHEE  505 

did  figure  as  he  sat  on  his  horse  directing  the  tire  of  his  guns. 
This  battery  fire,  coming  as  it  did  from  a  new  and  lower  point, 
was  evidently  disconcerting  to  the  enemy,  who  at  first  fired 
over  him,  but  they  soon  got  his  range  and  dismounted  one  of 
his  guns.  One  of  his  Lieutenants  and  a  number  of  his  men 
were  wounded,  so  many,  that  the  writer  has  an  indistinct 
recollection  that  he  made  a  detail  of  men  to  aid  in  serving 
the  guns  after  the  battery  ranks  had  been  depleted.  He 
continued  serving  his  guns  for  about  an  hour  and  until  the 
enemy's  batteries  in  our  front  were  silenced,  when  he  lim 
bered  up  and  galloped  off  as  suddenly  as  he  came.  We  learned 
afterwards  that  the  officer  in  command  of  the  battery  \vas 
Captain  Hubert  Dilger,  and  his  battery,  Battery  I,  First 
Illinois  Artillery.  He  had  become  quite  noted  as  a  sort  of 
free  lance  in  the  artillery  service.  He  wore  buckskin  trousers 
arid  the  boys  called  him  "Leather  Breeches."  It  was  said  that 
he  would  carefully  examine  the  location  of  the  enemy's  bat 
teries,  get  permission  to  choose  his  own  method  of  attack  and 
then  would  rapidly  lead  his  own  battery  to  a  new  position, 
sometimes  outside  of  our  skirmish  line,  and  open  out  on  and 
silence  the  enemy's  guns  almost  before  they  knew  of  his 
presence.  General  Stanley  was  reported  as  saying,  in  his 
quiet,  humorously  sarcastic  way,  that  "he  was  going  to  order 
bayonets  for  Dilger's  guns."  The  usual  sharp  picket  firing 
continued  during  the  night  and  our  pioneers  worked  all  night 
felling  trees  on  the  hill  in  our  rear,  in  order  to  remove  ob 
structions  to  the  fire  of  batteries  posted  there. 

For  several  days,  with  varying  success,  we  had  been  work 
ing  and  fighting  our  way  into  position  in  front  of  the  enemy's 
strong  position  on  Kenesaw  Mountain.  On  the  22nd  of  June 
some  of  us  had  watched  the  affair  at  Kolb's  House  on  Kene 
saw  Mountain,  where  Hood's  corps  had  assaulted  the  white 
and  blue  star  divisions  of  Hooker's  corps  and  were  signally 
repulsed.  It  was  a  fine  sight  to  watch  this  fighting  of 
Hooker's  men  and  to  see  how  gallantly  they  met  and  defeated 
the  enemy's  troops.  General  Sherman  in  his  official  report 
says,  speaking  of  the  affair  at  Kolb's  House  and  subsequent 
movements,  says : 

"Although  inviting  the  enemy  at  all  times  to  commit 
such  mistakes,  I  could  not  hope  for  him  to  repeat  them  after 
the  example  of  Dallas  and  the  Kolb  House,  and  upon  studying 
the  ground  I  had  no  alternative  in  my  turn,  but  to  assault  his 
lines  or  turn  his  position.  Either  course  had  its  difficulties 
and  dangers,  and  I  had  perceived  that  the  enemy  and  our 
own  officers  had  settled  down  to  a  conviction  that  I  would 

Sig.    17 


50G  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEEKS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

not  assault  his  fortified  lines.  All  looked  to  me  to  outflank. 
*  *  *  I  wanted,  therefore,  for  the  moral  effect,  to  make  a 
successful  assault  against  the  enemy  behind  his  breastworks, 
and  resolved  to  attempt  it  at  that  point  where  success  would 
give  the  largest  fruits  of  victory.  The  general  point  selected 
was  the  left  center,  because  if  I  could  thrust  a  strong  head 
of  column  through  at  that  point,  by  pushing  it  boldly  and 
rapidly  two  and  one-half  miles  it  would  reach  the  railroad 
below  Marietta,  cut  off  the  enemy's  right  and  center  from  its 
line  of  retreat,  and  then  by  turning  on  either  part  it  could  be 
overwhelmed  and  destroyed.  Therefore 'on  the  24th  of  June 
I  ordered  that  an  assault  should  be  made  at  two  points  south 
of  Kenesaw  on  the  27th,  giving  three  days'  notice  for  prepara 
tion  and  reconnoissance,  one  to  be  made  near  little  Kenesaw 
by  General  McPherson's  troops  and  the  other  about  a  mile 
further  south  by  General  Thomas'  troops.1 

The  point  for  this  assault  by  General  Thomas'  troops  was 
near  the  left  of  Stanley's  division  of  our  corps.  General 
Marker's  and  General  Wagner's  brigades  were  designated  to 
lead  the  assault  while  General  Kimball's  brigade  moved  in 
echelon  in  support  of  Wagner's  brigade.  Such  troops  of 
Stanley's  and  our  (Woods)  division  as  were  free  to  move 
were  massed  in  support.2  Both  assaults  failed  and  we  suf 
fered  heavy  losses  in  killed  and  wounded.  Among  the  killed 
were  General  Harker  and  Colonel  Daniel  McCook,  two  young 
officers  of  great  promise. 

Our  part  in  this  engagement  was  inconspicuous.  On  the 
morning  of  the  27th,  we  were  informed  that  there  was  to  be 
a  general  assault  on  the  enemy's  lines  and  that  our  brigade- 
was  to  occupy  and  hold  the  line  held  by  our  entire  division 
while  the  assault  was  being  made.  At  7  :30  a.  in.  our  regiment 
took  the  place  on  the  line  of  Hazen's  brigade  as  it  moved  out 
of  it.  A  little  later  heavy  cannonading  opened,  from  all  our 
batteries,  apparently,  and  at  8 :30  we  heard  musketry  firing 
on  our  left  toward  Kenesaw,  which  evidently  was  the  assault 
planned  to  be  made  by  General  McPherson's  troops.  We 
heard  little  firing  on  our  right  and  supposed  that  the  assault 
ordered  to  be  made  by  General  Newton's  troops  had  been 
postponed.  We  afterwards  learned  that  the  assault  had  been 
made  and  that  our  troops  had  been  repulsed  with  heavy  loss. 
W7e  also  heard  that  General  Harker  and  Colonel  Dan  McCook 
were  among  the  killed.  The  position  where  Newton's  troops 
had  assaulted  was  quite  near  us  and  we  supposed  the  con 
tour  of  the  hills  or  conflicting  air  currents  had  prevented  the 

1  W.  R.  R.   72-68. 

2  General  Howard's  Report,  W.  R.  R.  72-199. 


PROM  BALD  KNOB  TO  THE  CHATTAHOOCHEE  "»07 

noise  of  the  battle  from  reaching  us.  About  noon  word  came 
from  General  Wood  that  the  enemy  was  massing  on  our  front, 
whereupon  every  man  was  ordered  to  his  place  behind  the 
works  ready  for  any  emergency.  No  attack,  however,  was 
made  and  we  were  soon  afterwards  relieved  and  took  up 
our  position  on  our  former  line,  relieving  the  Eighty-ninth 
Illinois.  While  we  were  retiring  a  man  in  the  Thirty-fifth 
Illinois  was  wounded  by  a  rebel  sharpshooter.  The  usual 
picket  firing  continued  during  the  night. 

It  was  reported  that  our  losses  in  the  assaults  on  the 
enemy's  works  were  several  thousand  killed  and  wounded 
and  there  was  an  undercurrent  of  severe  criticism  of  General 
Sherman  for  sending  our  troops  against  works  which  were 
generally  believed  to  be  impregnable.  This  criticism  was 
not  softened  when  the  General  publicly  assumed  the  respon 
sibility  and  said  that  he  had  ordered  the  assault  because  the 
enemy  had  come  to  believe  he  would  not  attack  their  works ; 
that  he  wished  to  show  them  they  were  mistaken  and  at  the 
same  time  to  improve  the  morale  of  his  own  troops.  It  was 
afterwards  learned  that  the  losses  had  been  greatly  exag 
gerated.  Indeed,  the  losses  in  General  Newton's  division  of 
our  corps  were  officially  ascertained  to  be  only  654  killed, 
wounded  and  missing,1  and  in  General  Davis'  division  of  the 
Fourteenth  Corps,  824,2  or  a  total  of  1458  in  the  two  divisions 
which  made  the  assault  on  our  immediate  right.  The  losses 
sustained  by  the  column  under  General  Morgan  L.  Smith, 
which  made  the  assault  at  a  point  on  McPherson's  front  were 
only  317.3  The  total  losses  in  both  assaults  were  1795.  It  will 
be  observed  that  the  losses  in  both  Davis'  and  Newton's 
divisions  were  only  twenty-one  more  than  the  losses  in  our  divi 
sion  alone  on  May  27  at  Pickett's  Mills.  But  the  battle  of  Kene- 
alone  on  May  27  at  Pickett's  Mills.  But  the  battle  of  Kene- 
saw  Mountain,  June  27,  was  more  spectacular,  was  more 
widely  reported  and  discussed  and  was  more  conspicuous, 
because  of  the  loss  of  so  many  promising  officers  of  high 
rank.  The  assault  on  Kenesaw  Mountain  was  the  culmina 
tion  of  a  long  series  of  movements,  partial  successes  and 
failures,  since  crossing  the  Etowah  River,  which  were  alike 
trying  to  officers  and  men.  Perhaps  they  had  been  most  try 
ing  to  the  highly  wrought,  nervous  temperament  of  our  great 
commander.  General  Sherman. 

On  the  22nd  day  of  May  at  Kingston,  Ga.,  he  telegraphed 
to  Lieutenant  Colonel  Donaldson  at  Nashville,  Tenn. :  "Horse 

1  W.  R.  R.  72-296. 

2  W.    R.    R.    72-637. 

3  W.   R.   R.    74-179. 


508  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

arrived  all  safe  and  sound.  He  looks  well,  and  I  will  ride 
him  to  morrow  across  the  Etowah,  which  is  the  Rubicon  of 
Georgia.  We  are  now  all  in  motion  like  a  vast  hive  of  bees 
and  except  to  swarm  along  the  Chattahoochee  in  five  days/'1 
He  was  cutting  loose  from  the  railroad,  his  line  of  supplies, 
and  expected  in  three  days  to  have  his  entire  army  concen 
trated  about  Dallas,  from  which  point  he  could  strike  Marietta 
or  the  Chattahoochee,  according  to  developments.  He  evi 
dently  thought  Johnston,  if  the  concentration  was  successful, 
would  abandon  Marietta  and  place  his  army  safely  behind  the 
Chattahoochee.  But  in  this  he  was  disappointed.  Instead  of 
"swarming  like  bees  along  the  Chattahoochee  in  five  days," 
it  was  more  than  five  weeks  before  that  hope  was  realized. 
General  Johnston,  able  and  wary  strategist  as  he  was,  did  not 
propose  to  permit  such  concentration  without  strenuous 
efforts  to  prevent  it.  In  these  he  Avas  favored  by  a  better 
knowledge  of  the  most  difficult  country  and  its  roads  and 
streams.  He  also  knew  that  General  Sherman  had  cut  loose 
from  his  line  of  supplies  and  knew  the  great  risks  he  had 
taken  in  doing  so.  He  was  also  aided  by  the  summer  rains 
which  began  on  May  25  and  continued  with  only  slight  inter 
missions  for  over  a  month.  On  May  25  he  struck  the  head  of 
General  Thomas'  column  at  Pumpkin  Vine  Creek,  checked 
the  concentration  at  Dallas  and  when  Sherman  halted  and 
closed  in  on  him  with  a  view  of  forcing  an  engagement,  he 
was  found  too  strongly  intrenched  to  warrant  an  attack  on 
his  lines.  Then  followed  the  arduous,  dangerous  and  often 
unsuccessful  maneuvers  toward  getting  him  out  from  behind 
his  works  and  flanking  him  out  of  one  position  only  to  find 
him  as  strongly  and  securely  intrenched  in  another,  often  with 
severe  losses  and  without  compensating  benefits. 

General  Sherman  almost  every  day  reported  progress  to 
General  Halleck,  but  about  the  only  reassuring  news  he  could 
continue  to  give  was  that  he  was  so  engaging  the  enemy 
that  he  could  not  detach  any  troops  to  send  to  oppose  General 
Grant  in  his  advance  on  Richmond.  This  was  the  burden  of 
so  many  dispatches  that  General  Grant  on  June  28  telegraphed 
through  General  Halleck  saying  his,  General  Sherman's, 
movements  might  be  made  entirely  independent  of  any  desire 
to  retain  Johnston's  forces  where  ,they  were.  That  he  did 
not  think  Lee  would  bring  any  additional  forces  to  Rich 
mond  on  account  of  the  difficulty  of  feeding  them.2  General 
Johnston,  besides  holding  Sherman  in  check  as  above 
described,  detached  numerous  cavalry  detachments  to  break 

1     W.  R.  R.  75-299. 
'2     W.  R.  R.  7o-629. 


FROM  BALD  KXOB  TO  THE  CHATTAHOOCHEE  509 

and  interrupt  our  line  of  supplies,  and  almost  every  day  there 
were  actual  or  rumored  raids  on  the  railroad,  burning  of 
bridges,  blowing  up  portions  of  the  track,  cutting  of  telegraph 
wires  and  other  such  depredations.  When  it  was  realized  that 
our  army  was  in  the  enemy's  country  and  that  practically  all 
our  supplies  of  every  description  had  to  be  transported  over 
a  single  line  of  railroad  nearly  500  miles  in  extent,  running 
for  a  greater  part  of  its  length  through  the  enemy's  country, 
crossing  wide  and  deep  streams  and  threading  its  way 
through  mountainous  regions  infested  by  roving  bands  of 
guerillas,  it  is  not  surprising  that  at  times  the  General  in 
Chief  was  almost  overwhelmed  by  the  magnitude  of  his  task. 
His  official  reports  and  correspondence,  however,  show  only 
a  grim  determination  to  meet  and  to  overcome  all  obstacles 
in  the  way  of  success.  There  was  one  person  to  whom  he 
seems  to  have  opened  his  heart,  and  that  was  General  Grant. 
In  an  official  letter  to  him,  written  June  18,  1864,  we  get  an 
insight  into  some  of  the  difficulties  and  trials  of  the  campaign 
which  we  do  not  get  in  the  official  reports.  In  this  letter, 
after  telling  of  McPherson's  failure  to  sieze  Resaca,  he  says : 
''Our  cavalry  is  dwindling  away.  We  cannot  get  full  forage, 
and  have  to  graze,  so  that  the  cavalry  is  always  unable  to 
attempt  anything.  Garrard  is  over-cautious  and  I  think 
Stoneman  is  lazy.  The  former  has  4500  and  the  latter  2500. 
Each  has  had  fine  chances  of  cutting  in  but  were  easily 
checked  by  the  appearance  of  the  enemy.  My  chief  source  of 
trouble  is  with  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  which  is  dread 
fully  slow.  A  fresh  furrow  in  a  plowed  field  will  stop  the 
whole  column,  and  all  begin  to  intrench.  I  have  again  and 
again  tried  to  impress  on  Thomas  that  we  must  assail  and 
not  defend,  we  are  the  offensive,  and  yet  it  seems  that  the 
whole  Army  of  the  Cumberland  is  so  habituated  to  be  on 
the  defensive  that,  from  its  commander  down  to  the  lowest 
private,  I  cannot  get  it  out  of  their  heads.  I  came  out  with 
out  tents  and  ordered  all  to  do  likewise,  yet  Thomas  has  a 
headquarters  camp  on  the  style  of  Halleck  at  Corinth — every 
aide  and  orderly  with  a  small  tent,  and  a  baggage  train  big 
enough  for  a  division.  He  promised  to  send  it  all  back,  but 
the  truth  is,  everybody  there  is  allowed  to  do  as  he  pleases 
and  they  still  think  and  act  as  though  the  railroad  and  all  its 
facilities  were  theirs.  This  slowness  has  cost  me  the  loss  of 
two  splendid  opportunities  which  never  recur  in  war.  At 
Dallas  there  was  a  delay  of  four  hours  to  get  ready  to  advance, 
when  we  first  met  Johnson's  head  of  column,  and  that  four 
hours  enabled  him  to  throw  up  works  to  cover  the  head  of 


510  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

his  column  and  he  extended  his  works  about  as  fast  as  we 
deployed.  Also  here  I  broke  one  of  his  lines,  and  had  we 
followed  it  up  as  I  ordered  at  daylight  there  was  nothing 
between  us  and  the  railroad  track  back  of  Marietta.  I  ordered 
Thomas  to  move  at  daylight  and  when  I  got  to  the  point  at 
9  :30  I  found  Stanley  and  Wood  quarreling  which  should  not 
lead.  I'm  afraid  I  swore,  and  said  what  I  should  not,  but  I 
got  them  started,  but  instead  of  reaching  the  Atlanta  road 
back  of  Marietta,  which  is  Johnston's  center,  we  only  got  to 
a  creek  to  the  south  of  it  by  night,  and  now  a  heavy  rain 
stops  us  and  gives  time  to  fortify  a  new  line.  Still  I  have 
all  the  high  and  commanding  ground  but  the  one  peak  near 
Marietta  which  I  can  turn.  We  have  had  an  immense  quan 
tity  of  rain,  from  June  2  to  14,  and  now  it  is  raining  as  though 
it  had  no  intention  ever  to  stop.  The  enemy's  cavalry  sweeps 
all  around  us,  and  is  now  to  my  rear  somewhere.  The  wires 
are  broken  very  often,  but  I  have  strong  guards  along  the 
road  which  make  prompt  repairs.  Thus  far  our  supplies  of 
food  have  been  good  and  forage  moderate,  and  we  have  found 
growing  wheat,  rye,  oats,  etc.  You  may  go  on  with  the  full 
assurance  that  I  will  continue  to  press  Johnston  as  fast  as  I 
can  over  come  the  natural  obstacles  and  inspire  motion  into 
a  large,  ponderous,  and  slow  (by  habit)  army.  Of  course 
it  cannot  keep  up  with  my  thoughts  and  wishes,  but  no 
impulse  can  be  given  it  that  I  will  not  guide."1  General  Sher 
man's  strictures  in  the  above  quoted  letter  on  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland  seemed  uncalled  for  in  an  official  letter. 
That  it  had  failed  to  come  up  to  his  expectations  on  two 
important  occasions  are  doubtless  true,  but  there  may  have 
been  extenuating  circumstances.  The  Army  of  the  Cumber 
land  may  have  been  slow,  but  up  to  that  time  it  had  done  the 
heavier  part  of  the  hard  fighting  and  had  suffered  the  heaviest 
losses.  What  General  Sherman  says  about  General  Thomas' 
headquarters  is  literally  true.  They  seemed  like  a  small 
village  and  were  called  "Thomastown"  or  "Thomasville"  by 
officers  and  men  of  the  line.  It  was  known  that  General 
Sherman  had  only  a  single  tent,  and  sometimes  only  a  fly 
which  was  carried  on  a  pack-mule,  and  which  was  erected 
wherever  he  happened  to  be  when  night  came  on.  It  was 
said,  however,  that  whenever  General  Sherman  wanted  a 
good  meal  he  went  to  General  Thomas'  headquarters  to  get  it. 

But  there  were  other  things  besides  these  which  were 
causing  General  Sherman  trouble,  of  which  we  get  a  hint  by 
reading  the  now  published  correspondence.  Some  of  the  sub- 

1     W.  R.  R.  75-507. 


PROM  BALD  KNOB  TO  THE  CHATTAHOOCHEE  511 

ordinate  general  officers  were  querulous  and  complaining  and 
the  General  found  it  necessary  to  call  Generals  Thomas  and 
McPherson  into  counsel  to  see  if  possible  who  were  trying 
to  foment  jealousies  and  create  difficulties.1 

The  enemy  had  been  flanked  out  of  and  driven  from  Pine 
Mountain,  had  been  flanked  out  of  Lost  Mountain,  had  been 
hemmed  in  about  Kenesaw  Mountain,  covering  Marietta,  for 
about  ten  days,  and  all  efforts  to  turn  either  of  his  flanks  and 
get  him  out  of  his  strong  position  had  failed. 

The  Army  of  the  Tennessee  had  closed  in  on  the  eastern 
side  of  the  mountain  as  far  as  Noonday  Creek,  the  Army  of 
the  Ohio  on  its  western  side,  had  closed  in  to  Noyes  Creek  and 
both  Generals  McPherson  and  Schofield  reported  a  further  ad 
vance  as  impossible.  The  Army  of  the  Cumberland  hugged  its 
northern  end  closely  and  seemed  equally  powerless  to  advance. 
In  a  letter  to  General  Thomas  of  date  June  24,  General  Sher 
man  ironically  says :  "Schofield  reports  he  can't  go  ahead  for 
the  enemy  and  his  intrenchments,  and  is  far  outflanked.  I  sup 
pose  the  enemy,  with  his  smaller  force,  intends  to  surround 
us.  But  I  propose  to  study  the  ground  well  and  the  day  after 
tomorrow  break  through  after  letting  him  develop  his  line 
as  much  as  possible  and  attenuate.  According  to  Blair  his 
right  is  no\v  at  Roswell  Factory  and,  according  to  Schofield, 
his  left  is  more  than  a  mile  to  his  right,  across  Olley's  Creek, 
so  our  best  chance  is  to  break  through.  I  am  just  making 
orders  on  the  subject,  which  I  wish  kept  to  army  commanders 
for  the  present."2 

These  were  the  orders  issued  for  the  assault  which  is 
known  as  the  battle  of  Kenesaw  Mountain  of  June  27,  1864, 
our  part  in  which  has  already  been  described. 

During  this  attack  General  Sherman  had  taken  position 
on  "Signal  Hill"  to  overlook  and  direct  the  movements  should 
the  enemy's  line  be  broken,  and  his  dispatches  to  his  army 
commanders  show  his  keen  disappointment  at  its  failure. 
Even  after  its  failure  he  seemed  eager  for  its  renewal. 

After  General  Thomas  had  reported  to  him  that  Marker 
had  advanced  his  brigade  to  within  twenty  paces  of  the 
enemy's  intrenchments  and  had  been  repulsed  with  canister 
at  that  range,  losing  an  arm  ;  that  Wagner's  brigade  was  so 
severely  handled  that  it  was  compelled  to  reorganize ;  that 
Colonel  McCook's  brigade  of  Davis'  division  had  also  been 
severely  handled,  nearly  every  Colonel  being  killed  or 
wounded,  and  compelled  to  fall  back  and  reorganize,  he  dis 
patched  to  General  Thomas: 

1  W.  R.  R.  75-589. 

2  W.  R.  R.   75-582. 


512  FIFTEENTH   OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

"McPherson's  column  reached  near  the  top  of  the  hill 
through  very  tangled  brush,  but  was  repulsed.  It  is  found 
almost  impossible  to  deploy,  but  they  still  hold  the  ground. 
I  wish  you  would  study  well  the  position,  and  if  it  is  possible 
to  break  the  line,  do  it ;  it  is  easier  now  than  it  will  be  here 
after.  Hold  fast  all  you  make."1 

An  hour  later  he  again  dispatched  to  General  Thomas : 

"McPherson  and  Schofield  are  at  a  deadlock.  Do  you 
think  you  can  carry  any  part  of  the  enemy's  line  today? 
McPherson's  men  are  up  to  the  abatis  and  can't  move  without 
the  direct  assault.  I  will  order  the  assault  if  you  think  you 
can  succeed  at  any  point.  Schofield  has  one  division  close 
up  on  the  Powder  Springs  road,  and  the  other  across  Olley's 
Creek,  about  two  miles  to  his  right  and  rear."2 

General  Thomas  answered  these  dispatches  saying  that 
Generals  Howard  and  Davis  had  reported  that  they  did  not 
think  they  could  carry  the  wrorks  by  assault  because  of  the 
steepness  of  the  hill,  but  could  put  in  two  batteries  at  night 
and  probably  drive  them  out  in  the  morning;  that  the  enemy's 
works  were  from  six  to  seven  feet  high  and  nine  feet  thick, 
covered  by  strong  abatis,  and  that  he,  General  Thomas,  did 
not  think  they  could  be  carried  today,  but  could  be  approached 
by  saps.  To  this  General  Sherman  replied : 

"Secure  what  advantageous  ground  you  have  gained; 
but  is  there  anything  in  the  enemy's  present  position  that  if 
we  should  approach  by  regular  saps  he  could  not  make  a 
dozen  newr  parapets  before  one  sap  can  be  completed?  Does 
the  nature  of  the  ground  warrant  the  time  necessary  for  regu 
lar  approaches  ?'  To  this  General  Thomas  at  once  replied : 

"We  still  have  all  the  ground  wre  have  gained  and  division 
commanders  report  their  ability  to  hold  it.  They  also  report 
the  enemy's  works  exceedingly  strong.  In  fact,  so  strong  that 
they  cannot  be  carried  by  assault  except  at  immense  sacrifice, 
even  if  they  can  be  carried  at  all.  I  think  therefore  the  best 
chance  is  to  approach  them  by  regular  saps,  and  if  we  can 
find  a  favorable  position  to  batter  them  down."  He  then 
adds  this  pointed  rebuke  :  "We  have  already  lost  heavily  today 
without  any  material  advantage ;  one  or  two  more  such 
assaults  would  use  up  this  army."3 

Of  course  General  Sherman  could  not  let  this  fling  pass 
unnoticed,  and  mildly  urged  that  such  assaults  were  often  justi 
fied.  He  did  not  let  it  interfere  with  the  good  relations  existing 
between  him  and  General  Thomas  and  at  once  sought  the  latter's 
counsel  as  to  the  next  move  on  the  enemy. 

1  and  2     W.  R.  R.  75-609. 
3     W.  R.  R.  7.".- 610. 


FROM  BALD  KNOB  TO  THE  CHATTAHOOCHEE  513 

The  only  point  of  advantage  gained  during  the  day's 
movements  was  far  on  the  right,  where  General  J.  D.  Cox 
affected  a  lodgment  in  a  commanding  position  which  threat 
ened  the  enemy's  left  and  his  communications  to  the  rear. 
Acting  alone  and  almost  without  immediate  support,  that 
accomplished  and  clear-headed  officer  advanced  and  occupied 
the  crossing  of  Olley's  Creek  on  the  Sandtown  road  and, 
seeing  its  importance,  decided  to  hold  it  at  all  hazards  until 
he  had  orders  to  do  otherwise.  Upon  receiving  his  modest 
report,  General  Schofield  reported  the  matter  to  General  Sher 
man,  who  ordered  that  the  position  gained  be  permanently 
held  with  a  view  to  future  movements. 

Before  the  close  of  June  27,  General  Sherman  had  vir 
tually  decided  to  again  cut  loose  from  the  railroad,  and  move 
by  the  Sandtown  road  on  Fulton  or  Turner's  Ferry  of  the 
Chattahoochee.  General  Thomas  acquiesced  in  the  movement 
and  issued  orders  to  his  army  to  make  immediate  prepara 
tions  to  move  with  the  utmost  celerity  with  ten  days' 
rations  and  forage.1  The  Fifteenth  Ohio  on  the  night  of  June 
27,  occupied  its  former  place  on  the  front  line  with  the  usual 
quota  in  the  rifle  pits  in  its  front.  There  was  an  alarm  during 
the  night  which  brought  every  one  into  the  works,  but  the 
firing  soon  subsided  to  the  usual  exchanges  between  the 
pickets.  The  next  morning,  June  28,  the  Eighth  Kansas, 
which  had  been  caught  at  Chattanooga  on  its  return  from 
veteran  furlough  and  placed  in  charge  of  a  pontoon  train, 
rejoined  the  brigade  and  was  warmly  welcomed  by  its  old 
comrades.  The  exaggerated  reports  of  our  losses  in  the 
operations  of  the  day  before  caused  a  general  depression 
among  the  men  in  the  ranks.  John  G.  Gregory  in  his  diary 
says :  ''Boys  somewhat  discouraged  at  our  reverses.  I  will 
not  yet  despair,  feeling  as  I  do,  that  the  God  of  Battles  is  on  our 
side.  Our  prospects  are  dark  at  times,  but  behind  the  dark 
clouds  there  is  a  clear  sky.  Let  us  hope  for  the  better." 

There  was  heavy  firing  on  our  immediate  right  about 
midnight,  said  to  be  General  Davis'  division  charging  the 
enemy's  breastworks,  and  the  regiment  was  ordered  into  the 
front  line  of  works.2 

On  the  morning  of  June  29  we  again  relieved  the  Eighty- 
ninth  Illinois  on  the  front  and  picket  lines  and  enjoyed  an 
unusually  quiet  day.  There  was  a  sort  of  truce  between  the 
contending  picket  lines  in  our  front  all  morning  and  for  the 
time  the  men  ceased  shooting  at  each  other.  In  the  evening 
our  batteries  shelled  the  mountain  and  we  could  see  the  shells 

1  W.  R.   R.   75-630. 

2  Wm.  MeConnell's  and  Gleason's  Diaries. 


514  FIFTEENTH   OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

exploding  in  the  enemy's  works.  The  enemy's  batteries  in 
our  immediate  front  were  silent  and  it  was  thought  they  had 
been  withdrawn.  Picket  firing  was  resumed  in  the  evening. 
In  the  middle  of  the  night  there  was  a  rapid  roll  of  musketry 
from  the  right  and  every  one  rushed  to  the  breastworks  to 
repel  an  expected  attack.  The  fire  was  kept  up  for  some  time 
but  our  pickets  remained  at  their  posts  and  the  alarm  was 
soon  over. 

June  30,  we  were  relieved  from  duty  on  the  front  line 
and  rested  during  the  day.  The  pickets  kept  up  their  usual 
rattling  fire  and  our  artillery  failed  to  awaken  the  enemy's 
big  guns.  Had  they  been  withdrawn,  or  was  the  enemy 
merely  saving  up  his  ammunition?  There  wras  a  heavy 
thunderstorm  in  the  afternoon,  which  flooded  the  ground  and 
made  us  very  uncomfortable.  There  was  only  one  alarm  dur 
ing  the  night  but  the  firing  soon  subsided  and  we  were  not 
called  out.  The  morning  of  July  1,  our  regiment  was 
ordered  back  in  rear  of  the  position  we  held  when  we  charged 
Bald  Knob  on  June  21,  where  the  men  received  such  clothing 
as  they  were  in  need  of.  Our  batteries  opened  on  the  enemy 
but  there  was  no  response — a  mystery  we  could  not  under 
stand. 

On  the  morning  of  July  2,  we  again  took  position  in  the 
front  line,  relieving  the  Thirty-second  Indiana.  Our  bat 
teries  had  been  firing  since  daylight  all  along  the  line  but  the 
enemy's  guns  were  silent.  Before  we  had  occupied  the  front 
line  very  long  our  pickets  were  ordered  to  open  fire  and  con- 
tine  firing  for  half  an  hour,  after  first  giving  the  enemy's 
pickets  timely  warning.  Our  pickets  did  not  fire  so  briskly 
as  usual  and  the  enemy's  pickets  laid  low  until  the  half  hour 
was  up.  Our  men  then  waved  their  hats  and  the  men  on  both 
sides  came  out  of  their  works  and  looked  at  each  other.1 

Since  June  27  our  commanding  officers  had  been  hur 
riedly  at  work  accumulating  the  ten  days'  supplies  of  food 
and  forage  ordered  to  be  supplied  in  preparation  for  the  move 
ment  around  the  enemy's  left  flank,  as  above  mentioned.  All 
was  now  ready  for  the  movement.  McPherson's  army  was 
to  give  up  its  place  on  our  left  and  move  behind  our  lines  to 
our  right  to  lead  in  the  movement.  Soon  after  dark  our  regi 
ment  was  relieved  by  the  Thirty-second  Indiana  and  moved 
back  to  brigade  headquarters.  The  entire  brigade  was  assem 
bled  there  and  moved  by  the  left  flank  about  a  mile  and 
took  the  place  of  a  brigade  of  the  Fifteenth  Army  Corps  of 
McPherson's  army,  which  was  on  the  front  line  in  an  open 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


FROM  BALD  KNOB  TO  THE  CHATTAHOOCHEE  515 

field.  As  we  moved  into  position  the  enemy's  bullets  told 
by  their  zt.  zt.  that  our  only  secure  place  was  in  the  trenches. 
The  ground  was  very  filthy,  but  it  was  a  choice  between 
danger  and  dirt,1  and  most  men  preferred  the  latter.  It  was 
quite  dark  and  we  did  not  fully  realize  how  exposed  our 
position  was.  The  next  morning,  July  3,  before  daybreak, 
when  we  did  realize  it,  we  suspected  that  the  enemy  had 
abandoned  his  position.  Our  suspicions  were  soon  confirmed 
by  a  man  who  came  in  from  the  picket  line.  Sergeant  Major 
Gleason  was  at  once  sent  to  brigade  headquarters  with 
the  announcement,  which  was  the  first  they  had  received.2 
Our  breakfasts  were  hurriedly  prepared  and  eaten  and  we 
then  moved  back  whence  we  had  come  the  night  before. 
Quite  a  number  of  prisoners  were  gathered  in  by  our  brigade. 
They  mostly  belonged  to  the  First  Georgia  Reserves,  the 
same  regiment  from  which  Peter  Cupp  had  corralled  a  com 
pany  two  weeks  before.  In  the  early  hours  of  the  morning, 
before  it  was  clear  daylight,  Thomas  C.  Bethel,  a  Corporal  of 
Company  K,  was  mistaken  for  a  rebel  by  a  soldier  of  the  Four 
teenth  Corps  and  instantly  killed.  His  loss  was  greatly 
deplored,  for  he  was  a  brave  soldier  and  much  beloved  by  his 
comrades. 

We  marched  back  by  our  former  position  and  on  until 
we  reached  the  Marietta  road  where  we  rested,  awaiting 
orders,  until  about  10  a.  m.  We  then  resumed  our  march 
beside  the  road,  leaving  the  road  for  the  artillery  and  am 
munition  trains.  We  reached  a  point  near  the  Georgia  Mili 
tary  Institute  about  noon  and  made  preparations  for  dinner. 
We  were  not  permitted  to  finish  our  meal  but  were  pushed 
forward  west  of  the  town  of  Marietta  to  the  railroad  track 
near  a  large  tannery.  Here  we  remained  for  two  or  three 
hours  and  then  moved  on  over  a  very  crooked  road  and  in 
the  evening  turned  out  for  camp  on  a  large  plantation.  The 
occasional  boom  of  a  cannon  and  some  skirmish  firing  not  far 
to  our  right  indicated  that  the  enemy  was  still  near  at  hand 
and  delaying  our  advance. 

All  day  the  Armies  of  the  Tennessee  and  Ohio  had  been 
making  strenuous  efforts  to  strike  the  enemy  in  flank  before 
he  should  reach  the  Chattahoochee.  but  as  usual,  he  was  found 
behind  strong  intrenchments,  too  strong  to  warrant  attack 
in  front,  at  Smyrna  Camp  Meeting  Ground,  about  five  miles 
from  Marietta.  He  had  a  strong  tete-de-pont  at  the  Chatta 
hoochee  and  his  flanks  were  covered  and  protected  by  the 
Nickajack  and  Rottenwood  Creeks. 

1  and  2     Gleason's  Diary. 


516  FIFTEENTH   OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  C 

On  the  morning  of  July  4,  reveille  sounded  from  brigade 
headquarters  and  orders  came  to  be  ready  to  move  at  day 
light.  No  order  to  move,  however,  came  and  we  waited  while 
other  troops  of  our  corps  moved  forward.  Our  artillery 
had  been  throwing  an  occasional  shell  into  the  enemy's 
lines  during  the  night  and  now  opened  a  rapid  fire, 
which  was  followed  by  a  charge  of  a  part  of  the  Four 
teenth  Corps  and  Stanley's  division  of  the  Fourth  Corps. 
These  troops  over-ran  and  captured  the  entire  line  of  the 
enemy's  rifle  pits  on  the  main  Marietta  road,  together 
with  several  hundred  prisoners.  Our  brigade  did  not  move 
until  shortly  after  noon.  We  took  a  round-about  course 
through  the  woods  to  our  left  and  were  placed  in  position 
in  the  second  line  behind  the  crest  of  a  ridge  in  a  large  open 
ing  where  we  remained  during  the.  night.  The  sky  was  clear 
and  the  day  was  hot  and  humid.  Blackberries  were  abundant 
on  our  line  of  march  and  the  men  feasted  on  them  as  they 
marched.  On  the  morning  of  July  5,  while  we  were  at  break 
fast,  word  came  that  the  enemy  had  again  decamped.  The 
appearance  of  our  cavalry  and  some  of  McPherson's  troops 
at  a  point  below  them  on  the  river,  caused  their  hurried  retire 
ment.  We  moved  out  at  7  a.  m.  across  the  fields  and  along- 
country  roads  until  we  reached  the  railroad  about  two  miles 
distant,  which  we  followed  toward  the  river.  The  sun  was 
intensely  hot ;  there  were  frequent  halts  and  there  was  no  shade 
to  give  shelter  from  the  fervid  heat.  There  was  heavy  skirmish 
ing  in  our  front  and  our  progress  was  arduous  and  slow.  Upon 
nearing  Vining's  Station  we  left  the  railroad  and  taking  a 
road  to  the  left,  marched  over  the  hills  toward  the  river.  Our 
artillery  had  been  firing  for  some  time  quite  rapidly  and  we 
heard  that  it  was  shelling  a  pontoon  bridge  at  Pace's  Ferry 
over  which  the  enemy's  troops  were  crossing.  The  enemy 
was  so  closely  pressed  they  could  not  save  the  bridge  but 
cut  it  loose  on  this  side  and  swung  it  to  the  other  side  of  the 
river.1  We  were  placed  in  camp  not  far  from  the  river,  but 
exposed  to  stray  bullets  from  a  considerable  force  of  the 
enemy  occupying  a  strongly  intrenched  position,  still  on  our 
side  of  the  Chattahoochee.  Here  we  first  became  acquainted 
with  an  insect  called  "chigger,"  which  caused  an  eruption  all 
over  the  body  and  set  everyone  to  scratching.2 

And  now,  forty-two  days  after  crossing  the  Etowah 
River,  instead  of  five  as  buoyantly  predicted  by  General  Sher 
man,  we  were  "swarming  like  bees  along  the  Chattahoochee." 
During  these  forty-two  days,  except  two  da}^s  at  Ackworth, 

1  W.   R.   R.   76-51. 

2  Gleason's  Diary. 


PROM  BALD  KAOB  TO  THE  CHATTAHOOCHEE 


517 


we  had  been  in  immediate  touch  with  the  enemy,  and  the 
boom  of  cannon  and  the  zt.  of  bullets  had  not  been  absent 
from  our  ears  a  single  day  or  night.  They  had  been  days  of 
continuous,  arduous,  striving  and  fighting,  with,  in  some 
cases,  appalling  losses  in  killed  and  wounded.  It  may  truly 
be  said  that  the  period  was  one  continuous  battle.  From  a 
high  hill  just  in  the  rear  of  our  camp,  we  could  see  with  a 
field  glass  the  city  of  Atlanta,  the  goal  of  our  campaign.  But 
the  deep,  muddy  Chattahoochee  lay  before  us,  and  beyond, 
and  between  us  and  our  coveted  goal,  was  the  army  of  the 
Confederacy,  strongly  intrenched  and  still  powerful  and 
defiant.  There  was  the  Chattahoochee  and  other  streams  to 
cross  and  other  fierce  battles  to  fight  before  Atlanta  could 
be  won. 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 

THE     ATLANTA     CAMPAIGN FROM     THE     CHATTAHOOCHEE     TO 

ATLANTA. 

The  evening  of  July  5,  orders  were  issued  to  our  division 
to  force  a  crossing  of  the  Chattahoochee  at  Pace's  Ferry, 
making  use  of  the  pontoon  brige  which  the  enemy  had  swung 
to  the  farther  shore  of  the  river  at  that  point  and  abandoned,  if 
it  could  be  secured.  If  a  crossing  could  not  be  forced  at  this 
point  the  division  was  to  cross  at  some  other  point  to  be  selected 
by  General  Wood,  on  a  pontoon  bridge  to  be  furnished, — all  of 
the  artillery  of  the  corps  to  co-operate  in  the  movement.1  For 
some  reason  the  attempt  to  force  a  crossing  as  above  ordered 
was  not  made.  On  the  morning  of  the  sixth,  our  regiment  re 
ceived  orders  to  be  ready  to  move  at  5  o'clock.  No  order  to 
move  came,  however,  and  we  were  notified  that  we  might  not 
move  for  several  days.  The  men  thereupon  went  to  work  to 
clean  up  camp  and  make  themselves  comfortable.  The  forced 
crossing  of  the  river  may  have  been  abandoned  because  of  the 
movement  of  General  Garrard's  cavalry  against  Roswell  further 
up  the  river.  He  reported  the  capture  of  the  place  and  the  de 
struction  of  the  woolen  and  cotton  mills  there,  which  had  been 
supplying  the  enemy  with  clothing.  During  the  night  we  were 
all  awakened  by  the  prolonged  whistle  of  a  locomotive  in  the 
direction  of  Vining's  Station  which  announced  that  our  cracker 
line  was  in  working  order.2  July  7,  our  men  were  engaged 
in  usual  police  and  guard  duty  and  in  the  evening  at  7  o'clock 
three  companies  were  detailed  for  picket  duty.  Orders  came 
directing  that  at  8  o'clock  all  noise  should  cease  and  that  no  re 
treat  or  tattoo  should  be  sounded.  It  was  also  announced  that 
at  that  hour  our  artillery  would  open  on  the  enemy's  position 
across  the  river.  If  the  enemy  replied  the  men  were  directed  to 
shelter  themselves  in  the  timber  as  well  as  they  could.  Five  or 
six  of  our  batteries  opened  at  the  hour  named  and  for  a  half 
hour  poured  a  storm  of  shot  and  shell  into  the  enemy's  supposed 
line,  but  awakened  no  response.  Our  picket  line  was  on  the  face 
of  the  hill  overlooking  the  river  and  the  enemy's  works  beyond, 
and  was  very  much  exposed  to  his  fire.  To  protect  themselves 
our  pickets  dug  what  they  called  "rat  holes"  with  trenches  lead 
ing  into  them  which  they  covered  with  green  branches.  During 
July  8,  there  was  the  usual  picket  firing  and  one  of  the  enemy's 

1  W.  R.  R.  76-52. 

2  Gleason's  Diary. 


FROM  THE  CHATTAHOOCHEE  TO  ATLANTA  519 

batteries  threw  several  shells  at  us,  but  without  injuring  any  one. 
There  was  a  rumor  that  General  Schofield  had  effected  a  cross 
ing  of  the  river  at  some  point  above  us,  which  proved  to  be 
true,  General  Cox's  division  had  crossed  the  river  at  Isham's 
Ferry,  had  seized  a  good  position  and  made  it  secure  by  intrench- 
ments.1  It  was  learned  that  on  the  night  of  the  seventh,  during 
our  cannonade  of  the  enemy's  position,  some  of  our  men  got 
across  the  river  and  secured  the  pontoon  bridge  which  the  enemy 
had  abandoned.2  July  9,  there  was  no  unusual  occurrence 
on  our  portion  of  the  line.  Our  men  were  occupied  with  usual 
guard  and  police  duty.  Either  on  this  or  on  some  other  day 
while  we  were  in  camp  near  Vining's  Station,  Major  W.  M. 
Clark,  the  surgeon,  and  the  adjutant,  while  riding  through  the 
woods  above  the  river,  came  upon  the  body  of  a  man  hanging 
by  the  neck  to  a  low  over-hanging  limb.  The  buzzard's  had  torn 
much  of  the  flesh  from  the  bones  and  it  was  a  shocking  spec 
tacle.  They  supposed  it  was  the  body  of  some  spy  or  Union  man 
which  some  marauding  band  had  captured  and  executed.  In 
January,  1914,  J.  M.  Ewing,  of  Mary  Esther,  Florida,  formerly 
a  sergeant  of  Company  D,  Fifteenth  Ohio,  in  a  letter  printed  in 
the  National  Tribune  recalled  this  incident.  He  stated  that  the 
body  was  taken  down  and  buried  nearby,  that  there  was  a  fur 
lough  in  his  pocket,  that  he  had  been  a  soldier  in  a  Confederate 
Georgia  regiment,  but  he  had  forgotten  his  name  and  the  num 
ber  of  his  regiment. 

The  evening  of  July  9,  Major  McClenahan,  Surgeon  Clark 
and  the  Gleason  boys  met  in  a  tent  near  regimental  headquarters 
and  awakened  the  echoes  along  the  Chattahoochee  by  patriotic 
songs.  It  was  the  first  time  they  had  met  for  this  purpose  since 
crossing  the  Etowah  River. 

While  our  part  of  the  army  was  in  camp  near  Vining's  Sta 
tion,  occupied  as  above  related,  grand  plans  had  been  forming 
for  the  transfer  of  the  entire  army  across  the  Chattahoochee 
River  and  a  movement  upon  Atlanta  from  the  north.  General 
Garrard's  lodgment  across  the  river  at  Roswell  and  General 
Schofield's  at  Isham's  Ferry  had  opened  the  way.  It  was  un 
derstood  that  General  McPherson's  army  was  being  transferred 
to  the  left  flank  of  our  army  with  a  view  to  the  movement  above 
mentioned.  These  movements,  General  Sherman  believed,  would 
compel  General  Johnston  to  either  attack  our  right  at  and  near 
Turner's  Ferry  or  withdraw  from  our  front  across  the  river  and 
concentrate  on  our  left.3 

1  W.  R.  R.  76-89. 

2  Frank  I,.  Schreiber's  Diary,  also  W.  R.  R.  76-86. 

3  W,  R.  R.  76-93. 


520  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

Early  on  the  morning  of  July  10,  our  pickets  saw  a  large 
fire  in  the  direction  of  the  railroad  bridge  below  Vining's  Sta 
tion  and  soon  afterwards  the  report  came  that  the  enemy  had 
abandoned  the  position  they  still  held  on  our  side  of  the  river. 
The  report  was  later  confirmed.  It  was  Sunday  and  many  of 
the  men  were  getting  ready  to  attend  religious  services  when 
an  order  came  to  march  at  10  o'clock.  We  moved  out  at  11 
o'clock  taking  a  road  leading  to  the  left  and  up  the  river.  We 
were  impeded  by  trains  and  other  troops  moving  over  the  same 
road.  The  road  was  very  crooked  and  at  times  we  were  in 
doubt  as  to  our  destination,  but  our  general  course  was  eastward. 
The  day  was  extremely  hot,  the  road  dusty  and  many  of  our  men 
were  overcome  by  the  heat  and  fell  out  of  ranks  by  the  wayside. 
In  the  afternoon,  however,  there  was  a  copious  shower  which 
cooled  the  air  and  converted  the  dust  into  mud.  After  a  march 
of  six  miles  we  came  to  a  pontoon  bridge  across  the  Chattahoo- 
chee  near  the  mouth  of  Soap  Creek,  over  which  General  Scho- 
field's  troops  were  crossing,  and  went  into  camp  for  the  night. 
The  next  mormning  the  adjutant  was  busy  making  out  a 
report  of  our  effective  strength.  As  we  had  no  orders  to 
move  we  occupied  the  time  in  watching  the  troops  crossing  the 
river.  The  bridge  was  thronged  with  infantry,  artillery  and 
trains  crowding  and  jostling  each  other.  A  large  drove  of  cattle 
was  swimming  across  where  the  water  was  shallow,  hundreds 
of  our  men  were  bathing  in  the  river  and  a  large  number  of 
wagons  were  parked  on  the  other  side.  It  was  a  scene  for  an 
artist's  pencil.1 

The  next  morning  at  8  o'clock  we  received  orders  to  march 
at  10  o'clock  and  started  promptly  on  time.  Instead  of  crossing 
the  river  on  the  pontoon  bridge,  as  we  supposed  we  would,  we 
took  a  road  leading  down  the  river,  passing  General  Schofield's 
headquarters  on  the  way.  We  finally  descended  to  the  river 
bottom  where  the  pioneers  had  made  a  road  for  us  leading  to 
Power's  Ferry.  We  reached  the  ferry  at  11  o'clock  and  found 
a  force  under  Colonel  D.  C.  Buell  throwing  a  pontoon  bridge 
across  the  river  at  that  point.  General  Stanley's  division  had 
crossed  the  river  above  and  now  occupied  a  ridge  across  the 
river  which  he  was  to  hold  in  order  to  cover  our  crossing.  We 
halted  along  the  river  bank  until  the  pontoon  bridge  should  be 
completed.  Our  regiment  was  the  head  of  the  column  that  day 
and  we  were  in  close  touch  with  General  Howard  who  with  his 
staff  was  leading  it.  When  we  halted  the  general  was  quite 
near  to  us  and  we  had  an  opportunity  to  exchange  personal 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


PROM  THE  CHATTAHOOCHEE  TO  ATLANTA  521 

courtesies  with  him  and  his  staff  while  the  bridge  was  being 
laid. 

A  great  many  of  our  men  went  into  the  river  to  bathe  and 
swim  and  some  of  them  were  very  noisy  and  profane.  We  could 
see  that  General  Howard  was  greatly  annoyed  by  their  profanity. 
He  finally  could  stand  it  no  longer,  and  spurring  his  horse  to  the 
river  bank  exclaimed :  "My  men,  I  think  you  should  be  afraid  to 
use  such  language  if  the  water  is  deep."  The  rebuke  went  home, 
and  there  was  no  more  swearing  while  the  general  was  within 
earshot. 

In  about  four  hours  the  bridge  was  completed  and  we 
marched  across  it  and  about  a  mile  beyond,  passing  behind  Stan 
ley's  division. 

After  some  delay  our  division  was  formed  in  line  on  Stan 
leys'  left,  where  we  pitched  our  shelter  tents  and  at  once  began 
to  throw  up  intrenchments  to  cover  our  front,  on  which  we 
worked  by  reliefs  all  night.  Our  trains  did  not  get  up  and  no 
rations  were  issued.  On  the  morning  of  July  13,  rations  came 
up  but  before  they  could  be  issued  orders  came  to  move  for 
ward  and  occupy  another  ridge  about  one  mile  still  further 
down  the  river,  where  the  brigade  again  formed  into  line  and 
threw  up  intrenchments.  The  Eighth  Kansas  was  put  to  work 
on  them  and  were  aided  in  the  work  by  the  pioneers  of  the  bri 
gade.  We  received  rations  during  the  day  and  about  5  o'clock 
our  regiment  was  ordered  on  a  reconnaissance  out  to  the  front 
and  down  the  river.  We  moved  out  to  a  ridge  in  front  on  which 
our  picket  line  had  been  established,  followed  it  for  some  dis 
tance,  and  descended  through  a  dense  thicket  until  we  came  out 
into  an  open  cove  near  the  river.  Upon  an  adjoining  height  a 
single  rebel  picket  was  seen  who,  after  taking  a  good  look  at  us, 
fired  at  our  skirmish  line  and  then  disappeared  over  its  crest. 
We  saw  a  few  of  the  enemy's  pickets  or  skirmishers  and  they 
were  evidently  cavalry.  The  object  of  the  reconnaissance  was 
to  see  if  the  way  was  clear  for  a  further  advance  down  the  river 
so  as  to  permit  the  crossing  of  other  troops  at  Pace's  Ferry. 
That  being  accomplished  we  returned  to  our  place  in  the  line. 
Late  in  the  evening  orders  came  to  have  reveille  at  3  :30  and 
march  at  5  o'clock  next  morning, — leaving  our  tents  standing  and 
under  guard — which  order  was  later  countermanded.  During 
the  morning  of  the  fourteenth,  we  received  a  large  supply  of 
clothing  and  equipment,  including  blouses,  trousers,  socks  and 
canteens  and  they  were  duly  distributed.  In  the  evening  there 
was  a  violent  thunderstorm  and  a  high  wind,  which  played  havoc 
with  many  of  our  tents  and  caused  a  good  deal  of  swearing 
among  the  unfortunates.  We  remained  in  this  position  all  day 


522  FIFTEKXTII    OHIO  VOI.FNTKKKS   AND  CAMPAIGNS 

the  fifteenth  and  sixteenth  engaged  in  routine  camp  duty.  Our 
regimental  wagon  came  up  and  the  adjutant's  desk  was  taken 
from  it  and  some  delayed  reports  were1  made  out.  Gleason  in 
his  diary  describes  these  two  days  as  "about  as  restful  as  we  had 
experienced  during  the  campaign."  At  5  o'clock  the  evening 
of  the  seventeenth  about  one-half  the  regiment  was  ordered  out 
on  picket  duty.  Soon  afterwards  orders  came  to  march  next 
morning,  leaving  our  tents  with  a  guard,  each  man  to  carry  sixty 
rounds  of  ammunition.  The  night  was  unusually  quiet  with  only 
an  occasional  shot  on  the  picket  line. 

The  morning  of  July  17,  we  moved  out  as  ordered,  it  being 
understood  that  our  division  was  to  move  to  the  front  and  down 
the  river  to  cover  the  crossing  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps  at  Pace's 
Ferry.  We  left  nearly  one-half  the  regiment  on  the  picket  line 
and  the  remainder  formed  the  left  of  the  first  line  of  the  brigade 
and  division  in  the  advance.  We  took  the  same  course  our  regi 
ment  had  taken  in  the  reconnoissance  on  the  thirteenth.  Our 
progress  was  slow  but  we  finally  reached  a  commanding  ridge 
from  which  we  drove  the  enemy's  pickets.  We  here  reformed 
our  lines  and  advanced  over  a  succession  of  hills  finding  it  very 
difficult  to  preserve  our  formation.  We  drove  the  enemy's  pickets 
as  we  advanced,  capturing  several  at  their  posts.  They  were 
mostly  dismounted  cavalrymen.  Some  of  the  prisoners  were 
armed  with  new  Enfield  rifles  which  apparently  had  never  been 
fired.  At  one  of  the  vidette  posts  we  found  green  coffee  and 
one  of  the  prisoners  said  they  had  been  drawing  it  quite  often 
of  late  which  facts  we  thought  did  not  show  a  very  effective 
blockade.1  Reaching  a  point  on  the  river  opposite  our  old  camp 
at  Vining's  Station  we  halted  and  sent  out  a  strong  line  of  skir 
mishers  who  took  position  along  a  road  which  had  lately  been 
used  by  cavalry.  A  rebel  cavalryman  came  into  our  lines  and 
reported  that  General  Wheeler's  entire  command  was  in  camp 
only  three-fourths  of  a  mile  from  our  front.  A  little  after  noon 
General  Hazen's  brigade  relieved  us  on  the  skirmish  line  and 
our  regiment  moved  back  to  where  our  brigade  was  intrenching 
its  line.  At  one  time  Wheeler's  cavalry  made  a  dash  at  our  skir 
mish  line,  but  was  quickly  repulsed.  While  our  division  was 
holding  and  fortifying  the  position  above  named,  a  pontoon 
bridge  was  being  laid  across  the  river.  It  was  finally  completed 
and  after  two  divisions  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps  had  passed 
over  it,  our  division  was  withdrawn,  the  Fourteenth  Corps  troops 
moving  into  the  intrenchments  we  had  prepared  for  them,  and 
we  marched  back  to  our  camps,  arriving  at  5  :30  p.  m.  Our  en 
tire  army  was  now  across  the  Chattachoochee  and  General  Sher- 


1     Gleason's   Diary. 


FROM  THE  CHATTAHOOCHEE  TO  ATLANTA  523 

man  by  special  Field  Orders  No.  36  directed  that  General 
Thomas'  army  should  move  forward  and  occupy  Buckhead  and 
the  ridge  between  Nancy's  and  Peachtree  Creeks  and  all  the 
roads  toward  Atlanta  as  far  as  Peachtree  Creek;  that  General 
Schofield's  army  should  march  through  Cross  Keys  and  occupy 
the  Peachtree  road  where  intersected  by  the  road  from  Cross 
Keys  to  Decatur ;  and  that  General  McPherson's  army  should 
move  toward  Stone  Mountain,  which  was  a  little  north  of  east 
of  Atlanta,  and  secure  strong  ground  within  four  miles  of  Gen 
eral  Schofield's  position  pushing  General  Garrrd's  cavalry  to 
the  railroad.  After  General  Garrard  had  destroyed  a  section 
of  the  railroad  east  of  Atlanta  he  was  to  resume  his  position  to 
the  front  and  left  of  McPherson.1 

Our  orders  to  move  were  received  at  3  :30  a.  m.,  July  18, 
and  directed  us  to  march  at  5  a.  m.  We  knew  that  our  troops 
were  now  all  across  the  river  and  that  our  movement  was  to  be 
forward  against  Atlanta.  Rations  had  been  issued  the  night  be 
fore  and  we  were  all  ready  to  move.  The  order  of  march  of 
our  corps  was  first  Newton's  division,  then  Stanley's,  and  then 
ours,  and  being  in  the  rear  we  did  not  get  started  until  10  o'clock. 
We  moved  very  slowly  and  by  noon  had  only  gone  one-half  mile, 
when  we  stacked  arms  and  the  men  got  their  dinners.  On  re 
suming  our  march  we  soon  came  to  a  beaten  road  leading  in  a 
southeasterly  direction.  WTe  then  left  the  intrenchments  behind 
us  and  moved  so  rapidly  forward  we  thought  we  would  reach  the 
neighborhood  of  Atlanta  before  we  went  into  camp.  There  was 
heavy  skirmishing  far  to  the  front,  and  heavy  cannonading  to 
our  right  where  Hooker's  corps  was  advancing.  About  4  o'clock 
we  turned  off  the  road  to  the  left  and  bivouaced  in  double 
column.  An  old  cabin  near  the  regiment  was  occupied  by  the 
field  and  staff  as  headquarters.  A  light  shower  came  just  after 
we  had  halted  but  was  soon  over.  Our  letter  carriers  came  up 
bringing  letters,  papers,  etc.  and  commissions  for  a  number  of 
officers  and  non-commissioned  officers,  among  them  one  as 
second  lieutenant  for  Sergeant  Major  A.  J.  Gleason.2  As  we 
were  on  the  reserve  we  were  undisturbed  by  picket  firing  during 
the  night.  We  had  orders  to  rise  at  3  o'clock  next  morning  and 
be  ready  to  move  at  4:30  with  the  division  on  a  reconnaissance, 
leaving  our  tents  behind.  We  moved  out  slowly  with  frequent 
halts,  passing  the  little  hamlet  of  Buckhead  about  one  mile  from 
our  bivouac.  Here  we  found  the  head  of  our  corps  column  in 
camp.  We  moved  about  a  mile  further  and  halted  by  the  road 
side  for  several  hours.  Our  advance  had  reached  Peachtree 


1  W.   R.   R.    76-166. 

2  Gleason's  Diary. 


524  FIFTEENTH    OHIO  VOI.UNTKKKS   AND   CAMPAIGNS 

Creek  and  found  that  the  enemy  had  burned  the  bridge  and  were 
strongly  intrenched  on  the  opposite  bank.  From  a  point  near 
where  we  then  were  we  had  a  good  view  of  the  enemy's  intrench- 
ments.  Our  batteries  were  pouring  a  hot  fire  at  the  enemy's 
position  and  our  skirmishers  were  actively  engaged  with  those  of 
the  enemy.  About  4  o'clock  our  pioneers  were  ordered  to  cut 
timbers  for  a  temporary  bridge  across  the  creek  and  it  was  said 
there  would  be  an  attempt  to  force  a  crossing.  A  part  of  our 
brigade  was  now  ordered  on  to  the  skirmish  line,  a  brigade  on 
our  right  having  been  moved  to  the  right  a  short  distance.  About 
5  o'clock  the  movement  began  to  the  right  and  left  of  our  posi 
tion  and  the  enemy  was  forced  back,  our  men  advancing  in  the 
face  of  a  heavy  fire  of  artillery  and  musketry.  Before  long  we 
received  orders  to  move  up  to  the  bridge  which  was  being  re 
paired.  Our  pioneers  had  constructed  a  foot  bridge  beside  the 
one  which  had  been  burned  and  we  crossed  on  it  and  soon  had 
possession  of  the  enemy's  works  in  our  front.  In  them  we 
found  five  of  the  enemy's  dead  who  had  been  killed  in  the  fight. 
Our  loss  was  small,  a  few  men  being  wounded  and  none  killed. 
At  dark  we  re-crossed  the  creek,  having  been  relieved  by  troops 
of  Newton's  division,  and  marched  back  to  our  camp.  There 
were  rumors  that  two  of  the  railroads  leading  into  Atlanta  had 
been  cut.  That  night  General  Sherman  issued  orders  directing 
the  whole  army  to  move  on  Atlanta  at  5  o'clock  the  next  morn 
ing  by  the  most,  direct  roads.  General  Thomas  from  Buckhead, 
General  Schofield  by  the  road  leading  from  Doctor  Powell's  to 
Atlanta,  and  General  McPherson  to  follow  one  or  more  roads 
direct  from  Decatur  to  Atlanta,  each  army  commander  to  accept 
battle  on  anything  like  fair  terms.  If  either  army  should  reach 
within  cannon  range  of  the  city  without  receiving  artillery  or 
musketry  fire  he  should  halt,  form  a  strong  line  with  batteries  in 
position,  and  await  orders.1  The  orders  for  our  corps  were  that 
it  should  move  in  two  columns,  starting  at  5  a.  m.  on  different 
roads.  Stanley's  division  to  constitute  one  column  and  the  other 
to  be  composed  of  Newton's  and  Wood's  divisions,  Newton's 
division  to  take  the  lead.  After  the  two  columns  should  form  a 
junction,  Stanley's  division  was  to  take  the  lead,  followed  by 
Newton's  and  then  Wood's  division.2  On  the  morning  of  July 
20,  reveille  sounded  and  we  were  off  on  time.  It  was  reported 
that  General  Hood  had  succeeded  General  Johnston  in  com 
mand  of  the  Confederat  Army  in  our  front,  and  that  General 
Sherman  had  said  "Now  boys  we  will  have  to  fight.''  We  were 

1  W.   R.   R.   76-193. 

2  W.  R.  R.  76-194. 


FROM  THE  CHATTAHOOCHEE  TO  ATLANTA  325 

therefore  cautioned  to  be  on  the  lookout,  as  Hood  was  likely  to 
attack  us  at  any  time. 

When  we  reached  Buckhead  we  took  a  road  leading  to  the 
left  which  we  followed  for  a  mile  or  two,  crossing  a  branch  of 
Peachtree  Creek,  and  found  Stanley's  division  beyond  it  fortify 
ing  its  position.  \Ye  relieved  them  and  continued  fortifying,  aid 
ed  by  our  pioneers.  Our  regiment  occupied  a  little  grove  of 
young  pines,  the  ground  sloping  back  from  a  commanding  posi 
tion  in  front,  along  which  our  line  had  been  established.  The 
pioneers  cut  away  the  timber  in  our  front  and  soon  had  our  forti 
fications  in  very  good  condition  to  resist  an  attack.  At  ^o'clock 
we  heard  the  sound  of  battle  some  distance  on  our  right  on  New 
ton's  and  Hooker's  fronts.  From  our  line  of  works  we  had  a 
very  good  view  of  the  valley  and  could  follow  the  course  of  the 
contending  forces  by  the  smoke  of  their  guns.  The  lighting  con 
tinued  until  dark  when  it  suddenly  ceased.  We  learned  that  the 
enemy  had  massed  on  that  portion  of  our  line  and  after  gaining 
at  first  a  slight  advantage  had  been  repulsed  with  heavy  loss. 
This  engagement  came  afterwards  to  be  known  as  the  battle  of 
Peachtree  Creek.  In  the  evening  our  skirmish  line  was  advanced 
some  distance  and  protected  by  rifle  pits.  \Ve  got  a  fresh  supply 
of  ammunition  for  our  skirmishers,  which  was  issued  to  them 
about  midnight.  There  was  the  usual  picket  firing  at  night.  The 
next  morning,  July  21,  Company  commanders  were  ordered  to 
have  their  men  called  so  as  to  have  breakfast  and  be  ready  to 
move  at  daylight.  Lieutenant  Geiger  who  was  on  the  skirmish 
line  had  reported  about  midnight  that  the  enemy  had  left  our 
front,  so  we  naturally  expected  to  soon  follow  him  up.  The 
men  had  about  finished  their  breakfasts  when  the  "general"  call 
sounded,  followed  by  the  "assembly,"  and  soon  everything  was 
ready  for  an  advance.  We  moved  to  the  left  crossing  the  creek 
on  a  temporary  bridge  of  rails  after  which  we  took  a  course  lead 
ing,  as  we  supposed,  to  Atlanta.  Our  skirmishers  soon  found 
the  enemy  in  front  of  a  line  of  works  about  three  miles  from  the 
town  and  we  lay  quiet  while  they  developed  his  position.  We 
were  on  quite  a  hill  and  some  of  the  men  climbed  trees  from 
which  they  could  see  the  city  and  its  fortifications.  We  after 
wards  moved  about  half  a  mile  to  the  right  to  support  a  battery 
and  finally  the  entire  brigade  was  formed  at  the  same  place  and 
threw  up  the  usual  defensive  works.  A  line  of  the  enemy's 
works  was  in  plain  view  and  our  battery  threw  shells  into  them 
with  great  accuracy,  while  the  enemy  in  turn  directed  his  fire  on 
our  men  at  work  on  our  intrenchments.  We  remained  in  this 
position  during  the  night. 


526  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  A.XD  CAMPAIGNS 

The  morning  of  July  22,  on  awakening  we  found  that 
the  enemy  had  again  left  their  line  of  works  in  our  front.  Our 
pickets  had  been  out  to  the  enemy's  intrenchments  and  had 
brought  in  two  of  their  men  who  had  been  left  behind.  Before 
long  we  received  orders  to  move,  struck  tents  and  moved  out 
across  the  fields  until  we  reached  a  road.  Here  we  halted  near 
the  enemy's  works  which  they  had  abandoned  and  found  them 
very  strong, — much  stronger  than  our  own.  It  was  reported 
that  the  enemy  had  taken  up  a  new  position  nearer  the  city, 
whose  works  were  much  stronger  even  than  those  we  had  just 
seen. 

The  enemy  had  seemed  to  give  way  so  quickly  all  along  our 
front,  we  suspected  he  had  massed  on  some  other  part  of  the  line 
for  a  sudden  attack  on  one  of  our  moving  columns.  In  high 
official  circles  it  was  reported  and  believed  that  Atlanta  had  been 
evacuated  and  orders  were  issued  for  a  hot  pursuit.  Our  skir 
mishers  were  pushed  rapidly  forward  and  soon  developed  the 
main  defenses  of  the  city.  After  this  was  done  we  moved  for 
ward  a  short  distance  and  halted  for  dinner.  While  we  were 
so  engaged  one  of  the  enemy's  batteries  opened  on  us  and  made 
our  position  very  uncomfortable.  Some  time  after  noon  we 
were  ordered  to  move  forward  and  our  regiment  took  the  lead. 
While  we  were  in  motion  word  came  that  the  enemy  had  massed 
against  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  that  a  severe  battle  was 
raging  and  that  General  McPherson  had  been  killed.  The 
news  of  General  McPherson's  death  was  so  shockingly  pain 
ful  that  word  was  passed  to  the  officers  to  keep  it  from 
the  men  in  the  ranks.  It  was  soon  seen,  however,  that 
that  was  impossible.  The  story  reached  the  line  of  march 
ing  men  somewhere  and  so  quickly  spread  that  very  soon  every 
one  knew  it.  It  caused  a  profound  sensation  among  the  troops, 
not  of  depression,  but  of  sorrow  and  indignation,  and  one  could 
read  in  the  faces  of  the  men  a  grim  determination  to  fight  all 
the  harder.  We  soon  reached  the  front  and  relieved  a  portion 
of  Newton's  division  which  moved  rapidly  to  the  left.  We  found 
the  works  in  our  front  only  partially  finished  and  at  once  went 
to  work  to  complete  them.  The  enemy's  bullets  came  whistling 
through  the  woods  dangerously  close,  as  also  did  shells  from 
one  of  their  batteries.  Regimental  headquarters  were  located 
in  rear  of  the  center  of  the  regiment  and  for  the  first  time  during 
the  campaign  were  protected  by  a  barricade.1  Toward  evening 
we  heard  heavy  cannonading  far  to  the  left  indicating  that  the 
fight  in  McPherson's  front  was  not  yet  over.  Later,  word  came 
that  the  fighting  had  been  severe  and  that  the  enemy  had  finally 
been  repulsed  and  driven  back  into  their  main  works  at  Atlanta. 


FROM  THE  CHATTAHOOCHEE  TO  ATLANTA  527 

Two  of  Colonel  Gibson's  aids,  Lieutenants  McGrath  and 
Caylor,  had  a  narrow  escape  in  the  evening.  They  were  riding 
the  lines  with  General  Wood  and  Colonel  Gibson,  our  division 
and  brigade  commanders,  when  one  of  the  enemy's  shells 
knocked  off  the  head  of  Caylor's  horse  and  exploded,  a  frag 
ment  striking  McGrath's  foot  and  passing  through  his  horse. 
Caylor's  horse  when  killed  fell  on  and  broke  his  rider's  leg,  but 
neither  officer  was  dangerously  hurt.  A  man  of  Company  B 
was  killed  while  standing  inside  the  works.1 

We  were  now,  after  seventy-six  days  of  hard  working  and 
fightmg,  close  up  to  the  "Gate  City"  of  the  south,  but  between 
us  and  the  coveted  prize  were  frowning  battlements  and  bristling 
parapets,  strengthened  by  abatis,  slashings  and  other  entangle 
ments,  apparently  too  strong  to  be  carried  by  direct  assault. 

]     Gleason's  Diary. 


CHAPTER  XXV. 

THE   ATLANTA   CAMPAIGN — THE    SIEGE   AND   CAPTURE   OF 

ATLANTA. 

The  morning  of  July  23,  1864,  found  us  occupying  the 
works  we  had  completed  the  day  before.  All  through  the  night 
of  the  twenty-second  skirmish  or  picket  firing  continued  and  we 
were  so  close  up  to  the  enemy  that  his  bullets  came  whistling 
among  us  constantly.  From  the  left  his  fire  was  particularly 
annoying  and  we  had  to  construct  traverses  to  protect  our  men 
behind  our  defenses.  The  talk  during  the  twenty-third  was  all 
about  the  fierce  onslaught  on  General  McPherson's  troops  the 
day  before.  Captain  Dawson  of  our  regiment  was  at  corps  head 
quarters  in  the  afternoon  and  when  he  returned  reported  that 
the  enemy's  loss  was  fully  ten  thousand.  We  learned  that  our 
own  losses  were  about  3500  killed  and  wounded  and  ten  pieces 
of  artillery.  There  was  a  general  feeling  of  sorrow  and  regret 
over  the  death  of  General  McPherson.  While  few  of  us  knew 
him  we  knew  how  his  soldiers  loved  and  trusted  him  and  how 
proud  they  were  of  him.  We  also  knew  the  high  esteem  in  which 
he  was  held  by  his  brother  general  officers,  especially  General 
Sherman.  The  latter  announced  his  death  in  an  official  letter 
to  General  L.  D.  Thomas,  Adjutant  General  U.  S.  Army,  in 
which  he  said :  "General  McPherson  fell  in  battle,  booted  and 
spurred,  as  the  gallant  knight  and  gentlemen  should  wish.  Not 
his  the  loss,  but  the  country's,  and  the  army  will  mourn  his  death 
and  cherish  his  memory  as  that  of  one  who,  though  compara 
tively  young,  had  risen  by  merit  and  ability  to  the  command  of 
one  of  the  best  armies  which  the  nation  had  called  into  existence 
to  vindicate  its  honor  and  integrity.  History  tells  us  of  but  few 
who  so  blended  the  grace  and  gentleness  of  the  friend  with  the 
dignity,  courage,  faith  and  manliness  of  the  soldier.  His  public 
enemies,  even  those  who  directed  the  fatal  shot,  ne'er  spoke 
or  wrote  of  him  without  expressions  of  marked  respect:  those 
he  commanded  loved  him  even  to  idolatry,  and  I,  his  asso 
ciate  and  commander,  fail  in  words  adequate  to  express  my 
opinion  of  his  great  worth.  I  feel  assured  that  every  patriot  in 
America  on  hearing  this  sad  news  will  feel  a  sense  of  personal 
loss  and  the  country  generally  will  realize  that  we  have  lost  not 
only  an  able  military  leader  but  a  man,  who,  had  he  survived, 
was  qualified  to  heal  the  national  strife  which  has  been  raised 
by  ambitious  and  designing  men."1 

1     W.   B.   R.   76-241. 


SIEGE  AND  CAPTURE  OF  ATLANTA  529 

Through  this  announcement  runs  the  same  proud  minor 
note  we  hear  in  King  David's  lament  over  the  death  of  Jonathan, 

'The  beauty  of  Israel  is  slain  upon  thy  high  places :  how 
are  the  mighty  fallen ! 

"Tell  it  not  in  Gath,  publish  it  not  in  the  streets  of  Askelon, 
lest  the  daughters  of  the  Philistines  rejoice, 

"From  the  blood  of  the  slain  *  *  *  the  bow  of  Jona 
than  turned  not  back.  How  are  the  mighty  fallen  in  the  midst 
of  the  battle !  O,  Jonathan  thou  wast  slain  in  thine  high  places. 

"I  am  distressed  for  thee,  my  brother  Jonathan;  very  pleas 
ant  hast  thou  been  unto  me ;  thy  love  to  me  was  wonderful, 
passing  the  love  of  women. 

"How  are  the  mighty  fallen  and  the  weapons  of  war  per 
ished!"1 

General  Sherman  had  some  hope  that  the  enemy  would 
abandon  Atlanta  and  retreat  to  the  southeast,  and  on  the  twenty- 
fifth  gave  orders  to  follow  him  with  all  possible  vigor  and  speed. 
In  the  event  he  should  remain  in  Atlanta  on  the  defensive,  the 
cavalry  were  to  attack  the  Macon  road,  his  only  line  of  supplies, 
beyond  Fayetteville  and  McDonough  and  thoroughly  destroy  it. 
and  the  entire  army  was  to  move  by  shifts  to  the  right,  stretching 
out  so  as  to  reach  said  road  if  possible.  The  cavalry  to  move 
out  July  27. 2  These  movements  he  thought  would  compel  the 
evacuation  of  the  place.  General  Stoneman  was  eager  to  under 
take  the  breaking  of  the  railroad  to  Macon  and  asked  permission 
if  successful,  to  take  a  portion  of  his  command,  make  a  dash  on 
Macon,  release  the  officers  who  were  prisoners  there  and  after 
wards  go  on  to  Amerius  (Andersonville)  and  release  the  pris 
oners  at  that  place.  To  this  General  Sherman  consented,  but 
ordered  that  after  the  railroad  was  destroyed  he  should  send 
Garrard's  division  back  to  the  left  of  the  army.8  General 
Stoneman  was  to  go  round  the  enemy's  position  to  the  left  and 
at  the  same  time  General  McCook  with  his  cavalry  was  to  drop 
down  the  west  bank  of  the  Chattahoochee  to  about  Campbell- 
town,  cross  there  and  strike  out  for  the  railroad  from  that  direc 
tion.4  General  Stoneman's  force  was  about  5000  and  McCook's 
about  3500.  These  cavalry  movements  were  extremely  hazard 
ous  and  their  'results  were  awaited  with  unusual  anxiety.  While 
they  were  going  on,  our  portion  of  the  line  held  fast  in  the  posi 
tion  we  occupied  on  July  22,  with  the  usual  constant  picket  firing 
day  and  night.  We  were  so  close  to  the  enemy  that  no  one  was 
safe  from  his  bullets  in  the  open,  even  behind  our  main  line  of 
works. 


1  2  Samuel  1:  17  to  27  3     W  R    R    76-264-5 

2  W.  R.  R.  76-2-,5.  4     W.  R.  R.  76-260-261. 


530  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEEHS  AND  CAMPAIGN'S 

On  the  night  of  the  twenty-third,  Robert  B.  Brown,  (Paddy 
we  called  him)  a  member  of  the  regimental  band,  was  wounded 
quite  severely  in  the  leg  while  sleeping  in  a  ravine  to  the  rear  of 
our  intrenched  line.1 

A  great  light  was  seen  in  the  direction  of  Atlanta  and  we 
thought  the  enemy  was  leaving  the  place.  At  the  same  time  we 
heard  cannonading  far  to  our  left.  July  24,  our  faithful  Ser 
geant  Major,  Andrew  J.  Gleason,  was  assigned  to  duty  as  Sec 
ond  Lieutenant2  and  we  lost  his  valuable  services  at  regimental 
headquarters.  Orders  came  to  strengthen  our  works,  which  we 
did  by  constructing  abatis  and  placing  slashings  in  front  of  them. 
The  men  were  given  strict  orders  to  wear  their  cartridge 
boxes  day  and  night,  so  as  to  be  ready  for  an  attack  at  any  time. 
The  morning  of  the  twenty-fifth,  we  were  awakened  by  a  battery 
of  the  enemy  in  a  new  position  which  threw  shells  into  our  midst 
and  beyond  us,  but  fortunately  no  one  was  injured.  We  con 
tinued  strengthening  our  works  and  the  men  built  arbors  of 
green  bows  over  the  trenches  to  protect  themselves  from  the 
sun.  The  barricade  in  front  of  the  regimental  headquarters  was 
demonstrated  to  be  insufficient,  as  two  bullets  came  through  it, 
one  of  which  struck  Gleason's  sword  belt  which  was  hanging  on 
a  tent  pole.  Fortunately  he  was  lying  down  at  the  time.a  The 
next  day  the  bullets  came  so  thick  that  the  pioneers  put  up  some 
traverses,  and  so  strengthened  the  barricade  that  the  field  and 
staff  could  rest  behind  them  in  comparative  safety.  Occasionally 
a  bullet  would  strike  the  limb  of  a  tree  over  head  and  glance 
downward.  It  was  a  bullet  so  deflected  that  had  seriously 
wounded  "Paddy"  Brown  of  the  band  on  the  night  of  the  twenty- 
third.  There  was  a  large  tree  just  inside  our  barricade  and 
Surgeon  Clark  and  the  adjutant  slept  with  their  heads  at  its  foot. 
Sometimes  a  bullet  would  strike  the  tree  far  above  their  heads 
and  they  could  feel  the  tree  tremble  to  its  roots  from  the  impact. 
There  was  considerable  cannonading  to  our  right  during  the 
day.  On  the  twenty-seventh,  we  advanced  the  picket  line  on  our 
front  and  the  men  dug  rifle  pits  to  protect  themselves.  Just 
after  noon  in  obedience  to  orders  previously  received  our  pickets 
commenced  firing  and  every  one  began  to  cheer  and  yell.  It 
evidently  startled  the  enemy  and  caused  them  to  apprehend  an 
assault,  for  they  rained  shot  and  shell  at  us  for  nearly  an  hour. 
It  was  intended  to  divert  the  attention  of  the  enemy  from  our 
left  where  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  was  beginning  its  move 
ment  to  our  right.  This  day  General  Howard  relinquished  com 
mand  of  our  corps,  having  succeeded  General  McPherson  as 
commander  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee.  We  were  sorry  to 

1,  2  and  3     Gleason's  Diary. 


SIEGE  AND  CAPTURE  OF  ATLANTA  531 

lost  him  as  our  commander,  as  he  had  won  the  respect,  admira 
tion  and  confidence  of  our  officers  and  men.  General  David  S. 
Stanley  was  appointed  to  succeed  him  and  Gleason  in  his  diary 
says  that  "neither  change  met  our  approbation."  This  doubtless 
expressed  the  prevailing  sentiment  of  our  division  at  the  time. 
In  the  evening  our  shells  set  fire  to  a  mill  about  one-half  mile 
to  our  front/which  made  a  bright  light. 

July  twenty-eighth,  Gleason  took  up  quarters  with  the  of 
ficers  of  Company  A,  to  which  he  had  been  assigned,  and  Ser 
geant  David  Weh  of  Company  I  took  his  place  as  sergeant 
major.  The  morning  was  without  unusual  incident  and  Gleason 
in  his  diary  tells  of  having  a  game  of  chess  with  Bugler  Smith 
Gardner.  In  the  afternoon  there  was  another  demonstration  on 
our  front  similar  to  that  of  the  day  before,  but  much  more  seri 
ous,  as  succeeding  it  we  were  ordered  to  advance  and  drive  the 
enemy  from  his  rifle  pits.  The  adjutant  had  made  a  strong  de 
tail  to  reinforce  the  skirmishers  and  had  sent  them  out  to  the 
picket  line.  He  then  started  with  Colonel  Askew  to  the  front, 
the  former  wishing  to  direct  the  movement  in'  person.  Just  as 
they  stepped  upon  the  parapet  of  our  main  line  of  works,  the 
colonel  was  struck  in  the  breast  by  one  of  the  enemy's  bullets, 
which  staggered  him,  and  he  would  have  fallen  if  he  had  not 
been  supported  by  the  adjutant.  The  bullet  fortunately  had 
struck  a  pocket  dairy  which  he  carried  in  his  breast  pocket, 
which  probably  saved  his  life.  He  was  very  much  shaken  up 
and  soon  went  back  to  regimental  headquarters,  first  directing 
the  adjutant  to  go  out  to  the  line  and  caution  officers  and  men 
not  to  take  too  great  risks  in  the  movement,  which  was  only  in 
tended  to  be  a  strong  demonstration.  The  adjutant  soon  gained 
the  picket  line,  delivered  his  orders  and  was  about  to  return, 
when  Captain  Carroll  and  Lieutenant  Dubois  begged  him  to  re 
main  and  take  part  in  the  advance,  which  he  did.  Our  part  of 
the  line  moved  farword  cautiously  for  quite  a  distance,  the  men 
sheltering  themselves  from  the  enemy's  fire  by  the  trees,  until 
they  came  in  plain  view  of  one  of  the  enemy's  rifle  pits,  in  which 
seemed  to  be  twenty-five  or  thirty  men.  Our  men  from  behind 
trees  covered  them  so  completely  that  they  could  only  fire  an 
occasional  shot.  Carroll  and  Dubois,  both  eager  to  take  them  in, 
got  a  few  men  together  and  with  swords  in  hand  led  them  in  a 
rush  on  the  rebel  rifle  pit  and  captured  the  entire  force, — con 
sisting  of  a  captain,  lieutenant  and  twenty-two  men, — not  how 
ever  without  some  loss,  as  Philip  Fogle  of  Company  C  was 
killed  and  Oliver  J.  Henderson,  Company  E,  and  John  P.  Mor 
ris  of  Company  H  were  wounded.  After  the  capture  of  these 
officers  and  men  they  pleaded  to  be  taken  to  the  rear,  as  they 


532  FIFTEENTH    OHIO    VOLUNTEEKS    AND    CAMPAIGNS 

were  within  four  or  five  hundred  yards  of  their  main  line  of 
works  and  were  liable  to  be  shot  by  their  own  men  after  their 
surrender.  But  Dubois  and  Carroll  were  hot  over  the  loss  of 
our  own  men  and  insisted  on  marching  them  along  with  our 
line  as  we  advanced  further.  We  finally  came  to  the  edge  of 
the  woods,  and  about  400  yards  beyond  it  saw  the  enemy's 
main  line  of  works,  drew  their  fire  and  then  quickly  about  faced 
and  sought  cover.  The  prisoners  were  then  sent  to  the  rear  and 
went  at  a  pace  which  made  it  difficult  for  the  guard  to  keep  up 
with  them.  Fortunately,  none  of  them  was  killed  or  wounded. 
Our  skirmishers  occupied  the  line  of  rifle  pits  taken  from  the 
enemy,  which  were  at  once  turned  by  the  pioneers,  and  were 
directed  to  hold  them.  Besides  the  prisoners  we  captured  a 
number  of  new  Enfield  rifles  and  some  side  arms.1  It  was 
decided  to  hold  permanently  the  ground  \ve  had  gained.  In  the 
evening  large  fires  were  seen  in  the  direction  of  Atlanta.  This 
day  commissions  came  for  Lieutenant  Colonel  Askew  as  colonel, 
Major  McClenahan  as  lieutenant  colonel  and  Captain  Dawson 
as  major.1  While  we  were  making  the  demonstration  against 
the  enemy  as  just  described,  General  Hood  attacked  the  Army 
of  the  Tennessee,  which  was  just  getting  into  position  on  out 
right,  and  was  repulsed  with  heavy  loss.2  This  engagement  is 
known  in  history  as  the  battle  of  Ezra  Church. 

On  July  29,  we  found  that  as  a  result  of  our  operations  the 
day  before,  the  men  behind  our  main  line  of  works  were  not  so 
much  annoyed  by  the  enemy's  bullets.  Our  skirmishers  rein 
forced  by  Company  A  held  the  line  gained  the  day  before  and 
with  the  aid  of  the  pioneers  had  greatly  strengthened  it.  Look 
outs  were  posted  in  front  of  it  behind  trees,  and  in  such  posi 
tions  had  a  clear  view  of  the  enemy's  main  line  of  works  about  400 
yards  distant.  These  lookouts  occupied  peculiarly  dangerous 
positions  and  one  of  them  was  wounded  before  he  had  been  out 
long.  Even  from  our  rifle  pits  we  could  see  the  enemy's  line  of 
works  through  the  .  trees  and  distinguish  men  moving  about 
behind  them.  The  adjutant  visited  the  line  during  the  morning, 
bearing  orders  to  take  two-thirds  of  the  men  from  the  rifle  pits 
and  with  them  form  a  reserve  several  paces  to  their  rear.  In 
the  afternoon  the  pioneers  were  sent  out  and  constructed  strong 
defensive  works  for  such  reserve.  While  they  were  so  engaged 
a  sixty-four  pound  shell  throwrn  by  the  enemy  struck  within  a 
few  feet  of  the  squad  and  exploded  without  injuring  any  one. 
Gleason  says  the  but  end  of  the  shell  remained  intact  and  gave 
the  pioneers  an  idea  of  its  size  and  caliber.  The  pickets  were 

1  Gleason's  Diary. 

2  W.  R.  R.   76-289. 


SIEGE  AXD  CAPTURE  OF  ATLANTA  533 

undisturbed  during  the  night,  except  by  an  occasional  shot  from 
the  enemy's  main  line. 

The  morning  of  the  thirtieth  at  5  o'clock,  sharp  skirmishing 
began  on  our  right  in  front  of  Newton's  division.  It  was  thought 
a  severe  engagement  was  in  progress,  as  the  artillery  on  both 
sides  was  brought  into  action.  Our  pickets  were  relieved  after 
breakfast  had  been  taken  out  to  them  and  retired  behind  the  main 
line  of  works.  In  the  afternoon  orders  came  to  strengthen  our 
main  line  of  defenses  as  much  as  possible.  This  was  done  by 
cutting  down  trees  in  our  front,  sharpening  the  branches  and 
drawing  them  stem  first  up  to  our  abatis.  Our  field  officers  who 
had  received  commissions  found  that  our  regiment  lacked  thir 
teen  of  the  number  which  would  entitle  them  to  be  mustered  in. 
It  was  found,  however,  that  more  than  that  number  had  been 
wrongfully  dropped  from  the  company  rolls,  and  an  order  was 
issued  restoring  them.  The  officers  were  then  duly  mustered 
into  the  service  as  of  their  increased  rank.  July  31,  was  rainy 
and  damp  and  the  men  except  those  on  duty  kept  inside  their 
shelter  tents.  There  were  rumors  that  our  cavalry  had  de 
stroyed  the  tracks  of  the  Macon  road  near  Jonesboro. 

The  morning  of  August  1,  we  received  orders  to  be  ready  to 
move  at  7  o'clock,  leaving  tents  and  taking  arms,  accouterments 
and  haversacks  and  all  the  intrenching  tools  belonging  to  the 
regiment.  The  pioneers  were  ordered  to  report  at  brigade  head 
quarters  half  an  hour  earlier.  We  could  not  imagine  where  we 
were  going,  or  on  what  duty  we  were  assigned.  We  started  at 
the  time  named  and  marched  to  division  headquarters,  where 
we  halted  and  remained  an  hour.  We  then  marched  past  the 
house  which  had  '  been  used  as  headquarters  of  the  division, 
stacked  arms  and  began  tearing  down  the  buildings  and  build 
ing  a  line  of  works  with  the  timbers.  The  line  was  marked  off 
and  each  company  was  given  a  section  to  work  on.  While  we 
were  at  work  Thomas  Salty  of  the  Third  Ohio  Cavalry  came 
up.  He  said  he  had  been  with  General  Stoneman  when  he 
started  on  his  raid  round  Atlanta  and  had  escaped  after  his  com 
mand  had  been  ambushed.  We  continued  at  our  work  until 
sunset  and  then  returned  to  our  former  position  in  the  besieging 
line. 

The  line  of  works  we  were  working  on  was  being  built  to 
protect  our  left  flank  when  the  troops  to  the  left  of  us  should 
be  withdrawn  and  moved  over  to  our  right.  There  were  rumors 
that  General  Stoneman's  expedition  and  also  that  of  General 
McCook,  which  had  been  ordered  to  co-operate  with  him,  had 
met  with  disaster,  and  the  rumor  afterwards  was  confirmed.  It 
will  be  remembered  that  General  Stoneman  with  his  own  and 


534  FIFTEENTH   OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

Garrard's  cavalry  was  to  make  a  detour  by  the  left  round  Atlanta 
and  strike  the  Macon  road  at  McDonough,  that  General 
McCook  was  to  move  by  the  right  on  Fayetteville,  and  the  two 
were  to  join  their  forces  and  destroy  the  Macon  road.  This 
accomplished,  General  Stoneman  was  to  send  General  Garrard's 
cavalry  back  to  our  left  and  with  his  own  proceed  to  Macon  and 
Andersonville  and  release  the  prisoners  there.  Both  expedi 
tions  started  on  the  twenty-seventh  of  July  as  ordered.  General 
Stoneman  sent  Garrard's  cavalry  to  Flat  Rock,  for  the  purpose 
of  covering  his  own  movement  to  McDonough,  and  then  went 
off  toward  Covington  and  did  not  again  communicate  with  Gen 
eral  Garrard,  who  returned  on  the  thirtieth  and  resumed  his 
position  on  the  left  of  our  line.  Thomas  Salty's  regiment  be 
longed  to  this  command.  General  Stoneman  did  a  great  deal  of 
damage  in  the  way  of  burning  bridges,  destroying  the  railroad 
and  a  large  number  of  locomotives,  and  actually  appeared  before 
Macon.  He  could  not  cross  the  Okmulgee  river  at  Macon,  nor 
get  further  toward  Andersonville,  but  retired  in  the  direction 
whence  he  came,  followed  by  various  detachments  of  the  enemy's 
cavalry  under  General  Iverson.  He  was  so  hemmed  in  that  he 
gave  consent  to  two-thirds  his  force  to  escape  back,  while  he 
held  the  enemy  in  check  with  the  remainder,  about  700  men,  and 
a  section  of  light  guns.  One  brigade,  Colonel  Adam's,  came  in 
almost  intact.  Another,  commanded  by  Colonel  Capron,  was  sur 
prised  and  scattered.  Many  were  captured  and  killed  and  the 
balance  got  in  mostly  unarmed  and  afoot.  General  Stoneman 
surrendered  his  small  command,  and  himself  became  a  prisoner 
of  war. 

General  McCook  moved  down  the  Chattahoochee  to  River- 
ton,  crossed  on  a  pontoon  bridge  and  moved  rapidly  to 
Palmetta  Station  on  the  West  Point  Railroad,  where  he  tore  up 
a  section  of  the  track.  He  then  moved  on  to  Fayetteville,  where 
he  found  several  hundred  of  the  enemy's  wagons  and  took  250 
prisoners.  He  then  pushed  on  to  Lovejoy  Station  on  the  Macon 
road,  burned  the  station,  tore  up  a  section  of  the  track  and  con 
tinued  his  work  of  destruction  until  he  was  forced  to  leave  off 
to  defend  himself  against  the  enemy,  which  was  closing  in  on 
him.  He  could  hear  nothing  of  General  Stoneman  and  so  turned 
south  and  west.  At  Palmetta  Station  he  was  hemmed  in  and  was 
compelled  to  drop  his  prisoners  and  cut  his  way  out,  losing  500 
officers  and  men.  He  finally  recrossed  the  Chattahoochee  and 
got  to  Marietta  without  further  loss.1  The  failure  of  these 
cavalry  raids  had  a  depressing  effect  on  our  officers  and  men,  and 
postponed  our  capture  of  Atlanta,  it  seemed,  indefinitely.  But 

1     General  Sherman's  official  report,  W.  R.  R.   72-76. 


SIEGE  AND  CAPTURE  OF  ATLANTA  535 

we  set  to  work  doggedly  to  hold  our  grip  on  the  place,  while  our 
commander  inch  by  inch  and  foot  by  foot  moved  the  army  to 
the  right  towards  the  West  Point  and  Macon  roads. 

August  second,  nothing  unusual  occurred  on  our  front  and 
some  of  the  officers  took  occasion  to  stroll  to  parts  of  the  line 
which  gave  better  views  than  our  own  of  the  enemy's  works  in 
our  front  and  of  the  city  beyond  them.  At  one  point  to  our 
right  we  could  see  one  of  the  enemy's  forts  in  which  two  heavy 
guns  could  be  seen  -commanding  a  road  to  our  right.  The  Con 
federate  flag  was  flying  over  it.  At  a  post  or  lookout  on  the 
front  of  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio,  we  had  a  good  view  of  a  portion 
of  the  city  about  a  mile  distant.  August  3,  in  the  afternoon  the 
adjutant  appeared  at  the  picket  line  with  an  order  to  advance 
at  4 :30  p.  m.  and  if  possible  take  the  newly  erected  rifle  pits  of 
the  enemy  in  our  front.  Our  brigade  signal  did  not  sound  until 
after  the  pickets  on  our  left  had  begun  the  advance.  The  enemy 
was  on  the  alert  and  his  shot  and  shell  fairly  swept  the  woods 
were  we  were.  There  seemed  to  be  a  furious  engagement  going 
on  at  our  right,  but  a  ridge  shut  off  our  view  of  it.  Our  posi 
tion  was  such  that  we  could  not  advance  beyond  the  troops  to 
our  right  and  left  who  finally  retired  to  their  rifle  pits.  We  dis 
tinctly  heard  the  Confederate  officers  giving  commands  and  soon 
after  we  reached  our  rifle  pits  the  enemy  raised  a  shrill  yell  and 
fired  a  volley.  It  was  thought  that  he  was  advancing  in  force, 
and  seeing  the  troops  on  our  left  retiring  after  returning  the 
enemy's  volley,  our  skirmishers  were  ordered  to  fall  back  on  the 
reserve.  WTe  soon  learned  that  the  enemy's  movement  was  only 
a  feint  and  our  men  were  sent  back  to  the  rifle  pits.1  That  eve 
ning  General  Stanley  reported  that  he  had  "carried  the  rebel 
picket  lines  on  the  whole  corps  front,  excepting  in  front  of  Gib 
son's  brigade  of  Wood's  division.  *  *  *  Gibson  met  a  de 
structive  fire  of  musketry  and  canister,  the  rebels  opening  on 
us  with  at  least  twenty  pieces  of  artillery.  *  *  *  After 
Hazen  had  taken  the  enemy's  skirmish  rifle  pits  *  *  *  the 
rebels  rallied  out  and  drove  his  skirmishers  back.  *  *  *  We 
lost  about  thirty  killed  and  wounded."2 

August  4,  we  kept  up  the  usual  exchange  of  shots  with  the 
enemy's  pickets.  Our  men  by  continued  rifle  practice  had  got 
the  exact  range  of  the  enemy's  main  line  of  works  and  could 
knock  the  dust  from  their  head  logs  by  careful  aim. 

General  Sherman  had  again  grown  very  impatient  at  the 
slow  progress  we  were  making.  The  failure  of  Stoneman's  and 
McCook's  cavalry  raids  had  mortified  him,  and  he  was  urgent 

1  Gleason's  Diary. 

2  W.   R.  R.  76-343-4. 


536  FIFTEENTH   OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

that  his  troops  should  either  break  the  enemy's  line  in  some 
place  or  turn  his  flank.  On  the  fourth  of  August  he  issued 
orders  that  General  Schofield,  with  his  own  command  and  Gen 
eral  Palmer's  Fourteenth  Corps,  should  move  directly  on  the  rail 
road  leading  south  out  of  Atlanta,  at  any  point  between  White 
Hall  and  East  Point,  and  not  stop  until  he  had  absolute  control 
of  said  road,  and  that  Generals  Thomas  and  Howard  should 
press  close  on  the  enemy  at  all  points.  He  closed  his  order  by 
saying : 

"On  the  right  we  must  assume  the  offensive,  and  every  man 
be  prepared  to  fight,  leaving  knapsacks,  etc.  in  the  present 
trenches.  Wagons  will  not  be  taken  east  of  Utoy  Creek  until 
General  Schofield  has  secured  position  on  the  railroad  or  so 
near  it  that  it  can  be  reached  by  musket  ball  and  canister.  If 
necessary  to  secure  this  end  ordinary  parapets  must  be  charged 
and  carried,  and  every  hour's  delay  enables  the  enemy  to 
strengthen.  Therefore  let  it  be  done  today."1 

All  the  army  commanders,  Generals  Thomas,  Howard  and 
Schofield,  at  once  set  about  carrying  out  the  above  orders  and 
gave  the  necessary  directions,  but  General  Palmer,  commanding 
the  Fourteenth  Corps,  refused  to  serve  under  General  Schofield's 
orders  because,  as  he  claimed,  he  was  General  Schofield's  superior 
in  rank.  General  Schofield  disputed  this  claim  and  the  matter 
was  referred  to  General  Sherman  to  decide.  He  decided  in 
favor  of  General  Schofield  and  thereupon  General  Palmer 
tendered  his  resignation.  Afterwards,  at  the  urgent  solicitation 
of  Generals  Sherman  and  Thomas,  he  agreed  to  withdraw  his 
resignation  and  co-operate  with  General  Schofield,  but  General 
Sherman  on  further  consideration  decided  to  accept  it.  General 
Jeff  C.  Davis,  on  account  of  his  proved  ability,  vigor  and  splendid 
fighting  qualities,  was  at  once  suggested  as  the  proper  officer  to 
succeed  General  Palmer  in  command  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps, 
but  he  was  too  ill  to  then  undertake  it.  So  the  command  tem 
porarily  devolved  on  General  R.  W.  Johnson,  the  ranking  bri 
gadier  general  of  the  corps.  On  account  of  this  dispute  nothing 
was  done  on  the  fourth,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  fifth,  General 
Thomas  recommended  that  General  J.  C.  Davis  be  raised  to  the 
rank  of  Major  General  U.  S.  Volunteers  and  assigned  to  com 
mand  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps.2 

General  Sherman,  as  shown  by  the  letters  and  dispatches  of 
August  5  and  6,  was  urgent  to  the  extreme  in  pushing  the  move 
ment  ordered  on  the  fourth,  and  was  impatient  of  the  delay. 
He  was  evidently  in  the  same  condition  of  mind  as  at  Kenesaw, 

1  W.  R.  R.  76-364. 

2  W.  R.  R.  76-369. 


SIEGE  AND  CAPTURE  or  ATLANTA  ">37 

when  he  ordered  the  assault  of  June  27.  He  was  irritated  at 
the  slow  movements  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps.  To  General 
Thomas  he  wrote  or  dispatched,  "That  it  (the  Fourteenth  Corps) 
is  the  largest  corps  we  have  and  thus  far  has  not  sustained  heavy 
loss  in  this  campaign.  It  moves  slowly  and  reluctantly  and 
there  is  something  wrong."  On  the  same  day,  the  fifth,  General 
Schofield  telegraphed  that  he  "had  totally  failed  to  make  any 
aggressive  movement  with  the  Fourteenth  Corps"  and  General 
Sherman  in  transmitting  the  telegram  to  General  Thomas  said: 
"From  what  I  saw  myself  there  was  a  manifest  determination 
not  to  move  toward  the  enemy."  General  Thomas  at  once  re 
sented  this  reflection  on  the  Fourteenth  Corps  and  protested  that 
"it  has  always  been  prompt  in  executing  any  work  given  to  it 
heretofore."1  On  the  same  day  General  Sherman  again  dis 
patched  to  General  Thomas  saying,  "I  would  prefer  to  move  a 
rock  than  to  move  that  corps.  On  the  defensive  it  would  be 
splendid,  but  for  offensive  it  is  of  no  use.  It  must  have  a  head 
that  will  give  it  life  and  impulse.  I  was  ashamed  yesterday  and 
kept  away  on  purpose  today  to  see  if  orders  would  move  it,  but 
if  an  enemy  can  be  seen  with  a  spy  glass,  the  whole  corps  is 
halted  and  intrenched  for  a  siege.  Unless  it  will  attack  I  will 
relieve  it  in  orders  and  state  the  reasons."  He  fired  despatches 
to  Generals  Schofield,  Thomas,  Howard,  Logan,  Stanley  and 
others  urging  and  pleading  for  vigorous  assaults  all  along  the 
line.  Thomas  and  Howard  reported  that  they  had  pressed  for 
ward  their  skirmishers,  in  some  cases  up  to  the  enemy's  main 
line  and  were  pouring  volleys  of  artillery  into  their  works. 
At  7:15  p.  m.  of  the  fifth.  General  Schofield  reported,  "I  am 
compelled  to  acknowledge  that  I  have  totally  failed  to  make  any 
aggressive  movement  with  the  Fourteenth  Corps,  and  have  very 
little  hope  of  being  able  to  do  better.  The  efforts  of  yesterday 
and  today  on  this  flank  have  been  much  worse  than  mere  failures. 
I  have  ordered  Johnson  to  relieve  Hascall  this  evening,  and 
propose  tomorrow  to  take  my  own  corps  on  to  the  right  and  try- 
to  recover  what  has  been  lost  by  two  day's  delay."1  To  this 
General  Sherman  answered  "Very  well,  take  your  divisions  and 
order  in  writing  both  Generals  Baird  and. Morgan  to  follow  your 
movement,  either  in  support  or  in  echelon,  with  General  John 
son  to  hold  the  tete-de-pont.  push  out  for  the  Sandtown  road, 
and,  if  possible,  a  position  where  you  can  control  the  railroad 
*  *  *  those  divisions  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps  are  the 
strongest  and  best  in  the  army,  and  all  they  want  is  a  good 
leader."2 

1  W.  R.  R.  76-371. 

2  W.  R.  R.  7(1-380.  Siff.    18 


538  FlFTEEXTH     OHIO    VOLUNTEERS    AM)     CAMPAIGNS 

A  report  of  General  Sherman's  irritation  and  impatience 
had  probably  reached  Washington  for  on  the  sixth  of  August, 
Secretary  Stanton  telegraphed  him :  "Do  not  imagine  that  we 
are  impatient  of  your  progress ;  instead  of  considering  it  slow, 
we  regard  it  as  rapid,  brilliant,  and  successful  beyond  our  ex 
pectations.  Take  your  time  and  do  your  work  in  your  own 
way."1  General  Grant  who  was  in  Washington  at  the  time 
wired  to  him:  "Your  progress,  instead  of  appearing  slow,  has 
received  the  universal  commendations  of  all  loyal  citizens,  as 
well  as  the  President,  War  Department,  and  all  persons  whose 
commendations  you  would  care  for."2 

August  6,  General  Schofield  put  his  two  divisions  on  the 
extreme  right  and  assaulted  the  enemy's  intrenched  lines,  but 
found  the  obstructions  so  strong  he  could  not  reach  the  parapet. 
The  loss  in  his  two  divisions.  Cox's  and  Hascall's,  were  about 
1000  killed  and  wounded.2  After  this  attack  he  made  a  much 
larger  circuit  to  the  right  for  the  purpose  of  reaching  the  enemy's 
flank,  or  a  point  of  his  line  not  protected  by  abatis,  struck  the 
point  where  the  Sandtown  road  crosses  the  main  Utoy  Creek, 
and  reported  that  he  was  intrenching  the  ground  gained  and 
would  be  ready  for  work  again  in  the  morning/5 

August  7,  General  Sherman  it  appears  became  satisfied  that 
he  could  not  compel  the  evacuation  of  Atlanta  by  merely  ex 
tending  his  lines  to  the  right,  and  on  that  day  telegraphed  Gen 
eral  Halleck  saying,  "I  do  not  deem  it  prudent  to  extend  more 
to  the  right,  but  will  push  forward  daily  by  parallels,  and  make 
the  inside  of  Atlanta  too  hot  to  be  endured."4  The  same  day  he 
ordered  General  Thomas  to  telegraph  to  Chattanooga  and  have 
two  30-pounder  Parrotts  sent  down  on  the  cars  with  1000  shells 
and  ammunition  and  added,  "Put  them  into  your  best  position, 
and  knock  down  the  buildings  of  the  town."5  But  when  General 
Schofield  reported  that  his  troops  were  now  across  the  Sand- 
town  and  Campbelltown  roads,  he  at  once  telegraphed  to  him : 
"That's  right.  Go  on  in  your  own  way  to  accomplish  the  end 
and  keep  your  five  divisions  so  as  to  hold  the  enemy  until  a 
battle  is  fought."6 

While  the  events  and  movements  of  the  fifth,  sixth  and 
seventh  of  August  were  transpiring,  our  regiment  was  holding 
its  position  and  doing  its  part  to  keep  the  enemy  occupied  on  our 
immediate  front.  On  the  fifth,  in  the  afternoon,  there  was  a 
vigorous  demonstration  on  our  skirmish  line  which  at  first 
caused  quite  an  alarm,  as  no  previous  notice  of  it  had  been  given. 
It  drew  the  fire  of  the  64-pounders  in  the  enemy's  fort  and 

1  W.  R.  R.  76-390.  4     W.  R.  R.  76-408. 

2  W.  R.  R.  76-407.  5     W.  R.  R.  76-412. 

3  W.  R.  R.  76-399.  6     W.  R.  R.  76-415. 


SIEGE  AND  CAPTURE  OF  ATLANTA  5^9 

several  of  the  big  shells  passed  over  us  "with  a  noise  not  unlike 
the  flight  of  an  immense  turkey."1  During  the  momentary  panic 
at  the  beginning  of  the  demonstration  an  amusing  incident  oc 
curred  in  our  brigade.  Brigade  headquarters  w.ere  about  one 
hundred  yards  to  the  rear  of  the  headquarters  of  our  regiment 
and  like  the  latter  were  protected  by  a  heavy  parapet  and  trav 
erses.  At  the  time  the  demonstration  began  a  court  martial  was 
in  session  there.  The  court  suddenly  adjourned  and  the  officers 
composing  it  hurried  to  their  respective  commands,  thinking 
there  was  a  sudden  attack  by  the  enemy.  Captain  Chandler  H. 
Carroll  of  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  was  the  Judge  Advocate  of  the 
Court  and  lingered  behind  to  gather  up  the  papers.  As  he  was 
crossing  the  space  between  the  brigade  and  regimental  hear- 
quarters,  a  sixty-four  pound  shell  came  bounding  and  ricocheting 
across  his  path.  He  at  once  turned  aside,  followed  it,  picked  it 
up  and  started  with  it  to  brigade  headquarters.  Colonel  Gibson 
who  was  standing  at  the  door  of  his  tent  saw  him  coming  and 
with  arms  aloft  shouted,  "G — d  d — n  you !  Don't  you  bring  that 

d -d  thing  here,"  repeating  the  words,  until  Carroll  turned 

about  and  brought  the  shell  to  regimental  headquarters.  The 
members  of  the  regimental  staff  chided  him  for  his  temerity  in 
picking  up  the  shell,  but  he  said  there  was  no  danger,  as  he 
"saw  no  smoke  coming  from  it  and  knew  that  the  fuse  was  out." 
He  coolly  unscrewed  the  plug,  poured  out  the  powder  and  we 
kept  the  shell  at  regimental  headquarters  as  a  curiosity.  Orders 
were  issued  that  night  for  renewed  vigilance  on  our  front  in 
order  to  prevent  surprise. 

August  6,  there  was  the  usual  firing  on  the  skirmish  or 
picket  line  and  in  the  afternoon  another  demonstration  was 
made  and  our  batteries  threw  shells  into  the  enemy's  line,  with 
out  provoking  any  response  from  their  artillery.  It  was  said  they 
had  decided  to  save  their  ammunition  for  more  serious  work. 
There  was  a  thunderstorm  in  the  afternoon. 

On  the  seventh,  our  pickets  directed  their  fire  at  a  tent  inside 
the  enemy's  works  with  some  effect  for  we  saw  men  about  and 
near  it  executing  some  very  active  movements.2  We  heard 
musketry  and  artillery  firing  on  the  right  and  while  it  lasted  we 
also  heard  considerable  commotion  in  the  enemy's  camp. 

On  the  eighth,  there  was  constant  picket  firing  and  our  men 
kept  up  a  continual  wordy  noise,  shouting  over  to  the  enemy's 
pickets  all  sorts  of  badinage,  but  they  did  not  reply.  The  adju 
tant  started  back  to  Bridgeport.  Ala.,  where  our  baggage  train 
was  parked  for  some  needed  books  and  papers.3  General 
Thomas  and  staff  inspected  our  line  and  it  was  said  had  ordered 

1,  2  and  3     Gleason's  Diary. 


540  PlFTKKXTII    OHIO    VOLUNTKEHS    AND    CAMPAIGNS 

a  battery  placed  in  our  regimental  line.  On  the  ninth,  it  was 
rainy  and  disagreeable.  Our  batteries  pounded  away  at  the 
enemy  with  unusual  vigor.  It  was  a  long  time  before  the  enemy's 
artillery  replied  and  then  only  with  a  single  piece  whose  shots 
were  directed  to  our  right. 

August  10,  there  were  the  usual  daily  incidents  of  the  siege, 
which  was  becoming  somewhat  monotonous.  On  the  eleventh 
early  in  the  morning  we  heard  heavy  cannonading  far  to  the  right, 
which  indicated  an  engagement.  Captain  Carroll,  who  was  still 
acting  as  judge  advocate  of  the  court  martial  at  brigade  head 
quarters,  came  to  regimental  headquarters  and  reported  that  the 
War  Department  had  sent  a  dispatch  to  General  Sherman  an 
nouncing  the  capture  of  Mobile  by  Admiral  Farragut.  It  was 
evident  from  the  artillery  firing  that  we  had  some  guns  of  heavier 
caliber  than  the  ordinary  field  artillery.  In  fact  some  heavy 
siege  guns  had  been  received  and  were  firing  shot  and  shell  in 
the  city  at  intervals  day  and  night.  It  seems  that  General  Sher 
man  had  decided  to  give  the  enemy  no  rest  either  by  night  or  day. 

August  12,  in  the  afternoon  the  brigade  inspector,  Captain 
Green  of  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio,  came  to  the  picket  line  and  gave 
notice  that  another  demonstration  would  soon  be  made,  and  di 
rected  that  all  be  ready  when  the  signal  was  given.  At  the  signal 
our  batteries  opened  all  along  the  line  and  the  fire  from  our  rifie 
pits  was  redoubled.  It  aroused  the  enemy's  artillery  in  our  front 
and  a  number  of  shells  struck  near  us,  but  did  no  damage  to  any 
of  our  men  in  the  rifle  pits.  One  of  the  shells  struck  inside  our 
main  line  of  works  and  killed  one  man  and  wounded  another, 
both  of  the  Eighty-ninth  Illinois,  while  they  were  lying  down 
behind  the  works.  That  night  Lieutenants  Hanson,  Glover  and 
Gleason,  by  turns  took  charge  of  our  advance  pickets  and  look 
outs.  Gleason  says  that  during  his  relief,  from  8  to  11  p.  m.,  the 
enemy's  pickets  were  unusually  quiet  and  that  he  could  plainly 
hear  their  bugles  sounding  tattoo  and  taps  and  their  drums  beat 
ing,  and  that  he  also  heard  a  violin  and  talking  and  laughter 
inside  the  works.1 

The  morning  of  the  thirteenth  of  August,  a  man  in  Company 
F  was  severely  wounded  by  a  minnie  ball  back  of  our  line  and  a 
man  in  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  was  killed.  There  was  no  unusual 
occurrence  during  the  day.  Soon  after  dark  our  siege  guns 
opened  out  on  the  doomed  city  and  kept  it  up  all  night.  During 
the  night  a  great  fire  was  seen  in  the  direction  of  Atlanta  and 
we  heard  the  fire  bells  ringing.  So  it  seemed  our  guns  were 
doing  some  execution.2 

1  and  2     Glenson's  Diary- 


SIEGE  AISTD  CAPTURE  OF  ATLANTA  541 

August  14,  was  Sunday  and  we  got  ready  for  the  regular 
Sunday  morning  inspection,  which  however  did  not  take  place. 
Our  good  chaplain  came  up  from  the  field  hospital  and  preached 
a  short  sermon.  Captain  Updegrove,  who  had  been  painfully 
wounded  at  Pickett's  Mill,  rejoined  the  regiment,  having  walked 
from  Vining  Station.  Very  heavy  cannonading  was  heard  on 
the  right  in  the  evening.  The  day  was  clear  and  pleasant. 

August  15,  a  foraging  party  was  sent  out  from  our  brigade 
made  up  of  two  men  from  each  company,  the  men  from  our  regi 
ment  being  in  charge  of  Lieutenant  Welker.  There  was  the  usual* 
skirmish  or  picket  and  artillery  firing  during  the  day. 

Meanwhile,  on  August  12,  General  Sherman  had  invited 
Generals  Thomas,  Howard  and  Schofield  to  meet  at  his  head 
quarters  at  10  a.  m.  the  next  day.1  This  meeting  was  evidently 
to  consider  the  next  great  movement  of  the  combined  armies,  for 
on  the  thirteenth  at  8  a.  m.  he  telegraphed  General  Halleck : 

"We  have  now  pressed  the  enemy's  lines  from  east  around 
to  East  Point  on  the  south.  The  nature  of  the  ground,  with  its 
artificial  defenses,  makes  it  too  difficult  to  assult,  and  to  reach 
the  Macon  road  by  a  farther  extension  will  be  extra-hazardous. 
I  have  ordered  army  commanders  to  prepare  for  the  following 
plan :  Leave  one  corps  strongly  intrenched  at  the  Chattahoochee 
bridge  in  charge  of  our  surplus  wagon  trains  and  artillery,  with 
60,000  men,  reduced  to  fighting  trim,  to  make  a  circuit  of  devasta 
tion  around  the  town,  with  a  radius  of  fifteen  to  twenty  miles. 
To  do  this  I  go  on  the  faith  that  the  militia  in  Atlanta  are  only 
good  for  the  defense  of  the  parapets  and  will  not  come  out. 
*  *  *  "If  I  should  ever  be  cut  off  from  my  base,  look  out  for" 
me  about  Saint  Marks.  Florida,  or  Savannah,  Ga."2  This  dis 
patch  is  notable  as  prefiguring  the  celebrated  march  to  the  sea. 
At  the  time  there  were  rumors  that  our  forces  had  captured 
Mobile.  General  Sherman  in  a  later  despatch  to  General  Halleck 
on  the  same  day  said,  that  if  there  was  any  possibility  of  the 
forces  under  General  Canby  pushing  up  to  Montgomery,  his  best 
plan  would  be  to  wait  awhile  and  at  the  proper  time  move  down 
to  West  Point  and  operate  into  the  heart  of  Georgia  from  there.3 

This  proposed  movement  was  probably  carefully  con 
sidered  in  Washington,  for  on  the  14th  General  Grant 
telegraphed : 

"The  move  you  propose  to  make  is  a  little  hazardous, 
but  I  believe  it  will  succeed,  If  you  do  not  force  the  enemy 
out  to  fight  you  will  easily  get  back  to  your  base."1  General 
Sherman  seems  to  have  submitted  the  proposed  movement 

1  W.  R.   R.   76-472.  3     W.  R.  R.  76-482. 

2  W.    R.    R.    76-482.  4     W.  R.  R.  70-488. 


542  FIFTEENTH   OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND   CA.MPAUI.NS 

to  his  army  commanders  and  asked  them  to  submit  in  writing 
their  opinions  on  two  alternative  propositions,  i.e.,  a  move 
ment  to  compel  the  enemy  to  abandon  his  works  about 
Atlanta  and  give  battle  on  equal  terms,  or  retreat  below  East 
Point.1 

General  Howard  promptly,  on  the  day  of  the  conference, 
submitted  the  following,  which  is  given  in  full  because  it  is 
almost  identical  in  substance  with  the  orders  afterwards 
given  for  the  movement: 

"Proposition" 

"Acculmulate  all  impedimenta  not  going  to  proposed  depot  prior 
to  movement,  and  move  trains  of  Armies  of  the  Ohio  and  the  Cumber 
land  under  cover  as  much  as  possible,  to  vicinity  of  Utoy  Creek,  there 
to  be  parked  and  guarded  by  infantry;  this  before  the  troops  draw 
out.  Then 

First.  Move  Fourth  Corps,  in  the  night,  to  position  in  rear  of  the 
Fourteenth  Corps,  so  that  the  Twentieth  Corps  can  withdraw  at  day 
light  and  march  to  proposed  depot,  cavalry  following  closely  Twen 
tieth  Corps,  and  taking  up  position  on  south  side  of  Proctor's  Creek. 
Next  night,  let  trains  of  Army  of  the  Tennessee  move  down  Green's 
Ferry  road,  under  guard,  toward  Sandtown,  and  park  near  Utoy  Creek. 

Second.  At  daylight  Armies  of  the  Ohio  and  the  Cumberland 
move  out  simultaneously,  by  two  routes,  if  possible,  in  direction  of 
Fairburn,  Army  of  the  Ohio  to  hault  in  position,  Army  of  the  Cumber 
land  to  form  on  its  left,  and  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  marching  at 
same  hour  to  pass  via  Utoy  or  Sandtown  to  the  rear  and  right  of  the 
other  two  armies. 

The  three  armies  will  march  by  three  roads,  if  possible,  not  more 
than  two  miles  apart.  The  cavalry  (Kilpatrick's)  intended  to  cover 
the  right  flank  to  precede  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  and  that  intended  for 
the  left  flank  to  follow  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  as  far  as  Utoy 
Creek."2 

General  Schofield  submitted  a  plan,  which  was  to  con 
tinue  shifting  to  the  right  until  the  enemy's  line  was  so 
attenuated  that  it  could  be  broken  at  some  point,  or  one  or 
two  corps  could  be  withdrawn  as  if  to  continue  the  movement 
to  the  right,  and  then  sent  by  a  circuitous  route  to  the  left 
to  seize  Atlanta/3 

General  Thomas'  plan  conformed  to  that  of  General 
Sherman  and  indicated  with  more  particularity  how  it  might 
be  carried  out.4 

General  Sherman  on  the  15th,  in  answer  to  General  Scho- 
field's  suggestions,  said:  "I  am  more  and  more  satisfied  the 
movement  we  contemplate  is  the  true  one  to  be  made,"-'  and 
stated  that  he  wanted  to  hear  of  Generals  Kilpatrick  and 
Garrard  before  making  his  orders. 


1  W.  R.  R.  7G-4«J8.  4     W.  R.  R.  7»!-r,07. 

2  W.  R.  R.  76-487.  5     W.  R.  R.  7«:-r.ll. 

3  W.  R.  R.  76-498. 


SIKGE  AND  CAPTURE  OF  ATLANTA  543 

While  this  movement  was  under  consideration  General 
Wheeler  with  about  5000  cavalry  had  crossed  the  Chatta- 
hoochee  to  our  right,  and  on  the  14th  was  reported  to  be  before 
Dalton  on  our  line  of  communications.1  To  offset  Wheeler's 
raid,  General  Sherman  decided  to  at  once  send  a  cavalry 
force  to  again  attempt  the  destruction  of  the  Macon  road,  in 
the  hope  of  compelling  the  evacuation  of  Atlanta.  This 
movement  seemed  opportune,  for  the  detachment  of  Wheeler's 
force  had  probably  left  the  enemy's  cavalry  inferior  in  num 
bers  to  our  own.  Accordingly,  August  14,  orders  were  issued 
directing  General  Kilpatrick  to  cross  the  Chattahooche  at 
Sandtown  and  make  a  bold  push  for  Fairburn  and  the  West 
Point  road,  and  at  the  same  time  General  Garrard  was  to  feel 
well  around  the  enemy's  right  flank.2  The  order  for  the 
grand  movement  above  described  was  therefore  postponed 
until  the  results  of  these  cavalry  raids  were  known. 

In  the  meantime  army,  corps  and  division  commanders 
were  urged  to  give  the  enemy  no  peace  by  night  or  day.  The 
heavy  guns  which  had  been  placed  in  position  poured  a  con 
stant  fire  of  big  shells  into  the  doomed  city,  and  the  enemy's 
rifle  pits  were  assailed  almost  daily  on  some  part  of  his  line. 

August  16,  word  was  received  from  General  Kilpatrick 
that  he  had  cut  the  West  Point  Railroad  at  Fairburn  and 
burned  the  depot  there/'5  Thereupon  General  Sherman  issued 
the  order  for  the  grand  movement  around  the  enemy's  left. 
The  order  is  styled  Special  Field  Orders  No.  574  and  directed 
that  the  movement  begin  Thursday  night,  August  18,  and 
continue  on  the  general  plan  General  Howard  had  suggested. 

But  August  17,  a  message  enclosing  a  copy  of  General 
Kilpatrick's  report  was  received,  in  which  he  stated  that  it 
was  "not  only  possible  but  comparatively  easy  to  break  the 
railroad  to  Macon  effectually,"  and  therefore  General  Sherman 
dispatched  to  General  Thomas,  quoting  the  above  from  Gen 
eral  Kilpatrick's  report  and  saying: 

"I  do  not  want  to  move  this  vast  army  and  its  parapher 
nalia  round  Atlanta  unless  forced  to  do  so,  and  it  does  seem 
the  enemy  has  offered  us  the  very  opportunity  we  seek.  We 
know  positively  that  Wrheeler  is  above  Dalton,  and  that  he 
must  have  taken  the  very  flower  of  his  cavalry.  He  has,  and 
may  do  us  harm,  but  that  we  cannot  help.  I  do  not  think  he 
can  carry  any  point  on  our  road  that  he  can  maintain,  and 
his  own  necessities  will  force  him  back  soon  with  jaded  and 
worn-out  horses.  Now,  ours  can  be  quickly  moved  to  Sand- 

1      W.  R.  R.  76-501.  ;j     W.  R.  R.  76-535 

•2     W.  R.  R.  76-497.  4     W.  R.  R.  70-546. 


T44  FIITKHNTH   Oino  ^VOLU. \TKKKS  AND  CAMI'AICNS 

town  at  a  walk,  and  according  to  General  Kilpatrick,  can 
reach  Red  Oak  or  any  point  below  the  enemy's  infantry,  and 
by  a  single  dash  can  beat  the  remaining  cavalry  of  the  enemy 
and  break  up  many  miles  of  that  railroad.  General  Garrard 
with  one  brigade  could  amuse  those  on  the  east,  and  General 
Kilpatrick  with  his  own  and  t\vo  brigades  of  General  Garrard, 
under  Colonel  Long,  could  make  in  a  single  move  a  break 
that  would  disturb  Hood  seriously.  The  risk  wrill  be  com 
paratively  small,  as  General  Schofield  can  act  in  support  with 
his  whole  command.  I  am  perfectly  alive  to  the  fact  that  the 
loss  of  our  cavalry  would  be  most  serious,  but  I  do  not  think 
such  an  opportunity  if  neglected  will  never  again  appear. 
In  this  combination  I  would  merely  suspend  the  final  execu 
tion  of  the  movement  of  the  whole  army  till  the  result  of  this 
move  is  reached.  I  think  we  could  give  General  Kilpatrick 
such  orders  that  he  would  not  be  rash,  and  General  Schofleld 
could  move  to  his  right  a  couple  of  miles,  and  make  it  certain 
that  Hood  would  not  attempt  to  use  infantry  to  interpose  to 
the  return  of  our  cavalry.  Don't  make  any  orders  till  you 
and  I  have  perfectly  agreed  on  this  plan.  In  the  meantime 
anything  done  toward  the  movement  of  the  whole  army  will 
not  be  lost,  as  it  simply  means  sending  to  the  bridge  (at  the 
Chattahoochee)  all  the  loose  ends.  I  have  sent  for  General 
Kilpatrick  to  come  up."1 

On  the  same  day  General  Sherman  directed  General 
Thomas  to  notify  General  Garrard  to  have  one  of  his  brigades 
ready  to  make  a  demonstration  on  our  left  and  two  other 
brigades  ready  to  move  that  night  by  moonlight  by  Pace's 
Ferry  and  Sandtown  bridges  to  operate  under  Kilpatrick  on 
our  right — but  they  were  not  to  move  until  General  Sherman 
had  seen  Kilpatrick  and  had  an  understanding  with  him.  He 
also  directed  that  Stanley's  line  should  persistently  annoy  the 
enemy  by  making  feints  as  though  looking  for  a  place  to 
assault,  and  that  preparations  to  move  the  infantry  as  before 
ordered  might  be  continued,  but  no  movement  was  to  be 
actually  made  until  further  orders.2 

Afterwards,  on  the  same  day,  he  again  dispatched  to  Gen 
eral  Thomas  that  he  had  seen  General  Kilpatrick  and  was  con 
vinced  that  he  could  so  effectually  destroy  the  Macon  Rail 
road  that  it  could  not  be  used  in  two  weeks,  and  that  without 
risking  his  cavalry.  He  then  gave  orders  for  the  raid.  Kil 
patrick  wras  ordered  to  move  the  night  of  the  18th,  cross  the 
West  Point  road  at  Fairburn,  reach  the  Macon  road  near 


1  W.    R.   R.    76-548. 

2  W.  R.  R.  76-548. 


SIEGE  AND  CAPTURE  OF  ATLANTA  545 

Jonesborough,  face  toward  East  Point  and  break  the  road  to 
the  south. 

On  the  19th,  there  was  to  be  a  strong  demonstration  by 
Stanley's  corps  on  the  enemy's  right,  to  aid  in  Kilpatrick's 
movement.  Notice  of  this  raid  was  given  to  Generals  Scho- 
field  and  Howard.  They  were  ordered  to  demonstrate  actively 
against  Atlanta  the  next  two  days  and  make  the  enemy  be 
lieve  we  would  attack  them  in  their  trenches.1  Meanwhile 
the  grand  movement  around  the  enemy's  right  was  again 
postponed  to  await  the  result  of  Kilpatrick's  second  raid. 
While  this  raid  was  being  planned  and  carried  out  a  shower 
of  dispatches  came  to  General  Sherman  from  Allatoona, 
Resaca.  Chattanooga  and  other  points  to  our  rear,  telling  of 
assaults  and  threatened  assaults  by  Wheeler's  cavalry  on  our 
single  line  of  railroad.  The  track  was  torn  up  in  several 
places,  the  telegraph  wires  were  cut,  and  for  a  time  we  had 
no  communication  with  the  outside  world,  except  by  courier 
and  signalling  across  the  breaks. 

August  18,  General  Grant  from  City  Point,  Ya.,  tele 
graphed  General  Sherman :  "If  you  can  hold  fast  as  you  are 
now  and  prevent  raids  on  your  rear  you  will  destroy  most  of 
that  army  (meaning  the  army  holding  Atlanta.)  I  never 
would  advise  going  backward  even  if  your  roads  are  cut  so 
as  to  preclude  the  possibility  of  receiving  supplies  from  the 
north  *  *  *  and  if  it  comes  to  the  worst  move  south  as 
you  have  suggested."2 

August  16,  our  regiment  had  the  usual  number  of  men 
on  picket  and  there  was  the  usual  amount  of  firing.  Rumors 
came  that  Wheeler's  cavalry  had  made  a  raid  on  Tunnel  Hill, 
but  later,  word  came  that  they  had  struck  several  points  on 
the  railroad  in  our  rear  and  had  been  repulsed  at  all  of  them. 
There  came  to  the  line  about  midnight  a  communication  from 
Colonel  Askew  that  the  enemy  was  massing  on  our  front  and 
directing  that  unusual  precaution  should  be  taken  to  guard 
against  surprise. 

On  the  17th,  heavy  demonstrations  were  the  order  of  the 
day,  especially  in  the  afternoon,  troops  being  moved  toward 
the  left  in  plain  view  of  the  enemy  and  then  back  toward  the 
right  in  the  woods  where  they  could  not  be  seen,  so  as  to 
make  the  enemy  think  we  were  massing  on  his  right.  We 
had  orders  to  have  enough  ammunition  to  last  next  day  and 
then  have  sixty  rounds  per  gun.  We  interpreted  that  to 
mean  a  movement  of  some  kind,  but  where  we  could  not 
guess. 

1  W.  R.  R.  76-550 

2  W.  R.  R.  76-569. 


546  FIFTEENTH   OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

The  morning  of  the  ]8th  opened  by  our  batteries  tiring 
by  volleys  to  which  the  enemy  replied  vigorously.  Fires  were 
started  in  the  rear  of  our  camps  and  troops  were  maneuvered 
as  yesterday  to  deceive  the  enemy.  Our  one  wagon  was 
ordered  back  to  the  Chattahoochee.  This  further  convinced 
us  that  some  big  move  was  contemplated,  but  no  orders  came. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  19th,  a  furious  cannonading 
began  and  there  was  an  increase  of  musketry  firing  all  along 
the  line.  In  the  evening  heavy  artillery  firing  was  heard  far 
to  the  right  and  our  signal  officers  and  lookouts  reported 
movements  of  the  enemy's  troops  in  that  direction.  During 
the  afternoon  an  attempt  was  made  to  advance  our  line  and 
if  possible  make  a  lodgement  in  the  enemy's  works,  but  they 
proved  too  strong  to  be  successfully  assaulted.  The  attempt 
led  to  the  increase  of  musketry  firing  before  mentioned  and 
also  developed  artillery  on  the  enemy's  line  in  new  positions. 
These  demonstrations  were  all  in  accordance  with  previous 
orders,  and  were  intended  to  keep  the  enemy  from  sending  his 
infantry  against  Kilpatrick,  the  result  of  whose  raid  was 
awaited  with  feverish  anxiety  by  our  commander  in  chief. 
Strange  to  say,  that  evening  our  regimental  quartette,  the 
Gleason  boys,  Major  McClenahan  and  Surgeon  Clark,  got 
together  and  amid  the  din  of  skirmish  firing  and  exploding 
shells  sang  a  number  of  "the  old  songs."  During  the  20th  of 
August,  there  was  the  usual  picket  firing  in  our  front,  and  the 
usual  artillery  practice  on  the  beleaguered  city,  but  there  was 
no  demonstration  attempted.  Our  pioneers  were  engaged  in 
cutting  logs  to  use  in  building  advanced  works  on  our  picket 
line.  The  adjutant  returned  from  Bridgeport,  having  brought 
the  regimental  books  and  papers  as  far  as  Vining's 
Station,  where  he  was  ordered  to  leave  them.  He  brought 
with  him  some  peach  butter  which  was  highly  appreciated 
by  the  officers'  mess.1  Gleason  also  reports  that  he  also 
brought  an  express  package  for  him,  Gleason,  containing  a 
faded  bouquet,  sent  by  a  fair  hand  far  away  in  the  north. 
One  smells  its  fragrance  even  yet  although  near  fifty  years 
have  passed  since  then  and  both  sender  and  receiver  are  no 
more. 

At  10  p.  m.,  August  19,  the  signal  officer  at  the  Howard 
House,  near  our  part  of  the  line,  reported  that  he  saw  a 
column  of  smoke  south  of  Atlanta,  distant  about  eight  or  ten 
miles.2  Could  it  be  Kilpatrick?  The  report  was  sent  to  Gen 
eral  Sherman.  On  the  19th,  Jeff  C.  Davis  was  appointed  to 
command  the  Fourteenth  Corps  and  on  the  20th,  one  of  the 

1  Gleason's  Diary. 

2  W.  R.  R.  76-596. 


SIEGE  AND  CAPTURE  OF  ATLANTA  547 

brigades  of  his  old  division  made  a  forced  reconnoissance, 
struck  the  West  Point  Railroad  half  a  mile  east  of  Red  Oak 
Station,  cut  the  telegraph  wires,  tore  up  a  portion  of  the  track 
and  then  returned  to  camp1 — but  brought  no  news  from 
Kilpatrick.  On  the  21st,  a  part  of  Kilpatrick's  force  returned 
after  having  struck  the  main  road  at  Fayette  and  being 
attacked  by  a  superior  force.  His  main  force  had  not  been 
heard  from  and  there  were  grave  fears  that  it  had  met  with 
disaster.2  But  on  the  22nd  he  arrived  at  Decatur  on  his  return 
and  reported  to  General  Thomas.  General  Thomas  at  once 
reported  the  fact  to  General  Sherman  who  asked  that  Kil 
patrick  be  sent  to  him  as  soon  as  possible.  At  10  p.  m.  that 
night  General  Sherman  telegraphed  to  General  Halleck, 
saying : 

"General  Kilpatrick  is  back.  He  had  pretty  hard  fighting 
with  a  division  of  infantry  and  three  brigades  of  cavalry.  He 
broke  the  cavalry  into  disorder  and  captured  a  battery  which 
he  destroyed,  except  one  gun,  which  he  brought  in  in  addition 
to  all  his  own.  He  also  brought  in  three  captured  flags  and 
seventy  prisoners.  He  had  possession  of  a  large  part  of 
Ross'  brigade,  but  could  not  encumber  himself  with  them. 
He  destroyed  three  miles  of  the  road  about  Jonesborough, 
and  broke  pieces  for  about  ten  miles  more,  enough  to  dis 
able  the  road  for  ten  days.  I  expect  I  will  have  to  swing- 
across  to  that  road  in  force  to  make  the  matter  certain.  Gen 
eral  Kilpatrick  destroyed  two  locomotives  and  trains."3 

Instead  of  the  Macon  road  being  disabled  for  ten  days 
as  General  Sherman  had  supposed,  on  Tuesday,  August  2-'>, 
at  9:15  a.  in.,  he  telegraphed  to  General  Thomas: 

"As  near  as  I  can  make  out  the  rebels  have  repaired  the 
Macon  road,  and  we  must  swing  across  it.  Let  me  know 
when  you  will  be  ready  to  execute  the  former  plan."4  Gen 
eral  Thomas  at  once  answered  the  dispatch  and  said  : 

"I  would  like  to  commence  the  movement  without  being 
hurried,  and  can  do  so  by  Thursday  night.  I  think  the  cav 
alry  ought  to  have  a  little  rest  and  time  to  shoe  up.  I  will  be 
perfectly  prepared  by  Thursday  with  provisions,  and  can 
arrange  to  get  forage  by  Sandtown  the  day  after,  if  forage 
comes  down."5 

General  Sherman  readily  acquiesced  in  General  Thomas' 
request  for  delay,  and  at  3  p.  m.  that  day  gave  orders  to  Gen 
erals  Howard  and  Schofield  to  be  ready  to  move  Thursday 
night,  August  25.6 

1  W.  R.  R.  76-614.  4     W.   R.    R.   76-639. 

2  W.  R.  R.   76-627.  5     W  R.  R.  76-639. 

3  W.   R.  R.  76-628.  6     W.  R.  R.   76-641. 


548  FlFTKKXTH     OHIO    Voi.r.NTKKKS    AM)    CAMPAIGNS 

August  21,  when  our  pickets  went  to  relieve  those  on 
duty  they  found  that  the  line  had  been  advanced  the  night 
before.  The  pioneers  had  worked  until  midnight  on  the 
advanced  pits  and  our  men  had  quietly  moved  into  them 
without  resistence.  From  a  point  on  the  advanced  line  we 
got  a  view  of  the  enemy's  defenses  and  a  portion  of  the  city, 
but  the  aim  of  his  sharpshooters  was  so  good  one  did  not 
like  to  linger  long  "viewing  the  landscape  o'er."  Sergeant 
John  S.  Penrose  of  Company  B,  was  killed  in  one  of  our  new 
rifle  pits.  It  was  said  he  had  become  reckless  of  danger  and 
had  exposed  himself  unnecessarily.  He  was  a  fine  soldier  and 
his  death  was  greatly  regretted.  It  was  too  hazardous  to 
remove  his  body  by  daylight  and  it  was  not  removed  until 
nightfall.  Head  logs  were  placed  on  the  parapets  in  front  of 
the  rifle  pits  that  night.  The  reserve  was  called  up  at  2  :30 
a.  m.  and  stood  to  arms  until  daybreak.  On  the  2nd,  in  the 
evening,  quite  a  number  of  stray  bullets  came  over  our 
"works"  at  regimental  headquarters,  one  of  which  struck 
Willison  B.  White,  our  hospital  steward,  in  the  knee,  inflict 
ing  a  painful  wound.  Surgeon  Clark  at  once  dressed  the 
wound,  which  White  bore  with  his  usual  Christian  fortitude.1 

On  the  23rd,  our  pioneers  were  sent  to  construct  an 
additional  rifle  pit  on  the  left  of  our  picket  line,  as  the  Nine 
teenth  Ohio  which  was  on  our  immediate  left  had  failed  to 
connect  its  picket  line  with  ours,  and  our  left  rifle  pit  was 
enfiladed  by  the  enemy's  pickets.  While  they  \vere  about 
their  work  the  Ninteenth  Ohio  picket  line  showred  signs  of 
advancing  and  the  work  was  postponed  until  evening.  As 
necessary  blanks  had  been  brought  up  by  the  Adjutant,  com 
pany  commanders  were  busy  making  out  returns.  During- 
the  forenoon  one  of  the  enemy's  batteries  threw  a  few  shells 
which  struck  pretty  close  to  our  quarters  but  no  one  was  hit 
by  them.  A  man  in  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  was  killed  on  the 
picket  line,  also  said  to  be  the  result  of  carelessness  in  unnec 
essarily  exposing  himself. 

On  the  24th,  we  had  the  usual  round  of  duties  and  there 
was  the  usual  firing.  In  the  evening  a  Lieutenant  of  the 
Nineteenth  Ohio  was  killed  just  to  the  left  of  our  picket  line 
while  on  a  tour  of  inspection.  At  supper  time  orders  were 
issued  to  have  ammunition  enough  on  hand  to  last  until 
Friday,  the  26th,  and  then  have  sixty  rounds  per  man. 

On  the  morning  of  the  25th,  after  breakfast,  the  non- 
veterans  of  the  regiment  and  brigade  whose  terms  of  service 
had  expired,  started  for  home  under  charge  of  Colonel  Gibson^ 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


SIEGE  AND  CAPTURE  OF  ATLANTA  549 

whose  term  of  service  had  also  expired.  Indications  pointed 
to  a  movement  of  some  kind,  but  the  rank  and  file  did  not 
know  where.  At  supper  time  orders  were  issued  to  strike 
tents  as  soon  as  it  was  dark,  pack  up  and  be  ready  to  move. 
The  men  were  enjoined  not  to  make  any  unusual  noise  or  to 
attract  the  enemy's  attention  otherwise.  The  pickets  were 
instructed  to  remain  in  their  rifle  pits  until  midnight  and 
then  quietly  to  withdraw.  After  packing  up  we  lay  down  to 
await  orders,  which  were  not  received  until  near  11  o'clock. 
When  they  came  the  men  were  awakened,  formed  into  line 
in  rear  of  our  quarters  and  moved  out  to  the  right,  ours  being 
the  advance  regiment  of  the  brigade.  Our  progress  was 
impeded  because  of  the  First  Division  taking  the  wrong  road. 
The  roads  were  very  muddy  in  places,  as  it  had  rained  that 
afternoon,  and  the  artillery  made  slow  progress.  After 
making  about  four  miles,  flankers  were  thrown  out  on  the 
left  and  cautioned  to  keep  a  sharp  lookout  for  the  enemy,  as 
it  was  said  our  troops  had  all  been  withdrawn  from  our  works 
on  that  flank  of  our  column. 

We  soon  crossed  the  railroad  leading  back  to  the  Chatta- 
hoochee,  and  marching  about  a  mile  beyond  it,  stacked  arms 
by  the  roadside  and  waited  for  the  dawn  which  was  then 
beginning  to  redden  the  east.  During  the  slow  night  march 
some  of  the  officers  learned  that  General  Sherman  had  decided 
to  march  to  the  south  and  southeast  of  Atlanta  and  force 
the  enemy  to  come  out  of  his  works  and  give  battle.  They 
also  learned  that  a  strong  line  of  works  had  been  constructed 
at  the  railroad  bridge  crossing  the  Chattahoochee,  and  that 
the  Twentieth  Corps  had  been  detached  to  hold  them  while 
the  rest  of  the  army  turned  the  enemy's  left  flank.  There 
was  the  usual  speculation  on  the  result.  Some  were  very  pessi 
mistic  about  it.  They  argued  that  our  army  had  been  greatly 
depleted  in  numbers  by  sickness  and  death,  and  by  the  detach 
ment  of  large  numbers  to  guard  the  forts  and  bridges  on  our 
line  of  communication,  while  the  enemy  had  been  constantly 
strengthened  by  withdrawing  men  from  such  service.  As 
the  adjutant  was  riding  along  beside  the  line  of  marching 
men,  Captain  C.  W.  Carroll  took  hold  of  one  of  his  stirrups 
and  trotted  along  beside  him  for  some  distance.  The  Adju 
tant  told  him  of  this  pessimistic  talk,  to  which  he  listened 
attentively  and  said :  "Yes,  that's  all  true,  we'll  have  a  big 
fight,  but — we'll  whip  'em."  His  indomitable  courage  and 
hopefulness  made  a  profound  impression  on  the  adjutant's 
mind  and  when  they  parted  he  rode  on  with  a  lighter  heart. 
This  spirit  must  have  pervaded  the  rank  and  file  of  the  army, 


550  FIKTKKXTH   OHIO  VOLUNTEERS   AND  CAMPAEGNS 

for  the  next  day  they  showed  a  feeling  of  relief  that  we  were 
now  out  in  the  open  and  could  meet  the  enemy  on  equal  terms. 
While  we  bivouaced  by  the  roadside  the  men  got  two  or 
three  hours  of  sleep.  We  then  had  breakfast  and  awaited 
orders.  Other  troops  soon  began  moving  in  front  of  us  and 
our  brigade  began  to  fortify.  Another  line  of  works  was 
leing  laid  off  on  a  commanding  ridge  in  our  front.  From  a 
point  near  us  one  could  see  a  high  knob  in  the  direction  of 
Atlanta,  and  we  were  told  it  was  occupied  by  one  of  the 
enemy's  batteries  which  had  been  throwing  some  shells  dur 
ing  the  early  morning.  The  regiment  soon  moved  to  the 
right  a  short  distance  and  resumed  throwing  up  fortifications. 
After  working  about  half  an  hour  we  again  took  up  our  line 
of  march,  passing  the  Sixteenth  Corps,  which  was  also  build 
ing  intrenchments. 

The  sun  was  very  hot,  there  was  little  air  stirring  and 
many  of  the  men  were  overcome  by  the  heat.  The  inaction 
in  front  of  Atlanta,  where  we  had  practically  lived  in  the 
trenches  for  more  than  a  month,  had  unfitted  them  for  severe 
marching.  We  made  frequent  halts  to  give  them  rest, 
but  at  1  o'clock  when  we  halted  for  dinner  we  had  not  more 
than  100  men  in  our  ranks.  When  we  resumed  our  inarch 
we  were  told  that  we  would  only  have  to  go  two  miles 
further.  But  the  two  miles  lengthened  out  to  five  miles,  and 
when  we  climbed  a  hill  and  went  into  camp  for  the  night  not 
a  hundred  men  in  the  regiment  stacked  arms.  Many  of  the 
stragglers  did  not  get  up  to  the  regiment  until  late  in  the 
night.  Our  march  was  through  a  thickly  wooded  region  and 
we  could  not  tell  in  what  direction  AVC  were  moving,  but  one 
thing  was  clear,  it  was  not  a  retreat  and  we  began  to  suspect  it 
was  a  grand  flank  movement  toward  the  rear  of  Atlanta.1 

The  27th  was  cloudy,  with  light  rain  in  the  morn 
ing.  Our  men  f  ound  a  stone-\valled  spring  in  a  little 
cove  below  our  camp  and  filled  their  canteens  from  it.  We 
resumed  our  inarch  about  8  o'clock  and  to  our  surprise  took 
the  back  track.  It  was  only  for  a  short  distance,  however, 
for  in  about  half  a  mile  we  reached  a  road  leading  southward 
and  followed  it.  When  we  halted  at  noon  there  was  brisk 
skirmishing  in  our  front  and  we  thought  the  prospects  good 
for  a  fight.  T\vo  regiments  of  cavalry  went  forward,  drove 
the  enemy  and  made  the  way  clear  for  our  further  advance. 
We  marched  about  a  mile  further,  when  we  halted,  stacked 
arms,  and  began  throwing  up  intrenchments.  We  faced  a  large 
opening  to  the  southward,  across  which  we  could  see  the 

1     Gleason's   Diary. 


SIEGE  AND  CAPTURE  OF  ATLANTA  551 

enemy's  skirmishers.  As  we  had  brought  along  extra 
shovels  and  found  rails  in  abundance,  we  soon  had  a  very 
good  defensive  line  of  works  in  our  front.  One  of  the  enemy's 
batteries  threwr  shells  at  our  skirmishers,  but  only  for  a  short 
time,  as  the  Sixth  Ohio  Battery  took  position  near  us  and 
opened  out  and  probably  caused  its  withdrawal.  Three  com 
panies  of  the  regiment  were  sent  out  on  picket  in  the  evening, 
among  them,  Gleason's  company.  Gleason  says  that  during 
the  night  the  enemy  was  so  quiet  he  thought  it  portended 
some  unusual  movement.  There  was  frequent  snapping  of 
gun  caps  along  the  enemy's  line,  and  he  imagined  it  might 
mean  that  the  troops  were  massing  for  an  attack  which,  how 
ever,  was  not  made.1 

The  morning  of  the  28th  the  enemy  seemed  to  have  aban 
doned  a  portion  of  his  line  in  our  front  and  the  scouts  who 
were  sent  out  reported  that  he  had  entirely  disappeared. 
His  pickets,  however,  soon  returned,  and  skirmishing  with 
them  was  resumed  and  continued  until  9  o'clock.  A  line  of 
skirmishers  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps  then  advanced  upon 
them  on  our  right  and  drove  them  back  and  wras  followed  by 
a  column  of  troops  of  the  same  corps.  It  was  noticed  that 
the  troops  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps  moved  with  unusual 
quickness  and  spirit,  and  we  attributed  their  increased 
activity  and  vigor  to  the  fact  that  General  Jeff  C.  Davis  was 
now  in  command  of  the  corps.  We  remained  in  the  position 
held  the  day  before,  and  some  of  our  men  found  some  roasting 
ears  about  a  half  mile  away  on  which  they  feasted.  Troops 
and  trains  were  passing  us  all  the  afternoon  and  it  was  after 
supper  before  wre  received  orders  to  move.  This  was  because 
the  marching  orders  of  our  corps  for  the  day  placed  our 
division  in  rear  of  the  First  and  Second  Divisions  of  the 
Corps  and  their  headquarter  trains,  and  our  division  later  was 
ordered  not  to  move  until  all  the  troops  and  trains  of  the 
corps  had  passed.1  We  were  marching  for  Red  Oak  Station 
on  the  West  Point  Railroad  and  were  closely  following  the 
Fourteenth  Corps.  Our  course  was  southwardly.  The  Army 
of  the  Ohio,  General  Schofield,  was  moving  forward  on  our 
left,  and  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  General  Howard,  to  our 
right.  The  road  we  marched  on  was  so  obstructed  by  fallen 
trees  that  our  progress  was  tedious  and  slow.  After  march 
ing  about  three  miles  we  halted  in  the  woods,  stacked  arms, 
and  lay  down  for  the  night.  The  men  \vere  ordered  to  sleep 
with  cartridge  boxes  on.  The  night  w^as  very  dark.  This 
day  at  5  p.  m.  our  advance  division,  General  Kimball's,  arrived 

1     Gleason's   Diary. 


552  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

at  a  point  300  yards  from  the  railroad  at  Red  Oak  Station  and 
there  went  into  position  facing-  Atlanta.  On  its  right  was 
General  Davis'  division,  Fourteenth  Corps,  which  extended 
across  the  railroad.  Our  corps  was  formed  with  General 
Kimball's  division  on  the  right  and  ours  on  the  left.1 

On  the  29th,  our  brigade  lay  quietly  in  our  bivouac  in  the 
woods  most  of  the  day,  while  Kneffler's  and  Post's  brigades 
were  destroying  the  railroad  track  between  Red  Oak  and  a 
point  about  two  miles  from  the  enemy's  works  that  side  of 
East  Point.  In  the  afternoon  we  moved  forward  a  short 
distance,  formed  a  line  and  were  ordered  to  fortify  it,  but  the 
Twenty-third  Corps  soon  came  up  and  formed  a  line  in  our 
front  and  began  fortifying.  We  were  told  our  labors  had 
been  in  vain,  as  we  were  on  the  reserve  and  would  move  in  the 
morning.2 

The  orders  for  our  corps  for  August  30,  were  to  move  at 
6  a.  m.  by  a  road  leading  past  Ballards,  Godby's  and  Miller's 
to  Mrs.  Long's,  thence  to  the  Decatur  and  Fayetteville  road 
and  there  take  up  position  covering  said  road.3  Our  brigade 
received  marching  orders  about  (>  a.  m.  and  moved  out,  our 
division  following  General  Kimball's.  Just  as  we  started  a 
newsboy  come  into  our  camp  bringing  Cincinnati  and  Nash 
ville  papers,  which  put  us  in  touch  with  the  outside  world. 
We  struck  the  West  Point  Railroad  after  marching  about 
three-fourths  of  a  mile,  and  found  that  the  men  who  had  been 
sent  to  destroy  it  had  done  their  work  thoroughly.  The  ties 
had  all  been  burned  and  the  rails  had  been  heated  and 
twisted  into  every  conceivable  shape.  We  took  a  road  near  by 
parallel  with  the  railroad,  crossed  and  re-crossed  it  several 
times  and  finally  left  it  and  moved  to  the  right.  Arriving  at 
an  intersecting  road  our  regiment  was  left  to  guard  it  until 
the  First  Division,  which  was  following  us,  came  up. 
We  threw  up  a  barricade  of  rails  and  logs  and  remained 
here  long  enough  to  get  our  dinners.  We  were  then 
relieved  and  pushed  forward  to  rejoin  the  brigade.  We 
were  delayed  by  other  troops  and  trains  which  occupied 
the  road.  At  a  place  where  the  road  again  crossed  the  rail 
road  track  we  halted  for  a  while  and  our  men  found  some 
honey  at  a  little  house  near  by.4  The  sun  was  very  hot  and 
the  road  quite  dusty.  At  one  place  we  came  to  a  large  open 
ing  made  up  of  several  plantations  and  heard  what  appeared 
to  be  skirmishing  back  in  the  woods  we  had  just  left.  We 
supposed  it  was  the  enemy  and  were  at  once  formed  in  the 
most  commanding  position  near,  and  carried  rails  and  threw 

1     Fullerton's  Journal.  W.   R.   R.   72-929.       3     W.  R.  R.   76-700. 
'2     Gleason's  Diary.  4     Gleason's  Diary. 


SIEGE  AND  CAPTURE  OF  ATLANTA  553 

up  breastworks  to  repel  an  attack.  It  was  soon,  however, 
reported  that  it  was  a  false  alarm  and  we  withdrew  and 
marched  on.  It  was  not  long  until  we  came  up  with  the 
brigade.  After  marching  about  two  miles  further  we  turned 
into  a  cornfield  near  a  frame  church,  were  placed  in  line  of 
battle  and  as  usual  began  to  fortify.  We  remained  here  dur 
ing  the  night.  We  had  roasting  ears  for  our  suppers  and  corn- 
blades  for  our  beds.  It  was  nowr  evident  that  the  Macon 
Railroad  was  our  destination,  and  everything  seemed  to  be 
working  favorably  toward  the  success  of  our  movement.1 

That  night  our  corps  was  formed  facing  a  little  to  the 
north  of  east,  our  right  joining  General  Baird's  division  of 
the  Fourteenth  Corps  near  the  Decatur  road.2  During  the 
night  skirmishers  reported  heavy  columns  of  the  enemy  mov 
ing  to  our  right. 

At  3  o'clock  a.  m.,  August  31,  General  Howard  reported 
to  General  Sherman  that  General  Kilpatrick's  cavalry  had 
made  an  attempt  to  get  upon  the  railroad  near  Jonesborough, 
but  met  with  such  strong  resistance  that  he  had  given  it  up 
until  daylight,  and  that  General  Logan's  center  was  about 
800  yards  from  the  depot  at  that  place.  Howard  also  said 
the  Seventeenth  Corps  would  move  up  at  daylight.3 

General  Sherman  at  once  sent  a  copy  of  General  Howard's 
report  to  General  Thomas  and  with  it  the  following  order : 

"Order  one  of  Davis'  divisions  down  at  once  to  Renfroe's 
and  move  all  your  trains  well  to  your  right,  so  that  you  can 
rapidly  fling  your  whole  command  over  to  Jonesborough. 
Then  let  Davis  send  out  from  his  front,  obliquely  to  the  right 
front,  a  strong  skirmish  line  with  supports,  as  though  to 
reach  the  railroad  three  or  four  miles  beknv  Jonesborough. 
Have  Stanley  do  the  same  toward,  but  below,  Rough  and 
Ready.  Impress  on  these  commanders  that  it  is  not  so  nec 
essary  to  have  united  lines,  but  rather  columns  of  attack.  We 
are  not  on  the  defensive,  but  offensive,  and  must  risk  every 
thing  rather  than  dilly-dally  about.  We  must  confuse  the 
enemy.  As  soon  as  Schoneld  comes  up  I  will  put  him  against 
Rough  and  Ready  till  he  meets  formidable  resistance.''4 

The  morning  of  the  31st,  at  an  early  hour,  AVC  heard 
skirmishing  to  the  eastward  of  our  front  and  one  of  our  bat 
teries  threw  a  few  shells  toward  the  enemy.  We  soon  had 
orders,  to  move  and  marched  out  in  a  southeast  direction, 
crossing  a  small  creek  and  ascending  a  wooded  hill  upon 
which  some  of  our  troops  were  building  works.  We  here 
lay  for  some  time  in  reserve.  We  moved  to  the  opposite  side 

1  Gleason's  Diary.  3     W.   R.  R.  76-725. 

2  Fullerton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.   72-930.          4     Fullerton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.   72-931. 


554  FIFTEENTH    OHIO  VOLUNTEERS   AND  CAMPAIGNS 

of  the  road  into  a  thicket  where  there  was  a  large  hornets' 
nest,  which  afforded  much  amusement  to  our  men,  as  they 
watched  the  passersby  become  panic-stricken  at  the  attack 
of  the  little  sharpshooters.  They  evidently  had  no  love  for 
"the  ruthless  invaders."1  When  we  moved  again  it  was  over 
the  hill  to  the  east,  and  we  soon  came  to  a  line  of  works  which 
the  enemy  had  abandoned.  Here  we  halted  and  had  dinner 
beside  a  small  j5ond.  After  noon  we  advanced  slowly,  with 
some  skirmishing  in  front,  and  gradually  approached  the 
Macon  Railroad,  which  the  Twenty-third  Corps  had  posses 
sion  of  to  our  left.  There  were  dense  clouds  of  smoke  to  our 
left  and  it  was  evident  that  our  men  were  destroying  the 
railroad  track.  Arriving  at  a  point  within  half  a  mile  of  the 
railroad  we  were  halted  and  formed  in  line  in  a  dense  thicket 
and  ordered  to  build  wrorks.  The  thicket  was  soon  cleared 
and  works  built  which  would  enable  us  to  resist  any  ordinary 
attack.  That  night  the  left  of  our  corps  rested  on  the  rail 
road  and  its  right  at  Thorn's  Hill,  a  mile  and  three-fourths 
distant  in  a  straight  line — our  line  facing  Jonesborough. 
Schofield's  right  connected  with  our  left  at  the  railroad  and 
his  line  faced  toward  Atlanta.  Thus  our  two  lines  of  battle 
formed  a  V,  the  sides  facing  in  different  directions.2  We 
learned  late  at  night  that  Hardee's  and  Lee's  corps  of  Hood's 
army  that  afternoon  had  twice  assaulted  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee  and  had  twice  been  repulsed. 

General  Stanley,  commanding  our  corps,  received  orders 
directing  him  the  next  morning  to  commence  the  destruction 
of  the  Macon  and  Western  Rairoad  in  connection  with  Gen 
eral  Schofield.  He  was  directed  to  destroy  the  road  as  far 
as  he  could  in  the  direction  of  Jonesborough,  or  until  he  met 
with  General  Baird's  division  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps,  which 
would  likely  be  engaged  in  the  same  work.  Should  he  meet 
with  or  overtake  General  Baird  he  was  to  report  to  General 
Thomas  for  further  orders.8 

Early  next  morning,  September  1,  the  pioneers  of  our 
brigade  began  the  destruction  of  the  railroad  track  along 
our  front.  They  loosened  the  track  in  sections,  which  they 
lifted  up  and  turned  over.  Then  detaching  the  ties  they  made 
piles  of  them,  laid  the  rails  across  them  and  set  fire  to  the 
piles.  When  the  rails  became  heated  in  the  middle  suf 
ficiently,  they  took  hold  of  the  ends  and  bent  and  twisted 
them  so  they  could  not  be  used  again.  They  completed  their 
work  in  an  incredibly  short  time  and  our  squad  returned  to 

1  Gleason's  Diary. 

2  Fullerton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.  72-931. 

3  Fullerton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.  72-932. 


SIEGE  AND  CAPTURE  OF  ATLANTA  555 

the  regiment.  We  marched  at  8  o'clock  a.  m.,  taking  a 
southerly  course,  but  made  slow  progress.  Artillery  and 
trains  obstructed  the  road  and  the  enemy's  skirmishers 
delayed  the  advance.  We  halted  for  dinner  near  a  white 
house  not  far  from  the  railroad  track  where  some  rabidly 
"secesh"  ladies  exchanged  left-handed  compliments  with  some 
of  our  officers.  They  had  buried  their  silverware  in  the  gar 
den  and  some  of  our  men  discovered  and  appropriated  it  while 
digging  for  potatoes.  But  before  we  resumed  our  march, 
through  the  efforts  of  our  officers,  most  of  it  was  recovered 
and  returned  to  the  fair  southerners.  One  of  the  officers' 
servants  was  roughly  handled  at  the  negro  quarters  and  a  near 
riot  was  quelled  by  the  efforts  of  Major  Dawson  and  Captain 
Taft.1  We  moved  along  the  burning  railroad  track  to  the 
vicinity  of  Jonesborough  and  arrived  just  as  a  lively  battle 
took  place.  The  First  and  Second  Divisions  of  our  Corps 
took  part  and  we  moved  to  their  support  and  lay  in  reserve, 
within  range  of  the  enemy's  artillery.  Repeated  charges  were 
made  by  our  troops  on  the  right  of  our  corps,  which  were 
finally  successful,  as  we  knew  from  the  cheering.  \Ve  heard 
that  a  large  number  of  prisoners,  cannon  and  small  arms  had 
been  captured  from  the  enemy. 

This  was  the  battle  of  Jonesborough  and  was  another 
lost  opportunity,  because  our  corps  did  not  get  up  in  time. 
General  Sherman,  on  the  representations  made  to  him  by 
Captains  Poe  and  Audenried  of  his  staff,  sent  a  sharp  letter 
to  General  Thomas,  saying : 

"General  Stanley  remained  today  for  hours  on  the  rail 
road  awaiting  orders,  when  he  heard  firing  heavy  to  his  front 
and  right.  *  *  *  I  knew  you  had  given  him  orders  and 
think  we  should  not  overlook  it.  I  don't  know  why  Stanley 
could  not  have  pushed  along  the  railroad  while  General  Davis 
was  heavily  engaged,  and  absolutely  enveloped  the  enemy  in 
Jonesborough.  *  *  *  If  General  Stanley  lost  a  minute  of 
time  when  he  should  have  been  in  action  I  beg  you  will  not 
overlook  it,  as  it  concerns  the  lives  of  our  men  and  the  suc 
cess  of  our  armies."2  It  is  presumed  that  General  Thomas 
did  not  press  any  investigation  of  General  Stanley's  conduct 
on  this  occasion.  His  own  orders  to  General  Stanley  directed 
him  to  move  down  the  railroad  toward  Jonesborough, 
destroying  the  track  as  he  went,  until  he  came  up  with  Gen 
eral  Baird's  division  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps,  which  was  also 
engaged  in  tearing  up  the  railroad.  He  was  then  "to  report 
for  further  orders."3  At  noon  General  Thomas  reported  to 

1  Gleason's  Diary.  3     W.  R.  R    76-720 

2  W.   R.   R.   76-746. 


556  FIFTKKNTII   Onio  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

General  Sherman  that  "General  Stanley  was  at  Morrow's 
Station,  having  destroyed  all  the  road  to  his  rear  as  far  as 
his  camp  of  last  night.  I  have  ordered  him  to  concentrate 
there  and  move  right  down  on  Jonesborough.  He  will  con 
nect  with  General  Davis  and  thus  make  our  line  complete."1 
Colonel  Fullerton  says  in  his  "Journal"  that  he  gave  this 
message  to  General  Stanley  at  12:15.  General  Wood  was 
ordered  to  move  to  Morris  Station  to  join  the  rest  of  the 
corps  and  Stanley  was  directed  "as  soon  as  Wood  arrived" 
to  put  his  troops  in  column  to  move  on  and  report  his  readiness 
to  move  to  him  (General  Thomas)  as  soon  as  he  could."2 
Fullerton  saw  that  General  Wrood  had  come  up  and,  at  12:45, 
started  to  General  Thomas  to  inform  him  of  this  fact  and  found 
him  near  Jonesborough  with  General  Howard.  At  2:30  p.  m. 
General  Thomas  sent  word  to  General  Stanley  to  push 
forward  down  the  railroad  for  Jonesborough  at  once.  This 
massage  was  not  delivered  to  General  Stanley  until  3 :30  p. 
m.3  General  Stanley's  column  moved  in  ten  minutes  after 
receiving  the  order,4  and  if  there  was  any  delay  it  certainly 
appears  that  he  was  not  in  fault.  The  fault,  if  there  was  any, 
wras  with  General  Thomas  who  had,  perhaps,  needlessly, 
encumbered  him  with  orders.  Possibly  General  Sherman, 
upon  reflection,  realized  that  he  himself  was  primarily 
responsible  for  the  delay,  because  he  put  so  much  stress  upon 
the  destruction  of  the  Macon  road.  Instead  of  having  his 
army  stop  to  destroy  the  railroad,  if  he  had  left  its  destruc 
tion  to  a  small  but  adequate  force  and  had  pushed  on  to  Jones- 
borough,  the  battle  there  would  have  had  the  result  he  desired. 
From  all  the  evidence  at  hand  it  is  clear  that  after  Stanley's 
corps  received  orders  to  move,  it  moved  with  vigor  and  as 
rapidly  as  possible.  But  when  Newton's  division  had  by  a 
vigorous  assault  gained  a  position  on  the  enemy's  right  flank 
it  was  dark  and  too  late  to  press  his  advantage. 

About  midnight  we  heard  what  at  first  seemed  like  heavy 
musketry  in  the  direction  of  Atlanta  and  we  finally  concluded 
it  was  the  exposition  of  ordnance  stores  at  that  place.5  Gen 
eral  Sherman  thought  it  was  a  night  attack  on  Atlanta  by 
General  Slocum,  or  the  blowing  up  of  the  enemy's  magazines. <; 

Early  next  morning,  September  2,  wre  learned  that  the 
enemy  had  decamped  during  the  night  and  we  packed  up  and 
moved  out  along  the  railroad.  We  halted  near  our  advance 
works  for  over  an  hour.  Some  of  the  men  took  this  oppor- 

1  W.  R.  R.  76-745.  4     Fullerton's  Journal.  W.  R.  R.   72-932. 

2  Fullerton's  Journal  W.  .R.  R.   72-982.  5     Gleason's  Diary. 

3  Idem  and  Stanley's  Report,  W.   R.   R.   7(5-746.  6     W.  R.  R.  72-S2. 


SIEGE  AND  CAPTURE  OF  ATLANTA  557 

timity  to  inspect  the  enemy's  works  and  found  evidence  that 
he  had  lost  heavily  in  the  battle  of  the  day  before.  It  was 
reported  that  the  Fourteenth  Corps  alone  had  captured  nine 
teen  guns  and  1500  prisoners.  After  we  resumed  our  march 
we  soon  came  in  sight  of  Jonesborough  and  halted  near  the  ruins 
of  a  tannery,  said  to  have  been  destroyed  during  one  of  our 
cavalry  raids.  The  iron  water-tank  nearby  had  been  per 
forated  by  a  shell.  As  we  marched  through  the  town 
the  ruins  of  the  court  house  presented  another  sample 
of  the  work  of  our  cavalry  raiders.  On  a  plantation  just 
beyond  the  place  large  quantities  of  cornmeal  and  salt  were 
found.  We  soon  increased  our  pace  and  made  fewer  halts 
and  the  men  suffered  from  the  heat.  After  we  had  marched 
about  eight  miles,  we  came  up  to  the  Fifteenth  Corps  which 
had  found  the  enemy  in  a  strong  position  near  Lovejoy  Sta 
tion  and  had  commenced  to  deploy  into  line  of  battle  on  the  right 
of  the  railroad.  Our  corps,  General  Newton's  division  leading, 
as  it  arrived,  at  once  began  to  deploy  on  the  left  of  the  rail 
road.  Newton's  division  on  the  right,  then  Wood's  and  then 
Kimball's.  While  our  troops  were  thus  deploying  some  of 
the  officers  and  men  climbed  up  on  the  railroad  track,  which 
at  that  point  was  on  a  considerable  embankment,  in  order  to 
get  a  better  view  of  the  enemy's  position.  They  were  a  little 
surprised  to  see  General  Sherman  already  there,  closely 
examining  the  position.  Seeing  officers  and  men  coming  up 
he  exclaimed  :  "Men  get  off  the  parapet !  Get  off  the  parapet ! 
The  enemy  is  getting  ready  to  throw  a  shell  right  along  the 
track."  Of  course  we  got  off  "the  parapet"  in  short  order, 
but  some  of  us  were  there  long  enough  to  get  a  view  of  the 
enemy's  position  and  to  see  that  he  was  still  at  work  on  his 
fortifications.  About  3  o'clock  all  three  divisions  of  our 
corps  were  deployed  into  line  and  at  3  :20  p.  m.  General  How 
ard  reported  he  had  given  his  troops  orders  to  advance.  At 
3  :30  p.  m.  our  corps,  the  Fourth,  was  also  ordered  to  advance 
and  division  commanders  were  ordered  to  take  the  enemy's 
works  if  possible  and  not  to  stop  for  anything  trifling.1  Our 
skirmishers  were  wrell  in  advance  and  two  five-gun  batteries 
on  our  right  opened  out,  with  instructions  to  quiet  the 
enemy's  batteries.  Our  division  had  to  move  through  an 
almost  impenetrable  swamp  and  over  deep  ravines  and  high 
ridges  and  it  was  after  5  p.  m.  when  we  came  in  sight  of  the 
enemy's  works.  At  5:30  p.  m.  our  division  assaulted  the 
enemy's  position  and  Kneffler's  brigade  got  inside  his  works 
but  could  not  hold  them,  suffering  heavily  in  officers.2  In 

1  Fullerton's  Journal,   W.   R.   R.    72-933. 

2  Fullerton's  Journal.  W.   R.  R.   72-934. 


558  FIFTEENTH   OHIO  VOT.U.XTEKUS   AND  CAMPAIGNS 

this  advance  General  Wood,  our  division  commander,  was 
painfully  wounded  in  the  heel,  but  remained  on  duty  until 
night  closed  the  conflict.  The  losses  in  our  regiment  and 
brigades  wer  elight.  When  night  came  we  held  the  position 
gained  and  threw  up  the  usual  defenses.  It  was  rumored 
during  the  day  that  Atlanta  was  in  our  possession,  and  there 
was  a  feeling  on  the  part  of  some  of  the  men  in  our  ranks 
that,  if  such  was  the  case,  we  should  have  a  rest  from  fighting, 
for  awhile  at  least.  In  the  afternoon,  while  our  corps  was 
deploying  into  line,  the  adjutant  saw  a  group  of  Generals 
under  the  shade  of  a  tree  a  short  distance  to  the  left  of  the 
railroad  and  rode  up  near  them,  curious  to  know  what  they 
were  discussing.  He  heard  one  of  them  whom  he  did  not 
know  say :  "My  men  believe  we  now  have  Atlanta  and  think 
they  should  have  a  rest.  I  do  not  believe  they  will  obey 
orders  to  charge  the  enemy's  works."  Perhaps  General  Sher 
man  had  heard  similar  talk.  At  any  rate,  that  night  at  8 
o'clock  he  wrote  to  General  Thomas,  saying:  "Until  we  hear 
from  Atlanta  the  exact  truth,  I  do  not  care  about  your  push 
ing  your  men  against  the  breastworks.  Destroy  the  railroad 
well  up  to  your  lines ;  keep  skirmishers  well  up,  and  hold 
your  troops  in  hand  for  anything  that  may  turn  up.  As  soon 
as  I  know  positively  that  our  troops  are  in  Atlanta  .1  will 
determine  what  to  do."1 

The  next  morning,  September  3,  at  G  o'clock  we  received 
orders  from  department  headquarters  saying  that  Atlanta  was 
in  our  possession  and  that  we  would  advance  no  further.2 
General  Sherman  announced  the  fact  in  Special  Field  Orders 
No.  62, :i  and  at  the  same  hour  sent  the  following  message  to 
General  Halleck,  which  fitly  closes  this  chapter : 

"Near  Lovejoy's  Station, 
Twenty-six  miles  South  of  Atlanta,  Ga., 

September  3,  1864,  6  A.  M. 
Gen.  H.  W.  Halleck,  Washington,  D.  C. 

As  already  reported,  the  army  drew  from  about  Atlanta,  and  on 
the  30th  had  made  a  good  break  on  the  West  Point  road  and  reached  a 
good  position  from  which  to  strike  the  Macon  railroad,  the  right  (Gen 
eral  Howard's)  near  Jonesborough,  the  left  (General  Schofield's)  near 
Rough  and  Ready,  and  the  center  (General  Thomas's)  at  Couch's.  Gen 
eral  Howard  found  the  enemy  in  force  at  Jonesborough  and  intrenched 
his  troops,  the  salient  within  half  a  mile  of  the  railroad.  The  enemy 
attacked  him  at  3  P.  M.,  and  was  easily  repulsed,  leaving  his  dead  and 
wounded.  Finding  strong  opposition  on  the  right,  I  advanced  the  left 
and  center  rapidly  to  the  railroad,  made  a  good  lodgment  and  broke 
it  all  the  way  from  Rough  and  Ready  down  to  Howard's  left,  near 
Jonesborough,  and  by  the  same  movement  I  interposed  my  whole  army 

1  W.  R.  R.  76-764.  3     W.  R.  R.  76-789. 

2  Fullerton's  Journal,  72-934. 


SIEGE  AND  CAPTURE  OF  ATLANTA  559 

between  Atlanta  and  the  part  of  the  enemy  intrenched  in  and  around 
Jonesborough.  We  made  a  general  attack  on  the  enemy  at  Jones- 
borough  on  September  1,  the  Fourteenth  Corps,  General  Jeff  C.  Davis, 
carrying  the  works  handsomely,  with  ten  guns  and  about  1000  pris 
oners.  In  the  night  the  enemy  retreated  south,  and  we  have  followed 
him  to  another  of  his  well-chosen  and  hastily  constructed  lines,  near 
Lovejoy's.  Hood,  at  Atlanta,  finding  me  on  his  road,  the  only  one  that 
could  supply  him,  and  between  him  and  a  considerable  part  of  his  army, 
blew  up  his  magazines  in  Atlanta  and  left  in  the  night  time,  when  the 
Twentieth  Corps,  General  Slocum,  took  possession  of  the  place.  So 
Atlanta  is  ours  and  fairly  won.  I  shall  not  push  much  farther  on  this 
raid,  but  in  a  day  or  so  will  move  to  Atlanta  and  give  my  men  some 
rest.  Since  May  5  we  have  been  in  one  constant  battle  or  skirmish, 
and  need  rest.  Our  losses  will  not  exceed  1200,  and  we  have  possession 
of  over  300  rebel  dead,  250  wounded,  and  over  1500  well  prisoners. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Major  General." 

NAMES   OF   KILLED   AND   WOUNDED   ix    THE   FIFTEENTH    OHIO 

VOLUNTEERS   DURING   MONTHS  OF    JULY   AND   AUGUST 

IN  OPERATIONS  AROUND  ATLANTA. 

COMPANY  A. 

WOUNDED. — Hospital  Steward  Willison  B.   White,  William 
R.  Stewart.  Robert  B.  Brown,  Joseph  S.  Brown. 

COMPANY  B. 

KILLED. — Sergeant  John  G.  Penrose,  David  M.  Douglass. 
WOUNDED. — Sergeant  John   A.   Green,   Rezin   Bond,   Porter 
Gibson. 

COMPANY  C. 
KILLED. — Philip  Fogle. 

COMPANY  D. 

W'OUNDED. — Daniel    Vaugundy,    John    Osborne,    Joseph    A. 
Wilson,  the  last  two  at  Lovejoy  Station. 

COMPANY  E. 

WOUNDED. — Oliver  J.   Henderson,   George  W.    McMasters, 
Samuel  L.  Norris,  Allen  Wade. 

COMPANY  F. 
WOUNDED. — Jacob  Graf. 

COMPANY  G. 
WOUNDED. — Jacob  Stauffer. 

COMPANY  H. 
WOUNDED. — Sergeant  Thos.  C.  Cory,  George  Stoll. 

COMPANY  K. 
KILLED. — Ephraim  Houser,  Nelson  J.  Reed. 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 

FROM  ATLANTA  TO  GAYLESVILLE,  ALA. 

On  the  morning  of  September  3,  1864,  we  still  held  our  posi 
tion  to  close  up  to  the  enemy's  works  near  Lovejoy  Station.  In 
the  afternoon  sixty-seven  of  the  non-veterans  of  the  regiment 
whose  terms  of  service  had  expired  started  north  under  com 
mand  of  Captain  George  W.  Cummins.  Among  them  were  many 
with  whom  we  were  loth  to  part.  All  had  helped  to  make  the 
history  of  the  regiment  during  its  three  years  of  service  which 
had  expired,  and  had  earned  the  gratitude  of  their  country.  There 
was  quite  heavy  picket  firing  during  the  day  and  our  corps  lost 
a  number  of  men  killed  and  wounded,  but  no  advance  was  at 
tempted.  At  night  the  pioneers  cut  roads  back  from  the  lines  of 
each  division  of  the  corps,  so  that  the  troops  might  be  easily  drawn 
off  when  we  marched  back  to  Atlanta.  This  backward  march 
had  been  ordered,1  though  we  did  not  know  it.  The  next  day, 
September  4,  there  was  the  usual  picket  and  artillery  firing  and 
one  man  in  Company  A  and  two  men  in  Company  D  were 
wounded,  making  six  men  wounded  since  we  moved  into  our 
then  position.2  There  were  forty-two  killed  and  wounded  in 
the  corps  that  day.3  Rumors  prevailed  that  we  would  withdraw 
from  our  position.  That  night,  orders  were  received  directing 
that  there  should  be  no  reveille  sounded  next  morning  and  that 
the  men  should  be  under  arms  at  4  o'clock. 

The  morning  of  September  5,  we  were  able  to  read  letters 
which  came  the  night  before  and  newspapers,  which  an 
nounced  the  nomination  of  McClellan  and  Pendleton  as  the 
Democratic  candidates  for  President  and  Vice  President  on  a 
platform  declaring  the  war  a  failure.  There  were  indications 
that  we  would  withdraw  from  our  position  that  night  and  to 
wards  evening  we  received  orders  to  do  so.  The  orders  for  our 
corps  were  to  withdraw  the  troops  at  8  o'clock,  the  pickets 
at  midnight.  We  were  to  move  back  to  the  position  occupied  by 
the  corps  on  the  night  of  September  1,  just  beyond  Jonesborough. 
Our  order  of  march  was  first,  Newton's  division,  second,  Kim- 
ball's,  third,  Wood's.  The  usual  skirmishing  and  artillery  firing 
continued  during  the  day  and  our  casualties  were  twenty-five.4 
There  was  a  hard  shower  during  the  afternoon,  and  an  order 
to  build  no  fires  in  the  evening  prevented  us  from  drying  our  wet 

1  Fuller-ton's   Journal,   72-935.  3  and  4     Fullerton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.  72-735. 

2  Gleason's  Diary. 


FROM  ATLANTA  TO  GAYLESVILLE,  ALA.  561 

clothing.  It  was  nine  o'clock  when  we  moved  out,  and  was  very 
dark.  \Ye  floundered  along  a  muddy  road  and  across  corn 
fields,  making  very  slow  progress.  After  much  vexatious  delay 
and  any  amount  of  profanity,  we  emerged  at  last  into  an  opening 
near  the  railroad  track,  where  we  halted  to  wait  for  our  pickets.1 

Gleason  says:  "We  felt  that  Atlanta  was  the  objective  point 
of  our  campaign,  and  it  had  not  been  contemplated  to  go  further 
than  was  necessary  to  secure  it."  Doubtless  this  sentiment  per 
vaded  the  ranks,  but  there  were  some  who  remembered  that  the 
Confederate  Army  was  the  main  objective  and  who  felt  a  secret 
humiliation  in  turning  our  backs  to  it. 

After  waiting  until  midnight  we  again  moved  on,  keeping 
near  the  railroad  and  following  the  road  with  difficulty.  We 
stumbled  along  in  the  darkness,  ankle  deep  in  mud,  and  many 
were  the  falls  and  resulting  curses.  We  finally  came  to  Jones- 
borough,  where  we  found  the  Fourteenth  and  Fifteenth  Corps  in 
bivouac.  We  stopped  for  a  short  rest  and  then  pushed  on  through 
the  town,  passing  a  large  number  of  cotton  bales  which  were 
burning  near  the  railroad.  We  marched  on  until  we  came  to  the 
position  we  had  held  the  night  of  September  1,  where  at  4:30 
a.  m.  September  0,  we  went  into  camp  and  remained  the  rest  of 
the  day.  In  the  afternoon  of  the  6th,  the  bands  of  the  Eighth 
Kansas  and  Ninety-ninth  Ohio  gave  us  some  lively  music.2  The 
morning  of  September  7,  at  7  :30  we  moved  out  towards  Atlanta, 
our  regiment  being  the  advance  of  the  corps.  We  followed  a 
road  parallel  to  the  railroad  for  several  miles  and  then  turned 
off.  taking  a  more  direct  road  leading  to  our  destination.  Gleason 
with  ten  men  was  left  behind  to  direct  the  troops  following  us 
on  to  the  proper  road.  When  we  came  to  Rough  and  Ready,  six 
miles  from  Atlanta,  we  halted  and  went  into  camp  for  the  night. 

The  next  morning,  September  8,  at  8  o'clock  we'  resumed  our 
march  and  at  11  o'clock  reached  Atlanta,  the  prize  we  had  so 
long  striven  for.  We  marched  through  the  city  in  column  and 
as  our  route  was  not  through  the  business  part  of  the  place  we 
saw  few  buildings  which  had  been  struck  by  our  shells.  There 
seemed  to  be  quite  a  number  of  citizens  still  occupying  their 
residences,  and  many  female  faces  peered  from  doors  and  win 
dows  as  we  passed  by.  The  women  were  usually  attended  by 
some  gallant  blue  coat,  the  Twentieth  Corps  boys  having  ob 
viously  made  good  use  of  their  opportunities  since  they  took 
possession  of  the  place.  We  marched  out  Decatur  Street,  east 
ward,  and  saw  the  ruins  of  an  ordnance  depot  where  a  large  train 
of  ordnance  stores  had  been  burned.  Marching  about  four  miles 

1  and  '2     Gleason's  Diary. 


"•62  FlKTKKNTH     OHIO    Voi.l'.XTKKUS     AM)    CAMPAIGN'S 

beyond  the  city  we  went  into  camp  in  an  open  field  near  Decatur 
and  sent  out  Company  A  as  pickets. 

Fullerton  in  his  "Journal"  says  our  corps  was  formed  here 
facing  south,  its  right  resting  on  the  south  side  of  and  near  the 
Decatur  and  Augusta  Railroad,  with  Kimball's  and  Wood's 
divisions  in  the  first  line  and  Newton's  division  in  reserve,  in  rear 
of  the  center  of  the  first  line,  and  adds/'  Here  we  will  rest  until 
further  orders.  *  *  *  The  campaign  that  commenced  May  2,  is 
now  over,  and  we  will  rest  here  to  recruit  and  prepare  for  a  new 
campaign."1 

The  campaign  for  the  capture  of  Atlanta  may  be  said  to  have 
ended  this  day,  and  there  was  deep  satisfaction  among  the  rank 
and  file  at  the  result.  We  did  not  feel  that  we  had  done  anything 
out  of  the  ordinary.  We  had  become  so  inured  to  toil,  exposure 
and  danger  that  we  were  ready  for  an  emergency,  and  it  was 
not  until  we  began  to  make  out  the  official  reports,  that  we  real 
ized  the  sacrifices  which  the  campaign  had  entailed.  The  losses 
in  battle  and  on  the  skirmish  line  in  our  regiment  had  been : 
Killed,  44;  wounded,  177;  missing,  17;  total,  240.  Besides  these 
large  numbers  had  been  disabled  by  sickness  and  many  had  died 
of  diseases  incident  to  camp  life.  Of  the  men  who  were  enrolled 
in  the  regiment  when  the  campaign  opened  not  over  thirty-five  per 
cent  remained.  We  were  not  much  concerned  about  what  the 
people  up  north  would  say  about  our  campaign.  Indeed  we  gave 
that  very  little  thought. 

President  Lincoln  was  the  first  to  send  a  message  of  con 
gratulations  on  the  result  of  the  campaign,  and  on  September  3, 
tendered  to  General  Sherman  and  the  officers  and  men  in  his 
command  the  Nation's  thanks.  The  message  did  not  reach  Gen 
eral  Sherman,  however,  until  the  morning  of  September  6,  and  at 
the  same  time  came  a  message  from  General  Grant  at  City  Point, 
Va.,  dated  September  4,  9  p.  m.,  saying: 

"I  have  just  received  your  dispatch  announcing  the  capture 
of  Atlanta.  In  honor  of  your  great  victory  I  have  ordered  a 
salute  to  be  fired  with  shotted  guns  from  every  battery  bearing 
on  the  enemy.  The  salute  will  be  fired  within  an  hour  amid 
great  rejoicing." 

Also  at  the  same  time  General  Sherman  received  copy  of  an 
order  issued  by  President  Lincoln  September  3,  directing: 

"That  on  Wednesday,  the  seventh  day  of  September,  com 
mencing  at  the  hour  of  12,  noon,  there  shall  be  fired  a  salute  of 
100  guns  at  the  arsenal  at  Washington  and  at  New  York,  Boston, 
Philadelphia,  Baltimore,  Pitsburgh,  Newport,  Ky.,  Saint  Louis, 
New  Orleans,  Mobile,  Pensacola,  Hilton  Head  and  New  Berne, 

1     W.  R.   R.   72-936. 


FROM  ATLANTA  TO  GAYLESVILLE,  ALA.  563 

or  the  day  after  the  receipt  of  this  order,  for  the  brilliant  achieve 
ments  of  the  army  under  the  command  of  Major  General  Sher 
man  in  the  State  of  Georgia,  and  the  capture  of  Atlanta." 

General  Sherman  at  once  embodied  all  these  messages  in  a 
Special  Field  Order  (No.  66),  and  directed  that  all  the  corps, 
regiments  and  batteries  composing  our  army  might  without  fur 
ther  orders  inscribe  "Atlanta"  on  their  colors.1 

On  September  8,  he  issued  Special  Field  Orders  No.  68, 
saying,  among  other  things. 

''The  officers  and  soldiers  of  the  Armies  of  the  Cumberland, 
Ohio  and  Tennessee,  have  already  received  the  thanks  of  the 
nation  through  the  President  and  Commander-in-Chief,  and  it 
now  remains  only  for  him  who  has  been  with  you  from  the  begin 
ning,  and  who  intends  to  stay  all  the  time,  to  thank  the  officers 
and  men  for  their  intelligence,  fidelity  and  courage  as  displayed 
in  the  campaign  of  Atlanta."  He  then  gives  a  summary  of  the 
principal  events  of  the  campaign,  pays  a  tribute  to  Generals 
McPherson,  Harker  and  McCook  and  others  who  had  fallen  in 
the  strife,  and  asked  all  to  continue  "the  cultivation  of  the  sol 
dierly  virtues  *  *  *  courage,  patience,  obedience  to  the  laws 
and  constituted  authorities,  fidelity  to  our  trusts,  and  good  feeling 
among  each  other''  *  *  *  and  it  will  then,  he  said,  "require 
no  prophet  to  foretell  that  our  country  will  in  time  emerge  from 
this  war,  purified  by  its  fires  and  worthy  of  its  great  founder — 
Washington."2 

These  orders  were  published  to  our  regiment  at  dress  parade 
on  the  evening  of  September  11. 

President  Lincoln,  in  his  dispatch  tendering  the  thanks  of  the 
Nation,  said :  "The  marches,  battles,  sieges  and  other  military 
operations  that  have  signalized  the  campaign,  must  render  it 
famous  in  the  annals  of  war." 

General  Wood  our  division  commander,  a  trained  soldier, 
who  had  studied  all  the  military  campaigns  of  ancient  and  modern 
times,  says  in  his  official  report:  "If  the  length  of  the  campaign, 
commencing  on  the  second  of  May  and  ending  on  the  second  of 
September,  with  its  ceaseless  toil  and  labor  be  considered ;  if  the 
number  and  extent  of  its  actual  battles  and  separate  conflicts  and 
the  great  number  of  days  the  troops  were  in  the  immediate  pres 
ence  of.  and  under  a  close  fire  from,  the  enemy  be  remembered; 
if  the  vast  amount  of  labor  expended  in  the  construction  of  in- 
trenchments  and  other  necessary  works  be  estimated ;  if  the  bold, 
brilliant  and  successful  flank  movements  made  in  close  proximity 
to  a  powerful  enemy  be  critically  examined,  and  if  the  long  line 

1  W.  R.  R.  72-87. 

2  W.  R.  R.   72-87-89. 


564  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

of  communication  over  which  vast  and  abundant  supplies  of  every 
kind  for  the  use  of  this  great  army  were  uninterruptedly  trans 
ported  during  the  entire  campaign  be  regarded,  it  must  be  ad 
mitted  that  the  late  campaign  stands  without  a  parallel  in  military 
history."1 

We  remained  in  our  camp  near  Atlanta  until  October  3, 
resting  and  not  knowing  what  was  to  come  next.  From  the  ninth 
to  the  nineteenth  of  September  inclusive,  the  regiment  was  occu 
pied  with  the  usual  round  of  duties  of  troops  in  garrison.  Reveille 
sounded  reguarly  in  the  morning  and  the  men  fell  in  for  roll-call, 
then  details  were  made  for  picket  and  police  duty  and  in  the 
afternoons  there  was  inspection  and  dress  parade.  The  officers 
were  busy  with  reports  and  returns  and  the  colonel  was  busy 
making  his  report  of  the  Atlanta  campaign,  correcting  and  con 
firming  his  recollection  of  dates  and  incidents  by  Gleason's  diary. 
The  weather  was  warm,  with  occasional  showers,  our  camp  was 
in  a  good  location,  communication  was  re-established  with  the 
north  and  we  got  frequent  mails.  Our  regimental  quartette  had 
found  some  new  music  and  in  the  evenings,  in  the  adjutant's  or 
some  other  headquarters  tent,  sang  the  songs  of  the  times.  Tak 
ing  it  all  in  all  it  was  one  of  the  most  pleasant  resting  places  in 
our  experience.  We  were  about  four  miles  from  Atlanta  and 
the  mounted  officers  frequently  rode  into  the  city.  Other  of 
ficers  and  men  sometimes  did  the  same.  There  was  not  much  in 
the  city  to  interest  the  visitor.  It  was  carefully  patrolled  and 
the  troops  of  the  Twentieth  Corps  monopolized  the  attention  of 
the  fairer  sex  who  remained  there.  When  not  on  duty  both  of 
ficers  and  men  read  the  current  magazines  or  paper  covered 
novels,  which  circulated  from  tent  to  tent  until  they  were  worn 
out.  The  novels  of  Scott,  Bulwer,  Thackeray,  Dickens  and  Lever 
were  much  in  demand  among  the  officers  and  there  were  others 
by  authors  of  lesser  note  which  had  wide  circulation. 

On  the  morning  of  September  20,  we  had  reveille  at  4 
o'clock  and  at  6  o'clock  the  regiment  started  out  on  a  foraging 
expedition.  We  took  the  road  to  Atlanta  which  we  reached  in 
due  time,  and  there  found  a  train  of  about  fifty  wagons  ready 
to  pull  out.  By  permission  all  the  men  who  could  do  so  piled 
into  the  wagons  and  the  others  followed  along  on  foot  until  tired, 
when  those  in  the  wagons  gave  place  to  them,  thus  alternating 
during  the  expedition.  We  followed  the  Marietta  road  until  we 
reached  Buck  Head,  where  we  changed  direction  toward  Law- 
renceville.  The  men,  Gleason  says,  moved  along  chewing  sor 
ghum  cane  and  gathering  chincapins.  When  we  had  reached  a 
point  twenty-one  miles  from  Atlanta  we  parked  our  train  and 

1     W.  R.  R.  72-384-5. 


FROM  ATLANTA  TO  GAYLESVILLE,  ALA.  565 

bivouaced  for  the  night,  sending  out  Companies  D,  F  and  H  as 
pickets.  Next  morning  at  6  o'clock  we  continued  our  march 
until  we  came  to  a  cross-roads  where  we  halted  to  look  for  corn. 
While  waiting  here  a  negro  woman  came  out  of  an  adjoining 
wood  with  a  large  bundle  on  her  head,  a  small  babe  in  her  arms, 
and  leading  a  little  mulatto  boy.  Some  of  our  men  had  found 
her  at  a  neighboring  plantation  in  an  out-building  chained  to  the 
floor  and  had  set  her  free.  The  people  living  on  the  plantation 
said  she  was  a  bad  woman  and  that  they  were  unable  to  manage 
her  in  any  other  way,  but  her  story  was  that  they  wanted  to  sell 
her  away  from  her  children  and  had  chained  her  to  prevent  her 
running  away.  Here  was  a  practical  and  pathetic  enforcement 
of  President  Lincoln's  emancipation  proclamation,  for  we  had 
literally  struck  the  chains  of  bondage  from  this  poor  creature. 
She  went  toward  our  train  where  she  was  sure  of  sympathy  and 
help  and  we  do  not  know  what  became  of  her  afterwards.1 

Two  intelligent  contrabands  living  nearby  soon  guided  us  to 
a  plantation  where  there  was  plenty  of  forage,  potatoes,  apples, 
honey  and  a  few  watermelons  which  we  appropriated  against 
the  formal  protest  of  the  owner.  Our  wagons  were  soon  filled 
to  their  utmost  capacity  and  we  pulled  out  for  Atlanta.  After 
going  about  fifteen  miles  we  again  parked  our  train,  threw  out 
pickets  and  bivouaced  for  the  night. 

The  next  morning,  September  22,  at  G  o'clock  we  resumed 
our  march  and  by  a  short  cut  reached  our  camp  by  noon.  Besides 
the  forage  and  food  in  our  wagons,  we  brought  into  camp  four 
intelligent  contrabands,  who  had  come  out  of  the  woods  where 
they  were  hiding.  They  all  found  employment  as  cooks  in  our 
regiment.  Word  came  that  afternoon  of  Sheridan's  successes 
in  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  over  which  we  greatly  rejoiced.  We 
remembered  him  as  a  division  commander  in  our  corps  at  Stone 
River,  Chickamauga  and  Missionary  Ridge. 

September  23,  24,  25  and  26,  we  were  occupied  with  our 
usual  round  of  camp  duties  and  in  making  our  quarters  more 
comfortable.  Both  officers  and  men  acted  as  though  we  were  to 
remain  in  our  pleasant  camp  for  a  long  time.  On  the  twenty- 
sixth.  General  Newton's  division  was  sent  back  toward  Chatta 
nooga,  to  guard  our  line  of  communcations.  we  were  told,  and 
some  of  the  company  officers  went  to  their  old  camp  and  brought 
a  wagon  load  of  lumber  with  which  to  improve  their  quarters 
and  build  a  kitchen.  They  also  brought  windows  for  a  small 
house  which  they  had  built  for  an  office.1  A  brigade  bakery  had 
been  established  so  we  could  have  soft  bread,  supplies  of  all 

1  Gleason's  Diary. 

2  Gleason's  Diary. 


566  FIFTEENTH   OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

kinds  were  abundant  and  we  were  literally  living  on  the  fat  of 
the  land.  We  were  ignorant  of  what  was  going  on  even  in  the 
immediate  field  of  our  operations. 

September  27,  there  was  a  review  and  inspection  of  our 
division  by  General  Stanley  and  all  morning  we  were  busy  burn 
ishing  our  guns  and  equipments  and  putting  our  quarters  in  prime 
order  for  the  event.  Colonel  Askew  called  the  officers  together 
and  announced  that  our  regiment  had  been  selected  to  escort  a 
set  of  colors  which  was  to  be  presented  to  the  division.  He  also 
gave  the  necessary  instructions  for  the  ceremony.  The  review 
and  inspection  took  place  on  a  portion  of  the  battlefield  of  July 
22,  and  on  our  march  to  the  place  one  of  our  sergeants  picked 
up  by  the  road  side  a  human  skull  which  dogs  had  probably 
scratched  out  of  a  shallow  grave.1  The  review  was  an  imposing 
spectacle  and  occupied  all  the  afternoon.  Our  escort  and  pres 
entation  of  the  division  colors  was  said  to  have  been  very  credit 
able.  There  was  also  a  set  of  colors  presented  to  our  brigade 
during  the  afternoon,  which  was  received  by  Colonel  John  A. 
Martin  of  the  Eighth  Kansas,  who  was  then  in  command  of  the 
brigade. 

On  the  twenty-eighth  both  officers  and  men  in  generous 
rivalry  continued  improving  their  quarters.  The  company  of 
ficers  above  mentioned  finished  their  kitchen,  added  to  their  store 
of  kitchen  utensils  a  waffle  iron,2  and  put  the  "glass  windows" 
in  their  office  building.  There  were  rumors  that  the  enemy  was 
trying  to  cut  our  line  of  communications,  but  little  attention  was 
paid  to  them. 

September  29,  we  had  drill  in  the  morning.  In  the  after 
noon  it  rained  and  Gleason  was  busy  re-arranging  "There's  Music 
in  the  Air"  for  our  regimental  quartette.  In  the  evening  there 
was  a  near  riot  in  our  brigade.  Men  from  all  the  regiments  made 
a  concerted  raid  on  the  brigade  bakery  because  of  an  alleged 
shortage  in  the  bread  ration.  There  was  quite  a  hubbub  for  a 
while,  and  a  large  quantity  of  bread  was  stolen  before  Colonel 
Martin,  the  brigade  commander,  succeeded  in  dispersing  the 
raiders,  which  he  did  by  promising  the  men  full  redress — and 
full  rations. 

The  next  day,  September  30,  after  morning  drill,  Colonel 
Askew  called  the  regiment  together  and  after  reading  some  pas 
sages  from  the  Revised  Army  Regulations,  warned  the  men 
against  any  repetition  of  the  offense  of  the  day  before.  He  said 
that  in  such  cases  redress  could  always  be  secured  in  a  legal  and 
proper  way.  He  then  gave  the  men  their  choice  between  hard 

1  Gleason's  Diary. 

2  Gleason's  Diary. 


FROM  ATLANTA  TO  GAYLESVILLE,  ALA.  567 

and  soft  bread  and  all  cbose  the  latter.  He  then  said  he  would 
have  a  regimental  bakery  as  soon  as  it  was  practicable.1  There 
was  dress  parade  that  afternoon  and  in  the  evening  the  regi 
mental  quartette  tried  out  the  music  Gleason  had  re-arranged  and 
there  was  literally  "Music  in  the  Air." 

October  1,  Gleason  put  a  lock  on  the  door  of  the  "office  with 
the  glass  windows"  before  mentioned  and  the  pioneers  were  put 
to  work  building  and  almost  finished  a  huge  oven  for  a  regimental 
bakery.  In  the  evening  Captain  Updegrove,  who  had  just  re 
turned  from  Atlanta  where  he  had  gone  that  morning,  reported 
that  Generals  Forrest  and  Wheeler  with  a  large  force  of  cavalry 
and  mounted  infantry  were  raiding  in  Tennessee,  but  the  report 
aroused  little  interest. 

October  2,  we  had  the  usual  Sunday  morning  inspection  and 
there  was  Divine  Service  morning  and  evening.  In  the  evening 
our  regiment  was  called  on  to  furnish  extra  pickets,  as  the  second 
brigade  of  our  division  was  to  start  early  next  morning  on  a 
foraging  expedition.  At  midnight  to  our  great  surprise,  the  ad 
jutant  awakened  the  company  commanders  with  an  order  that 
reveille  would  sound  next  morning  at  2  :30  and  that  we  would 
march  at  early  daylight.  We  did  not  know  what  was  afoot, 
where  we  were  going,  or  why,  but  suspected  that  some  unusual 
emergency  had  arisen — and  such  was  the  case. 

It  was  afterwards  learned  that  on  September  21,  General 
Hood  had  shifted  his  army  from  the  Macon  Railroad  at  Lovejoy 
Station  to  the  West  Point  Railroad  at  Palmetto  Station,  and  that 
President  Jefferson  Davis  had  there  visited  his  army  and  in  a 
public  speech  had  urged  an  invasion  of  the  north.  Also  that 
General  Forrest  with  a  large  cavalry  force,  on  September  24,  had 
made  his  appearance  at  Athens,  Ala.  and  had  captured  our  gar 
rison  there.1  This  was  the  occasion  of  Newton's  division  being 
sent  to  our  rear  on  the  twenty-sixth.  It  was  ordered  back  to 
Chattanooga  and  at  the  same  time  General  Corse's  division  of 
the  Seventeenth  Corps  was  sent  to  Rome.  By  September  27, 
general  Sherman  had  become  convinced  that  General  Hood  had 
begun  a  general  movement  against  the  railroad  in  our  rear  and 
on  the  twenty-ninth  sent  General  Thomas  to  Chattanooga,  with 
Morgan's  division  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps,  to  meet  the  danger 
in  Tennessee.  There  was  great  difficulty  in  obtaining  correct 
information  about  Hood's  movements  and  it  was  not  until  Octo 
ber  1.  that  General  Sherman  learned  that  he  had  crossed  the 
Chattahoochee  at  Campbelltown,  and  not  until  the  third,  that  he 
concluded  that  Hood  would  strike  our  railroad  about  Kingston 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


568  FIFTEENTH    OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

or  Marietta.1  It  must  have  been  immediately  after  coming  to 
this  conclusion  that  the  orders  were  given  for  our  unexpected 
movement,  although  Gleason  says  we  received  the  orders  about 
midnight,  October  2.  Frank  Schreiber  says  it  was  about  2  a.  m. 
October  32  and  the  adjutant  thinks  it  was  still  later.  The  order 
is  dated  October  2,  and  was  received  at  corps  headquarters  at 
9  p.  m.  that  day.3 

The  morning  of  October  3,  reveille  sounded  in  our  camp  at 
2  :30  and  there  was  a  busy  time  packing  up.  There  was  also 
much  regret  in  giving  up  our  pleasant  quarters  but  there  was  no 
help  for  it.  A  little  after  daylight  we  moved  out.  The  first  divi 
sion  of  our  corps  preceded  us.  We  marched  to  and  through 
Atlanta  and  there  took  the  Marietta  road  which  ran  parallel  to 
the  railroad.  The  road  was  quite  slippery  from  rain  the  night 
before  but  we  made  rapid  progress.  We  reached  the  railroad 
bridge  across  the  Chattahoochee  at  11  a.  m.  and  halted  for  dinner. 
WTe  had  but  a  short  time  for  it  and  before  some  of  the  men  had 
taken  their  hard-tack  and  coffee  our  march  was  resumed.  We 
crossed  the  river  on  a  pontoon  bridge.  Some  men  of  the  Twen 
tieth  Corps  were  guarding  the  railroad  bridge  which  was  under 
going  repairs.  We  moved  rapidly  on  toward  Marietta  and  went 
into  line  and  camp  inside  of  some  old  works  of  the  enemy.  Our 
line  faced  northwest  and  we  were  in  the  second  line.  We  had 
marched  twenty-five  miles,  according  to  Gleason,  and  were  glad 
to  be  able  to  lie  down  and  rest. 

The  morning  of  October  -i,  there  was  a  light  rain  falling 
and  as  we  had  no  orders  to  move  the  men  lay  in  their  shelter 
tents  and  were  slow  in  getting  out  even  for  breakfast.  A  number 
took  strolls  through  the  woods  looking  for  chestnuts.  They  were 
however  soon  recalled  by  the  bugle  and  we  moved  on  towards 
Marietta,  said  to  be  six  miles  distant.  Soon  after  starting  we  struck 
the  railroad  near  our  old  camp  of  July  4,  near  Smyrna  Camp 
grounds,  and  were  soon  marching  into  and  through  the  town. 
We  halted  for  a  brief  rest  after  passing  through  and  then  moved 
on  until  we  reached  the  foothills  of  Kenesaw  Mountain,  where 
we  were  placed  in  camp  along  a  line  of  the  enemy's  abandoned 
works.  Captain  George  W.  Cummins,  who  had  rejoined  the  regi 
ment  at  Marietta,  reported  that  when  he  was  coming  through 
from  Chattanooga  the  day  before  on  the  train,  the  enemy  was 
seen  near  Big  Shanty  and  had  struck  the  railroad  ten  minutes 
after  his  train  had  passed  and  began  tearing  up  the  track.  From 
our  camp  we  could  see  a  signal  station  on  one  of  the  highest 

1  General  Sherman's  Memoirs. 

2  Frank  I.    Si  hreiboi  's  L'jfirj. 

3  Fullertr  ./s  Journal.  A\     R.  R.   77-593 


FROM  ATLANTA  TO  GAYLESVILLE,  ALA.  569 

points  of  Kenesaw,  busily  wig-wagging  messages  to  the  front 
and  rear.  Of  course  we  could  not  imagine  what  the  messages 
were,  but  doubtless  one  of  them  was  to  General  Corse  at  Rome 
directing  him  to  move  to  the  defense  of  Allatoona,  as  General 
Sherman  says  he  signalled  such  an  order  on  October  4.1 

On  October  5,  we  moved  forward  about  three  miles  in  the 
direction  of  Pine  Top,  evidently  with  much  caution,  and  with 
frequent  long  halts.  During  one  of  them  Colonel  Askew  and  the 
adjutant  rode  up  to  the  signal  station  on  Kenesaw.  When  they 
reached  the  summit  a  startling  prospect  opened  before  them.  The 
railroad  from  Ackworth  north  to  Allatoona  was  marked  con 
tinuously  by  the  smoke  of  burning  ties,  and  distant  cannonading 
was  heard  in  the  direction  of  Allatoona.  We  had  heard  that 
there  was  over  a  million  rations  stored  there  and  suspected  that 
the  enemy  was  attacking  the  place.  The  enemy  was  between  us 
and  its  garrison  and  we  were  extremely  anxious  as  to  the  result. 
We  had  a  superb  view  of  the  country  to  the  north  and  northwest 
and  in  the  latter  direction  could  see  the  smoke  of  camp  fires,  evi 
dently  the  enemy's,  who  appeared  to  be  in  heavy  force.  We 
soon  made  our  way  to  where  the  signal  officers  were  trying  to  get 
communication  with  Allatoona.  General  Sherman  was  there 
and  seemed  to  be  impatient  to  hear  from  that  point.  We  could 
see  smoke,  evidently  the  smoke  of  battle,  at  Allatoona  and  thought 
we  could  hear  cannonading.  Presently  the  signal  officers  caught 
a  message  which  seemed  to  greatly  please  the  General  as  he 
stepped  about  nervously  and  said,  "That's  all  right !  That's  all 
right  r  The  message  caught  was  "C,,  "R,,  "S,,  "E,,  "H,,  "E., 
"R,,  ,  which  the  signal  officer  translated  "Corse  is  here."  The 
general  however  was  evidently  very  anxious  as  to  the  result  of 
the  battle  still  raging  there.  About  2  o'clock  the  smoke  about 
Allatoona  seemed  to  deminish  and  by  4  o'clock  it  had  disappeared. 
Later  the  signal  flag  at  Allatoona  announced  that  the  enemy  had 
been  repulsed  and  that  General  Corse  had  been  wounded.  It 
was  not  until  the  next  day  that  General  Corse  sent  the  character 
istic  dispatch  which  at  once  became  historic.  The  dispatch  was 
as  follows : 

Allatoona,  Ga.,  October  6,  1864,  2  P.  M. 
Captain  L.  M.  Dayton, 

Aide-de-Camp. 

I  am  short  a  cheek  bone  and  an  ear,  but  I  ani  able  to  whip  all 
h — 1  yet.  My  losses  are  heavy.  A  force  moving  from  Stilesboro  to 
Kingston  gives  me  some  anxiety.  Tell  me  where  Sherman  is. 

JOHN  M.  CORSE,2 

Brigadier  General. 
.     1     General  Sherman's  Memiors. 

2     Sherman's  Memoirs.  Si^.    19 


570  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUXTEEKS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

This  signalling  from  Kenesaw  Mountain  gave  rise  to  the 
popular  hymn  beginning 

"Hold  the  fort  for  I  am  coming." 

Captain  Samuel  Bachtel  of  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  had  charge  of 
the  signal  forces  with  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  and  directed 
the  sending  of  the  messages  above  mentioned.  A  short  time 
before  his  death — he  wrote  a  full  account  of  the  incidents  above 
related  for  Mr.  W.  W.  Bond  of  Columbus,  Ohio,  who  permitted 
the  author  to  take  a  copy  of  it.  He  says  that  when  General 
Hood  commenced  his  movement  against  our  communications  he 
had  signal  stations  at  Marietta,  twenty-three  miles  distant  from 
Atlanta,  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  three  miles  north  of  Marietta, 
and  at  Allatoona,  fifteen  miles  further  north.  His  narrative  then 
states,  "About  the  time  Sherman  learned  of  Hood's  movement, 
he  sent  Colonel  Warner  to  me  to  learn  what  facilities  I  had  for 
communicating  with  Allatoona.  I  informed  him  that  I  had  sta 
tions  at  the  previously  named  places.  This  as  I  now  recall  oc 
curred  on  the  third  day  of  October.  On  the  following  day,  the 
fourth,  Sherman  sent  a  telegram  to  General  Corse  at  Rome  to 
move  with  such  force  as  he  could  to  Allatoona.  The  message 
was  wired  to  Marietta  and  then  signalled  to  the  station  on  top 
of  Kenesaw  and  thence  to  Allatoona  over  the  heads  of  the  rebel 
troops  who  were  tearing  up  the  railroad  and  destroying  the  tele 
graph  line.  From  Allatoona  the  message  was  wired  to  Corse  at 
Rome.  On  the  same  day  Sherman,  leaving  a  force  to  hold  Atlanta, 
with  the  rest  moved  to  the  rear  to,  if  possible,  punish  Hood. 
Sherman  ordered  me  to  accompany  him  with  a  detachment  of 
the  Signal  Corps  under  my  command.  We  camped  to  the  south 
of  Marietta  that  night  and  resumed  our  march  the  following  day. 
During  the  afternoon  we  went  to  the  signal  station  on  top  of 
Kenesaw  to  learn  if  possible  any  news  regarding  the  situation  at 
Allatoona.  We  there  learned  from  Lieutenants  Fisk  and  Connelly 
that  a  battle  had  been  and  was  then  in  progress,  that  the  repeated 
desperate  charges  of  the  enemy  had  been  repulsed  and  that  Gen 
eral  Corse  had  arrived  and  was  in  command  at  Allatoona  though 
wounded.  I  gave  this  information  to  Sherman.  Sherman  doubt 
ed  whether  Corse  had  arrived  and  said  he  feared  that  the  enemy 
had  captured  the  place  and  were  compelling  our  Signal  Corps  to 
send  those  messages.  I  assured  him  it  was  not  captured,  as  with 
our  telescopes  we  could  see  the  infantry  fire  from  our  works, 
but  that  the  artillery  ammunition  was  running  low,  as  our  men 
seemed  to  be  using  it  sparingly,  which  afterwards  proved  to  be 

the  case." 

*     *     * 

"It  was  late  in  the  afternoon  when  Sherman  and  staff  left 


FROM  ATLANTA  TO  GAYLESVILLE.  ALA.  571 

Kenesaw  Mountain.  Before  leaving,  I  directed  the  signal  officers 
on  top  of  Kenesaw  to  keep  watch  for  my  signal  torch  as  soon  as 
darkness  came  on.  Sherman's  headquarters  that  night  were  sev 
eral  miles  to  the  rear  and  west  of  Marietta.  After  headquarters 
were  established  I  called  Kenesaw  signal  station  and  communica 
tion  was  established  through  to  Allatoona  and  I  received  a  mes 
sage  from  Allatoona  stating  that  we  had  driven  off  the  enemy  and 
still  held  the  place.  I  took  this  message  to  General  Sherman  and 
told  him  that  if  he  wished  to  send  any  message  I  would  be  pleased 
to  send  it.  Still  doubtful  whether  or  not  Corse  had  arrived  and 
we  still  held  the  place,  he  said  again  that  he  feared  the  enemy 
had  captured  the  place  and  were  compelling  our  men  to  send 
such  messages.  Studying  a  moment,  he  said :  'Send  this  mes 
sage  it  can  do  no  harm.' 

'Corse  how  are  you. 

Sherman.'  ' 

In  a  few  moments  came  back  the  answer.  Captain  Bachtel's 
story  of  this  signalling,  disagrees  materially  with  that  of  General 
Sherman  as  related  in  his  memoirs.  In  the  latter,  General  Corse's 
famous  message  appears  to  have  been  sent  to  Captain  L.  M.  Day 
ton  who  was  one  of  Sherman's  staff.  In  Bachtel's  account  it  was 
sent  to  Sherman  himself. 

Captain  Bachtel  was  one  of  the  most  efficient  officers  in  the 
signal  service,  and  afterwards  rose  to  the  head  of  the  corps  in 
Sherman's  army.  He  was  modest,  quiet,  clear  headed  and  of 
unquestioned  truth  and  sincerity.  He  related  the  story  as  given 
above  a  number  of  times  to  the  compiler  of  these  pages.  It  is 
not  necessary  however  to  cast  a  doubt  on  either  story.  General 
Corse  may  have  sent  the  message  first  to  Captain  Dayton,  and 
then  to  General  Sherman  himself  as  soon  as  he  knew  where  he 
was.  This  possibility  completely  reconciles  the  apparent  con 
flict  between  the  two.  There  were  two  messages  signalled  from 
Kenesaw  Mountain  to  the  ''Commanding  Officer,  Allatoona"  by 
General  Vandever,  on  the  afternoon  and  evening  of  October  4. 
one  at  2  p.  m.  saying:  "Sherman  is  moving  in  force.  Hold  out" 
and  the  other  at  6:30  p.  m.  saying:  "General  Sherman  says  hold 
fast.  We  are  coming."1 

On  the  night  of  the  fifth  we  encamped  near  Pine  Top  in  a 
sheltered  position  and  retired  early.  We  were  now  convinced 
that  the  enemy  was  to  our  rear  and  it  looked  very  much  like  we 
would  have  to  fight  our  way  back  to  where  we  started  from  five 
months  before.  W7e  also  learned  that  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  was 

1     W.  R.  K.  79-78. 


572  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

moving  on  our  right  toward  Allatoona  and  that  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee  was  within  easy  support  of  us. 

On  the  sixth  and  seventh  of  October,  our  regiment  remained 
in  camp  near  Pine  Top  and  during  this  time  we  heard  some  ot 
the  particulars  of  the  battle  of  Allatoona.  On  the  morning  of 
October  5,  General  French  with  three  brigades  of  infantry  had 
appeared  before  Allatoona.  After  practically  enveloping  the  place 
he  had  demanded  its  unconditional  surrender  in  order,  as  he  said, 
"to  prevent  the  needless  effusion  of  blood."  General  Corse  who 
had  reached  the  place  from  Rome,  thirty-five  miles  away,  at  1 
o'clock  that  morning,  bringing  with  him  about  1000  reinforce 
ments,  was  in  command.  He  acknowledged  receipt  of  the  de 
mand  for  surrender  in  the  following  words : 

General  S.  G.  French,  Confederate  States,  etc. 

Your  communication  demanding  surrender  of  my  command  I 
acknowledge  receipt  of,  and  respectfully  reply  that  we  are  prepared 
for  the  "needless  effusion  of  blood"  whenever  it  is  agreeable  to  you. 

JOHN  M.  CORSE, 
Brigadier  General  Commanding  Forces,  United  States.  1 

The  enemy  nearly  surrounded  the  place  and  at  once  began 
the  attack.  It  was  a  vigorous  assault  of  near  5000  of  the  enemy 
against  about  2000  of  our  troops,  but  our  forces  were  behind 
skillfully  constructed  fortifications,  were  commanded  by  an  in 
trepid  leader,  and  the  result  was  as  might  have  been  expected. 
General  Corse's  losses  were  killed  142,  wounded  358  and  missing 
313,  a  total  of  707 — more  than  one-third  of  his  command.  His 
loss  of  officers  was  thirty-five.  General  Young  o,f  French's  com 
mand  who  was  captured  estimated  the  enemy's  losses  at  2000 
men,  including  over  300  dead  and  over  400  prisoners.'2  The 
number  of  casualties  on  both  sides  shows  the  sanguinary  charac 
ter  of  the  struggle.  General  French  withdrew  very  suddenly 
after  his  final  repulse,  probably  because  of  the  approach  of  the 
Army  of  the  Ohio,  then  commanded  by  General  Cox. 

During  the  two  days  we  were  in  camp  near  Pine  Top  both 
officers  and  men  had  opportunity  to  ascend  it  and  enjoy  the  fine 
prospect  from  its  summit.  On  the  sixth  we  saw  the  Twenty-third 
Corps  moving  north  toward  Allatoona.  To  the  northwest  were 
clouds  of  smoke  which  indicated  the  camps  of  the  enemy. 

On  the  seventh  the  adjutant  strolled  out  on  top  of  the  moun 
tain  alone  and  was  scanning  the  horizon  to  the  northwest.  While 
he  was  so  engaged  General  Sherman,  attended  only  by  an  orderly, 
suddenly  appeared  close  at  hand  and  commenced  looking  across 
the  country  with  a  field  glass.  Nearby  was  a  tent-fly  under  which 

1  General  Sherman's  Memoirs. 

2  Sherman's  Memoirs,  Vol.  2-150. 


FROM  ATLANTA  TO  GAYLESVILLE,  ALA.  573 

he  had  evidently  been  taking  a  nap.  There  was  a  sound 
of  cannonading  in  the  distance  and  he  suddenly  exclaimed,  ''What 
direction  is  that!  What  direction  is  that!"  The  adjutant  there 
upon  approached  and  saluting  offered  him  a  small  pocket  com 
pass.  He  did  not  take  it  but  putting  his  hand  in  his  coat  pocket 
produced  a  similar  but  much  larger  and  finer  compass  and  said, 
"No  thank  you !  This  is  the  thing  we  run  the  machine  by."  After 
getting  the  direction  he  looked  again  through  his  field  glasses 
and  then  mounted  his  horse  and  rode  off,  leaving  an  attendant  to 
take  down  his  tent-fly,  pack  it  on  a  mule  and  follow.  This  tent- 
fly  became  quite  a  familiar  object  to  the  officers  and  men  of  our 
army.  It  was  said  that  sometimes  the  general  did  not  even  have 
its  shelter  at  night,  but  laid  down  on  a  rubber  blanket  without  it. 
Once  when  our  regiment  was  moving  along  a  road  in  the  edge 
of  a  wood  the  men  looked  over  a  rail  fence  and  saw  an  officer 
lying  apparently  asleep,  his  head  at  the  foot  of  a  tree.  Some  one 
said,  "another  drunken  officer,"  and"  others  began  to  roast  the 
shoulder  straps,  when  suddenly  the  officer  rose  and  they  saw  it 
was  General  Sherman.  He  climbed  the  fence,  crossed  the  road  to 
where  an  orderly  was  holding  his  horse,  mounted  and  started  in 
the  same  direction  our  column  was  moving.  He  took  a  cigar 
from  his  pocket  and  not  finding  a  match  rode  up  to  the  line  of 
marching  men  and  asked  a  light  of  a  big  fellow  who  was  smoking 
a  cigar.  He  promptly  handed  his  lighted  cigar  to  the  general  who 
puffed  away  at  it  until  his  own  cigar  was  lighted  and  then  cooly 
threw  it  away  and  rode  on.  Every  one  was  astonished  and  no 
one  more  so  than  the  man  whose  cigar  had  been  so  contemptu 
ously  thrown  away,  who  exclaimed,  "Well !  That  beats  h — 1." 
There  was  a  momentary  feeling  of  indignation  which  did  not 
have  time  to  express  itself,  for  the  orderly  who  saw  it  all,  called 
the  general's  attention  to  what  he  had  done.  He  suddenly 
wheeled  his  horse  and  taking  a  handful  of  cigars  from  his  pocket, 
exclaimed,  "Where  is  that  man?  Here  take  a  cigar,  take  three 
or  four  of  them."  Having  thus  made  amends  for  his  forgetful- 
ness,  he  rode  on. 

On  October  8,  the  Eighty-ninth  Illinois,  which  was  mostly 
made  up  of  railroad  men  and  was  called  the  "Railroad  Regi 
ment"  was  sent  to  repair  the  railroad  track.  In  the  afternoon 
orders  came  to  march  and  our  division  moved  toward  Ackwortli. 
The  second  brigade  soon  turned  toward  Big  Shanty,  but  our 
brigade  kept  on  and  reached  Ackworth  after  dark  and  encamped 
for  the  night. 

October  9  was  Sunday  and  having  no  orders  the  men  rested 
quietly  in  camp.  In  the  village  there  were  some  comely  girls 
which  Gleason  says  were  much  regarded  by  some  of  our  men,  not 


574  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

all  of  them  unmarried.  That  evening  the  "quartette"  sang  some 
sacred  music.1 

The  morning  of  October  10,  the  colonel  gave  orders  to  "fix 
up"  camp  and  we  somehow  got  the  impression  we  would  remain 
near  Ackworth  for  some  days.  Every  one  went  to  work  tearing 
down  some  old  buildings  nearby  to  get  material  for  quarters. 
Some  of  the  shacks  or  shanties  were  about  finished  when  order > 
came  to  "get  ready  to  move  right  away."  The  din  which  had 
been  caused  by  chopping,  hammering,  nailing,  etc.,  instantly 
cease4  and  every  one  began  to  pack  up.  We  moved  out  towards 
Allatoona  at  4  p.  m.  which  place  we  reached  about  dark.  It  was 
light  enough  however  for  us  to  note  evidences  of  the  fierceness 
of  the  attack  on  General  Corse's  little  garrison  on  the  fifth.  We 
followed  the  railroad  track  through  the  pass  after  which  we 
descended  into  a  little  valley.  Here  we  found  a  good  road  on 
which  we  made  rapid  progress.  We  crossed  the  Etowah  River, 
marched  two  miles  beyond  it  and  at  9  p.  m.  encamped  near  the 
village  of  Cartersville,  having  marched  about  twelve  miles. 

Next  morning,  October  11,  we  resumed  our  march  at  6 
o'clock,  moving  quite  rapidly.  For  some  cause  unknown  to  us 
there  seemed  to  be  unusual  hurry  and  excitement.  It  was  elec 
tion  day  in  Ohio,  and  as  voters  of  that  state  we  held  an  election. 
At  a  meeting  judges  and  clerks  were  appointed  and  a  tin  bucket 
with  a  slit  in  the  lid  was  improvised  as  a  ballot  box.  Two  of 
the  judges  carried  the  ballot  box  on  a  ramrod  at  the  head  of  the 
regiment  and  when  the  regiment  halted  the  men  came  forward 
and  voted. 

We  marched  through  Cartersville  and  Caswell  Station,  passed 
by  Kingston,  and  went  about  two  miles  beyond  it  towards  Rome, 
where  we  bivouaced  for  the  night,  having  marched  about  four 
teen  miles.  That  evening  the  adjutant  and  other  judges  of  the 
election  counted  the  ballots  cast  at  the  election  and  made  out  the 
returns  in  an  old  saw  mill  near  our  camp.  There  were  221  votes 
cast,  215  for  the  Union  ticket  and  six  for  the  Democratic  ticket.2 

October  12,  we  resumed  our  march  at  8  a.  m.  and  moved 
on  toward  Rome.  We  marched  through  the  woods  and  along 
side  of  a  road  which  was  overcrowded  with  wagons  and  ar 
tillery  and  our  progress  was  slow.  We  heard  cannonading  in 
the  direction  of  Rome.  At  1  p.  m.  we  halted  for  dinner  on 
a  hill  by  the  roadside  where  we  rested  an  hour.  We  then 
pushed  on  until  11  o'clock  p.  m.  when  we  went  into  bivouac 
about  two  miles  from  Rome,  having  marched  twenty  miles. :i 

1  Gleason's  Diary. 

2  Frank  L.  Schreiber's  Diary. 

3  Fullerton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.  77-601. 


FKOM  ATLANTA  TO  GAYLESVILLE,  ALA.  575 

October  10,  General  Sherman  wired  General  Thomas 
who  was  at  Nashville,  that  General  Hood  had  crossed  the 
Coosa  River  and  was  probably  making  for  Tuscumbia  on 
the  Tennessee  River.1  He  thereupon  ordered  the  entire  army 
to  Kingston  and  thence  to  Rome.  But  while  we  were  march 
ing  in  such  haste  toward  Rome,  Hood  was  marching  up  the 
west  side  of  the  Oostenaula  and  on  the  12th  appeared  before 
Resaca.  He  at  once  demanded  its  immediate  surrender, 
coupled  Avith  the  threat  that  if  he  had  to  carry  it  by  assault 
no  prisoners  would  be  taken.  To  this  demand  Colonel 
Weaver,  who  was  in  command,  replied,  expressing  his  sur 
prise  at  the  threat  that  no  prisoners  would  be  taken  and 
sayino-:  "In  my  opinion  I  can  hold  this  post.  If  you  want 
it  come  and  take  it."2  General  Hood's  Experience  at  Allatoona 
had  made  him  cautious  and  he  did  not  attempt  to  carry  the 
place  by  assault,  but  limited  his  attack  to  a.  little  skirmishing, 
while  with  the  rest  of  his  army  he  destroyed  the  railroad  for 
twenty  miles  back  to  Tunnel  Hill.  At  Dalton  he  captured  a 
regiment  of  colored  troops.3 

Our  regiment  lay  in  camp  near  Rome  until  3  o'clock  the 
afternoon  of  the  13th,  and  then  marched  out  taking  the  back 
track,  going  by  way  of  Calhoun.  Our  regiment  led  the 
advance  of  the  entire  corps  and  we  made  good  time.  The 
officers  were  called  together  and  cautioned  to  be  very  saving 
of  ammunition,  as  the  railroad  had  been  cut  both  north  and 
south  of  us.  They  were  also  advised  that  we  were  to  march 
to  relieve  the  garrison  at  Resaca,  which  was  besieged  but  still 
held  out.  Company  commanders  were  ordered  to  march  in 
the  rear  of  their  companies  in  order  to  prevent  straggling. 
As  we  marched  along  we  soon  heard  artillery  firing  in  the 
direction  of  Resaca.  At  nightfall  we  were  still  marching, 
but  there  was  a  full  moon  and  a  clear  sky  and  we  could 
see  our  way  almost  as  well  as  in  daylight-  After  march 
ing  about  fifteen  miles  we  turned  into  an  open  field  where 
we  bivouaced  for  the  night.  The  Fourteenth  Corps  was 
closely  following  us,  both  the  Fourth  and  Fourteenth  Corps 
being  now  under  command  of  General  Stanley. 

On  the  morning  of  October  14,  we  resumed  our  march  at 
6  o'clock.  Just  before  we  started  we  were  entertained  by  a 
quiet  fight  and  knock  down  between  two  men  of  Company  F. 
(Logan  and  Gibson.)4 

We  reached  Calhoun  at  9  a.  m.  and  marched  through  it 
without  halting.  Three  trains  bearing  soldiers  of  the  Seven 
teenth  Corps  passed  us  before  we  reached  Resaca.  We 

1,  2  and  3     Sherman's  Memoirs. 
4     Gleason's  Diary. 


576  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

arrived  at  the  place  about  noon,  having  marched  about  fifteen 
miles,  and  crossed  the  river  on  a  pontoon  bridge.  We 
marched  through  the  place,  with  bands  playing  and  colors 
flying,  and  soon  reached  the  vicinity  of  our  works  of  May 
14,  where  we  finally  halted,  very  tired  and  hungry.  During 
the  preceding  twenty-four  hours  we  had  marched  thirty-five 
miles,  with  only  seven  hours  rest.1  We  expected  to  move  on 
to  Dalton,  but  after  resting  about  two  hours  we  moved  about 
one-half  mile  and  bivouaced  inside  of  some  old  breatworks 
facing  toward  the  east.  A  reconnoissance  that  afternoon 
showed  that  Lee's  corps  of  Hood's  army  occupied  Snake 
Creek  Gap  and  his  other  two  corps  the  gaps  beyond  Dalton.2 

At  12 :30  a.  m.,  October  15,  our  corps  received  orders 
announcing  that  General  Howard  would  move  at  7  a.  m.  direct 
on  Snake  Creek  Gap,  and  that  at  daylight  General  Stanley 
with  the  infantry  of  the  Fourth  and  Fourteenth  Corps  would 
cross  over  to  the  hills  about  tWo  miles  north  of  the  gap,  some 
where  south  of  Tilton,  and  if  possible  find  a  way  across  the 
valley  beyond  toward  Villanow.  General  Cox  with  the  Army 
of  the  Ohio  was  to  follow  General  Howard. >0)  That  morning 
at  7  o'clock  our  regiment  and  brigade  moved  out  taking  the 
road  to  Dalton.  At  our  first  halt  we  heard  skirmishing  some 
distance  to  our  left  toward  a  range  of  hills  we  Avere  approach 
ing.  We  turned  in  that  direction  and  after  moving  about 
three  miles  came  to  an  opening  near  the  hills,  and  formed 
line  of  battle  near  the  edge  of  a  woods  along  a  rail  fence. 
Here  we  stacked  arms  and  awaited  further  orders.  We  sent 
skirmishers  out  toward  the  hills,  but  they  found  no  enemy 
to  oppose  them.  While  waiting  here  our  men  found  a  corn 
field  and  a  sweet  potato  patch  which  they  raided.  A  call 
summoned  the  officers  to  headquarters,  where  they  were  told 
that  our  corps  would  attempt  to  cross  the  almost  mountain 
ous  ridge  before  us,  that  both  officers  and  men  would  move 
on  foot,  taking  no  horses  and  nothing  that  could  not  be  car 
ried  on  their  persons.  This  caution  seemed  to  be  unneces 
sary,  for  those  of  us  who  had  been  near  the  foot  of  the  ridge 
we  were  to  cross,  saw  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  ride  a 
horse  up  its  steep,  rocky  and  thickly  wooded  slopes.  General 
Wood,  who  was  not  yet  recovered  from  the  wound  in  his 
foot  received  at  Lovejoy  Station,  insisted  in  going  with  our 
division,  even  if  he  had  to  be  carried  on  a  stretcher.  It  seemed 
to  be  a  wild  adventure  but  both  officers  and  men  were  eager  to 
undertake  it.  Later  we  were  informed  that  our  brigade  had 


1  Fullerton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.   77-602. 

2  Fullerton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.   77-602. 

3  W.   R.   R.   79-268. 


FROM  ATLANTA  TO  GAYLESVILLE,  ALA.  ,          577 

been  designated  to  guard  the  supply  and  ammunition  trains 
while  the  other  troops  crossed  the  ridge.  We  were  to  escort 
the  trains  and  artillery  back  toward  Resaca  as  soon^  as  the 
other  troops  started  on  their  arduous  expedition. 

The  movement  began  late  in  the  afternoon  and  the  trains 
at  the  same  time  commenced  to  pull  out  towards  Resaca. 
Companies  A  and  F  were  sent  back  to  the  intersection  of  the 
Dalton  road,  and  instructions  to  guard  the  crossing  until  all 
trains  had  passed.  By  11  p.  m.  we  had  the  trains  and  artillery 
safely  back  inside  the  enemy's  old  works  near  Resaca,  where  we 
were  formed  into  line  behind  the  works  and  bivouaced  for 
the  night.  At  4  p.  m.  the  other  troops  of  the  Fourth  Corps 
had  gained  the  top  of  the  mountain  ridge  and  at  6  p.  m.  had 
worked  over  it  and  come  out  in  Snake  Creek  Gap.  The 
Fourteenth  Corps  also  reached  the  top  and  encamped  for  the 
night  on  its  summit.  General  Sherman  sent  a  dispatch 
saying  that  the  enemy  had  left  the  mouth  of  the  gap  and 
that  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  was  working  through  it. 
Orders  were  therefore  sent  to  bring  up  the  trains  and  artillery. 

Next  morning,  October  1G,  we  were  ordered  to  march  at 
6  o'clock.  By  the  time  we  were  ready  the  trains  had  moved 
out  and  we  followed  them  to  Resaca  and  thence  on  to  Snake 
Creek  Gap,  where  we  halted  for  dinner.  Captain  J.  T.  Upde- 
grove's  resignation  on  account  of  his  wounds  had  been 
accepted  and  he  left  for  home.  After  dinner  we  resumed  our 
march  through  the  gap.  After  we  had  gone  about  a  mile  we 
had  to  halt  for  an  hour  to  let  the  trains  of  the  Twenty-third 
Corps  pass.  We  got  through  the  gap  by  7  p.  m.  and  pressed 
on  for  about  four  miles,  passing  through  the  village  of  Vil- 
lanow,  with  its  white  church,  and  found  our  corps  encamped 
about  a  mile  beyond.  Here,  at  9  :30  p.  m.,  we  went  into  camp, 
having  marched  during  the  day  about  fifteen  miles.  The 
Army  of  the  Ohio  was  encamped  near  us.  On  the  17th,  General 
Wood  having,  as  he  thought,  sufficiently  recovered  from  his 
wound,  reported  for  duty  and  was  assigned  to  the  command 
of  the  Fourth  Corps  in  place  of  General  Stanley,  who  was 
commanding  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  in  the  absence  of 
General  Thomas.  There  were  no  orders  to  march  and  we 
remained  quietly  in  camp.  At  8  a.  m.  that  morning  our  cav 
alry  occupied  Lafayette  and  reported  the  enemy  as  moving 
south  in  the  direction  of  Summerville.1  General  Sherman  at 
once  issued  orders  directing  our  whole  army  to  move  against 
him  at  that  place  the  next  morning — the  Army  of  the  Ten 
nessee  to  move  through  to  Lafayette  and  there  take  the  direct 
road  to  Summerville ;  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  (the 

1     W.  R.  R.  79-327. 


Foxcrtlbi  amitS  Fotourteeimtlhi  Corps'1  to-  ervtss  Shi^V  Gap  a:^t  :^k^ 
^  iroad  to  SicinnBnje^-illlke,  :o  sthe  kfu  Jumo  eas:  of  site  raker,  1 
:;-••-•      .::•-.;       .  -  .  .    .         •  .  .  .    .  .    .    - 

wittn  it:  the  Anray  of  tfee  Ottic*  to  move  u£owti  the  Ro-t-tte 
?    fry    SdW%inau    ^unxul    themce  :ake  clhe  b«ess    sxxic   :•> 
>z"      -         -:.."1 

The  iniext  mnneiiTKasjg.  tSae  kh>  an  *   o>Vk>dk.  oar  ojtrpt?  KBoveni 
O'  ^^2^2  omder^.      A>  th<e  CBrst  divisknn  wa>  r:i 
u&cc     t-tr  staurt^d  lanmtiH  7  a.  cm.    After  a  rstarvr. 


oe  >ie®es  aimd  > 


we  saw  r5ue  fimmiSiar  pmwiEe  of  Lcwfoi»cai  Mosmc 

We  inniatsSe  jgeiomil   j»ni?i§Tnes>    amnriiS 
of  o^Mhmsnnm  ram  ksto  nine  Anny  of  she 
wSaicfis  wa<  nnBOvim^  oan  t2ne  smaim  S^nsunmer\~fflle  rOkini..     Here  we 
weme  laaHteuS  few  afeount  am  feomr.  ann«J  tfeem  turrrtCTs:  to-  the  left 

lea^Simg-    to    SBonnunaeirviSIe    2.1k>n^: 
tkat.    We  nmarvrfeeui  OEB  umnstfll  after 
ssn  a  wooiis  near  a  cornfield  not  far 
iineBEi    F-otsterV    Hoosse   OJIB    the    Osattoog^i    River.    alSo-mt    fix 
rviEUe,  Ihavsinjr    uaarcr-c-i     i~.:r:"<    nfee    "la 


t2oe  nnext  <day"<  miovenieiiit>  True  Annay  oi  tfee 
Tesmessee  was  «2Enecte«i  to-  p>ass  to  ttne  .ri^tat  «c»'f  SmcniBniervtlie 
aiavS  nuDove  t»c«waru2  AUjpinne.  Tfee  Annsy  of  tfee  Oh&cfc  was  to 
inaove  oca  dhe  mam  GayHesriUle  inc?ffi«dL  wMEe  <o»car  o^rps  and  tfee 
FownteenstD  Ciocpt?  weine  to  CKEES?  -D^JLT  SMnnBer«i!IlIe.  nea«iy  '•:• 

"~.',r.^   :~         '    rer  US*,  we  .  -.  rs  t">  iniiurcfe 

at  *5ay2ig9iitL  Bwrnt  as  fine  Focuraeeantfin  Corps  p>reoe(tSe«iJ  rrs  we  -sir-i 
3>vC  m>(}tve  BnmtaS  after  we  had  ufa^er.  Oar  p»k»eeers  lod  gi^Eie 
e  dav  and.  inn  ooanisectiQc  winfe  nine  p»wnn:eer? 
aTTTn^.  lsss.4  ojot?trm£teni  a  ii~e  foot  ^rE-ife 

"-.     -.  •  .'.      '        :.-    '         "  .  ;  :         ~  . 

-    .      -    _  -      --  -      -_--   -      fossm«    I 

'—•&  a^ainn  ran  inntiC"  tine  ATEEDV  of  tiae 
nnnmimeTTilille-  aLm4  we  !iad 
'i  SommeiniBIe  aUwjisit  ^  p. 
b     a  t*ack  street  rnnto  a 


^  t<eE  nzsiSes-.     Ohiirisiiigr  t5ne  dav's  nmancln  T»re  Snear'-i  fmct'cm  the 
s  isa  CWnao.  Jmefimm^  amd  PeEans^dhrajmia.  wr.  .  sll 

r^a-  f^cv  tSse  UniooL     GHeaisiocn  kn  to£>  ffeir     sas,  ""tfoe 


AT-LAJVTA  TO  OAYL£SVIT.IJ,    AT.A  57$ 

news  was  received  with  all  the  joy  that  a  victory  for  our 
arms  could  inspire/'  It  was  also  reported  that  General  For 
rest  had  been  repulsed  at  Fort  Donelson, 

In  view  of  what  afterwards  occurred  it  is  interesting  to 
note  that  about  this  time  General  Sherman  received  a  dis 
patch  from  General  Slocum  who,  with  the  Twentieth  Corps 
had  been  left  at  Atlanta,  saying,  that  he  would  like  to  take 
two  of  his  divisions  and  strike  out  for  Macon  and  Milledge- 
ville.  He  said  one  division  in  the  new  works  at  Atlanta  could 
hold  it  and  that  he  believed  he  could  go  through  the  state 
with  two  good  divisions.  He  urged  that  he  be  permitted  to 
undertake  it.1  It  may  be  presumed  that  General  Sherman 
had  then  no  notion  of  letting  any  one  else  set  out  on  an 
expedition,  which  he  had  at  heart  and  wished  to  lead 
himself.  He  answered  General  Slocum's  dispatch  on  the 
20th,  saying  in  substance,  that  he  himself  would  march 
through  Georgia,  taking  Slocum's  corps  along,  and  asking 
Slocum  to  bend  all  his  energies  toward  securing  supplies,  so 
the  grand  march  could  begin  November  I.2 

October  20,  the  whole  army  moved  to  Gaylesville,  Ala.- 
Our  brigade  and  division  marching  at  6:30  a.  m  Our  march 
was  rapid  and  the  halts  few  and  shorL  We  reached  the  little 
hamlet  of  Chattooga  about  noon  and  halted  for  dinner  in  a 
young  orchard.  In  the  rear  of  the  orchard  was  a  large  patch 
of  sweet  potatoes,  which  was  soon  full  of  scratchers — there 
being  no  guard  to  interfere.  Officers  mingled  with  the  men 
in  the  general  scramble.  Among  the  officers  who  were  most 
conspicuous  in  the  raid  were  the  surgeon  of  the  Fifteenth 
Ohio  and  the  chaplain  of  the  Eighth  Kansas.3  After  dinner 
we  resumed  our  march  and  after  passing  through  the  hamlet 
crossed  the  Chattooga  River  on  a  covered  bridge.  Gleason 
says:  "Two  miles  further  on  we  crossed  the  Alabama  line 
and  bade  adieu  to  Georgia  after  sojourning  more  than  five 
months  on  her  soil,  and  I  could  not  help  wondering  how  long 
it  would  be  ere  we  returned,  as  it  was  evident  that  we  were 
moving  toward  Northern  Alabama,  the  supposed  destination 
of  the  rebel  army."4  \Ye  reached  Gaylesville  in  the  evening, 
after  a  march  of  twenty  miles  and  encamped  in  an  open  plain 
near  the  village.  Here  the  pursuit  of  Hood's  army  ended. 
Here  we  rested  until  October  27.  engaged  with  the  usual 
round  of  camp  dut3%  going  occasionally  on  foraging  expedi 
tions.  In  the  meantime  plans  wore  forming  for  two  memora 
ble  campaigns  in  which  the  military  power  of  the  Confederacy 
in  the  southwest  was  to  be  practical!}-  destroyed. 

1     W.  R.  K.  7J»-S4S.  3    Caeascm'K  Diary 

i     W.   E.   E    7P-S7C.  4     Gleason's  Diary. 


CHAPTER   XXVII. 

HOOD'S  INVASION  OF  TENNESSEE — FROM  GAYLESVILLE,  ALA.  TO 
PULASKI,  TENN. 

On  the  13th  day  of  August,  1864,  while  we  were  in  front 
of  Atlanta,  and  were  shifting  our  position  round  to  the  right 
to  gain  possession  of  the  railroads  and  compel  Hood  to 
evacuate  the  city,  General  Sherman  in  a  dispatch  to  General 
Halleck  said: 

"If  I  should  ever  be  cut  off  from  my  base  look  out  for  me 
about  St.  Mark's,  Fla.  or  Savannah,  Ga."  August  IS, 
when1  Wheeler's  cavalry  was  breaking  up  our  railroad  to  the 
north,  burning  bridges  and  cutting  telegraph  Avires,  General 
Grant  wired  him  from  City  Point,  Va.,  saying,  among  other 
things : 

"I  never  would  advise  going  backward  even  if  your  roads 
are  cut  so  as  to  preclude  the  possibility  of  receiving  supplies 
from  the  north,  but  would  recommend  the  accumulation  of 
ordnance  stores  and  supplies  while  you  can,  and  if  it  comes 
to  the  worst  move  south  as  you  suggested."2 

Doubtless  General  Sherman,  while  we  occupied  Atlanta 
and  before  General  Hood  began  his  raid  on  our  communica 
tions  in  October,  had  accumulated  a  large  amount  of  supplies 
at  Atlanta,  with  the  possibility  above  mentioned  in  vie\v. 
Even  before  Hood  moved  on  our  line  of  communications,  on 
October  1,  in  a  dispatch  to  General  Grant,  he  asked  why, 
if  Hood  should  go  over  to  the  Selma  and  Talledega  road,  it 
would  not  do  for  him  (Sherman)  to  leave  Tennessee  to  the 
force  which  General  Thomas  had  and  the  reserves  he  ex 
pected,  destroy  Atlanta  and  then  march  across  Georgia 
to  Savannah  and  Charleston.3  This  suggestion  was  the 
subject  of  serious  consideration  by  President  Lincoln, 
Secretary  Stanton  and  Generals  Grant  and  Halleck.  The 
situation,  however,  was  very  different  from  that  of  August 
18,  1864,  when  General  Grant  gave  implied  assent  to 
such  a  movement.  Then  only  Wheeler  with  his  cavalry 
was  raiding  in  Tennessee,  and  he  could  do  little  of  per 
manent  injury  even  to  our  line  of  communications.  Now, 
Hood's  seasoned  army  of  nearly  50,000,  including  his  cavalry, 
troops  w^hich  had  so  successfully  resisted  our  advance  on 
Atlanta,  were  menacing  our  rear  and  it  was  proposed  to  meet 

1  W.  R.  R.   76-482.  3     W.  R.  R.  79-3. 

2  W.  R.  R.,  76-569. 


FROM  GAYLESVILLE,  ALA.,  TO  PULASKI,  TEXX.  581 

him  with  an  army  made  up  largely  of  new  and  untrained 
soldiers,  which  had  yet  to  be  organized  into  an  effective  force. 
It  was  true  that  A.  J.  Smith's  corps  of  perhaps  10,000  men 
had  been  ordered  to  Nashville  from  Missouri,  but  they  were 
far  into  the  interior  of  that  state  and  no  one  could  tell 
whether  they  would  arrive  in  time  to  be  of  service  in  repelling 
Hood's  proposed  invasion  of  the  North.  But  General  Sher 
man  had  his  heart  set  on  a  march  to  the  sea,  and  persisted  in 
urging  it  upon  the  authorities  in  Washington.  In  his  memoirs 
General  Sherman  does  not  mention  having  received  any  reply 
to  his  dispatch  of  October  1.  On  the  9th  of  October  he  sent 
another  dispatch  to  General  Grant  saying : 

"It  will  be  a  physical  impossibility  to  protect  the  roads, 
now  that  Hood,  Forrest  and  Wheeler  and  the  whole  batch  of 
devils  are  turned  loose,  without  home  or  habitation.  I  think 
Hood's  movements  indicate  a  diversion  to  the  end  of  the 
Selma  and  Talledega  Railroad  at  Blue  Mountain,  about  sixty 
miles  south  west  of  Rome,  from  which  he  will  threaten 
Kingston,  Bridgeport  and  Decatur,  Ala.  I  propose  we  break 
up  the  railroad  from  Chattanooga  and  strike  out  with  wagons 
for  Millledgeville,  Millen  and  Savannah.  Until  we  can  re- 
populate  Georgia  it  is  useless  to  occupy  it,  but  the  utter 
destruction  of  its  roads,  houses  and  people  will  cripple  their 
military  resources.  By  attempting  to  hold  the  roads  we  will 
lose  1000  men  monthly  and  will  gain  no  result.  I  can  make 
the  march  and  make  Georgia  howl.  We  have  over  8000  cattle 
and  3,000,000  of  bread,  but  no  corn ;  but  we  can  forage  in  the 
interior  of  the  state."1 

Again  on  October  10,  he  wired  General  Grant  saying  that 
Hood  was  crossing  the  Coosa  River  below  Rome  bound  west, 
and  asking  if  he  had  not  better  execute  the  plans  above 
referred  to.2  General  Grant  the  next  day  at  11  a.m.,  answered 
this  dispatch  in  a  message  which  shows  strong  common  sense 
and  superior  military  judgment.  He  said:  "Your  dispatch 
received.  Does  it  not  look  as  if  Hood  was  going  to  attempt 
the  invasion  of  Middle  Tennessee,  using  the  Mobile  and  Ohio 
and  Memphis  and  Charleston  roads  to  supply  his  base  on  the 
Tennessee  River  about  Florence  or  Decatur?  If  he  does  this 
he  ought  to  be  met  and  prevented  from  getting  north  of  the 
Tennessee  River.  If  you  were  to  cut  loose,  I  do  not  believe 
you  would  meet  Hood's  army,  but  would  be  bushwacked  by 
all  the  old  men,  little  boys,  and  such  railroad  guards  as  are 
still  left  at  home.  Hood  would  probably  strike  for  Nashville, 
thinking  that  by  going  north  he  could  inflict  greater  damage 

1  W.  R.  R.  79-162. 

2  W.  R.  R.  79-174. 


582  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

upon  us  than  we  could  do  upon  the  rebels  by  going  south. 
If  there  is  any  way  of  getting  at  Hood's  army,  I  would  prefer 
that,  but  I  must  trust  to  your  judgment.  *  *  *  j  am  afraid 
Thomas  with  such  lines  of  road  as  he  has  to  protect  could  not 
prevent  Hood  from  going  north."1 

To  the  candid  critic  it  seems  that  General  Grant's  ob 
jections  to  Sherman's  "cutting  loose,"  from  the  ordinary 
military  point  of  view,  were  logical  and  sound. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  at  the  beginning  of  the  At 
lanta  campaign  General  Sherman  had  announced  that  Hood's 
army  would  be  his  first  objective,  Atlanta  the  second.2  Could 
General  Grant  have  had  that  in  mind  when  he  said  :  "You  will 
be  bushwacked  by  all  the  old  men  and  little  boys  and  such 
railroad  guards  which  are  left  at  home?"  The  plain  meaning 
of  this  language  seems  to  be  "you  are  running  away  from 
Hood's  army  of  fighting  men,  your  first  and  main  objective, 
to  fight  old  men,  little  boys  and  home  railroad  guards."  The 
proposed  movement  was  perhaps  contrary  to  military  rules 
and  to  common  sense,  but  General  Sherman's  heart  was  set 
upon  it  and  he  turned  an  unwilling  ear  to  General 
Grant's  suggestions.  He  answered  General  Grant's  dispatch 
the  same  day,  repeating  his  arguments  in  favor  of  a  move 
ment  through  Georgia  to  the  sea,  and  saying,  "ans\ver  quick, 
as  I  know  we  will  not  have  the  telegraph  long."3  This  was 
the  day  the  army  was  concentrating  at  Kingston  for  the  march 
to  Rome.  At  11 :30  p.  m.  that  night  General  Grant 
telegraphed : 

"Your  dispatch  of  today  received.  If  you  are  satisfied  the 
trip  to  the  sea  coast  can  be  made,  holding  the  line  of  the  Ten 
nessee  firmly,  you  may  make  it,  destroying  all  the  railroad 
south  of  Dalton  or  Chattanooga,  as  you  think  best/'  The 
"if"  in  this  dispatch  and  the  movement  of  Hood  to  Resaca 
delayed  the  final  decision  for  some  days. 

The  proposed  movement  by  General  Sherman  caused 
deep  anxiety  at  Washington  and  on  the  evening  of  October 
12,  Secretary  Stanton  telegraphed  to  General  Grant  at  City 
Point,  saying : 

"The  President  feels  much  solicitude  in  respect  to  Gen 
eral  Sherman's  proposed  movement  and  hopes  it  will  be  ma 
turely  considered.  The  objections  stated  in  your  telegram  of 
last  night  impressed  him  with  much  force,  and  a  mis-step 
by  General  Sherman  might  be  fatal  to  his  army."4 

General  James  H.  Wilson,  who  had  been  sent  by  General 
Grant  to  General  Sherman  to  take  command  of  his  cavalry, 

1  W.  R.  R.  79-202.  3     W.  R.  R.  79-202. 

2  Sherman's  Memoirs,  Vol.  2,  p.  '6-7.  4     W.  R.  R. 


FROM  GAYLESMLLE.  ALA.,  TO  PULASKI.  TENS.  583 

with  the  remarkable  statement  that  his  presence  and  per 
sonal  activity  would  increase  its  efficiency  fifty  per  cent.1 
had  arrived  at  Gaylesville.  In  a  letter  to  General  John  A. 
Rawlins,  General  Grant's  chief  of  staff,  setting  forth  fully  the 
situation  Sherman  would  leave  behind  him,  made  a  vigorous 
plea  against  subdividing  Sherman's  forces  until  Hood  had  been 
disposed  of.2  This  letter  so  aroused  Rawlins'  apprehensions  of 
disaster,  should  Hood  not  attempt  to  follow  Sherman,  but  move 
against  Middle  Tennessee,  that  he  sought  and  obtained  General 
Grant's  permission  to  go  to  St.  Louis  and  hurry  up  A.  J.  Smith's 
command  and  other  troops  to  General  Thomas'  aid.3 

The  wires  between  General  Sherman  and  City  Point  were 
kept  open  several  days  after  this,  and  the  whole  movement  in 
all  its  details  and  bearings  was  thoroughly  threshed  over 
between  him  and  General  Grant,  who  finally  yielded,  but  only 
on  the  assurance  and  belief  that  General  Thomas  would  be 
left  with  sufficient  force  to  successfully  oppose  Hood's 
invasion  of  the  North.  That  it  succeeded  is  now  a  matter  of 
history  and  General  Sherman  is  entitled  to  all  the  fame  it 
earned  for  him.  But  that  it  did  not  result  in  disaster  to  our 
arms  and  the  country,  was  due  to  fortuitous  circumstances, 
accidents  of  war — which  sometimes  seem  to  be  the  work  of 
overruling  Providence. 

On  the  7th  of  November,  1864,  at  6  p.  m.,  General  Sher 
man  telegraphed  General  Grant  his  final  message  before 
cutting  loose,  as  follows  : 

"On  the  10th  the  election  will  be  over,  the  troops  all  paid 
and  all  our  surplus  property  will  be  back  in  Chattanooga.  On 
that  day  or  the  following,  if  affairs  should  remain  as  now  in 
Tennessee  I  propose  to  begin  the  movement  which  I  have 
hitherto  fully  described.  I  can  hear  of  no  large  force  to  our 
front,  and  according  to  Thomas,  Hood  remains  about  Tuscum- 
bia,  and  he  feels  perfectly  confident  of  his  ability  to  take  care 
of  him."4  On  the  same  evening  at  11:30  p.  m..  General  Grant 
answered  saying : 

"Your  dispatch  of  this  evening  received.  I  see  no  reason 
for  changing  your  plan  ;  should  any  arise  you  will  see  it.  I 
think  everything  here  favorable  now.  Great  good  fortune 
attend  you.  I  believe  you  will  be  eminently  successful  and 
at  worst  can  only  make  a  march  less  fruitful  of  results  than 
is  hoped  for."5 

1  W.  R.  R.  79-64. 

2  W.  R.  R.  79-442  et  seq. 

8     J.   H.   Wilson's   "Under  the   Old  Flag,"  Vol.    2,  pp.    29-30,   also   Grant's  Memoirs 

Vol.  2,  376. 
4  and  5     W.  R.  R.  79-679. 


584  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

In  preparation  for  the  march  to  the  sea,  which  at  that 
date  he  felt  pretty  sure  would  be  made,  General  Sherman  on 
October  26,  issued  orders  directing  General  Stanley  to  move 
his  entire  corps,  wagons,  artillery,  &c.,  via  Alpine,  Winston's, 
&c.,  to  Chattanooga  or  Bridgeport,  according  to  intelligence 
received  of  the  movements  of  Hood's  army — which  was  then 
reported  moving  toward  Decatur  or  Tuscumbia,  Ala. — -turn 
ing  over  any  surplus  provisions  on  hand  to  the  Fourteenth 
Corps.1 

He  also  issued  orders  stating  that  "in  the  event  of  mili 
tary  movements  or  the  accidents  of  Avar"  separating  him  from 
command  of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi,  General 
Thomas  should  exercise  command  over  all  troops  and  gar 
risons  not  in  his,  General  Sherman's,  presence.2 

In  pursuance  of  the  first  of  the  above  named  orders,  on 
the  morning  of  October  27,  at  4  o'clock,  announcement  was 
made  that  our  brigade  (Willich's)  would  inarch  from  Gayles- 
ville  at  6  :30  a.  m.  We  soon  learned  that  the  entire  Fourth 
Corps  was  to  move.  We  turned  over  to  the  Fourteenth 
Corps  some  wheat  which  we  had  gathered  on  a  foraging 
expedition  the  day  before  and  were  nearly  on  time.  There 
had  been  rain  the  night  before  and  the  roads  were  slippery. 
At  noon  we  halted  for  dinner  at  a  deep  spring,  where  the 
water  seemed  to  come  from  an  unfathomable  depth.  It  was 
cool  and  clear  and  we  noticed  some  quite  large  fish  in  it.  We 
were,  it  was  said,  marching  to  Alpine,  about  sixteen  miles 
from  Gaylesville.  As  we  neared  the  town  we  passed  through 
the  picket  line  of  Newton's  division,  which  had  marched  down 
from  Chattanooga  and  there  rejoined  the  corps.  We  arrived 
at  Alpine  about  5  p.  m.  and  went  into  camp  in  a  large  field 
thickly  overgrown  with  broom  sedge,  which  made  excellent 
beds. 

On  the  morning  of  October  28,  soon  after  reveille 
sounded,  we  got  orders  to  move  at  6  :30  a.  m.,  our  regiment  to 
have  the  advance  of  the  entire  corps.  We  were  now  near 
Lookout  Mountain  and  not  far  from  the  most  southerly 
position  held  by  McCook's  corps  a  few  days  before  the  battle 
of  Chickamauga.  As  we  moved  out  "old  Lookout"  loomed 
up  on  our  left.  Our  course  was  about  parallel  with  the  range 
and  toward  Lafayette,  which  we  reached  about  sunset  and 
went  into  camp  west  of  the  town,  having  marched  twenty- 
two  miles.  The  day  and  night  were  frosty  and  pleasant.  We 
had  had  a  long  march  and  so  slept  the  deep  sleep  of  weary 
men. 


1  W.  R.  R.   79-442. 

2  W.  R.  R.  79-442. 


FKOM  GAYLESVILLE,  ALA.,  TO  PULASKI,  TENN.  585 

October  29,  we  resumed  our  march  at  daylight,  taking  the 
road  toward  Chattanooga.  The  fine  valley  through  which 
we  marched  seemed  not  to  have  been  much  disturbed  by  the 
ravages  of  war  until  we  approached  the  battlefield  of  Chicka- 
mauga.  Even  there  nature  had  begun  her  marvelous  work 
of  restoration,  greening  the  sod  and  hiding  the  scars  in  the 
earth's  bosom  made  by  the  battle  storm  which  raged  there 
only  a  little  over  a  year  before.  Few  objects  seemed  familiar, 
and  Gleason  had  some  difficulty  in  recognizing  the  spring 
near  the  hospital  to  which  he  was  borne  wounded  September 
19,  1863.  We  finally  reached  Rossville  where  we  went  into 
camp  near  the  position  to  which  our  army  retired  after  the 
battle. 

On  Sunday,  October  30,  at  6  a.  m.,  we  moved  out  toward 
Chattanooga  and  marched  direct  to  the  railroad  station  where 
we  were  to  take  a  train.  During  a  short  wait  we  got  some  Cin 
cinnati  papers,  which  reported  that  Hood's  army  had  made 
an  attack  on  the  garrison  at  Decatur  and  had  been  repulsed. 
We  guessed  that  this  was  our  destination.  Our  men  were 
piled  into  some  very  dirty  freight  cars,  so  filthy  that  many 
chose  to  ride  on  top,  and  we  soon  moved  out,  meeting  with 
no  delay  until  we  reached  Stevenson.  There  it  was  reported 
that  the  track  had  been  torn  up  near  Bellefonte,  and  we 
remained  on  a  siding  for  more  than  an  hour.  Our  train  then- 
ran  down  to  the  break,  where  we  were  detained  until  evening. 
Just  before  reaching  the  break  we  stopped  at  a  small  wood 
station.  As  we  slowed  up  an  old  woman  stood  at  the  gate  of 
a  small  house  with  her  apron  full  of  fine  apples  which  she 
began  tossing  to  the  men.  There  was  soon  a  crowd  about 
her  which  became  so  dense  that  she  fled  into  the  house,  but 
returned  writh  another  supply  which  she  distributed  as  before 
—the  men  scrambling  over  each  other  to  get  them,  to  her 
great  amusement.  When  the  train  pulled  out  the  men  gave 
her  a  great  cheer  and  she  answered  by  swinging  her  bonnet 
until  we  passed  out  of  sight.  After  the  break  was  repaired 
our  train  moved  forward  through  the  night.  It  began  to  rain 
and  the  men  who  were  riding  on  top  of  the  cars  were  in  a 
sorry  plight.  We  passed  Huntsville,  Ala.,  about  4  a.  m., 
where  we  made  a  short  stop  and  then  moved  on,  toward  Deca 
tur,  as  we  supposed.  But  on  arriving  at  the  railroad  junction 
we  proceeded  towards  Athens,  wrhich  we  reached  at  6 :30  a. 
m.  October  31.  There  we  found  other  trains  carrying  troops, 
and  after  some  delay  were  detrained  and  ordered  to  get 
breakfast.  A  new  regiment,  the  One  Hundred  and  Eighty- 
first  Ohio,  was  nearby  and  their  new  uniforms  were  in  sharp 


586  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS   AND  CAMPAIGNS 

contrast  with  those  of  our  dusty  veterans.  There  xvere  no 
orders  to  move  and  some  of  the  men  slipped  out  and  looked  about 
the  town. 

At  11  a.  m.  General  Stanley  received  a  dispatch  from 
General  Thomas  at  Nashville  ordering  him  to  march  his  com 
mand  to  Pulaski  at  once  and  prepare  to  make  a  stubborn 
defense  of  the  place,  and  stating  that  it  was  reported  the 
enemy  was  across  the  Tennessee  River  at  Florence.  At  the 
same  hour  a  dispatch  was  received  from  General  Robert  S. 
Granger,  who  was  in  command  at  Decatur,  dated  at  7  p.  m.  the 
day  before,  stating  that  Hood  had  landed  his  infantry  three 
miles  above  Florence  at  4  p.  m.  that  day.1 

Just  before  noon  we  moved  out  near  a  fort,  where  we 
received  one  day's  rations  of  bread,  sugar  and  coffee.  Near 
the  railroad  station  each  man  received  sixty  rounds  of  am 
munition.  We  did  not  then  know  where  we  were  to  go  but 
it  looked  like  serious  work  ahead.  We  marched  at  2  p.  m. 
and  wrere  told  our  destination  was  Pulaski,  Tenn.,  thirty-five 
miles  north,  and  we  must  cover  the  distance  by  the  next 
evening.  WTe  sent  out  Companies  A,  F  and  D  as  advance 
guards  of  the  division,  and  a  small  detachment  as  feelers.  We 
soon  got  beyond  the  pine  country  about  Athens  and  came  into 
a  monotonous  level  forest  region.  The  soil  was  thin  and 
the  cleared  spaces  far  apart.  Our  side  foragers  scoured  the 
woods  for  stray  hogs  but  found  none.  Their  disappointment 
was  keen  for  we  had  no  meat.  After  marching  several  miles, 
we  came  to  a  good  sized  farm,  where  the  division  went  into 
camp  and  we  sent  out  Companies  A  and  F  as  pickets.  On  the 
morning  of  November  1,  we  were  aroused  by  the  bugle  at 
4  o'clock,  with  unexpected  orders  to  march  at  once.  As  one 
of  the  brigades  preceded  ours,  we  had  time  to  make  coffee  and 
eat  hard  tack  before  we  started.  The  stretcher-bearers  were 
ordered  to  the  rear  of  the  division,  Gleason  in  charge. 

It  was  rumored  that  the  enemy  had  entered  Athens  the 
night  before.  A  citizen  reported  that  he  had  left  the  place 
after  dark  and  that  the  enemy  \vas  then  within  two  miles  of 
the  town.  We  reached  Elk  River  at  9  a.  m.  The  stream  was 
waist  deep,  there  was  no  bridge  across  it,  and  we  waded 
through  and  pressed  on.  We  struck  a  good  pike  at  Rlkton, 
a  hamlet  on  a  hill  north  of  the  river,  and  made  rapid  progress. 
We  reached  Pulaski  at  4  p.  m.  and  found  it  quite  a  town,  with 
many  good  buildings  and  but  little  ravaged  by  the  war.  As  we 
marched  through  it  many  fair  faces  looked  from  windows  on 
this  new  invasion.  We  went  into  camp  near  a  large  fort  on 

1     W.  R.  R.  77-606. 


FROM  GAYLESVILLE,  ALA.,  TO  PULASKI,  TENX.  587 

a  hill  beyond  the  town.  At  4:20  p.  m.,  November  1,  General 
Stanley  telegraphed  to  General  Thomas,  reporting  his  arrival 
at  Pulaski  with  the  infantry  of  our  division,  that  Athens  had 
been  evacuated  two  hours  after  we  left  the  place  by  his  (Gen 
eral  Thomas')  orders,  and  that  there  had  been  no  preparation 
for  the  defense  of  Pulaski.  At  6  p.  m.  he  received  a  dispatch 
from  General  Thomas,  saying: 

"General  Granger  evacuated  Athens  yesterday  after  you 
left,  on  your  advice,  he  says.  I  have  ordered  him  to  re-occupy 
it  immediately  which  I  suppose  he  has  done.  Whittaker's  and 
Wagners'  troops  (the  First  and  Second  Divisions  of  the 
Fourth  Corps)  have  left  Chattanooga  and  some  of  them 
should  reach  you  tomorrow.  Assume  command  at  Pulaski  by 
my  order.  Make  dispositions  for  the  defense  of  the  place. 
General  Sherman  will  send  me  Schofield,  whose  troops  I  will 
endeavor  to  give  you  in  four  days.  Your  artillery  is  coming 
up  with  Wagner.  If  General  Hatch  has  left  Pulaski  send  a 
staff  officer  after  him  and  bring  him  back."1 

At  7  :30  that  evening  General  Hatch  reported  to  General 
Stanley  with  2500  cavalry  and  was  directed  to  remain  at 
Pulaski  and  scout  well  down  on  the  roads  towards  Flor 
ence  and  Athens.  In  addition  to  our  division  and  Hatch's 
cavalry,  there  was  at  that  time  at  Pulaski  a  brigade  of  four 
regiments  of  cavalry,  under  command  of  Colonel  George 
Spalding.  At  9  p.  m.  General  Rousseau  telegraphed  from 
Columbia,  Tenn.,  to  General  Stanley,  that  General  Thomas 
had  ordered  him  to  assist  in  case  of  a  fight  with  Hood  and 
that  he  was  ready  to  do  so.2 

November  2,  at  7  a.  m.,  word  came  that  a  portion  of  the 
First  Division  of  our  corps  had  arrived  at  Athens  and  that 
the  rest  was  on  the  way. 

At  7  :30  a.  m.  a  note  was  received  from  General  Croxton, 
commanding  a  cavalry  brigade  at  Shoals  Cross  roads,  saying, 
that  the  enemy  was  in  force  at  Florence  and  was  intrenching, 
that  no  part  of  his  forces  had  yet  moved  out  on  either  the 
Huntsville  or  Lawrenceburg  roads  and  that  Forrest's  cavalry 
was  reported  crossing  the  Tennessee  River  below  Florence. 
Word  also  came  that  Russell's  brigade  of  rebel  cavalry  was 
near  Larkinsville  for  the  purpose  of  tearing  up  the  railroad 
between  that  place  and  Stevenson.3  There  was  no  word  from 
the  Second  Division  of  the  Fourth  Corps.  On  November  2, 
some  of  the  troops  of  our  division  began  fortifying  the  ridges 
north  and  northeast  of  the  town,  but  our  regiment  rested 
cmietly  in  camp  and  we  tried  to  make  ourselves  comfortable 

1  and  2     Fullerton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.  77-608. 
3     Fullerton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.  77-609. 


588  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

in  spite  of  a  cold  rain.  On  Thursday,  November  3,  the  First 
Division  of  our  corps  reached  Pulaski.  We  heard  that  the 
Second  Division  was  three  miles  north  of  Athens  at  noon  and 
would  march  for  Pulaski  that  day.  Forrest's  cavalry  was 
reported  having  reached  Lawrenceburg,  and  General  Hatch 
was  directed  to  send  a  cavalry  force  to  that  point  to  find  out 
the  truth  about  it.  At  7  :30  p.  m.  General  Stanley  received  a 
dispatch  from  General  Thomas  saying : 

"Keep  Hood  at  Florence  until  Sunday  (two  days  longer)  and 
you  will  be  all  right,  as  Schofield's  corps  will  be  up  by  that  time. 
I  have  heard  from  Croxton  up  to  yesterday  p.  m.  He  reports 
the  enemy  still  at  Florence  fortifying."1 

General  Sherman  had  not  yet  "cut  loose"  and  gone  on  his 
famous  march  to  the  sea,  and  Hood  was  evidently  wary  about  also 
cutting  loose,  knowing  that  Sherman  could  still  reinforce  Thomas 
to  a  considerable  extent. 

Sherman  was  busy  accumulating  supplies  and  weeding  out 
the  force  with  which  he  proposed  to  "make  Georgia  howl,"- 
sending  all  sick  and  disabled  men  and  horses  and  all  defective 
equipment  back  for  General  Thomas  to  take  care  of,  retaining 
about  60,000  well  drilled  and  trained  soldiers.  The  only  well 
drilled  and  trained  organizations  which  he  was  leaving  to  Thomas 
with  which  to  resist  Hood's  invasion  of  the  north,  were  theFourth 
Corps  (ours)  and  the  Twenty-third  Corps.  The  former  on 
October  31,  1864,  had  an  effective  force  of  11,087  officers  and 
men2  and  the  latter  10,965  officers  and  men  present  for  duty.a 
With  these  men  and  7898  cavalry4  under  command  of  General 
Wilson,  which  included  two  regiments  detached  at  Tullahoma, 
he  was  expected  to  resist  Hood's  advance.  It  is  true  that  there 
were  other  troops  under  General  Thomas'  command,  but  they 
were  fully  employed  in  holding  the  fortified  posts  at  Chattanooga, 
Bridgeport,  Stevenson,  Murfreesboro  and  other  points  on  the 
Nashville  and  Chattanooga  railroad.  Other  regiments  were  being 
sent  to  him,  but  they  were  raw  troops  and  had  not  yet  been  or 
ganized  and  trained  for  field  service,  and  added  little  to  the  ef 
fective  strength  of  his  army.  A.  J.  Smith's  corps  which  was  away 
out  in  Missouri  had  been  ordered  to  Tennessee,  but  it  was  not 
likely  to  arrive  for  two  weeks  at  least.  So  it  devolved  on  Gen 
eral  Thomas  to  repel  Hood's  advance  with  the  Fourth  Corps,  the 
Twenty-third  Corps  and  the  cavalry  above  named.  The  field  re 
turns  of  Hood's  army  November  6,  1864,  show  at  that  time  an  ag 
gregate  present  of  44,832, 5  not  including  Forrest's  cavalry  and 

1  W.  R.  R.  79-620.  4     W.  R.  R.  79-573. 

2  W.  R.  R.  79-552.  5     W.  R.  R.  79-893. 

3  W.  R.  R.  79-569. 


FROM  GAYLESMLLE.  ALA.,  TO  PULASKI,  TENX.  589 

other  cavalry  detachments  which  were  menacing  our  lines  of  com 
munications,  which  probably  swelled  his  force  to  over  50,000  men. 

The  problem  was  therefore  to  hold  Hood's  army  back  until 
A.  J.  Smith's  corps  of  about  10,000  should  arrive  and  the  new 
troops  arriving  could  be  assigned  and  made  effective.  On  Novem 
ber  4,  our  regiment  and  brigade  were  moved  across  a  ridge  a 
little  further  from  the  town,  where  we  were  placed  in  camp  in 
low  ground  between  two  ridges  which  formed  a  complete  horse 
shoe,  and  we  thought  was  an  admirable  position  for  defense. 
It  was  a  sheltered  location,  where  we  were  protected  by  the  hills 
from  the  winds,  which  were  quite  cold.  This  far  we  had  not 
been  detailed  to  work  on  fortifications,  but  on  the  fifth  we  drew 
a  lot  of  intrenching  tools  and  received  orders  to  be  ready  to  do 
such  work  next  morning.  It  was  reported  that  our  cavalry  had 
met  the  enemy  some  twenty  miles  to  the  southwest  and  were  grad 
ually  falling  back,  so  we  rather  expected  an  early  attack  on  our 
position. 

At  7  a.  m.  November  6,  we  ascended  the  ridge  in  our  front 
and  began  a  line  of  works,  building  them  mostly  of  earth,  as  the 
timber  had  nearly  all  been  cut  away.  That  morning  at  8  o'clock 
a  dispatch  from  General  Croxton  dated  Six-Mile  Creek,  ten  miles 
east  of  Florence,  November  5,  addressed  to  General  Thomas,  was 
opened  by  Colonel  Fullerton.  It  stated  that  he  had  been  attacked 
by  infantry  and  artillery  at  Shoal  Creek  and  that  the  enemy  had 
crossed  the  river  below  him  in  force.  The  telegraph  line  be 
tween  Nashville  and  Columbia  had  been  cut,  and  General  Stanley 
sent  by  Captain  Moxley  a  message  to  General  Thomas,  asking 
for  500  boxes  of  ammunition  and  saying,  "I  will  hold  this  place."1 
At  10  a.  m.  the  telegraph  line  was  working  to  Nashville.  A 
regiment  of  cavalry  was  ordered  to  Lawrenceburg.  On  learning 
from  General  Croxton  that  the  enemy  had  recrossed  Shoal  Creek, 
General  Stanley  was  ordered  to  keep  Generals  Hatch  and  Crox 
ton  as  close  to  the  enemy  as  they  could  get  and  be  secure,  at  Shoal 
Creek  for  instance,  in  order  that  they  might  get  the  earliest  in 
telligence  of  any  movement  of  the  enemy.  November  7,  it  was 
raining  and  some  of  the  men  did  not  get  breakfast  in  time  to  go 
to  work  on  the  fortifications  as  ordered.  This  displeased  Colonel 
Askew  who  ordered  the  men  to  move  and  breakfast  to  be  sent  out 
afterwards.  We  finished  the  parapet  we  had  been  working  on 
the  day  before  and  were  moved  to  another  place,  to  extend  the 
line  between  the  hills,  which  would  complete  the  work  assigned 
to  our  brigade.  We  cut  down  a  large  tree  and  rolled  it  to  the 
line,  which  saved  a  good  deal  of  digging.  We  were  relie-~d  at 

1     W.  R.  R.  77-611. 


590  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

noon  and  rested  the  afternoon  and  evening.     No.  signs  of  the  ap 
proach  of  Hood's  army  as  yet.1 

That  evening  a  dispatch  was  received  from  General  Hatch 
saying  he  had  found  the  enemy's  pickets  on  the  Lawrenceburg 
road,  three  miles  north  of  Bough'  Factory,  had  driven  them  across 
Shoal  Creek  and  that  they  belonged  to  Armstrong's  cavalry,  said 
to  be  4000  strong.  A  deserter  from  Cleburne's  division  came  into 
our  camp  and  reported  that  all  three  corps  of  Hood's  army  were 
across  the  Tennessee  River  near  Florence,  but  that  the  cavalry 
were  all  on  the  other  side  of  the  river  watching  for  Sherman. 
He  also  reported  that  Jeff  Davis  had  visited  the  army  when  below 
Decatur  and  that  he  and  General  Hood  both  made  speeches ;  that 
General  Hood  said  they  would  plant  their  flag  on  the  Ohio  be 
fore  they  stopped,  and  that  they  were  going  to  Murfreesboro  via 
Athens  and  were  waiting  for  their  cavalry  to  start. 

The  next  morning,  the  eighth,  the  right  wing  of  the  regiment 
worked  on  the  fortifications  until  11  o'clock  and  the  left  wing 
from  2  p.  m.  until  dark.  It  was  the  day  of  the  Presidential  elec 
tion.  Judges  and  clerks  were  chosen  and  129  men  in  the  regiment 
voted  for  Lincoln  and  Johnson  and  9  for  McClellan  and  Pendle- 
ton.2  At  2  p.  m.  General  Thomas  sent  a  dispatch  to  General  Stan 
ley  saying  he  wished  Generals  Hatch  and  Croxton  of  Wilson's 
command  to  hold  the  enemy  as  long  as  possible.  Should  the  enemy 
overpower  them  and  march  on  Pulaski,  he.  General  Stanley  must 
hold  that  place,  but  should  the  enemy  avoid  Pulaski  and  move 
north.  General  Stanley  was  to  so  place  his  troops  as  to  cover 
Nashville  and  strike  the  enemy  the  first  favorable  opportunity. 
He  also  said  that  A.  J.  Smith's  troops  would  begin  to  arrive  soon, 
and  also  the  cavalry  which  had  been  sent  to  Lousiville  to  be  re 
mounted,  and  that  we  would  then  be  able  to  assume  the  offen 
sive.  Orders  were  sent  to  burn  every  mill  in  the  country  if  the 
enemy  advanced.8 

November  9,  10,  11,  12  and  13  we  continued  work  on  the 
fortifications.  The  recent  rains  had  caused  a  rise  in  all  the 
streams  and  the  railroad  bridge  across  Duck  River  at  Columbia 
had  been  destroyed,  thus  breaking  our  "cracker  line."  A  reported 
big  rise  in  the  Tennessee  was  regarded  with  unusual  interest,  as 
General  Hatch  had  reported  on  the  tenth,  that  one  of  his  scouts 
had  just  come  in  and  reported  that  only  one  corps  of  Hood's 
army  and  Roddey's  cavalry  were  across  the  river,  and  that  the 
other  two  corps  were  at  luka  and  Tuscumbia.  On  the  eleventh 
of  November,  a  strolling  theatrical  company  from  Louisville  gave 

1  Gleason's  Diary. 

2  John  J.  Gregory's  Diary. 

3  Fullerton's  Journal,  W.   R.  R.   77-612. 


FROM  GAYLESVILLE,  ALA.,  TO  PULASKI,  TENX.  591 

a  performance  at  a  hall  in  the  town  which  was  quite  an  attraction 
to  both  officers  and  men.  The  principal  play  was  "Toodles."  On 
the  evening  of  the  13th,  we  heard  that  Lincoln  was  re- 
elected,  carrying  every  state  except  Kentucky.  No  change  was 
reported  in  the  position  of  the  enemy.  There  was,  however,  an 
unconfirmed  report  that  1000  of  Forrest's  cavalry  passed  through 
Waynesboro  Thursday  afternoon,  November  10,  moving  in  the 
direction  of  Columbia.  At  9  p.  m.  on  the  thirteenth,  General 
Schofield,  with  a  part  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  arrived  by  rail 
and  reported  the  rest  on  the  way.1 

The  wires  between  General  Sherman  and  the  north  were 
finally  broken.  He  had  "cut  loose"  and  had  left  us  to  take  care 
of  Hood's  army,  which  his  entire  force  had  fought  all  summer 
and  had  failed  to  conquer; — with  its  relative  strength  but  little 
reduced  and  its  organization  unimpaired. 

November  14,  General  Schofield  assumed  command  of  the 
forces  at  Pulaski  and  of  the  detachments  of  the  cavalry  corps 
with  General  Hatch's  command.  General  Hatch  reported  that 
General  Beauregard  had  made  a  speech  to  Hood's  army  telling 
them  that  they  were  going  forward, — Hood  to  attack  Nashville, 
and  Forrest  to  lead  a  grand  raid  to  the  Ohio  River.2 

On  the  16th  the  Fifty-first  Indiana  was  assigned  to  our  bri 
gade.  Its  commanding  officer,  Colonel  A.  D.  Streight  had  gained 
notoriety  by  escaping  from  Libby  Prison.  It  was  said  that  his. 
regiment  was  so  assigned  in  order  to  give  him  command  of  a 
brigade,  as  he  outranked  Colonel  John  A.  Martin,  who  was  then 
in  command.  Colonel  Martin  was  much  beloved  by  the  old  of 
ficers  of  the  brigade,  and  Colonel  Streight  did  not  receive  a  very 
cordial  welcome.  It  rained  from  the  15th  until  9  p.  m.  the  19th. 

On  the  17th  prisoners  taken  by  General  Hatch  reported  that 
another  corps  of  Hood's  army  was  across  the  river,  that  the  third 
and  last  corps  was  to  cross  the  the  night  of  the  16th  and  that 
Forrest's  cavalry  10,000  strong  was  also  across  and  was  near 
Florence.3 

We  finished  work  on  the  fortifications  of  Pulaski  on  the 
18th,  and  on  the  19th  were  engrossed  by  the  usual  camp  duties. 
On  the  20th,  word  came  that  Forrest's  cavalry  was  moving  north 
from  Florence  on  the  old  military  road.  General  Schofield 
thought  it  probable  that  he  was  marching  for  the  railroad  be 
tween  Pulaski  and  Columbia,  and  directed  General  Stanley  to 
send  a  division  to  Lynnville,  about  thirteen  miles  north  of 
Pulaski  in  the  morning.  Orders  were  given  to  General  Wagner 


1     Fuller-ton's  Journal,  W    R.  R.  77-614. 

•2  and  3     FMllerton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.  93-142. 


592  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

in  command  of  the  Second  Division  to  march  for  Lynnville  early 
the  next  morning.  The  rain  which  ceased  the  day  before  at  9 
p.  m.  again  began  to  pour  and  poured  down  all  day.  The  men 
who  were  not  on  picket  kept  close  in  quarters,  and  in  the  eve 
ning  we  heard  Colonel  McClenahan,  Major  Clark  and  the  Gleason 
boys  singing  in  one  of  the  tents. 

November  21,  at  6  a.  m.  the  order  directing  General 
Wagner  to  march  for  Lynnville  was  recalled,  evidently  because 
General  Hatch  reported  the  capture  of  a  rebel  dispatch  stating 
that  General  Forrest  would  not  move  until  Monday  morning, 
which  would  be  the  26th.  The  morning  was  very  cold  and  we 
had  the  first  snow  storm  of  the  season.  There  was  a  camp  rumor 
that  we  would  soon  move  but  no  one  regarded  it  as  reliable.  The 
men  had  made  their  quarters  very  comfortable  and  had  settled 
clown  to  the  happy  belief  that  we  would  remain  at  Pulaski  at 
least  several  days  longer.  At  6  :45  p.  m.  that  day,  General  Stan 
ley  received  a  dispatch  from  General  Schofield  saying: 

"General  Hatch's  report  just  received  leaves  no  doubt  of 
Hood's  advance.  He  was  last  night  about  twenty  miles  from 
Florence — one  corps  on  the  Waynesborough  road  and  one  on  the 
Lawrenceburg  road,  the  third  was  only  six  miles  out  from  Flor 
ence.  Hood  must  be  going  to  Columbia  or  west  of  that.  We 
will  have  to  move  accordingly  without  delay.  Have  your  quar 
termaster  move  all  surplus  stores  to  Columbia  at  once,  and  make 
all  preparations  to  withdraw  entirely  from  Pulaski  by  Wednes 
day  morning  the  23d.  Let  Wagner  march  to  Lynnville  tomorrow 
morning.  Cox  will  precede  him."1  The  night  was  bitter  cold, 
but  we  were  tucked  in  our  shelter  tents  and  slept,  not  knowing 
how  very  soon  our  courage  and  physical  endurance  would  be  put 
to  one  of  the  severest  tests  of  our  service. 


1     W.  R.  R.  93-143. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII. 

HOOD'S  INVASION  OF  TENNESSEE — THE  RETREAT  FROM  PULASKI, 
SPRING  HILL  AND  THE  BATTLE  OF  FRANKLIN. 

The  morning  of  November  22,  1864,  the  Second  Division 
of  our  corps  marched  for  Lynnville.  That  day  General  Jas.  H. 
Wilson  arrived  at  Lynnville  and  posted  the  cavalry  on  the 
north  bank  of  Duck  River  to  watch  the  fords  and  roads  above 
and  below  Columbia.1 

There  were  rumors  that  our  division  would  move  soon  and 
that  Pulaski  was  to  be  evacuated.  Some  of  our  officers  who 
were  in  the  town,  on  their  return,  reported  great  excitement 
there.  All  sorts  of  rumors  were  afloat,  but  the  one,  that  Hood's 
entire  army  was  marching  north,  was  the  most  persistent  and 
came  to  be  generally  believed.  Many  of  the  officers  knew  that 
General  Hatch  had  so  reported  and  the  report  was  the  cause  of 
much  anxiety.  We  believed  that  the  enemy  far  outnumbered 
us  and  did  not  know  when  our  reinforcements  would  arrive. 
The  fact  that  the  Second  Division  had  been  ordered  to  Lynnville 
indicated  a  fear  on  the  part  of  General  Schofield  that  Hood 
would  try  to  strike  the  railroad  between  us  and  Columbia  and 
thus  cut  us  off  from  the  north.  Both  Generals  Thomas  and 
Schofield  were  slow  to  believe,  notwithstanding  General  Hatch's 
dispatches  to  the  contrary,  that  Hood  would  attempt  a  general 
forward  movement,  because  the  weather  and  the  roads  were  so 
bad.2  The  latter  suggested  that  perhaps  General  Forrest  was 
only  moving  out  to  encamp  his  cavalry  on  Buffalo  River  where 
the  forage  was  abundant/*  Still  both  realized  the  possibility 
that  Hood  might  atempt  to  interpose  his  army  between  us  and 
Columbia  and  so  on  the  22d,  as  before  stated,  Cox's  division  of 
the  Twenty-third  and  Wagner's  division  of  the  Fourth  Corps 
were  ordered  to  Lynnville.  On  November  20,  General  Thomas 
sent  one  of  General  Hatch's  dispatches  to  General  Halleck  at 
Washington,  and  said  he  had  ordered  General  Schofield  to  move 
his  main  force  to  Lynnville,  so  as  to  be  able  to  support  General 
Hatch,  or  concentrate  at  Columbia,  according  to  circumstances ; 
that  he  had  nearly  two  brigades  at  Columbia  and  would  have  a 
third  there  by  the  next  night ;  that  he  had  heard  from  General  A. 
J.  Smith  who  was  at  St.  Louis  and  that  he,  General  Smith,  would 
not  be  able  to  embark  his  troops  before  the  22d  and  could  not 

1  Under  the  Old  Flag,  Vol.  2,  p.  36. 

2  W.  R.   93-944-955. 

3  W.  R.  R.  93-955. 


594  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

reach  Nashville  before  the  27th  or  28th :  that  he  would  do  his 
best  to  keep  the  enemy  from  the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga  Rail 
road,  but  that  his  cavalry  force  was  only  3000,  whereas  the 
enemy's  was  at  least  10,000,  and  that  three  of  Wilson's  cavalry 
divisions  were  still  absent  for  horses,  and  Grierson's  division  was 
still  in  Missouri.1 

November  21,  General  Thomas  sent  another  of  General 
Hatch's  dispatches  to  General  Halleck,  which  reported  that  the 
heads  of  Hood's  marching  columns  were  on  the  roads  leading 
north  from  Florence,  fifteen  and  twenty  miles  respectively  north 
of  that  place,  and  said  he  had  ordered  General  Schofield  to  move 
back  gradually  from  Pulaski  and  to  concentrate  at  Columbia 
before  Hood  could  reach  that  place.  He  also  said  that  Hood's 
force  was  so  much  larger  than  his  then  available  force,  both  in 
infantry  and  cavalry  and  that  he  would  have  to  act  on  the  defens 
ive :  that  the  effective  force  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  Stanley's  was 
12,000  and  that  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  Schofield's  10,000  and 
that  General  Wilson  as  yet  could  only  raise  about  3000  effective 
cavalry.2 

The  situation  was  alarming.  Our  anxiety  was  shared  in 
Washington,  where  extraordinary  efforts  were  being  made  to  re 
inforce  our  thin  ranks.  But  these  efforts  did  not  keep  pace  with 
the  rapid  advance  of  Hood's  army.  At  lip.  m.  November  22, 
a  dispatch  was  received  from  General  Hatch  saying  that  Hood's 
infantry  was  then  at  Lawrenceburg  and  that  his  cavalry  was 
probably  moving  round  to  the  railroad.  Lawrenceburg  is  about 
twenty-five  miles  a  little  north  of  west  of  Pulaski  and  Waynes- 
borough  a  few  miles  farther  in  the  same  direction.  The  three 
places  are  about  equidistant  from  Columbia,  which  is  about  thirty- 
five  miles  north  of  Pulaski.  It  will  be  remembered  that  one  of 
Hood's  columns  was  advancing  on  the  Waynesborough  road. 
So  it  seemed  problematical  whether  our  little  army  could  con 
centrate  at  Columbia  before  the  whole  of  Hood's  army  would  be 
upon  us. 

At  7  :30  a.  m.  November  23,  General  Stanley  was  informed 
by  General  Schofield's  Adjutant  General  that  Hood's  advance  in 
fantry  was  in  Lawrenceburg  the  night  before,  and  that  Forrest 
was  striking  for  the  railroad  and  might  possibly  reach  it  that 
day ;  that  General  Schofield  would  go  that  morning  to  Lynnville 
and  had  directed  that  he,  Stanley,  should  have  all  the  railroad 
trains  at  Pulaski  loaded  and  started  to  the  rear  as  soon  as  pos 
sible,  and  have  his  entire  command  in  readiness  to  march  to 
Lynnville  that  afternoon.3  On  the  receipt  of  this  order  there 

1  W.  R.  R.   93-954.  3     W.  R.  R.  93-997. 

2  W.  R.  R.   93-970. 


SPRING  HILL  AND  FRANKLIN  595 

was  tremendous  activity  among  the  troops  remaining  at  Pulaski, 
and  there  were  all  sorts  of  wild  rumors  regarding  the  advance 
of  Hood's  army.  The  railroad  and  wagon  trains  were  quickly 
loaded  with  surplus  supplies  and  there  was  a  "hurrying  to  and 
fro"  of  aides  and  orderlies  carrying  directions  about  the  evacua 
tion.  The  paymaster  \vas  in  camp  and  some  of  the  men  were 
being  paid  off.  Companies  A  and  F  were  sent  out  on  picket  duty 
and  posted  by  Major  Dawson  of  our  regiment  and  Captain 
Greene  of  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio.  At  about  2  p.  m.  the  stores 
were  nearly  all  loaded,  such  as  we  could  not  take 'with  us  were 
destroyed,  and  our  column  moved  out  toward  Lynnville.  A  brig 
ade  of  the  first  division  was  left  behind  to  cover  our  trainsT 
artillery,  etc.,  with  orders  to  follow7  us  at  3  a.  m.  the  next  day. 
At  2:15  p.  m.  General  Stanley  received  word  from  General 
Hatch  that  the  enemy's  infantry  were  moving  through  Lawrence- 
burg  toward  Columbia  and  that  one  of  his,  General  Hatch's,  spies 
was  just  in  and  reported  that  Hood  had  40,000  infantry  and 
15,000  cavalry.1  This  dispatch  quickened  our  march  and  the 
head  of  our  column  reached  Lynnville  about  7  p.  m.  The  artil 
lery  and  trains  did  not  arrive  until  about  11  p.  m.  Before  we  en 
camped  \ve  had  orders  to  march  for  Columbia  at  6  a.  m.  next 
morning.  The  air  was  frosty  and  cold  and  the  ground  frozen. 

At  1  a.  m.  November  24,  General  Schofield  received  a  dis 
patch  from  Colonel  Capron,  who  with  a  small  brigade  of  cavalry 
had  been  over  on  the  Waynesborough  road.  The  dispatch  was 
dated  at  9  p.  m.  the  day  before  and  stated  that  the  enemy's 
cavalry  and  a  small  body  of  infantry  had  driven  him  back  through 
Mount  Pleasant,  a  village  about  fifteen  miles  southwest  of  Co 
lumbia. 

There  was  a  good  turnpike  from  Mount  Pleasant  to  Co 
lumbia,  and  as  the  enemy  at  Mount  Pleasant  was  several  miles 
nearer  Columbia  than  our  column,  this  dispatch  caused  increased 
apprehension.  Our  marching  orders  were  therefore  changed  to 
3  a.  m.  next  morning.  Fortunately,  General  Cox's  division  of 
the  Twenty-third  Corps  had  moved  forward  and  was  then  seven 
miles  from  Columbia.  General  Ruger,  who  was  in  command  of  a 
division  in  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  was  at  Columbia,  but  with 
only  about  800  men,  the  rest  of  his  division  being  scattered  in 
observation  along  the  Tennessee  and  Duck  Rivers.  At  3  a.  m. 
on  the  24th,  our  corps  moved  out,  the  Second  Division,  General 
Wagner's,  in  the  advance.  Our  division  followed,  then  came  the 
artillery  brigade  an  dtrains  and  in  the  rear  was  the  First  Division, 
General  Whitaker's.  Our  march  was  unusually  rapid  and  every 
one  seemed  to  feel  that  there  was  some  emergency  to  be  met. 

1     Fuller-ton's  Journal,  W.   R.   R.   93-144. 


596  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

During  the  morning  we  heard  cannonading  over  on  the  left  and 
supposed  the  enemy  was  engaging  our  cavalry.  The  nearer  we 
approached  Columbia  the  louder  the  reports  seemed  and  we  soon 
heard  skirmish  firing  on  our  left.  When  we  were  about  three 
or  four  miles  from  Columbia  the  adjutant  was  directed  to  take 
Companies  A  and  F  and  drive  back  the  enemy's  cavalry  which 
had  appeared  on  our  flank.  The  two  companies  were  deployed 
into  line  and  advanced  through  an  open  woods,  driving  the 
enemy's  cavalry  to  the  farther  side  of  the  woods,  and  then  re 
tired  and  rejoined  the  regiment.  One  of  the  men  captured  a 
fine  blooded  grey  mare  which  he  presented  to  the  adjutant. 
When  General  Cox  was  within  three  miles  of  Columbia  his  divi 
sion  was  sent  over  to  the  Mount  Pleasant  pike  and  reached  it 
just  in  time  to  prevent  the  annihilation  of  Colonel  Capron's 
cavalry,  which  was  rapidly  being  driven  back  into  Columbia  by 
a  largely  superior  force.  General  Cox's  division  checked  the 
enemy's  advance  and  drove  him  back  for  some  distance.1  His 
timely  arrival  doubtless  prevented  the  enemy  from  entering  Co 
lumbia  ahead  of  our  troops.  A  short  distance  out  of  Columbia 
which,  we  reached  about  noon,2  our  brigade  turned  to  the  left 
across  the  fields  and  formed  in  line  of  battle.  Shortly  afterwards 
we  were  moved  across  the  Pulaski  road  to  the  east  and  were 
formed  behind  the  first  line  of  the  brigade,  which  at  once  be 
gan  throwing  up  defensive  works.  While  we  were  in  this  posi 
tion,  the  paymaster  came  up  and  finished  paying  the  companies 
of  our  regiment.  There  were  some  fine  residences  some  distance 
in  front  of  our  position.  It  was  seen  that  they  might  afford  pro 
tection  to  the  enemy's  artillery  and  they  were  ordered  set  on  fire. 
Some  of  our  staff  officers,  with  their  swords  ripped  up  the  richly 
upholstered  furniture  and  applied  the  torch  to  it  and  to  every 
thing  else  inflammable,  and  the  houses  were  soon  in  ruins.  Some 
of  them  contained  valuable  paintings  and  other  works  of  art. 
It  was  barbarous,  but  the  exigencies  of  war  seemed  to  justify  it. 
It  was  Thanksgiving  day.  There  was  no  formal  observance  of 
it,  but  many  in  our  army  were  devoutly  thankful  that  we  had 
been  able  to  reach  Columbia  ahead  of  Hood's  army  and  to  con 
centrate  there  our  effective  force.  That  night  our  troops  were 
formed  in  line  as  follows :  General  Cox's  division  west  of  the 
town  covering  the  Mount  Pleasant  road,  its  right  resting  on  Duck 
River ;  General  Wagner's  division  on  Cox's  left,  his  left  on  the 
Pulaski  pike;  General  Wood's  (our)  division  connecting  with 
the  left  of  General  Wagner's  division,  facing  south,  our  right  on 
the  Pulaski  pike;  and  General  Whitaker's  division  connecting 

1     Fuller-ton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.  93-144. 
•2     Frank  L.  Schreiber's  Diary. 


SPRING  HILL  AND  FRANKLIN  597 

with  our  division  on  its  left,  extending  to  near  the  river  east  of 
the  town  and  facing  almost  southeast.  Our  artillery  was  placed 
on  the  rising  ground  and  knolls  along  our  line  of  battle.  The 
cavalry,  Hatch's  division  of  about  2000  men,  Croxton's  brigade, 
about  1300,  and  Capron's  brigade  1500,  of  the  cavalry  corps, 
which  had  been  fighting  Hood's  advance  and  holding  him  back 
while  we  were" concentrating  at  Lynnville,  was  also  concentrated 
at  Columbia  that  evening,  and  was  immediately  stationed  on  the 
north  side  of  Duck  River  between  Columbia  and  the  Lewisburg 
pike  to  watch  the  movements  of  the  enemy.1 

In  these  positions,  with  skirmishers  thrown  well  to  the  front 
and  watchful,  we  awaited  the  advance  of  the  enemy,  who  we 
felt  pretty  sure  would  attack  us  next  morning.  The  morning  of 
November  25,  was  unusually  quiet  and  work  was  continued  on 
our  intrenchments.  About  noon  our  regiment  was  ordered  to 
go  to  work  on  a  new  line,  being  told  by  Colonel  Straight,  our  new 
'brigade  commander,  "to  work  lively,  as  the  enemy  was  reported 
advancing."  Our  first  task  was  to  remove  a  long  row  of  cedar 
fence  in  front,  which  would  make  a  good  cover  for  the  enemy, 
and  we  could  make  good  use  of  the  posts  in  our  defenses.2  A 
small  detachment  was  set  to  work  making  chevaux-de-frise  to 
cover  a  part  of  our  works  on  the  east  of  the  pike.  We  worked 
until  dark,  then  got  our  suppers  and  prepared  to  make  ourselves 
comfortable  for  the  night.  But  after  dark  orders  came  to  move 
to  the  right  about  one-half  mile.  Our  division  was  to  occupy 
the  wThole  line  of  the  works,  while  Wagner's  and  Whitaker's  divi 
sions  retired  to  an  interior  line  which  had  been  partly  constructed 
during  the  day.  It  was  pitch  dark,  but  we  finally  found  our 
way  and  went  into  position  behind  a  line  of  works  which  had 
been  constructed  by  Wagner's  division.  Our  position  was  in  a 
corn  field.  The  works  we  occupied  were  covered  by  abatis  and 
chevaux-de-frise  and,  although  we  were  stretched  along  them 
in  only  a  single  line  "like  an  India  rubber  string,"  as  General 
Wood  described  it,  we  felt  we  could  hold  them  against  any 
ordinary  attack.  W^e  were  undisturbed  during  the  night.  During 
the  morning  a  reconnoissance  out  the  Pulaski  pike  developed 
the  fact  that  the  enemy's  cavalry  covered  our  whole  front  and 
were  not  more  than  two  miles  distant  at  any  one  point.3 

General  Grant  at  that  time  seems  to  have  been  more  inter 
ested  in  General  Sherman's  movements  in  Georgia  than  in  the 
critical  situation  in  Tennessee.  On  the  24th  of  November,  he 
telegraphed  General  Thomas  from  City  Point,  enclosing  a  news- 

1  General  Wilson's  Report,  W.  R.  R.  93-554. 

2  Gleason's  Diary. 

3  Fullerton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.  93-145. 


598  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

paper  clipping  stating  that  Beauregard  had  issued  a  proclama 
tion  calling  on  the  people  of  Georgia  to  arise  to  oppose  Sherman, 
and  asking  Thomas  "not  to  let  Forrest  get  off  without  punish 
ment."1  To  this,  General  Thomas  pointedly  replied  as  follows : 

" Hood's  entire  army  is  in  front  at  Columbia  and  so  greatly 
outnumbers  mine  at  this  time  that  I  am  compelled  to  act  on  the 
defensive.  None  of  General  Smith's  troops  have  arrived  yet, 
although  they  embarked  at  St.  Louis  on  Tuesday  last  (the  22nd). 
The  transportation  of  Generals  Hatch's  and  Grierson's  cavalry 
was  ordered  by  General  Wasburne,  I  am  told,  to  be  turned  over 
at  Memphis,  which  has  crippled  the  only  cavalry  I  have  at  this 
time.  All  of  my  cavalry  was  dismounted  to  furnish  horses  to 
Kilpatrick's  division  which  went  with  General  Sherman.  My 
dismounted  cavalry  is  now  detained  at  Louisville  awaiting  arms 
and  horses, — horses  are  arriving  slowly  and  arms  have  been 
detained  somewhere  enroute  for  more  than  a  month.  General 
Grierson  has  been  delayed  by  conflicting  orders  in  Kansas  and 
from  Memphis,  and  it  is  impossible  to  say  when  he  will  reach 
here.  Since  being  placed  in  charge  of  affairs  in  Tennessee  I  have 
lost  nearly  15,000  men,  discharged  by  expiration  of  service  and 
permitted  to  go  home  to  vote.  My  gain  is  probably  12,000  of 
perfectly  raw  troops.  Therefore  as  the  enemy  so  greatly  out 
numbers  me  both  in  infantry  and  cavalry,  I  am  compelled  for 
the  present  to  act  on  the  defensive.  The  moment  I  can  get  my 
cavalry,  I  will  march  against  Hood,  and  if  Forrest  can  be  reached 
he  will  be  punished."2 

This  dispatch  seems  to  have  awakened  General  Grant  and 
the  authorities  at  Washington  to  an  appreciation  of  the  difficul 
ties  of  the  situation  in  Tennessee,  for  the  same  day  General 
Grant  advised  General  Halleck  that  all  troops  coming  from  Mis 
souri  should  receive  directions  from  General  Thomas,  and  the 
Secretary  of  War  authorized  him  to  call  on  the  governors  of 
Indiana  and  other  western  states  for  militia/''  The  morning  of 
November  26  was  rainy  and  very  disagreeable.  Before  daylight 
a  crash  of  musketry  admonished  us  of  the  near  presence  of  the 
enemy,  but  only  sharp  skirmishing  followed.  When  the  pickets 
of  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  came  in  they  reported  that  Captain 
Greene,  brigade  inspector,  was  wounded.  Later  it  was  announced 
that  his  wound  was  mortal.  He  was  a  brilliant  young  officer 
and  beloved  by  everyone  who  knew  him.  His  loss  was  generally 
mourned,  and  the  report,  that  he  had  been  driven  to  needlessly 
expose  himself  by  an  unjust  insinuation  of  his  superior  officer, 

1  w.  R.  R.  93-1014. 

2  W.  R.  R.  93-1034. 

3  W.  R.  R.  93-1034. 


SPRING  HILL  AND  FRANKLIN  599 

gave  added  keenness  to  the  general  sorrow.  We  sheltered  our 
selves  as  well  as  we  could  from  the  rain  and  awaited  develop 
ments.  In  the  afternoon  orders  came  to  be  ready  to  move,  but 
soon  afterwards  they  were  countermanded  and  we  were  told 
we  would  remain  where  we  were  during  the  night.  We  were 
ordered  to  be  aroused  at  4  :30  next  morning  and  to  stand  at  arms 
until  daylight.  Firing  was  kept  up  along  the  line  nearly  all  night. 
The  night  was  rainy  and  cold.  During  the  afternoon  General 
Schofield  had  ordered  all  the  artillery  and  trains  across  the  river 
and  the  infantry  to  be  prepared  to  move  after  dark.  But  the 
rain  which  had  continued  all  day  made  it  almost  impossible  for 
the  artillery  and  trains  to  move  down  the  bank  to  the  pontoon 
bridge  and  up  the  bank  on  the  other  side.  At  7  p.  m.  only  a  few 
wagons  and  two  or  three  caissons  had  crossed.  At  8  o'clock  the 
order  above  mentioned  was  suspended  and  the  artillery  which 
had  been  taken  out  of  our  works  was  ordered  back  into  posi 
tion.  It  was  reported  that  only  one  division  of  the  enemy's  in 
fantry  had  shown  itself  in  our  front  during  the  day,  and*  it  was 
thought  that  he  was  only  making  a  demonstration  while  his  main 
force  might  be  endeavoring  to  cross  Duck  River,  or  moving  over 
toward  the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga  Railroad.1 

General  Wilson  on  the  25th  had  sent  a  strong  battalion  of 
cavalry  to  the  point  where  the  Lewisburg  pike  crossed  Duck 
River  to  feel  well  out  toward  Lewisburg  for  the  enemy,2  and 
had  taken  other  precautions  to  guard  other  crossings  and  fords 
of  Duck  River  and  to  watch  the  enemy's  movements  both  above 
and  below  Columbia.  On  the  26th  at  2  p.  m.  he  reported  that  his 
command  was  encamped  seven  miles  from  Columbia  and  five 
miles  from  Rally  Hill,  and  that  Capron's  brigade  was  at  the 
crossing  of  Duck  River  watching  out  toward  Lewisburg.3 

Sunday  morning,  November  27,  there  was  the  usual  picket 
firing  at  daylight  but  no  other  demonstration.  After  breakfast 
a  portion  of  the  left  wing  of  the  regiment  was  sent  out  to  the 
picket  line  and  orders  to  be  ready  to  move  at  any  moment  were 
received.  After  dinner  Colonel.  Streight  ordered  that  the  men  be 
kept  together  close  to  the  works,  as  he  had  an  intimation  of  an 
attack  by  the  enemy.  No  attack  however  was  made.  Toward 
evening  our  batteries  shelled  the  enemy  vigorously  without  pro 
voking  any  response.  The  enemy's  artillery  had  been  silent  since 
Friday  the  25th.  We  got  no  orders  to  move  and  were  making 
preparations  to  pass  another  night  where  we  were,  when  sud 
denly  at  about  G  p.  m.,  the  order  to  fall  in  was  quietly  passed 

1  Fullerton's  Journal,  W.   R.  R.   92-145-146. 

2  W.  R.  R.  93-1041. 

3  W.    R.   R.   93-lOii!). 


600  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

along  the  line  and  we  formed  and  marched  out  to  the  Pulaski 
pike:  There  we  found  the  other  brigades  passing,  and  having 
gathered  in  all  the  stragglers,  we  marched  through  the  city  to 
wards  the  river.  The  rain  had  ceased  early  in  the  morning,  but 
the  streets  were  very  muddy  and  sloppy.  It  was  plain  to  us 
that  we  were  evacuating  Columbia.  The  streets  were  filled  with 
marching  troops  and  some  of  our  artillery  was  on  its  way  to 
the  ford.  The  pontoon  bridge  had  been  moved  below  the  rail 
road  bridge  and  we  moved  in  that  direction.  A  building  in  the 
town  took  fire  after  we  left  it  and  it  was  reported  that  it  had 
been  set  on  fire  by  some  southern  sympathizer  as  a  signal  to  the 
enemy.  The  approaches  to  the  bridge  were  very  muddy  and 
there  were  frequent  short  halts  which  were  very  exasperating: 
Our  army  swore  terribly  in  this  campaign,  that  is,  our  part  of  it. 
Much  of  the  profanity  was  doubtless  caused  by  the  example  set 
by  our  brigade  commander,  Colonel  Streight.  He  was  loudly, 
brutally  and  aggressively  profane.  It  was  said  that  he  could  not 
give  an  order  to  an  orderly  without  accompanying  it  by  a  pro 
fane  oath.  His  profanity  directed  to  others  incited  profane 
language  in  reply  and  when  conditions  were  unusually  trying, 
as  on  this  night,  many  unused  to  swearing  swore  profanely.  We 
finally  got  across  the  pontoon  bridge  and  up  the  river  bank  and 
after  marching  about  a  mile  formed  in  line  in  a  woods  over 
looking  the  river.  On  the  27th,  Lee's  corps  of  Hood's  army  re 
mained  with  its  right  resting  on  the  Mount  Pleasant  pike.  Cheat- 
ham's  corps  moved  over  from  the  Columbia  pike  across  the 
Pulaski  pike  and  went  into  position  with  its  left  on  the  Pulaski 
pike  and  its  right  on  Duck  River.  Stewart's  corps  moved  up  and 
went  into  position  with  its  right  on  the  Pulaski  pike  and  its  left 
on  the  Mount  Pleasant  pike.1  His  cavalry  was  threatening  the 
Chattanooga  Railroad  near  Tullahoma,  and  the  Northwestern 
Railroad  from  Centerville,2  about  twenty-five  miles  down  Duck 
River.  The  last  of  our  troops,  except  the  pickets,  got  across  the 
river  about  midnight,  and  General  Schofield  gave  orders  to  de 
stroy  the  bridges  across  the  river  as  soon  as  the  last  of  our  pickets 
were  withdrawn.  General  Schofield  wired  General  Thomas  that 
he  thought  Hood  did  not  intend  to  attack  but  would  try  to  cross 
Duck  River  above  Columbia,  as  near  it  as  he  could. :J  There  was 
no  word  from  A.  J.  Smith's  corps.  Our  trains  were  moved  back 
on  the  Franklin  pike  to  Rutherford's  Creek,  a  short  distance 
north  of  Columbia.  Rutherford's  Creek  was  an  affluent  of  Duck 
River,  emptying  into  it  a  short  distance  below  Columbia.  No 

1  General  Hood's  Army,  W.   R.   R.   93-670. 

2  W.  R.  R.   93-1084-5.' 

3  W.  R.  R.  93-1084. 


SPRING  HILL  AND  FRANKLIN  601 

report  of  the  enemy's  movements  could  be  obtained.  General 
Wilson,  from  his  headquarters  four  miles  east  of  Columbia,  at  10 
a.  m.,  reported  that  no  evidence  of  a  movement  by  the  enemy 
toward  Shelbyville  or  the  Lewisburg  pike  could  be  obtained,  that 
there  were  no  reports  from  below  since  the  morning  of  the  26th, 
and  that  the  people  said  Duck  River  was  impassable  or  nearly 
so,  everywhere  that  morning.1  That  night,  however,  he  received 
word  that  General  Croxton's  pickets,  who  were  stationed  at  the 
fords  above  Huey's  Mill,  reported  that  there  were  rumors  that 
rebel  infantry  were  moving  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  river 
toward  the  mouth  of  Cedar  Creek  and  that  they  intended  cross 
ing  where  the  Lewisburg  pike  crossed  Duck  River.  He  also 
received  a  report  from  Colonel  Capron  giving  various  rumors  : 
among  them  that  on  November  26th,  a  Confederate  regiment  of 
cavalry  had  passed  six  miles  north  of  Chapel  Hill,,  going  toward 
the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga  Railroad;  that  Forrest  was  mov 
ing  on  the  south  side  of  the  river,  but  in  what  direction  could  not 
be  ascertained ;  that  a  brigade  of  cavalry  and  a  corps  of  in 
fantry  were  expected  in  Lewisburg  the  morning  of  the  28th ;  and 
4hat  there  were  rumors  that  Hood's  main  army  was  not  before 
Columbia,  but  was  crossing  the  river  lower  down  and  moving 
on  Nashville  by  way  of  Centerville.  General  Wilson  forwarded 
these  reports  to  General  Schofield  the  morning  of  the  28th,  stat 
ing  that  they  were  nothing  but  rumors  obtained  from  country 
people  and  that  no  reliable  information,  other  than  that  obtained 
from  prisoners  "sent  herewith,"  had  been  obtained  from  south 
of  Duck  River.2 

November  28  was  a  day  of  anxiety  and  intense  activity. 
At  5  a.  m.,  the  last  of  our  pickets  crossed  the  river  on  the 
railroad  bridge,  having  been  followed  through  the  town  by 
the  enemy's  skirmishers.  The  ends  of  the  railroad  bridge 
were  burned  and  the  pontoon  boats  scuttled  and  sunk.  Very 
early  in  the  morning-  Colonel  Askew,  himself,  awakened  the 
men  of  the  regiment  and  directed  them  to  get  ready  to  march. 
There  was  evident  anxiety  in  his  face  and  manner,  and  he 
probably  knew  more  about  the  critical  nature  of  our  position 
than  anyone  else  in  the  command.  He  felt  intuitively  that 
Hood's  purpose  was  to  interpose  his  army  between  us  and 
Nashville,  and  that  the  chances  were  ten  to  one  that  he  could 
do  it.  There  was  heavy  skirmishing  toward  the  ford.  We 
soon  moved  out  toward  the  Franklin  pike  and  it  looked  as 
if  we  would  continue  our  retreat.  We  crossed  Rutherford 
Creek  but  when  we  reached  the  pike  turned  southward  and 

1  W.  R.  R.  93-1089. 

2  W.  R.  R.  93-1109.  Sig.    20 


602  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

marched  toward  Columbia  until  we  reached  a  point  about  two 
miles  from  the  town.  There  we  formed  into  line  facing 
Columbia,  one-fourth  of  a  mile  east  of  the  pike,  and  at  once 
began  to  throw  up  intrenchments.  We  were  a  part  of  the 
general  line  of  battle  which  was  formed  from  east  to  west  as 
follows :  Our  division  (Wood's)  on  the  left  or  east  of  the 
Franklin  pike,  Wagner's  division  on  our  right,  and  Kimball's 
(lately  commanded  by  General  Whitaker)  on  Wagner's  right, 
his  right  resting  on  Rutherford  Creek.  Across  the  creek  cov 
ering,  the  railroad  bridge,  was  Ruger's  division  of  the  Twenty- 
third  Corps.  General  Cox's  division  of  the  Twenty-third 
Corps  was  in  advance  of  ours  and  Kimball's  division,  and 
covered  the  crossing  of  the  river  at  the  Franklin  pike.  The 
main  body  of  General  Wilson's  cavalry  seems  to  have  been 
still  five  miles  from  Rally  Hill,  where  he  had  reported  it  as 
encamped  at  2  p.  m.,  the  26th.  Capron's  brigade  was  at  Duck 
River,  where  the  Lewisburg  pike  crossed  it,  and  Croxton's 
brigade  at  Caldwell's  house,  six  miles  above  Columbia,  on  the 
Rally  Hill  road,  with  a  strong  picket  at  Huey's  Mill,  directly 
south  of  his  cam]),  and  pickets  at  the  fords  below  Columbia.1 
Stewart's  brigade  was  below  Columbia,  probably  on  the  right 
of  General  Ruger's  division  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps.2 

November  28,  there  was  heavy  skirmishing  along  the 
river  front,  and  artillery  firing  continued  all  day.  Our  dis 
tance  from  the  enemy's  guns  in  Columbia,  however,  was  so 
great  that  little  damage  was  done.  We  continued  work  on 
intrenchments  all  day  and  into  the  night.  Picket  firing  along 
the  river  continued  all  night  long. 

The  incidents  of  the  day  had  been  startling.  At  9  :40  a. 
m.,  Colonel  Capron  sent  a  dispatch  to  General  Wrilson  stating, 
that  his  troops  across  the  river  reported  a  brigade  of  the 
enemy  in  line  of  battle  within  two  miles  of  the  river.  At 
12 :45  p.  m.  General  W7ilson  sent  the  dispatch  to  General 
Schofield  and  asked  if  he  should  move  to  the  pike  leading 
from  Lewisburg  to  Franklin.  Later,  General  Wilson  received  a 
dispatch  from  one  of  General  Croxton's  lieutenants,  stating  that 
the  rebel  infantry  were  crossing  in  force  above  Huey's  Mill, 
and  at  1  p.  m.  forwarded  it  to  General  Schofield  saying,  he 
could  scarcely  credit  it,  but  \vould  find  out  at  once.8  At  2  :10 
p.  m.  General  Wilson  sent  a  dispatch  to  General  Schofield 
saying  that  General  Capron  reported  his  force  driven  back 
from  the  south  side  of  river  by  a  heavy  force  of  the  enemy, 
and  was  then  fighting  them,  and  that  the  force  crossing  the 

1  General  R.  W.  Johnson's  Report,  W.  R.  R.  93-597. 

2  W.  R.   R.   93-1111. 

3  W.  R.  R.  93-1109-1110. 


SPRING  HILL  AND  FRANKLIN  603 

river  above  Huey's  also  seemed  to  be  heavy.1  At  3  p.  m. 
Colonel  Capron  reported  that  his  brigade  of  cavalry  had  been 
driven  back  from  the  ford  eleven  miles  east  of  Columbia,  and 
that  some  of  the  enemy's  infantry  had  crossed  the  river  at 
that  point.  At  4 :30  p.  m.  General  Wilson  again  dispatched 
to  General  Schofield,  saying  the  enemy's  cavalry  had  crossed 
the  river  on  the  roads  leading  to  Spring  Hill  and  that  he 
(Schofield)  would  better  look  out  for  that  place.2  In  the 
evening  after  5  o'clock  word  came  to  our  brigade,  which  was 
the  extreme  left  of  our  line,  that  two  regiments  of  the  enemy's 
cavalry  had  crossed  the  river  a  short  distance  up  the  river 
from  our  left.  Colonel  Streight  reported  the  fact  to  head 
quarters,  and  orders  were  sent  to  him  to  drive  this  cavalry 
back.  It  was  9  p.  m.  when  the  order  came  and  General  Wood 
decided  it  was  too  dark  to  send  us  on  that  expedition.  He, 
however,  sent  150  men  beyond  our  left  flank  up  the  river  to 
find  out  what  the  enemy  was  doing.  To  crown  it  all,  General 
Thomas  at  6  p.  m.  sent  a  dispatch  to  General  Schofield,  saying 
he  thought  General  A.  J.  Smith  would  be  in  Nashville  in 
three  da-\s^  and  directing  that  if  he,  Schofield,  could  not  prevent 
the  enemy  from  crossing  Duck  River,  he  should  fall  back  to 
the  north  bank  of  the  Harpeth  River  at  Franklin.  The 
officers  to  whom  these  facts  were  known  passed  an  anxious 
night. 

At  ?  :30  a.  m.,  November  29,  word  came  from  General 
Wilson  that  the  enemy  had  laid  a  pontoon  bridge  across  the 
river  about  five  miles  east  of  our  flank,  and  at  his  suggestion 
orders  were  given  to  General  Stanley  to  send  two  divisions 
to  Spring  Hill,  which  was  about  ten  miles  to  our  rear  on  the 
Franklin  pike,  to  hold  the  enemy  in  check  in  case  he  should 
approach  that  point,  until  the  rest  of  the  force  could  with 
draw  from  the  enemy  in  our  front.  He  was  also  directed  to 
send  a  brigade  of  our  division  up  the  river  to  see  if  the  enemy 
was  crossing  the  river  as  reported.  Our  regiment  and  brigade 
were  astir  at  daylight.  There  was  only  desultory  picket 
firing  along  the  river.  We  soon  saw  the  Second  Brigade  of 
our  division,  under  command  of  Colonel  Post,  moving  out  to 
the  left  on  a  reconnoissance  and  extended  our  line  in  that 
direction  about  a  mile.  Messengers  from  Post's  brigade 
reported  that  the  enemy's  infantry  was  across  the  river  on 
our  left.  The  report  was  soon  confirmed  and  we  wondered 
why  our  troops  were  not  at  once  ordered  back  towards 
Franklin.  Instead,  we  were  ordered  to  continue  fortifying 

1  W.  R.  R.  93-1111. 

2  W.  R.  R.  93-1112. 

3  Fullerton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.  93-147. 


604  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

our  line.  The  crossing  of  the  enemy's  infantry  so  near  our 
left  caused  General  Schofield  to  halt  Kimball's  division,  which 
together  with  Wagner's  had  been  ordered  to  Spring  Hill,  at 
Rutherford  Creek.1  Just  before  we  moved  to  the  left,  as 
above  stated,  there  was  a  sharp  artillery  duel  between  bat 
teries  on  opposite  sides  of  the  river,  but  the  enemy's  batteries 
were  soon  apparently  silenced.  We  worked  all  day  on  our 
fortifications  and  finally  finished  them.  There  was  no 
approach  of  the  enemy  on  our  front,  no  orders  came  to  move 
and  we  wondered  what  it  all  meant.  Just  before  sunset  a 
terrific  cannonading  began  at  the  ford  where  General  Cox's 
division  was  posted,  accompanied  by  volleys  of  musketry  and 
the  shrill  cheers  of  the  enemy.  It  was  an  attempt  of  the 
enemy  to  force  a  crossing  of  the  river  in  General  Cox's  front. 
The  fight  continued  until  after  dark  and  it  was  reported  that 
the  enemy  had  been  repulsed  and  that  General  Cox  still  held 
his  position.-  It  was  afterwards  known  that  the  enemy  had 
succeeded  in  getting  about  1  oOO  men  across  the  river  and 
had  put  down  a  pontoon  bridge.  We  put  up  no  tents,  as 
everyone  realized  that  WTC  were  to  move  back  towards  Frank 
lin.  We  waited  patiently  for  orders,  and  at  last  were  quietly 
called  into  line  and  moved  down  to  the  Franklin  pike.  There 
we  found  a  large  body  of  troops  massed  in  column  and  build 
ing  fires.3  At  length  after  all  the  troops  there  assembled 
moved  out,  we  followed  them.  We  were  fairly  well  on  the 
road  when  we  noticed  a  red  glare  in  the  sky  to  the  north,  and 
Colonel  Askew  said  to  the  adjutant  who  was  riding  beside 
him :  "Cope,  I  am  not  an  alarmist,  but  I  think  that  light  is  from 
the  enemy's  camp  fires."  The  situation  was  in  fact  even  more 
critical  than  we  then  imagined.  Hood  had  made  our  chief 
officers  believe  that  his  cavalry  would  cross  Duck  River  about 
twelve  miles  up  the  river  from  Columbia,  and  General  Wilson 
had  withdrawn  nearly  all  our  cavalry  to  that  point  to  oppose 
him.  He  had  held  the  greater  part  of  our  army  at  Columbia 
by  threatening  an  attack  on  our  front,  and  in  the  meantime 
had  crossed  the  main  body  of  his  infantry  not  more  than  five 
miles  from  our  left  flank  and  had  marched  directly  on  Spring 
Hill.  He  arrived  near  Spring  Hill  with  sufficient  forces  to  have 
overwhelmed  the  small  number  of  troops  there,  and  to  have 
interposed  the  greater  part  of  his  army  between  us  and  Nash 
ville,  and  thus  wrought  our  destruction.  That  it  did  not 
succeed  was  due  to  the  warning  given  by  General  Wilson,  the 
superior  skill  of  General  Stanley,  the  intrepid  courage  of  the 

1  W.  R.  R.   93-1141. 

2  Gleason's  Diary. 

3  Gleason's  Diary. 


SPRING  HILL  AND  FRAXKLIX  605 

troops  of  Wagner's  Second  Division,  who  held  the  enemy's 
veterans  under  General  Cleburne  at  bay,  and  to  one  of  those 
"accidents  of  war"  before  referred  to,  which  will  be  men 
tioned  further  along. 

We  did  not  know  the  real  condition  of  affairs  and  it  is 
perhaps  as  \vell  that  we  did  not.  We  marched  on  over  a 
weary  and  difficult  road,  hurrying  up  the  laggards,  and  trying 
to  keep  the  men  from  straggling.  For  a  week  they  had  been 
on  very  severe  duty,  with  little  sleep,  and  it  was  hard  work  to 
keep  them  awake  and  in  place.  All  at  once  we  came  to  a 
bend  in  the  road  and  there,  in  plain  view  before  us,  were  the 
enemy's  camp  fires,  not  more  than  a  half  mile  away — so 
near,  in  fact,  that  we  could  see  the  men's  faces  by  their  camp 
fires'  light  and  hear  their  talk  and  laughter.  Pursuant  to 
orders  the  adjutant  rode  back  along  the  line  of  marching 
men  and  cautioned  them  to  hook  up  their  canteens  so  they 
would  not  rattle  against  their  bayonets,  and  to  preserve  strict 
silence,  as  those  were  the  enemy's  camp  fires.  At  first  the 
men  were  inclined  to  scoff  at  the  caution.  They  could  not  be 
lieve  such  a  thing  was  possible.  Soon,  however,  they  realized 
the  truth  of  the  situation  and  something  akin  to  awe  crept 
along  the  ranks.  The  canteens  were  hooked  up  as  ordered, 
all  talking  ceased,  and  nothing  was  heard  but  the  click  of  our 
horses'  hoofs  and  the  shuffle  of  the  men's  feet  as  wre  moved 
along  in  the  darkness.  The  enemy's  camps  were  about  700 
yards  to  our  right.  The  road  ran  along  the  top  of  an  em 
bankment  and  there  seemed  to  be  a  mist  covering  the  low 
ground  between  us  and  the  enemy.  One  who  rode  along  that 
road  that  memorable  night  imagined  that  heavy  lines  or 
columns  of  troops  might  be  concealed  by  it,  and  wondered 
what  he  would  do  if  he  escaped  the  first  volley  from  such  a 
concealed  foe.  No  flankers  were  thrown  out  and  we  moved 
on,  realizing  our  almost  helpless  condition  in  case  of  such  an 
attack.  We  were  strung  out  along  the  road  for  a  long  dis 
tance.  Our  artillery  and  trains,  the  First  Division  of  our 
corps  and  the  pickets  at  Columbia  were  to  follow.  Strange 
to  say  our  column  \vas  not  fired  into.  It  was  the  most 
remarkable  incident  in  all  our  military  experience. 

Mr.  Samuel  T.  Wallace,  Company  F,  of  Benton,  Iowa,  a 
boy  in  his  teens,  who  was  recovering  from  a  severe  attack 
of  fever  and  had  been  ordered  to  rejoin  our  thin  ranks,  relates 
his  experience  on  the  march  from  Columbia  to  Spring  Hill  as 
follows : 

"I  rejoined  the  regiment  at  Columbia  the  evening  of  the 
eventful  29th  day  of  November,  and  in  less  than  an  hour  we 


606  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

began  that  noted  march.  About  midnight,  as  we  approached 
Spring  Hill,  we  saw  a  long  line  of  camp  fires  ahead  of  us, 
parallel  with  and  not  far  from  the  pike  on  which  we  were 
marching.  It  was  a  grand  sight,  but  the  anxious  inquiry  was : 
' What  does  it  mean  ?  Are  they  our  men  or  Confederates  ?' 
Soon  a  lone  horseman,  coming  from  our  front,  was  seen  riding 
along  beside  the  column.  He  leaned  over  and  in  low  tone 
said  something  to  our  commanding  officer,  repeating  the  same 
as  he  hurriedly  passed  along  at  the  side  of  the  marching 
column.  It  was  an  order  to  preserve  strict  silence,  as  we 
were  then  about  to  pass  immediately  in  front  of  the  Confed 
erate  army,  within  speaking  distance.  Every  soldier  soon 
seemed  to  comprehend  the  seriousness  of  the  situation,  and 
not  a  word  was  spoken  above  a  whisper,  as  we  silently 
marched  by  this  threatening  line  of  battle  less  than  half  a 
mile  away.  Even  the  usually  noisy  driver  of  the  six-mule 
team  sat  statue-like  on  the  lead  mule  as  the  team  and  wagon 
moved  slowly  and  quietly  on." 

How  and  why  it  occurred  is  still  a  matter  of  dispute. 
General  Hood's  plan  was  to  have  Cheatham's  division  attack 
our  small  'force  as  soon  as  it  arrived  at  Spring  Hill,  Stewart's 
corps  and  Johnson's  division  of  Lee's  corps  were  to  support 
him  and  the  t\vo  divisions  of  Lee's  corps  which  had  held  us 
at  Columbia  were  to  follow  us,  press  our  rear  and  finally  join 
the  left  flank  of  his  army.  General  Hood  in  his  official 
report,1  says : 

"Late  in  the  evening  of  the  38th  of  November  General 
Forrest,  with  most  of  his  command,  crossed  Duck  River  a 
few  miles  above  Columbia,  and  I  followed  early  in  the  morn 
ing  of  the  29th,  with  Stewart's  and  Cheatham's  corps,  and  John 
son's  division  of  Lee's  corps,  leaving  the  other  divisions  of  Lee's 
corps  in  the  enemy's  front  at  Columbia.  The  troops  moved 
in  light  marching  order,  with  only  a  battery  to  the  corps,  my 
object  being  to  turn  the  enemy's  flank,  by  marching  rapidly 
on  roads  parallel  to  the  Columbia  and  Franklin  pike,  at  or 
near  Spring  Hill,  and  to  cut  off  that  portion  of  the  enemy  at 
or  near  Columbia.  When  I  had  gotten  well  on  his  flank  the 
enemy  discovered  my  intention  and  began  to  retreat,  on  the 
pike  toward  Spring  Hill.  The  cavalry  became  engaged  near 
that  place  about  midday,  but  his  trains  were  so  strongly 
guarded  that  they  were  unable  to  break  through  them.  About 
4  p.  m.  our  infantry  forces,  Major  General  Cheatham  in  the 
advance,  commenced  to  come  in  contact  with  the  enemy  about 
two  miles  from  Spring  Hill,  through  which  place  the  Colum- 

1     W.  R.  R.  93-652 


SPRIXG  HILL  AND  FRANKLIN  607 

bia  and  Franklin  pike  runs.  The  enemy  was  at  this  time  mov 
ing  rapidly  along  the  pike,  with  some  of  his  troops  on  the 
flank  of  his  column  to  protect  it.  Major  General  Cheatham 
was  ordered  to  attack  the  enemy  at  once  and  vigorously,  and 
get  possession  of  this  pike,  and  although  these  orders  were 
frequently  and  earnestly  repeated,  he  made  but  a  feeble  and 
partial  attack,  failing  to  reach  the  point  indicated.  Had  my 
instructions  been  carried  out  there  is  no  doubt  we  should  have 
possessed  ourselves  of  this  road.  Stewart's  corps  and  John 
son's  division  were  arriving  on  the  field  to  support  the  attack. 
Though  the  golden  opportunity  had  passed  with  daylight,  I 
did  not  at  dark  abandon  the  hope  of  dealing  the  enemy  a 
heavy  blow.  Accordingly,  Lieutenant  General  Stewart  was 
furnished  a  guide  and  ordered  to  move  his  corps  beyond 
Cheatham's  and  place  it  across  the  road  beyond  Spring  Hill. 
Shortly  after  this  General  Cheatham  came  to  my  headquar 
ters,  and  when  T  informed  him  of  Stewart's  movement,  he 
said  that  Stewart  ought  to  form  on  his  right.  I  asked  if  that 
would  throw  Stewart  across  the  pike.  He  replied  that  it 
would  and  a  mile  beyond.  Accordingly,  one  of  Cheatham's 
staff  officers  was  sent  to  show  Stewart  where  his  (Cheat- 
ham's)  right  rested.  In  the  dark  and  confusion  he  did  not 
succeed  in  getting  the  position  desired,  but  about  11  p.  m. 
went  into  bivouac.  About  12  p.  m.,  ascertaining  that  the 
enemy  was  moving  in  great  confusion,  artillery  wagons  and 
troops  intermixed,  I  sent  instructions  to  General  Cheatham 
to  advance  a  heavy  line  of  skirmishers  against  him  and  still 
further  impede  and  confuse  his  march.  'This  was  not  accom 
plished.  The  enemy  continued  to  move  along  the  road  in 
hurry  and  confusion,  within  hearing  nearly  all  the  night. 
Thus  was  lost  a  great  opportunity  of  striking  the  enemy  for 
which  we  had  labored  so  long — the  greatest  this  campaign 
offered  and  one  of  the  greatest  during  the  war."  General 
Hood  also  states  that  General  Cheatham  afterwards  con 
fessed  his  mistake  and  took  the  entire  blame  upon  himself. 
.  In  1865  General  Hood  gave  support  to  a  story  that  Gen 
eral  Cheatham,  early  in  the  evening  of  November  29,  went 
to  call  on  a  wrell  known  woman  who  lived  near  Spring  Hill, 
placed  a  guard  around  the  house  with  orders  to  admit  no  one, 
and  thus  lost  for  Hood  the  opportunity  of  crushing  our  army.1 
It  must  have  been  long  after  midnight  when  our  tired 
and  sleepy  column  reached  Spring  Hill.  General  Cox's 
advance  reached  the  place  at  11  p.  m.2  and  our  division  fol 
lowed  his.  John  G.  Gregory,  in  his  diary,  says :  "We  camped 

1  New  Orleans  Paper,  July,  1865. 

2  Fullerton's  Journal,  \V.  R.  R.,  93-148. 


608  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

at  3  :30  a.  m.,  and  threw  up  some  rail  breastworks."  Gleason, 
in  his  diary,  says :  "We  halted  at  1  a.  m.,"  and  General  Wood, 
in  his  official  report,  says :  "The  head  of  the  division  reached 
Spring  Hill  about  midnight."1  We  marched  quietly  through 
the  town  and  a  mile  beyond  it,  where  our  division  was 
formed  in  line  east  of  and  parallel  to  the  Franklin  pike,  to  pro 
tect  the  artillery  and  trains  which  were  passing  hurriedly 
along  it  towards  Franklin.  We  threw  up  a  barricade  of  rails 
in  front  of  our  line,  sent  out  pickets,  and  the  tired  men 
dropped  on  the  ground  for  a  moment  or  two  of  rest.  There 
was  little  or  no  sleep  for  any  one,  for  artillery,  trains  and 
troops  were  hurrying  by  in  great  confusion.  At  9  p.  m.  word 
had  come  to  General  Schofield,  who  had  reached  Spring  Hill 
at  7  p.  m.,2  that  the  enemy  had  possession  of  Thompson's 
Station,  three  miles  north  of  Spring  Hill,  and  he  at  once 
started  there  with  a  brigade  of  Ruger's  division  to  force  a 
passage  for  our  trains  and  troops.  At  11:30  he  returned  and 
reported  that  the  enemy  had  withdrawn  from  that  place.  He 
left  General  Ruger's  troops  at  Thompson's  Station.  At  11:40 
p.  m.  General  Cox's  division,  which  had  arrived  at  11 :30  p. 
m.,  was  ordered  to  move  at  once  for  Franklin,  Ruger's  brigade 
to  go  with  him  from  Thompson's  station.  The  wagon  train 
was  to  follow  Cox,  Wood's  and  Kimball's  divisions  to  follow 
the  wagon  train.  Wagner's  division  was  to  remain  at  Spring 
Hill  until  everything  had  passed  and  then  move  out,  acting 
as  rear  guard.3 

At  1  a.  m.,  November  30,  General  Cox's  division  had 
passed  and  our  train  of  500  to  800  wagons  moved  out.  It 
had  to  cross  a  small  stream  on  one  dilapidated  bridge  and  its 
progress  was  exasperatingly  slow.  Our  division  moved  at  the 
same  time,  marching  along  to  the  right  side  of  the  train.  At 
a  point  two  and  a  half  miles  from  Spring  Hill  the  train  was 
attacked  by  the  enemy's  cavalry.  Repeated  attacks  were  made 
at  the  same  point  and  at  a  point  a  half  mile  further  on,  and 
a  number  of  men  and  mules  were  killed  and  wounded  and 
some  of  the  wagons  destroyed.  Hood's  infantry,  as  before 
stated,  had  crossed  Duck  River  between  our  infantry  and 
Wilson's  efficient  cavalry,  and  Forrest  had  turned  to  the  left 
toward  the  Franklin  pike,  but  was  held  in  check  by  Stanley 
at  Spring  Hill.  The  attacks  on  the  wagon  train  were  con 
tinued  until  daylight  when  two  regiments  of  our  division  and 
a  section  of  artillery  were  hurried  to  the  front  and  drove  the 
enemy's  cavalry  off.4  Because  of  these  attacks  and  the  single 

1  General  Wood's  official  report,  W.  R.  R.  93-123. 

2  General  Stanley's  official  report,  W.  R.  R.  93-114. 

3  Fullerton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.  93-140. 

4  W.  R.  R.  93-123-4. 


SPRING  HILL  AND  FRANKLIN  609 

defective  bridge  over  which  all  had  to  cross,  the  rear  of  the 
train  did  not  leave  Spring  Hill  until  nearly  daylight.  Gen 
eral  Wagner's  division  left  Spring  Hill  about  4  a.  m.  and 
his  pickets  were  withdrawn  at  daylight.1  No  one  who  took 
part  in  the  march  of  Schofield's  column  from  Spring  Hill  to 
Franklin  that  November  morning  can  ever  forget  it.  The 
distance  was  about  fifteen  miles  and  every  mile  of  the  way  was 
full  of  excitement  and  action.  Forrest's  cavalry  threatened  our 
flanks  at  every  cross  road.  They  would  dash  in  at  our  train, 
troops  would  double  quick  forward  and  drive  them  off,  and 
we  would  then  resume  our  march.  General  Stanley  says: 
"The  rebel  cavalry  was  in  possession  of  all  the  hills  to  our 
right,  and  made  numerous  demonstrations  upon  our  flank,  but 
were  easily  driven  off  by  General  Wood's  skirmishers."2  The 
enemy's  infantry  followed  us  with  tremendous  energy.  Our 
column  was  impeded  by  our  long  train,  while  his  troops  were 
unincumbered  with  trains,  were  in  light  marching  order,  had 
had  a  night's  rest  and  could  easily  out-march  us.  Colonel 
Opdycke's  brigade  of  Wagner's  division  acted  as  our  rear 
guard  and  was  praised  by  every  one  for  the  skill  with  which 
it  held  the  enemy  in  check.  At  every  defensible  position 
Colonel  Opdycke  put  his  men  in  line  and  threw  out  skir 
mishers.  This  would  cause  the  enemy  to  halt  and  deploy  into 
line,  when  Opdycke's  troops  would  be  withdrawn,  his 
skirmishers  would  slowly  retire  and  thus  our  column  was 
enabled  to  proceed.  This  was  kept  up  until  about  noon,  when 
the  rear  of  our  column  reached  a  high  knoll,  two  miles  south 
east  of  Franklin.  Here  Colonel  Opdycke  was  halted  and 
ordered  to  hold  the  position,  supported  by  the  two  other 
brigades  of  Wagner's  division,  until  he  was  threatened  by  a 
superior  force  of  the  enemy. 

Our  regiment  had  performed  no  very  conspicuous  service 
on  this  hurried  march  from  Spring  Hill,  but  we  were  part  and 
parcel  of  the  moving  scene — one  of  the  most  vividly  impres 
sive  in  our  experience. 

Our  division  arrived  within  about  a  mile  of  Franklin  about 
noon,  when  we  were  halted  a  short  time  for  dinner  and  then 
pushed  on  through  the  town.  On  our  way  we  saw  troops  of 
our  own  and  the  Twenty-third  Corps  working  on  the  bridge 
head,  in  front  of  the  town,  which  General  Cox  had  be 
gun.  We  crossed  the  Harpeth  River  on  a  pontoon  bridge,3 
moved  to  the  left  and  were  posted  in  a  commanding  position 
to  cover  the  right  flank  of  our  army  and  protect  our  trains 

1  Fuller-ton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.  93-149. 

2  W.  R.  R.  93-115. 

3  Gleason's  Diary. 


610  FIFTEENTH   OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CA.MI'AKI.NS 

which  had  been  hurried  across  the  river.  The  Harpeth  River 
was  a  small  stream  and  was  fordable  at  a  number  of  points, 
both  above  and  below  Franklin.  The  occasion  of  our  being- 
sent  to  the  position  above  named  was  that  at  1  p.m.  General 
Schotield  received  word  that  the  enemy  was  trying  to  cross 
the  river  a  few  miles  above  the  town,  and  he  therefore  wished 
General  Stanley  to  send  our  division  to  watch  the  trains  and 
drive  back  the  enemy  if  he  attempted  to  take  them.1  Our 
position  was  an  admirable  one  for  a  reserve.  We  could 
quickly  move  to  either  flank  or  to  the  center,  as  occasion 
should  require.  From  it  we  had  a  fine  view  of  the  country  to 
the  south  of  us.  We  could  see  the  hills  beyond  Franklin, 
where  the  enemy  was  supposed  to  be.  The  day  was  mild  and 
the  sun  shone  through  a  fine  mist,  which  softened  all  harsh 
outlines,  and  the  air  was  soft  and  unusually  still.  The  bridge 
head  which  had  been  constructed  under  General  Cox's  im 
mediate  direction,  extended  from  the  river  above  to  the  river 
belo\v  the  town — a  distance  of  about  a  mile  and  a  half.  The 
line  had  been  designated  by  General  Schofield.  The  ground 
in  front  of  it  was  almost  level,  without  any  cover  from  woods 
or  orchards  for  a  distance  of  nearly  a  mile,  the  part  of  it  on 
both  sides  of  the  Columbia  pike  for  a  distance  of  about  800 
yards,  being  almost  as  level  as  a  floor  without  any  obstruction 
whatever.  The  men  had  thrown  up  the  usual  parapet  and 
in  some  places  it  was  topped  by  head  logs  and  protected  by 
abatis.  An  osage  orange  hedge  in  front  of  Stile's  brigade  on 
the  extreme  left  had  been  partially  cut  away  to  form  such 
abatis  and  on  the  right  a  similar  hedge,  a  small  locust  grove 
and  an  orchard,  had  been  used  for  the  same  purpose.  At  the 
left  of  the  line  across  the  river  was  Fort  Granger,  which  had 
been  constructed  two  years  before.  It  commanded  a  stretch 
of  the  river,  which  here  runs  in  a  northwesterly  direction  to 
the  left,  and  also  a  cut  in  the  railroad  which  here  ran  nearly 
parallel  to  the  river  and  to  the  left  of  the  Lewisburg  pike. 
General  Cox's  division  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  was  placed 
in  the  line  with  its  right  resting  on  the  Columbia  pike  and  its 
left  extending  across  the  Lewisburg  pike  to  the  river.  Upon 
the  right  of  the  Columbia  pike,  extending  to  and  across  the 
Carter's  Creek  pike,  which  entered  the  town  from  the  south 
west,  was  placed  Ruger's  division  of  the  same  corps,  and  on 
his  right  was  General  Kimball's  division  of  the  Fourth  Corps, 
the  right  of  his  line  resting  on  the  river.  Our  division 
(Wood's)  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  as  before  stated,  had  been 
posted  across  the  river  in  a  position  to  protect  the  left  flank 

1     Pullerton's  Journal,  W.   R.  R.   93-149. 


SPRING  HILL  AND  FRAXKLIN  611 

and  guard  the  trains.  The  line,  where  it  crossed  the  Columbia 
pike,  was  just  south  of  Carter's  house,  the  southernmost  house 
in  the  town.  There  was  no  ground  in  the  rear  of  the  works 
where  artillery  could  be  posted  to  advantage  and  the  batteries 
of  the  Fourth  Corps  were  posted  along  the  bridge-head,  as 
follows :  The  First  Kentucky  Light  Artillery,  four  guns,  on 
the  left  of  the  Columbia  pike,  in  the  line  of  the  One  Hundredth 
Ohio ;  the  Sixth  Ohio  Light  Artillery,  four  guns,  on  the 
right  of  the  Columbia  pike,  just  west  of  the  Carter  house ; 
Battery  B,  Pennsylvania  Volunteers  on  the  Carter's  Creek 
pike ;  Battery  M,  Fourth  U.  S.  Artillery,  and  Battery  G,  First 
Ohio  Artillery,  to  the  left  of  Stile's,  the  left  brigade  of  Gen 
eral  Cox's  division ;  Battery  A,  First  Ohio  Artillery,  in  re 
serve  near  the  Columbia  pike;  and  Bridge's  Battery,  Illinois 
Light  Artillery,  near  the  left  of  Strickland's,  the  left  brigade 
of  Ruger's  division.  The  artillery  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps 
had  been  sent  across  the  river  early  in  the  morning  and  a  part 
of  it  placed  in  Fort  Granger.1  The  larger  part  of  General 
Wilson's  cavalry,  which  the  day  before  had  covered  the  main 
road  of  Forrest's  advance,  had  fallen  back  on  the  Lewisburg 
pike  and  taken  position  on  the  extreme  left  of  the  infantry 
on  the  north  bank  of  the  Harpeth,  with  Croxton's  brigade 
on  the  south  side,  both  connecting  with  the  infantry  pickets 
and  protecting  the  left  flank  of  the  army.2  At  1  p.  m.,  Gen 
eral  Wagner  who,  with  his  two  other  brigades,  was  support 
ing  Opdycke's  brigade  on  the  high  knoll  south  of  the  river, 
before  mentioned,  reported  that  two  large  columns  of  the 
enemy's  infantry  were  approaching  Colonel  Opdycke's 
position,  moving  on  the  Le\visburg  and  Columbia  pikes,  and 
that  he  was  moving  his  division  back  to  the  bridge-head.3 
At  10  :,25  a.  m.,  General  Thomas  telegraphed  that  A.  J.  Smith's 
troops  had  arrived  that  morning  at  Nashville  and  that  it 
would  take  him  quite  all  day  to  disembark.4  So  all  hope  of 
his  being  able  to  reach  Franklin  was  abandoned,  and  at  2 
p.  m.  General  Cox  was  ordered  to  withdraw  his  command  to 
the  north  side  of  the  river  at  6  p.  m.r>  At  2  :50  p.  m.,  General 
Schofield  sent  word  to  General  Stanley  that  the  enemy's 
infantry  was  trying  to  force  a  crossing  of  the  river  at  Hughes' 
Mill,  about  three  miles  above  Franklin,  and  at  3  p.  m.  General 
Wood  was  ordered  to  send  one  of  our  brigades  there.  KnefT- 
ler's  brigade,  then  commanded  by  General  Samuel  Beatty, 
was  selected  for  this  duty  and  started  at  3  :30  p.  m.,  but  never 
reached  the  point.  He  had  been  preceded  by  the  cavalry, 

1  General  Cox's  report,  W.  R.  R.  98-348.  4     W.  R.  R.  93-1169. 

2  General  Schofield's  report,  W.  R.  R.  93-343.  5     W.  R.  R.  93-352. 

3  Fullerton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.  93-149. 


612  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

which  drove  the  enemy  back  across  the  river.  At  -> : 45  p.  in. 
word  came  that  the  enemy  was  forming  for  an  assault  on  out 
line  and  General  Beatty  was  ordered  to  post  his  brigade  on 
the  left  of  Fort  Granger  instead  of  moving  to  Hughes'  Mill.1 

By  this  time  Colonel  Opdycke's  brigade  of  Wagner's 
division  had  withdrawn  from  the  knoll,  had  marched  inside 
the  bridge-head  and  was  posted  in  reserve  about  two  hundred 
yards  back  of  where  the  bridge-head  crossed  the  Columbia  pike, 
near  the  Carter  house.  The  other  two  brigades  of  Wagner's 
division  had  been  halted  from  500  to  800  yards  in  front  of 
the  bridge-head,  or  main  works,  with  orders  to  withdraw 
"whenever  the  enemy  appeared  to  be  advancing  in  decidedly 
superior  force  without  allowing  his  troops  to  become  seriously 
engaged."2  He  was  then  to  take  position  near  Opdyke's 
brigade  and  form  a  part  of  the  reserve.3  Two  brigades  of 
W7ood's  (our)  division  still  occupied  the  position  they  had 
taken  when  the  division  crossed  the  Harpeth  River  at  noon. 
Such  was  the  position  and  alignment  of  our  little  army  when 
the  storm  broke. 

It  was  unexpected.  General  Stanley  in  his  official  report 
says :  "From  1  until  -JL  o'clock  in  the  evening  the  enemy's 
entire  force  was  in  sight  and  forming  for  attack,  yet  in  view 
of  the  strong  position  we  held,  and  reasoning  from  the  former 
course  of  the  rebels  during  this  campaign,  nothing  appeared 
so  improbable  as  that  they  wrould  assault.  I  felt  so  confident 
in  this  belief  that  I  did  not  leave  General  Schofield's  head 
quarters  (at  Fort  Granger)  until  the  firing  commenced."3 

About  3  p.  m.  the  enemy  formed  line  of  battle  behind 
the  knoll  above  mentioned.  Stewart's  corps  of  three  divisions 
on  the  right  of  the  Columbia  pike  facing  the  town,  Loring's 
division  on  the  right,  then  WalthaH's,  and  then  French's, 
whose  left  was  on  the  Columbia  pike.  Cheatham's  corps  of 
three  divisions  was  formed  on  the  left  of  the  Columbia  pike 
in  order  from  right  to  left  as  follows :  First  Cleburne's,  then 
Brown's  and  then  Bates'.  Buford's  division  of  cavalry,  dis 
mounted,  was  on  Stewart's  right  extending  to  the  river,  and 
Jackson's  division  was  on  the  left  of  Buford's,  south  of  the 
river.  Chalmer's  cavalry  division  was  on  the  left  of  Cheat- 
ham's  corps,  covering  the  space  between  his  extreme  left  and 
the  river.  Johnson's  and  Clayton's  infantry  divisions  of 
Lee's  corps  were  placed  in  position  to  support  the  attack.5 

About  4  o'clock  the  enemy's  troops  appeared  in  great 
force  on  the  hills  south  of  the  town  moving  with  admirable 

1  Fullerton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.  93-150.  4     W.  R.  R.  93-115. 

2  General  Cox's  report,  W.  R.  R.  93-352.          5     Report  of  General  A.  P.  Stewart. 

3  General  Cox's  report,  W.  R.  R.  93-352.  W.  R.  R.  93-708. 


SPRING  HILL  AND  FRANKLIN  613 

steadiness.  His  divisions  were  formed  with  two  brigades  in 
front  and  one  or  two  in  their  rear,  and  in  this  formation 
moved  to  the  top  of  the  range  of  hills.  On  reaching  the  top, 
the  troops  moved  down  the  hills  by  the  right  flank  of  regi 
ments  and  formed  forward  into  line.1  The  moment  they 
debouched  from  the  hills  a  section  of  artillery  with  Wag 
ner's  two  brigades  opened  out  on  them,  but  did  not  check 
their  advance  for  a  moment.  When  they  came  within  range 
of  Wagner's  muskets,  his  infantry  line  opened  out  on  them, 
but  even  this  lire  did  not  apparently  retard  their  progress. 
Wagner's  brigade  commanders,  Colonels  Conrad  and  Lane, 
had  received  orders  from  him  "not  to  retire  to  the  main  line 
until  forced  to  do  so  by  the  righting  of  the  enemy."2  The 
section  of  artillery  above  mentioned,  after  firing  a  few  shots, 
rapidly  retired  to  the  main  line,  but  not  so  the  infantry. 
Under  the  mistaken  orders  of  General  Wagner  they  held  to 
the  slight  barricade  of  rails  they  had  thrown  up  in  their  front 
until  the  enemy  was  upon  them  and  orderly  retreat  was  im 
possible.  The  men  in  our  main  line  saw  with  amazement 
the  two  brigades  in  disorderly  retreat,  with  the  enemy,  Gor 
don's  and  Gist's  brigade  of  Brown's  division,3  so  close  upon 
them  and  so  intermingled  with  them  that  they  could  not  fire 
without  danger  of  hitting  our  own  men.  There  was  a  mo 
mentary  panic,  and  a  portion  of  Reilly's  brigade,  Twenty- 
third  Corps,  directly  east  of  the  Columbia  pike,  and  Strick 
land's  brigade  immediately  west  of  it,  broke  to  the  rear.  At 
this  critical  moment  Colonel  Opdycke  of  his  own  motion  led 
his  brigade  against  the  enemy  and  drove  him  from  the  para 
pet  east  of  the  Columbia  pike.  General  Stanley,  who  had  just 
arrived,  and  General  Cox  exerted  themselves  personally  to 
restore  the  line.  Stanley's  horse  was  killed  and  soon  after 
he  was  struck  by  a  musket  ball  in  the  back  of  the  neck  and 
severely  wounded,  but  did  not  leave  the  field.  Opdycke's 
charge  not  only  restored  a  portion  of  our  broken  line,  but  the 
courage  and  intrepidity  of  his  troops  inspired  the  same  quali 
ties  in  others,  and  soon  the  men  in  Reilly's  and  Strickland's 
brigades  who  had  given  way  returned  to  the  fight.  The  men 
in  Conrad's  and  Lane's  brigades  did  likewise,  taking  their 
places  along  the  line  with  the  troops  of  other  commands. 
One  result  of  Opdycke's  charge  was  the  capture  of  several 
hundred  prisoners,  who  had  broken  through  and  when  our 
lines  were  restored  found  themselves  inside  and  surrendered. 
Among  the  captured  were  General  George  W.  Gordon,  com- 

1  Colonel  Capers,  commanding  Gist's  brigade,  Hood's  army,  W.  R.  R.  93-736. 

2  General  Stanley's  report,  W.  R.  R.  93-116. 

3  Report  of  Colonel  Capers,  W.  R.  R.     93-736. 


614  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

manding  a  brigade  in  Brown's  division  of  Cheatham's  corps, 
and  a  large  portion  of  his  brigade.  West  of  the  Columbia 
pike  for  a  space  about  the  length  of  a  regiment,  the  enemy 
held  on  to  our  main  line  of  works  and  could  not  be  dislodged. 
There  was  a  second  line  of  works  about  twenty-five  yards 
in  rear  of  the  main  line  at  this  point,  and  Opdycke's  men  and 
others,  under  cover  of  the  battle  smoke,  strengthened  and  held 
it  until  the  close  of  the  engagement.  The  air  was  so  still 
and  moist  that  the  smoke  of  the  guns  settled  over  the  field 
and  after  a  half  hour's  fighting  it  was  almost  impossible  to 
see  any  object  along  the  line  at  a  distance  of  a  few  yards.1 
The  assault  further  to  the  left  of  the  Columbia  pike  was  just 
as  determined.  Our  guns  from  Fort  Granger  poured  an 
oblique  and  direct  fire  on  Stewart's  advancing  columns,  and 
those  distributed  along  the  line  poured  grape  and  canister  into 
their  front.  But  the  line  still  pressed  on  and  in  a  number  of 
places  reached  our  parapet,  where  a  hand  to  hand  conflict 
ensued.  The  heaviest  assault  seemed  to  be  directed  against 
our  center  and  left,  and  officers  of  all  ranks  joined  the  men 
in  desperate  efforts  to  break  our  lines.  General  John  Adams 
and  his  horse  were  both  killed  on  our  parapet.  Generals 
Quarles  and  Cockrell,  brigade  commanders,  were  severely 
wounded ;  General  Wathall,  division  commander,  had  two 
horses  shot  under  him  and  was  severely  bruised,  while  scores 
of  Colonels  and  officers  of  lesser  rank  were  killed  or  wounded 
by  the  sturdy,  cool  and  intrepid  men  of  General  Cox's  division. 
But  perhaps  the  enemy  suffered  the  heaviest  losses  in  the 
center  on  the  Columbia  pike.  There  General  Cleburne,  with 
the  same  brigades — Govan's,  Granbury's  and  Lowry's — which 
we  had  met  so  often  before,  fought  with  the  same  steadfast 
valor  and  he  and  General  Granbury,  whose  brigade  of  Texans 
had  slaughtered  us  in  that  awful  ravine  at  Pickett's 
Mill,  were  both  killed  near  our  works.  The  losses  in  Cle- 
burne's  division  were  appalling,  and  must  have  exceeded  the 
losses  of  our  division  at  Pickett's  Mill,  about  six  months 
before.  The  retribution,  if  such  it  may  be  called,  was  not 
exacted  by  our  division,  but  by  other  troops  of  the  Fourth 
Corps,  and  troops  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  who  stubbornly 
held  the  line  against  their  repeated  attacks. 

It  is  to  be  regretted  that  one  is  unable  to  find  in  the  War  of 
the  Rebellion  Records  any  report  of  this  battle  by  General  Cheat- 
ham,  or  of  any  one  for  him,  or  any  report  of  the  part  taken  by 
General  Cleburne's  division.  When  the  Confederate  Army  moved 
to  the  attack  Cleburne's  division  was  directly  west  of  the  Co- 

1     General  Cox's  report,  W.  R.  R.  93-354. 


SPRING  HILL  AND  FRANKLIN  615 

lumbia  pike.  It  must  have  crossed  the  pike  before  the  attack 
was  delivered,  for  it  was  General  Gordon's  brigade  of  Brown's 
division  which  first  came  through  our  line  on  the  pike,  and 
Brown's  division  was  to  the  west  of  Cleburne's  when  the  advance 
began.  Wherever  Cleburne  was  there  was  sure  to  be  firece  and 
hard  fighting,  and  this  was  the  case  at  Franklin. 

In  fact  the  entire  attacking  force  moved  with  a  steady  cour 
age  and  intrepidity  worthy  of  a  better  cause.  With  the  excep 
tion  of  that  portion  of  his  forces  which  so  closely  followed  Wag 
ner's  brigades  in  their  retreat  from  their  advanced  position,  that 
neither  our  artillery  or  infantry  could  fire  without  danger  of 
shooting  our  own  men,  his  whole  assaulting  lines  had  to  advance 
over  an  unobstructed  plain  from  800  to  1000  yards  wide,  ex 
posed  almost  every  step  of  the  way  to  the  fire  of  artillery  and 
infantry.  General  Stewart  says  that  the  ground  over  which 
Loring's,  his  right  division,  advanced,  was  perfectly  open  and 
unobstructed,  except  by  the  railroad  cut  and  the  osage  orange 
hedge  before  mentioned,  and  was  swept  by  a  terrible  cross  fire 
of  artillery  from  our  works  and  from  the  opposite  side  of  the 
Harpeth1  (Fort  Granger).  Major  General  Walthall  who  com 
manded  the  center  division  of  Stewart's  corps  says : 

"Both  officers  and  men  seemed  fully  alive  to  the  importance 
of  beating  the  enemy  here  at  any  cost,  and  the  line  moved  steadily 
forward  until  it  neared  his  outer  works,  and  then  fell  upon  it  so 
impetuously  that  the  opposing  force  gave  way  without  even  re 
tarding  the  advance  and  retired  in  disorder  to  the  strong  in- 
trenchments  in  rear.  There  was  an  extensive,  open,  and  almost 
unbroken  plain  between  the  outer  and  inner  lines  across  which 
we  must  pass  to  reach  the  latter.  This  was  done  under  far  the 
most  deadly  fire  of  both  small  arms  and  artillery  that  I  have  ever 
seen  troops  subjected  to."2 

The  ground  on  either  side  of  the  Columbia  pike  was  equally 
open  and  exposed  for  a  distance  of  nearly  a  mile.3  The  entire 
plain  was  swept  by  a  terrible  fire  from  our  small  arms  and 
artillery  and  the  charge  of  Hood's  veterans  across  it  was  as  cour 
ageous  as  Pickett's  charge  at  Gettysburg,  or  the  charge  at  Mis 
sionary  Ridge,  and  more  deadly  than  either.  But  it  was  met  by 
a  little  army  of  veterans  as  brave  as  themselves,  who  behind 
their  low  intrenchments  literally  slaughtered  them  as  they 
came  on.  After  the  momentary  panic  and  break  in  our  line  due 
to  Wagner's  retirement  at  the  beginning,  there  was  no  flinching, 
and  the  men  of  the  Fourth  and  Twenty-third  Corps  held  fast 

1  W.  R.  R.   93-708. 

2  W.  R.  R.  93-720. 

3  General  Cox's  report,  W.  R.  R.  93-350. 


616  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

against  superior  numbers  and  repeated  charges  until  near  mid 
night,  when  they  were  withdrawn.  At  a  number  of  places  along 
the  line  our  troops  held  one  side  of  the  parapet  and  the  enemy 
the  other  and  continued  in  such  positions  until  about  10  o'clock 
at  night.  In  one  place  to  the  west  of  the  Carter  house  the  enemy 
held  our  main  line  of  works  until  our  troops  were  withdrawn  at 
midnight.1 

While  the  infantry  was  engaged  in  the  fierce  struggle  above 
described  the  cavalry,  unknown  to  us,  was  fighting  an  important 
and  independent  battle  on  our  left  up  the  river.  It  is  described 
as  independent  because  General  Wilson  says,  "I  received  neither 
orders  nor  information  from  General  Schofield  during  the  con 
test  between  him  and  Hood,  although  I  was  not  two  miles  away."2 
General  Schofield  in  his  official  report  says  he  sent  such  orders, 
but  that  General  Wilson  had  anticipated  them.3  The  enemy's 
cavalry  under  General  Forrest  had  forced  a  crossing  of  the  Har- 
peth  and  at  3  p.  m.,  when  General  Beatty's  brigade  of  our  divi 
sion  was  ordered  to  Hughes  Mill,  as  before  stated,  was  threaten 
ing  our  connections  and  trains.  He  was  met  by  General  Wilson's 
cavalry  and  after  a  hot  encounter  which  lasted  until  nightfall, 
was  defeated  and  driven  back  across  the  river.4  This  made  safe 
the  infantry's  road  to  the  rear. 

The  losses  of  the  enemy  were  enormous,  especially  in  offi 
cers.  In  two  of  the  brigades,  Gist's  and  Quarle's,  when  the  battle 
ended,  the  highest  ranking  officer  present  for  duty  was  a  captain. 
All  of  higher  rank  had  been  either  killed  or  wounded.  Among  his 
General  Officers,  Major  General  Cleburne  and  Brigadier  Gener 
als  Gist,  Adams,  Strahl  and  Granbury  were  killed.  Major  Gen 
eral  Brown  and  Brigadier  Generals  Carter,  Manigault,  Quarles, 
Cockrell  and  Scott  were  wounded  and  General  George  W.  Gor 
don  was  captured.5  No  detailed  report  of  the  enemy's  aggregate 
losses  is  obtainable.  General  Hood  in  his  official  report  says: 
His  loss  was  4500,  but  General  Cox  in  his  official  report  says : 

"The  loss  of  the  enemy  we  are  enabled  to  approximate  with 
some  accuracy  from  the  public  admissions  from  their  commander 
as  well  as  from  the  statements  of  prisoners,  our  own  examina 
tion  of  the  field  when  it  came  into  our  possession,  and  the  state 
ments  of  citizens  and  hospital  attendants  remaining  in  Franklin. 
From  all  these  sources  the  testimony  is  abundant  that  the  rebels 
lost  six  general  officers  killed,  six  wounded  and  one  captured ; 
that  they  buried  1,800  men  on  the  field,  and  that  3800  were 

1  Report  of  Colonel  Capers,  W.  R.  R.  93-737. 

2  Under  the  Old  Flag,  Vol.  2,  pp.  49  and  53. 

3  W.  R.  R.  93-343. 

4  W.  R.  R.  93-343  and  1170,  and  "Under  the  Old  Flag,"  Vol.  2,  pp.  47  to  54. 

5  W.  R.  R.  93-654. 


SPRING  HILL  AND  FRANKLIN  617 

wounded.  The  number  of  prisoners  captured  by  the  Corps  (the 
Twenty-third)  was  702.  Thus  without  estimating  the  prisoners 
taken  by  the  Fourth  Corps,  who  are  known  to  have  been  numer 
ous,  the  enemy's  loss  was  not  less  than  6300. "*  The  losses  on  our 
side  in  battle  were  990  in  the  Twenty-third  Corps2  and  1368  in 
the  Fourth  Corps.3  In  the  War  of  the  Rebellion  Records  there 
is  given  a  list  furnished  to  General  S.  Cooper,  Adjutant  and  In 
spector  General  of  the  C.  S.  Army  giving  the  names  of  the  di 
vision,  brigade  and  regimental  commanders,  killed,  wounded, 
missing  and  captured  in  the  battle  of  Franklin,  November  30, 
1864.  Such  list  shows  a  loss  of  65  such  commanders,  and  it  is 
fair  to  presume  that  the  loss  of  other  officers  was  proportionately 
great.  It  may  be  truly  said  that  in  no  battle  of  the  war  was  the 
relative  loss  of  officers  so  great.  It  can  also  be  safely  affirmed 
that  in  no  great  battle  of  the  war  were  the  numbers  of  killed  in 
proportion  to  the  numbers  wounded  so  large. 

While  this  fierce  struggle  was  going  on,  the  Fifteenth  Ohio 
Volunteers,  with  the  first  and  second  brigades  of  the  division  lay 
quietly  on  the  hill  covering  the  left  flank,  awaiting  orders.  About 
3  :40  p.  m.,  General  Wood  received  an  order  from  General  Stan 
ley  directing  him  to  hold  his  force  in  readiness  to  cover  the  cross 
ing  of  the  river  in  case  the  enemy  who  was  advancing  in  heavy 
lines  should  break  our  lines  across  the  river.  Some  of  the  men 
slept  and  others  chased  and  captured  some  hogs  to  add  to  their 
meat  rations.  About  4  o'clock  from  the  top  of  the  hill  where  we 
were  posted,  we  saw  shells  bursting  in  the  air  beyond  the  town 
but  could  hear  no  explosion.  We  could  hear  no  boom  of  cannon 
or  rattle  of  musketry,  although  the  air  was  unusually  still.  The 
smoke  across  the  river  beyond  the  town  seemed  to  slightly  in 
crease,  but  still  there  was  no  sound  of  battle,  and  yet  we  were 
within  two  and  one  half  miles  of  the  battle  ground.  No  word 
came  to  us  telling  of  what  was  going  on,  and  the  men  were  as  ap 
parently  care-free  as  if  the  enemy  had  been  a  hundred  miles 
away.  The  adjutant  at  one  time  stood  beside  Colonel  Askew 
who  was  silently  watching  the  exploding  shells,  saw  the  grave 
look  on  his  face  and  judged  from  that  more  than  from  what  we 
saw,  that  there  was  serious  work  going  on  beyond  the  river. 
Gleason  in  his  diary  says :  "Artillery  firing  from  the  direction  of 
the  town  mingled  with  rapid  musketry  indicated  an  assault  of  the 
works  by  the  enemy  and  it  lasted  until  after  dark.  All  being 
quiet  on  our  front  across  the  river,  we  prepared  our  suppers  and 
after  the  sound  of  battle  had  died  away  we  were  ordered  back 

1  W.  R.  R.  93-355-356. 

2  W.   R.  R.   93-355. 

3  W.  R.  R.   93-125. 


618  FIFTEENTH  Omo  VOM.\TKKI;S  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

to  the  bridge".1  But  it  is  the  writer's  recollection  that  we  heard 
no  firing  until  we  descended  from  the  hill  and  moved  to  the 
river  to  cover  the  crossing  of  the  army  in  its  withdrawal ;  that 
we  then  first  heard  sounds  of  the  strife. 

The  writer's  recollection  is  confirmed  by  Major  Wm.  M. 
Clark,  surgeon  of  the  regiment,  who,  in  a  letter  dated  El  Cajon, 
California,  April  27th,  1914,  says: 

"I  have  no  recollection  of  seeing  bursting  shells  or  hearing 
any  sounds  of  battle  and  did  not  know  there  had  been  an  en 
gagement  until  towards  evening,  when — I  think — Rev.  Randall 
Ross  came  over  from  town  and  told  of  what  had  occurred.  Had 
we  known  a  battle  was  in  progress,  Major  McClenahan  and  I 
would  hardly  had  the  nerve  to  strip  off  and  take  baths  in  a  pool 
of  water  in  an  abandoned  quarry  in  the  rear  of  our  position, 
which  we  did  as  I  remember  distinctly.  The  only  shells  I  saw 
or  heard  were  those  that  were  fired  in  our  direction,  as  the  bridge 
was  burning  and  we  were  taking  up  our  line  of  retreat  towards 
Nashville." 

General  Thomas  on  the  afternoon  of  November  30th  had 
telegraphed  to  General  Schofield  that  one  of  General  A.  J. 
Smith's  divisions  was  still  behind  and  that  he  must  therefore  hold 
Hood  at  Franklin  until  those  troops  could  be  got  up,  and  asked 
if  he,  Schofield,  could  hold  Hood  three  days  longer.-  To  this 
General  Schofield  answered  at  3  p.  m.,  saying  in  substance,  that 
he  did  not  think  that  he  could  hold  Hood  for  more  than  a  day 
and  would  risk  something  in  doing  even  that ;  that  the  enemy 
had  two  corps  in  his,  Schofield's,  front  and  was  prepared  to 
cross  the  river  above  and  below ;  that  he,  Schofield,  thought  the 
enemy  could  cross  the  river  that  night  or  the  next  day  in  spite 
of  all  his  efforts  to  prevent  him,  and  that  Forrest  would  be  in 
his  rear  the  next  day  or  doing  some  greater  mischief.  He  also 
said  that  a  worse  positon  than  that  we  then  held  for  an  inferior 
force  could  not  be  found,  and  that  he  ought  to  take  position  at 
Brentwood  near  Nashville  at  once.3 

At  7:10  p.  m.  General  Schofield  telegraphed  to  General 
Thomas,  announcing  the  attack  of  the  enemy  and  his  repulse,  and 
was  cautioned  "to  look  out  that  the  enemy  does  not  still  persist."4 

After  the  receipt  of  this  last  dispatch.  General  Schofield 
issued  an  order  directing  that  the  troops  should  be  withdrawn 
from  the  south  bank  of  the  river  that  night  and  march  for  Brent- 
wood,  and  that  General  Wood's  division  should  cover  the  cross 
ing  and  act  as  rear  guard. r'  It  was  after  dark  when  this  order 

1  Gleason's  Diary.  4     W.  R.  R.  93-1171. 

2  W.  R.  R.  93-1170.  5     W.  R.  R.  93-1172. 

3  W.   R.   R.    93-1170. 


SPRING  HILL  AND  FRANKLII:  619 

reached  us  and  we  moved  down  from  the  hill  and  thence  along 
the  pike  toward  the  river.  When  we  struck  the  pike  we  first 
realized  that  a  heavy  battle  had  been  fought  across  the  river. 
There  was  the  usual  hurry  and  confusion  which  is  always  seen 
in  the  rear  of  a  fighting  army.  As  we  were  moving  slowly  to 
ward  the  river  quite  a  body  of  men  in  dusty  gray  uniforms  were 
being  hurried  to  the  rear  and  one  of  them  called  out,  "Where  is 
General  Askew?".  Colonel  Askew  had  ridden  back  to  the  rear 
for  some  purpose  and  the  adjutant  answered,  "This  is  Colonel 
Askew's  regiment".  Thereupon  a  soldier  in  gray  stepped  up  and 
handed  the  adjutant  a  note  for  General  Askew.  When  the 
colonel  came  up  the  adjutant  gave  him  the  note.  It  was  written 
on  a  piece  of  brown  wrapping  paper.  The  colonel  stopped  beside 
some  burning  cracker  boxes  and  read  the  following: 

"Dear  General  Askew: 

"I  plunged  my  brigade  through  your  center  on  the  Spring  Hill 
road  today  and  was  captured  with  my  command.  I  have  received  no 
injury  except  a  severe  bruise  from  a  musket,  in  the  hands  of  one  of  your 
men.  I  hope  you  have  escaped  personal  harm." 

"GORDON." 

It  was  the  same  Lieutenant  Colonel  George  W.  Gordon,  now 
Brigadier  General  Gordon,  with  whom  Colonel  Askew  had  be 
come  acquainted  when  they  were  carried  wounded  to  the  same 
room  at  Murfreesboro  during  the  battle  of  Stone  River. 

Our  brigade  moved  on  down  to  the  river  and  were  posted 
on  a  bluff  bank  just  west  of  the  railroad  bridge,  over  which  the 
left  of  our  fighting  line  was  to  cross.  Colonel  Post's  Second 
Brigade  of  our  division  was  stretched  along  down  the  river  on  our 
right  and  the  Third  Brigade,  General  Samuel  Beatty,  was  simi 
larly  placed  along  up  the  river  to  our  left.  We  waited  hour  after 
hour  for  the  withdrawal  to  begin.  Fnally,  about  midnight,  it 
was  reported  that  our  troops  on  the  other  side  of  the  river  were 
moving,  or  beginning  to  move.  All  at  once  some  villian  set  fire 
to  the  town.  The  light  from  the  burning  buildings  streamed 
over  the  surrounding  country  and  compelled  a  suspension  of  the 
movement. 

The  swearing  at  Columbia  was  mild  as  compared  to  that 
which  broke  loose  in  our  brigade  at  that  time,  led  of  course  by 
Colonel  Streight.  A  detail  of  100  men  was  sent  across  the  river 
and  under  the  direction  of  the  corps  and  division  staff  officers  the 
fire  was  soon  extinguished.  Our  skirmishers  in  front  across 
the  river  kept  up  a  brisk  fire  to  deceive  the  enemy  as  to  our  pur 
pose  to  withdraw,  and  soon  the  columns  began  to  cross  the  river; 
those  on  the  right  over  the  wooden  bridge  where  the  Columbia 


620  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUXTEEKS  AND  CAMI»AK;XS 

pike  crossed  the  river,  and  those  on  the  left  on  the  railroad  bridge, 
which  had  been  covered  with  plank. 

Just  north  of  the  crossings  great  piles  of  boxes  of  hard  tack 
and  side  bacon  had  been  knocked  apart,  the  bacon  cut  into  small 
pieces,  and  as  the  hungry  men  marched  by  each  helped  himself 
and  hurried  on  toward  Nashville. 

For  over  three  hours  we  stood  under  arms  while  our  weary 
comrades  marched  across  the  bridges  and  moved  on  to  the  north. 
When  it  was  thought  that  nearly  all  were  across,  we  gathered 
together  near  the  railroad  bridge  hundreds  of  those  empty 
cracker  boxes  with  which  to  set  fire  to  the  bridge.  General 
Streight  ordered  that  the  boxes  be  piled  on  the  bridge,  but  a 
staff  officer  of  General  Schofield  interposed,  saying  we  must  wait 
until  sure  that  the  troops  were  all  across.  This  caused  an  out 
break  of  profanity  from  Colonel  Streight.  Later  it  was  an 
nounced  that  all  were  across,  when  the  bridge  at  the  pike  was 
torn  up  and  the  cracker  boxes  were  piled  on  the  railroad  bridge 
and  the  torch  applied.  The  blaze  lighted  up  the  surrounding 
country  and  plainly  disclosed  the  position  of  our  brigade  stand 
ing  in  line  along  the  river  bank.  There  was  low  wooded  ground 
just  beyond  the  river,  and  we  felt  that  the  enemy  might  at  any 
moment  send  a  deadly  volley  into  our  exposed  ranks.  All  the 
troops,  except  our  brigade,  had  by  this  time  marched  on  north 
ward  and  we  were  ordered  to  remain  until  the  bridge  went  down. 
A  number  of  times  we  heard  commands  across  the  river  in  the 
dark  low  ground,  and  once  or  twice  thought  we  heard  moving 
artillery.  We  did  not  know  but  any  moment  we  would  receive 
a  storm  of  grape  and  canister  from  the  unseen  foe.  The  posi 
tion  was  very  trying  and  there  were  bursts  of  profanity  which, 
if  possible,  exceeded  anything  we  had  heard  before.  General 
Schofield  had  sent  one  of  his  staff  to  see  that  the  bridge  was  act 
ually  destroyed  before  our  brigade  was  withdrawn.  The  fire  on 
the  bridge  had  been  burning,  it  seemed  an  age,  and  Colonel 
Streight  insisted  on  moving  out,  but  the  staff  officer  protested 
that  we  must  not  go  until  the  bridge  fell.  There  then  occurred 
the  most  vicious  exchange  of  profane  oaths  we  ever  heard.  While 
this  was  going  on,  we  distinctly  heard  the  rattle  of  artillery  har 
ness  across  the  river.  Suddenly  the  bridge  fell  in,  and  in  an 
incredibly  short  time  we  were  hurrying  away  out  of  the  light 
of  the  burning  structure.  Fortunately,  our  officers  steered  the 
column  away  from  the  pike,  for  we  had  not  gone  more  than  a 
few  hundred  yards,  when  the  enemy's  artillery  opened  on  us 
They  mistook  our  direction  and  their  shots  went  wild,  but  it 
seemed  to  our  overwrought  nerves  the  wickedest  cannonading 
we  had  ever  heard.  It  was  then  after  4  a.  m.,  December  1.  We 


SPRING  HILL  AXD  FRANKLIN  621 

threw  out  a  strong  rear  guard  to  gather  up  the  stragglers,  sent 
out  small  squads  of  mounted  men  to  drive  in  all  live  stock  on  the 
farms  on  either  side  of  the  road  for  quite  a  distance,  set  fire 
to  all  ricks  and  stacks,  and  all  barns  containing  grain  or  forage. 
Looking  backward,  as  we  ascended  the  hills  on  our  toilsome 
march,  we  literally  saw  a  land  of  smoke  and  flame.  Our  rear 
guard  was  relieved  at  daylight  by  Wilson's  cavalry  which  had 
held  off  Forrest's  cavalry  and  guarded  our  flanks  during  the 
withdrawal  from  Franklin.1  We  pressed  on  until  we  reached 
Brentwood  and  halted  for  breakfast.  We  then  pushed  on  for 
Nashville  and  in  the  middle  of  the  afternoon  halted  at  one  of 
our  old  camps,  "Camp  Andy  Johnson",  and  had  our  dinner.  We 
then  moved  on  toward  the  city.  Filing  off  the  Franklin  pike  to 
the  left,  we  finally  reached  a  position  on  Lauren's  Hill  near  the 
Hillsborough  pike,  about  two  and  a  half  miles  southwest  of  the 
city,  and  were  formed  into  line.  As  our  corps  was  moving  into 
position  General  A.  J.  Smith's  corps,  so  long  and  anxiously 
awaited,  moved  up  and  went  into  position  on  our  right. 

1     "The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War,"  John  Fiske,  p.  343. 


CHAPTER  XXIX. 
HOOD'S  INVASION  OF  TENNESSEE — THE  BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE. 

When  we  reached  Nashville,  December  1,  1864,  the  men 
were  so  worn  out  that  nothing  was  required  of  them  but  to  take 
position  and  rest.1  Fortunately,  Hood's  army  had  suffered  so 
severely  at  Franklin  that  he  did  not  follow  us  up  as  vigorously 
as  from  Spring  Hill  to  Franklin,  and  as  A.  J.  Smith's  troops 
had  now  arrived  and  it  was  reported  that  General  Steedman  had 
arrived  from  Chattanooga  with  5000  men,  our  anxiety  was  much 
relieved,  and  we  enjoyed  a  few  hours  of  welcome  rest  and  re 
laxation. 

On  the  morning  of  December  2,  our  army  was  formed  in 
line  of  battle  south  of  Nashville  on  a  series  of  ridges  running 
north  of  west,  about  a  mile  and  a  half  from  the  city, — the  line 
facing  west  of  south.  On  the  left  was  the  Twenty-third  Corps, 
then  came  the  Fourth  (our)  Corps  and  to  our  right  was  General 
A.  J.  Smith's  command.  The  left  of  our  corps,  Kimball's  divi 
sion,  was  a  few  hundred  yards  east  of  the  Granny  White  pike, 
then  came  our  division,  whose  right  extended  over  to  and  beyond 
the  Hillsborough  pike,  and  then  came  Wagner's  division,  which 
connected  on  the  right  with  General  A.  J.  Smith's  command.2 
Our  brigade  was  to  the  right  and  in  front  of  Mrs.  Acklin's  resi 
dence,  its  left  on  Lauren's  Hill  and  its  right  extending  to  the 
Hillsborough  pike.3  The  cavalry  had  been  withdrawn  from  the 
Nolensville  pike  and  for  the  next  ten  days  was  encamped  and 
refitting  at  Edgefield  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Cumberland.4 
Some  time  in  the  forenoon  a  body  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  made 
its  appearance  on  the  pike  in  our  front,  skirmishing  with  our 
pickets,  and  in  the  afternoon  we  saw  from  the  hill  in  our  front 
columns  of  his  infantry  about  a  mile  and  a  half  away  moving 
toward  our  right  and  deploying  into  line  of  battle.  We  were  at 
once  ordered  to  throw  up  fortifications  to  resist  an  attack.  The 
Fifty-first  Indiana  was  on  the  left,  on  the  crest  of  the  hill ;  our 
regiment  was  on  its  right,  but  moved  further  to  the  right  down 
the  hill  to  make  room  for  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio.  The  Eighth 
Kansas  was  on  our  right,  and  to  its  right  was  the  Eighty-ninth 
Illinois.  We  soon  threw  up  a  formidable  line  of  intrenchments. 
The  ground  was  rocky  and  we  used  a  good  many  loose  stones  in 

1  Fuller-ton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.   93-151. 

2  Fuller-ton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.  93-152. 

3  Colonel  Streight's  report,  W.  R.  R.  93-294. 

4  General  Wilson's  report,  W.  R.  R.  93-550. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE  623 

its  construction.  After  it  was  finished  we  covered  it  with  a  fine 
abatis.  Our  regiment  was  then  moved  to  a  position  a  short  dis 
tance  back  of  the  line  and  placed  in  reserve  in  a  dense  thicket, 
where  we  had  to  clear  the  ground  to  get  room  to  put  up  tents. 
The  night  came  on  with  no  attack  by  the  enemy  and  we  slept  the 
sleep  of  tired  men. 

On  the  morning  of  December  3  we  found  a  gap  in  our  in-' 
trenchments  between  our  right  and  the  Eighth  Kansas,  and  our 
pioneers  were  set  to  work  to  close  it  by  works  similar  to  those 
we  had  built  the  day  before.  December  2,  General  Hood 
ordered  General  Lee  to  form  his  corps  with  its  center  resting  on 
the  Franklin  pike, — General  Cheatham's  to  form  his  corps  on 
Lee's  right,  and  General  Stewart  to  form  on  Lee's  left,  his  entire 
line  to  curve  forward  from  Lee's  center  so  that  the  right  of 
General  Cheatham's  corps  might  come  as  near  the  Cumberland 
river  above  Nashville  as  possible,  and  General  Stewart's  left  as 
near  as  possible  to  the  river  below  the  city, — the  line  to  be 
strengthened  and  extended  as  fast  as  possible.1  By  the  evening 
of  December  3,  the  enemy's  infantry  was  in  force  along  our  en 
tire  line  and  pressing  forward  so  as  to  reach  the  river,  both  above 
and  below  the  city.  On  the  first  day  of  December,  at  9  :30  p.  m., 
General  Thomas  sent  a  dispatch  to  General  Halleck  saying: 

"After  General  Schofield's  fight  of  yesterday,  feeling  con 
vinced  that  the  enemy  far  outnumbered  him,  both  in  infantry  and 
cavalry,  I  determined  to  retire  to  the  fortifications  about  Nash 
ville,  until  General  Wilson  can  get  all  his  cavalry  equipped.  He 
has  now  but  about  one  fourth  the  number  of  the  enemy,  and  con 
sequently  is  no  match  for  him.  I  have  two  iron  clads  here,  with 
several  gun  boats,  and  Commander  Fitch  assures  me  that  Hood 
can  neither  cross  the  Cumberland  nor  blockade  it.  I  therefore 
think  it  best  to  wait  here  until  Wilson  can  equip  all  his  cavalry. 
If  Hood  attacks  me  here,  he  will  be  more  seriously  damaged  than 
he  was  yesterday.  If  he  remains  until  Wilson  gets  equipped,  I 
can  whip  him  and  will  move  against  him  at  once.  I  have  Mur- 
freesborough  strongly  held  and  therefore  feel  easy  in  regard  to 
its  safety.  Chattanooga,  Bridgeport,  Stevenson  and  Elk  River 
bridge  have  also  strong  garrisons".2 

This  dispatch  created  alarm  at  Washington  and  Secretary 
Stanton  at  once  telegraphed  to  General  Grant  at  City  Point  say 
ing  that  President  Lincoln  felt  "solicitous  about  the  disposition 
of  General  Thomas  to  lay  in  fortifications  for  an  indefinite  period 
until  Wilson  gets  equipments''  and  added,  "this  looks  like  the 
McClellan  and  Rosecrans  strategy  of  do  nothing  and  let  the 

1  W.  R.  R.  94-640-641. 

2  W.   R.   R.   04-3. 


624  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

rebels  raid  the  country.  The  President  wishes  you  to  consider 
the  matter."1 

General  Grant  at  11  a.  m.,  December  2,  wired  General 
Thomas  as  follows : 

"If  Hood  is  permitted  to  remain  quietly  about  Nashville, 
you  will  lose  all  the  road  back  to  Chattanooga  and  possibly  have 
to  abandon  the  line  of  the  Tennessee.  Should  he  attack  you  it 
is  all  well,  but  if  he  does  not  you  should  attack  him  before  he 
fortifies.  Arm  and  put  in  the  trenches  your  quartermaster  em 
ployes,  citizens,  etc."2  Again  at  1  :30  p.  m.  General  Grant  tele 
graphed  : 

"With  your  citizen  employes  armed  you  can  move  out  of 
Nashville  with  all  your  army  and  force  the  enemy  to  retire  or 
fight  upon  ground  of  your  own  choosing.  After  the  repulse  of 
Hood  at  Franklin,  it  looks  to  me  that  instead  of  falling  back  on 
Nashville  we  should  have  taken  the  offensive  against  the  enemy 
where  he  was.  At  this  distance,  however,  I  may  err  as  to  the 
best  method  of  dealing  with  the  enemy.  You  will  now  suffer 
incalculable  injury  upon  your  railroads,  if  Hood  is  not  speedily 
disposed  of".3 

At  10  p.  m.  General  Thomas  answered  these  dispatches  say 
ing: 

"At  the  time  that  Hood  was  whipped  at  Franklin,  I  had  at 
this  place  but  about  5000  men  of  General  Smith's  command 
which,  added  to  the  force  under  General  Schofield,  would  not 
have  given  me  more  than  25,000  men,  besides  General  Schofield 
felt  convinced  that  he  could  not  hold  the  enemy  at  Franklin  until 
the  5,000  could  reach  him.  As  General  Wilson's  cavalry  force 
also  numbered  about  one-fourth  that  of  Forrest's  I  thought  it 
best  to  draw  the  troops  back  to  Nashville  and  wait  the  arrival  of 
the  remainder  of  General  Smith's  force,  and  also  a  force  of  5,000 
commanded  by  Major  General  Steedman,  which  I  had  ordered  up 
from  Chattanooga.  The  division  of  General  Smith  arrived  yes 
terday  morning,  and  General  Steedman's  troops  arrived  last 
night.  I  now  have  infantry  enough  to  assume  the  offensive,  if 
I  had  more  cavalry,  and  will  take  the  field  anyhow  as  soon  as  the 
remainder  of  General  McCook's  division  of  cavalry  reaches  here, 
which  I  hope  it  will  do  in  two  or  three  days.  We  can  neither 
get  reinforcements  nor  equipments  at  this  great  distance  from 
the  north  very  easily,  and  it  must  be  remembered  that  my  com 
mand  was  made  up  of  the  two  weakest  corps  of  Sherman's  army 
and  all  the  dismounted  cavalry  except  one  brigade,  and  the  task 
of  reorganizing  and  equipping  has  met  with  many  delays,  which 

1  W.   R.  R.   94-15.  3     W.  R.  R.   94-17. 

2  W.   R.   R.   94-17. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE  625 

have  enabled  Hood  to  take  advantage  of  my  crippled  condition. 
I  earnestly  hope,  however,  that  in  a  few  days  I  shall  be  able  to 
give  him  a  fight."1 

General  Grant  seemed  to  appreciate  General  Thomas'  need 
of  more  cavalry,  for  on  December  2,  he  suggested  to  Secretary 
Stanton  that  Thomas  be  given  authority  to  impress  horses  in 
Tennessee  and  Kentucky,  which  authority  Secretary  Stanton  at 
once  granted,  together  with  authority  to  impress  and  seize  every 
other  species  of  property  needed  for  the  military  service  in  his 
command.2  General  Grant  also  asked  General  Halleck  if  troops 
from  General  Hooker's  department,  (Ohio,  Indiana,  Illinois  and 
Michigan)  could  not  be  sent  to  General  Thomas  and  urged,  "If 
there  are  new  troops,  organized  state  militia,  or  anything  that 
can  go,  now  is  the  time  to  annihilate  Hood's  army."  He  also 
suggested  that  Governor  Bramlette  of  Kentucky  might  put  from 
5,000  to  10,000  horsemen  into  the  field  to  serve  only  to  the  end 
of  the  campaign.3  To  these  suggestions  General  Halleck,  De 
cember  3,  replied : 

"Every  available  man  from  Hooker's  and  other  western  de 
partments  has  been  sent  to  General  Thomas.  Hooker  is  already 
calling  for  more  men  to  guard  his  prisoners,  and  General  Fry  is 
getting  all  he  can  from  the  hospitals.  Thomas  was  authorized 
some  time  ago  to  call  on  the  Governors  of  any  western  state  for 
militia,  if  he  wanted  them.  He  himself  says  that  no  more  troops 
should  be  sent  from  Kentucky.  Loyal  Kentuckians  say  that  if 
Bramlette's  militia  are  armed  a  large  portion  of  them  will  join 
the  rebels,"  and  added,  "I  believe  that  every  possible  effort  has 
been  made  to  supply  General  Thomas'  demands  and  wants  so  far 
as  the  means  at  the  disposition  of  the  government  permitted."4 

The  first  two  weeks  of  December,  1864,  seem  to  have  been  a 
period  filled  with  apprenhensioon  and  anxiety.  Nothing  had  been 
heard  from  General  Sherman.  A  Confederate  column,  estimated 
as  containing  from  3000  to  10,000  troops,  under  General  Breck- 
enridge,  was  reported  as  advancing  into  Kentucky  from  East  Ten 
nessee,  and  another  similar  column  under  General  Lyon  was  ad 
vancing  from  Western  Tennessee  into  Kentucky  and  threatening 
our  railroad  communications.5  The  loyalty  of  Governor  Bram 
lette's  militia  was  suspected  and  many  Union  people  believed  that 
these  invasions  were  secretly  invited  by  Confederate  sympathizers 
and  that  the  larger  portion  of  such  militia  would  join  the  invad 
ers.  At  the  same  time  the  Confederate  refugees  and  conspirators 
in  Canada  were  reported  making  Greek  fire  at  Windsor  and  other 

1  W.   R.   R.   94-17.  4     W.  R.  R.  94-28. 

2  W.   R.  R.   94-18.  5     W.   R.   R.   94-63-79. 

3  W.  R.  R.  94-17. 


626  FIFTEENTH   OHIO  VOLUNTEEHS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

points,  to  use  in  a  campaign  of  incendiarism  in  the  lake  and  other 
northern  cities.1  The  Sons  of  Liberty  were  unusually  active,  and 
urgent  calls  were  made  for  additional  troops, — cavalry  and  ar 
tillery, — to  strengthen  the  garrisons  at  Rock  Island  and  Chicago 
and  protect  Detroit,  Cleveland  and  other  cities  from  plunder  and 
fire.2  This  period,  beginning  with  Hood's  invasion  of  Tennessee, 
seems  now  to  have  been  the  last  desperate,  despairing,  struggle  of 
Rebellion  in  the  Southwest,  into  which  was  thrown  all  the  accum 
ulated  venom  of  four  years  of  bloody  strife. 

General  Thomas's  confidence  that  the  two  iron  clads  and 
several  gun  boats  under  Commander  Fitch  could  prevent  Hood's 
crossing  the  Cumberland  or  blockading  it  was  soon  rudely  shat 
tered.  On  December  3,  the  enemy  planted  a  battery  at  Bell's 
Landing  a  few  miles  down  the  river  from  Nashville  and  turned 
back  a  steamer  loaded  with  troops  for  Nashville/0- 

Following  the  orders  and  suggestions  of  General  Grant  and 
the  War  Department,  there  was  intense  activity  at  Nashville  in 
preparation  for  an  immediate  attack  on  Hood's  army,  especially 
on  the  part  of  the  cavalry.  Orders  were  issued  making  details 
of  officers  and  men  for  a  general  impressment  of  horses,  saddles 
and  cavalry  equipment  of  all  kinds.  The  orders  were  imperative 
and  commanded  the  taking  of  every  horse  owned  by  or  under  the 
care  of  a  citizen.  The  writer  can  testify  that  it  was  rigidly  en 
forced.  He  was  persuaded  to  let  the  regimental  sutler  ride  his 
favorite  horse  into  the  city  and  it  was  taken  and  he  never  saw 
it  afterwards.  General  Wilson  in  his  absorbingly  interesting  book 
"Under  the  Old  Flag",  says :  "This  arbitrary  measure  was  en 
tirely  without  precedent  within  our  lines,  but  it  was  carried  ruth 
lessly  into  effect  while  the  contending  armies  were  facing  each 
other  in  front  of  Nashville.  Within  seven  days  after  the  Secre 
tary's  authority  came  to  hand  seven  thousand  horses  were  ob 
tained  in  middle  and  western  Kentucky,  and  our  mounted  force 
was  increased  to  twelve  thousand."  He  also  says,  "Every  horse 
and  mare  that  could  be  used  was  taken.  All  street  car  and  livery 
stable  horses  and  private  carriage  and  saddle  horses  were  seized. 
Even  Andrew  Johnson,  the  vice-president  elect,  was  forced  to 
give  up  his  pair  and  a  circus  then  at  Nashville  lost  everything 
except  its  ponies ;  even  the  old  white  trick  horse  was  taken,  but 
it  is  alleged  that  the  young  and  handsome  equestrienne,  who 
claimed  him,  succeeded  in  convincing  my  adjutant  general  that 
the  horse  was  unfit  for  cavalry  service."4 

By  December  4,  it  was  ascertained  that  Hood's  left  had  been 

1  W.  R.  R.  94-82.  3     W.  R.  R.  04-41. 

2  W.  R.  R.  94-41-42.  4     Under  the  Old  Flag,  Vol.  2,  pp.  33-34. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE  627 

extended  to  Bell's  Landing  on  the  Cumberland  River  ( four  miles 
below  Nashville)  and  that  Forrest  was  there  in  command.1 

December  5,  at  8  p.  m..  General  Grant  again  telegraphed  to 
General  Thomas  as  follows : 

"Is  there  not  danger  of  Forrest  moving  down  the  Cumber 
land  to  where  he  can  cross  it?  It  seems  to  me  whilst  you  should 
be  getting  up  your  cavalry  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  look  after 
Forrest,  Hood  should  be  attacked  where  he  is.  Time  strengthens 
him,  in  all  probability,  as  much  as  it  does  you."2 

The  same  evening  General  Thomas  telegraphed  General 
Halleck  that  he  had  been  along  his  entire  line  during  the  day,  and 
that  if  he  could  perfect  his  arrangements  he  would  move  against 
the  advanced  position  of  the  enemy  on  December  7.3  The  same 
day  General  Hammond  telegraphed  from  Gallatin.  which  is 
about  3  miles  north  east  of  Nashville,  to  General  Wilson,  that 
his  scouts  just  in,  had  been  chased  by  the  rebels  to  the  river,  that 
Breckenridge  with  three  brigades  of  8000  mounted  men  left 
Labanon,  a  town  about  35  miles  east  of  Nashville,  and  was  ex 
pected  to  cross  the  Cumberland  river  at  Carthage,  about  50  miles 
up  the  river  from  Nashville,  and  strike  for  the  railroad  at  Bowling 
Green,  and  that  citizens  reported  that  Forrest  would  cross  down 
the  river  near  Clarksville.4  December  5,  word  also  came  that  a 
strong  force  of  the  enemy  had  made  an  attack  on  Murfreesboro, 
which  however  had  been  repulsed.  These  alarming  reports  of  the 
enemy's  activity  caused  increased  apprehension  at  Washington, 
as  there  seemed  to  be  no  corresponding  activity  on  the  part  of 
our  army  at  Nashville. 

The  evening  of  December  6  General  Thomas  sent  a  dispatch 
to  General  Grant  acknowledging  his  telegram  of  8  p.  m.  Decem 
ber  5,  and  saying  that  as  soon  as  he  could  get  up  a  respectable 
force  of  cavalry  he  would  march  against  Hood,  that  he  had  no 
doubt  Forrest  would  attempt  to  cross  the  river,  but  was  in  hopes 
the  gun  boats  would  prevent  him,  and  that  Breckenridge  was  re 
ported  at  Lebanon,  Tenn.,  with  6000  men,  but  he  could  not  be 
lieve  it.5  These  reports  were  sent  to  General  Grant  at  City  Point, 
Va.  who  at  4  p.  m.  December  6,  telegraphed  General  Thomas: 
"Attack  Hood  at  once  and  wait  no  longer  for  a  remount  of  your 
cavalry.  There  is  great  danger  of  delay  resulting  in  a  campaign 
back  to  the  Ohio  River."6  At  0  p.  m.  the  same  day,  General 
Thomas  acknowledged  receipt  of  the  telegram  and  said  "I  will 
make  the  necessary  dispositions  and  attack  Hood  at  once,  aggree- 

1  W.  R.  R.  94-44.  4     W.  R.  R.  94-63. 

2  W.  R.  R.  94-55.  5     W.  R.  R.  94-70. 

3  W.  R.  R.  94-.",.  6     W.  R.  R.  94-70. 


628  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

able  to  your  order,  though  I  believe  it  will  be  hazardous  with  the 
small  force  of  cavalry  now  at  my  service."1 

December  7,  at  1 :30  p.  m.,  General  Grant  telegraphed  to 
Secretary  Stanton : 

"You  probably  saw  my  order  to  Thomas  to  attack.  If  he 
does  not  do  it  promptly,  I  would  recommend  superseding  him 
by  Schofield,  leaving  Thomas  subordinate.2 

December  7  at  9  p.  m.,  General  Thomas  sent  a  message  to 
General  Halleck  saying  among  other  things  that  a  convoy  of 
transport  steamers  had  not  been  able  to  get  down  the  Cumberland 
River  because  of  the  enemy's  batteries,3  but  said  nothing  about 
attacking  Hood's  army. 

December  8  at  4  p.  m.,  General  Grant  asked  General  Halleck 
to  direct  General  Dodge,  who  was  in  command  at  St.  Louis,  to 
send  all  the  troops  he  could  spare  to  General  Thomas,  and  sug 
gested  that  they  had  probably  better  be  sent  to  Louisville,  as  he 
feared  either  Hood  or  Breckenridge  would  get  to  the  Ohio  River. 
He  also  suggested  calling  on  Ohio,  Indiana  and  Illinois  for  60,000 
men  for  thirty  days  and  added,  "If  Thomas  has  not  struck  yet, 
he  ought  to  be  ordered  to  hand  over  his  command  to  Schofield. 
There  is  no  better  man  to  repel  an  attack  than  Thomas,  but  I  fear 
he  is  too  cautious  to  ever  take  the  initiative."4  At  8  :30  p.  m. 
the  same  afternoon.  General  Grant  dispatched  to  General  Thomas 
as  follows:  "Your  dispatch  of  yesterday  received.  It  looks  to 
me  evident  the  enemy  are  trying  to  cross  the  Cumberland  River, 
and  are  scattered.  Why  not  attack  at  once?  By  all  means  avoid 
the  contingency  of  a  foot  race  to  see  which,  you,  or  Hood,  can 
beat  to  the  Ohio.  If  you  think  necessary  call  on  the  Governors 
of  States  to  send  a  force  into  Louisville  to  meet  the  enemy  if 
he  should  cross  the  river.  You  clearly  never  should  cross  except 
in  rear  of  the  enemy.  Now  is  one  of  the  finest  opportunities 
ever  presented  of  destroying  one  of  the  three  armies  of  the 
enemy.  If  destroyed  he  can  never  replace  it.  Use  the  means 
at  your  command  and  you  can  do  this  and  cause  a  rejoicing  that 
will  resound  from  one  end  of  the  land  to  the  other."5 

General  Grant's  suggestion  that  General  Thomas  be  relieved 
and  General  Schofield  be  placed  in  command  at  Nashville  did  not 
meet  with  favor  at  Washington  for  at  9  p.  m.,  December  8,  after 
he  had  sent  the  last  above  quoted  dispatch  to  General  Thomas, 
General  Halleck  telegraphed  him: 

"If  you  wish  General  Thomas  relieved  from  command,  give 
the  order.  No  one  here  will,  I  think,  interfere.  The  responsi- 

1  W.  R.  R.  94-70.  4     W.  R.  R.  94-96. 

2  W.  R.  R.  94-84.  5     W.  R.  R.  94-97. 

3  W.  R.  R.  94-85. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE  629 

bility,  however,  will  be  yours,  as  no  one  here,  so  far  as  I  am  in 
formed,  wishes  General  Thomas'  removal''.1  At  10  p.  m.,  the  same 
evening,  General  Grant  answered  this  dispatch  saying:  "Your 
dispatch  of  9  p.  m.  just  received.  I  want  General  Thomas  re 
minded  of  the  importance  of  immediate  action.  I  sent  him  a 
dispatch  this  evening  (the  dispatch  dated  8:30  p.  m.)  which  will 
probably  urge  him  on.  I  would  not  say  relieve  him  until  I  hear 
further  from  him."1 

The  reports  from  various  points  on  December  8,  show  that 
on  that  day  the  enemy  had  placed  a  large  artillery  force  on  the 
south  bank  of  the  Cumberland  river  between  Nashville  and  the 
Harpeth  shoals ;  that  one  of  our  gun  boats  had  come  to  grief  at 
Bells  Ferry  or  Landing,  and  that  the  Confederate  General  Lyon 
held  the  same  bank  of  the  river  below  Harpeth  to  Fort  Donelson.2 
The  river  was  falling,  and  the  larger  gun  boats  in  the  squadron 
patroling  the  river  would  soon  have  to  get  below  into  deeper 
water.  A  strong  force  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  had  crossed  the 
river  below  the  mouth  of  the  Harpeth  and  were  reported  moving 
up  the  river  to  strike  the  Springfield  pike,  taking  cattle  and  every 
thing  within  reach.-'5 

A  council  of  war  was  called  to  meet  at  General  Thomas' 
headquarters,4  and  it  is  safe  to  assume  it  did  not  favor  imme 
diate  action.  That  evening  at  7  o'clock,  General  Wilson,  com 
manding  the  cavalry,  after  conference  with  his  division  com 
manders,  reported  to  General  Thomas  that  "his  forces  could  not 
be  assembled  and  put  in  proper  condition  to  move  in  a  general 
campaign  before  Sunday  afternoon"  (December  11),  and  inti 
mated  the  hope  that  the  movement  might  be  delayed  until  Mon 
day,  December  12."' 

In  the  meantime,  the  authorities  at  Washington  and  General 
Grant  were  growing  more  and  more  impatient  over  General 
Thomas'  delay.  At  10:30  a.  m.,  December  9,  General  Halleck 
telegraphed  him: 

"General  Grant  expresses  much  dissatisfaction  at  your  delay 
in  attacking  the  enemy.  If  you  wait  until  General  Wilson  mounts 
all  his  cavalry,  you  will  wait  till  dooms-day,  for  the  waste  equals 
the  supply.  Moreover  you  will  soon  be  in  same  condition  that 
Rosecrans  was  last  year, — with  so  many  animals  that  you  can  not 
feed  them.  Reports  already  come  of  a  scarcity  of  forage."6 

At  11  a.  m..  General  Grant  telegraphed  to  General  Halleck 
as  follows : 

1  W.  R.  R.  94-9«. 

•2  W.  R.  R.  94-97. 

3  W.  R.  R.  94-101. 

4  W.  R.  R.  94-103.     See  also  Under  the  Old  Flag,  Vol.  2,  pp.  79  et  seq 
r>  W.  R  .R.  94-106. 

6     W.  R  .R.  94-114.     See  "Under  the  Old  Flag,"  Vol.  2,  pp.  87  et  seq. 


630  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

"Dispatch  of  8  p.  m.,  last  evening  from  Nashville  shows  the 
enemy  scattered  for  more  than  seventy  miles  down  the  river  and 
no  attack  yet  made  by  Thomas.  Please  telegraph  orders  reliev 
ing  him  at  once  and  placing  Schofield  in  command.  Thomas 
should  be  directed  to  turn  over  all  orders  and  dispatches  received 
since  the  battle  of  Franklin  to  Schofield."1 

In  accordance  with  this  dispatch  an  order  of  the  War  De 
partment  was  prepared  for  the  President's  signature,  whereby 
General  Thomas  was  relieved  and  General  Schofield  placed  in 
command  of  all  the  troops  in  the  Departments  of  the  Cumberland, 
the  Ohio  and  the  Tennessee,  but  was  not  signed.2  In  two  hours 
after  General  Grant  had  taken  this  radical  step,  General  Thomas 
answered  Grant's  message  of  8  :30  p.  m.  the  day  before,  above 
quoted,  saying: 

"I  had  nearly  completed  my  preparations  to  attack  the  enemy 
tomorrow  morning,  but  a  terrible  storm  of  freezing  rain  has 
come  on  today,  which  will  make  it  impossible  for  our  men  to 
fight  at  any  advantage.  I  am  therefore  compelled  to  wait  for  the 
storm  to  break  and  make  the  attack  immediately  after.  Admiral 
Lee  is  patroling  the  river  above  and  below  the  city  and  I  believe 
will  be  able  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  crossing.  There  is  no 
doubt  but  that  Hood's  forces  are  considerably  scattered  along 
the  river  with  the  view  of  atempting  a  crossing,  but  it  has  been 
impossible  for  me  to  organize  and  equip  the  troops  for  an  attack 
at  an  earlier  time.  Major  General  Halleck  informs  me  that  you 
are  very  much  dissatisfied  with  my  delay  in  attacking.  I  can 
only  say  I  have  done  all  in  my  power  to  prepare,  and  if  you 
should  deem  it  necessary  to  relieve  me  I  shall  submit  without  a 
murmur."3 

An  hour  later  General  Thomas  sent  a  similar  dispatch  to 
General  Halleck  and  at  4:10  p.  m.,  the  latter  forwarded  it  to 
General  Grant,  stating  that  the  order  relieving  General  Thomas 
had  been  made  out  when  it  was  received,  and  saying,  "If  you 
still  wish  these  orders  telegraphed  to  Nashville  they  will  be  for 
warded."4 

At  5:30  p.  m..  General  Grant  dispatched  to  General  Hal 
leck,  saying: 

"General  Thomas  has  been  urged  in  every  way  possible  to 
attack  the  enemy,  even  to  the  giving  the  positive  order.  He  did 
say  he  thought  he  would  be  able  to  attack  on  the  7th,  but  did  not 
do  so,  nor  has  he  given  a  reason  for  not  doing  it.  I  am  very 
unwilling  to  do  an  injustice  to  an  officer  who  has  done  as  much 

1  W.  R.  R.  94-115.  3      W.  R.  R.   &J-115. 

2  W.  R.  R.  94-116.  4      W.  II.  R.  &4-116. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE  631 

good  service  as  Thomas  has,  however,  and  will  therefore  sus 
pend  the  order  relieving  him  until  it  is  seen  whether  he  will  do 
anything.''1  Two  hours  later,  at  7  :30  p.  m.,  General  Grant  sent 
the  following  dispatch  to  General  Thomas : 

"Your  dispatch  of  1  p.  m.  received.  I  have  as  much  confi 
dence  in  your  conducting  a  battle  rightly  as  I  have  in  any  other 
officer,  but  it  has  seemed  to  me  that  you  have  been  slow,  and  I 
have  had  no  explanation  of  affairs  to  convince  me  otherwise. 
Receiving  your  dispatch  of  2  p.  m.  from  General  Halleck,  before 
I  did  the  one  to  me  I  telegraphed  to  suspend  the  order  relieving 
you  until  we  should  hear  further.  I  hope  most  sincerely  that 
there  will  be  no  necessity  of  repeating  the  orders,  and  that  the 
facts  will  show  that  you  have  been  right  all  the  time/'-' 

That  night  at  11:30  p.  m.,  General  Thomas  answered  the 
last  quoted  dispatch  saying: 

"Your  dispatch  of  7:30  p.  m.,  is  just  received.  I  can  only 
say  in  further  explanation  why  I  have  not  attacked  Hood,  that 
1  could  not  concentrate  my  troops  and  get  their  transportation 
in  order  in  shorter  time  than  it  has  been  done,  and  am  satisfied 
I  have  made  every  effort  that  was  possible  to  complete  the  task/'3 
Owing  to  "the  terrible  storm  of  freezing  rain"  mentioned  in 
General  Thomas'  above  quoted  dispatches,  orders  for  an  attack 
on  Hood's  army  on  the  morning  of  December  10,  were  sus 
pended.  The  storm  continued  during  the  9th  and  10th,  and  then 
turned  cold  and  left  the  ground  a  glare  of  ice  which  made  it 
difficult  to  get  from  place  to  place  on  foot  and  dangerous  to  try 
to  do  so  mounted. 

On  the  10th,  General  Wood,  who  was  commanding  the 
Fourth  Corps,  in  answer  to  an  inquiry  by  General  Thomas  as  to 
the  condition  of  the  ground  between  our  line  and  the  enemy's 
said,  "The  ground  is  covered  with  a  heavy  sleet  which  would 
make  the  handling  of  troops  difficult,  if  not  impracticable."4 

On  the  llth  and  12th  there  were  meetings  of  the  corps  com 
manders  at  General  Thomas'  headquarters.  At  these  meetings  it 
was  decided  that  we  could  not  move  to  attack  the  enemy,  or  even 
to  demonstrate  against  him,  until  the  ice  and  sleet  that  covered 
the  ground  thawed. r> 

While  our  army  was  thus  ice  bound  at  Nashville  and  ap 
parently  immovable,  the  enemy  seems  not  to  have  ceased  his 
activity.  December  10,  General  Meredith  from  Paducah  re 
ported  to  General  Thomas  that  the  Confederate  Generals  Lyon 
and  Cheatham  had  crossed  the  Tennessee  River  on  the  8th  with 

1     W.  R.  R.  94-110.  4     Fullerton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.  93-154. 

•2     W.  R.  R.  94-11.1.  5     Fullertons'  Journal,  W.  R.  R.  93-154. 

M     W.  R.  R.  94-lir.. 


632  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

2000  to  2500  men  and  six  guns  and  were  probably  making  for 
Green  River  Bridge  on  the  Lousville  and  Nashville  Railroad.1 

General  Watkins,  who,  with  his  cavalry  brigade,  was  at 
Edgefield,  was  sent  by  rapid  marches  to  Bowling  Green  to  head 
off  General  Lyon2  and  General  Long,  who  was  at  Louisville  re 
mounting  his  command,  was  directed  to  operate  against  him  from 
that  point.3 

The  same  day  a  dispatch  from  the  commanding  officer  at 
Fort  Donelson  stated  that  the  day  before,  General  Lyon,  C.  S.  A., 
had  captured  the  transport  "Thomas  E.  Tutt"  at  Cumberland 
City,  20  miles  above  that  point,  and  had  crossed  the  Cumberland 
River  with  his  division,  numbering  about  4000  men,  and  was 
reported  as  marching  upon  Hopkinsville,  Ky., — also  that  an  at 
tack  was  anticipated  in  Clarksville.4  On  the  same  day  it  was 
reported  by  General  Hooker  that  a  Major  Taylor  of  the  C.  S.  A. 
with  400  armed  men  was  at  Haynesville  opposite  Carroll-ton,  Ind., 
recruiting  and  conscripting  for  the  Confederate  army.5  These 
reports  of  course  were  forwarded  to  General  Grant  at  City  Point, 
who  at  4  p.  m.,  December  11,  again  telegraphed  General  Thomas 
as  follows : 

"If  you  delay  attack  longer  the  mortifying  spectacle  will  be 
witnessed  of  a  rebel  army  moving  for  the  Ohio  River,  and  you 
will  be  forced  to  act,  accepting  such  weather  as  you  find.  Let 
there  be  no  further  delay.  Hood  cannot  stand  even  a  drawn 
battle  so  far  from  his  supplies  of  ordnance  stores.  If  he  retreats 
and  you  follow,  he  must  lose  his  material  and  much  of  his  army. 
I  am  in  hopes  of  receiving  a  dispatch  from  you  today  announcing 
that  you  have  moved.  Delay  no  longer  for  weather  or  rein 
forcements."0 

At  9  :30  p.  m..  General  Thomas  sent  a  dispatch  to  General 
Halleck  saying  that  the  appearance  of  the  enemy  in  his  front 
appeared  the  same  as  the  day  before,  that  the  weather  continued 
very  cold,  that  the  hills  were  covered  with  ice  and  that  as  soon 
as  there  was  a  thaw  he  would  attack  Hood.  He  also  repeated  the 
report  that  General  Lyon  had  crossed  the  Cumberland  and  said 
he  had  sent  two  brigades  of  cavalry  to  intercept  him,  that  General 
Rousseau  at  Murfreesboro  had  reported  that  Bate's  division  of 
Cheatham's  corps  had  threatened  that  place  on  the  fith  and  7th 
instants,  and  that  on  the  7th  General  Milroy  with  six  regiments 
of  infantry  and  a  battery  of  artillery  had  got  on  Bate's  flank  and 
routed  him,  capturing  two  pieces  of  artillery  and  207  prisoners  of 
whom  18  were  officers.7  General  Thomas  did  not  answer  General 


1  W.  R.  R.  94-139.  r»  W.  R.  R.  94-140. 

2  W.   R.   R.    94-136.  6  W.  R.  R.  94-143. 

3  W.  R.  R.   94-136.  7  W.  R.  R.   94-143. 

4  W.   R.   R.   94-140. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE  633 

Grant's  dispatch  last  above  quoted  until  11:30  p.  m.,  December 
11,  and  then  said: 

"Your  dispatch  of  -4  p.  m.,  this  day  is  just  received.  I  will 
obey  the  order  as  promptly  as  possible,  however  much  I  may 
regret  it,  as  the  attack  will  have  to  be  made  under  every  disad 
vantage.  The  whole  country  is  covered  with  a  perfect  sheet  of 
ice  and  sleet,  and  it  is  with  difficulty  the  troops  are  able  to  move 
about  on  level  ground.  It  was  my  intention  to  attack  Hood  as 
soon  as  the  ice  melted,  and  would  have  done  so  yesterday,  had 
it  not  been  for  the  storm."1 

General  Thomas  at  once  sent  word  to  his  corps  commanders 
to  have  their  commands  "put  in  readiness  tomorrow  for  opera 
tions,"  and  asked  them  to  call  at  his  headquarters  at  3  p.  m.  the 
next  day, — the  12th.2  Telegrams  from  Clarksville  brought  fur 
ther  reports  of  General  Lyon's  crossing  the  Cumberland  and 
stated  that  the  boat  "Ben  South"  had  been  burned  by  General 
Lyon  at  Cumberland  City,  20  miles  below  Clarksville,  and  that 
the  tow  boat  "Echo"  and  steamer  "Thomas  E.  Tutt"  loaded  with 
grain  and  troops  coming  up  the  river  were  also  captured  and 
destroyed  at  the  same  place.3  To  add  to  the  trouble  Admiral 
Lee  who  was  at  Clarksville,  wired  General  Thomas  that  the  river 
was  so  low  that  his  flag  boat  the  "Cincinnati"  could  not  get  over 
the  shoals  just  above  Cumberland  City  so  as  to  reach  the  enemy.4 

December  12,  at  10:30  p.  m.,  General  Thomas  reported  to 
General  Halleck  at  Washington  that  he  had  his  troops  ready  to 
attack  the  enemy  as  soon  as  the  sleet  had  sufficiently  melted  to 
enable  the  men  to  march.  That  the  whole  country  was  then 
covered  with  a  sheet  of  ice  so  hard  and  slippery  that  it  was  utter 
ly  impossible  for  troops  to  ascend  the  slopes,  or  even  move  over 
level  ground  in  anything  like  order ;  that  it  had  taken  the  entire 
day  to  place  his  cavalry  in  position  and  that  it  had  only  been 
finally  affected  with  imminent  risk  and  many  serious  accidents, — • 
resulting  from  the  number  of  horses  falling  on  their  riders  on 
the  roads, — and  that  under  these  circumstances  he  believed  that 
"an  attack  at  this  time  would  result  in  a  useless  waste  of  life."5 

At  9  p.  m.,  December  13,  he  again  telegraphed  to  General 
Halleck  as  follows : 

"At  length  there  are  indications  of  a  change  in  the  weather, 
and  as  soon  as  there  is,  I  shall  move  against  the  enemy,  as  every 
thing  is  ready  and  prapared  to  assume  the  offensive."6 

The  same  day  word  came  that  the  enemy  under  General 
Lyon  had  occupied  Hopkinsville,  Ky.  the  day  before,  and  had 

1  W.  R.  R.  94-143.  4     W.  R.  R.  94-144. 

2  W.  R.  R.  94-147.  5     W.  R.  R.  94-155. 

3  W.  R.  R.  94-145.  6     W.  R.  R.  94-168.  Sig.    21 


634  FIFTEENTH  Omo  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

burned  a  forty-foot  trestle  on  the  railroad,  ten  miles  from  Clarks- 
ville.1  General  Grant  was  anxiously  waiting  for  a  report  that 
our  army  under  General  Thomas  had  begun  the  attack  on  the 
enemy  at  Nashville.  Still  impatient  at  General  Thomas'  delay, 
on  December  18,  he  issued  an  order  directing  General  John  A. 
Logan,  who  was  then  at  City  Point,  to  proceed  immediately  to 
Nashville,  Term.,  reporting  by  telegraph  his  arrival  at  Louisville 
and  also  his  arrival  at  Nashville.2  An  order  was  given  to  Gen 
eral  Logan  directing  him  to  relieve  General  Thomas,  but  he  was 
directed  not  to  deliver  or  publish  it  until  he  reached  Nashville. 
If  Thomas  had  moved  he  was  not  to  deliver  it  at  all,  but  report 
to  General  Grant  by  telegraph.  After  General  Logan  had  start 
ed.  General  Grant  became  restless  over  the  situation  and  decided 
to  go  in  person  to  Nashville.3 

The  whole  country  was  alarmed,  fearing  that  Hood's  army 
would  get  across  the  Cumberland  and  transfer  the  seat  of  war 
to  the  Ohio  river.  At  12:30  p.  m.,  December  14,  General  Hal- 
leek  voicing  such  alarm  again  telegraphed  General  Thomas : 

"It  has  been  seriously  apprehended  that  while  Hood  with  a 
part  of  his  forces  held  you  in  check  near  Nashville,  he  would 
have  time  to  operate  against  other  important  points  left  only 
partially  protected.  Hence  General  Grant  was  anxious  that  you 
should  attack  the  rebel  force  in  your  front,  and  expressed  great 
dissatisfaction  that  his  orders  had  not  been  carried  out.  More 
over,  so  long  as  Hood  occupies  a  threatening  position  in  Ten 
nessee,  General  Canby  is  obliged  to  keep  a  large  force  upon  the 
Mississippi  River  to  protect  its  navigation  and  to  hold  Memphis, 
Vicksburg,  etc.,  although  General  Grant  had  directed  a  part  of 
these  forces  to  co-operate  with  General  Sherman.  Every  day's 
delay  on  your  part,  therefore  seriously  interferes  with  General 
Grant's  plans.''4  That  evening  at  8  o'clock  General  Thomas  ans 
wered  this  last  dispatch  of  General  Halleck,  saying:  "The  ice 
having  melted  away  today,  the  enemy  will  be  attacked  tomorrow 
morning."5  General  Grant  reached  Washington  on  his  way  to 
Nashville,  presumably  just  after  this  dispatch  from  General 
Thomas  was  received,  for  he  says  in  his  memoirs,  "I  went  as  far 
as  Washington  City,  when  a  dispatch  was  received  from  General 
Thomas  announcing  his  readiness  at  last  to  move  and  designating 
the  time  of  his  movement.  I  concluded  to  wait  until  that  time. 
He  did  move  and  was  successful  from  the  start.0 

While  the  events  covering  the  wider  field  of  our  military 
operations  related  in  this  chapter  were  transpiring,  and  the  War 

1  W.  R.  R.  94-176-177.  4     W.  R.  R.  94-180. 

2  W.  R.  R.  94-171.  5     W.  R.  R.  94-180. 

3  Grant's  Memoirs  and  W.  R.  R.  94-195.        <>     Grant's  Memoirs,  Vol.  2,  p.  383. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE  635 

Department  and  General  Grant  were  urging  General  Thomas  to 
hastier  action,  as  shown  by  the  dispatches  given  above,  the  regi 
ment  was  lying  with  the  brigade  on  Lauren's  Hill  in  the  same 
position  we  left  it  on  December  2. 

On  December  3,  from  the  top  of  the  hill  in  our  front,  we  saw 
what  appeared  to  be  new  earth  works  thrown  up  by  the  enemy. 
Our  pickets  in  front  were  firing  occasionally,  when  suddenly  we 
saw  the  enemy's  skirmishers  advancing  and  in  rear  of  them  a 
strong  line  of  battle  also  advancing.  There  was  a  rapid  increase 
of  skirmish  firing  along  the  line  and  Colonel  Askew,  who  was 
watching  the  enemy's  movements,  hastened  back  and  gave  orders 
to  send  our  baggage  to  the  rear  and  prepare  for  battle.1  After 
a  few  minutes  the  skirmish  firing  subsided,  and  we  learned  that 
the  enemy  was  only  advancing  his  line  in  our  front  to  a  more  fav 
orable  position  for  intrenching  it,  which  our  superior  officers  did 
not  oppose.  That  night  we  heard  cannonading  to  our  right  near 
the  river.  On  the  morning  of  December  4,  we  stood  to  arms  at 
early  dawn  awaiting  an  attack  which  did  not  come.  During  the 
forenoon,  looking  to  our  left  from  Lauren's  Hill,  we  were  sur 
prised  to  see  the  enemy  throwing  up  fortifications  apparently 
under  the  very  noses  of  our  men.  He  had  occupied  Montgomery 
Hill  about  800  yards  in  our  front  during  the  night,  and  his  rifle 
pits  were  in  plain  view.  One  or  two  of  our  men  had  been  wound 
ed  by  his  skirmishers  while  inside  our  works.  The  rifle  pits  oc 
cupied  by  our  pickets  were  in  a  hollow  in  our  front,  and  the 
ground  between  them  and  our  main  line  was  so  much  exposed 
to  the  enemy's  fire  that  we  could  only  relieve  them  at  night.  One 
of  our  batteries  went  into  position  on  our  line  and  soon  put  a 
stop  to  the  enemy's  work  on  his  fortifications.  A  number  of  our 
batteries  opened  on  the  enemy,  but  he  was  evidently  saving  his 
ammunition  for  he  did  not  reply.  On  the  5th  and  6th  there  was 
the  usual  desultory  picket  firing  and  our  batteries  kept  firing 
at  intervals.  On  the  6th  the  enemy  fired  a  few  shots  from  two 
guns  on  Montgomery  Hill  which  did  little  damage.  On  the  7th 
the  enemy  was  reported  moving  a  considerable  force  to  our  right 
opposite  General  A.  J.  Smith's  command,  and  extending  his 
works  in  the  same  direction.2  Our  skirmish  line  was  reinforced 
by  a  company  of  the  Fifty-first  Indiana  for  the  purpose  of  mak 
ing  a  forward  movement,  but  the  movement  was  not  ordered. 

The  morning  of  December  8,  was  the  coldest  we  had  so  far 
experienced  during  the  winter  and  it  was  difficult  to  keep  warm. 
The  enemy  made  a  demonstration  on  the  first  division  of  our 
corps  to  our  left  in  front  of  Fort  Negley,  driving  in  our  skirm- 

1  C  lea  son's  Diary. 

2  Fuller-ton's  Diary,  W.  R.  R.  93-153. 


636  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUXTEEKS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

ishers,  and  we  were  called  into  line  prepared  for  an  attack.  The 
enemy's  skirmishers  were  finally  repulsed  and  driven  back  and 
our  pickets  resumed  their  former  posts. 

On  Friday,  December  9,  early  in  the  morning,  there  was  a 
storm  of  sleet  and  snow  which  continued  all  day,  and  it  grew  so 
cold  the  men  crowded  together  in  their  tents  to  keep  warm.  It 
was  reported  that  an  order  to  move  against  the  enemy  next  morn 
ing  had  been  issued,  but  was  afterwards  countermanded  because 
of  the  storm.  There  was  a  good  deal  of  picket  firing  during  the 
day.  It  was  reported  that  we  were  to  be  in  readiness  to  move 
against  the  enemy  as  soon  as  the  storm  was  over.  December  10, 
the  storm  had  practically  ceased,  but  it  was  very  cold  and  the 
ground  was  covered  with  sleet  and  snow,  and  it  was  very  diffi 
cult  to  get  about.  The  enemy  was  seen  working  on  a  new  and 
interior  line  of  works,  parallel  to  and  about  half  a  mile  in  rear 
of  his  first  line.1 

December  11,  was  still  cold  and  the  sleet  and  snow  did  not 
melt.  The  men  kept  their  tents,  or  huddled  about  their  fires. 
There  was  but  little  picket  firing.  At  10  a.  m.  there  was  a  meet 
ing  of  corps  commanders  at  General  Thomas'  headquarters  and 
it  was  decided  that  we  could  not  attack  the  enemy  with  any  show 
of  success  until  the  weather  moderated  and  the  snow  and  sleet 
melted.  General  Grant  had  been  insisting  for  several  days  that 
General  Thomas  should  attack  the  enemy.2  At  10  p.  m.,  General 
Wood  received  an  order  from  General  Thomas  directing  him  to 
have  our  corps  put  in  readiness  next  day  for  operations.3  The 
night  was  cold  and  clear. 

December  12,  it  was  still  cold  and  although  the  sun  shone  in 
the  morning  it  did  not  have  power  to  melt  the  ice  and  snow  which 
covered  the  ground.  The  officers  call  summoned  company  offi 
cers  to  regimental  headquarters  and  they  were  told  everything 
must  be  at  once  put  in  readiness  for  a  contemplated  movement. 
They  were  also  directed  to  make  requisition  for  supplies  of  every 
kind  needed  on  a  march.  That  day  the  cavalry,  12,000  strong, 
crossed  to  the  south  side  of  the  river  on  the  railroad  and  pon 
toon  bridges,  and  was  massed  between  the  Hardin  and  Charlotte 
pikes.4  This  looked  like  moving  the  next  morning.5  The  enemy 
was  still  at  work  on  his  second  line  of  fortifications,  and  was 
erecting  epaulements  for  batteries  in  front  of  General  A.  J. 
Smith's  line  of  works  which  would  command  the  Hillsborough 
and  perhaps  the  Hardin  pike.6  There  was  considerable  picket 
firing  during  the  day. 

1  Fuller-ton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.  93-154.        4     General  Wilson's  report,  W.  R.  R.  93-551 

2  Gleason's  Diary.  5     Gleasons'  Diary. 

3  Fullerton's  Journal,  W.   R.   R.   93-154.      6     Fullerton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.  93-154. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE  637 

The  morning  of  December  13,  the  weather  had  slightly  mod 
erated  but  it  was  still  very  cold.  Our  picket  relief  did  not  get 
out  to  the  rifle  pits  in  our  front  until  nearly  daylight,  and  for 
tunately  were  not  fired  at  before  they  reached  their  protection. 
The  pickets  were  allowed  fires,  but  the  wood  soon  gave  out  and  a 
truce  was  agreed  upon  between  the  opposing  picket  lines,  which 
truce  continued  all  day.  The  men  walked  about  in  plain  view  of 
each  other  and  not  a  shot  was  fired.1  A  little  after  noon  a  de 
serter  from  the  enemy  crossed  over  to  our  lines  unmolested,  hav 
ing  given  out  that  he  wished  to  get  some  tobacco  for  himself  and 
comrade.  He  had  previously  met  one  of  our  men  between  the 
lines.  He  said  he  had  once  belonged  to  the  Fifty-Eighth  Illinois, 
that  he  lived  near  Meridian,  Miss.,  and  while  visiting  his  family 
there  was  impressed  into  the  Confederate  service  as  a  member  of 
the  Fourteenth  Missiissippi.  He  said  that  this  was  the  first  oppor 
tunity  he  had  to  escape  and  seemed  greatly  relieved  to  be 
back  under  the  old  flag  again.  He  was  sent  under  guard  to 
headquarters.2  Geason  in  his  diary  further  says  "The  boys 
gathered  from  the  Johnnies  whom  they  met  on  the  sly,  that  their 
loss  at  Franklin  was  8000,  including  a  Major  General  and  a 
Brigadier,  and  that  they  seemed  rather  hopeless,  wondering  if 
there  was  to  be  another  killing  soon."  About  5  p.  m.,  the  weather 
grew  much  warmer  and  the  ice  began  to  melt  quite  rapidly. 

The  morning  of  December  14,  the  ice  had  all  disappeared, 
but  a  dense  fog  shut  from  sight  the  enemy's  lines  and  made  any 
general  movement  extremely  hazardous.  At  3  p.  m.  the  corps 
commanders  again  met  at  General  Thomas'  headquarters  and  it 
was  decided  to  attack  the  enemy  next  morning,  if  it  was  not  too 
foggy.3  There  was  the  usual  picket  firing  during  the  day.  The 
final  steps  were  taken  to  see  that  every  organization  was  sup 
plied  with  everything  needed  in  the  way  of  clothing  and  equip 
ment.  Regular  roll  calls  were  ordered  and  officers  were  in 
structed  to  keep  the  men  in  camp  both  night  and  day  ready  for 
the  contemplated  movement.4  The  divisions  of  General  Hatch, 
Knipe  and  Johnson  and  Croxton's  brigade,  of  General  Wilson's 
Cavalry  Corps,  which  had  been  recruiting  and  remounting  on 
the  north  side  of  the  river,  had  crossed  the  river  to  the  south  side 
on  the  12th,  and  were  in  position  ready  for  the  advance.  In  fact 
everything  was  in  complete  readiness. 

The  position  of  Hood's  army  was  relatively  the  same  as 
when  he  closed  in  on  our  position  in  front  of  Nashville.  He  had 
extended  his  fortified  line  to  our  right  beyond  A.  J.  Smith's  po 
sition,  an  dhad  protected  his  left  flank  by  a  series  of  detached 

1  Gleasons'  Diary.  3     Fuller-ton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.  93-155. 

2  Gleason's  Diary.  4     (Reason's  Diary. 


638  FIITEEXTH   OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

redoubts  on  the  hills  along,  near  to  and  on  either  side  of  the 
Hillsborough  pike,  each  redoubt  containing  a  section,  or  battery, 
of  artillery  and  from  100  to  150  infantry.  His  line  was  pro 
longed  to  the  river  by  Chalmers  cavalry.  Ector's  brigade  of 
French's  division  of  Stewart's  corps  was  placed  on  the  Harclin 
pike,  with  cavalry  to  his  right  and  left.1  The  enemy's  most 
advanced  position  was  on  Montgomery  Hill  in  front  of  Streight's 
(our)  brigade.  The  general  position  of  the  different  corps  of 
our  army  has  been  given  heretofore.  That  evening  the  long  ex 
pected  order  for  our  advance  came.  It  was  as  follows : 

Hdprs.  Dept.  of  the  Cumberland, 

Special  Field   Orders  Nashville,  Tennessee,  December  14,  1864. 

No.  342. 

As  soon  as  the  weather  will  admit  of  offensive  operations,  the 
troops  will  move  against  the  enemy's  position  in  the  following  order: 

First.  Maj.  Gen.  A.  J.  Smith,  commanding  detachment  of  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee,  after  forming  his  troops  on  or  near  the  Hardin 
pike,  in  front  of  his  present  position,  will  make  a  vigorous  assault  on 
the  enemy's  left. 

Second.  Brvt.  Maj.  Gen.  J.  H.  Wilson,  commanding  the  cavalry 
corps,  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi,  with  three  divisions,  'will 
move  on  and  support  General  Smith's  right,  assist  as  far  as  possible 
in  carrying  the  left  of  the  enemy's  position,  and  be  in  readiness  to 
throw  his  force  upon  the  enemy  the  moment  a  favorable  opportunity 
occurs.  Major  General  Wilson  will  also  send  one  division  on  the 
Charlotte  pike  to  clear  that  road  of  the  enemy  and  observe  in  the  direc 
tion  of  Bell's  Landing  to  protect  our  right  rear  until  the  enemy's  posi 
tion  is  fairly  turned,  when  it  will  join  the  main  force. 

Third.  Brig.  Gen.  Th.  J.  Wood,  commanding  Fourth  Array  Corps, 
after  leaving  a  strong  skirmish  line  in  his  works  from  Lauren's  Hill 
to  his  extreme  right,  will  form  the  remainder  of  the  Fourth  Corps  on 
the  Hillsborough  pike,  to  support  General  Smith's  left  and  operate  on 
the  left  and  rear  of  the  enemy's  advanced  position  on  Montgomery  Hill. 

Fourth.  Maj.  Gen.  John  M.  Schofield,  commanding  Twenty-third 
Army  Corps,  will  replace  General  Kimball's  division  of  the  Fourth 
Corps,  with  his  troops,  and  occupy  the  trenches  from  Fort  Negley  to 
Lauren's  Hill  with  a  strong  skirmish  line.  He  will  mass  the  remainder 
of  his  force  in  front  of  the  works  and  co-operate  with  General  Wood, 
protecting  the  latter's  left  flank  against  an  attack  by  the  enemy. 

Fifth.  Maj.  Gen.  James  B.  Steedman,  commanding  District  of 
the  Etowah,  will  occupy  the  interior  line  in  rear  of  his  present  position, 
stretching  from  the  reservoir  on  the  Cumberland  River  to  Fort  Negley, 
with  a  strong  skirmish  line,  and  mass  the  remainder  of  his  force  in 
his  present  position,  to  act  according  to  the  exigencies  of  the  service 
during  these  operations. 

Sixth.  Brig.  Gen.  J.  F.  Miller,  with  the  troops  forming  the  garri 
son  of  Nashville,  will  occupy  the  interior  line  from  the  battery  on 
Hill  210  to  the  extreme  right,  including  the  enlosed  work  on  the  Hyde's 
Ferry  road. 

Seventh.  The  quartermaster's  troops,  under  command  of  Brvt. 
Brig.  Gen.  J.  L.  Donaldson,  will,  if  necessary,  be  posted  on  the  interior 
line  from  Fort  Morton  to  the  battery  on  Hill  210. 


1     Ceneral  Stewart's  report,  VV.  R.   R.   93-709. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE  639 

The  troops  on  the  interior  line  will  be  under  the  direction  of 
Major  General  Steedman,  who  is  charged  with  the  immediate  defense 
of  Nashville  during  the  operations  around  the  city. 

Should  the  weather  permit  the  troops  will  be  formed  in  time  to 
commence  operations  at  6  A.  M.,  or  as  soon  thereafter  as  practicable. 
By  command  of  Major  General  Thomas. 

WM.  D.  WHIFFLE,! 
Assistant  Adjutant  General. 

General  Wood,  in  company  with  Colonel  Opdyke,  had  made 
a  careful  examination  of  the  enemy's  intrenched  lines  and  with 
the  concurrence  of  Generals  Schofield  and  Smith,  in  a  confiden 
tial  letter  to  General  Thomas,  suggested  a  conference  of  Generals 
Schofield,  Smith,  Wilson  and  himself,  with  a  view  to  some  modi 
fication  of  the  above  orders.2  What  these  modifications  were  is 
not  disclosed,  but  it  is  probable  that  they  resulted  in  General 
Steedman  being  ordered  to  relieve  General  Kimball's  troops  on 
our  left  and  in  General  Schofield  being  directed  to  mass  his  corps 
in  rear  of  the  Fourth  Corps  and  General  Smith's  command,3 
instead  of  on  General  Wood's  left.  General  Wood's  orders  for 
the  movement  of  the  Fourth  Corps  were  as  follows : 

Headquarters  Fourth  Army  Corps, 

Nashville,  Tenn.,  December  14,  1864. 

Orders  of  the  day  for  the  Fourth  Army  Corps  for  tomorrow,  De 
cember  15,  1864: 

I.  Reveille  will  be  sounded  at  4  A.  M.     The  troops  will  get  their 
breakfasts,  break  up  their  camps,  pack  up  everything,  and  be  prepared 
to  move  at  6  A.  M. 

II.  Brigadier  General  Elliott,  commanding  Second  Division,  will 
move  out  by  his  right,  taking  the  small  road  which  passes  by  the  right 
of  his   present   position,   form   in   echelon   with   General  .Smith's    left, 
slightly  refusing  his  own  left,  and,  maintaining  the  relative  position 
to  General  Smith's  troops,  will  advance  with  them.     When  he  moves 
out  he  will  leave  a  strong  skirmish  line  in  his  solid  works. 

III.  Brigadier  General  Kimball,  commanding  First  Division,  on 
being  relieved  by  General  Steedman,  will  move  his  division  to  the  Hills- 
borough  pike,  inside  our  lines,  and  by  it  through  our  lines,  and  form 
in  echelon  to  General  Elliott's  left,  slightly  refusing  his  own  left.     He 
will  maintain  this  position  and  advance  with  General  Elliott. 

IV.  As  soon  as  General  Kimball's  division  has  passed  out  of  the 
works,  by  the  Hillsborough  pike,  General  Beatty,  commanding  Third 
Division,  will  take  up  the  movement,  drawing  out  by  his  left,  and  will 
form  in  echelon  to  General  Kimball's  left.     He  will  maintain  this  po 
sition  and  advance  with  General  Kimball;  he  will  also  leave  a  strong 
line  of  skirmishers  behind  the  solid  works  along  his  present  position. 

V.  The  pickets  on  post,   being  strengthened   when  in  the  judg 
ment  of  division  commanders  it  becomes  necessary,  will  advance  as  a 
line  of   skirmishers   to   cover   the   movement.     The   formation   of   the 
troops  will  be  in  two  lines — the  front  line  deployed,  the  second  line  in 


1  W.  R.  R.   94-18H. 

2  W.  R.   R.  94-1X4. 
:;     W.  R.  R.  !).'}- 12!). 


640  FIFTEENTH   OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

close  column  by  division,  massed  opposite  the  interval  in  the  front 
line.  Each  division  commander  will,  so  far  as  possible,  hold  one 
brigade  in  reserve.  Five  wagon  loads  of  ammunition,  ten  ambulances, 
and  the  wagons  loaded  with  the  intrenching  tools,  will  as  nearly  as 
possible,  follow  immediately  after  each  division.  The  remaining  am 
munition  wagons,  ambulances  and  all  other  wagons,  will  remain  inside 
our  lines  until  further  orders.  One  rifle  battery  will  accompany  the 
Second  Division,  and  one  battery  of  light  twelve-pounders  will  accom 
pany  each  of  the  other  divisions.  The  rest  of  the  artillery  of  the  corps 
will  retain  its  present  positions  in  the  lines. 
By  order  of  Brig.  General  T.  J.  Wood. 

J.  S.  FULLERTON, 
Assistant  Adjutant  General. * 

On  the  evening  of  December  14,  after  some  of  the  officers 
had  retired,  Colonel  Askew  called  a  meeting  of  company  com 
manders  at  his  tent  and  communicated  to  them  the  substance  of 
the  foregoing  orders.  He  also  informed  them  that  General  A.  J. 
Smith's  troops  would  attack  and  try  to  turn  the  enemy's  left 
flank,  that  the  general  movement  was  to  be  a  grand  left  wheel, 
with  our  brigade  as  the  pivot,  and  that  the  men  were  to  be 
awakened  at  4  :30  o'clock  next  morning  and  have  tents  struck  and 
everything  packed  up  by  6  o'clock.2 

After  this  meeting,  a  number  of  officers  of  our  own  and  other 
regiments  gathered  at  our  sutler's  tent.  Among  them  were  Lieu 
tenant  Colonel  Luther  M.  Strong,  commanding  the  Forty-ninth 
Ohio ;  Lieutenant  Colonel  John  Conover,  commanding  the  Eighth 
Kansas ;  Colonel  Frank  Askew,  commanding  the  Fifteenth  Ohio : 
Lieutenant  Colonel  John  McClenahan,  Fifteenth  Ohio;  Major 
Wm.  M.  Clark,  Surgeon  of5 the  Fifteenth  Ohio;  Captain  Chandler 
W.  Carroll,  Fifteenth  Ohio,  the  adjutant  and  others  whose  pres 
ence  is  not  now  remembered.  The  subject  of  conversation  was 
of  course  the  battle  to  be  fought  next  day.  All  were  sanguine  of 
victory  and  all  seemed  relieved  to  know  that  our  period  of  inac 
tion  was  about  over.  A  minor  note  wras  struck  by  Lieutenant 
Colonel  Strong  of  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio,  who  said  he  had  a 
strong  presentiment  that  he  was  going  to  be  shot  in  the  battle. 
All  tried  to  rally  and  laugh  him  out  of  his  morbid  fancy,  but 
without  avail,  and  when  we  separated  he  was  ttill  moody  and  de 
pressed. 

At  4:50  a.  m.,  December  15,  our  bugles  all  along  the  line 
sounded  the  reveille.  There  seemed  to  be  an  unusual  note  of  de 
fiance  in  the  calls,  and  we  fancied  they  seemed  louder  and  clearer 
than  usual.  We  were  soon  all  astir,  had  our  breakfasts,  struck 
tents,  packed  everything  up  and  then  awaited  orders.  There  was 
a  very  dense  fog, — so  dense  that  we  could  not  distinguish  objects 

1  W.    R.   R.    93-127. 

2  (Reason's  Diary. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE  641 

a  hundred  feet  away, — and  we  supposed  the  general  movement 
would  be  again  postponed.  But  in  the  depression  to  our  rear  we 
heard  the  clank  of  artillery  harness  and  the  murmur  of  multi 
tudinous  voices,  which  indicated  the  movement  of  heavy  columns 
of  our  troops  to  our  right.  The  thick  fog  hid  them  and  in  imagin 
ation  they  seemed  a  mighty  host. 

Between  7  and  8  a.  m.  the  fog  began  to  rise  and  we  saw,  be 
sides  the  moving  troops,  a  heavy  column  massed  in  rear  of  our 
lines.1  The  Twenty-third  Corps  was  massed  in  rear  of  the 
Fourth  Corps  and  General  A.  J.  Smith's  line.  Soon  we  heard 
heavy  cannonading  to  our  left.  It  was  General  Steedman,  who 
was  making  a  demonstration  on  our  left  flank  to  withdraw  the 
enemy's  attention  and  troops  from  his  left  where  our  real  at 
tack  was  about  to  be  made.  This  cannonading  continued  at  inter 
vals  all  the  forenoon.  By  nine  o'clock  the  fog  had  lifted  and  the 
sun  shone  from  a  sapphire  sky.  The  air  was  crisp  and  bracing 
and  one  thought  of  the  "Sun  of  Austerlitz''  as  described  in 
Headley's  Life  of  Napoleon.  Our  regiment  and  brigade  were 
formed  behind  the  works  and  the  men  stacked  arms  and  were 
permitted  to  break  ranks,  but  cautioned  not  to  go  far  from  the 
guns.  It  was  not  long  until  we  heard  the  boom  of  cannon  far  to 
the  right,  which  announced  that  the  battle  had  begun.  The  dis 
tant  cannonading  continued  and  an  occasional  deeper  boom  indi 
cated  that  the  big  guns  from  the  iron  clads  in  the  river  were 
joining  in  the  chorus.  Montgomery  Hill  rising  about  150  feet 
above  the  level  of  the  surrounding  country,  its  sides  covered 
with  open  woods  which  extended  down  its  slopes,  across  the 
hollow  and  up  to  our  works  on  Lauren's  Hill,  stood  about  800 
yards  in  our  front.  It  was  encircled  just  below  its  crest  by  for 
midable  intrenchments  protected  by  an  abatis  and  rows  of  sharp 
ened  stakes  firmly  driven  into  the  ground.2  It  was  the  most 
advanced  position  of  the  enemy  and  our  first  duty  would  be  to 
assault  and  take  it.  We  were  not,  however,  to  advance  until  the 
troops  on  our  right  had  begun  to  move  forward.  For  some  rea 
son  the  troops  on  our  right  did  not  get  into  position  for  the  for 
ward  movement  until  about  11  o'clock.3  With  hearts  beating 
high  and  nerves  tingling  we  waited  for  the  order  to  advance.  We 
waited  and  waited  until  noon,  and  still  no  orders  came.  We  had 
our  dinners  and  still  waited.  In  the  meantime  the  sounds  of 
cannonading  on  our  right  grew  louder  and  louder  and  soon  we 
heard  the  distant  rattle  of  small  arms.  We  heard  too  an  occa 
sional  cheer  from  our  men,  which  told  that  the  battle  was  going 
well  with  us.  General  Wilson's  cavalrv  had  found  the  enemy's 


1  Gleason's  Diary.  3     General  R.  W.  Johnson's  Report,  W.  R.  R.  93-599. 

2  General  Wood's  Official  Report,  W.  R.  R.  93-128. 


642  FlI-TKENTH     OlIH)    Voi.l'NTKKKN    AM)    CAMPAIGNS 

left  flank  and,  in  co-operation  with  General  McArthur's  division 
of  General  A.  J.  Smith's  corps,  soon  afterwards  charged  and 
carried  a  redoubt  near  the  Hardin  pike  which  covered  such 
flank.1 

From  our  position  on  Lauren's  Hill  we  looked  to  the  right 
down  the  valley  of  Richland  Creek,  a  small  stream  which  ran 
between  the  fortified  lines  of  the  opposing  armies.  We  could  see 
the  skirmishers  on  both  sides  keeping  up  the  usual  desultory 
firing,  but  that  was  all.  Presently,  about  13:45  p.  m.,  far  down 
the  creek  we  saw  our  skirmishers  advancing.  Soon  those  nearer 
towards  us  up  the  valley  began  moving  out,  driving  the  enemy's 
skirmishers  back,  and  the  storm  of  battle  kept  rolling  nearer  and 
nearer.  It  is  nearly  fifty  years  since  then  and  the  blood  still 
tingles  when  recalling  the  scene.  Soon  the  skirmishers  of  the 
second  division  of  our  corps  took  up  and  prolonged  the  advanc 
ing  line  and  a  battery  of  the  enemy  in  a  position  not  before  known 
opened  out  on  our  advancing  lines.  Our  time  to  advance  had 
come. 

General  Post's  brigade  of  our  division  had  been  designated 
to  lead  the  assault  on  Montgomery  Hill,  our  brigade  was  to  fol 
low  in  close  support  and  a  little  to  his  left.  Our  formation  was 
from  right  to  left  as  follows:  the  Eighth  Kansas  and  Fifty- 
first  Ohio  in  the  first  line  deployed  in  line  of  battle,  the  Eighty- 
ninth  Illinois,  Fiftenth  Ohio  and  Forty-ninth  Ohio  in  the  second 
line  formed  in  column  by  division.  At  the  signal  to  advance 
which  was  given  about  2  p.  m.,  the  officers  and  men  of  the  line 
leaped  across  the  parapet  and  the  mounted  officers  followed 
through  gaps  cut  through  it  by  the  pioneers.  Our  troops  were 
so  impatient  to  be  in  at  the  finish,  that  the  charge  on  Montgomery 
Hill  became  a  race  to  see  who  should  get  there  first  and,  although 
Post's  brigade  led,  many  men  of  our  brigade  reached  the  enemy's 
works  among  the  foremost.  General  Beatty  in  his  official  re 
port  says : 

"The  second  brigade.  Colonel  Post,  moved  forward  with 
great  rapidity.  *  *  The  first  brigade,  Colonel  Streight, 
which  was  intended  as  a  supporting  column,  fired  with  the  spirit 
of  the  charge,  rushed  forward,  and  the  charge  almost  became 
a  race  to  the  summit  of  the  hill."2  Colonel  Streight  says  the 
Eighth  Kansas  men  were  the  first  of  our  brigade  to  reach  the 
enemy's  works,  though  he  was  not  certain  but  that  many  men  in 
the  second  line  of  our  brigade  had  reached  and  formed  a  part  of 
the  advance  when  the  works  were  carried.3  All  were  so  eager 
and  so  fired  with  enthusiasm  that  they  seemed  to  care  no  more  for 

1  W.  R.  R.  93-434-348-503-577.  3     W.  R.  R.  93-294. 

2  W.  R.  R.  93-289. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE  643 

the  storm  of  missies  which  poured  from  the  enemy's  works  than 
if  they  were  so  many  snow  flakes.  They  did  not  stop  to  fire 
but  pressed  on  up  the  acclivity  and  into  the  enemy's  works,  taking 
prisoners  of  all  who  did  not  escape  by  flight,  and  following  the 
fugitives  until  called  back  to  reform. 

As  soon  as  Montgomery  Hill  was  in  our  possession  and  the 
enemy  was  driven  back  to  his  second  intrenched  line,  about  600 
yards  to  the  rear  of  his  line  on  Montgomery  Hill,  the  Fifteenth 
Ohio  was  ordered  to  the  left  and  placed  in  position  to  protect  the 
left  flank  of  the  brigade.  We  thus  became  detached  from  the 
rest  of  the  brigade,  who  had  orders  to  conform  their  movements 
to  those  of  the  troops  on  their  right.  The  position  in  which  we 
were  placed  was  on  the  left  slope  of  Montgomery  Hill  and  on 
ground  which  sloped  toward  the  enemy's  intrenched  line.  We 
were  exposed  to  artillery  and  infantry  fire  from  the  enemy's  in- 
trenchments,  as  well  as  from  his  skirmishers.  Our  only  protec 
tion  was  an  osage  orange  hedge  along  which  the  regiment  was 
formed  and  behind  which  the  men  lay  down  and  hugged  the 
ground.  It  afforded  little  protection  and  a  number  of  our  men 
were  wounded  while  so  posted.  To  keep  down  the  fire  of  the 
enemy  a  strong  line  of  skirmishers  made  up  of  Companies  B,  G 
and  K  under  command  of  Captain  Carroll  was  pushed  to  the 
front  some  200  yards.  The  enemy  had  a  battery  near  the  Mc- 
Crary  house  on  the  Granny  White  pike  about  700  yards  in  our 
front,  but  fortunately  for  us,  its  fire  was  mostly  directed  to  the 
troops  advancing  on  our  right.  Colonel  Askew  and  the  adjutant 
had  ridden  their  horses  in  the  charge  on  Montgomery  Hill  and 
still  kept  them,  although  they  were  constantly  exposed  to  the 
enemy's  fire.  They  did  not  wish  to  appear  otherwise  than  brave, 
but  occasionally  they  would  dismount  and  stand  behind  their 
horses  using  them  as  animated  breastworks  against  the  enemy's 
sharp  shooters.  Colonel  Askew's  horse  was  a  big,  ugly,  raw 
boned,  ewenecked  mare,  which  the  men  in  the  regiment  were 
ashamed  of,  and  the  adjutant  more  than  once  told  him  that  the 
boys  would  all  be  pleased  to  see  it  stop  an  enemy's  bullet. 

From  our  position  the  crest  of  Montgomery  Hill  to  our 
right  cut  off  our  view  of  our  own  troops,  but  for  perhaps  a  mile 
or  more  we  had  a  plain  view  of  the  enemy's  intrenched  line.  The 
roar  of  the  battle  to  our  right  continued  to  grow  louder  and  nearer 
and  the  cheers  of  our  men  more  frequent.  Occasionally  we  could 
see  one  or  two  men  at  a  time  go  back  from  the  enemy's  intrench 
ed  line.  They  were  evidently  men  who  had  been  wounded  by 
shots  from  our  men,  whom  we  could  not  see.  While  we  were 
thus  watching  the  results  of  our  fire,  unobserved  by  either  of  us, 
a  section  of  our  artillery  had  taken  position  on  the  hill  just  to 


644  FIFTEENTH   OHIO  VOLUNTEEUS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

our  rear  and  not  a  hundred  feet  away.  Suddenly  the  guns  opened 
out  on  the  enemy's  battery  near  McCrary's  house  before  men 
tioned.  The  guns  were  so  near  and  the  explosions  were  so  loud 
that  we  were  both  startled.  The  adjutant's  horse  broke  away 
from  him,  ran  around  the  hedge  in  our  front  and  made  for  the 
enemy's  lines.  Fortunately,  our  men  on  the  skirmish  line  saw 
and  recognized  her  and  brought  her  back.  We  had  been  now 
holding  the  position  above  described  about  two  hours.  The  con 
flict  on  the  right  deepened,  the  cheers  grew  louder  and  clearer 
and  wounded  men  in  constantly  increasing  numbers  were  stream 
ing  back  from  the  enemy's  works.  It  was  plain  that  a  crisis  in 
the  battle  had  been  reached,  and  we  felt  confident  we  would  soon 
see  our  troops  assault  and  carry  the  enemy's  intrenched  line.  We 
wanted  to  be  in  when  the  critical  moment  came,  but  we  had  na 
orders  to  move.  The  rest  of  the  brigade  had  moved  still  fur 
ther  to  our  right  and  we  were  practically  left  alone.  Presently 
Colonel  Askew  quietly  said  "I  believe  we  can  take  that  battery"., 
(meaning  the  battery  near  McCrary's  house).  "We  can  make  a 
dash  across  the  valley  to  the  house,  reform  behind  it,  and  by  a 
sudden  sally  can  take  it  in."  The  words  were  no  sooner  said, 
when  the  adjutant  was  galloping  out  to  the  skirmish  line  with 
the  order  and  the  regiment  was  getting  round  and  through  the 
hedge.  The  writer  can  still  see  Captain  Carroll  striding  along  the 
skirmish  line  calling  out  "Forward!"  "Forward!",  and  almost 
before  he  was  aware  of  it,  the  main  body  of  the  regiment  had 
overtaken  the  skirmishers  and  all  were  joining  in  a  mad  race  for 
the  McCrary  house.  The  enemy's  skirmishers  were  literally  run 
over  and  broke  to  our  rear,  and  we  rushed  forward  in  impetuous 
haste.  The  stop  at  the  McCrary  house  was  only  for  a  moment,  to 
get  breath,  and  soon  our  men  were  on  the  enemy's  battery,  shout 
ing  and  cheering  in  wild  delirium, — some  of  them  scratching  the 
words  "Fifteenth  Ohio  Battery"  on  the  captured  guns.  The 
pioneers  soon  cut  down  the  epaulements  and  the  guns  were  drag 
ged  through  the  embrasures  and  turned  upon  the  enemy.  Some 
of  the  men  got  into  the  bomb  proofs  behind  the  epaulements.. 
where  the  ammunition  was  stored,  and  there  was  a  sudden  ex 
plosion  which  wounded  one  or  two  of  them.1  Soon  it  was  no 
ticed  that  the  enemy  was  reforming,  evidently  for  the  purpose  of 
retaking  the  battery,  and  the  men  were  ordered  to  form  behind  a 
stone  fence  which  extended  from  the  battery  toward  the  Granny 
White  pike.  While  the  adjutant  was  hurrying  the  men  into  po 
sition,  our  own  Lieutenant  Wallace  McGrath,  who  was  on  the 
brigade  staff,  came  riding  up  like  a  wild  man  and  threw  his  arms 
around  the  adjutant  exclaiming,  "Oh,  Copie,  we've  captured  a 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE  64."> 

battery!  We've  captured  a  battery!"  A  volley  or  two  from  the 
stone  wall  above  mentioned  soon  dispersed  the  enemy's  troops 
who  were  trying  to  reform,  and  the  attempt  to  retake  the  battery 
was  abandoned. 

Almost  simultaneously  with  our  capture  of  the  battery  our 
troops  on  the  right  with  tremendous  cheering  charged  and  carried 
the  enemy's  intrenched  line  and  sent  him  back  in  disorderly  but 
sullen  retreat.  It  was  now  growing  dusk,  but  the  firing  continued 
and  the  wild  cheers  to  the  right  proclaimed  victory  all  along  the 
line.  We  had  turned  the  enemy's  flank,  driven  him  from  his  in 
trenched  line  and  had  captured  16  cannon  and  about  1000  pris 
oners.1 

General  Logan  who  was  on  his  way  to  relieve  General 
Thomas,  stopped  at  Louisville  with  his  undelivered  orders  in  his 
pocket,  and  General  Grant  at  11:30  that  night  telegraphed  to 
General  Thomas  from  Washington  "I  was  just  on  my  way  to 
Nashville,  but  receiving  a  dispatch  from  Van  Duzer,  detailing 
your  splendid  success  of  today,  I  shall  go  no  further.  Push 
the  enemy  now,  and  give  him  no  rest  until  he  is  entirely  destroyed. 
Your  army  will  cheerfully  suffer  many  privations  to  break  up 
Hood's  army  and  render  it  useless  for  future  operations.  Do  not 
stop  for  trains  or  supplies,  but  take  them  from  the  country  as  the 
enemy  have  done.  Much  is  now  expected."2 

As  soon  as  the  troops  could  be  reformed  the  division  moved 
forward  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy  who  was  falling  back  toward 
the  Franklin  pike.  In  fact  the  whole  corps  was  ordered  to  press 
the  enemy  vigorously  in  that  direction,  and  to  reach  the  Franklin 
pike  if  possible  before  dark.8  Our  regiment  was  still  the  left  of 
the  line.  Wre  moved  on  driving  the  enemy's  skirmishers  before 
us  until  it  grew  dark,  when  we  bivouaced  in  line  of  battle  for  the 
night  and  barricaded  our  front  with  logs  and  rails.  Our  line 
was  east  of  and  about  parallel  to  the  Granny  White  pike. 

That  night  the  field  officers  of  some  of  the  regiments  of  the 
brigade  were  together  at  the  headquarters  of  one  of  the  regi 
ments,  recounting  the  experiences  of  the  day.  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Strong  of  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  was  rallied  because  his  presenti 
ment  had  not  come  true.  He  had  not  been  shot  during  the  day's 
engagement.  Colonel  Askew  and  the  adjutant  had  kept  their 
horses  during  the  day  while  the  field  officers  of  the  other  regi 
ments  had  sent  theirs  to  the  rear.  This  fact  was  the  subject  of 
comment,  and  the  field  officers  of  the  Eighth  Kansas  decided  to 

1     W.  R.  R.  04-15)4.  3     Fullerton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.  93-155. 

•1     W.  R.  R.  94- 195. 


646  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

keep  their  horses  during  the  next  day's  operations,  with  the  re 
sult  that  they  were  all  shot. 

The  operations  of  the  day  resulted  on  our  side  in  the  Twenty- 
third  Corps,  which  was  in  reserve,  being  put  into  line  on  the 
right  of  General  A.  J.  Smith's  troops,1  and  on  the  side  of  the 
enemy  General  Cheatham's  corps  was  sent  to  their  left.- 

At  nightfall  our  line  was  formed  nearly  parallel  to  the 
Hillsborough  pike,  Schofield  on  the  right,  A.  J.  Smith  in  the 
center  and  Wood  on  the  left.  The  cavalry  was  on  the  right  of 
Schofield  and  General  Steedman  held  the  position  he  had  gained 
during  the  day  on  the  Nolensville  pike.3 

That  night  before  we  retired  orders  came  to  renew  the  at 
tack  in  the  morning,  and  if  the  enemy  had  gone  from  our  front, 
to  cross  the  Franklin  pike  and  move  south  on  the  east  side  of  it, 
while  General  Smith's  and  Schofield's  troops  were  to  move  on 
our  right  and  the  cavalry  to  move  still  further  to  the  right. 

At  6:30  a.  m.,  December  16,  we  moved  forward  by  the  right 
of  companies  to  the  front  until  we  reached  the  Franklin  pike, 
when  changing  direction  we  advanced  on  the  east  side  of  and 
parallel  to  the  pike,  halting  at  times  for  alignment.  There  was 
brish  skirmishing  to  the  right  of  us,  and  as  we  advanced  the 
skirmish  fire  grew  heavier  and  the  artillery  on  both  sides  opened 
out.  At  one  point,  looking  toward  the  east,  we  saw  another 
skirmish  line  advancing  and  took  it  to  be  Steedman's  troops. 
When  we  reached  a  point  about  a  mile  south  of  our  old  camp. 
Camp  Andrew  Johnson,  we  seemed  to  have  developed  the  enemy's 
position,  which  was  on  the  Overton  Range  about  five  miles  south 
of  Nashville,  and  came  to  a  halt  within  800  yards  of  his  main 
line.  There  were  no  troops  immediately  to  the  left  of  our  regi 
ment  and  the  movements  of  the  enemy  indicated  a  sudden  attack 
on  our  left  flank.  Colonel  Askew  said  to  the  adjutant,  "If  the 
enemy  charges  us  we  will  meet  him  by  a  counter  charge",  and 
the  necessary  preparations  were  made  for  doing  so.  The  charge, 
however,  was  not  made.  Very  heavy  firing  was  now  heard  away 
to  our  right  and  we  understood  that  we  were  again  moving  to 
turn  the  enemy's  left  flank.  We  now  had  time  to  take  in  the 
general  features  of  the  ground  before  us.  General  \Vood  in  his 
official  report  of  the  battle  describes  them,  as  they  were  then, 
substantially  as  follows : 

"The  basin  in  which  the  city  of  Nashville  stands  is  enclosed 
on  the  southwest,  south  and  southeast  by  the  Brentwood  Hills. 
The  Brentwood  Hills  consist  of  two  ranges  or  branches — the 

1  W.   R.   R.   93-38. 

2  W.  R.  R.   93-660. 

3  W.  R.  R.  93-39. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE  647 

branch  west  of  the  Franklin  pike  runs  from  northwest  to  south 
east  and  the  branch  east  of  it  from  northeast  to  southwest,  the 
two  branches  uniting  in  a  gap  at  Brentwood  about  nine  miles 
south  of  Nashville.  The  Franklin  pike  passes  through  this  gap. 
These  two  branches  form  a  roughly  shaped  V  with  the  apex  at 
Brentwood.  Nashville  is  north  of  and  about  opposite  the  center 
of  the  V.  The  Franklin  pike  nearly  disects  the  valley  between 
the  two  ranges.  The  average  elevation  of  the  Brentwood  Hills 
is  about  350  feet  above  the  general  level  of  the  surrounding 
country.  The  surface  of  the  valley  is  broken  by  detached  hills, 
some  of  them  150  feet  high,  with  abrupt  sides  densely  wooded. 
About  five  miles  from  Nashville  the  Franklin  pike  passes  along 
the  base  of  one  of  these  isolated  heights,  known  as  the  Overton 
Hill.  When  we  had  forced  the  enemy's  skirmishers  back  on  the 
morning  of  December  16,  we  found  him  occupying  a  fortified 
line  along  the  base  of  the  western  range  of  the  Brentwood  Hills, 
and  thence  across  the  valley  eastward  across  the  Franklin  pike 
and  around  the  northern  slope  of  Overtoil's  Hill,  about  midway 
between  its  summit  and  base,  with  a  retired  flank  running  nearly 
south  prolonged  along  its  eastern  slope.  This  line  was  strongly 
intrenched  and  the  intrenchments  were  further  strengthened  by 
abatis  and  other  embarrassments." 

It  was  this  formidable  line  which  we  saw  before  us  at  a  dis 
tance  of  about  800  yards.  We  were  on  a  small  eminence  imme 
diately  to  the  east  of  the  Franklin  pike.  The  ground  sloped  to 
the  front  a  short  distance  and  then  ascended  through  an  open 
woods  to  the  enemy's  intrenched  position  on  Overton  Hill,  which 
it  seemed  almost  folly  to  assault  if  it  could  be  turned.  We  lay  in 
this  position  with  our  line  barricaded  until  about  3  p.  m.  In  the 
meantime  two  batteries  were  placed  on  the  line  of  our  division 
and  vigorously  shelled  the  enemy's  position  on  Overton  Hill. 
The  roar  of  the  conflict  on  our  right  increased  and  we  hoped 
that  our  troops  on  the  right  would  turn  the  enemy's  left  flank, 
as  they  had  done  the  day  before,  and  thus  save  us  from  the 
necessity  of  storming  the  works  on  Overton  Hill.  General 
Steedman's  colored  troops  had  come  up  on  our  left  about  1*2:30 
p.  m.  and  we  no  longer  apprehended  an  assault  on  our  left  flank. 
General  Wood  was  sitting  on  his  horse  on  a  knoll  a  short  dis 
tance  to  the  left  and  rear  of  our  position,  overlooking  the  field 
and  directing  the  movements  of  the  corps.  Aides  and  orderlies 
were  coming  and  going  and  the  scene  was  one  of  unusual  thrill 
ing  interest  and  activity.  The  artillery  on  both  sides  was  en 
gaged  and  the  air  was  filled  with  solid  shot  and  shell,  while 
between  the  lines  the  skirmishers  were  keeping  up  a  lively 
fusilade.  A  solid  shot  from  one  of  the  enemy's  guns  knocked 


€48  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

off  the  head  of  an  officer  a  little  to  the  left  and  rear  of  the  knoll 
above  mentioned. 

Colonel  Askew  and  the  adjutant  had  ridden  up  on  the  knoll, 
to  get  a  better  view  of  the  movements  to  the  right  and  also  to 
hear  reports  of  our  progress  on  that  part  of  the  line.  As  they 
sat  on  their  horses  not  far  from  General  Wood,  Colonel  Philip 
Sidney  Post,  who  was  in  command  of  the  Second  Brigade  of  our 
division,  rode  up  and  addressing  General  Wood,  said  he  would 
like  to  take  his  brigade  and  assault  the  enemy's  line  on  Overtoil 
Hill.  Colonel  Askew  and  the  adjutant  looked  at  each  other  with 
surprise,  as  they  had  examined  the  enemy's  position  on  Over- 
ton  Hill  and  had  remarked  its  unusual  strength.  They  were  still 
more  surprised  when  General  WTood  said,  "Well,  Post,  suppose 
you  ride  out  and  reconnoiter  the  position  and  come  back  and 
tell  me  what  you  think  of  it."  Colonel  Post  at  once  galloped  off 
and  Colonel  Askew  and  the  adjutant  decided  to  await  his  re 
turn. 

Colonel  Post  was  an  intrepid  officer,  but  somewhat  rash,  and 
it  was  bruited  about  among  the  officers  of  the  division  that  he 
was  ambitious  to  win  a  general's  star.  It  was  therefore  with 
some  apprehension  that  the  result  of  his  reconnoissance  was 
awaited.  In  about  half  an  hour  he  came  galloping  back,  his 
horse  all  afoam.  Riding  up  to  General  Wood  he  saluted  that 
officer  and  said,  "General  Wood,  I  have  carefully  reconnoitered 
the  enemy's  position  and  can  take  it  like  a  knife."  General 
\Vood  thereupon  said,  ''Well,  Post  have  your  men  strip  and 
pile  up  their  knapsacks  and  I  will  support  you  with  the  First 
Brigade."  The  First  Brigade  was  ours,  and  we  realized  that  there 
was  serious  work  ahead  for  us,  for  we  would  be  expected  to  take 
care  of  the  enemy  after  his  line  was  broken. 

General  WTood  in  his  official  report  says :  "A  close  examina 
tion  of  the  enemy's  position  satisfied  me  that  if  the  Overton  Hill 
could  be  carried  the  enemy's  right  would  be  turned,  his  line  from 
the  Franklin  pike  westward  would  be  taken  in  reverse,  and  his 
line  of  retreat  along  the  Franklin  pike  and  the  valley  leading  to 
Brentwood  commanded  effectually.  The  capture  of  half  of  the 
rebel  army  would  almost  certainly  have  been  the  guerdon  of 
success.  It  was  evident  that  the  assault  would  be  very  difficult, 
and,  if  successful,  would  be  attended  with  heavy  loss,  but  the 
prize  at  stake  was  worthy  of  the  hazard.  Early  in  the  afternoon 
I  began  to  make  preparations  for  assaulting  the  hill.  Owing  to 
the  openness  of  the  country  the  preparatory  movements  could 
not  be  concealed  from  the  enemy ;  in  truth  from  our  close 
proximity  to  his  intrenchments,  they  were  necessarily  made  un 
der  the  fire  of  his  artillery.  Knowing  that  the  safety  of  his 


THE  BATTLE  or  NASHVILLE  649 

army  depended  on  holding  the  Overton  Hill,  to  the  last  moment, 
he  re-inforced  the  position  heavily  with  troops  drawn  from  his 
left  and  left  center.  I  directed  Colonel  Post  to  reconnoiter  the 
position  closely  with  the  view  of  determining,  first  the  feasibility 
of  the  assault,  and,  second,  to  determine  the  most  practicable 
point  on  which  to  direct  it.  After  a  thorough  and  close  recon- 
noissance,  in  which  perhaps  three-quarters  of  an  hour  were  spent, 
Colonel  Post  reported  that  the  position  was  truly  formidable ; 
that  it  would  be  very  difficult  to  carry,  but  that  he  thought  he 
could  do  it  with  his  brigade.  He  further  reported  that  an  as 
sault,  in  his  opinion  on  the  northern  slope  of  the  hill  held  out 
the  greatest  promise  of  success.  I  ordered  him  to  prepare  his 
brigade  for  an  assault  immediately  and  to  inform  me  when  he 
was  ready  to  move.  I  directed  General  Beatty,  commanding 
Third  Division,  to  have  the  First  Brigade  (Colonel  Streight's) 
formed  to  support  Colonel  Post.  I  further  ordered  Major  Good- 
speed,  chief  of  artillery  of  the  corps,  to  open  a  concentrated  fire 
on  the  hill  for  the  purpose  of  silencing  the  enemy's  batteries 
and  demolishing  his  defenses,  and  to  continue  the  fire  as  long  as 
it  could  be  done  with  safety  to  our  advancing  troops.  *  *  * 
I  also  conferred  with  Major  General  Steedman  and  explained  to 
him  what  I  intended  to  do.  He  promptly  agreed  to  'move  his 
command  forward  with  the  assaulting  brigade  to  cover  its  left : 
also  to  participate  in  the  assault  with  a  view  to  carrying  what 
ever  might  be  in  its  front."1 

When  Colonel  Askew  and  the  adjutant  heard  General  Wood 
give  Colonel  Post  permission  to  assault  Overton  Hill  they  rode 
slowly  back  to  the  regiment,  the  former  remarking,  "We  will 
also  have  our  men  strip  and  pile  up  their  knapsacks."  It  was 
not  long  until  we  received  orders  for  the  assault.  Our  brigade 
was  formed  in  the  following  order:  The  Fifteenth  Ohio  and 
Forty-ninth  Ohio  in  order  from  right  to  left  formed  the  first 
line  under  command  of  Colonel  Askew ;  the  Eighth  Kansas  and 
the  Eighty-ninth  Illinois  formed  the  second  line  under  command 
of  Lieutenant  Colonel  W.  D.  Williams  of  the  Eighty-ninth  Illi 
nois  and  the  Fifty-first  Indiana  under  command  of  Captain 
Scearce  formed  the  third  line.2  Companies  E  and  K  of  the 
Fifteenth  Ohio  were  at  the  time  on- duty  as  skirmishers  to  our 
front  and  left.  Major  McClenahan  being  in  command  of  the 
skirmishers  of  the  entire  brigade.3 

About  3  p.  m.,  after  our  batteries  had  poured  a  storm  of 
shot  and  shell  at  the  enemy's  position,  Colonel  Post's  brigade 


1  W.  R.  R.   93-132-133. 

2  W.    R.    93-295. 

3  W.  R.  R. -93-301. 


650  FIFTEENTH   OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

began  the  advance.  It  moved  forward  under  a  storm  of  grape 
and  canister  from  the  enemy's  batteries,  the  lines  even  and 
steady,  the  men  shoulder  to  shoulder,  marching  with  that  tense 
nervous  stride,  which  showed  plainly  that  they  knew  the  danger 
and  difficulty  of  the  task  before  them.  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Robert  L.  Kimberly,  Forty-first  Ohio,  who  made  the  offHr.il  re 
port  of  the  brigade  says  there  were  no  stragglers.1  Our  orders 
directed  us  to  move  in  support  of  Post's  brigade  at  a  distance  of 
150  yards,  but  our  men  were  so  impatient  of  restraint  that  this 
distance  narrowed  to  less  than  that  number  of  feet  as  we  ap 
proached  the  enemy's  parapet.  The  enemy  poured  into  us  a 
withering  fire  of  grape  and  canister,  which  was  so  hot  that  twice 
the  adjutant  felt  the  wind  of  a  grape  or  canister-shot  on  his 
bridle  wrist.  How  one  lived  through  it  was  a  marvel.  The 
enemy's  infantry,  lying  close  behind  his  intrenclments, 
seemed  to  be  reserving  their  fire.  Amidst  this  terrible  storm  of 
missiles,  Colonel  Post's  men,  led  by  their  intrepid  commander, 
moved  steadily  forward,  our  line  but  a  few  yards  behind  them, 
until  they  neared  the  abatis  in  front  of  the  enemy's  works.  We 
could  see  some  of  the  men  in  their  works  start  back  and  their 
officers  forcing  them  again  into  line  and  felt  confident  Post's 
men  would  soon  be  over  the  parapet.  Suddenly,  the  front  line 
wavered,  then  stopped,  lay  down  and  commenced  firing.  Colonel 
Post  had  been  shot  through  the  bowels  by  a  canister  shot  and  the 
brigade  was  without  a  commander.  The  enemy's  infantry  from 
behind  his  parapet  poured  a  deadly  fire  into  the  then  disordered 
mass  of  our  men  lying  on  the  ground  before  them.  A  tremend 
ous  effort  was  made  to  push  the  succeeding  lines  of  our  troops 
over  the  men  who  were  lying  down,  but  without  avail.  Small 
groups  of  men  and  an  individual  here  and  there,  got  forward  to 
the  abatis  and  some  of  the  officers  did  the  same.  Captain  George 
S.  Crawford  of  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  and  Captain  Thomas  C. 
Davis  and  Lieutenant  Wallace  McGrath  of  the  Fifteenth  Ohio, 
of  the  brigade  staff,  pressed  their  horses  up  to  the  abatis  and  fired 
their  revolvers  into  the  faces  of  the  foe.  The  latter,  as  he  rode 
back  after  a  retreat  had  been  ordered,  proudly  held  up  the  stub 
of  a  bleeding  finger,  part  of  which  he  had  lost  in  the  charge. 

Colonel  Askew  was  making  vigorous  efforts  to  press  the  first 
supporting  line  forward  when  a  bullet  struck  him  in  the  breast. 
The  adjutant  who  was  at  his  side  heard  the  dull  thud,  saw  him 
reel  in  his  saddle  and  half  fall  from  his  horse,  and  was  dis 
mounted  and  by  his  side  in  a  moment.  A  ball  had  struck  the  top 
button  of  his  overcoat  which  was  buttoned  across  his  breast,  had 

1     W.  R.  R.  93-305. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE  651 

torn  it  off  and  his  vest  button  underneath  and  glanced  aside.  He 
had  received  only  a  severe  bruise,  but  the  blow  had  made  him 
very  sick.  He  insisted,  however,  on  remaining  at  his  post,  and 
continued  to  exert  himself  feebly  to  encourage  the  men.  About 
the  same  time  Lieutenant  Colonel  Strong  of  the  Forty-ninth 
Ohio  had  his  presentiment  verified  and  was  severely  wounded 
while  urging  his  men  forward.  It  was  soon  realized  by  every 
one  that  the  assault  had  failed,  and  orders  were  given  to  fall  back 
out  of  range  of  the  enemy's  murderous  fire.  Indeed  before  the 
order  was  given  many  of  the  men  were  falling  back  in  disorder, 
and  soon  all  the  troops  which  had  taken  part  in  the  assault  were 
in  hasty  and  disorderly  retreat,  our  regiment  among  them,  and 
did  not  halt  until  they  reached  the  line  they  occupied  when  the 
assault  began. 

In  the  final  moments  of  the  assault,  the  different  organiza 
tions  of  the  two  brigades  of  our  division  had  become  inter 
mingled.  General  Steedman's  colored  brigade,  in  its  advance  on 
our  left,  converged  toward  us  as  they  neared  the  point  of  attack, 
and  were  also  mingled  in  the  general  mass.  That  was  noticed 
when  a  few  minutes  afterwards  we  passed  over  the  same  ground 
and  saw  the  dead  black  men  lying  side  by  side  with  their  white 
comrades.  That  sight  forever  removed  from  the  mind  and  heart 
of  at  least  one  white  soldier  all  prejudice  against  the  Negro 
race. 

It  was  the  first  time  the  soldiers  of  our  command  had  seen 
colored  troops  in  action  and  it  was  said,  ''they  fought  just  like 
white  soldiers,  with  this  difference, — that  when  a  black  man  was 
wounded  and  went  to  the  rear  he  held  on  to  his  gun,  while  the 
white  soldier  dropped  or  threw  his  gun  aside." 

After  the  assault  had  failed  and  our  men  had  fallen  back 
to  a  distance  which  made  it  safe  for  our  artillery  to  fire,  our  bat 
teries  agai  nopened  out  on  the  enemy  over  our  heads,  to  pre 
vent  his  sallying  out  of  his  works  in  pursuit  of  our  retreating 
troops. 

The  adjutant  under  the  direction  of  Colonel  Askew,  who 
was  suffering  painfully  from  his  severe  bruise,  assisted  in  re 
forming  the  regiment  in  rear  of  the  Sixth  Ohio  Battery  and 
then  went  to  hunt  up  Lieutenant  Colonel  McClenahan  to  have 
him  take  command  of  the  regiment.  Colonel  Askew  being  too 
ill  to  continue  on  duty.1  Colonel  McClenahan  was  some  dis 
tance  to  our  left  in  front  of  General  Steedman's  line,  organizing 
a  skirmish  line  to  guard  against  a  sally  by  the  enemy,  and  when 
the  adjutant  returned  with  him,  our  brigade  and  division  were 
again  advancing,  sweeping  everything  before  them. 

1     W.  R.  R.  93-301. 


652  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

A  similar  assault,  made  by  Colonel  McMillan's  brigade  of 
General  McArthur's  division  of  General  Smith's  command,  and 
General  Hatch's  division  of  Wilson's  cavalry,1  had  penetrated  the 
enemy's  works,  when  his  entire  line  began  to  crumble  and  fall 
back  in  disorderly  retreat.  We  pressed  forward  and  were  soon 
inside  the  enemy's  works  which  we  had  failed  to  carry,  and 
moved  rapidly  forward  capturing  many  prisoners.  While  we 
were  pursuing  the  fleeing  enemy  it  began  to  rain,  but  we  pushed 
on  and  finally  bivouaced  in  a  muddy  field  east  of  the  Franklin 
pike,  about  two  miles  from  Brentwood. 

We  had  won  a  great  victory,  and  in  spite  of  the  discomfort, 
we  had  good  reason  to  rejoice.  The  two  companies  under  com 
mand  of  Captain  Carroll,  who  had  been  detailed  as  skirmishers 
had  not  yet  come  up,  and  it  was  feared  they  would  lose  their  way 
in  the  darkness.  The  adjutant  had  the  bugler  sound  the  regi 
mental  call,  which  General  Willich  had  taught  us,  every  three 
minutes  and  Captain  Carroll's  men,  more  than  a  mile  away  in  a 
thick  cane  break,  heard  and  followed  it  and  in  about  an  hour 
arrived  safely  in  camp. 

Gleason  who  was  then  a  Lieutenant  in  Company  A  and  took 
part  in  the  charge  on  Overtoil  Hill,  thus  describes  it : 

"As  soon  as  our  men  realized  that  we  were  to  take  part  in 
the  charge,  there  was  manifest  that  nervous  impatience  which 
so  often  defeats  all  discipline,  and  before  we  reached  a  posi 
tion  near  the  enemy's  lines  the  men  began  to  yell  and  run  forward 
alternately,  each  one  for  himself,  in  spite  of  all  efforts  of  field 
and  company  officers  to  keep  the  line  intact.  Advancing  under 
a  galling  fire  from  the  enemy  we  reached  a  position  a  short  dis 
tance  from  the  works  where  we  halted  for  formation,  the  line 
seeking  what  cover  could  be  found  and  replying  as  best  we  could 
to  the  enemy's  fire.  A  formidable  array  of  chevaux  de  frise 
and  abatis  confronted  us  and  rendered  futile  any  attempt  to  ad 
vance  further.  Two  other  lines  came  up  after  ours,  only  to  halt 
as  we  did.  To  our  left  Steedman's  'smoked  yankets'  met  with 
no  better  success.  Company  A  having  advanced  along  the  pike. 
was  divided  by  it, — Hanson  being  on  the  right  and  I  on  the  left, 
as  we  sought  cover  among  the  scattering  trees.  Before  long  the 
brigade  of  colored  troops,  which  had  advanced  as  near  the  works 
as  the  whites,  began  to  go  back,  and  as  the  number  increased  the 
whites  began  to  join  the  retreat.  Still  we  held  our  position  for 
some  time,  pouring  in  a  hot  fire,  which  kept  down  the  rebel  fire 
in  our  front.  *  *  *  The  withdrawal  of  the  troops  on  our 
left  subjected  us  to  severe  cross  fire  and  we  soon  also  retired. 

1     W.  R.  R.  93-434-438-441. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE  653 

After  getting  out  of  range  of  the  enemy's  fire  I  began  to  get  the 
men  of  Company  A  together  and  reform  them,  when  Sergeant 
Ferguson  joined  us  with  the  report  that  Captain  Hanson  was 
killed.  I  could  not  believe  it.  It  was,  however,  soon  confirmed 
by  Sergeant  Rickey  who  had  been  with  him  when  he  died.  He 
lived  but  a  few  minutes  after  he  was  wounded.  *  *  As 

soon  as  our  men  had  retired  our  batteries  opened  out  on  the 
enemy's  position  to  check  any  desire  they  might  have  to  follow 
us.  After  we  had  reformed,  a  successful  movement  on  the  right 
turned  the  works,  and  to  our  great  joy  we  could  see  that  the 
force  in  our  front  was  sharing  in  the  general  panic.  It  riow  came 
our  turn  to  advance  again  and  as  we  went  forward,  we  met  the 
stretcher  bearers  carrying  Captain  Hanson's  body  to  the  rear. 
We  moved  forward  at  a  double  quick,  meeting  with  no  opposi 
tion,  the  rebels  having  abandoned  their  battery  and  many  small 
arms  in  their  hasty  flight.  We  continued  our  pursuit  of  the 
enemy,  moving  on  the  left  of  the  Franklin  pike,  over  the  Over- 
ton  Hill  and  across  the  plantation  and  the  Nashville  and  Decatur 
Railroad,  passing  through  a  dense  cane  brake.  The  brigade  then 
turned  and  moved  by  the  plantation  mansion  to  a  position  near 
the  pike  and  advanced  to  within  two  miles  of  Brentwood.  By 
this  time  it  was  dark  and  further  pursuit  was  abandoned."  The 
losses  in  our  regiment  in  the  two  day's  engagement,  considering 
the  fact  that  we  attacked  the  enemy  behind  his  intrenchments, 
were  unexpectedly  small.  The  first  day  we  had  nine  men 
wounded  and  the  second  day  two  officers  and  one  non-commis 
sioned  officer  killed  and  one  officer  and  fourteen  enlisted  men 
wounded.  We  captured  four  12-pounder  brass  Napoleons,  a 
large  number  of  small  arms  and  two  commissioned  officers  and 
one  hundred  enlisted  men,  all  taken  in  open  field  fighting.1 

The  following  names  of  the  killed  and  wounded  are  taken 
from  the  imperfect  official  rosters : 

FIELD  AND  STAFF. 
\VOUNDED. — Colonel  Frank  Askew. 
COMPANY  A. 

KILLED. — Captain  Thomas  N.  Hanson. 

WOUNDED. — Corporal  James  W.  Paxton,  Samuel  R.  Guth- 
rie,  John  Mitchell. 

COMPANY  B. 

WOUNDED. — Sergeant  Robt.  S.  McClenahan,  Sergeant  Cor- 
win  F.  Camp.  William  A.  Stewart  (who  died  of  wounds"), 
Thomas  H.  Williams. 


1     Colonel  Askew's  official  report,  W.  R.  R.  93-301. 


654  FIFTEENTH   OHIO  'VOLUNTEERS  AM>  CAMPAIGNS 

COMPANY  C. 

WOUNDED. — Lieutenant  Wallace  McGrath,  Sergeant  David 
C.  Thurston,  Sergeant  William  Doak,  Corporal  Harvey  C.  Cal 
kins,  Felix  Allbaugh,  John  R.  McBride  (and  died  of  wounds 
December  16,  1864.) 

COMPANY  D. 

KILLED. — Lieutenant  Charles  C.  Rodig. 
WOUNDED. — Orville  Kerr. 

COMPANY  F. 

WOUNDED. — John  Diday,  Henry  C.  Bowles,  Jas.  F.  Good- 
erich. 

COMPANY  G. 

KILLED. — Sergeant  Jacob  Ward. 

WOUNDED. — Sergeant  Logan  McD.  Scott,  Edward  McCon- 
naughey. 

COMPANY  H. 

WOUNDED. — Sergeant  Franklin  Armstrong,  Henry  Crates, 
William  H.  Payne. 

COMPANY  I. 

WOUNDED. — Francis  W.  Hallabaugh  (and  died  of  wounds), 
Newton  F.  Mickey,  Joseph  Sheehy,  John  Barnett. 

Though  we  were  unsuccessful  in  our  attempt  to  force  the 
enemy's  position  on  Overton  Hill,  our  efforts  were  not  in  vain, 
for  the  enemy  in  order  to  meet  our  assault,  rushed  reinforce 
ments  from  his  left  and  left  center  to  the  threatened  point, — 
thus  weakening  his. line  at  those  points  and  making  it  easier  for 
our  troops  on  the  right  to  storm  and  carry  his  works.  General 
Thomas  in  his  official  report,  after  relating  the  dispositions  made 
for  a  general  advance,  says : 

"As  soon  as  the  above  dispositions  were  completed  *  *  * 
I  gave  directions  that  the  movement  against  the  enemy's  left  flank 
should  be  continued.  Our  entire  line  approached  to  within  600 
yards  of  the  enemy's  at  all  points.  His  center  was  weak  as  com 
pared  with  either  his  right  at  Overton's  Hill,  or  his  left 
bordering  on  the  Granny  White  pike ;  still  I  had  hopes  of  gain 
ing  his  rear  and  cutting  off  his  retreat  from  Franklin.  About  3 
p.  m.  Post's  brigade  of  Wood's  corps,  supported  by  Streight's 
brigade  of  the  same  command,  was  ordered  by  General  Wood 
to  assault  Overton's  Hill.  This  intention  was  communicated  to 
General  Steedman,  who  ordered  the  brigade  of  colored  troops 
commanded  by  Colonel  Morgan,  Fourteenth  U.  S.  Colored 
troops,1  to  co-operate  in  the  movement.  The  ground  on  which 

1     A  mistake.     Col.  C.  R.  Thompson's  Twelfth  U.  S.  Colored  troops  led  the  Colored 
Troops,     W.  R.  R.  93-49. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE  655 

the  two  assaulting  columns  formed  being  open  and  exposed  to 
the  enemy's  view,  he,  readily  perceiving  our  intention,  drew  re 
inforcements  from  his  left  and  center  to  the  threatened  point. 
This  movement  of  troops  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  was  com 
municated  along  the  line  from  left  to  right.  The  assault  was 
made,  and  received  by  the  enemy  with  a  tremendous  fire  of  grape 
and  canister  and  musketry  ;  our  men  moved  steadily  onward  up 
the  hill  until  near  the  crest,  when  the  reserve  of  the  enemy  rose 
and  poured  into  the  assaulting  column  a  most  destructive  fire 
causing  the  men  first  to  waver  and  then  to  fall  back,  leaving 
their  dead  and  wounded — black  and  white  indiscriminately 
mingled, — lying  amid  the  abatis, — the  gallant  Colonel  Post 
among  the  wounded.  *  *  *  Immediately  following  the  ef 
fort  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  General  Smith's  and  General  Scho- 
field's  commands  moved  against  the  enemy's  works  in  their  re 
spective  fronts,  carrying  all  before  them,  (but  not  till  after  the 
cavalry  had  driven  them  to  the  rear),1  irreparably  breaking  his 
line  in  a  dozen  places,  and  capturing  all  his  artillery  ana  thou 
sands  of  prisoners,  among  the  latter  four  general  officers.  *  *  * 
Wood's  and  Steedman's  troops,  hearing  the  shouts  of  victory 
coming  from  the  right,  rushed  impetuously  forward,  renewing 
the  assault  on  Overton's  Hill,  and  although  meeting  a  very  heavy 
fire,  the  onset  was  irresistible,  artillery  and  innumerable  pris 
oners  falling  into  our  hands.  The  enemy,  hopelessly  broken,  fled 
in  confusion  through  the  Brentwood  Pass,  the  Fourth  Corps  in 
a  close  pursuit,  which  was  continued  for  several  miles,  when 
darkness  closed  the  scene  and  the  men  rested  from  their  labors."2 

The  Confederate  troops  which  repulsed  our  assault  on  Over- 
ton's  Hill  were  Clayton's  and  Stevenson's  divisions  of  Lee's 
corps. 

Brigadier  General  Holtzclaw  who  commanded  a  brigade  in 
General  Clayton's  division,  in  his  official  report  gives  a  vivid  pic 
ture  of  the  assault  on  Overton's  Hill  from  the  Confederate  stand 
point.  He  says : 

"At  12  M.  the  enemy  made  a  most  determined  charge  on 
my  right.  Placing  a  negro  brigade  in  front  they  gallantly  dashed 
up  to  the  abatis,  forty  feet  in  front,  and  were  killed  by  hundreds. 
Pressed  on  by  their  white  brethren  in  the  rear  they  continued 
to  come  up  in  masses  to  the  abatis,  but  they  only  came  to  die.  I 
have  seen  most  of  the  battle  fields  of  the  West,  but  never  saw 
dead  men  thicker  than  in  front  of  my  two  left  regiments,  the 
great  masses  and  disorder  of  the  enemy  enabling  the  left  to  rake 
them  in  flank,  while  the  right,  with  a  coolness  unexampled, 

1  General  James   H.   Wilson  in  note  to  writer. 

2  W.  R.  R.  93-39-40. 


656  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

scarcely  threw  away  a  shot  at  their  front.  The  enemy  at  last 
broke  and  fled  in  wild  disorder.  With  great  difficulty  I  prevented 
my  line  from  pursuing ;  with  a  supporting  line  I  should  certainly 
have  done  so ;  but  covering  the  pike,  which  would  be  our  only 
line  of  retreat  in  case  of  disaster,  I  did  not  feel  justified  in  haz 
arding  the  position  for  what  might  have  been  a  temporary  suc 
cess.  A  color-bearer  of  the  negro  brigade  brought  his  standard 
to  within  a  few  feet  of  my  line.  He  was  shot  down,  and  Lieu 
tenant  Knox  of  the  Thirty-sixth  Alabama  Regiment  sprang  over 
the  shattered  works  and  brought  it  in.  Another  flag  was  carried 
off  by  an  officer  after  five  different  bearers  had  fallen  in  the  vain 
effort  to  plant  it  in  my  works.  At  2  p.  m.,  the  enemy  attempted 
a  second  charge  less  determined  than  the  first.  Their  brave  of 
ficers  could  neither  lead  nor  drive  their  men  to  such  certain 
death.  I  noticed  as  many  as  three  mounted,  who  fell  far  in  ad 
vance  of  their  commands,  urging  them  forward.  The  shelling 
of  the  enemy's  batteries  between  12  and  3  p.  m.,  was  the  most 
furious  I  ever  witnessed,  while  the  range  was  so  precise  that 
scarce  a  shell  failed  to  explode  in  the  line.  The  enemy  seemed 
now  to  be  satisfied  that  he  could  not  carry  my  position  and  con 
tented  himself  by  shelling  and  sharpshooting  everything  in  sight. 
About  4  p.  m.,  I  saw  the  left  suddenly  give  way  three  or  four 
brigades  distant  from  me.  Almost  instantaneously  the  line 
crumbled  away  till  it  reached  me.  I  had  no  time  to  give  any 
order  or  to  make  any  disposition  to  check  the  disaster.  When 
my  command  showed  symptoms  of  taking  care  of  themselves. 
I  could  only  order  them  back,  hoping  to  reform  in  a  new  posi 
tion.  I  had  to  retire  under  a  destructive  fire  of  eighteen  guns 
600  yards  distant,  sweeping  almost  an  open  plain.  I  could  not 
maintain  order.  The  parallel  stone  walls  on  the  pike  separated 
my  command  in  the  center.  I  had  neither  staff  officer,  or  mounted 
courier  with  me,  and  used  my  best  endeavors  to  get  my  com 
mand  all  on  the  same  side  of  the  pike.  I  succeeded  in  doing  this 
about  one  mile  from  the  field,  getting  the  greater  body  of  the 
brigade  together.  I  was  directed  by  the  major  general  com 
manding  to  take  position  as  rear  guard  of  the  army  across  the 
pike.  At  11  p.  m.,  I  halted  four  miles  from  Hollow  Tree  Gap."1 
General  Holtzclaw's  report  contains  a  number  of  inaccur 
acies.  There  was  but  one  assault  on  Overton  Hill  before  its 
final  capture  and  that  was  made  about  3  p.  m.,  instead  of  12  M. 
The  advance  of  our  rear  lines  after  General  Post's  brigade  had 
failed  to  carry  the  enemy's  works,  may  have  seemed  to  General 
Holtzclaw  like  other  distinct  assaults.  But  they  were  all  parts 
of  the  same  movement  and  made  at  the  same  time.  It  was  some 


1     W.  R.  R.  93-705-6. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE  657 

four  weeks  after  the  engagement  when  General  Holtzclaw'b  report 
was  written,  and  his  memory  was  evidently  at  fault  in  these 
particulars.  But  his  report  confirms  the  sanguinary  character  of 
the  struggle  on  the  rugged  slopes  of  Overton's  Hill,  and  has 
therefore  a  proper  place  in  any  history  of  the  battle.  At  6  p.  m. 
December  16,  General  Thomas,  from  eight  miles  south  of  Nash 
ville  sent  the  following  dispatch,  addressed  to  the  President  of 
the  United  States,  Hon.  E.  M.  Stanton,  Lieutenant  General  U.  S. 
Grant  and  Governor  Andrew  Johnson  of  Tennessee:  "The  army 
thanks  you  for  your  approbation  of  its  conduct  yesterday  and  to 
assure  you  that  it  is  not  misplaced.  I  have  the  honor  to  report 
that  the  enemy  has  been  pressed  at  all  points  today  on  his  line  of 
retreat  to  the  Brentwood  Hills  and  Brigadier  General  Hatch  of 
Wilson's  corps  of  cavalry,  on  the  right  turned  the  enemy's  left 
and  captured  a  large  number  of  prisoners,  number  not  yet  re 
ported.  Major  General  Schofield's  troops  next  on  the  left  of 
cavalry,  carried  several  heights,  captured  many  prisoners  and 
six  pieces  of  artillery.  Brevet  Major  General  Smith  next  on  the 
left  of  Major  General  Schofield,  carried  the  salient  point  of  the 
enemy's  line  with  McMillan's  brigade  of  McArthur's  division, 
capturing  sixteen  pieces  of  artillery,  two  brigadier  generals  and 
about  2000  prisoners.  Brigadier  General  Garrard's  division  of 
Smith's  command,  next  on  the  left  of  McArthur's  division,  car 
ried  the  enemy's  intrenchments,  capturing  all  the  artillery  and 
troops  of  the  enemy  on  the  line.  Brigadier  General  Wood's 
corps,  on  the  Franklin  pike,  took  up  the  assault,  carrying  the 
enemy's  intrenchments  in  his  front,  captured  eight  pieces  of  artil 
lery,  something  over  (>00  prisoners,  and  drove  the  enemy  within 
one  mile  of  the  Brentwood  pass.  Major  General  Steedman,  com 
manding  the  detachments  of  the  different  armies  of  the  Military 
Division  of  the  Mississippi  most  nobly  supported  General  Wood's 
left  and  bore  a  most  honorable  part  in  the  operations  of  the  day. 
I  have  ordered  the  pursuit  to  be  continued  in  the  morning  at 
daylight,  all  the  troops  are  very  much  fatigued.  The  greifest  en 
thusiasm  prevails.  I  must  not  forget  to  report  the  operations 
of  Brigadier  General  Johnson,  in  successfully  driving  the  enemy, 
with  the  co-operations  of  the  gunboats  under  Lieutenant  Com 
mander  Fitch,  from  their  established  batteries  on  the  Cumber 
land  River  below  the  City  of  Nashville,  and  of  the  services  of 
Brigadier  General  Croxton's  brigade  in  covering  and  relieving 
our  right  and  rear  in  the  operations  of  yesterday  and  today. 
Although  I  have  no  report  of  the  number  of  prisoners  captured 
by  Johnston's  and  Croxton's  commands,  I  know  they  have  made 
a  large  number  and  am  glad  to  be  able  to  state  that  the  num 
ber  of  prisoners  captured  yesterday  greatly  exceeds  the  number 


658  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

reported  to  me  last  evening.  The  woods,  fields  and  intrenchments 
are  strewn  with  the  enemy's  small  arms,  abandoned  in  their  re 
treat.  In  conclusion,  I  am  happy  to  state  that  all  this  has  been 
effected  with  but  a  small  loss  tc  us.  Our  loss  does  not  p?'ob:ibly 
exceed  3000,  very  few  killed.1 

During  the  two  day's  operations  there  were  4462  prisoners 
captured  including  28?  officers  of  all  grades  from  that  of  Major 
General,  fifty-three  pieces  of  artillery  and  thousands  of  small 
arms."2  The  losses  of  our  entire  army  in  the  battle,  were  twenty- 
nine  officers  and  358  enlisted  men  killed,  164  officers  and  2398 
enlisted  men  wounded  and  one  officer  and  111  enlisted  men  cap 
tured  or  missing,  a  total  of  3061. 

By  a  singular  omission,  General  Thomas  fails  to  state  the 
number  of  guns  captured  by  the  cavalry.  That  arm  of  the  serv 
ice  had  for  the  first  time  in  our  part  of  the  army  fought  as  an 
independent  organization  under  a  single  leader,  and  commanders 
of  infantry  were  slow  to  give  it  the  credit  it  deserved.  Accord 
ing  to  the  official  reports  of  General  Wilson  and  his  division  and 
brigade  commanders,  the  cavalry  captured  during  the  campaign 
seventeen  cannon,3  the  larger  portion  having  been  captured  in 
the  battle  of  Nashville,  but  as  they  were  taken  in  co-operation 
with  the  infantry  the  infantry  received  all  the  credit. 

The  Fourth  Corps  suffered  the  heaviest  losses.  The  brigade 
which  suffered  most  \vas  the  colored  brigade  led  by  Colonel  C. 
R.  Thompson  in  the  attack  on  Overtoil  Hill.  Its  loss  was  four 
officers  and  seventy-three  enlisted  men  killed,  fourteen  officers 
and  376  enlisted  men  wounded  and  one  enlisted  man  captured  or 
missing,  a  total  of  468.  Colonel  Hubbard's  brigade  of 
McArthur's  division  came  next  with  three  officers  and  thirty  en 
listed  men  killed,  twenty-two  officers  and  259  enlisted  men 
wounded  and  one  enlisted  man  missing,  total  315.  Colonel  Post's 
brigade  came  next  with  six  officers  and  thirty  enlisted  men  killed, 
twenty-seven  officers  and  236  enlisted  men  wounded  and  thirteen 
enlisted  men  missing,  total  312.  General  Grose's  brigade  of 
seven  regiments  of  the  First  Division  of  the  Fourth  Corps  came 
next  with  four  officers  and  thirty-two  enlisted  men  killed,  ten 
officers  and  205  enlisted  men  wounded  and  two  enlisted  men 
missing,  total  253,  while  our  brigade  had  three  officers  and  thirty- 
seven  enlisted  men  killed  and  thirteen  officers  and  191  enlisted 
men  wounded,  total  244.  The  total  losses  in  no  other  brigade 
engaged  in  the  battle  reached  200  and  in  many  brigades  the  loss 

1  w.  R.  R.  94-211. 

2  From  General  Thomas's  Official  Report,  \V.  R.  R.  93-41). 

2  From  General  Thomas's  Offcial  Report,  W.  R.  R.  94-40. 

3  W.  R.  R.   93-571. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE  659 

was  far  below  that  number.1  All  honor  to  the  brave  colored 
troops  who  fought  in  the  battle  of  Nashville.  They  were  among 
the  black  men  described  by  Lincoln  who  ''with  silent  tongue  and 
clenched  teeth  and  steady  eye  and  well  poised  bayonet  helped 
mankind  on  to  the  great  consummation." 

On  the  morning  of  December  17,  Secretary  of  War  Stanton 
telegraphed  General  Grant  who  was  at  Burlington,  New  Jersey, 
that  Thomas  was  victorious  at  Nashville,  that  Hood's  army  was 
broken,  and  that  Sherman  had  taken  Fort  McAllister,2  which 
placed  him  in  communication  with  the  Union  fleet  in  Ossibaw 
Sound. 

Thus  almost  simultaneously,  the  two  branches  of  Sherman's 
army  which  separated  in  November,  had  each  accomplished  it's 
mission.  General  Thomas  had  practically  destroyed  Hood's  army 
and  General  Sherman  had  cut  the  Confederacy  in  twain  by  his 
successful  march  from  Atlanta  to  the  sea. 


1  W.  R.  R.  93-97-105. 

2  \V.   R.   R.   94-228. 


CHAPTER    XXX 

QOD"S  INVASION  OF  TENNESSEE — THE  PURSUIT  OF  HOOD  TO  THE 
TENNESSEE  RIVER. 

At  9:30  p.  m.%  December  16,  General  Thomas  issued  or- 
rs  for  the  immediate  vigorous  pursuit  of  Hood's  broken 
my.  Generals  Wood  and  Steedman  were  ordered  to  move  on 
e  Franklin  pike  in  their  then  order:  Generals  Schoneld  and 
nith  on  the  Granny  \Yhite  pike,  and  concentrate  with  the 
K>ps  of  Generals  Wood  and  Steedman  at  or  near  Brent  wood, 
id  the  whole  army  was  then  to  march  on  Franklin.1  At  the 
me  time  General  Wilson  was  ordered  to  leave  Johnson's 
valry  division  on  the  Hillsboro  pike,  to  observe  the  enemy 
id  protect  our  right  and  rear,  and  to  move  the  balance  of  his 
mmand  over  to  the  Franklin  pike  to  operate  on  that  road 
id  the  road  east  of  it.2 

General  Wilson  before  he  received  the  above  order  had 
reeled  General  Johnson  to  move  by  the  Hilisborough  pike 
r  Franklin,  and  was  preparing  to  press  the  enemy  by  the 
iortest  roads.  This  he  reported  to  General  Thomas  at  3  a.  m. 
i  the  17th.  and  stated  that  he  thought  he  would  be  able  to  do 
e  enemy  more  damage  by  crowding  him.  as  he  had  already 
cided  to  do.  General  Wilson  also  stated  that  it  was  his  in- 
ntion  to  try  to  get  into  Franklin  with  his  whole  force,  that 
k  had  sent  General  Thomas  a  dispatch  to  that  effect  which 
id  not  been  acknowledged,  but  that  he  would  send  his  cav- 
ry.  except  Johnson's  division,  to  the  Franklin  pike  as  or- 
Ted.  General  Wilson  also  stated  that  he  inferred  that  Hood 
as  expecting  the  arrival  of  Forrest's  forces  from  the  direction 

Mmfreesboro  and  that  the  infantry  therefore  should  crowd 
e  enemy  vigorously  on  the  Franklin  pike,  and  if  possible  pre- 
ait  the  junction.3  These  seem  to  have  been  such  excellent 
ggestions,  that  one  wonders  why  they  were  not  followed. 
:>ssibly  the  report  that  General  Breckenridge's  army,  esti- 
ated  at  10,000  cavalry  infantry  and  artillery,  was  at  a  point 

miles  southeast  of  Murfreesboro  and  was  moving  toward 
at  place4  had  something  to  do  with  it. 

About  the  hour  orders  as  above  were  given  for  the  pursuit 
Hood,  Colonel  Willett.  who  had  charge  of  the  pontoon  train, 

T~W.  K.  *-  M-H4-H5.  3     W.  K.  B.  94-237. 

6    W.  B.  *.  M-21S.  4     W.  «_  B_  94-24?. 


PTESTIT  «F  Ht*w>  -651 

was  ordered  to  move  smch  train  at  as  -early  an  hour  as  possible 
on  like  Mwrfreesboro  ffoe}- 

The  order  of  march  of  tike  Fourth  Corps  "was  piibBsihed 
tt  ^J  a.  m.  December  17.  and  directed  that  the  advance  atgainsi 
the  enemv  shomld  continue  —  -tike  troops  to  move  out  in  tike 
following  order  —  General  KrnTbalTs  division  on  the  rigirt.  Gen 
eral  Elliotrs  Uormerhr  General  Wagners  )  division  in  the  cs&- 
ter  and  onr  division.  (general  Beatty's  on  the  left.  Each  deri 
sion  was  to  deploy-  one  brigade  and  the  other  brigades  were 
to  follow  in  column  until  the  eneim'  was  met,  wnen  a  secofwl 
brigade  was  to  be  deployed  .and  the  enenrr  pressed  uiria 
vigor.- 

We  were  expecting  to  pursue  the  enemy  rigorously  aaad 
were  up  verv  earlv  and  packed  up  and  ready  to  more  by  day 
light.  ^It  had  rained  all  night  the  night  of  the  l-6xh  ,and  was 
grill  raining,  but  the  thrill  of  onr  glorious  Tictory  uras  still 
vibrating;  and  the  discomfort  was  not  tiiougirt  oL  Ev-en  our 
gjief  over  the  lc^ss  of  onr  former  comrades  was  half  forgotten 
in  onr  eagerness  to  press  forward.  A  detail  02  men  "«~as  s»ent 
to  Nashville  to  see  that  the  remains  of  Captain  Hanson  irere 
sent  home  to  New  Concord.  Ohio.s  •  -  -  -  . 
about  b  a.  m_  cmr  regiment  in  column  by  rigirt  of  coTrrpgrnae&. 
through  c*pen  woods  and  fields  to  the  left  of  the  EranMin  pike.. 
The  pike  ivas  a  river  of  soft  mud  and  the  grcnmd  everywhere 
was  covered  with  water. 

Shortly  after  we  started.  General  Thomas.,  attended  by  Ms 
stall,  rode  bv  on  the  pike  and  was  cheered  by  -every  one.  He 
was  clothed  from  head  to  foot  in  rubber  and  was  covered 
with  mud.  His  lace  was  splashed,  but  be  was  srrrilrng  and 
jolly,  and  as  he  swayed  in  his  saddle  and  bowed  to  acknowl 
edge  the  cheers  and  salutes  which  were  given  irrm.  he  was  a 
•wholesome  and  pleasant  study.  We  did  not  T-JVPTI  know  how 
near  he  had  come  to  being  removed  because  be  did  not  move 
against  Hood  rmt-Tl  he  was  ready.  The  marching  was  very 
difTicnlt.  some  of  the  fields  were  deep  with  mad  and  we  had  to 
wade  a  number  of  small  streams-  After  we  passed  Brent- 
wood,  "where  we  halted  tor  "half  an  hour,,  we  finally  found  room 
to  march  on  the  poke,  which  was  preferable  to  the  nmddr 
fields.  for  it  had  a  firm  bottom. 

Soon  after  reaching  the  poke,  we  mel  a  Confederate  TCgp- 
inent  going  to  the  rear  as  prisoners.  It  had  been  captured 
by  the  cavalry.  Wt  beari  anill'try  f_r:nr  ~-~-  frz-nr  and  learned 
that  the  enemy's  rear  guard  was  sriH  sn:bb-:>m:y  :o>:smg-  our 


I*iarr. 


662  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

advance.  Signs  of  the  enemy's  demoralization  were  every 
where  visible  in  broken  guns  and  cast  away  pieces  of  equip 
ment. 

We  reached  Franklin  about  3  :30  p.  m.1  and  turned  off  the 
road,  to  remain  over  night,  we  were  told,  and  to  draw  rations 
which  we  very  much  needed.  Colonel  Suman  writh  his  regi 
ment,  the  Ninth  Indiana,  was  trying  to  build  a  bridge  across 
the  Harpeth  but  the  river  was  rising  so  fast  it  seemed  very 
doubtful  whether  he  would  succees.2  We  had  orders  to  cross 
the  stream  as  soon  as  the  bridge  was  completed,  or  the  pon 
toon  train  arrived.  At  8  p.  m.  General  Wood  dispatched  to 
General  Thomas,  that  Colonel  Suman  had  reported  it  impossi 
ble  to  construct  the  bridge,  owing  to  the  rapid  rise  of  the  river, 
and  urged  that  the  pontoon  train  be  hurried  forward.3  It  was 
not  known  at  that  time  that  the  pontoon  train  had  been  or 
dered  to  move  out  on  the  Murfreesboro  pike  and  was  not 
within  reach.  At  8  p.  m.,  word  came  that  General  Wilson 
with  his  cavalry  had  attacked  and  "bust  up"  Stevenson's  divi 
sion  and  a  brigade  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  three  miles  beyond 
Franklin  and  had  captured  three  cannon  and  a  number  of 
prisoners.3.  At  10  p.  m.  orders  came  from  General  Thomas 
to  press  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy  at  daylight  next  morning.4 
On  the  morning  of  December  18,  we  were  ready  to  move  at 
daylight.  At  7  :30  a.  m.  Colonel  Suman,  whose  men  had 
worked  all  night,  reported  that  the  bridge  he  had  been  work 
ing  on  was  completed  and  orders  came  to  move  at  once,  which 
we  did.  Kimball's  division  crossed  first,  then  Elliott's  and 
then  ours.  A  battery  of  artillery  followed  each  division. 
After  the  three  divisions  came  the  rest  of  the  corps  artillery, 
then  the  ammunition  and  hospital  trains  and  then  the  other 
trains,  all  moving  down  the  Franklin  pike.4 

As  we  marched  through  Franklin  we  found  the  place  full 
of  Confederate  wounded.  Almost  every  other  house  was  a 
hospital.  The  number  of  wounded  still  remaining  there  was 
said  to  be  near  2000.  There  were  some  few  of  our  own  men 
in  the  hospitals  there.  As  we  passed  by  the  Carter  House 
we  saw  many  evidences  of  the  fierceness  of  the  conflict  which 
had  raged  about  that  now  historic  dwelling.  The  side  of  the 
house  towards  the  south  still  bore  the  marks  of  the  battle. 
In  a  number  of  places  were  holes  torn  by  the  shot  and  shell 
of  the  enemy's  artillery  and  there  was  scarcely  a  square  inch 
of  its  surface  that  did  not  show  the  dint  of  a  bullet.  The  north 
side  of  the  house  showed  similar  marks  but  they  were  not  so 


1  Gleason's  Diary.  3     W.  R.  R.  94-233. 

2  Fuller-ton's  Journal,  \V.  R.  R.  93-157.          4     Fuller-ton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.  93-158. 


THE  PURSUIT  OF  HOOD  663 

numerous  as  on  the  south  side.  The  marks  on  the  north  side 
were  evidently  made  by  the  men  of  Opdycke's  brigade  at  the 
time  our  center  was  broken  by  the  men  of  Brown's  and  Cle- 
burne's  divisions,  and  General  Gordon  led  his  brigade  over 
our  works  and  was  captured  with  his  command.  The  small 
grove  of  locusts  to  the  southwest  of  the  Carter  House  looked 
like  a  cherry  orchard  in  abundant  bloom.  It  had  been  swept 
by  such  a  storm  of  leaden  hail  that  scarcely  a  twig  had  not 
been  touched  by  a  bullet.  Here  and  there  many  dead  horses 
\vere  lying  unburied.  But  most  impressive  of  all  the  remind 
ers  of  the  fierce  conflict,  were  the  hundreds  of  small  head 
boards  which  marked  the  graves  of  the  enemy's  dead  who 
had  fallen  in  front  of  our  works.  There  seemed  to  be  acres  of 
them.  The  headboards  bore  the  name,  rank  and  regiment  of 
the  men  buried  beneath  them,  those  of  each  regiment  grouped 
together.  The  loss  of  officers  was  appalling.  In  some  regi 
ments  almost  all  the  field,  staff  and  line  officers  seemed  to 
have  been  killed.  Gleason  in  his  diary  says  that  some  of  the 
enemy's  prisoners  whom  we  met  at  Franklin  said  "that  after 
carrying  the'  line  of  works  held  by  General  Wagner's  division, 
they  supposed  all  wras  clear  and  that  we  had  no  other  in 
trenched  line,  that  with  this  impression,  they  rushed  forward 
blindly  into  the  open  jaws  of  death  as  it  were,  thinking  the 
coveted  prize  within  their  grasp."1 

We  marched  rapidly  forward  through  the  pouring  rain, 
meeting  three  or  four  pieces  of  artillery  which  the  cavalry 
had  captured,  and  small  groups  of  prisoners  which  were  being 
sent  to  the  rear.  There  was  artillery  firing  in  front,  which  indi 
cated  that  the  enemy  was  stubbornly  resisting  our  advance. 
But  we  pressed  forward  in  support  of  the  cavalry  to  beyond 
Spring  Hill,  where  we  bivouaced  for  the  night,  having  marched 
14  miles. 

Colonel  Fullerton  in  his  journal  of  this  day,  says: 
"The  enemy  is  very  much  demoralized,  about  one-third 
of  what  remains  of  Hood's  army  is  without  arms  and  as  many 
are  without  shoes.  Thus  far  we  (the  army)  have  taken  from 
them  over  60  pieces  of  artillery  and  a  large  number  of  prison 
ers,  perhaps  9000  up  to  date,  including  the  captured  in  hospi 
tal.  Hood's  trains  are  two  days  ahead  of  him.  He  has  but 
a  few  pieces  of  artillery  left.  Forrest  it  is  supposed  has 
joined  him  with  one  division  of  cavalry  and  two  divisions  of 
infantry  that  he  has  had  at  Murfreesborough,  part  of  the  same 
force  General  Rousseau  whipped  a  few  days  ago.  The  rest 
of  Forrest's  cavalry  is  in  our  front.  Wilson  has  been  driving 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


664  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

it  today,  together  with  Cheatham's  corps  that  has  been  acting 
as  rear  guard  today.  We  (the  army)  have  captured  four  gen 
eral  officers  up  to  date."1 

That  night  General  Thomas  received  the  following  dis 
patch  from  General  Grant : 

"The  armies  operating  against  Richmond  have  fired  200 
guns  in  honor  of  your  great  victory.  Sherman  has  fully  es 
tablished  his  base  on  Ossibaw  Sound,  with  Savannah  fully  in 
vested.  I  hope  to  be  able  to  fire  a  salute  tomorrow  in  honor 
of  the  fall  of  Savannah.  In  all  your  operations  we  heard 
nothing  of  Forrest.  Great  precautions  should  be  taken  to  pre 
vent  him  crossing  the  Cumberland  or  Tennessee  below  East- 
port.  After  Hood  has  been  driven  as  far  as  it  is  possible  to 
follow  him,  you  want  to  re-occupy  Decatur  and  all  other 
abandoned  points."2 

General  Thomas  answered  this  dispatch  as  follows : 

"Yours  of  12:20  p.  m.  today  received.  I  have  already 
given  orders  to  have  Decatur  occupied,  and  also  to  throw  a 
strong  column  on  the  south  side  of  the  Tennessee  toward 
Tuscumbia,  for  the  purpose  of  capturing  Hood's  depot  there, 
if  possible,  and  gaining  possession  of  his  pontoon  bridge.  I 
have  also  requested  Admiral  Lee  to  go  up  the  Tennessee  River 
with  a  fleet  of  gunboats,  which  he  has  promised  to  do,  and  his 
vessels  are  no  doubt  already  on  the  way.  General  Wilson  in 
formed  me  today  that  prisoners  taken  yesterday  by  him  told 
him  that  Forrest,  Jackson  and  another  division  left  Murfrees- 
boro  Thursday  (Dec.  15.)  for  Columbia  direct,  and  that  Buford 
with  another  division  left  Murfreesboro  the  same  day  and 
marched  continuously  until  he  reached  Spring  Hill,  where  he 
assumed  the  duties  of  rear  guard  to  the  rebel  army.  I  hope 
you  will  be  able  to  fire  a  salute  tomorrow  in  honor  of  the  cap 
ture  of  Savannah."3 

It  appears  from  General  Forrest's  report  that  it  was  not 
until  the  night  of  the  16th  that  General  Buford  was  ordered 
across  to  the  Columbia  pike,  and  that  he,  with  the  balance  of 
his  command  did  not  reach  Columbia  until  the  evening  of  the 
18th.4  The  morning  of  December  19,  it  was  still  raining  hard 
and  the  ground  was  in  such  condition  that  a  wagon  could  not 
possibly  move  off  the  pike,  and  it  was  almost  impossible  to 
march  infantry  off  of  it.5  We  were  ready  to  move  a  little  after 
daylight.  We  heard  artillery  firing  in  the  direction  of  Ruther 
ford's  Creek,  distant  about  two  and  one-half  miles,  and  after 
some  delay  moved  out  in  that  direction  about  two  miles  and 

1  W.  R.  R.  93-158-159.  4     W.  R.  R.  94-756. 

2  W.  R.  R.  94-248.  5     Fullerton's  Journal,  W.  R,  R.  93-159. 

3  W.  R.  R.  94-249. 


THE  PURSUIT  OF  HOOD  685 

were  halted  in  a  piece  of  woodland  ,the  rain  pouring  down 
harder  than  at  any  time  since  we  left  Nashville.  We  heard 
skirmishing"  in  front  and  were  ordered  to  have  the  men  draw 
the  loads  from  their  guns,  which  looked  ominous.1  This  was 
about  9  a.  m.  The  cavalry  had  reached  the  creek  before  us,  and 
found  the  bridge  destroyed  and  the  enemy  holding  a  high 
and  commanding  line  of  hills  on  the  south  side  near  to  and 
running  parallel  with  the  creek.  He  had  constructed  thereon 
a  line  of  earth  works,  and  as  our  advance  appeared  opened  on 
it  with  a  four-gun  battery.  His  skirmishers  and  sharpshooters 
lined  the  bank  of  the  creek,  which  was  so  swollen  that  it  was 
impossible  to  ford  it,  it  being  fifteen  feet  deep  in  most  places. 
The  pontoon  train  had  not  come  up  and  we  could  hear  nothing 
of  it.2 

After  the  men  had  drawn  the  loads  from  their  guns  and 
replaced  them  with  dry  cartridges,  we  moved  out  into  the 
pike,  marched  a  short  distance  and  then  again  moved  off  the 
road  and  went  into  bivouac  where  we  remained  the  rest  of  the 
day  and  the  night. :i  Here  Colonel  Askew  rejoined  us.  We 
built  large  fires  and  tried  to  dry  our  wet  garments,  with  poor 
success,  however.  At  10  a.  m.  parties  wrere  sent  above  and 
below  the  position  covering  the  pike  held  by  the  enemy,  to 
fell  trees  across  the  creek,  so  that  we  might  cross  our  skir 
mishers,  and  a  working  party  was  sent  to  build  infantry  foot 
bridges.  At  2  p.  m.  they  reported  that  there  were  no  trees 
on  the  bank  large  enough  to  reach  across  the  creek,  and  those 
that  were  cut  were  swept  away  by  the  swift  current.  Wre 
did  not  have  tools  to  build  a  bridge  that  the  wagons  could  cross 
on.  At  3  p.  m.,  General  Elliott  was  directed  to  drive  back 
the  enemy's  sharpshooters  and  try  to  build  a  bridge  at  some 
point  above  the  pike,  and  to  continue  the  wrork  until  after 
dark.  Similar  instructions  were  given  to  General  Kimball  to 
build  a  bridge  below  and  not  far  from  the  pike.  After  mak 
ing  all  possible  efforts  to  build  a  bridge  as  directed,  General 
Elliott  gave  it  up  and  reported  it  as  impossible  because  of 
the  rapid  rise  of  the  creek  and  the  swiftness  of  the  current.4 

While  our  division  was  in  bivouac,  keeping  up  great  fires 
and  trying  to  dry  our  blankets,  some  of  the  men  in  the  other 
divisions  were  still  at  work  trying  to  find  some  way  to  get 
across  the  swollen  creek.  Some  of  the  men  in  General  Kim- 
ball's  division  built  two  rafts  and  tried  to  cross  to  the  other 
bank,  but  both  rafts  wrere  swamped  by  the  swift  current  and 
two  men  were  drowned.  At  1  a.  m.  December  20,  General 
Kimball  reported  that  General  Grose  who  had  been  trying  to 

1  Gleason's  Diary.  3     Gleason's  Diary. 

2  Fullerton'si  Journal,  W.  I'..  R.  93-l.VJ.          4     Fullerton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.  93-159. 

Sig.    22 


666  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEEKS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

build  a  bridge  below  the  pike  had  given  it  up,  as  the  stream 
was  too  deep  and  swift.1 

At  9  p.  m.  December  19,  General  Thomas  sent  a  dispatch 
to  General  Wood  saying,  that  Forrest  with  7000  cavalry  was 
in  camp  between  Rutherford's  Creek  and  Duck  River  and 
directing  him  to  cross  the  creek  next  morning  and  move  di 
rectly  against  him.  General  Wilson  was  ordered  to  send  Gen 
eral  Hatch's  division  of  cavalry  across  on  the  ruins  of  the  rail 
road  bridge  to  strike  Forrest  in  flank,  while  our  corps  at 
tacked  him  in  front.  General  Smith  was  to  co-operate  by 
way  of  the  Columbia  and  Rally  Hill  road,  which  crossed  the 
creek  near  its  head  waters.2 

At  the  time  of  the  receipt  of  this  order,  General  Wilson 
sent  word  that  General  Hatch  believed  Forrest  had  already 
gone,3  but  orders  were  given  accordingly,  with  renewed  direc 
tions  to  redouble  efforts  to  find  some  way  to  get  across  the 
creek.  The  rain  ceased  about  midnight  and  it  grew  much 
colder. 

The  morning  of  December  20,  we  had  no  orders  to  move 
and  the  men  were  busy  until  near  noon  trying  to  dry  their 
soaked  blankets.  At  9  a.  m.  we  heard  that  General  Grose  had 
a  few  men  across  the  river,  was  crossing  his  brigade  and  would 
soon  have  a  bridge  on  which  infantry  could  cross.  The  bridge 
was  completed  at  11 :30  a.  m.  and  General  Kimball's  division 
commenced  crossing.  General  Hatch's  division  of  cavalry  at 
the  same  time  commenced  crossing  over  the  ruins  of  the  rail 
road  bridge.  At  12:30  p.  m.  General  Elliott  completed  a  foot 
bridge  at  the  pike  crossing  and  began  crossing  his  division. 
Just  after  we  had  our  dinners  the  "assambly"  sounded  in  our 
division  and  we  moved  out  on  the  pike  and  to  the  creek.  After 
an  hour's  wait,  we  crossed  on  the  bridge  just  below  the  pike 
General  Elliott's  men  has  constructed,  and  marched  toward 
Columbia.  We  heard  considerable  firing  toward  Columbia  but 
it  soon  ceased.  We  moved  forward  slowly  through  the  mud 
until  we  came  to  Duck  River  and  went  into  camp  on  a  part  of 
the  same  ground  on  which  we  had  camped  on  our  march  to 
Shiloh  in  1862. 4  Forrest  had  gone,  as  General  Hatch  had  re 
ported,  and  the  entire  corps  was  halted  along  Duck  River 
awaiting  for  the  pontoon  train  to  come  up.  The  enemy  held 
the  south  bank  of  the  river,  which  was  too  deep  and  swift  to 
bridge  with  timber  and  was  still  rising.  At  3  :50  p.  m.  it  again 
commenced  raining  hard  and  the  prospects  of  overtaking  the 
enemy  were  growing  more  and  more  remote.  General  Fuller- 
ton  in  his  diary  of  this  day  says,  that  at  3  :50  p.  m.  he  had  just 

1  Fullerton's  Journal,  \V.  R.  R.  93-159.         4     Gleason's  Diary. 

2  and  3     Fullerton's  .Journal,  W.  R.  R.  93-160. 


THE  PURSUIT  OF  HOOD  617 

heard  from  General  Thomas,  who  reported  that  the  pontoon 
train  would  be  up  that  night  and  adds,  "This  corps  has  already 
been  delayed  thirty-four  hours  waiting  for  the  pontoon  train 
to  cross  the  Harpeth  River,  Rutherford's  Creek  and  now  Duck 
River.  The  enemy  has,  therefore,  gained  so  many  hours  in 
his  retreat."1 

The  morning  of  December  21,  it  was  snowing  and  as 
there  were  no  orders  to  move  the  men  generally  kept  inside 
their  shelter  tents.  Gleason  in  his  diary  says  he  "walked  down 
to  the  place  where  it  was  proposed  to  lay  the  pontoon  bridge, 
when  it  should  come  up,  and  found  that  the  pickets  on  either 
side  of  the  river  had  made  an  amicable  arrangement  not  to 
fire  until  we  were  ready  to  cross,  and  that  the  rebels  had  called 
out  to  our  men  not  to  come  too  near  the  river  but  to  go  back 
and  build  fires,  which  advice  seemed  sensible  and  prevailed." 
He  also  says  that  he  "was  informed  that  two  pieces  of  artillery 
and  300  prisoners  had  been  captured  here  yesterday  (by  the 
cavalry)  after  the  rebels  had  removed  their  pontoon  bridge 
(too  soon)  and  that  it  was  reported  that  several  other  field 
pieces  had  been  dumped  into  the  river  over  the  abutments  of 
the  old  bridge."2 

At  8  a.  m.  General  Wood  received  a  dispatch  from  General 
Thomas  dated  8  p.  m.  the  20th,  saying  that  General  Schofield 
had  been  instructed  to  build  a  bridge  over  Rutherford's  Creek 
so  that  artilery  and  trains  could  cross,  and  that  General  Smith 
would  assist  in  getting  the  pontoon  train  over  and  hurry  it 
forward  so  that  a  bridge  could  be  thrown  across  Duck  River 
early  next  morning.  General  Thomas  also  said  : 

"It  is  the  desire  that  the  entire  army  be  over  the  river 
before  tomorrow  night,  in  which  case  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  the 
greater  part  of  Hood's  army  may  be  captured,  as  he  cannot 
possibly  get  his  teams  and  troops  across  the  Tennessee  River 
before  we  can  overtake  him."3 

The  pontoon  train  did  not  get  to  Rutherford's  Creek  until 

I  p.  m.  the  21st,  ond  only  a  part  of  it  reached  Duck  River  that 
night.     Colonel   Streight  of  our  brigade  who  was  to  lay  it,  at 

II  :30  p.  m.  reported  that  it  would  be  impracticable  to  com 
mence  the  work  until  5  a.  m.  next  morning.4     Colonel  Fuller- 
ton  in  his  diary  of  this  day  says : 

"The  last  of  Forrest's  command  and  Bate's  rebel  divi 
sion  of  infantry  arrived  opposite  Columbia,  on  the  north  bank 
of  Duck  River  from  Murfreesboro  yesterday.  If  we  could 
have  had  a  pontoon  train  to  enable  us  to  cross  Rutherford's 
Creek  when  we  arrived  there,  we  would,  have  captured  the 

1  W.  R.  R.,  Fuller-ton's  Jnuranl,  93-160.         M     W.  R.  R.  04-287. 

2  Gleason's   Diary.  4     Fuller-ton's  Diary,  W.  R.  R.   93-161. 


668  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

most  of  the  force.  This  part  of  the  enemy's  force  was  in  such 
haste  that  it  abandoned  six  pieces  of  artillery  that  were  stuck 
in  the  mud  near  Columbia  on  the  Murfreesboro  road."1 

Later  in  the  day  he  writes,  "We  have  been  delayed  an 
other  day  in  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy  on  account  of  the  pon 
toon  train  not  being  up  with  us.  The  following"  reason  for  the 
delay  has  been  given:  On  the  17th  instant  General  Thomas 
sent  word  for  the  train  to  leave  Nashville  at  once,  to  push  for 
ward  and  join  us.  Captain  Ramsey,  assistant  adjutant  gen 
eral,  wrote  the  order  for  the  train  and  directed  it  to  come  out 
on  the  Murfreesboro  pike  instead  of  the  Franklin  pike.  The 
train  had  moved  out  fifteen  miles  on  the  Murfreesboro  pike 
when,  the  mistake  having  been  discovered,  it  was  reached  by 
a  messenger,  and  the  officer  in  charge  of  it  was  ordered  to 
move  over  to  the  Franklin  pike.  He  crossed  over  on  a  coun 
try  road  which  was  almost  impassable.  Captain  Ramsey 
says  that  when  General  Thomas  gave  him  the  order,  he  had 
just  awakened  out  of  a  deep  sleep  and  said  'Murfreesboro  pike' 
and  not  'Franklin  pike.'  By  this  mistake  we  have  been  de 
layed  about  three  days  in  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  and  have 
missed  many  splendid  opportunities  to  inflict  severe  blows  on 
the  enemy,  perhaps  to  annihilate  him."2  It  seems  strange  that 
a  staff  officer  of  ordinary  intelligence  should  not  at  once  have 
noticed  the  mistake,  or  at  least  have  inquired  if  Murfreesboro 
was  really  intended,  for  it  must  have  been  known  to  him  that 
the  enemy  was  retreating  and  our  entire  army  was  pursuing 
him  on  the  Franklin  pike.  It  is  now  apparent  that  if  the  mis 
take  had  not  been  made  Hood's  army  would  never  have 
reached  the  Tennessee  river,  and  that  its  destruction  would 
have  been  complete. 

At  7  a.  m.  December  22,  Colonel  Askew  received  orders 
to  move  our  regiment  quickly  out  to  the  Franklin  pike,  as  the 
Confederate  cavalry  were  thought  to  be  coming  around  to 
cut  off  some  of  our  troops  who  had  already  crossed  the  river 
above  the  bend.  The  bugle  sounded  "Fall  In"  and  "Double 
Quick."  The  men  pulled  their  bayonets  out  of  the  frozen 
mud  and  grasping  their  icy  guns  fell  in,  and  in  an  incredibly 
short  time  were  in  line  on  the  pike  near  the  river.  The  right 
wing  of  the  regiment  was  sent  down  toward  where  the  pon 
toon  bridge  was  to  be  laid  to  take  possession  of  some  cabins 
near  the  river.  It  went  at  a  double  quick  amid  quite  a  patter 
of  carbine  shots  from  the  enemy  across  the  river  and  soon 
reached  the  cabins.  From  this  position  it  opened  a  hot  fire  on 
the  enemv,  who  were  concealed  bv  rocks  and  trees  on  the 


1  and  2     W.  R.  R.,  Fullerton's  ournal,  93-1G1. 


THE  PURSUIT  OF  HOOD  669 

other  side.  The  Fifty-first  Indiana  of  our  brigade,  which  had 
crossed  the  river  in  pontoon  boats  above  us,  soon  worked  their 
way  down  the  bank  and  dislodged  the  enemy  in  front  of  us, 
who  fled  in  confusion  leaving  quite  a  number  of  killed  and 
wounded  and  some  prisoners.  As  soon  as  the  enemy  was 
routed  we  were  ordered  down  to  the  river  and  helped  to  un 
load  the  wagons  which  had  come  up,  and  in  preparing  the  ap 
proaches  for  the  pontoon  bridge.  The  mud  was  very  deep, 
there  seemed  to  be  a  lack  of  system  and  the  work  made  slow 
progress.  The  men  worked  by  reliefs  and  those  not  at  work 
hovered  over  the  fires  trying  to  keep  warm.  We  worked 
steadily  on  until  about  7  p.  m.,  when  our  regiment  was  re 
lieved  and  went  back  to  camp,  got  supper  and  prepared  to 
cross  as  soon  as  the  bridge  was  completed.  At  8  p.  m.  it  was 
done  and  we  marched  across  it  and  out  through  the  city  and 
went  into  camp  about  a  mile  beyond  it.1 

There  were  only  three  pontoniers  with  the  pontoon  train 
and  the  men  who  laid  the  bridge  knew  nothing  about  the  work, 
which  made  it  necessarily  slow.  In  crossing  the  river  and 
driving  the  enemy  back,  the  Fifty-first  Indiana  lost  one  man, 
killed,  and  eight  'men'  wounded.2  Our  division  was  the  first  to 
cross  and  bivouaced  on  a  ridge  just  beyond  the  picket  line  we 
had  held  when  we  arrived  at  Columbia  from  Pulaski  about  a 
month  before.  The  crossing  of  the  river  was  very  slow  and 
•General  Elliott's  division,  which  followed  ours,  was  not  all 
across  at  midnight.  General  Kimball's  division  was  to  follow, 
then  the  artillery  and  trains  and  then  the  cavalry.  The 
orders  for  next  day  were  to  press  the  enemy  on  the  Pulaski 
pike  as  soon  as  the  cavalry  got  across.  Some  of  the  prisoners 
captured  during  the  day  reported  that  five  brigades  of  the 
enemy  had  left  Columbia  early  that  morning  for  Pulaski  and 
that  Hood  intended  to  cross  the  Tennessee  at  Decatur.3 

There  was  a  heavy  white  frost  the  morning  of  December 
33,  and  when  the  sun  came  up  the  air  was  full  of  glistening  cry 
stals.4  The  pontoon  bridge  had  been  poorly  constructed  and 
the  descent  to  and  ascent  from  it  were  so  slippery  that  it  was 
difficult  to  get  on  and  off  it.  At  5  a.  m.  only  three  batteries 
and  a  fewr  wagons  were  over.  It  was  decided  to  let  the  cavalry 
precede  the  rest  of  the  artillery  and  the  trains,  and  orders 
were  given  to  the  infantry  to  move  down  the  Pulaski  pike  as 
soon  as  the  cavalry  passed  them.5 

Our  corps  commenced  to  move  out  at  2  :30  p.  m..  General 
Kimball's  division  in  advance,  then  ours  and  then  General  El- 

1  Gleason's  Diary.  4     Gleason's  Diary. 

2  Fullerton's  Journal,  \V.  R.  R.  93-l«2.          3     Fullerton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.  93-162. 

3  Fullerton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.  {):-]- H>2. 


670  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

liott's.  At  4  p.  m.  General  Kimball's  troops  came -up  with  t he- 
rear  guard  of  the  enemy,  posted  in  a  narrow  gorge  through 
which  the  pike  runs,  about  five  miles  south  of  Columbia. 
High  hills  on  either  side  of  the  gorge,  running  at  right  angles 
to  the  pike,  completely  commanded  it.  Three  regiments  of 
Kimball's  division  and  a  rifled  battery  were  sent  against  the 
enemy  and  soon  dislodged  him.  A  Confederate  Captain  was 
killed  during  the  affair,  it  was  now  5  p.  m.  and  the  troops 
all  went  into  camp  for  the  night.1  Our  regimental  camp  was 
in  a  sheltered  cove  to  the  left  of  the  pike  and  quite  near  the 
gorge  above  mentioned.  Companies  A  and  F  were  detailed 
for  picket  duty  and  were  conducted  to  their  posts  by  Captain 
John  M.  Farquahar  of  the  Eighty-ninth  Illinois,  our  new  brig 
ade  inspector.  The  picket  line  was  on  the  crest  of  a  high  ridge. 
The  reserve  was  on  a  bank  below,  from  which  hundreds  of  our 
campfires  were  visible,  and  as  the  night  was  clear,  they  pre 
sented  a  pleasing  and  inspiring  spectacle. - 

While  we  were  thus  pressing  forward  in  pursuit  of  Hood, 
General  Steedman  was  moving  by  way  of  the  Nashville  and 
Chattanooga  Railroad  with  a  view  of  reaching  Decatur  and 
moving  thence  to  Florence.  Word  came  that  he  had  reached 
Christiana  on  the  22nd,  that  he  would  cross  the  Tennessee 
above  Decatur,  drive  out  Roddey's  force  which  held  the  place 
and  move  on  to  Florence  as  fast  as  possible."'  Word  also  came 
that  General  Edward  M.  McCook  had  broken  up  Lyon's 
command  which  was  raiding  in  Kentucky. 

The  morning  of  December  24,  four  dviisions  of  Wilson's 
cavalry  passed  to  the  front  and  our  corps  followed  at  11 :50 
a.  m.,  General  Elliott's  division  leading,  ours  next  and  then 
followed  Kimball's.  Our  progress  was  slow,  as  the  cavalry 
could  not  move  on  the  side  of  the  pike  as  was  ordered,  be 
cause  of  the  nature  of  the  ground.  The  enemy's  force  in 
our  front  consisted  of  seven  brigades  of  infantry  and  For 
rest's  cavalry.4  Our  division  moved  out  a  little  after  noon.. 
We  heard  cannonading  in  our  front  and  as  our  progress  was 
steady  it  was  evident  that  our  cavalry  was  meeting  with 
little  opposition.  We  pressed  forward  through  Lynnville  and 
went  into  camp  three  miles  south  of  that  place,  having 
marched  sixteen  and  one-half  miles.  Some  of  the  men  of  the 
regiment  had  gone  out  foraging,  and  Gleason  reports  that  his 
mess  was  happy  in  the  possession  of  two  turkeys  which  their 
cook  prepared  for  breakfast  the  next  morning.5  We  were 

1  Fuller-ton's  Diary,  W.   R.   R.   93-163.  4     Fuller-ton's  Journal,  W.   R.   R.   93-163. 

2  (Reason's  Diary.  5     Gleason's   Diary. 

3  W.  R.  R.  94-317. 


THE  PUKSUIT  01-   HOOD  671 

to  have  no  Christmas  holiday,  for  orders  came  to  move  at 
«laylight  next  morning. 

The  morning  of  December  25,  our  regiment  led  the  corps 
and  we  pulled  out  at  sunrise,  following  the  cavalry.  There 
was  the  usual  cannonading  in  front,  but  we  marched  steadily 
on,  only  stopping  at  times  for  a  short  rest.  We  reached 
Pulaski,  eleven  miles  distant,  at  1  p.  m.,  marched  rapidly 
through  the  town  and  crossed  Richland  Creek  on  a  bridge 
which  the  enemy  had  set  fire  to,  but  which  our  cavalry  had 
arrived  in  time  to  save.  We  noticed  quite  a  change  in  the 
appearance  of  the  place  since  we  evacuated  it,  November  23. 
The  stores  were  all  deserted  and  the  windows  broken.  It 
was  Sunday,  as  well  as  Christmas  day,  and  the  few  people 
we  saw  were  in  Sabbath  attire,  but  we  had  no  time  to  ex 
change  compliments  with  them.  We  heard  sharp  firing  in 
front  and  hurried  forward  to  support  the  cavalry.  We  had 
now  bidden  adieu  to  pikes  and  found  the  road  almost  im 
passable.  It  was  strewn  with  broken  down  wagons,  aban 
doned  artillery,  ammunition,  etc.,  left  by  the  enemy.  At  3 
p.  m.  General  Wilson  sent  word  from  a  point  two  miles  south 
of  Pulaski  that  he  had  run  against  eight  brigades  of  the 
enemy's  infantry  and  Forrest's  cavalry,  in  a  strong  position, 
their  front  covered  by  rail  barricades,  and  that  he  needed 
assistance  from  the  infantry.1  He  had  pushed  forward  too 
rapidly  and  the  enemy  had  made  a  counter  charge  and  cap 
tured  one  of  his  guns.2  Strenuous  efforts  were  made  by  the 
•cavalry  to  recover  the  lost  gun,  but  the  enemy  finally  got 
off  with  it.  It  was  afterwards  recaptured  by  Wilson's  cavalry 
in  the  campaign  against  Selma,  Alabama. :j  We  hurried  for 
ward  to  the  cavalry's  support,  but  when  we  reached  the  point 
where  Wilson  was  checked,  the  enemy  had  fled  and  we  went 
into  bivouac  at  5 :30  p.  m.,  about  six  miles  from  Pulaski, 
having  marched  sixteen  miles.  The  day  had  been  cloudy 
with  light  rain. 

It  could  not  be  known  to  what  point  on  the  Tennessee 
River  Hood  was  directing  his  retreat  until  we  reached  the 
junction  of  the  Lamb's  Ferry  and  Florence  roads.  At  10:10 
a.  m.  on  the  25th,  General  Wilson  telegraphed  to  General 
Thomas  that  there  seemed  to  be  little  doubt  that  the  enemy 
had  gone  to  Bainbridge,  eight  miles  above  Florence  on  the 
Tennessee  River,  fearing  a  flank  movement  from  Stevenson  ; 
that  Stewart's  and  Lee's  corps  had  gone  by  the  Florence  road 
to  Lexington,  and  that  Cheatham's  corps  had  gone  to  Law- 

1  W.   R.   R.    94-348. 

2  Fullerton's  Journal,  \V.  R.  R.  93-1H4. 

3  Under  the  Old  Flag,  Vol.   2,  p.   140-141. 


672  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

renceburg,  striking  the  old  military  road  eight  miles  below 
that  place,  and  that  a  Mr.  Carter  had  told  him  that  the 
Colonel  commanding  Hood's  pontoon  train  had  said  he  had 
left  Pulaski  on  Thursday  morning  (the  23rd)  and  was  going" 
to  Bainbridge.1  On  that  day  General  Hood  telegraphed  the 
Confederate  Secretary  of  War  that  he  was  already  at  Bain- 
bridge  and  was  laying  a  pontoon  bridge  across  the  Tennessee 
River.2 

General  Wilson  in  the  above  dispatch  to  General  Thomas 
said  that  it  was  reported  that  the  enemy  was  suffering  im 
mensely,  that  Buford's  wound  was  said  to  be  quite  severe: 
that  Cheatham's  ammunition  train  of  fifteen  or  twenty 
wagons  had  been  abandoned  at  Pulaski  and  the  mules  were 
put  in  to  help  the  pontoons  along ;  that  General  Lee  had  been 
seriously  wounded  in  the  fight  at  Nashville ;  that  the  enemy 
had  lost  eighteen  generals  killed,  wounded  and  captured, 
since  they  started  north,  and  acknowledged  the  loss  of  sixty- 
eight  pieces  of  artillery.  Wrord  came  that  General  Lyon  was 
still  "roaming  round"  in  Kentucky,  and  on  the  evening  of  the 
2:kl  had  captured  Elizabethtown.3  General  Thomas  there 
upon  dispatched  to  General  McCook  at  Nashville  : 

"Lyon,  it  seems  is  not  destroyed  or  driven  out  of  the 
country.  We  hear  of  him  on  the  Louisville  and  Nashville 
Railroad."  He  directed  McCook  "to  keep  at  work  at  him 
until  he  is  finished  or  driven  across  the  Cumberland."4 

While  these  events  were  transpiring  in  the  southwest  the 
country  was  electrified  by  a  dispatch  from  General  Sherman 
to  President  Lincoln,  dated  Savannah,  Ga.,  December  22, 
1864,  saying : 

"I  beg  to  present  to  you  as  a  Christmas  gift  the  city  of 
Savannah,  with  one  hundred  and  fifty  heavy  guns  and  plenty 
of  ammunition,  also  about  twenty-five  thousand  bales  of 
cotton."-"* 

The  orders  for  the  Fourth  Corps  for  December  26,  were 
to  march  as  soon  as  rations  were  issued,  General  Kimball's 
division  first,  General  Elliott's  next  and  ours  last.  To  facili 
tate  rapid  marching  it  was  ordered  that  the  only  wagons 
which  would  be  allowed  were  five  ammunition  wagons  and 
ten  ambulances  to  each  division.6 

The  day  was  fair  and  mild.  We  were  entirely  out  of 
rations,  and  the  supply  train  not  coming  up,  the  men,  and 
officers  too,  resorted  to  various  expedients  to  appease  their 
hunger.  One  mess  sent  its  forager  out,  who  soon  returned 

1  W.  R.  R.   94-351.  4     W.  R.  R.   94-364. 

2  W.  R.  R.  94-731.  r»     Sherman's  Memoirs,  Vol.  i\  p.  231. 

3  W.  R.  R.  94-338.  «     W.  R.  R.  H4-3KO. 


THE  PURSUIT  OF  HOOD  673 

with  a  bag  of  corn  which  was  boiled  until  it  was  soft  enough 
to  grate,  when  it  was  grated  and  the  cook  made  out  of  it  a 
batch  of  course  corn  cakes.  Some  of  the  corn  was  ground  in 
a  coffee  mill  and  made  into  a  course  mush.  Some  of  the 
private  foragers  mounted  on  the  officers  horses  went  out 
some  distance  from  camp  and  brought  iii  two  hams,  a  shoulder 
and  some  side  meat,  which  were  divided  up  among  the 
messes. 1 

The  supply  train  did  not  get  up  until  5  p.  m.,  and  as  it 
would  take  all  the  evening  to  distribute  the  rations,  march 
ing  orders  were  suspended  until  5:30  a.  m.,  December  27. 
At  T  p.  m.,  December  26,  a  note  was  received  from  General 
Wilson  dated  "Sugar  Creek,  seventeen  miles  from  Pulaski," 
saying,  that  the  enemy  had  made  a  short  stand  at  that  place, 
but  soon  retreated,  and  he  would  stop  there  to  feed  his 
horses.  He  also  stated  that  as  soon  as  he  crossed  the  creek 
he  would  send  a  brigade  to  fell  trees  in  the  Tennessee  River 
to  float  down  the  stream  in  the  hope  of  destroying  the 
enemy's  pontoon  bridge.2 

At  6  a.  m.,  December  27,  the  corps  resumed  its  march,  the 
divisions  in  the  order  designated  in  the  orders  for  the  26th. 
Our  regiment  did  not  march  until  8  a.  m.  After  ascending  a 
steep  ridge  we  followed  it  in  a  southerly  direction,  threading 
our  way  through  a  thick  growth  of  young  saplings,  the  road 
being  impassable  from  so  much  travel  6n  it  during  the  recent 
rains.  We  passed  a  pontoon  wagon  and  one  artillery  caisson 
which  had  stuck  fast  in  the  mud  and  had  been  abandoned 
by  the  enemy.  At  10  :30  a.  m.,  the  head  of  our  column  reached 
the  point,  thirteen  and  a  half  miles  from  Pulaski,  where  the 
Lamb's  Ferry  and  the  Florence  roads  separate,  the  latter 
leading  through  Lexington.  As  the  cavalry  had  moved  out 
on  the  latter  road  and  we  were  directed  to  follow  the  cavalry, 
we  also  took  that  road.3  When  we  descended  into  the  valley  of 
Sugar  Creek  we  found  a  better  country  and  better  roads  and 
could  march  in  the  fields  around  the  deep  places.  We  reached 
Sugar  Creek  where  Wilson's  cavalry  were  halted  about  3  p. 
m.,  and  went  into  camp  on  an  elevation  overlooking  the 
creek.  General  Wilson's  headquarters  were  at  Pinhook  Town, 
two  miles  beyond  Sugar  Creek.  He  reported  that  he  was 
unable  to  move  farther,  as  he  had  no  forage  for  his  horses  nor 
rations  for  his  men ;  that  a  little  forage  could  be  found  in  the 
country  and  was  being  brought  in;  that  it  was  impracticable 
to  bring  rations  up  from  Pulaski  as  the  road  from  that  place 

1  Gleason's  Diary. 

2  Fullerton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.  93-165. 

3  Fullerton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.  94-163. 


674  FlKTKKXTH     OHIO    VOLUNTEERS    AM)    CAMPAIGNS 

was  impassable;  that  he  believed  the  bulk  of  the  enemy  was 
now  over  the  Tennessee  River,  having  crossed  at  Bainbridge 
— on  the  shoals  between  Lamb's  Ferry  and  Florence.  Gen 
eral  Wood  at  once  sent  the  forgoing  report  to  General 
Thomas  by  special  courier  and  stated  that  he,  General  Wood, 
had  sent  out  parties  'to  ascertain  certainly  whether  General 
Wilson's  suppositions  were  correct.  If  they  were  not,  he 
would  move  on  and  support  the  cavalry,  and  if  the  enemy  had 
crossed  the  Tennessee  he  would  go  no  further,  but  await 
orders.  He  also  informed  General  Thomas  that  Major 
Goodspeed,  chief  of  the  artillery  of  the  corps,  had  reported 
that  after  the  next  day  the  artillery  horses  would  have  no 
forage.1 

At  8:30  p.  m.  that  evening  a  dispatch  was  received  from 
General  Wilson  saying  that  he  had  received  a  dispatch  from 
Colonel  Spalding,  who  was  at  Lexington,  saying  that  the 
enemy's  rear  guard  had  only  left  that  place  at  10  a.  m.  that 
day ;  that  a  lady  from  Florence  had  informed  him,  Colonel 
Spalding,  that  on  the  evening  of  the  2oth  the  enemy  had  not 
finished  their  bridge  at  Bainbridge,  and  that  he  therefore 
would  push  on  at  once.  General  Wilson  also  said  he  had 
written  to  General  Thomas  that  he  would  press  on  with  all 
his  force  early  in  the  morning,  and  would  ''move  everything, 
beginning  at  5  a.  m.,  though  1- latch  has  received  no  rations 
and  three  days'  of  Crouton's  were  taken  by  A.  J.  Smith. "- 

Colonel  Fullerton  closes  his  journal  of  this  day  as  follows : 

"General  Wilson's  proposed  movement  is  not  at  all 
judicious,  as  the  rear  of  the  enemy  will  have  crossed  the  river 
some  time  before  he  can  reach  it,  even  if  they  do  not  cros^ 
until  today,  December  27.  His  horses  will  be  without  forage 
and  his  men  without  rations  and  he  is  going  into  a  barren 
country.  Under  orders  of  General  Thomas  we  are  obliged  tc 
follo\v  up  the  cavalry  closely  and  support  it,  and  must  follow 
wherever  Wilson  leads.  As  soon  as  the  cavalry  moves  out  of 
the  way  tomorrow^  we  will  march."3 

At  6  :30  a.  m.,  December  28,  orders  were  issued  to  march 
at  8  a.  m.  if  the  cavalry  was  out  of  the  way,  General  Elliott 
to  lead,  General  Beatty  to  follow  and  General  Kimball  to 
bring  up  the  rear. 

At  9  a.  m.  our  brigade  moved  out,  crossing  Sugar  Creek 
about  a  half  mile  from  camp  on  a  rude  bridge  of  fence  rails, 
and  halting  there  until  the  Third  Brigade  passed  us.  Here 
we  heard  of  Sherman's  capture  of  Savannah.  Gleason  says  : 

1  Fullerton's  Journal,  W.   R.   R.   93-166. 

2  Fullerton's  Journal,  W.   R.   R.   93-166. 

3  Fullerton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.  93-166. 


THE  PURSUIT  OF  HOOD  675 

*'The  good  news  brightened  our  hearts  and  made  our  steps 
more  eleastic."  We  soon  crossed  a  branch  of  Sugar  Creek, 
then  turned  eastward,  and  it  was  thought  that  our  chase  of 
Hood  was  to  be  abandoned.  But  after  ascending  a  ridge  we 
again  turned  southwesterly  through  a  region  similar  to  that 
traversed  the  day  before.  We  had  more  streams  to  cross  and 
deeper  mud  to  wade  through.  Where  the  road  was  impassa 
ble  the  pioneers  cut  trails  through  the  dense  wood*  on  the 
sides  of  the  road.  At  one  time  the  brigade  became  almost 
demoralized  by  excessive  straggling  and  had  to  halt  and  re 
form  its  ranks.  At  3  :30  p.  m.  we  reached  a  cluster  of  cabins 
known  as  Lexington,  and  went  into  camp  in  the  woods 
beyond  it,  having  marched  thirteen  miles.1  All  day  nothing 
had  been  heard  from  General  Wilson,  but  at  1:°>0  p.  rn.  a  note 
came  from  his  chief  of  staff  to  General  Wood,  dafcd  Bull's 
Mills,  saying,  that  information  had  been  received  that  the 
last  of  the  enemy's  forces  had  crossed  the  Tennessee  River 
on  the  evening  of  the  day  before ;  that  his  pontoon  bridge  had 
been  taken  up  that  morning,  and  that  General  Wilson  had 
sent  a  staff  officer  to  General  Thomas  with  the  info  ^nation 
and  to  asl:  for  orders.2 

December  29,  our  entire  corps  lay  in  cam])  near  Lexing 
ton  awaiting  orders.  Large  foraging  parties  were  sf;nt  out 
and  gathered  in  all  the  forage  they  could  find — enough  to  last 
two  days.:! 

At  1  :oO  p.  m.,  December  30,  General  Wood  received  a 
dispatch  from  General  Thomas  dated  Pulaski,  Tenn.,  Dec. 
29,  1864,  saying: 

"The  last  of  the  rebel  army  having  been  driven  across 
the  Tennessee  River,  the  Major  General  Commanding  directs 
that  the  pursuit  cease,  and  that  you  march  with  your  corps  to 
Huntsville,  Athens  and  vicinity,  and  there  go  into  camp  for 
the  winter  and  attend  to  the  reorganizing  of  your  co-nrnand 
and  fitting  it  generally  for  an  early  spring  campaign . 
The  Major  General  commanding  the  forces  in  the  field  ten 
ders  his  thanks  to  yourself,  your  officers  and  the  m^n  for  the 
vigor,  bravery  and  willing  endurance  of  privations  and  hard 
ships  displayed  by  your  command  during  this  long  ai  d  toil 
some  pursuit  of  the  retreating  rebel  army."4 

This  order  was  published  that  evening  and  jf  w?is  decided 
to  take  up  our  march  to  Athens  and  Huntsville  next  day,  not 
by  way  of  Pulaski,  but  by  new  and  untried  roads,  which  we 
hoped  we  would  find  less  difficult. 

1  Gleasou's  Diary. 

2  Fuller-ton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.   93-167. 
o     Fullerton's  Journal,  93-169. 

4     Fullerton's  Journal.  \V.  R.  R.  93-169-170. 


676  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

The  campaign  which  was  here  brought  to  a  close  had 
lasted  only  about  five  weeks,  but  it  had  been  one  of  the  most 
anxious  and  arduous  in  which  we  had  been  engaged.  The  officers 
and  men  who  had  fought  under  General  Thomas  will  -ilways 
believe  that  when  General  Sherman  started  on  his  ••rent  raid 
through  Georgia  to  the  sea,  he  devolved  upon  them  thv- 
heavier  burden.  As  will  be  seen  in  former  pages  of  this  his 
tory,  he  took  with  him  more  than  two-thirds  of  the  very 
flower  of  the  great  army  which  had  fought  first  Johnson  and 
then  Hood,  pressing  their  army  back  from  Tunnel  Hill  to 
Atlanta  and  finally  taking  the  latter  stronghold ;  and 
sent  his  two  weakest  corps  and  his  broken  down  and  dis 
mounted  cavalry  to  resist  the  northward  march  of  that  same 
army,  aided  of  course  by  such  new  and  untrained  troops  as 
could  be  hurried  into  the  field,  and  the  troops  of  A.  J.  Smith 
which  were  far  away  in  Missouri.  But  Providence  interposed 
to  save  us  from  destruction  at  Spring  Hill,  and  the  heroic 
fortitude  of  the  Fourth  and  Twenty-third  corps,  aided  by 
Wilson's  cavalry,  at  Franklin,  broke  the  spirit  of  Hood's- 
army  and  made  Nashville  an  easy  victory. 

There  was  great  risk  in  General  Sherman's  dual  cam 
paign,  ind  some  military  critics  will  always  think  th'at  Gen 
eral  Grant's  first  suggestion  to  him,  "to  first  whip  Hood's  army 
and  then  he  could  go  where  he  pleased,"  was  correct.  But  the 
risk  was  taken,  and  although  far  out  of  the  direct  course,  the 
results  justified  it.  Sherman  marched  to  the  sea,  practically 
unimpeded,  opened  communication  with  the  Union  fleet  at 
Ossibaw  Sound,  captured  Savannah,  and  placed  his  fine  army 
of  60,000  veterans,  strengthened  and  invigorated  by  their 
holiday  march,  in  close  touch  and  support  of  Grant's  army  at 
Petersburg,  and  the  troops  sent  to  Thomas  practically  de 
stroyed  Hood's  army.  That  the  success  of  Thomas  was 
absolutely  necessary  to  make  General  Sherman's  march  to  the 
sea  successful,  is  recognized  by  him  in  his  order  directing 
that  the  troops  who  fought  under  Thomas'  at  Columbia,  Spring 
Hill,  Franklin  and  Nashville,  might  inscribe  "Savannah"  on 
their  colors.1  The  two  campaigns  had  broken  the  military 
power  of  the  rebellion  in  the  Southwest,  and  it  was  soon  to> 
crumble  and  utterly  fall. 

1     \V.  R.  R.,  and1  Sherman's  Memoirs,  Vol.  2,  pp.  219-220. 


CHAPTER    XXXI. 

THE   MARCH   TO  HUNTSVILLE — A  MONTH  OF  IDLENESS  AND  A 
MISTAKEN   MOVEMENT  BACK  TO   NASHVILLE. 

The  orders  for  December  31,  1864,  for  our  corps  were  to 
march  for  Athens  and  Huntville,  Ala.,  at  7  a.  m.,  General 
Beatty's  division  leading,  then  General  Kimball's,  and  lastly 
General  Elliott's.  Each  division  was  to  take  one  battery  and 
all  its  trains  and  send  its  pioneers  in  front  to  repair  the  roads 
and  bridge  the  small  streams.1 

As  our  division  was  to  march  first,  we  were  up  early, 
dried  our  tents  and  blankets  and  were  ready  to  move  out  at 
7  a.  m.  as  ordered.  The  night  had  been  cold  and  in  the  morn 
ing  there  was  frost  and  snow  and  a  keen  wind,  and  we 
marched  rapidly  to  keep  warm.  Our  course  was  eastward 
and  the  road  was  much  better  than  that  from  Pulaski.  We 
crossed  a  number  of  small  streams  and  at  some  of  them  had 
to  wait  until  our  pioneers  completed  bridges  across  them. 
After  such  a  wait  we  sometimes  went  at  a  double  quick.2 
We  arrived  at  Sugar  Creek  about  2  p.  m.  and  found  the  water 
three  feet  deep  at  the  ford  and  the  stream  ninety  feet  wide. 
We  halted  here  until  a  bridge  could  be  thrown  across  the 
creek.  In  an  hour  it  was  completed  and  we  marched  across. 
The  teams  forded  the  creek.  We  marched  two  and  a  half 
miles  beyond  the  creek  and  at  4  p.  m.  went  into  camp,  hav 
ing  marched  seventeen  and  a  half  miles  since  7  a.  m.,  and 
having  bridged  Sugar  Creek  and  all  of  the  smaller  creeks 
running  across  the  road  on  our  line  of  march.3 

There  was  little  to  remind  us  that  it  was  New  Year's  eve. 
Gleason  remembered,  however,  that  he  was  at  home  on  the 
•last  day  of  1863,  and  noticed  the  contrast,  while  others  remem 
bered  that  they  were  freezing  at  Strawberry  Plains.  Still 
others  recalled  the  evening  of  December  31,  1862,  when  we 
were  freeziner  after  the  disastrous  first  day  of  the  battle  of 
Stone  Ri>/er. 

There  was  no  New  Year's  turkey  in  sight  for  any  one, — not 
even  a  chicken.  But  there  was  no  enemy  near  to  occasion  alarm 
and  we  were  marching  to  a  region  where  supplies  would  be 
abundant  and  where  we  would  again  be  in  nearer  touch  with 
loved  ones  at  home.  The  day  had  been  fair  and  we  were  thankful 
for  dry  ground  on  which  to  rest  and  sleep. 

1  Fuller-ton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.  93-171.          3     Fullerton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.  03-172. 

2  Gleason's  Diary. 


678  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

We  were  heading  for  Elk  River,  but  it  had  not  been  decided 
at  which  ford  we  should  try  to  cross  it,  or  whether  we  should  not 
be  compelled  to  march  back  to  Sugar  Creek  and  take  the  road 
to  Fayetteville,  where  there  was  a  good  bridge  across  the  Elk. 
It  was  decided  to  send  a  reconnoitering  party  to  the  fords  next 
morning  to  examine  and  report  whether  we  could  cross  at  either 
of  them.1 

The  morning  of  January  1,  1865,  we  got  the  impression  that 
we  were  not  to  leave  until  a  bridge  had  been  constructed  across 
Elk  River,  which  would  take  considerable  time.  At  10  a  m.  the 
reconnoitering  party  above  mentioned  reported  that  none  of  the 
fords  could  be  crossed  by  wagons  and  artillery,  as  the  water  was 
six  feet  deep.  But  notwithstanding  this  report,  at  10 :30  a.  m. 
Colonel  Suman  and  Major  Watson  of  the  first  division  were  ord 
ered  to  construct  a  good  strong  wagon  bridge  across  the  river  at 
Buck  Island  Ford  for  the  passage  of  the  corps.  All  the  pioneers 
of  the  corps  were  directed  to  report  to  them,  and  our  division  and 
General  Kimball's  division  were  ordered  to  move  up  to  the  vicin 
ity  of  the  ford  to  render  Colonel  Suman  any  assistance  he  might 
call  for.2  In  compliance  with  the  last  named  order,  our  division 
left  its  camp  a  little  after  noon  and  marched  to  within  one  half 
mile  of  Buck  Island  Ford,  where  our  regiment  and  brigade  went 
into  camp  in  a  sheltered  cove,  where  there  were  plenty  of  rails 
with  which  to  make  fires.3  Our  rations  were  getting  extremely 
low  and  each  brigade  was  ordered  to  send  out  parties  to  forage 
the  country  for  subsistence  and  to  seize  mills  in  which  to  grind 
corn  for  the  troops.4  Captain  George  S.  Crawford,  brigade 
commissary,  was  quick  to  act  upon  the  latter  suggestion  and  soon 
had  possession  of  a  mill  for  our  brigade  a  short  distance  up  the 
river.5  At  3  p.  m.  Colonel  Suman  and  Major  Watson  com 
menced  work  on  the  bridge,  which  they  found  a  difficult  task. 
The  stream  was  325  feet  wide,  too  deep  to  ford  and  very  swift, 
and  no  boats  were  to  be  found  any  where.  They  had  only  axes, 
a  few  saws,  two  or  three  augers  and  no  nails  or  spikes.0 

It  was  thought  that  time  would  be  saved  by  going  by  way 
of  Fayetteville,  but  that  would  be  thirty-four  miles  out  of  the 
Avay  and  many  of  the  men  were  barefooted,  or  too  nearly  so  to 
march  such  a  distance.  Fortunately  the  weather  became  milder, 
our  camp  was  pleasantly  located,  and,  barring  the  matter  of  ra 
tions,  we  were  more  comfortable  than  we  had  been  for  many  days. 

December  29,  when  General  Thomas  ordered  the  Fourth 
Corps  into  winter  quarters  at  Athens  and  Huntsville,7  he  ordered 

1  Fullerton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.   93-171.  .">  Gleason's  Diary. 

•2  Fullerton's  Journal  W.  R.  R.  93-172.  fi  Fullerton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.  93-172. 

?,  (Reason's   Diary.  7  \V.  R.  R.  !>4-408. 

4  Fullerton's  Journal,  W.  R.  R.  93-172. 


MARCH  TO  HUNTSVILLE,  ALA.  679 

General  Schorield's  Corps  to  Dalton  for  the  same  purpose,1  and 
General  Smith's  command  to  Eastport.2  General  Wilson  had 
been  directed  to  send  a  division  of  his  cavalry  to  destroy  the 
bridge  across  Bear  Creek,  south  of  the  Tennessee  River,  and  was 
now  ordered  to  march  his  other  divisions  to  Huntsville  to  rest, 
recruit  and  re-equip.3 

Notwithstanding  the  orders  to  go  into  winter  quarters  both 
General  Wilson  and  General  Wood  were  of  the  opinion  that  a 
campaign  against  the  enemy's  forces  south  of  the  Tennessee 
should  at  once  be  begun.  General  Wilson  at  3  p.  m.  December 
29,  wrote  to  General  Thomas  saying,  "Croxton's  brigade,  1500 
strong,  marched  from  Taylor's  Springs  this  morning  via  Grav 
elly  Springs  to  Waterloo,  with  instructions  to  cross  the  river  at 
that  place,  and,  if  possible,  to  destroy  Bear  Creek  bridge,"  and 
urged  that  he  be  not  recalled.  He  also  stated  that  the  indications 
were  that  the  enemy  had  gone  to  Corinth,  and  if  such  was  the  case. 
Florence  or  Eastport  would  be  better  places  to  reorganize  the 
cavalry,  and  pointedly  said,  he  "would  greatly  prefer  to  go  to 
either  place  than  to  trail  back  on  the  road  to  Pulaski  with  the 
ultimate  prospect  of  returning  by  the  same  route,  to  make  a  new 
campaign  against  the  enemy."4 

General  Wood  the  next  day  also  wrote  to  General  Thomas 
detailing  the  reports  concerning  the  demoralization  of  the  enemy 
and  urging  action  before  Hood  could  reorganize  his  army.  He 
said,  "I  feel  confident  that  Hood  has  not  taken  across  the  Ten 
nessee  River  more  than  half  the  men  he  brought  across  it ;  that 
not  more  than  one-half  of  those  taken  out  are  armed ;  that  he 
has  lost  three-fourths  of  his  artillery,  and  that,  for  rout,  demoral 
ization,  even  disintegration,  the  condition  of  his  command  is  with 
out  a  parallel  in  this  war.  *  *  *  At  present  so  far  as  Hood's 
command  is  concerned  *  *  *  the  whole  country  from  the 
Tennessee  River  to  Mobile  is  open  to  us.  Should  we  not  then 
improve  the  present  opportunity  for  bringing  Alabama,  at  pres 
ent  the  best  state  for  supplies  the  rebels  have,  under  our  con 
trol?  I  firmly  believe  we  can  within  the  next  few  weeks  with 
out  much  opposition,  bring  the  whole  state  under  our  control/' 
He  then  outlined  a  plan  of  campaign,  and  concluded  his  letter 
by  saying,  "that  the  success  of  the  expedition  would  be  greatly 
facilitated  by  moving  before  Hood's  command  could  be  reorgan 
ized,  armed  and  equipped,  and  before  a  force  could  be  con 
centrated  from  other  quarters  to  oppose  us."5 

As   soon   as   General   Halleck   at   Washington   got   word   of 

1      \V.   R.   R.   04-4HO.  4      W.  R.   R.  04-411-41± 

•1     \\.   R.   R.   !>4-39(>.  r»     W.  R.  R.  04-423. 

:i      W.   R.   R.  04-411. 


€80  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

General  Thomas'  proposed  disposition  of  his  troops  after  his 
pursuit  of  Hood  had  ended,  he  sent  a  dispatch  to  General  Grant 
at  City  Point  saying,  "I  think  from  the  tone  of  General  Thomas' 
telegram  of  last  night,  that  there  is  very  little  hope  of  his  doing 
much  further  injury  to  Hood's  army  by  pursuing  it.  You  will 
perceive  that  he  is  disposed  to  postpone  further  operations  till 
spring.  This  seems  to  me  entirely  wrong.  In  our  present  finan 
cial  condition  we  cannot  afford  this  delay,  I,  therefore  respect 
fully  suggest  whether  Schofield  or  A.  J.  Smith  with,  say  20,000 
men  should  not  be  sent  by  water  to  Pascagoula  to  assist  Canby 
in  taking  Mobile/and  then  using  it  as  a  base  against  Selma  and 
Montgomery.  This  would  prevent  any  of  Hood's  force  from 
being  sent  against  Sherman,  and  the  capture  of  Selma  would  be 
almost  as  disastrous  to  the  enemy  as  that  of  Atlanta.  Thomas 
with  the  remainder  of  his  force,  could  certainly  maintain  the  line 
of  the  Tennessee  to  Chattanooga.  If  Schofield  should  be  sent, 
the  two  departments  (Tennessee  and  Kentucky)  should  be  united 
under  Thomas.  If  Thomas  was  as  active  as  Sherman,  I  would 
say  march  directly  from  Decatur  to  Talladega,  Montgomery  and 
Selma,  living  off  the  country  and  anticipating  Hood  should  he 
move  by  Meridian.  But  I  think  Thomas  too  slow  to  live  off  the 
country.  He,  however,  will  make  the  best  possible  defense.  It 
is  said  that  the  rebels  have  a  very  large  amount  of  supplies  at 
Selma  and  Montgomery.  If  these  can  be  captured  and  the  rail 
roads  destroyed  their  Western  armies  cannot  get  ammunition  and 
ordnance  stores.  The  reason  for  not  suggesting  that  Schofield 
move  from  Vicksburg  by  Meridian  is  that  the  country  is  mostly 
stripped  of  supplies,  and  at  this  season  very  difficult  of  passage, 
while  that  from  Mobile  is  less  swampy  and  moreover  the  operat 
ing  army  could  be  supplied  by  steamers  on  the  Alabama  River.1 

To  these  suggestions  General  Grant  rather  curtly  replied : 
"I  have  no  idea  of  keeping  idle  troops  in  any  place,  but  before 
taking  troops  away  from  Thomas  it  will  be  advisable  to  see 
whether  Hood  halts  his  army  at  Corinth,  I  do  not  think  he  will, 
but  think  he  is  much  more  likely  to  be  thrown  in  front  of  Sher 
man  ;  if  so,  it  will  be  just  where  we  want  him  to  go.  Let  Thomas 
collect  all  troops,  not  essential  to  hold  his  communications,  at 
Eastport,  if  he  chooses,  a  part  of  them  at  Tuscumbia,  and  be  in 
readiness  for  their  removal  where  they  can  be  used."2 

In  accordance  with  foregoing  General  Halleck  sent  the  fol 
lowing  order  to  General  Thomas : 

"General  Grant  directs  that  all  of  your  available  forces  not 
essential  to  hold  your  communications,  be  collected  on  the  Ten- 


1  W.  R.  R.  94-419-420. 

2  W.  R.  R.  94-420. 


MARCH  TO  HUNTSVILLE,  ALA.  681 

nessee  River,  say  at  Eastport  and  Tuscumbia,  and  be  made  ready 
for  such  movements  as  may  be  ordered.  It  is  supposed  that  a 
portion  of  the  troops  in  Louisville  and  other  parts  of  Kentucky 
and  Tennessee  can  now  be  availed  of  for  active  operations  else 
where.  They  should  be  made  ready  for  that  purpose.  General 
Dodge  wishes  you  to  return  to  Saint  Louis  the  Thirty-ninth  Mis 
souri  Infantry,  now  at  Louisville,  so  that  he  may  complete  its 
organization.  Please  give  us  the  earliest  possible  notice  of 
Hood's  line  of  retreat,  so  that  orders  may  be  given  for  a  con 
tinuance  of  the  campaign.  General  Grant  does  not  intend  that 
your  army  shall  go  into  winter  quarters,  it  must  be  ready  for 
active  operations  in  the  field."1 

On  receipt  of  this  order  General  Thomas  sent  the  following 
dispatch  to  General  Halleck : 

"Your  telegrams  of  11  :30  a.  m.  and  3:30  p.  m.  this  day  re 
ceived.  I  am  watching  Hood  closely  to  determine  his  line  of 
retreat,  of  which  I  will  inform  you  as  soon  as  ascertained.  I 
have  ordered  the  cavalry  to  Eastport  and  also  General  A.  J. 
Smith's  command.  The  Fourth  Army  Corps  has  been  ordered 
to  Huntsville,  Ala.,  as  that  place  will  be  convenient  to  furnish 
the  troops  with  supplies  to  refit.  I  had  ordered  the  Twenty-third 
Army  Corps  to  Dalton,  but  countermanded  the  order  yesterday 
upon  a  report  that  Hood  was  moving  toward  Corinth.  I  will 
now  order  the  Twenty-third  Corps  to  Eastport,  I  have  received 
a  communication  from  General  Wilson  today,  dated  the  29th, 
instant,  in  which  he  represents  his  cavalry  as  very  much  fagged 
out  and  in  need  of  rest  and  asks  that  he  may  be  allowed  to  as 
semble  it  near  Eastport  sufficiently  long  to  reorganize  and  recup 
erate,  shoe  up  his  horses  and  organize  his  trains.  His  losses  in 
horses  have  been  very  heavy  since  we  left  Nashville,  owing 
principally  to  the  intolerably  bad  weather,  the  almost  impassable 
condition  of  the  country,  caused  by  constant  and  heavy  rains 
and  snow,  and  the  great  scarcity  of  forage  along  the  route  over 
which  we  pursued  the  enemy.  The  infantry,  also,  is  very  much 
exhausted,  having  been  constantly  on  campaign  duty  since  early 
last  spring.  To  continue  the  campaign  without  any  rest,  I  fear, 
will  cost  me  very  heavy  losses  from  disease  and  exhaustion.  The 
troops,  however,  will  be  assembled  at  Eastport  and  Huntsville 
as  soon  as  possible,  where  we  will  await  orders.  I  must  say, 
however,  in  justice  to  all  the  commands,  that  they  have  not  yet 
had  sufficient  time  to  get  supplied  with  the  transportation  which 
General  Sherman  had,  necessarily,  to  take  from  them  to  supply 
himself  with  the  requisite  amount  for  his  march.  I  had  already 

1     W.   R.   R.   94-441. 


682  FIFTEENTH   OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

taken  steps,  before  receiving  your  telegram  of  today,  to  refit  the 
troops  under  my  command  as  soon  as  possible,  so  as  to  com 
mence  the  campaign  at  the  earliest  possible  moment,  and  I  do 
believe  that  it  is  much  the  best  policy  to  get  well  prepared  on  an 
important  campaign."1 

As  the  correspondence  and  orders  above  given  made  no 
change  in  the  disposition  of  the  Fourth  Corps  we  continued  our 
work  on  the  bridge  across  Elk  River.  On  January  2,  foraging 
parties  were  sent  out  and  were  so  successful  that  we  had  provi 
sions  sufficient  to  last  us  until  we  reached  Huntsville.  The  work 
on  the  bridge  proceeded  rapidly  and  Colonel  Suman  reported 
he  would  have  it  completed  by  1  p.  m.  the  next  day.  It  was 
quite  warm  and  there  were  indications  of  rain. 

January  3,  we  were  slow  in  getting  out  of  our  tents,  for  no 
one  supposed  we  would  move  until  late  in  the  day.  But  the 
bridge  was  completed  at  11  a.  m.  having  been  built  in  just  twenty- 
four  hours  working  time,  and  was  strong  enough  for  the  heaviest 
trains.2 

At  11:30  a.  m.  General  Kimball's  division  began  to  cross 
the  bridge,  our  division  followed  and  following  us  came  General 
Elliott's  division.  It  had  begun  raining  at  midnight  the  night 
before,  but  ceased  about  daylight  and  the  weather  was  fair  and 
mild.  The  bridge  was  across  the  channel  east  of  Buck's  Island. 
The  channel  west  of  the  island  was  fordable  and  we  waded 
through  it  and  struck  out  at  a  rapid  pace  for  Athens,  twelve 
miles  distant.  The  latter  part  of  our  march  the  road  ran  through 
a  number  of  sloughs  which  were  difficult  to  cross.  Our  division 
reached  Athens  about  5  p.  m.  and  marched  about  a  half-mile  be 
yond  the  town  where  we  went  into  camp  for  the  night/5 

That  evening  General  Wood  received  a  telegram  from  Gen 
eral  Thomas  directing  him  to  "concentrate  his  whole  corps  at 
Huntsville  and  prepare  for  an  early  resumption  of  the  winter 
campaign."4 

January 'i,  we  resumed  our  march  at  (5:30  a.  in.,  our  brigade 
being  in  advance  of  the  entire  corps.  The  morning  was  frosty, 
but  fair,  the  air  was  invigorating  and  the  road  was  good,  so  we 
made  rapid  progress.  AJ3OUt  4  p.  m.  we  arrived  at  a  stream 
called  Indian  Creek,  where  we  went  into  camp,  having  marched 
nineteen  miles.  The  only  untoward  incident  of  the  day  was  that 
"Lieutenant  Glover  was  placed  in  arrest  by  an  officer  of  General 
Wood's  staff  for  some  imaginary  offense/' 

January  5,  we  resumed  our  march  at  8  a.  m.     While  wait- 

1  W.  R.  R.  94-441-44H.  4      Fiilk'rtnn's  Journal  !KM7:}. 

2  Fuller-ton's  Journal,  W.   R.   R.   93-17?,.         .".     (Reason's  Diary. 

3  (Reason's  Diary. 


MARCH  TO  HUNTSVILLE,  ALA.  683 

ing  for  marching  orders  an  order  from  corps  headquarters  was 
published  setting  forth  the  evils  of  a  habit  which  prevailed  to 
quite  an  extent  throughout  the  corps, — of  jeering  and  shouting 
derisive  epithets  when  certain  officers  rode  by.  Colonel  Askew 
gave  notice  that  he  would  expect  the  line  officers  to  see  that  the 
practice  was  discontinued  and  added,  that  what  ever  our  private 
opinions  of  superior  officers  might  be,  it  was  not  proper  to  ex 
press  them  in  the  presence  of  the  men1 

After  marching  about  7  miles  we  reached  Huntsville  and 
had  our  first  view  of  the  place,  although  this  was  the  third  time 
we  had  been  in  its  immediate  vicinity.  We  marched  through  it 
without  halting,  and  four  miles  beyond  the  town  went  into  camp 
near  a  splendid  large  spring,  called  Bird  Spring,  or  Lake,  whose 
waters  overflowed  into  a  swamp  called  "Big  Spring  Bottom/'2 
General  Kimball's  division  went  into  camp  about  one  mile  east 
and  General  Elliott's  about  three  miles  west  of  the  town.  Here 
we  remained  until  February  1. 

Our  camp  at  Bird  Lake  was  named  Camp  Green,  in  honor 
of  Captain  Green  of  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio,  who  was  killed  at 
Columbia.  It  was  a  pleasant  and  healthful  camp.  We  had  an 
abundant  supply  of  good  water  and  fuel,  plenty  of  timber  for 
building  shacks  for  quarters,  and  rations  and  supplies  of  all  kinds 
in  abundance.  The  regimental  camps  were  regularly  laid  out, 
the  grounds  were  well  policed  and  we  soon  took  up  the  doily 
duties  of  soldiers  in  garrison.  There  was  no  enemy  in  force 
near  to  give  us  uneasiness  and  as  a  natural  result  discipline  was 
somewhat  relaxed. 

January  6,  an  order  came  to  turn  over  the  animals  we  had 
accumulated  on  our  recent  march.  In  our  numerous  foraging 
expeditions  we  had  acquired  so  many,  that  each  regiment  had  a 
regular  caravan  of  horses  and  mules  which  had  been  used  as 
pack  animals.1  A  regular  guard  was  placed  about  our  camp  and 
Colonel  Streight  issued  strict  orders  about  granting  passes  to 
the  officers  and  men  to  go  outside  the  guard  lines.  In  his  instruc 
tions  to  the  guards  he  was  reported  to  have  said  he  "would  pro 
mote  any  man  who  shot  another  while  attempting  to  break 
guard."  This  caused  great  indignation  amongst  the  men  and 
was  the  subject  of  severe  criticism.  The  men  decided  that  they 
did  not  care  to  earn  promotion  in  that  way.8 

January  10,  a  number  of  commissions  came,  which  caused 
quite  a  change  in  the  duties  of  some  of  the  officers  of  the  regi 
ment.  The  adjutant  received  a  commission  as  captain  and 
Andrew  J.  Gleason  and  Rees  Pickering  received  commissions  as 
first  lieutenants.  The  adjutant  was  assigned  to  duty  as  captain 

1,  -2  and  3     (Reason's  Diary. 


684  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

of  Company  F,  and  Gleason  took  his  place  as  adjutant  of  the 
regiment. 

January  11,  the  left  wing  of  the  regiment  was  ordered  to  a 
point  north  of  Athens  to  reconstruct  Sulphur  Trestle,  which  had 
been  destroyed  during  the  recent  campaign.1 

January  13,  Captains  Chandler  W.  Carroll,  George  W.  Cum 
mins  and  John  G.  Byrd,  three  faithful  officers  who  had  been 
with  the  regiment  since  its  organization,  were  mustered  out  of 
service  at  their  own  request  and  started  for  home.1  All  had 
distinguished  themselves  by  faithful  and  valiant  service  and  all 
had  contributed  largely  to  the  regiment's  character  for  courage 
and  efficiency. 

January  22,  an  order  was  issued  from  regimental  head 
quarters  precribing  regular  hours  for  drill  and  establishing  a 
school  of  instruction  for  the  officers,1  who  had  become  some 
what  rusty  in  tactics  and  regulations  by  reason  of  constant  march 
ing  and  fighting  during  the  previous  eight  months. 

January  24,  we  received  a  copy  of  (he  Cincinnati  Commer 
cial,  which  announced  that  Governor  John  Brough  had  issued 
commissions  as  captain  to  Lieutenant  Thomas  C.  Davis,  Lucius 
O.  Doolittle,  Alexander  R.  Lord  and  J.  Alonzo  Gleason,  Com 
missions  for  these  officers  were  received  January  27,  and  on  the 
same  day  commissions  as  first  lieutenant  came  for  Second  Lieu 
tenants  John  W.  Wilson,  Joseph  N.  Welker,  James  Gass  and 
Peter  T.  Gardner, — the  commissions  as  first  lieutenant,  how 
ever,  were  returned  by  Colonel  Askew  because  of  some  irregu 
larity.1 

On  the  27th,  an  ambulance  from  division  headquarters  drove 
up  to  regimental  headquarters  and  an  orderly  alighted  from  it 
bearing  an  order  detailing  the  former  adjutant,  now  Captain 
Alexis  Cope,  as  acting  assistant  adjutant  general  of  the  divi 
sion.  That  officer  was  found  engaged  in  his  duties  as  captain 
of  Company  F,  and  was  greatly  surprised  at  the  order.  But  he 
soon  got  his  personal  belongings  together,  climbed  into  the  ambu 
lance  and  was  driven  to  division  headquarters. 

It  was  a  cold  frosty  morning  and  as  the  ambulance  rattled 
along  over  the  frozen  road,  he  tried  to  pull  himself  together  in 
anticipation  of  his  new  and  important  duties.  He  thought  there 
must  be  some  mistake,  and  could  not  realize  how  it  had  come 
about  that  he,  an  obscure  subaltern,  should  have  been  selected 
for  such  an  important  post.  Mingled  with  the  surprise  was  a 
feeling  of  his  inadequacy  for  the  discharge  of  his  new  duties. 
But  there  was  the  order  which  must  be  obeyed,  and  by  the  time 
he  reached  division  headquarters,  he  had  decided  to  do  his  best 

1     Cleason's  Diary. 


MARCH  TO  HUNTSVILLE.  ALA.  685 

to  justify  the  confidence  reposed  in  him.  It  is  to  be  presumed 
that  he  had  his  share  of  the  buoyancy  and  hopefulness  of  youth 
which  characterized  the  volunteer  soldier,  who  needed  only  the 
order  to  undertake  any  task,  however  difficult  or  dangerous. 

January  30,  some  of  the  newly  promoted  officers  went  to 
Huntsville  to  be  mustered  as  of  their  new  rank  and  brought  back 
a  rumor  that  the  regiment  was  soon  to  move.1 

January  31,  an  order  came  to  be  ready  to  move  at  4  a.  m. 
February  1,  our  destination  being  Eastport  on  the  Tennessee 
river.  As  the  order  directed  that  we  should  mgve  by  rail  and 
boat  it  was  not  unwelcome,  though  all  regretted  to  leave  the  com 
fortable  cabins  of  our  camp  on  Bird  Lake.2 

There  was  considerable  hilarity  throughout  the  camps  over 
the  prospect  of  moving,  which  was  probably  increased  by  the 
issue  of  rations  of  whisky.  It  was  said  the  whisky  was  issued  to 
save  the  trouble  of  transporting  it.  Some  of  the  men  began  firing 
off  their  guns  down  by  the  swamp,  others  did  the  same  and  soon 
there  was  a  rattle  of  musketry,  which  sounded  like  a  general  en 
gagement  and  which  company  officers  seemed  unable  to  stop. 
The  field  officers  interposed,  but  their  effects  were  also  in  vain. 
Finally  the  brigade  bugle  sounded  the  "assembly",  when  the 
regiments  fell  into  line  and  the  firing  ceased.  There  was  a  dis 
position  on  the  part  of  the  men  to  burn  their  cabins,  or  shacks, 
before  leaving,  but  strict  orders  forbidding  it  were  issued  and 
fortunately  obeyed,  for  the  troops  were  afterward  to  re-occupy 
them  during  the  rest  of  the  winter. 

While  we  were  lying  in  camp  at  Bird  Lake,  what  to  do  with 
General  Thomas's  army  was  the  subject  of  serious  concern  at 
the  War  Department,  because  of  his  reluctance  to  begin  a  new 
campaign  until  he  was  thoroughly  prepared.  To  Thomas'  sug 
gestion  that  he  needed  time  in  which  to  recruit  and  re-organize  his 
transportation  facilities,  which  had  been  depleted  in  order  to  pre 
pare  General  Sherman  for  his  march  to  the  sea,  (see  page  14 
ante)  General  Grant,  January  2,  telegraphed  General  Halleck, 
"Inform  General  Thomas  that  he  will  require  no  new  outfit  of 
teams ;  his  troops  will  either  operate  in  a  country  which  will 
supply  them,  or  the  surplus  ones  will  be  sent  where  it  is  not  de 
sirable  to  transport  wagons  or  mules.  There  has  always  been 
an  unnecessary  accumulation  of  teams  in  the  Department  of  the 
Cumberland,  along  the  railroads,  where  every  supply  but  fuel 
was  brought  on  the  cars."3 

On  the  same  day  General  Halleck  telegraphed  General 
Thomas : 


1   and  2     Gleason's  Diary. 
3     W.  R.  R.  94-481. 


686  FIFTEENTH   OHIO  VOLUNTEEHS  AM>  CAMPAIGNS 


orders  of  General  Grant  to  concentrate  your  forces  on 
the  Tennessee  were  not  intended  to  interfere  in  any  manner  with 
your  pursuit  of  Hood,  or  your  cutting  off  his  lines  of  railroad, 
ie  :  they  have  reference  to  what  is  to  be  done  when  your  present 
operations  are  concluded."1 

The  same  day  General  Thomas  reported  to  General  Halleck 
that  General  Hood  had  gone  to  Corinth,  but  that  in  his  opinion 
he  would  not  stop  there.2  January  3,  General  A.  J.  Smith  re 
ported  to  General  Thomas  his  arrival  at  CHfton  on  the  Ten 
nessee  ready  to  embark  for  Eastport,  and  saying  that  Hood  was 
at  Corinth.  He  also  stated  that  his  position  at  Eastport  would 
not  be  safe,  that  with  one  more  corps,  say  the  Fourth  and  suffi 
cient  cavalry  he  could  whip  Hood  and  drive  him  from  the  coun 
try.3  On  the  same  day,  General  Wilson,  in  view  of  a  continua 
tion  of  the  campaign  against  Hood,  telegraphed  General  Thomas, 
asking  for  10,000  horses  and  all  the  Spencer  carbines  to  be  had.4 

It  was,  however,  becoming  apparent  that  the  army  with 
which  General  Thomas  had  beaten  Hood  at  Nashville  and  driven 
him  across  the  Tennessee  river  was  to  be  broken  up.  January 
4,  General  Grant  telegraphed  General  Halleck: 

"If  Hood  goes  south  from  Corinth,  order  A.  J.  Smith  and 
two  divisions  besides,  to  Baltimore,  Md.,  to  be  thrown  where  they 
were  needed  on  arrival.5  January  7,  General  Grant  asked  Gen 
eral  Halleck  to  order  General  Thomas,  if  he,  Thomas,  was  as 
sured  that  Hood  had  gone  south  from  Corinth,  to  send  Schofield 
with  his  corps  east,  to  be  assembled  at  Annapolis,  Md.,  leaving 
liis  transportation  at  Louisville  until  further  orders,  and  recom 
mending  that  the  departments  of  the  Ohio  and  the  Cumberland 
.be  united  in  one  department.6 

On  the  same  day,  General  Thomas  telegraphed  to  General 
Halleck  that  A.  J.  Smith's  and  Schofield's  troops  would  be  con 
centrated  at  Eastport  by  the  llth,  instant,7  and  dispatched  to 
General  Canby  at  Mobile  that  he  was  assembling  his  troops  on 
the  Tennessee  River,  ready  for  any  operations  ;  that  he  might  be 
ordered  south  and  would  let  him,  Canby,  know  in  time  to  enable 
him  to  co-operate.8 

The  next  day,  January  8,  General  Halleck  issued  the  order 
transferring  Schofield's  Corps  to  Annapolis,  and  consolidating 
the  departments  of  the  Cumberland  and  the  Ohio,  under  General 
Thomas's  command.9 

A    letter    from    General   J.    C.    Donaldson,    Chief    Quarter 

1  W.  R.  R.  94-481.  4     \V.  R.  R.  94-500.  7     W.  R.  R.  04-530. 

2  W.  R.  R.  94-482.  5     W.  R.  R.  94-50(5.  S     W.  R.  R.  94-540 
S     W.  R.  R.  94-499.                      (>     W.  R.  R.   94-521).  9     W.  R.  R.  94-540. 


MARCH  TO  HU.NTSVILLE.  ALA.  687 

Master,  Department  of  the  Cumberland,  to  General  M.  C.  Meigs, 
dated  January  10,  1805,  discloses  the  fact  that  at  that  time  there 
were  rumors  that  General  Thomas  was  to  be  relieved.  He  says 
that  General  Thomas  left  Nashville  the  day  before  for  Eastport 
where  he  was  concentrating  his  troops.  He  says,  "I  saw  him  on 
board  and  he  opened  his  heart  to  me.  He  feels  very  sore  at  the 
rumored  intentions  to  relieve  him,  and  the  Major  Generalcy  does 
not  cicatrize  the  wound.  You  know  Thomas  is  morbidly  sensi 
tive  and  it  cut  him  to  the  heart  to  think  it  was  contemplated  to 
remove  him.  He  does  not  blame  the  Secretary,  for  he  said  Mr. 
Stanton  is  a  fair  and  just  man."1 

January  14,  General  Thomas  reported  to  General  Halleck 
That  Hood  had  gone  south  to  Corinth  and  that  Schofield's  corps 
had  been  ordered  to  Annapolis  and  would  begin  embarking  next 
day.2 

January  17,  the  order  consolidating  the  departments  of  the 
Ohio  and  the  Cumberland  was  issued — the  new  department  to  em 
brace  such  parts  of  Mississippi,  Alabama  and  Georgia  as  might 
be  occupied  by  troops  under  General  Thomas'  command.-'1 

January  18,  General  Halleck  sent  a  dispatch  to  General 
Grant  saying,  in  substance,  that  he  had  learned  from  General 
Canby  that  if  General  Thomas  proposed  to  move  to  Selma  or 
some  other  point  on  the  gulf,  he,  Canby,  could  co-operate,  but 
to  do  so  effectively  he  would  require  remounts  for  a  part  of  his 
cavalry.  That  since  October  1,  1804,  all  cavalry  horses  purchased 
in  the  west  and  north-west  had  been  sent  to  General  Thomas. 
That  the  question  was  whether  we  should  continue  to  send  all 
cavalry  horses  to  General  Thomas,  or  General  Canby  should  re 
ceive  his  due  proportion,  and  that  this  must  be  decided  in  a 
great  measure  by  his.  General  Grant's,  plan  of  ulterior  opera 
tions  in  that  part  of  the  country.  That  whatever  that  plan  might 
be,  it  was  important  that  there  should  be  a  concert  of  action 
between  Generals  Canby  and  Thomas,  for  the  former  could  not 
safely  operate  against  the  interior  of  Alabama,  unless  the  latter 
at  the  same  time  aided  in  the  movement,  by  pursuing  Hood  or 
keeping  him  away  from  Memphis,  Vicksburg,  Natchez,  etc. ;  that 
Canby  seemed  very  anxious  to  make  a  winter  campaign  while  the 
weather  was  favorable,  if  he  could  be  certain  of  the  co-operation 
of  Thomas.  General  Halleck  said  further,  that  he  felt  confident 
that  Selma  and  Montgomery  could  be  taken  this  winter,  if 
Thomas  and  Canby's  forces  could  either  unite  or  co-operate,  and 
that  General  Sherman  had  written  that  abundant  supplies  would 
be  found  in  all  the  interior  of  Alabama.4 

1  W.  K.  R.  94-561.  :i     W.  R.  R.  94-603. 

2  W.  R.  R.  94-586.  4      W.  R.   R.   94-609. 


688  FIITEEXTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

General  Grant  answered  this  dispatch  the  same  day,  saying: 
"I  now  understand  that  Beauregard  has  gone  west  to  gather  up 
what  can  be  saved  from  Hood's  army  to  bring  against  Sherman. 
If  this  be  the  case,  Selma  and  Montgomery  will  be  easily  reached. 
I  do  not  believe,  though,  that  General  Thomas  will  ever  get  there 
from  the  north.  He  is  too  ponderous  in  his  preparation^  and 
equipments  to  move  through  a  country  rapidly  enough  to  live  off 
of  it.  West  of  the  Mississippi  we  do  not  want  to  do  more  than 
defend  what  we  now  hold,  but  I  do  want  Canby  to  make  a  winter 
campaign,  either  from  Mobile  Bay  or  from  Florida.  You  might 
order  all  the  horses  now  in  the  West  to  Canby  and  direct  him  to 
make  an  independent  campaign,  looking  to  the  capture  of  Mobile, 
first,  if  the  job  does  not  promise  too  long  a  one,  and  Montgomery 
and  Selma,  the  destruction  of  all  roads,  machine  shops  and  stores, 
the  main  object.  Thomas  can  do  without  horses  for  some  time; 
a  portion  of  his  troops  could  be  sent  by  water  to  Canbv.  If 
Thomas  does  not1  move  in  co-operation  probably  the  best  route 
for  him  to  take  would  be  by  way  of  Chattanooga,  repairing  the 
road  to  Rome  and  starting  from  there.  These  I  give  as  views. 
What  I  would  order  is,  that  Canby  be  furnished  cavalry  horses 
and  be  directed  to  prepare  to  commence  a  campaign,  and  that 
Thomas  be  telegraphed  to,  to  say  what  he  could  do,  and  when, 
and  get  his  views  upon  the  choice  of  routes,  looking  upon  Selma 
as  his  objective.  Thomas  must  make  a  campaign,  or  spare  his 
surplus  troops."2 

In  pursuance  of  General  Grant's  foregoing  order,  General 
Halleck,  on  January  19,  telegraphed  to  General  Thomas  report 
ing  General  Grant's  "views"  and  asking  General  Thomas  for  his 
ideas  on  the  proposed  operations.3 

General  Thomas,  January  24,  answered  General  HahYck's 
dispatch  of  January  19,  as  follows : 

"Your  dispatch  of  2:30  p.  m.,  19th  instant  is  received  this 
day.  In  my  dispatch  of  12  p.  m.  21st  instant,  I  reported  the  con 
dition  of  the  roads  in  this  region  of  the  country  and  since  writing 
that  dispatch,  an  officer  sent  by  me  under  a  flag  of  truce  toward 
Columbus  has  returned.  He  succeeded  in  getting  ten  miles  be 
yond  Fulton,  and  reports  that  both  the  road  he  went  out  and  the 
one  he  returned  by  are  at  this  time  impracticable  for  artillery  and 
wagon  trains.  I  have  also  received  the  same  reports  from  reliable 
scouts  and  from  refugees  of  the  condition  of  the  roads  leading 
from  Tuscumbia,  via  Russellville  to  Tuscaloosa  and  Columbus. 
I  therefore  think  that  it  will  be  impossible  to  move  from  the 

1  The  word  "not"  omitted  in  dispatch  as  received  by  General  Halleck. 

2  W.  R.  R.  94-609-610. 

3  W.  R.  R.  94-614. 


MARCH  TO  HUXTSVILLE,  ALA.  689 

Tennessee  River  upon  Montgomery  and  Selma  with  a  large  force 
during  this  winter.  It  was  my  purpose,  after  having  driven  Hood 
out  of  Tennessee,  to  have  assembled  my  available  force  at  or  near 
Huntsville,  Ala.,  for  the  winter,  and  as  soon  as  the  roads  become 
practicable  in  the  spring  to  cross  the  Tennessee  River  at  Wrntes- 
burg  and  Decatur,  move  by  Somerville  and  Blountsville,  through 
Brown's  and  Murphree's  Valleys,  via  Elyton,  Cedar  Grove,  Mon- 
tevallo  and  Summerville,  ( Summerfield?)  upon  Selma,  this  coun 
try  having  been  represented  by  various  persons  as  being  per 
fectly  practicable  and  abounding  in  supplies.  That  country, 
however,  is  in  the  same  condition  as  the  country  between  this 
point  and  Columbus,  Miss.,  at  this  season  of  the  year,  and  I  do 
not  believe  I  could  make  a  winter  campaign,  with  any  reasonable 
chance  of  complete  success,  starting  from  this  point,  (Eastport, 
Miss.)  or  Decatur.  Should  Lieutenant  General  Grant  determine 
upon  a  winter  campaign  from  some  point  on  the  gulf,  I  could 
send  General  Canby,  Maj.  Gen.  A.  J.  Smith's  command  an  .I  all 
the  cavalry  now  here  except  two  divisions,  feeling  able  to  securely 
hold  the  line  of  the  Tennesse,  and  all  the  territory  now  held  in 
East  Tennessee,  with  the  Fourth  Army  Corps,  the  troops  in 
East  Tennessee,  and  two  divisions  of  cavalry.1 

January  25,  at  6  p.  m.  General  Halleck  telegraphed  to 
General  Thomas  saying,  ''General  Grant  is  anxious  that  your 
expedition  should  get  off  at  the  very  first  favorable  weather,"  but 
later  on  the  same  day  at  10:30  p.  m.,  he  dispatched  to  General 
Grant,  saying,  that  after  conversing  with  General  Schofield  he 
was  satisfied  that  no  movement  would  be  made  from  the  Ten 
nessee  during  the  winter.2 

General  Thomas  did  not  receive  General  Halleck's  dispatch 
of  January  25,  until  the  27th,  and  at  once  answered  it  saying: 
"Please  let  me  know  as  soon  as  possible  General  Grant's  decision, 
whether  I  shall  make  a  campaign  or  send  reinforcements  to  Canby. 
I  can  start  from  here  (Eastport,  Miss.)  early  in  the  spring,  but 
I  do  not  believe  any  effectual  progress  could  be  made  with  the 
roads  in  their  present  condition. ":i  General  Grant  had  evidently 
anticipated  General  Thomas'  last  foregoing  dispatch,  for  on  Jan 
uary  26,  he  directed  General  Halleck  to  order  General  Thomas  to 
send  A.  J.  Smith's  command  to  Canby  at  once.  He  did  not  ihink 
it  wise  for  General  Thomas  to  strip  himself  of  cavalry,  as  he  had 
proposed  to  do,  and  suggested  that  he  send  only  one  division 
of  3000  or  4000,  which  he  thought  would  be  sufficient.4 

Upon  receipt  of  this  dispatch  General  Halleck  at  once  tele 
graphed  to  General  Thomas  the  following  order: 

1  W.  R.  K.  94-627.  S     W.  R.  R.  103-595. 

2  W.  R.  R.   103-581.  4     W.  R.  R.   103-584. 


690  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

"General  Grant  directs  that  you  send  General  Canby  A.  J. 
Smith's  command  of  about  18,000  men  and  5000  cavalry  with  all 
possible  dispatch.  They  will  report  at  New  Orleans  if  they  re 
ceive  no  order  while  enroute."1 

General  Thomas  evidently  received  this  order  on  January 
29,  and  in  transmission  it  was  changed  to  read  "five  cavalry'' 
instead  of  5000  cavalry.  General  Thomas  interpreted  it  to  mean 
five  divisions  of  cavalry  and  gave  orders  accordingly.2 

General  Thomas  evidently  realized  that  the  sending  of  five 
divisions  of  cavalry  instead  of  two,  as  he  had  proposed,  would 
leave  him  with  an  insufficient  force  at  Eastport,  and  on  the  Game 
day  telegraphed  to  General  Wood  at  Huntsville,  Ala.,  to  send  one 
division  of  the  Fourth  Corps  to  Nashville,  by  rail,  and  thence  by 
steamer  to  Eastport  as  rapidly  as  possible.3 

It  was  this  which  led  to  our  division  being  ordered  to  East- 
port  as  before  narrated. 

The  order  of  march  or  movement  to  Eastport  was,  first  the 
Third  Brigade,  second  the  Second  Brigade  and  third  the  First 
Brigade  and  we  were  directed  to  take  with  us  all  our  tents,  bag 
gage,  desks,  offices,  horses  and  all  provisions  on  hand.4  It  looked 
like  we  were  to  begin  a  winter  campaign.  General  Wood,  who 
had  been  eager  to  begin  such  a  campaign,  had  on  January  29, 
telegraphed  to  General  Thomas  that  the  Fourth  Corps  was  pre 
pared  to  take  the  field,  that  it  was  amply  supplied  with  transpor 
tation,  and  had  150  rounds  of  small  arms  ammunition  per  man 
and  250  rounds  of  artillery  ammunition  per  gun.5  But  there 
was  to  be  no  winter  campaign  for  the  Fourth  Corps.  General 
Thomas'  magnificent  army,  which  had  beaten  Hood  at  Nashville 
and  driven  him  south  of  the  Tennessee  River,  had  been  depleted 
by  sending  Schofield's  Corps  to  the  East  and  A.  J.  Smith's  com 
mand  and  a  large  part  of  his  cavalry  to  Mobile,  and  there  re 
mained  apparently  only  a  force  sufficient  to  hold  the  line  of  the 
Tennessee  River.  It  looked  very  much  as  if  the  final  blows  which 
were  to  crush  the  rebellion  were  to  be  struck  while  we  rested  in 
inglorious  ease. 

The  morning  of  February  1,  1865,  reveille  was  sounded  at 
2  :30  o'clock,  and  we  packed  up,  had  breakfast  and  were  soon  on 
our  way  to  Huntsville.  We  entered  the  town  about  day  light 
with  bands  playing  and  halted  at  the  big  spring  to  lay  in  a  supply 
of  water.  The  brigade  commander.  Colonel  Streight,  had  issued 
disciplinary  orders  which  were  quite  galling  to  both  officers  and 
men,  and  were  in  striking  contrast  to  the  tactful  orders  of  our 

1  W.  R.  R.  103-584.  4     W.  R.  R.  103-618. 

2  W.  R.  R.   103-606.  5     W.  R.  R.   103-607. 

3  W.  R.  R.  103-608. 


MABCH  TO  HUNTS  VILLE.  ALA.  691 

dear  old  brigade  commander,  General  Willich.1  We  were  scon 
abroad  the  train,  but  had  to  wait  a  long  time  for  the  transporta 
tion  to  be  loaded.  It  was  9  o'clock  before  our  train  pulled  out 
for  Stevenson,  Ala.,  which  we  reached  at  2  p.  m.  Here  we  had 
'and  hour's  wait  and  then  moved  out  for  Nashville,  where  we  ar 
rived  at  9  o'clock  a.  m.  February  2.  By  some  reason  Colonel 
Streight  did  not  get  the  train  on  which  we  left  Huntsville  and 
Colonel  Hotchkiss  of  the  Eighty-ninth  Illinois,  assumed  command 
of  the  brigade.2  The  steam  boats  which  were  to  carry  vs  to 
Eastport  had  not  yet  arrived,  and  after  a  conference  of  regi 
mental  commanders  it  was  decided  to  move  out  and  encamp 
where  we  were  posted  preceding  the  battle  of  Nashville.  But 
when  we  halted  near  the  Acklin  place,  we  were  told  that  the 
ground  we  had  selected  was  under  special  protection  by  orders 
of  General  Thomas,  and  we  moved  on  to  a  good  location  just 
beyond  the  old  confederate  rifle  pits,  and  there  went  into  camp. 
This  special  protection  did  not  prevent  General  Wood,  who  was 
now  in  command  of  the  division,  from  occupying  the  beautiful 
Acklin  home  as  his  headquarters.  As  Mrs.  Acklin  was  tru:n  oc 
cupying  the  house,  it  was  doubtless  done  with  her  consent  and. 
probably  at  her  request,  for,  as  division  headquarters,  it  would 
be  more  fully  protected.  On  the  march  from  the  cars  Company 
B  showed  such  lack  of  discipline  that  it  was  required,  after  trial 
before  Lieutenant  Colonel  M.  Clenahan,  provost  marshal,  to  per 
form  three  days  hard  labor  of  ten  hours  each.3 

Gleason  in  his  diary  relates  this  incident  of  the  dav,  which 
he  says  illustrates  the  nimble  wit  of  the  typical  Southern  woman. 

Colonel  Askew  received  an  unexpected  call  from  a  laJv  liv 
ing  on  the  plantation  on  which  we  were  encamped  who  washed 
a  safeguard.  She  stated  the  case  to  the  colonel,  at  the  same  time 
apparently  trying  to  recall  his  name.  The  colonel  modestly  baid, 
"My  name  is  Askew"  and  she  laughingly  and  quickly  said,  "Why, 
then  I  have  come  to  ask  you  for  a  guard.  So  neat  a  play  on  his 
name  vanquished  this  usually  stern  and  unemotional  officer,  and 
a  safe  guard  was  at  once  ordered. 

We  remained  quietly  in  camp  February  3,  4  and  5,  the  com 
pany  officers  being  busy  making  out  returns  with  occasional  visits 
to  the  city. 

In  the  mean  time  General  Thomas  had  learned  that  he  was 
only  to  send  5000  instead  of  five  divisions  of  cavalry  to  General 
Canby  and  on  February  2,  telegraphed  General  Stanley,  who  had 
resumed  command  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  that  it  would  not  be 
necessary  to  send  a  division  to  Eastport.  Wlien  this  dispatch 

1,  2  and  3     Gleason's  Diary. 


692  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

was  received,  our  division  was  already  at  Nashville  and  was  at 
once  ordered  back  to  Huntsville,  Ala.1 

About  noon,  February  6,  we  marched  into  the  city  and  took 
train  at  4  p.  m.  for  our  old  camp  at  Bird  Lake.  There  was  much 
straggling  on  our  march  into  and  through  the  city  and  some  of 
the  men  got  drunk  and  noisy  in  spite  of  unusual  precautions  to 
prevent  it.  Some  of  the  regimental  band  were  boozy  and  some 
of  the  officers  were  hilarious.  Gleason  in  his  diary  laments  that 
the  prospects  for  sleep  on  the  train  were  not  flattering.  It  was 
snowing  when  our  train  pulled  out  of  Nashville  and  the  night 
was  cold.  We  reached  our  camp  at  Huntsville  February  ?'.  late 
in  the  evening,  and  found  that  it  had  been  ruthlessly  ransacked 
by  other  troops  during  our  absence.  The  weather  was  cold  and 
as  our  camp  equipage  had  not  arrived  we  passed  a  very  uncom 
fortable  night.  At  Nashville  General  Wood  applied  for  and  re 
ceived  a  leave  of  absence  because  the  wound  he  had  received 
at  Lovejoy  Station  was  troubling  him,  and  because  he  was  satis 
fied  no  winter  campaign  by  our  corps  would  be  undertaken.  Gen 
eral  Samuel  Beatty  again  resumed  command  of  our  division, 
the  writer  as  his  adjutant  general. 

1     W.  R.  R.  103-655. 


CHAPTER  XXXII. 

ANOTHER   LONG   PERIOD  OF   INACTION   AT   HUNTSVILLE   AND  A 

MOVEMENT  UP  THE  EAST  TENNESSEE  VALLEY  IN 

AID  OF  OPERATIONS  IN  THE  EAST. 

After  our  hurried  and  mistaken  movement  to  Nashville, 
described  in  the  preceding  chapter,  we  remained  in  winter 
quarters  at  Huntsville,  Ala.,  until  March  15,  1865.  It  was  a 
pleasant  camp,  in  easy  communication  with  the  north,  and  sup 
plies  of  all  kinds  were  abundant.  Our  mail  facilities  were  sel 
dom  interrupted,  the  daily  papers  reached  us  regularly,  and  we 
watched  with  unabated  interest  the  movements  of  other  forces, 
which  were  to  give  the  final  blows  to  the  rebellion.  There  was 
a  pleasing  monotony  in  our  camp  life.  We  were  practically 
care-free,  and  each  one  sought  such  congenial  amusement  as 
he  could  find  in  his  limited  surroundings.  Division  headquar 
ters  were  about  one  mile  north  of  our  division  camp,  in  a  brick 
house  near  the  Huntsville  road.  The  writer  who  was  serving 
as  assistant  adjutant  general  of  the  division  recalls  seeing 
more  than  once  General  Beatty,  our  division  commander, 
starting  out  early  in  the  morning,  in  rubber  coat  and  boots,  to 
shoot  ducks  in  the  swamps  about  Bird  Lake  and  Big  Spring 
Bottom.  Ducks  were  plentiful  and  of  a  very  fine  quality  and 
our  mess  table  was  constantly  supplied  with  them.  They 
were,  however,  not  all  of  General  Beatty's  shooting. 

We  had  as  a  guest  at  division  headquarters  Colonel 
Charles  F.  Manderson  of  the  Nineteenth  Ohio,  who  was  recov 
ering  from  an  illness,  and  whose  grace,  courtesy  and  fine  con 
versational  powers,  made  our  mess  table  most  interesting  and 
delightful.  After  the  war  he  removed  from  Ohio  to  Nebraska 
and  became  the  honored  representative  of  that  state  in  the 
United  States  Senate.  Our  life  in  camp  was  so  monotonous 
that  for  a  whole  week  Gleason  made  no  entry  in  his  diary 
except  that  "the  week  was  spent  in  the  usual  routine." 

General  Stanley  had  recovered  from  the  wound  he  had 
received  at  the  battle  of  Nashville  and  was  back  in  command 
of  the  corps  and  Colonel  Hotchkiss  was  in  command  of  the 
brigade. 

February  IT,  there  were  orders  for  brigade  drill  in  the  aft 
ernoon  and  we  were  notified  that  General  Stanley  would  in 
spect  our  camp.  All  set  to  work  to  clean  up  and  put  every 
thing  in  order.  There  wras  a  very  high  wind,  which  blew  down 
a  number  of  tents  and  shacks,  and  wrecked  the  chapel  tent. 


694  FIKTKEXTU   OHIO  VOLUNTKKKS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

The  band  was  practicing  in  it  at  the  time,  but  fortunately  the 
only  injury  resulting  was  to  some  of  the  horns  which  were 
slightly  dinted.  The  brigade  drill  took  place  in  the  afternoon 
in  some  large  fields  near  the  pike.  While  we  were  drilling 
General  Stanley  rode  up,  and  after  some  conversation  wdth  the 
field  officers  of  the  brigade,  rode  on  to  our  camp  to  inspect  our 
quarters.1 

February  18,  the  following  promotions  to  the  non-com 
missioned  staff  w^ere  made  and  the  appointees  at  once  entered 
upon  their  new  duties.  Sergeant  Major  James  G.  Gass,  Quar 
termaster  Sergeant  Robert  S.  McClenahan,  Commissary  Ser 
geant  Morris  Cope.  Sergeant  John  G.  Gregory,  Company  A. 
and  Daniel  Norman,  Company  H,  were  granted  furloughs.2 

Sunday,  February  19,  there  wrere  religious  services  morn 
ing  and  evening  in  the  chapel,  conducted  by  a  delegate  of  the 
Christian  Commission. 8 

Monday,  February  20,  regular  drills  and  dress  parade  were 
resumed.  During  the  day  the  mail  brought  newspapers  tell 
ing  that  General  Sherman  was  marching  rapidly  across  South 
Carolina  and  was  approaching  Charleston,  the  cradle  of  seces 
sion.  That  night,  Gleason  says,  "I  had  scarcely  got  to  sleep 
when  an  uproar  in  camp  awakened  me  and  kept  me  a\vake  an 
hour  or  two.  From  what  we  could  learn  it  was  caused  by  the 
news  that  Charleston  had  been  evacuated.  The  great  joy  it 
caused  found  vent  in  various  ways — wild  yells,  beating  of 
drums,  playing  by  the  bands  and  the  firing  of  guns  and  squibs 
over  the  old  swamp,  until  the  welkin  rang.  I  expected  to  be 
called  out  to  help  restore  order,  but  wras  not.  A  party  of 
tipsy  officers  came  by  our  quarters  and  tried  to  awaken  the 
colonel,  but  he  apparently  did  not  hear  them  and  they  passed 
on.  After  an  hour  or  twro  it  quieted  down  and  I  resumed  my 
slumber."4 

The  next  morning  it  was  learned  that  the  newrs  of  Charles 
ton's  evacuation  had  come  in  a  dispatch  to  corps  headquar 
ters  and  was  believed  because  it  had  been  foreshadowed  by  the 
late  newspapers.5 

February  21,  Gleason  reports  that  on  that  day  he  had 
finished  some  regimental  rolls  on  which  he  had  been  working 
for  some  time  and  finished  them,  with  the  exception  of  the 
history.  It  is  presumed  that  the  history  on  which  he  was 
working  is  the  short  sketch  which  was  prepared  under  direc 
tion  of  Colonel  Askew,  and  which  appears  in  Whitelaw 
Reid's  "Ohio  In  The  War." 

February  22,  Colonel  Askew  received  leave  of  absence  for 

1,  2,  3,  4  and  5     Gleason's  Diary. 


REST  AT  HUNTS VILLE  AND  MARCH  TO  EAST  TENNESSEE  695 

twenty  days,  but  did  not  leave  for  home,  hoping  he  could  take 
with  him  the  regimental  rolls  and  history  which  Gleason 
hoped  to  complete  in  another  day.  In  the  evening  an  order 
was  published  saying  that  the  old  flag  waved  again  over  Fort 
Sumter  and  that  salutes  had  been  ordered  fired  from  all  navy 
yards  and  other  public  places.  Our  brigade  commander  was 
careful  to  state  that  the  order  \vas  published  for  information, 
not  compliance.  So  our  only  celebration  of  the  event  was  the 
spontaneous  outburst  above  related.  Gleason  in  his  diary 
says : 

"As  it  was  Washington's  birthday,  a  compliance  by  every 
battery  in  the  command  would  have  been  most  appropriate." 

February  23,  commissions  as  first  lieutenant  came  for 
Sergeant  Major  Gass  and  Sergeant  Stewart  McClenahan,  the 
latter  still  being  absent  on  account  of  wounds. 

On  the  24th  Colonel  Askew  left  for  home.  The  regimen 
tal  history  not  being  completed,  Gleason  was  directed  to  for 
ward  it  to  him  by  mail.  Before  the  colonel  left  Adjutant 
Gleason  and  Quartermaster  Joseph  N.  Welker,  hearing  that 
some  promotions  to  captain  would  be  recommended  by  him, 
sought  an  interview  with  him  and  stated  that  they  preferred  to 
remain  in  their  present  positions  rather  than  to  take  command 
of  companies.1 

February  25,  reports  came  that  Wilmington,  N.  C.  had 
been  evacuated  by  the  enemy  and  occupied  by  our  troops  and 
that  General  Grant  had  met  with  a  reverse.  The  report  of 
our  occupation  of  Wilmington  was  confirmed  on  the  26th. 
The  26th  being  Sunday  the  usual  inspection  took  place  and 
religious  services  were  held  in  the  chapel  tent  morning  and 
evening. 

February  27,  a  general  court  martial  was  convened  at 
brigade  headquarters  to  try  our  dear  old  chaplain,  Randall 
Ross,  for  absence  without  leave.  Gleason  notes  in  his  diary 
that  he  was  summoned  to  appear  as  a  witness,  but  was  not 
needed.  It  perhaps  goes  without  saying,  that  the  good  old 
chaplain's  absence  without  leave  was  easily  explained. 

On  the  28th  the  regular  bi-monthly  muster  and  inspection 
was  held.  March  1.  2  and  3,  there  was  the  usual  routine  of 
camp  duty.  On  the  nights  of  the  2nd  and  3rd  there  were  vio 
lent  thunder  storms,  and  on  the  4th  it  was  reported  that  sev 
eral  railroad  bridges  between  Huntsville  and  Nashville  had 
been  carried  away  by  high  water.2 

Sunday,  March  5,  religious  services  were  held  in  the 
chapel  tent  at  1  p.  m.  There  was  dress  parade  in  the  evening 

1  and  2     (Reason's  Diary. 


696  FIFTEENTH   OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

and  after  night  closed  down  the  voices  of  Lieutenant  Colonel 
McClenahan,  Surgeon  Clark  and  the  Gleason  boys  were  again 
heard  singing  sacred  songs.1 

March  6,  we  were  engaged  with  usual  camp  duties  and  on 
the  same  day  there  was  brigade  drill  for  two  hours.  During 
the  drill  Adjutant  Gleason's  horse  ran  away  with  him  and, 
according  to  his  report,  "would  have  been  running  yet  if  he 
had  not  been  stopped  by  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio." 

March  8,  there  was  the  usual  daily  round  of  duties  and 
dress  parade  in  the  evening.  It  was  reported  that  Sheridan 
had  won  a  brilliant  victory  over  Early  in  the  Shanandoah 
Valley.2 

On  the  9th,  a  commission  as  major  came  for  Captain 
Jos.  N.  Dubois,  vice  major  A.  R.  Z.  Dawson,  who  had  been 
appointed  colonel  of  the  One  hundred  and  eighty-seventh  O. 
N.  G.,  one  of  the  100-day  regiments  Ohio  was  sending  into  the 
field  at  that  time.  Commissions  as  captain  came  for  Lieu 
tenants  Jos.  N.  Welker  and  Rees  Pickering,  as  first  lieu 
tenant  for  Morris  Cope  and  as  second  lieutenant  for  Vin 
cent  T.  Trego  and  Franklin  Armstrong.  •  Welker  declined  pro 
motion,  preferring  to  remain  as  regimental  quartermaster. 
The  weather  grew  quite  cold  towards  evening. 

March  10  and  11,  were  occupied  as  usual.  On  Sunday, 
March  12,  Gleason  tells  of  a  ride  he  took  to  Whitesburg  on 
the  Tennessee  River,  and  that  the  river  was  so  high,  one 
could  not  get  to  the  boat  landing.  Whitesburg,  he  reports, 
was  then  occupied  by  the  Thirteenth  Michigan.  He  says  all 
seemed  very  peaceful  at  this  point,  and  that  he  saw  "Southern 
ladies  out  riding  with  officers  of  the  garrison,  apparently  hav 
ing  laid  aside  all  sectional  differences.  '  In  the  evening  it 
was  rumored  that  the  entire  Fourth  Corps  was  soon  to  move 
to  Knoxville.  Robert  B.  McClenahan,  the  lieutenant  col 
onel's  brother,  arrived  from  the  north,  bringing  with  him  the 
latter's  iron  grey  war  horse.3 

On  March  13,  a  soldier  of  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  was 
drummed  through  the  camp  for  insubordination,  having 
taken  a  rail  from  the  shoulders  of  a  comrade  who  had  been 
ordered  to  carry  it  for  some  breach  of  discipline.  The  whole 
brigade  was  formed  to  witness  the  degrading  ceremony.  He 
had  been  sentenced  to  confinement  at  hard  labor  during  the  re 
mainder  of  his  term  of  service,  with  forfeiture  of  all  pay  and 
to  be  drummed  through  the  camp  to  the  tune  of  the  Rogue's 
March,  having  a  placard  with  the  word  "Mutineer"  pinned  on 
his  back.4  It  was  not  surprising  that  Gleason  in  his  diary  de- 

1.  2,  3  and  4     Gleason's  Diary. 


REST   AT   HUXTSVILLE   AND   MARCH   TO    EAST   TENNESSEE  697 

nounces  the  sentence  as  outrageously  severe  and  unnecessarily 
humiliating. 

We  had  received  no  marching  orders,  but  it  was  reported 
that  the  First  Division  was  moving,  and  that  the  stretcher- 
bearers  had  been  sent  ahead.  In  the  afternoon  there  was  a 
rumor  that  Richmond  had  fallen,  which  was  not  credited, 
and  a  report  that  Colonel  Streight  had  resigned  and  would 
leave  for  the  north  at  once,  which  was  believed.  There  wras 
no  mail,  as  the  railroads  were  said  to  be  wholly  occupied  by 
moving  troops.1 

On  the  14-th  little  was  done  in  our  camp.  We  were  in 
hourly  expectation  of  orders  to  move,  but  no  such  orders 
came.  The  only  incident  noted  by  Gleason  is  that  Captain 
David  A.  Geiger  left  for  home  on  a  20  days'  leave  of  absence. 

The  morning  of  March  15,  we  received  orders  to  be 
ready  to  move  at  an  hour's  notice.2 

With  the  exception  of  the  few  days  occupied  in  moving 
to  Nashville  and  back,  as  before  related,  we  had  now  been  in 
camp  at  Huntsville  since  January  5,  1865 — two  months  and 
ten  days.  Our  inaction  was  not  our  fault,  nor  the  fault  of  our 
corps  commander,  for  he  had  reported  to  General  Thomas 
January  29  that  the  corps  was  fully  re-equipped  and  ready  to 
take  the  field.3  It  was  not  the  fault  of  General  Thomas,  for 
after  his  fine  army  had  been  depleted  by  sending  General 
Schofield's  command  to  the  east  and  General  A.  J.  Smith's 
command  and  5000  of  Wilson's  cavalry  to  Mobile,  he  had 
barely  sufficient  troops  to  hold  the  line  of  the  Tennessee  River. 

On  February  5th  he  had  written  to  General  Sherman 
saying : 

"During  my  pursuit  of  Hood  I  had  planned  a  campaign 
against  Montgomery  and  Selma,  to  be  commenced  as  soon  as 
the  roads  became  passable,  so  that  I  might  have  a  reasonable 
hope  of  reaching  those  places  in  a  week  or  ten  days  with  my 
troops  in  a  compact  and  manageable  condition.  General 
Grant,  however,  has  ordered  Schofield,  either  to  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  or  to  you,  and  General  Smith's  command  to  Gen 
eral  Canby.  I  am  now  left  with  the  Fourth  Corps  and  about 
12,000  effective  cavalry.  I  am  willing  to  undertake  the  cap 
ture  of  Montgomery  and  Selma  with  these  troops  when  the 
roads  become  passable,  but  we  can  do  nothing  now ;  for  even 
here,  where  we  have  gravelly  hills  to  move  our  wagons  over, 
the  roads  are  so  bad  that  we  can  scarcely  get  over  them  with 
empty  wagons.  I  am  as  anxious  as  anybody  to  strike  crush- 

1  and  2     Gleason's  Diary. 

3     W.  R.  R.  103-607.  .  Sig".    23 


698  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

ing  blows  to  the  enemy,  but  I  do  not  see  how  it  is  possible 
to  accomplish  anything  now,  and  I  do  not  want  to  fail  when 
I  start.  If  General  Canby  moves  against  Mobile  and  Selma 
there  will  be  no  necessity  for  the  troops  remaining  with  me 
to  go  in  that  direction,  and  I  can  effect  far  more  by  moving 
through  East  Tennessee  and  Western  North  Carolina,  cov 
ering  your  movements  on  Charleston,  or  in  the  direction  of 
Richmond  in  the  spring.  The  Fourth  Corps,  within  itself,  is 
prepared  to  move  and  the  cavalry  will  be  as  soon  as  Wilson 
can  get  horses  to  mount  his  men,  but  1  assure  you,  most 
earnestly,  that  the  roads  are  in  such  condition  now,  that  no 
good  whatever  can  be  done  by  attempting  a  move.  We  shall 
only  exhaust  our  troops  and  ruin  our  animals;  whereas,  if 
we  wait  until  the  roads  become  passable,  about  the  1st  of 
March,  I  do  not  believe  the  rebels  will  have  any  force  short 
of  Virginia,  which  can  resist,  successfully,  even  the  troops  i 
have  left  under  my  command.'*1 

January  31,  General  Grant  had  written  to  General  Thomas 
enclosing  a  letter  from  General  Sherman  in  which  the  latter 
had  suggested  a  movement  by  General  Thomas  south  of  the  Ten 
nessee  River,  saying,  that  General  Sherman,  when  he  wrote  the 
letter  did  not  know  of  the  depletion  of  Thomas'  army.  General 
Grant  further  said :  "It  will  be  impossible  for  you  at  present 
to  move  south  as  he  contemplated  with  the  force  of  infantry 
as  indicated.  General  Sherman  is  advised  before  this  of  the 
changes  made,  and  that  for  the  winter  you  will  be  on  the 
defensive.  I  think,  however,  an  expedition  from  East  Ten 
nessee,  under  General  Stoneman  might  penetrate  South 
Carolina  well  down  toward  Columbia,  destroying  the  railroads 
and  military  resources  of  the  country.  *  *  *  It  will  be 
necessary  probably  for  you  to  send,  in  addition  to  the  force 
now  in  East  Tennessee,  a  small  division  of  infantry,  to  enable 
General  Gillem  to  hold  the  upper  end  of  Holston  Valley  and 
the  mountain  passes  in  rear  of  Stoneman.  You  may  order 
such  expedition.  *  *  *  Let  there  be  no  delay  in  the 
preparation  of  this  expedition."2 

General  Thomas  did  not  receive  this  communication  until 
February  9,  but  at  once  answered  it  saying  he  would  immediately 
proceed  to  organize  the  expedition  and  get  it  off  with  as  little 
delay  as  possible.3 

February  14,  General  Grant  telegraphed  to  General 
Thomas,  who  was  then  at  Nashville,  saying  that  General 
Canby  was  preparing  a  movement  from  Mobile  Bay  against 

1  W.  R.  R.   103-653-4. 

2  W.  R.  R.   103-616. 

3  W.  R.  R.  103-678. 


REST  AT   HUNTSVILLE   AND   MARCH   TO    EAST   TENNESSEE  699 

Mobile  and  the  interior  of  Alabama.  That  Hood's  army  had 
been  terribly  reduced  by  the  severe  punishment  it  had  received 
at  Nashville,  by  desertion,  and  by  the  withdrawal  of  one-half 
of  its  members  to  oppose  Sherman.  That  if  such  reported 
withdrawal  was  true,  or  even  if  it  was  not  true,  Canby's  move 
ment  would  attract  all  the  attention  of  the  enemy  and  leave 
an  advance  from  the  Tennessee  River  easy.  He,  therefore, 
advised  General  Thomas  to  prepare  all  the  cavalry  he  could 
spare  and  hold  it  in  readiness  to  go  south.  General  Grant 
stated  that  the  object  of  the  expedition  would  be  first,  to 
attack  as  much  of  the  enemy's  forces  as  possible  to  insure 
success  to  General  Canby ;  second,  to  destroy  the  enemy's 
lines  of  communication  and  military  resources ;  third,  to 
destroy  or  capture  their  forces  brought  into  the  field.  General 
Grant  said  he  did  not  know  what  number  of  men  General 
Thomas  could  put  into  the  field,  but  thought  that  5000  men, 
all  cavalry,  would  be  sufficient,  and  that  the  movement  should 
not  be  started  until  an  expedition  from  Vicksburg,  in  aid  of 
General  Canby,  which  had  been  ordered,  had  been  three  or 
four  days  out.1 

General  Thomas  answered  this  dispatch  the  same  day, 
saying : 

"I  can  send  on  the  expedition  you  propose  about  10,000 
men.  They  are  fully  equipped  now,  with  a  battery  to  each 
division  composed  of  four  guns,  six  caissons,  and  each  car 
riage  drawn  by  eight  horses.  I  wrill  have  the  command  in 
readiness  to  move  promptly  on  receiving  orders.2 

General  Grant  at  once  telegraphed  to  General  Thomas 
that  the  expedition  might  start  as  soon  after  February  20th 
as  it  could  get  off.  Orders  for  the  expedition  were  at  once 
sent  to  General  Wilson,  and  on  the  20th  General  Thomas 
went  to  Eastport  to  hurry  it  up.3 

The  Stoneman  expedition  was  very  slow  in  getting 
started,  very  much  to  General  Grant's  disappointment,  and 
on  February  2?th,  he  telegraphed  General  Thomas  saying  that 
as  General  Stoneman  was  so  late  in  starting  on  his  contem 
plated  expedition,  and  as  General  Sherman  had  passed  out  of 
the  state  of  South  Carolina,  his  course  had  better  be  changed. 
He  further  said : 

"It  is  not  impossible  that  in  the  event  of  the  enemy  being 
driven  out  of  Richmond  they  may  fall  back  to  Lynchburg  with 
a  part  of  their  force  and  attempt  to  raid  into  East  Tennes 
see.  It  will  be  better,  therefore,  to  keep  Stoneman  between 
our  garrison  in  East  Tennessee. and  the  enmy.  Direct  him 

1     W.  R.  R.  103-708.  :;     W.  R.  R.  Id3-74(i. 

•2     \V.   R.  R.   103-701*. 


700  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

to  repeat  his  raid  of  last  fall,  destroying  railroads  as  far 
toward  Lynchburg  as  he  can.  Sheridan  starts  today  from 
Winchester  for  Lynchburg.  This  will  vastly  favor  Stoneman. 
Every  effort  should  be  made  to  collect  all  the  surplus  forage 
and  provisions  of  East  Tennessee  at  Knoxville,  and  to  get 
there  a  large  amount  of  stores  besides.  It  is  not  impossible 
that  we  may  have  to  use  a  very  considerable  force  in  that 
section  the  coming  spring.  Preparations  should  at  once  be 
made  to  meet  such  contingency."1 

It  will  be  remembered  that  General  Grant  in  the  winter 
of  1863-4  expressed  the  opinion  that  perhaps  the  last  great 
battle  of  the  war  would  be  fought  in  East  Tennessee.  (See 
page  -  -  ante.) 

To  General  Grant's  last  above  quoted  dispatch  General 
Thomas  answered  the  same  day,  saying  he  was  sorry  that 
General  Stoneman  could  not  get  off  sooner,  but  that  he  had 
not  had  time  to  prepare  fully  and  said  further : 

"I  will  direct  him  (General  Stoneman)  to  throw  his  forces 
into  Southwestern  Virginia  as  you  direct;  and  in  anticipa 
tion  of  probable  operations  in  East  Tennessee  this  spring 
I  have  already  thrown  into  Knoxville  over  2,000,000  rations, 
and  have  given  orders  to  have  the  store  houses  filled  to  their 
full  capacity.  Orders  were  given,  some  weeks  since  to  ac 
cumulate  forage  at  Knoxville,  which  order  is  now  being  com 
plied  with  by  the  quartermaster's  department.  Unless  you 
wish  otherwise,  I  shall  send  General  Stanley's  entire  corps 
to  East  Tennessee  as  soon  as  a  sufficient  number  of  new 
regiments  report  to  enable  me  to  withdraw  it  from  Hunts- 
ville,  Ala.  I  shall  also  concentrate  the  surplus  of  new  regi 
ments  at  Chattanooga,  as  the  most  available  point  from  which 
to  reinforce  the  troops  in  East  Tennessee,  if  necessary."2  The 
next  day  General  Grant  telegraphed  to  General  Thomas,  saying: 
saying : 

"I  think  your  precaution  in  sending  the  Fourth  Corps  to 
Knoxville  a  good  one.  I  also  approve  of  sending  the  new 
troops  to  Chattanooga."3 

It  was  therefore  on  the  suggestion  of  General  Thomas, 
approved  by  General  Grant,  that  on  the  morning  of  March 
15,  as  before  stated,  we  received  orders  to  leave  our  pleasant 
camp  at  Huntville,  Ala.,  and  move  to  Knoxville,  Tenn. 

There  seems  to  have  been  in  the  minds  of  both  General 
Grant  and  General  Thomas  the  possible  escape  of  a  portion, 
or  all  of  Lee's  army  at  Richmond  and  Petersburg  to  Lynch- 

1  W.  R.  R.  1-3-777. 
•2  W.  R.  R.  103-778. 
3  W.  R.  R.  103-783. 


REST   AT   HUNTSVILLE   AND   MARCH   TO   EAST   TENNESSEE  701 

burg,  Va.,  and  thence  into  East  Tennessee,  and  the  Fourth 
Corps  was  ordered  to  Knoxville  to  provide  against  such 
contingency. 

It  is  presumed  that  it  was  not  General  Thomas'  intention 
to  order  the  Fourth  Corps  to  Knoxville  until  both  Generals 
Stoneman  and  Wilson  had  got  well  started  on  their  respective 
raids.  General  Wilson  intended  to  start  March  5th,  but  un 
precedented  rains  and  floods  delayed  him  and  he  did  not  get 
across  the  Tennessee  River  until  the  17th,  and  did  not  get 
started  until  the  20th.1  Singular  to  state,  General  Stoneman 
started  the  same  day.  These  raids  have  passed  into  history, 
the  former  being  one  of  the  most  brilliant  and  successful  of 
the  war.  Unfortunately  for  the  immediate  fame  of  General 
Wilson  and  his  command,  greater  events  nearer  home  were 
occurring  at  the  time,  which  absorbed  public  attention,  and 
he  and  his  gallant  troopers  did  not  then  receive  the  honor 
and  praise  which  they  so  nobly  earned. 

The  order  for  our  movement  was  issued  March  11,  and 
directed  General  Stanley  to  prepare  one  of  his  divisions  and 
start  it  to  Bull's  Gap,  as  soon  as  he  could  get  railroad  trans 
portation,  sending  the  division  wagons  and  ambulances  by 
the  common  roads  ;  the  other  divisions  to  follow  in  the  same 
manner.2  General  Stanley's  orders,  issued  the  same  day, 
directed  the  divisions  to  move  in  the  following  order :  First 
the  First  Division ;  second,  the  Third  Division,  and  third,  the 
Second  Division.3  The  order  of  march  of  ours,  the  Third 
Division,  which  was  dated  March  11,  was  :  First,  the  Second 
Brigade ;  second,  the  First  Brigade ;  third,  the  Third  Brigade. 
The  Second  Brigade  was  to  be  at  Huntsville  in  time  to  embark 
at  7  a.  m.  the  loth.  It  was  directed  in  the  order  that  the  trans 
portation  of  the  division  should  march  by  land  under  an  escort 
of  two  regiments — the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  and  Fourth  Michi 
gan,  both  under  command  of  Colonel  Hall  of  the  latter 
regiment.4 

Our  brigade  was  ready  to  move  at  an  hour's  notice,  but 
•owing  to  the  failure  of  an  orderly  to  deliver  the  order  we 
did  not  get  started  until  3  p.  m.  Our  regiment  led  the  brigade 
on  the  way  to  Huntsville.  Gleason  says:  "We  were  joined 
by  Captain  Cope  (then  acting  as  assistant  adjutant  general 
of  the  division)  and  learned  from  him  that  our  train  had  been 
waiting  for  us  four  hours.  Other  delays  occurred  and  the 
train  bearing  the  regiment  did  not  leave  the  station  until  near 
dark.5 


1  W.  R.  K.   104-10-17.  4     W.  R.  R.   103-916. 

2  W.  R.  R.  103-892.  5     (Ueason's  Diary. 
.3     W.  R.  R.   103-893. 


702  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

Next  morning,  March  16th,  upon  looking-  out  we  found 
our  train  standing  still  near  Lookout  Mountain,  whose  craggy 
point  rose  majestically  far  above  us.  A  landslide  from  the 
mountain  had  blocked  the  track  in  front  of  us  and  a  working 
party  was  slowly  removing  it.  A  very  heavy  rain  the  night 
before  caused  the  slide.  It  was  near  9  o'clock  before  our  train 
got  under  way  again. 

There  was  another  delay  of  several  hours  at  Chattanooga. 
This  gave  us  opportunity  to  renew  our  acquaintance  with  the 
veterans  of  the  Thirty-second  Indiana,  who,  when  the  non- 
veterans  of  the  regiment  were  mustered  out  during  the 
Atlanta  campaign,  had  been  sent  back  to  Chattanooga,  where 
they  still  were.  After  their  arrival  there,  by  order  of  General 
Thomas,  they  had  been  formed  into  four  companies,  aggre 
gating  nearly  400  men,  and  Lieutenant  Colonel  Hans  Blume 
was  placed  in  command.  They  afterwards  joined  the  brigade 
at  New  Orleans  and  were  with  us  during  our  campaign  in 
Texas.1  Colonel  Blume  insisted  on  entertaining  the  officers 
and  men  of  the  brigade  with  true  German  hospitality  .  At 
'3  p.  m.,  when  our  train  pulled  out,  he  sent  aboard  all  the  lager 
beer  that  he  could  have  carried  to  it,  together  with  several 
boxes  of  cigars.  In  honor  of  the  hospitable  colonel  the  band 
played  some  of  its  old  tunes  and  amid  music  and  cheers  we 
left  him,  bowing  and  waving  his  hat  as  the  train  pulled  out. 

We  made  fair  headway  until  we  reached  our  old  camp 
at  McDonald  Station,  when  a  pair  of  trucks  left  the  track  and 
caused  another  delay  of  several  hours.  It  was  after  dark  when 
we  passed  through  Cleveland,  and  all  settled  down  for  a  night's 
rest.2 

The  next  morning  we  were  at  Lenoir,  a  little  hamlet 
where  there  was  a  cotton  mill,  a  grist  mill,  one  good  dwelling 
house  and  several  dilapidated  cabins.  Our  engine  was  out 
of  water.  The  water  works  were  not  in  working  order  and 
the  water  had  to  be  carried  quite  a  distance.  We  were  here 
run  on  to  a  siding  and  had  to  wait  for  a  long  time  for  south 
bound  trains  to  pass  us.  During  the  wait  the  Eighty-ninth 
Illinois  got  up  a  game  of  ball  which  aided  in  relieving  the 
tedium.  We  finally  got  started  again,  but  met  with  other 
delays,  and  did  not  reach  Knoxville  until  after  dark.  There 
was  only  a  short  stop  there  and  we  moved  on  to  New  Market, 
which  we  learned  was  our  immediate  destination,  where  we 
arrived  some  time  after  midnight.  Next  morning  we  had  our 
breakfast  near  the  station,  where  we  had  disembarked  before 


1  Letter  of  Colonel  Frank  Erdelmeyer. 

2  Gleason's  Diary 


REST  AT  HUNTS VILLE  AND  MARCH  TO  EAST  TENNESSEE  703 

daylight,  and  then  moved  to  a  pleasant  spot  about  a  mile 
south  of  the  town  and  went  into  camp. 

As  March  19  was  Sunday,  many  of  our  men  went  into 
the  village  to  church.  The  house,  a  good  sized  wooden  build 
ing,  was  well  filled  by  soldiers,  with  a  sprinkling  of  citizens. 
Chaplain  Paulson  of  the  Eighth  Kansas,  officiated  and 
preached  a  patriotic  sermon.  Gleason  says  that  in  the  evening 
he  went  to  the  same  church  again  with  Colonel  McClenahan 
and  Surgeon  Clark ;  that  the  house  was  so  crowded  he  and 
Doctor  Clark  shared  the  pulpit  with  the  preacher,  our  own 
Chaplain,  and  pitched  the  tunes  for  the  singing.  That 
evening  Colonel  Askew  returned  from  the  north  and  many 
sought  his  tent  to  welcome  him  back.  He  had  come  from 
Louisville  in  company  with  General  Wood.  From  news  he 
brought  from  Ohio  and  elsewhere*  everything  seemed  to  be 
coming  our  way  and  portending  an  early  collapse  of  the 
rebellion.1 

March  20,  Gleason  notes  that  Captain  Bestow,  the  regular 
adjutant  general  of  the  division,  returned  to  duty,  thus 
relieving  Captain  Cope,  who  returned  and  took  command  of 
his  company.2 

On  the  21st  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio,  which  had  been  left 
behind  at  Huntsville  to  help  escort  the  transportation,  rejoined 
the  brigade.  There  were  rumors  regarding  General  Stone- 
man's  expedition,  but  nothing  more  definite  than  that  he  was 
moving  toward  Lynchburg,  Va.  There  was  a  thunderstorm 
during  the  night  and  after  it  the  weather  became  colder.  On 
the  22nd,  dispatches  were  published  saying  that  Sherman  was 
reported  to  have  reached  Goldsboro,  N.  C.,  and  that  Sheridan 
was  at  White  House,  near  Richmond.  Gold  was  quoted  at 
$1.57  and  cotton  at  55  cents.  There  was  dress  parade  in  the 
evening.  On  the  23rd,  our  camps  were  policed  and  very  much 
improved  under  orders  of  General  Wood.  The  weather  was 
cold  with  a  high  wind. 

March  24,  we  heard  that  Mobile  had  been  evacuated. 
Part  of  the  First  Division  passed  through  New  Market  and 
it  was  reported  that  we  would  move  as  soon  as  our  wagons 
came  up.  Saturday,  March  25,  Chaplain  Ross  received  an 
invitation  to  preach  next  day  at  a  church  some  distance  out 
in  the  country,  and  asked  Sugeon  Clark  and  Lieutenants 
Gardner  and  Gleason  to  accompany  him. 

Gleason  says  they  heard  there  was  to  be  a  singing  school 
in  the  morning  at  the  same  church  and  decided  to  attend  it. 
They  did  so  and  found  a  well  filled  house,  made  up  of  soldiers, 

1  and  2     (Reason's  Diary. 


704  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

principally  from  our  regiment,  and  citizens,  waiting  for  the 
teacher  who  had  not  then  arrived.  He  soon  came  and  after 
much  persuasion  got  the  thing  started.  As  is  the  custom  in 
country  singing  schools,  the  women  sang  the  tenor  part, 
screaming  at  the  top  of  their  voices,  while  the  men  sang  the 
soprano  or  air.  One  fine  appearing  young  lady,  said  to  be 
the  daughter  of  a  deceased  Union  officer,  made  quite  an  im 
pression  on  our  susceptible  lieutenant,  but  the  rest  of  the 
ladies  were  rather  plain  looking.1  Lieutenant  Armstrong 
returned  in  the  evening. 

March  27,  orders  came  to  ship  all  surplus  baggage  to 
Knoxville  for  storage.  There  was  the  usual  routine  of  daily 
duty,  and  in  the  evening  some  of  the  line  officers  took  the 
regimental  band  and  went  out  serenading  in  the  town  and 
returned  boozy.2 

March  28,  we  received  orders  to  be  ready  to  move  at  6 
o'clock  next  morning. 

The  morning  of  March  29,  at  6 :30  o'clock,  we  left  our 
pleasant  camp  at  New  Market  under  orders  to  march  to 
Rogersville.3  The  weather  was  fair  and  mild  and  the  road 
good,  and  we  made  rapid  progress.  The  pace  soon  began 
to  tell  on  the  recruits  of  the  Fourth  and  Fifth  Michigan,  then 
marching  with  our  brigade,  and  the  road  was  soon  lined  with 
stragglers  and  strewn  with  abandoned  clothing  and  other 
property.  We  soon  came  to  Mossy  Creek,  about  five  miles 
from  New  Market,  and  crossed  it,  using  both  railroad  and 
wagon  bridges.  After  a  good  long  rest  we  resumed  our  march 
and  after  going  about  seven  miles,  came  to  the  little  village 
of  Panther  Springs.  In  the  village  two  fine  springs  gushed 
out  of  the  roadside,  the  waters  of  which  were  cold  and  pure. 
We  intended  stopping  over  night  at  these  springs,  but  learn 
ing  that  there  were  some  cases  of  smallpox  in  the  village, 
we  passed  through  it  and  encamped  in  a  large  open  field  about 
a  mile  beyond  the  place.  On  turning  in  that  night  we  re 
ceived  orders  to  march  at  5  :30  next  morning.  It  rained  all 
night,  and  next  morning  we  had  wet  tents  to  pack.  Soon 
after  we  started  it  began  to  rain  again  and  the  marching  was 
difficult  and  disagreeable.  After  marching  about  three  miles 
we  came  to  Morristown.  a  hamlet  of  three  or  four  brick  houses 
and  a  score  or  more  tumble-down  Avooden  buildings.  At  11 
a.  m.  we  reached  Russellville,  a  village  with  but  a  single 
street,  in  the  center  of  which  a  stream  of  water  ran.  The 
inhabitants,  with  a  few  exceptions,  were  of  the  poorest  class. 
We  passed  through  the  village,  encamped  about  a  mile  beyond 

1  and  2     Gleason's  Diary. 
3     W.   R.  R.  104-108-109. 


REST  AT   HUNTSVILLE   AND   MARCH   TO   EAST    TENNESSEE  705 

and  proceeded  to  make  ourselves  comfortable.  That  evening, 
as  night  closed  down  about  us,  we  heard  Colonel  McClenahan, 
Surgeon  Clark  and  the  Gleason  boys  singing  in  the  adjutant's 
tent.  Orders  came  to  march  next  morning  at  6  :30  o'clock. 

March  31,  reveille  sounded  at  4:30  a.  m.,  and  at  the  time 
ordered  we  moved  out,  our  brigade  being  in  the  advance. 
Shortly  after  we  started  General  Wood  rode  by  and  spoke 
cheerily,  saying  we  would  have  only  a  short  pull  today.1  The 
road  was  muddy  and  many  of  the  men  took  the  railroad  track, 
which  ran  near  the  road.  We  reached  Bull's  Gap  about  10 
o'clock,  having  marched  about  ten  miles,  and  went  into  camp 
on  a  green  hillside  to  the  right  of  the  road. 

We  remained  in  camp  at  Bull's  Gap  April  1,  2  and  3.  On 
the  night  of  the  2nd  we  were  awakened  by  hearing  a  number 
of  shots,  and  someone  crying  out  as  though  hurt.  As  it  was 
outside  our  regimental  camp,  we  did  not  take  the  trouble  to 
learn  the  cause  of  it.  Next  morning  at  breakfast  wre  learned 
that  a  party  had  attempted  to  steal  some  of  the  horses  at 
division  headquarters,  had  been  fired  at  and  had  returned  the 
fire,  wounding  the  guard  in  arm  and  leg.  At  daylight  a 
bloody  trail  was  followed  from  our  camp  across  a  small  creek 
to  a  clump  of  bushes  on  a  hillside,  wrhere  a  wounded  Con 
federate  officer  lay  shot  through  the  thigh.  A  party  of  rebels 
had  entered  our  lines  in  search  of  horses  and  had  made  a  raid 
on  General  Wood's  stables.  In  their  retreat  one  of  the  party 
had,  by  mistake,  fired  on  and  Avounded  their  officer,  a  Lieu 
tenant  Carter  of  the  Second  Tennessee  Confderate  Cavalry.  His 
papers  were  found  in  the  ground  beneath  him,  where  he  had  buried 
them,  and  were  signed  by  Confederate  General  Vaughan. 
They  authorized  him  to  collect  horses  for  the  Confederate 
service.  He  claimed  to  have  deserted,  but  his  story  was  not 
believed.2  A  dispatch  announced  the  occupation  of  Raleigh, 
N.  C.,  by  General  Sherman's  army  on  April  3.  Doctor  Joshua 
B.  Young  of  Hardin  county,  Ohio,  who  had  been  appointed 
assistant  surgeon  of  the  regiment,  appeared  and  entered  upon 
his  duties. 

In  the  afternoon  General  Stanley  sent  word  that  General 
Thomas  had  received  a  dispatch  from  Secretary  Stanton, 
dated  April  3,  10  a.  m.,  saying  that  Petersburg  had  been 
evacuated  and  that  General  Weitzel's  forces  had  entered 
Richmond,  having  taken  it  at  8:15  that  morning.3  At  the 
same  time  General  Thomas  reported  the  successful  advance 
of  General  Stoneman's  and  General  Wilson's  expeditions.4 

1  and  2     Gleason's  Diary. 

3  W.  R.  R.   104-197. 

4  W.  R.  R.   104-198. 


706  FlFlKKNTJI    OlllO    VOLUKTEEKS    A  .\  O    C.\  M  I' .\\(,  \^ 

General  Wilson  had  reported  the  capture  of  Selma,  Ala.,  on 
April  2,  with  all  its  guns  and  many  prisoners.1  These  reports 
having  come  from  official  sources  were  regarded  as  reliable 
and  seemed  almost  too  good  to  be  true.  In  the  afternoon  a 
salute  of  100  guns  was  fired  by  the  artillery  brigade  at  corps 
headquarters.  In  the  evening  a  barrel  of  ale  was  on  tap  at 
division  headquarters,  and  there  was  great  rejoicing.  Upon 
receipt  of  Secretary  Stanton's  dispatch,  General  Thomas  at 
once  telegraphed  to  General  Stanley  that  General  Lee  might 
try  to  escape  by  wray  of  East  Tennessee,2  and  amidst  the  gen 
eral  hub-bub  there  came  an  order  to  march  to  Greenville, 
starting  at  ?  o'clock  next  morning.  The  great  rebellion 
seemed  to  be  crumbling,  and  it  looked  as  if  we  might  be  in 
position  to  take  part  in  the  final  struggle  for  its  overthrow. 
It  was  evidently  with  that  in  view  that  we  were  marching;  for 
before  starting  we  were  ordered  to  replenish  our  supply  of 
ammunition. 

The  morning  of  April  4,  reveille  sounded  about  4 
o'clock.  We  got  our  breakfasts,  struck  tents,  laid  in  a  fresh 
supply  of  ammunition  and  moved  out  at  7  o'clock.  After 
passing  through  the  gap  the  road  was  good  and  we  made 
good  time.  We  passed  the  other  divisions  of  the  corps,  which 
were  encamped  along  the  road.  They  had  constructed  com 
fortable  quarters,  evidently  thinking  they  would  remain  for 
some  time.  The  Second  Division  was  at  a  little  place  called  Blue 
Springs,  where  AVC  struck  the  railroad.  A  little  further  on  was 
the  artillery  brigade.  We  passed  Major  Goodspeed's  head 
quarters  and  saw  the  major  himself,  looking  as  natural  as 
when  his  battery  wras  attached  to  our  brigade.  Wre  halted  an 
hour  for  dinner  and  then  passed  on  with  renewed  strength. 
Half  an  hour  before  sunset  we  came  to  a  pleasant  spot  one- 
half  mile  from  Greenville,  where  we  went  into  camp  for  the 
night.  Immediately  in  front  of  our  camp,  apparently  about 
ten  miles  away,  towered  the  great  Smoky  Mountains — well 
named,  we  thought.  We  had  been  cheered  on  our  long  march 
by  the  reflection  that  the  war  was  soon  to  end.  That  night 
we  were  further  cheered  by  a  report  that  General  Grant  had 
cut  off  General  Lee's  line  of  retreat.  Major  Joseph  N. 
Dubois  was  temporarily  detailed  as  division  picket  officer. 

The  morning  of  the  5th  of  April  the  Third  Brigade  of 
our  division  was  ordered  to  march  to  Jonesboro  and  we 
occupied  their  camp.  The  Forty-ninth  Ohio  was  detailed  as 
provost  guard  and  took  up  quarters  in  the  center  of  the  town. 
We  had  time  to  look  about  the  place  during  the  day  and  found 

1  W.  R.  R.  104-188. 

2  W.  R.  R.  104-199. 


REST   AT   HUNTSVILLE  AND   MARCH   TO   EAST    TENNESSEE  707 

it  rather  unattractive.  Its  chief  distinction  was  that  it  was 
the  home  of  Vice  President  Andrew  Johnson  His  house  and 
the  tailor  shop  where  he  worked  at  his  trade  were  pointed  out. 
We  also  visited  the  house  of  Mrs.  Williams,  where  General 
John  Morgan  was  killed  and  captured,  and  noted  the  spot 
at  the  foot  of  a  grape  arbor  where  he  was  shot  while  trying 
to  escape. 

Gleason  notes  in  his  diary  that  on  April  6,  Captain  Cope 
was  detailed  as  acting  assistant  adjutant  general  of  the 
brigade,  that  General  Stanley  removed  his  headquarters  to 
the  town,  and  that  commissions  as  captain  came  for  First 
Lieutenants  David  Weh  and  John  W.  Wilson,  and  a  commis 
sion  as  first  lieutenant  for  Franklin  Armstrong.1  That 
evening  the  singers  met  in  the  adjutant's  tent  and  sang  their 
usual  repertoire  of  songs. 

April  ?th,  the  weather  was  cloudy  and  cold,  with  light 
rain  and  the  men,  as  a  rule,  kept  their  tents.  In  the  afternoon 
General  Stanley  published  a  dispatch  Secretary  Stanton  had 
sent  at  JO  o'clock  that  morning  to  General  Thomas,  saying: 

"General  Sheridan  attacked  and  routed  Lee's  army  yes 
terday,  capturing  Generals  Ewell,  Kershaw,  Barton,  Corse 
and  many  other  general  officers,  several  thousand  prisoners 
and  a  large  number  of  cannon,  and  expects  to  force  Lee  to 
surrender  all  that  is  left  of  his  army."2 

Gleason  says :  "This  was  the  best  news  yet  and  called 
forth  cheers  both  loud  and  long.  General  Thomas  acknowl 
edged  Secretary  Stanton's  above  dispatch,  saying" : 

"I  heartily  rejoice  to  learn  of  General  Sheridan's  victory 
yesterday  over  Lee's  army.  I  am  pushing  forward  a  strong 
force  along  the  Tennessee  and  Virginia  Railroad,  and  pre 
pared  to  meet  any  force  of  the  enemy  coming  in  this 
direction."3 

Gleason  reports  in  his  diary  that  on  the  evening  of  the 
7th  he  detailed  Company  C,  Lieutenant  Gass,  and  Company 
F,  Lieutenant  Gieger,  to  go  out  with  a  telegraph  corps  next 
morning  with  five  days'  rations  to  aid  in  repairing  the  railroad 
telegraph  lines.  The  writer  recalls  distinctly  that  he  was  in 
command  of  a  similar  detail  about  this  time  and  took  part 
in  the  delightful  work  of  cutting  poles  for  repairing  the  tele 
graph  lines. 

There  was  no  noteworthy  incident  on  the  8th  of  April, 
and  none  on  Sunday,  the  9th,  except  that  a  heavy  picket 
detail  was  called  for.4 


1  Gleason's  Diary. 

2  ami  3     W.  R.  R.  104-259. 
4     Gleason's  Diary. 


708  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

On  the  10th,  we  received  news  of  Lee's  surrender  on 
April  9,  on  terms  proposed  by  General  Grant.  The  news 
came  in  a  dispatch  from  Danville,  Ky.  Gleason  and  Quarter 
master  Welker  were  at  the  railroad  station  in  the  town  when 
a  soldier  handed  them  a  printed  dispatch  giving-  them  the 
terms  of  the  surrender.1  The  artillery  brigade  moved  up 
from  the  Blue  Springs  this  day,  camping  between  us  and  the 
picket  line. 

A  little  before  midnight  a  staff  officer  galloped  up  to 
regimental  headquarters  with  orders  to  the  colonel  to  call 
the  regiment  out  at  once,  as  there  was  fighting  going  on  three 
or  four  miles  distant.  We  could  distinctly  hear  musketry 
firing  in  a  westerly  direction.  The  regiment  was  quickly 
formed  and  the  colonel  rode  to  brigade  headquarters  to  learn 
what  it  all  meant.  After  the  men  had  stood  at  arms  in  line 
for  an  hour,  they  were  dismissed.  At  headquarters  it  was 
guessed  that  the  'firing  was  the  result  of  a  general  jollification 
at  Blue  Springs  over  the  news  of  Lee's  surrender.  The  guess 
was  confirmed  next  day.  On  the  llth,  quite  a  number  of 
deserters  from  the  rebel  armies  in  the  northeast  came  in  and 
gave  themselves  up.  On  the  12th,  dispatches  came  reporting 
the  capture  of  Confederate  Generals  Forrest  and  Roddey  by 
General  Wilson  at  Selma,  Ala.,  and  on  the  13th,  fuller  reports 
stated  that  Selma  and  Montgomery,  Ala.,  and  the  commands 
of  both  Generals  Forrest  and  Roddey  had  been  captured. 

On  the  13th,  General  Stanley  issued  the  following  order: 

"Head  Quarters  Fourth  Army  Corps, 
Greenville,   East   Term., 
April   13,   1865. 
"General  Orders  No.  4. 

The  glorious  success  of  the  national  arms  under  Lieutenant  General 
U.  S.  Grant,  being  no  longer  a  matter  of  any  doubt,  the  army  under 
his  command  having  killed,  wounded,  captured  and  forced  the  cap 
itulation  of  the  entire  principal  army  of  the  rebels,  including  their 
commander  in  chief,  to-morrow,  which  is  the  day  appointed  for  the 
raising  of  the  old  flag  over  Fort  Sumter,  where  it  was  first  pulled 
down  and  insulted  by  insolent  traitors,  will  be  kept  as  a  holiday  and 
a  day  of  thanks-giving  in  this  corps.  A  salute  of  100  guns  will  be 
fired  at  12  m.,  under  the  direction  of  Major  Goodspeed,  Chief  of  Artil 
lery.  All  military  duty,  excepting  necessary  police  and  guard  duty 
will  be  suspended.  It  is  recommended  that  Chaplains  of  regiments 
hold  services  in  their  respective  places  of  worship,  to  render  thanks  to 
Almighty  God  for  His  goodness  and  mercy  in  preserving  us  a  nation, 
and  giving  us  this  great  victory  over  our  enemies.  Let  us  in  our 
thankfulness  remember  in  tears  the  many  brave  men  who  have  fallen 
at  our  sides  in  this  great  and  terrible  war.  Who  among  us  has  not 
lost  a  brother,  a  relative  or  a  dear  comrade?  Let  us  reflect,  and  we 


1     Gleason's  Diarv. 


REST   AT   HUNTSVILLE   AND   MARCH    TO    EAST    TENNESSEE  709 

may  profit  by  so  doing,  that  great  national,  as  well  as  personal  sin, 
must  be  atoned  for  by  great  punishment." 

By  command  of  Maj.  Gen.  D.  S.  Stanley. 
Win.  H.  Sinclair, 
Assistant  Adjutant  General.1 

April  14,  was  propitious  for  our  celebration.  The 
weather  was  ideal — there  was  a  clear  sky  and  balmy  winds. 
The  services  in  our  brigade  were  well  attended,  and  our  good 
Chaplain  Ross  and  Chaplain  Paulson  of  the  Eighth  Kansas, 
delivered  feeling  and  patriotic  addresses,  expressing  devout 
thankfulness  for  the  near  conclusion  of  the  bloody  and  fra 
tricidal  war.  Shortly  after  the  sermon  a  salute  of  100  guns 
was  fired  from  the  hill  back  of  our  camp,  and  the  shots 
reverberated  from  hill  to  hill  as  far  away  as  the  great  Smoky 
Mountains.  The  bands  all  played  and  there  was  a  general 
jubilee.  An  interesting  incident  of  the  day  \vas  an  equestrian 
parade,  or  procession,  made  up  of  a  number  of  our  dashing 
staff  officers  and  an  equal  number  of  the  fair  women  of 
Greenville.2  There  was  a  public  meeting  at  the  Presbyterian 
church  in  the  evening  to  give  the  citizens  an  opportunity  to 
express  their  feelings.  Our  regimental  band  was  present  to 
enliven  the  occasion  with  appropriate  music  and  a  Mr.  Britton 
made  a  genuine  Tennessee  oration,  which  was  loudly  ap 
plauded.  Many  of  the  houses  in  the  village  were  illuminated 
and  a  display  of  fireworks  closed  the  public  exercises  of  the 
day. 

In  the  midst  of  our  rejoicing  we  did  not  know  that  the 
culminating  crime  of  the  great  rebellion  was  being  enacted 
at  Washington,  and  that  our  beloved  President,  Abraham 
Lincoln,  had  been  slain  by  a  Confederate  assassin. 

The  morning  of  April  15,  we  were  engaged  in  our  regu 
lar  duties.  A  dispatch  was  sent  around  stating  that  Jeff 
Davis  had  applied  to  General  Grant  for  permission  to  leave 
the  country  and  that  General  Grant  had  informed  him  that 
his  (Grant's)  business  was  to  fight  the  rebellion,  not  to  answer 
such  questions.  It  was  also  stated  that  General  Joe  John? ton 
had  retreated  in  the  direction  of  Charlotte,  N.  C,  and  that 
General  Sherman  w^as  hot  after  him.  We  were  not  prepared 
for  the  next  dispatch,  which  came  from  our  Major  Dubois, 
and  said  that  General  Thomas  had  just  telegraphed  General 
Stanley  that  Lincoln  and  Seward  had  been  assassinated  the 
day  before.  The  news  rapidly  passed  from  lip  to  lip  and  the 
deepest  gloom  succeeded  the  joyfulness  of  the  day  before. 
In  the  evening  the  hope  was  expressed  that  perhaps  the  report 

1     W.  R.  R.  104-343. 
"1     Gleason's  Diary. 


710  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

was  not  wholly  true,  as  no  confirmation  of  it  had  been 
received.  That  night  Doctor  Clark  received  a  twenty  days' 
leave  of  absence,  and  there  were  rumors  that  our  command 
would  soon  receive  orders  to  move.1 

On  Sunday,  April  16,  there  were  services  in  all  the 
churches,  morning  and  evening,  and  at  the  morning  services 
a  dispatch  giving  the  particulars  of  President  Lincoln's  assas 
sination  was  read  from  the  pulpits.  At  the  evening  services 
many  ladies  escorted  by  Union  officers,  attended.2 

April  17,  the  camp  was  full  of  rumors  regarding  our  future 
movements,  but  there  was  a  dearth  of  reliable  news.  That 
day,  unknown  to  us  at  the  time,  General  Grant  telegraphed  to 
General  Thomas  saying  that  owing  to  the  freedom  of  Vir 
ginia  from  any  armed  forces  of  the  enemy,  it  was  unnecessary 
to  longer  occupy  East  Tennessee  with  a  large  force,  and  that 
the  Fourth  Corps  might  be  withdrawn  to  Nashville  immedi 
ately.3  This  dispatch  General  Thomas  answered,  saying*  he 
would  at  once  make  arrangements  for  removal  of  the  Fourth 
Corps  to  the  vicinity  of  Nashville.*  The  same  day  he  sent 
orders  to  General  Stanley  to  move  the  Fourth  Corps  to  Nash 
ville  by  rail,  shipping  one  brigade  at  a  time,  and  added :  "Use 
dispatch,  but  do  not  hurry."5  On  receipt  of  this  order  General 
Stanley  telegraphed  from  Knoxville :  "The  troops  will  be 
marched  to  Rogersville  Junction  to  take  the  cars.  If  the 
roads  improve  I  will  march  the  artillery  to  Knoxville,  and 
time  may  be  gained  possibly  by  marching  the  troops  here."6 

On  the  18th  it  was  reported  in  our  camp  that  the  First  Divi 
sion  had  been  ordered  to  Nashville  by  rail,  that  our  division  was 
soon  to  follow,  or  to  march  to  Louisville,  and  that  the  Fourth 
Corps  was  to  go  to  Texas  to  end  the  war  in  that  part  of  the 
country.7  The  order  for  the  movement  of  the  Fourth  Corps  to 
Nashville  was  issued  on  that  day  and  directed  the  embarkation  of 
the  entire  corps  at  Rogersville  Junction,  the  divisions  to  move  in 
the  order  of  their  respective  numbers, — the  First  Division  first— 
and  to  embark  on  the  cars  a  brigade  at  a  time.8 

On  the  19th  at  8  a.  m.,  the  artillery  brigade  broke  camp  and 
moved  out  towards  Knoxville  where  it  was  said  it  would  take 
cars  for  Nashville.  Not  long  afterwards,  a  flag  of  truce  was 
seen  approaching,  followed  by  about  seventy  Confederates,  nearly 
all  mounted  but  unarmed.  They  reported  themselves  as  belong 
ing  to  General  Vaughan's  command  which  had  been  disbanded, 
a  part  of  it  going  south  to  join  General  Johnston  and  the  rest 

1     and  *     Glei'sop's  D'ar-.  <>     W.  R.  R.  104-37.-). 

3     and  4     W.  R.  R.  104-37.'..  7     Gleason's  Diary. 

5     W.  R.  R.  104-378.  S     W.  R.  R.   104-393. 


REST   AT    HUNTSVILLE    AND   MARCH   TO   EAST    TENNESSEE  711 

having  been  ordered  to  go  to  their  homes  and  behave  as  quiet 
citizens.  They  seemed  glad  to  seek  the  protection  of  the  old  flag. 
Following  them  came  a  battalion  of  contrabands,  which  the  Con 
federacy  had  organized  to  fight  against  us  but  had  not  yet  armed. 

That  evening  Colonel  Askew  was  ordered  to  furnish  a  detail 
from  our  regiment  to  start  next  morning  to  Jonesboro  as  guard 
to  the  supply  train  there  and  back.  That  night  several  horses 
were  stolen  and  among  them  the  adjutant's.  That  officer  re 
covered  his  horse  next  day  out  in  the  country  about  two  miles 
from  town.  A  handsome  young  woman  was  riding  it  on  her 
way  home  from  a  funeral.  The  thief  had  loaned  it  to  her.  She 
was  much  embarrassed  to  be  found  riding  a  stolen  horse,  but  not 
more  so  than  Gleason.  Of  course,  she  did  not  know  the  horse 
had  been  stolen,  and  said  so.  After  mutual  explanations,  she 
laughingly  said  she  had  had  a  jolly  good  ride,  and  turned  the 
horse  over  to  the  blushing  adjutant. 

On  the  evening  of  April  20,  the  officers  gave  a  reception  at 
brigade  headquarters  to  which  the  ladies  of  Greenville,  who  had 
entertained  them  so  hospitably,  were  invited.  The  regimental 
colors  of  the  regiments  in  the  brigade  had  been  borrowed  for  the 
occasion.  Some  hot-headed  men  of  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  conceived 
the  notion  that  this  use  of  the  colors  was  a  desecration,  and  get 
ting  together  a  crowd  went  to  brigade  headquarters  and  loudly 
demanded  them.  They  became  so  boisterous  that  Captain  Cope, 
adjutant  general  of  the  brigade,  sent  word  to  Colonel  Askew 
asking  that  he  send  Adjutant  Gleason  to  take  charge  of  and  re 
turn  them  to  regimental  headquarters.  Colonel  Askew  directed 
the  adjutant  to  call  on  Colonel  Hotchkiss,  who  was  then  com 
manding  the  brigade,  and  say  that  it  was  his  (Askew's)  wish 
that  the  colors  should  remain  at  brigade  headquarters  during  the 
reception.  Colonel  Hotchkiss,  however,  to  quiet  the  mob,  sent 
them  by  one  of  his  staff  to  regimental  headquarters  and  thus 
ended  a  disgraceful  episode.1  It  was  understood  that  the  notion 
that  the  flag  was  being  desecrated  was  only  used  as  a  pretext  for 
raising  a  disturbance. 

April  21,  quite  a  large  body  of  Confederates  came  in  under 
guard  from  the  direction  of  Jonesboro  and  our  men  gathered  at 
the  road  side  to  see  them  pass.  They  did  not  seem  at  all  cast 
down  over  the  collapse  of  the  rebellion.  The  brigade  received 
orders  to  march  next  morning  at  5  o'clock,  our  regiment  being 
designated  to  escort  the  trains  to  Bull's  Gap.  Colonel  Askew  who 
had  been  ill  for  a  few  days  was  worse  and  it  was  thought  best 
for  him  to  remain  at  a  private  house  in  Greenville  for  a  short 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


712  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

time,  and  when  well  enough,  to  rejoin  the  regiment  by  rail.  It 
was  rumored  that  our  regiment  was  to  guard  the  wagon  trains 
to  Knoxville,  while  the  rest  of  the  division  should  go  by  railroad. 

April  22  was  cloudy  and  cool.  The  bugler  sounded  reveille 
at  4  a.  m.  and  then  the  band  played.  Playing  by  the  band  im 
mediately  after  reveille  had  been  the  orders  ever  since  we  were 
at  New  Market.  The  order  was  issued  to  secure  prompt  falling  in 
line  for  roll  call.  It  was  provided  in  the  order  that  company  com 
manders,  under  severe  penalties,  should  see  that  all  the  men  of 
their  respective  companies  were  in  line  ready  to  answer  to  their 
names  by  the  time  the  band  had  finished  playing,  and  the  officer 
of  the  day  was  directed  to  enforce  the  order.  One  morning 
reveille  sounded  as  usual,  and  as  soon  as  it  was  ended  the  band 
commenced  to  play.  The  officer  of  the  day  was  Captain  Lucius 
O.  Doolittle.  The  piece  of  music  the  band  played  that  morning 
was  unusually  short  and  two  or  three  men  of  Company  F  strag 
gled  into  line  after  the  band  had  ceased  playing,  Captain  Doo 
little,  who  was  near  by  at  once  placed  the  captain  of  the  company 
in  arrest,  ordered  him  to  report  to  regimental  headquarters  and 
surrender  up  his  sword.  That  officer,  who  prided  himself  on  his 
uniform  attention  to  duty,  proceeded  to  headquarters  quite  crest 
fallen,  and  handed  his  sword  to  the  colonel.  Colonel  Askew  de 
manded  to  know  the  cause  of  the  arrest  and  on  hearing  it  said, 
"The  d — n  fool !  Go  back  and  take  command  of  your  company." 
Doolittle  had  taken  this  opportunity  to  get  even  with  the  ar 
rested  officer  for  some  fancied  or  real  slight.  The  two  officers 
afterwards  laughed  over  the  incident  and  are  now  good  com 
rades  and  friends. 

We  did  not  get  started  on  our  march  to  Bull's  Gap  until  8 
o'clock  and  were  delayed  by  bad  places  in  the  road.  But  we 
made  the  eighteen  miles  in  fairly  good  time  and  went  into  our 
old  camp  on  the  hillside.  We  found  the  other  regiments  of  the 
brigade  occupying  their  old  camps.  In  the  evening  we  got  orders 
to  escort  the  wagon  train  to  Knoxville,  where  we  were  to  see 
that  all  the  transportation  of  the  division  was  loaded  on  the  cars 
and  then  take  trains  for  Nashville.  We  received  an  issue  of  ra 
tions  sufficient  to  last  us  until  we  reached  the  last  named  city.  It 
was  arranged  to  have  the  men  ride  a  part  of  the  time  in  the 
wagons,  so  as  to  make  the  march  as  easy  as  possible.1 

The  morning  of  April  23,  we  moved  out  with  our  trains 
at  7  o'clock  and  as  we  passed  General  Wood's  headquarters,  he 
announced  to  us  that  General  Joe  Johnston  had  surrendered  his 
army  to  General  Sherman,  which  brought  forth  a  great  cheer 

1     Gleuson's  Diary. 


REST  AT   HUNTSYILLE   AND   MARCH   TO   EAST    TENNESSEE  713 

from  the  men.1  We  reached  our  old  camp  near  Panther  Springs 
early  in  the  evening  and  encamped  for  the  night,  sending  out 
pickets  on  all  the  roads  leading  into  the  place. 

Next  morning,  April  24,  we  started  again  at  7  o'clock.  The 
weather  was  fine  and  we  made  good  progress.  We  halted  at 
New  Market  for  an  hour,  had  dinner,  and  then  pushed  on  five 
miles  to  Hodges  Creek  where  we  found  a  pleasant  camp  and  good 
water.  Some  of  our  lieutenants  stopped  at  New  Market,  to  call 
on  the  young  ladies  whose  acquaintance  they  had  made  while  we 
encamped  there.1 

Thursday,  April  25,  we  pulled  out  at  the  usual  time,  and 
reached  Strawberry  Plains  in  an  hour,  where  we  crossed  the 
Holston  River  on  the  long  railroad  bridge.  We  found  rougher 
roads  after  we  crossed  the  Holston.  The  country  was  poorer 
and  for  quite  a  distance  was  hilly  and  covered  with  rocks.  We 
crossed  a  number  of  fine  streams  and  at  one  of  them  halted  for 
dinner.  After  dinner  we  pushed  on  quite  rapidly  to  Knoxville, 
passed  through  it  and  encamped  near  Fort  Saunders,  pitching  our 
tents  just  in  front  of  some  of  Longstreet's  old  works.  We  had 
marched  twenty-one  miles,  and  as  soon  as  pickets  were  posted  we 
turned  in  for  the  night.  The  next  day,  the  26th,  Doctors  Clark 
and  Young  and  the  adjutant  went  fishing  in  the  Holston,  but  got 
nothing.  There  were  a  number  of  trot  lines  in  the  river,  and 
some  of  the  men  on  the  sly  pulled  in  some  of  them  and  got  a 
good  supply  of  fish.1  In  the  evening  we  heard  that  the  trans 
portation  of  the  Second  Division  was  nearly  all  aboard  the  cars 
and  it  was  said  we  would  begin  loading  ours  tomorrow.  On  the 
27th,  the  cars  for  our  transportation  not  being  ready  we  spent 
the  day  quietly  in  camp.  News  of  General  Sherman's  negotia 
tions  with  General  Joe  Johnston  reached  our  camp  and  occasioned 
much  surprise  and  comment.  In  the  evening  we  were  cheered 
by  hearing  Colonel  McClenahan,  Doctor  Clark  and  the  Gleasons 
again  singing  the  old  familiar  songs. 

On  the  28th,  the  weather  changed  and  became  showery  and 
cooler.  The  regiment  moved  camp  to  near  the  railroad  station 
and  we  began  loading  the  division  transportation  on  the  cars. 
During  the  afternoon  we  got  four  sections  loaded  and  ready  to 
move  out.  Companies  A,  F  and  D  were  to  go  with  them. 

On  the  29th,  we  completed  our  work  and  if  cars  for  our 
headquarters,  horses  and  baggage  could  have  been  secured,  would 
have  got  off  for  Chattanooga  on  the  regular  2  p.  m.  train.  But 
we  failed  to  get  them  until  11  p.  m.  and  by  that  time  the  larger 
part  of  the  regiment  was  on  its  way  to  Chattanooga,  leaving  the 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


714  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS    AND  CAMPAIGNS 

field  and  staff  behind.  During  the  morning-  a  dispatch  was  re 
ceived  announcing  General  Joe  Johnston's  surrender  on  the  same 
terms  as  had  been  given  to  General  Lee.  The  field  and  staff  and 
that  part  of  the  regiment  remaining  at  Knoxville  had  to  be  con 
tent  with  cars  in  which  stock  had  been  hauled.  After  cleaning 
them  out  a  little,  all  got  aboard  and  while  waiting  for  the  train 
to  start  curled  down  and  went  to  sleep. 

On  awaking  next  morning,  April  30,  instead  of  finding  the 
train  at  Chattanooga,  as  we  expected,  it  was  still  standing  on  the 
track  near  the  Knoxville  Station.  Some  unforseen  delay  had  oc 
curred  and  it  was  announced  that  we  would  move  out  at  7  a.  m. 
This  gave  time  to  make  coffee  and  get  breakfast  before  starting. 
We  pulled  out  on  time,  ours  being  the  second  section  of  the  train. 

As  we  rolled  and  jolted  along,  the  people  along  the  route 
waved  greetings  with  handkerchiefs  and  aprons  and  our  men  re 
sponded  with  cheers.  The  news  of  the  fall  of  the  rebellion  had 
evidently  reached  all  parts  of  the  country  and  every  one  was  re 
joicing  at  the  near  return  of  peace.  We  expected  to  stop  at  Chat 
tanooga,  where  some  of  the  regimental  officers  hoped  to  regale 
themselves  with  a  glass  or  two  of  beer,  but  our  stop  there  was 
but  for  a  moment,  and  they  were  woefully  disappointed.  We 
caught  glimpses  of  Old  Lookout  and  Missionary  Ridge  as  we 
passed  through,  but  our  thoughts  were  too  much  occupied  with 
the  present  to  even  try  to  recall  the  struggles  which  had  taken 
place  there  only  a  few  months  before  in  which  we  had  borne  an 
honorable  part.  It  was  to  be  years  before  some  of  us  would  again 
see  the  grand  old  mountain,  and  realize  how  grand  and  imposing 
a  theater  it  was  for  the  great  war  drama  there  enacted.  In 
October,  1914,  one  who  was  with  the  troops  then  on  their  way  to 
Nashville,  revisited  Chattanooga,  and  the  evening  of  the  day  be 
fore  he  left  saw  Lookout  Mountain  towering  in  serene  majesty 
over  the  peaceful  city  which  lies  at  its  foot.  A  new  moon  was 
seen  just  over  its  crest,  accompanied  by  a  bright  evening  star. 
It  was  a  scene  of  surprassing  beauty  and  grandeur,  and  wa> 
probably  his  last  view  of  the  historic  mountain. 

When  we  awoke  next  morning  we  were  at  Wartrace.  Be 
tween  that  place  and  Murfreesboro,  we  were  stopped  on  a  siding 
long  enough  to  get  breakfast,  and  then  moved  on  to  Nashville, 
whose  suburbs  at  Mill  Creek  we  reached  at  10  a.  m.  on  the  first 
day  of  May,  1865.  After  some  delay  the  regiment  marched  to 
our  brigade  camp,  which  had  been  established  about  three  miles 
from  our  point  of  debarkation,  near  the  Lebanon  pike. 


CHAPTER  XXXIII. 

Six  WEEKS  AT  NASHVILLE  AND  PREPARATIONS  FOR  A 
CAMPAIGN  IN  TEXAS. 

The  brigade  headquarters  had  preceded  the  arrival  of  our 
regiment  at  Nashville,  and  when  we  reached  camp  the  head 
quarters  tents  were  up  and  the  brigade  commander  and  his  staff 
had  had  time  to  clean  up  and  don  their  dress  uniforms.  Our 
regimental  headquarters  were  at  first  located  near  brigade  head 
quarters,  but  Colonel  Hotchkiss,  who  was  in  command  of  the 
brigade,  complained  that  they  crowded  him  too  closely  and  they 
were  removed  to  a  less  favorable  place.  Our  camp  was  near  the 
Lebanon  pike,  about  five  miles  from  Nashville  and  was  named 
Camp  Harker,  in  honor  of  General  Charles  Marker,  who  was 
killed  in  the  assault  on  Kenesaw  Mountain,  June  27,  1864.  Its 
location  was  good,  we  had  abundance  of  good  water  and  as  it  was 
partly  wooded  we  had  plenty  of  fuel.  The  weather  was  fine  and 
the  air  was  sweet  with  the  scent  of  May  blooms.  Any  one  who 
has  been  favored  with  even  a  short  stay  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Nashville  during  this  loveliest  of  the  months,  can,  to  some  extent 
at  least,  realize  the  pleasure  we  were  at  that  time  enjoying. 

As  some  of  the  officers  were  strolling  about  brigade  head 
quarters  they  noticed  a  party  of  ladies  and  gentlemen  driving 
into  the  woods  a  short  distance  from  our  camp  and  a 
platform  which  had  been  erected  for  dancing.  It  proved  to  be  a 
party  from  Nashville  bent  on  celebrating  May  Day  with  a  picnic 
and  dance.  The  spot  had  evidently  been  selected  before  it  was 
known  that  we  would  encamp  so  near.  Presently  a  committee  of 
gentlemen  came  to  where  the  officers  were  strolling  about  and 
invited  them  to  join  the  party. 

Those  who  accepted  the  invitation  were  well  pleased  that 
they  did  so,  for  they  made  many  agreeable  acquaintances,  whose 
genuine  friendliness  and  hospitality  made  the  days  spent  in  Camp 
Harker  one  of  the  most  pleasant  experiences  of  their  service. 
Through  these  acquaintances  they  soon  made  others  equally 
agreeable  and  there  was  a  constant  succession  of  picnics  and 
social  entertainments  during  the  entire  six  weeks  of  our  stay. 
Everything  seemed  propitious  for  a  period  of  unusual  social  en 
joyment.  The  war  was  over,  peace,  so  long  hoped  for  and  prayed 
for,  had  come,  and  the  consequent  joy  was  almost  universal. 
Confederate  officers  and  soldiers  who  had  served  with  Lee  and 
Johnston  were  returning  to  their  homes,  and  all  sectional  bitter- 


716  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

ness  seemed  to  have  entirely  disappeared.  Both  blue  and  gray 
uniforms  were  seen  at  the  picnics  and  dances  in  the  woods  and  at 
social  functions  in  the  city.  The  northerners  were  charmed  with 
the  frank  cordial  manners  of  the  fair  ones  of  Nashville,  and  it 
was  bruited  about  camp  that  more  than  one  young  Yankee  had 
lost  his  heart  to  a  fair  daughter  of  the  late  Confederacy.  One 
young  officer  who  was  paying  marked  attention  to  a  dark  eyed 
beauty  was  somewhat  disconcerted  when  her  older  sister  said, 
"Captain —  —I  would  give  my  little  sister  to  you  for  a 

sweetheart,  but  she  is  engaged  to  Mr.—  — ." 

Remembering  this  experience  at  Nashville  one  wonders  why, 
under  wise  leadership,  the  era  of  good  feeling  then  prevailing, 
could  not  have  been  continued,  and  the  bitterness  afterwards  re 
vived  with  added  intensity,  could  not  have  been  prevented. 

We  found  on  arrival  in  Camp  Harker  that  very  stringent 
regulations  were  to  govern  the  troops  while  near  Nashville.1 

On  Tuesday,  May  2,  we  were  busy  putting  our  camp  in 
order,  cleaning  the  streets,  straightening  up  our  lines  of  tents, 
etc.  We  received  orders  to  prepare  for  a  regimental  muster  next 
day  at  10  o'clock  a.  m. 

The  next  day,  Wednesday,  May  3,  the  muster  and  inspection 
took  place  and  we  received  orders  to  prepare  for  a  review  of  the 
Fourth  Corps  to  take  place  on  the  5th.  May  4,  an  order  came 
requiring  officers  to  wear  crape  as  insignia  of  mourning  for  our 
dead  President.  May  5,  the  Nashville  papers  announced  that  the 
review  had  been  postponed  until  Monday  the  8th.  Chaplain  Ross 
arrived  in  camp  and  reported  that  Colonel  Askew,  who  had  been 
left  behind  at  Greenville,  had  reached  Nashville,  and  was  waiting 
for  an  ambulance  to  bring  his  baggage  to  camp.  The  ambulance 
was  at  once  sent  and  in  the  afternoon  the  colonel  arrived,  looking 
as  well  as  ever,  thanks  to  the  good  people  of  Greenville,  who  had 
taken  care  of  him  in  his  illness.1  May  6,  a  party  made  up  of 
mounted  officers  of  the  three  brigades  went  to  the  Hermitage, 
taking  with  them  an  ambulance  to  carry  their  subsistence. 

On  Sunday,  May  ?,  our  chaplain  held  religious  services  in 
the  afternoon  and  in  the  evening  there  was  dress  parade.  After 
the  parade  the  companies  were  equalized  for  the  review  next  day. 
It  rained  steadily  all  night  and  continued  at  intervals  all  the  next 
day  and  the  review  was  therefore  postponed  until  9  a.  m.  the  fol 
lowing  day.  The  men  kept  their  tents  and  only  necessary  duties 
were  required  of  them. 

Tuesday,  May  9,  the  grand  review  of  the  corps  by  General 
Thomas,  to  which  we  had  been  looking  forward  for  a  week,  took 

1     (Reason's  Diary. 


Six  WEEKS  AT  NASHVILLE  717 

place.  The  morning  broke  bright  and  clear  and  everything  seemed 
auspicious  for  a  fine  day.  We  needed  little  time  for  prepara 
tion,  as  every  thing  was  in  readiness  the  day  before,  even  to  the 
equalizing  of  the  companies.  We  moved  out  a  little  before  8 
o'clock  and  after  an  easy  march  of  about  three  miles  came  to 
the  reviewing  ground,  which  was  south  of  the  city  and  between 
it  and  the  battle  ground  of  December  16,  1864.  The  First  and 
Second  Divisions  were  already  formed  with  their  long  rows  of 
wagons  immediately  in  tear  of  their  lines,  which  was  a  new  feat 
ure  on  such  occasions.  We  soon  found  our  place  in  the  line,  and 
were  surprised  that  there  was  not  the  usual  delay  in  starting  the 
ceremony.  Everything  moved  off  on  time  like  clock  work,  to 
the  great  relief  of  the  troops,  and  evidently  to  the  great  satis 
faction  of  the  large  crowd  of  spectators,  who  had  come  out  from 
the  city  to  witness  the  affair.  There  was  another  innovation,  all 
the  more  novel  because  evidently  impromptu.  As  the  general 
and  his  staff  passed  in  front  of  each  regiment  the  men  cheered, 
and  as  the  cheering  was  not  repressed  it  was  done  with  a  will. 
As  the  old  hero  rode  along  the  front  of  the  line  of  one  of  his 
favorite  corps  greeted  by  tumultuous  cheers,  which  he  evidently 
did  not  expect,  we  noticed  that  he  was  visibly  affected.  He  was 
taking  his  last  look  at  the  troops,  which  had  never  failed  him 
during  the  trying  period  from  Missionary  Ridge  to  the  present. 
Doubtless,  as  he  rode  along  he  recalled  Chickamauga,  Missionary 
Ridge,  the  Relief  of  Knoxville,  Rocky  Face,  Resaca,  New  Hope 
Church,  Kenesaw  Mountain  and  Atlanta,  and  the  crowning 
glories  of  Franklin  and  Nashville, — battles  in  which  those  troops 
had  never  faltered.  How  could  he  fail  to  be  touched  by  this 
demonstration  of  their  confidence  and  affection? 

Our  regiment  had  the  distinguished  honor  of  leading  the 
march  in  review.  We  were  on  the  extreme  right  of  brigade,  divi 
sion  and  corps.  Both  officers  and  men  felt  proud  of  this  dis 
tinction,  and  as  we  passed  by  the  reviewing  stand  we  kept  a  per 
fect  alignment  and  marched  as  we  had  never  marched  before  on 
such  an  occasion.  The  troops  following  us  caught  the  same  spirit, 
and  it  was  said  afterwards  that  there  had  never  been  a  finer  re 
view  in  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland.  After  the  review  was  over 
the  regiment  marched  back  to  camp  under  command  of  Lieu 
tenant  Colonel  McClenahan,  Colonel  Askew  having  been  invited 
to  dinner  in  the  city.  The  next  day  General  Thomas  in  general 
orders  expressed  his  admiration  for  the  conduct  of  the  Fourth 
Corps  at  the  review  and  complimented  officers  and  men  on  their 
fine  marching.1 

1     W.  R.  R.  104-699. 


718  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

May  10  we  were  occupied  with  the  usual  routine  of  camp 
duties.  In  the  evening  a  number  of  the  officers  and  men  went 
into  the  city  to  see  ''Our  American  Cousin,"  which  had  added 
interest  because  it  was  the  drama  which  was  being  played  at 
Ford's  Theater  at  Washington  when  the  great  world  tragedy, 
the  assassination  of  Abraham  Lincoln,  was  enacted.  May  11, 
was  cold  and  rainy  and  little  was  done.  Albert  Noe,  the  colonel's 
little  orderly,  left  for  home.  There  were  rumors  that  we  were 
to  be  mustered  out  and  Gleason  voiced  a  generally  prevailing 
feeling  when  he  noted  in  his  diary  that  "there  seemed  to  be  no 
good  reason  why  it  should  not  take  place,  as  the  war  was  now 
over." 

May  12,  an  order  came  to  report  the  names  of  all  the  men 
in  the  regiment  who  were  veterans  and  all  who  were  recruits. 
This  was  in  compliance  with  an  order  of  the  War  Department 
of  May  9,  1865,  directing  General  Thomas  to  cause  the  imme 
diate  muster  out  of  all  officers  and  soldiers  of  his  command 
whose  terms  of  service  would  expire  prior  to  May  31,  1865. 3 

May  13,  Captains  David  A.  Geiger,  J.  Alonzo  Gleason  and 
Vesper  Dorneck  were  detailed  as  members  of  a  Court  Martial 
convened  to  try  some  of  the  men  who  had  raised  the  disturb 
ance  at  Greenville  over  the  flags,  before  related.2 

May  14,  Gleason  reports  that  he  and  Lieutenant  Peter  T. 
Gardner  went  on  an  excursion  to  The  Hermitage,  and  quotes  in 
his  diary  the  inscription  on  the  tomb  of  Rachel  Jackson.  That 
evening  news  came  of  the  capture  of  Jefferson  Davis. 

May  15,  we  had  brigade  inspection  and  in  the  evening  some 
of  the  officers  went  into  the  city  to  see  the  "Bohemian  GirV" 
The  weather  had  become  clear  and  warm  and  was  almost  ideal. 
In  the  evening  our  old  friends,  the  singers,  met  in  one  of  the  head 
quarters  tents  and  made  music  for  those  who  could  not  go  into 
the  city. 

May  16,  we  learned  that  we  were  to  have  a  new  brigade 
commander  in  the  person  of  General  Charles  C.  Doolittle,  for 
merly  colonel  of  the  Eighteenth  Michigan.  It  was  reported  that 
Jefferson  Davis  was  expected  to  reach  Nashville  at  4  p.  m.  on  his 
way  north. 

It  appears  that  on  the  report  of  Davis'  capture  by  General 
Wilson,  General  Thomas  at  once  gave  orders  to  have  him  sent 
under  proper  guard  to  Nashville,  whence  he  was  to  be  forwarded 
to  Louisville  and  thence  by  boat  to  Parkersburgh,  W.  Va.  From 
that  point  he  was  to  be  sent  via  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad 
to  Washington.  Great  care  had  been  taken  by  General  Thomas 

1  W.  R.  R.  104-078. 

2  (Reason's  Diary. 


Six  WEEKS  AT  NASHVILLE  719 

to  provide  for  his  arrival  at  Atlanta,  Chattanooga,  Nashville  and 
Louisville,  and  he  had  reported  specifically  all  such  arrange 
ments  to  the  authorities  at  Washington.  A  steamboat,  the 
"Shamrock,"  on  which  he  was  to  be  taken  from  Louisville  to 
Parkersburgh,  had  been  selected,  and  an  officer  had  been  sent  up 
the  river  to  prepare  the  way.1  General  Thomas  did  not  hear 
from  General  Wilson  and  his  reports  to  Washington  were  not 
acknowledged.  He  kept  telegraphing  to  Atlanta  and  Chat 
tanooga,  asking  when  Davis  and  party  would  arrive  at  these 
points.2  In  the  mean  time  General  Wilson,  acting  under  im 
mediate  instructions  from  Secretary  Stanton,  both  probably  re 
garding  the  captives  as  political  prisoners,  was  sending  them  to 
Augusta,  Ga.,  whence  they  were  to  be  sent  by  boat  to  Savannah 
and  thence  by  the  naval  vessel  "Clyde"  to  Fortress  Monroe.3 
General  Thomas  did  not  know  that  the  disposition  of  Davis  and 
party  had  been  taken  out  of  his  hands  until  May  20,  and  must 
have  felt  deeply  humiliated  and  chagrined.  He  at  once  sent  to 
General  Grant  the  following  dispatch : 

"I  learn  by  telegraph  from  Resaca  that  General  Wilson  has 
sent  Jeff  Davis  by  way  of  Savannah  to  Washington.  He  first 
dispatched  to  me  that  he  was  ordered,  from  Washington  I  sup 
pose,  to  send  him  direct.  On  the  14th  upon  receiving  his  dis 
patch,  I  telegraphed  you  for  orders,  as  to  how  he  should  be  for 
warded,  but  received  no  answer.  On  the  loth  I  made  prepara 
tions  to  send  the  prisoner  by  steamer  under  a  strong  guard  to 
Parkersburgh,  W.  Va.,  and  thence  in  a  special  train  to  Wash 
ington,  and  telegraphed  to  you  what  preparations  I  had  made, 
and  asked  if  they  were  approved.  I  have  received  no  answer 
to  this  telegram,  I  am  consequently  led  to  the  conclusion  that 
General  Wilson  is  considered  no  longer  under  my  orders.  I 
would  be  glad  to  know  if  my  conjectures  are  correct."4 

The  only  answer  to  this  dispatch  made  by  General  Grant, 
was  as  follows : 

"No  orders  have  been  made  taking  Wilson  from  your  com 
mand.  At  the  time  of  receiving  your  dispatch,  relative  to  the 
disposition  you  had  ordered  for  Jeff  Davis,  I  thought  he  was 
coming  by  way  of  Savannah  and  let  the  matter  run  until  I  for 
got  to  answer  it."5 

One  reads  between  the  lines  that  Secretary  Stanton  had 
probably  taken  commarjd,  as  he  sometimes  did,  with  little  regard 
for  precedent,  and  less  regard  for  the  feelings  of  others. 

May  17,  the  weather  was  warm  and  showery  and  nothing 

1  W.  R.  R.   104-760-767-774.  4     W.  R.  R.   104-849 

2  W.  R.  R.  104-792.  r>     W.  R.  R.  104-858. 

3  W.  R.  R.   101-782-813. 


720  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

unusual  occurred  in  our  camp.  May  18,  General  Doolittle  ap 
peared  and  took  command  of  the  brigade,  and  Colonel  Hotchkiss 
resumed  command  of  his  regiment.  General  Doolittle  announced 
that  for  the  present,  at  least,  the  staff  would  be  retained.  In  the 
afternoon  he  called  a  meeting  of  the  regimental  commanders  of 
the  brigade  at  his  headquarters.  General  Doolittle  was  not 
known  by  the  officers  and  men  of  the  brigade,  and  his  coming 
was  not  looked  upon  with  any  great  favor.  But  his  personal 
appearance  and  his  quiet,  sincere  and  courteous  manners  dis 
armed  all  opposition,  and  he  was  soon  in  high  esteem.  On  the 
day  he  took  command  the  Cincinnati  papers  announced  that  our 
dear  old  brigade  commander,  General  Willich,  had  been  relieved 
as  post  commander  of  that  city  and  ordered  to  report  to  General 
Thomas.  This,  we  thought,  could  only  mean  that  he  was  com 
ing  back  to  take  command  of  his  old  brigade.  There  was  dress 
parade  in  the  evening,  at  which  the  adjutant  read  an  order  from 
Colonel  Askew  announcing  that  he  had  concluded  not  to  court- 
martial  the  men  who  were  guilty  of  riotous  conduct  at  Green 
ville.  He  believed  we  would  be  soon  mustered  out  of  service, 
and  it  would  be  a  bitter  reflection  that  at  the  close  of  their  serv 
ice  he  had  been  compelled  to  punish  men  who  had  previously 
conducted  themselves  as  soldiers  and  gentlemen.1  That  eve 
ning  we  heard  our  singers  singing  in  one  of  the  headquarters' 
tents. 

May  19  and  20,  there  was  nothing  unusual  to  report,  except 
that  on  the  19th  the  quartermaster  received  a  large  invoice  of 
clothing  and  camp  equippage,  which  looked  like  we  were  to  be 
refitted  for  another  campaign. 

Unknown  to  us  at  the  time,  May  17,  an  order  was  issued 
relieving  General  Sheridan  from  duty  in  the  east  and  assigning 
him  to  the  command  of  the  territory  west  of  the  Mississippi 
River.  2  Accompanying  the  order  was  a  letter  from  General 
Grant,  dated  the  same  day,  which  was  as  follows : 

"General :  Under  the  orders  relieving  you  from  the  com 
mand  of  the  Middle  Military  Division  and  assigning  you  to  com 
mand  west  of  the  Mississippi,  you  will  proceed  without  delay  to 
the  west  to  arrange  all  preliminaries  for  your  new  field  of 
duties.  Your  duty  is  to  restore  Texas  and  that  part  of  Louisi 
ana,  held  by  the  enemy,  to  the  Union  in  the  shortest  practicable 
time,  in  a  way  most  effectual  for  securing  premanent  peace.  To 
do  this  you  will  be  given  all  the  troops  that  can  be  spared  by 
General  Canby,  probably  twenty-five  thousand  men  of  all  arms, 
the  troops  with  Major  General  Reynolds  in  Arkansas,  say  twelve 

1  Gleason's  Diary. 

2  W.  R,  R.  104-825. 


Six  WEEKS  AT  NASHVILLE  721 

thousand,  Reynolds  to  command.  The  Fourth  Army  Corps,  now  at 
Nashville  awaiting  orders,  and  the  Twenty-fifth  Army  Corps,  now 
at  City  Point,  Virginia,  ready  to  embark.  I  do  not  wish  to  tram 
mel  you  with  instructions ;  I  will  state  however,  that  if  Smith1 
holds  out,  without  even  an  ostensible  government  to  receive 
orders  from  or  to  report  to,  he  and  his  men  are  not  entitled  to 
the  consideration  due  to  an  acknowledged  belligerent.  Theirs 
are  the  conditions  of  outlaws  making  war  against  the  only 
Government  having  an  existence  over  the  territory  where  war 
is  now  being  waged.  You  may  notify  the  rebel  commander  west 
of  the  Mississippi — holding  intercourse  with  him  in  person,  or 
through  such  officers  of  the  rank  of  major  general  as  you  may 
select — that  he  will  be  allowed  to  surrender  all  his  forces  on  the 
same  terms  as  were  accorded  to  Lee  and  Johnston.  If  he  ac 
cedes,  proceed  to  garrison  the  Red  River  as  high  up  as  Shreve- 
port,  the  seaport  at  Galveston,  Matagorda  Bay,  Corpus  Christi 
and  mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande.  Place  a  strong  force  on  the  Rio 
Grande,  holding  it  at  least  to  a  point  opposite  Camargo  and 
above  that  if  supplies  can  be  procured.  In  case  of  an  active 
campaign  (a  hostile  one)  I  think  a  heavy  force  should  be  put  on 
the  Gio  Grande  as  a  first  preliminary.  Troops  for  this  might  be 
started  at  once.  The  Twenty-fifth  Corps  is  now  available,  and 
to  it  should  be  added  a  force  of  white  troops,  say  those  now 
under  Major  General  Steele. 

To  be  clear  on  this  last  point  I  think  the  Rio  Grande  should 
be  strongly  held  whether  the  forces  in  Texas  surrender  or  not, 
and  that  no  time  should  be  lost  in  getting  the  troops  there.  If 
war  is  to  be  made  they  will  be  in  the  right  place,  if  Kirby  Smith 
surrenders,  they  will  be  on  the  line  which  is  to  be  strongly  gar 
risoned.  Should  any  forces  be  necessary,  other  than  those  des 
ignated,  they  can  be  had  by  calling  for  them  on  Army  Head 
quarters."2 

It  was  in  pursuance  of  the  foregoing  order  and  instructions 
that  on  May  19,  unknown  to  us  at  the  time,  General  Thomas 
was  ordered  to  hold  the  Fourth  Corps  subject  to  orders  of  Gen 
eral  Sheridan.3 

May  21,  there  was  no  unusual  incident  of  record.  On  the 
22nd,  there  was  regimental  drill,  at  which  General  Doolittle  was 
present,  and  in  the  evening  dress  parade.  May  23,  there  was  a 
rumor  that  General  Stanley  had  received  an  order  to  hold  the 
Fourth  Corps  in  readiness  to  move  on  short  notice,  and  as  the 
newspapers  announced  that  General  Sheridan  was  to  take  troops 

1  General  E.  Kirby  Smith  who  was  in  command  of  all  the  Confederate  armies  west 

of  the  Mississippi. 

2  Sheridan's  Memoirs,  Vol.  2-208. 

3  W.   1C.   R.   104-837. 


722  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

with  him  to  Texas,  some  thought  that  was  our  destination.1 
In  the  evening  our  band  serenaded  General  Doolittle.  May  24 
and  25,  we  had  the  usual  drill  and  dress  parade.  On  the  26th, 
our  old  comrade,  Captain  C.  W.  Carroll,  now  Lieutenant  Colonel 
of  the  One  Hundredth  and  Eighty-fourth  Ohio,  visited  our 
quarters  and  was  cordially  welcomed  by  his  old  comrades  and 
friends.  Orders  came  to  have  pay  rolls  made  out  immediately, 
to  include  our  service  to  April  30.  It  was  ordered  that  these 
rolls  should  not  include  the  men  whose  terms  expired  prior  to 
October  31,  1865.  These  were  to  be  mustered  out  of  service  and 
sent  to  their  respective  states  to  await  payment.  Captain  David 
A.  Geiger  of  ours  was  detailed  as  division  mustering  officer  to 
muster  them  out. 

On  the  27th,  Lieutenant  Colonel  Carroll  gave  the  men  of 
his  old  commands, — Companies  E  and  K — a  treat,  and  many  of 
them  became  both  boozy  and  boisterous.  A  great  many  of  the 
officers  went  to  the  races. 

May  28,  General  Willich  made  an  unexpected  visit  to  the 
camp.  He  had  arrived  that  day  at  Nashville,  reported  to  Gen 
eral  Stanley  for  assignment  to  duty,2  and  in  the  afternoon  ap 
peared  in  the  camp  of  his  old  brigade.  Gleason  says,  "As  he 
came  charging  up  to  one  regiment  after  another  of  his  old  bri 
gade,  on  his  big  gray  horse,  the  men  gathered  about  him  with 
cheers,  such  as  none  but  General  Willich  could  draw  forth.  His 
right  arm  was  still  disabled  by  the  wound  received  at  Resaca, 
but  he  said  he  could  do  the  brain  work  for  us,  and  that  when  he 
heard  we  were  to  go  to  Texas  he  could  not  stay  away."  His 
English  was  as  broken  as  ever  and  he  had  frequently  to  pause 
to  get  the  right  word  to  express  what  he  was  trying  to  say.  His 
call,  as  he  explained  was  "just  a  little  visit  to  the  boys,"  but  in  a 
day  or  two  he  expected  to  be  with  us  and  stay  with 
us  until  we  were  all  mustered  out  of  service.  May  29, 
there  was  a  meeting  in  the  chapel  tent  to  choose  a  delegate 
from  the  regiment  to  the  state  Republican  Convention, 
which  was  soon  to  meet  in  Columbus,  Ohio.  The  choice 
fell  on  James  McClenahan  of  Company  B.3  On  the  30th, 
the  quartermaster  and  some  of  the  men  worked  all  day  putting 
up  swings  and  parallel  bars.  Gleason  says  that  while  the  regi 
mental  headquarters  mess  was  at  dinner,  General  Willich  sud 
denly  appeared  and  joined  them,  saying  he  was  hungry,  and  that 
afterward  he  walked  through  the  company  quarters  to  see  what 
the  men  had  for  dinner,  laughing  and  cracking  jokes  with  the 

1  Gleason's  Diary. 

2  W    K.  R.  104-923. 

3  Gleason's  Diary. 


Six  WEEKS  AT  NASHVILLE  723 

men  as  in  former  times.  On  this  day  General  Grant  telegraphed 
to  General  Thomas : 

"Send  the  Fourth  Corps  to  New  Orleans  as  soon  as  prac 
ticable.  Separate  the  men  whose  time  expires  before  the  1st 
of  October  from  the  corps  and  if  paymasters  are  ready  to  pay 
the  balance  let  them  leceive  their  money  before  starting.  Let 
there  be  no  unavoidable  delay  in  getting  off  the  corps."1 

May  30,  Major  Dubois  reported  that  General  Wood  had 
orders  to  move  our  division  to  New  Orleans  as  soon  as  we  were 
paid  off.2 

June  1,  the  bars  and  the  swings  which  had  been  erected  in 
camp,  afforded  much  amusement,  not  only  to  our  men  but  to  the 
men  of  other  commands,  and  were  kept  in  use  all  day.  Many 
of  the  men  were  busy  making  transparencies  for  the  grand  re 
ception  which  the  men  of  the  brigade  were  preparing  for  Gen 
eral  Willich.  June  1,  an  order  had  been  issued  relieving  Gen 
eral  Doolittle  and  restoring  General  Willich  to  his  old  com 
mand.3 

June  2,  preparations  for  the  reception  to  General  Willich 
were  continued,  and  a  delegation  of  non-commissioned  officers 
went  to  the  city  to  find  out  when  the  General  would  be  out  to 
take  command  of  the  brigade.  They  were  assured  that  he  would 
be  out  that  evening  without  fail.  Newspaper  reporters  of  the 
Cincinnati  and  Nashville  papers  and  a  number  of  guests  were 
expected. 

This  reception  was  conceived  and  carried  out  by  the  en 
listed  men  of  the  brigade, — the  officers  having  nothing  to  do 
with  it, — and  was  a  most  remarkable  demonstration  of  their 
love  for  and  confidence  in  their  old  brigade  commander. 
Gleason  thus  describes  it. 

"Dress  parade  came  off  at  the  usual  hour  and  shortly  after- 
dark  the  lights  began  to  start  up  as  the  procession  began  forming 
a  little  above  our  camp.  The  Ohio  state  agent  and  a  friend  who 
accompanied  him,  being  our  agents,  we  proceeded  to  brigade  head 
quarters  as  the  column  began  moving.  It  was  headed  by  our 
own  Fifteenth  Ohio  and  its  band.  Two  other  bands  were  placed 
at  intervals  in  the  procession.  As  it  passed  brigade  headquarters 
the  display  far  exceeded  all  expectations.  It  was  conceded  that 
our  regiment  had  the  most  extensive  display  of  transparencies, 
but  those  of  the  Eighty-ninth  Illinois  were  more  artistic.  One 
of  the  Eighty-ninth  Illinois  bore  a  fine  picture  of  a  railroad  en 
gine  to  symbolize  the  "railroad  regiment"  as  it  was  called,  with 

1  W.  R.  R.  104-931. 

2  Gleason's  Diary. 

3  W.  R.  R.  104-943. 


724  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

an  inscription  of  the  general's  own  words  at  Chickamauga. 
"Now  boys  one  more  charge,"  and  underneath  them  "All  right 
General  we  are  on  time." 

There  were  scores  of  transparencies,  nearly  all  giving  some 
homely  remark  in  the  General's  broken  English,  or  recalling  in 
cidents  occurring  while  he  was  in  command  of  the  brigade. 
Among  them  one  recalls  "Bugler  blow  fight,"  "Boys  what  for 
you  spradle  out  the  road  so  wide  for,"  "Vere  is  Joe  Brown"- 
one  wishes  he  could  recall  them  all. 

After  the  parade  was  over  the  brigade  was  formed  in  close 
column  in  front  of  brigade  headquarters,  about  a  stand  which 
had  been  erected  for  the  occasion.  General  Willich  was  escorted 
to  it  and  made  a  notable  speech,  so  replete  with  patriotic  senti 
ments  expressed  in  his  forcible,  though  broken  English,  that 
Gleason  regrets  he  did  not  have  his  note  book  and  pencil  with 
him  to  take  it  down. 

The  next  day,  June  3,  General  Willich,  resumed  formal  com 
mand  of  the  brigade.  The  members  of  the  staff  were  all  re 
quested  to  remain  on  duty  for  the  present,  and  Captain  Cope 
was  informed  by  the  general  that  Captain  Charles  A.  Booth,  his 
adjutant  general  while  he  was  in  command  at  Cincinnati,  had 
been  ordered  to  report  to  him  and  would  be  on  hand  in  a  few 
days  to  act  as  adjutant  general  of  the  brigade.  All  of  the  of 
ficers  of  the  brigade  were  called  to  brigade  headquarters  at  9 
o'clock  to  meet  the  general,  who  said  he  "wanted  to  get  ac 
quainted  with  them."  He  greeted  all  cordially,  and  those  he 
remembered,  affectionately.  There  were  many  new  faces  among 
the  officers,  for  the  campaigns  and  battles  of  more  than  a  year 
had  thinned  their  ranks.  He  wished  to  see  if  the  men  had  for 
gotten  the  German  bugle  calls.  At  his  request  the  brigade  bugler 
sounded  the  regimental  calls  and  each  regimental  bugler  re 
sponded,  which  pleased  the  old  warrior  very  much.  When  the 
officers  were  dismissed  they  returned  to  their  respective  regi 
ments  and  there  was  short  drill.  In  the  evening  some  of  the 
officers  rode  to  the  mouth  of  Stone  River  and  had  a  swim  in  the 
Cumberland.  It  was  moonlight  when  they  rode  back  to  camp. 
The  air  was  sweet  with  the  perfume  of  wild  grape  blossoms  and 
other  blooms  and  it  was  delightfully  cool.  The  memory  of  that 
night  and  ride  is  still  fragrant  after  nearly  fifty  years  have  gone. 

Sunday,  June  4,  there  was  the  usual  inspection  which  was 
more  thorough  than  heretofore,  especially  the  inspection  of 
quarters,  and  one  officer  was  placed  under  arrest  for  having 
some  of  the  men's  bunks  so  near  the  ground.1  There  were  re- 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


Six  WEEKS  AT  NASHVILLE  725 

ligious  services  in  the  chapel  tent  and  dress  parade  in  the  eve 
ning.  Mulberries  were  ripe  and  some  of  the  men  got  permission 
to  go  "berrying." 

June  5,  the  commanding  officers  and  adjutants  of  regiments 
were  summoned  to  brigade  headquarters  for  a  sort  of  council  of 
war.  The  Eighty-ninth  Illinois  was  to  be  mustered  out  of  serv 
ice  on  Thursday,  and  a  number  of  positions  at  brigade  head 
quarters  held  by  officers  and  men  of  that  regiment  had  to  be 
filled.  Captain  Adams  of  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  was  selected  as 
brigade  quartermaster  to  take  the  place  of  Deering  of  the  Eighty- 
ninth  Illinois.  The  general  announced  that  we  would  have  bat 
talion  and  brigade  drills  morning  and  evening.  He  believed  that 
that  best  way  to  keep  officers  and  men  healthy  and  contented 
was  to  keep  them  busy.  He  also  took  up  and  discussed  the 
question  of  varying  the  rations  of  the  men,  so  as  to  keep  them  in 
good  health.  As  a  result  of  this  council  of  war  all  the  regi 
ments  had  battalion  drill  that  evening. 

From  June  6,  to  June  10,  inclusive,  we  were  drilling  every 
day,  and  life  in  camp  was  much  more  strenuous  than  it  had  been 
before  General  Wiliich  resumed  command  of  the  brigade.  When 
the  regiments  were  having  battalion  drill  it  was  not  unusual  for 
him  to  gallop  mto  the  field  and  direct  the  maneuvers.  He  was 
always  on  hand  and  in  command  at  brigade  drill.  He  was  always 
welcome  and  his  presence  put  vigor  and  spirit  into  the  move 
ments. 

On  the  evening  of  June  8,  there  was  a  meeting  of  the  regi 
ment  called  to  take  action  concerning  a  report  appearing  in  the 
Cincinnati  Gazette,  of  a  public  reception  given  at  Columbus, 
Ohio,  to  a  large  detachment  of  drafted  men  and  substitutes,  who 
had  arrived  there  from  Sherman's  army  to  be  mustered  out  of 
the  service,  and  who  had  represented  themselves  to  be  the  Fif 
teenth  Ohio. 

The  detachment,  numbering  near  two  hundred  men,  had 
been  assigned  to  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  and  sent  from  Columbus, 
Ohio,  in  October,  1864.  to  Chattanooga,  where  it  was  temporarily 
placed  on  duty  as  part  of  a  guard  of  a  large  drove  of  cattle 
which  was  bemg  driven  through  to  Atlanta.  When  it  reached 
Atlanta,  the  Fifteenth  Ohio,  to  which  it  had  been  assigned,  had 
gone  north  with  the  Fourth  Corps  to  oppose  Hood's  invasion  of 
Tennessee.  Communication  between  Atlanta  and  the  north  was 
soon  broken  and  the  detachment  never  joined  the  regiment  and 
never  saw  its  colors.  It  was  continued  as  cattle  guard  and  in 
this  capacity  marched  with  Sherman  to  the  sea  and  thence  north 
ward  through  Georgia  and  the  Carolinas.  It  is  said  that  it  car 
ried  a  flag  and  called  itself  the  Fifteenth  Ohio.  It  took  part,  it 


726  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

was  said,  in  the  grand  review  at  Washington,  May  23  and  24, 
1865,  and  on  June  4,  1865  arrived  at  Columbus,  Ohio,  for  final 
discharge.  There  were  161  men  in  its  ranks, — more  than  in 
many  of  the  old  regiments.  The  newspapers  announced,  and 
the  people  believed,  that  it  was  the  old  veteran  Fifteenth  Ohio  In 
fantry,  returning  after  over  four  years  of  arduous  service. 
Further  interest  in  its  arrival  was  aroused  by  the  report  that  it 
had  served  as  General  Sherman's  body  guard  on  his  march  from 
Atlanta  to  the  sea. 

A  meeting  of  citizens  was  called  and  a  committee,  of  which 
ex-Governor  Lennisor;  was  chairman,  was  appointed  to  arrange 
for  a  public  reception  to  the  supposed  veterans.  The  reception 
took  place  at  the  east  side  of  the  capitol  on  the  evening  of  June 
5,  and  the  detachment,  which  had  been  quartered  at  Tod  Bar 
racks,  was  escorted  to  the  capitol  by  the  Twenty-second  regi 
ment  of  the  .Reserve  Corps.  High  Street,  along  which  it 
marched,  was  throngtd  by  cheering  citizens,  and  young  girls 
strewed  flowers  in  the  path  of  the  returnings  braves.  At  the 
east  front  Governor  John  Brough  welcomed  them  in  a  remark 
able  patriotic  speech. 

In  the  Cincinnati  Gazette  of  June  6,  1865,  an  account  of  the 
reception  was  published  and  it  was  this  which  gave  rise  to  the 
meeting  mentioned  in  Gregory's  diary.  To  show  how  complete 
ly  the  governor  and  the  good  people  of  Columbus  were  de 
ceived,  the  following  extracts  from  the  published  account  of 
the  reception  and  the  governor's  speech  are  given : 

"Just  as  the  sun  was  sinking  in  the  horizon  the  detachment 
of  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  which  formed  the  body  guard  of  General 
Sherman  during  his  campaign  from  Chattanooga  to  Goldsboro, 
escorted  by  the  Twenty-second  regiment  of  the  Veteran  Re 
serve  Corps  under  command  of  Major  J.  \Y.  Skiles,  marched 
up  High  Street  in  the  capital  and  took  position  in  front  of  the 
east  terrace,  where  they  were  welcomed  by  Governor  Brough  and 
hundreds  of  enthusiastic  citizens.''  In  his  speech  the  Governor 
said,  among  other  things,  "Holding  the  honorable  post  of  Sher 
man's  body  gunrd,  your  toils  and  privations  have  been  great  but 
under  an  all  wise  Providence  you  have  been  permitted  to  return 
home  and  enjoy  the  sweets  of  peace  won  by  the  Armies  of  the 
Union,  for  out  of  the  campaigns  in  which  you  participated 
sprang  the  safety  of  the  country  again."  He  called  attention  to 
the  circumstances  under  which  the  veteran  soldiers  of  Ohio  had 
gone  into  the  service  of  their  country — "Not  as  conscripts  but 
as  patriot  volunteers."  He  described  the  services  they  had  rend 
ered  and  the  sacrifices  they  had  made  under  their  gallant  leader 
General  Sherman,  and  assured  them  that  "The  people  were  proud 


Six  WEEKS  AT  NASHVILLE  727 

of  the  record  they  had  made.''  It  appears  that  Captain  W.  H. 
Walker  of  the  Seventeenth  Ohio  commanded  the  detachment 
and  signed  its  mriter  out  rolls. 

The  meeting  mentioned  by  Gregory,  of  which  he  was  secre 
tary,  passed  resolutions  informing  the  people  of  Ohio,  that  the 
men  to  whom  such  a  notable  reception  was  given  were  not  vet 
erans  of  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  but  conscripts,  that  they  never  were 
Sherman's  body  guard,  but  were  in  fact  only  cattle  guards,  and 
that  they  had  performed  no  other  service. l 

Whether  these  resolutions  ever  reached  the  governor's  of 
fice  is  not  known.  If  they  did  it  may  have  been  the  part  of 
prudence  to  withhold  from  the  public  the  fact  that  a  stupendous 
practical  joke  had  been  played  on  the  governor  and  the  patriotic 
people  of  Columbus.  There  is  some  ground  for  believing  that 
the  governon  and  other  state  officials  never  knew  the  truth  about 
it,  for,  as  late  as  1894,  the  late  Hon.  Wm.  Henry  Smith,  who  was 
secretary  of  state  at  the  time  of  the  reception,  in  a  public  speech 
:it  Columbus,  Ohio,  mentioned  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  as  "one  of  the 
noble  regiments  who  had  made  the  famous  march  to  the  sea 
which  had  cleft  the  Confederacy  in  twain."  It  is  only  just  to 
state  that  this  detachment  rendered  valuable  services  to  the  coun 
try,  for  which  they  are  entitled  to  their  meed  of  praise.  It  was 
through  no  fault  of  theirs  that  they  did  not  join  the  regiment  and 
share  with  it  the  hardships  and  dangers  of  our  last  campaigns. 
If  they  had  done  so,  doubtless  they  would  have  borne  themselves 
as  gallantly  as  those  who  had  seen  longer  service. 

The  orders  for  the  movement  of  the  Fourth  Corps  to  the 
south  were  issued  by  General  Thomas  June  5,  and  directed  that 
in  accordance  with  instructions  from  General  Grant,  "the  veteran 
portion  of  the  Fourth  Army  Corps"  would  proceed  by  the  most 
practicable  route  to  New  Orleans  and  on  its  arrival  at  that  point 
report  to  General  Canby,  commanding  the  Military  Division  of 
West  Mississippi.  General  Stanley  was  directed  to  reorganize 
the  corps,  after  detaching  from  it  all  men  whose  terms  expired 
prior  to  October  1,  1865.  The  transportation  allowed  was  eight 
teams  and  two  ambulances  to  each  1000  men.  The  corps  pon 
toon  train  was  to  be  taken  with  the  command. - 

General  Stanley  issued  orders  next  day  reorganizing  the 
corps  as  follows :  There  still  were  to  be  three  divisions  but  each 
division  was  to  have  only  two  brigades.  The  organization  was 
as  follows : 

First  Division — Brevet  Major  General  Kimball,  command 
ing. 

1     John  G.  Gregory's   Diary. 
•.     W.  R.  K.   104-J»r»!i. 


728  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

First  Brigade — Colonel  Thomas  W.  Rose,  Seventy-seventh 
Pennsylvania,  Fifty-first  Ohio,  Thirty-first  Indiana,  Twenty-first 
Kentucky,  Twenty-third  Kentucky. 

Second  Brigade — Colonel  I.  C.  B.  Suman,  Ninth  Indiana, 
Thirty-fifth  Indiana,  Thirtieth  Indiana,  Thirty-eighth  Illinois 
Twenty-first  Illinois,  Thirty-sixth  Indiana. 

Second  Division — Brevet  Major  General  Elliott,  command 
ing: 

First  Brigade — Brevet  Brigadier  General  Opdycke,  Twenty- 
sixth  Ohio,  Thirty-sixth  Illinois,  Fortieth  Indiana,  Forty-fourth 
Illinois,  Fifty-seventh  Indiana,  One  Hundred  and  Twenty-fifth 
Ohio. 

Second  Brigade — Brigadier  General  L.  P.  Bradley,  Fif 
teenth  Missouri,  Twenty-eighth  Kentucky,  Forty-second  Illinois, 
Fifty-first  Illinois,  Sixty-fourth  Ohio,  Sixty-fifth  Ohio. 

Third  Division — Major  General  Thomas  J.  Wood  com 
manding. 

First  Brigade — Brigadier  General  A.  Willich,  Fifteenth 
Ohio,  Eighth  Kansas,  Forty-ninth  Ohio,  Fifty-first  Indiana, 
Fifty-ninth  Illinois,  Seventy-first  Ohio. 

Second  Brigade — Brevet  Major  General  Samuel  Beatty, 
Ninteenth  Ohio,  Thirteenth  Ohio,  Third  Michigan,  Fourth  Mich 
igan,  Thirteenth  Wisconsin,  Forty-first  Ohio.1 

General  Stanley's  order  for  our  movement  to  New  Orleans 
directed  that  the  corps  should  move  as  soon  as  the  men  were  all 
paid  and  that  the  route  was  to  be  by  rail  to  Johnsonville  on  the 
Tennessee  River  and  thence  by  steamer.  The  artillery  and  trains 
were  to  move  to  Johnsonville  by  the  dirt  road  as  early  as  June 
12,  if  the  men  were  paid.  The  order  of  march  was  first,  the 
Second  Division,  second,  the  Third  Division,  third,  the  First 
Division. - 

The  day  General  Stanley  issued  the  foregoing  orders  he 
addressed  an  identical  letter  to  Generals  Wood,  Kimball  and 
Elliott,  the  division  commanders,  suggesting :  That  before  the  dis 
persion  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  a  meeting  of  the  of 
ficers  and  men  should  be  held  for  the  purpose  of  giving  expres 
sion  to  the  sentiment  of  fellowship  and  unanimity  of  feeling 
which  the  great  events  of  the  past  years  should  inspire  within 
our  hearts,  and  to  organize  a  committee  with  whom  any  one 
might  correspond  upon  the  social  and  friendly  ties  and  subjects 
in  common  with  us,  not  coming  under  official  business."  He  sug 
gested  that  the  meeting  he  held  at  the  headquarters  of  the  artil 
lery  brigade  on  Saturday,  June  10,  and  that  the  organization 

1  W.  R.  R.  104-966. 

2  W.  JR.  R.  104-965-6. 


Six  WEEKS  AT  NASHVILLE  729 

should  embrace  the  Fourth,  Fourteenth  and  Twentieth  Corps 
and  the  Cavalry  Corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland.1 

The  suggestion  met  with  most  cordial  approval.  The  meet 
ing  was  held  at  the  time  and  place  appointed.  Three  of  the 
delegates  from  our  regiment  were  W.  F.  Rickey,  Anderson  and 
John  G.  Gregory.2  A  committee  was  appointed  to  report  at  an 
adjourned  meeting  to  be  held  June  14,  a  design  for  a  badge  to 
be  worn  by  officers  and  men  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 
At  the  adjourned  meeting  the  committee  reported  a  design  for 
a  badge  which  was  adopted.  The  proceedings  at  these  meetings 
were  published  in  general  orders  from  the  headquarters  of  the 
Department  of  the  Cumberland  and  included  a  description  and 
drawing  of  the  badge.3 

At  one  of  these  meetings  the  following  preamble  and  resolu 
tions  were  adopted; 

"Whereas;  Many  of  the  soldiers  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland 
are  about  to  abandon  the  profession  of  arms  and  again  mingle  in  the 
peaceful  pursuits  of  home. 

Resolved:  That  in  parting  with  each  other  we  do  so  with  mingled 
feelings  of  sorrow,  sadness  and  pride, — sorrow  because  friends  bound 
together  by  ties  formed  on  many  battle  fields  must  part;  sadness  at 
turning  our  backs  upon  the  thousands  of  fresh  made  graves  of  our 
brave  comrades;  and  pride,  because  it  has  been  our  good  fortune  to 
be  numbered  among  the  members  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland, 
and  have  each  done  his  part  in  proving  to  the  world  that  republics 
have  the  ability  to  maintain  and  perpetuate  themselves. 

Resolved,  That  in  parting  we  do  as  we  have  many  times  done  in 
the  face  of  the  enemy,  renew  our  pledges  of  unending  fidelity  to  each 
other;  and  that  in  whatever  position  in  life  we  may  happen  to  be  we 
will  never  permit  our  affections  to  be  estranged  from  those  who  con 
tinue  to  fight  our  battles,  but  that  we  will  sustain  and  defend  them  at 
all  times  and  in  all  proper  places. 

Resolved:  That  the  following  named  persons,  and  none  others, 
are  authorized  to  wear  the  badge  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 

I.  All  persons  now  in  that  army  in  good  standing. 

II.  All  soldiers  who  formerly  belonged  to  that  army,  and  have 
received  honorable  discharge  from  the  same. 

Resolved,  That  any  soldier  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  who 
is  now  entitled  to  wear  the  badge  of  the  army,  who  may  hereafter  be 
dishonorably  discharged  from  the  service  shall  by  such  discharge 
forfeit  the  right  to  wear  said  badge. 

Resolved,  That  we  exhort  all  members  of  the  Army  of  the  Cum 
berland  to  discountenance  any  attempt  on  the  part  of  any  unauthorized 
person  to  arrogate  to  themselves  honor  to  which  they  are  not  entitled 
to  by  wearing  our  badge." 

When  it  was  known  that  orders  sending  us  south  had  been 
recieved,  a  mutinous  spirit  developed  in  some  of  the  brigades  of 
the  corps.  The  terms  of  enlistment  of  the  veterans  provided  that 

1     W.  R.  R.  104-961-2. 

:'.     (>reiron-'s  Piarv. 

3     W.  R.  R.  104-1013-14.  Sig.    24 


730  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

they  should  serve  for  'three  years  or  during  the  war,'  and  many 
thought  that  the  war  was  now  practically  over  and  that  they 
were  entitled  to  be  at  once  discharged  and  return  to  their  homes. 
Some  of  the  more  reckless,  it  was  said,  were  secretly  signing 
papers  pledging  themselves  to  disobey  orders  to  move  to  Texas, 
and  meetings  were  held  on  the  borders  of  the  various  camps,  at 
which  the  men  were  urged  to  sign  these  papers  and  form  an 
organized  resistance  to  all  commands  looking  toward  going  fur 
ther  south.  The  movement,  it  was  said,  originated  in  two  of 
the  Michigan  regiments  and  an  Ohio  regiment  belonging  to  an 
other  brigade.1  It  was  known  that  a  number  of  the  men  of  our 
brigade  were  attending  these  meetings. 

The  following  extracts  from  the  diary  of  Sergeant  John  G. 
Gregory  show  that  this  feeling  of  dissatisfaction  was  prevailing 
to  some  extent  among  the  men  of  our  regiment  and  brigade. 

The  morning  papers  of  Tune  7,  had  reported  that  the  Fourth 
Corps  would  be  sent  to  Galveston,  Texas.  Gregory  in  his  diary 
of  that  day  says  he  "could  hardly  see  it  in  that  light,  that  some 
of  the  boys  were  terribly  discouraged,"  that  Hatfield  felt  so  bad 
about  it  he  cried,"  and  that  "it  does  get  me  how  childish  some 
old  soldiers  are."  He  also  says,  "the  hard  feeling  is  all  among 
the  veteran  troops."  June  8,  he  writes,  "orders  came  for  us  to 
go  towards  New  Orleans  as  soon  as  we  are  paid  off.  I  can 
hardly  believe  it."  June  9,  he  notes  that  there  was  great  dissat 
isfaction  among  the  veterans  over  the  contemplated  movement 
to  Texas,  that  they  "claimed  to  be  misused,"  and  adds,  "I  will 
go  any  where  in  the  United  States."  June  10,  he  reports  "strong 
talk  against  going  to  Texas."  June  11,  he  reports,  "a  large  meet 
ing  of  our  division  in  a  field  near  here  tonight  to  decide  whether 
to  go  to  Texas,  believe  the  brigade  greatly  opposed  to  going." 
He  also  reports  that  the  colonel  came  at  night  and  looked  through 
the  company  to  see  who  were  out  at  the  meeting.  June  12,  he 
writes,  "The  meeting  last  night  fizzled  out,  the  boys  themselves 
coming  to  the  conclusion  that  it  would  not  do."2 

At  this  point  that  it  was  decided  to  take  official  notice 
of  what  was  going  on,  and  on  the  evening  of  June  12,  General 
Willich  called  the  brigade  together  to  talk  it  over.  It  was  known 
throughout  the  division  that  this  meeting  was  to  be  held,  and 
many  officers  and  men  from  other  commands  were  present. 
There  was  a  feeling  of  intense  solicitude  as  to  the  result  of  the 
meeting,  for  many  feared  an  outbreak  which  would  require  more 
than  ordinary  prudence  and  wisdom  to  repress. 

1  Gleason's  Diary. 

2  John  G.  Gregory's  Diary. 


Six  WEEKS  AT  NASHVILLE  731 

The  brigade  was  called  together  at  5  p.  m.  and  for  the  first 
time,  the  two  new  regiments  which  had  been  assigned  to  it — the 
Seventy-first  Ohio  and  Fifty-ninth  Illinois, — were  present. 
General  Grant's  farewell  address  to  the  army1  was  read  and 
also  a  vigorous  order  of  General  Wood  touching  on  the  proposed 
mutiny.2  General  Willich  made  the  only  speech  of  the  occasion. 
In  his  broken,  but  always  forceful  and  eloquent  speech,  he  told 
the  men  before  him  of  the  reported  circulation  of  seditious 
papers  and  the  attempt  of  some  mistaken  and  thoughtless  men  to 
excite  discontent  and  raise  a  mutiny  among  the  men  of  the  com 
mand,  and  portrayed  the  necessary  consequences  of  such  con 
duct.  He  then  made  an  appeal  to  them  to  remember  their  proud 
record  as  soldiers  of  the  old  First  Brigade  and  not  to  sully  it  by 
any  such  proposed  action.  The  speech  was  one  of  the  most 
eloquent  and  convincing  he  had  ever  made.  If  there  had  been 
any  real  mutinous  spirit  among  the  veterans  of  our  brigade  it 
was  dispelled  by  his  eloquent  appeal.  That  night,  one  of  the 
ring  leaders,  a  hospital  steward  of  the  Seventy-first  Ohio,  who 
had  been  an  adjutant,  had  been  mustered  out  of  the  service 
and  had  again  entered  it  as  a  substitute,  was  arrested  and  sent 
north  in  irons.3  This  ended  the  mutiny.  One  who  shared  the 
anxiety  of  this  critical  moment  has  always  thought  that  it  was 
fortunate  that  General  Willich  was  in  command  at  the  time,  and 
that  it  was  his  notable  speech,  more  than  any  repressive  meas 
ures  adopted,  which  prevented  a  most  serious  outbreak. 

June  10,  the  Eighty-ninth  Illinois,  \vhich  had  been  a  mem 
ber  of  our  brigade  from  the  beginning  of  its  service,  had  fought 
side  by  side  with  us  at  Stone  River,  Chickamauga,  Missionary 
Ridge,  the  battles  -of  the  Atlanta  Campaign,  Franklin  and  Nash 
ville,  had  shared  with  us  the  rigors  and  privations  of  all  our 
long  and  varied  service  and  had  proven  themselves  true  com 
rades  and  friends,  left  for  the  north,  having  been  mustered  out 
of  service.  Colonel  AskewT  and  a  number  of  the  officers  of  other 
regiments  of  the  brigade  went  to  Nashivlle  to  see  them  off. 

June  12,  the  men  in  the  regiment  whose  terms  of  service 
would  expire  before  October  1,  were  marched  into  the  city  and 
quartered  in  Barracks  No.  1  until  they  could  be  paid.4 

June  13,  the  colonel  and  adjutant  went  into  the  city  to  see 
that  the  discharged  men  were  paid  and  provided  with  transporta 
tion  to  their  homes,  and  returned  in  the  evening  with  the  news 
that  the  paymaster  would  be  out  the  next  day  to  pay  us  off. 

June  14,  our  entire  regiment  was  on  guard  duty  and  when  the 
paymaster  arrived,  the  companies  were  relieved  in  turn  to  be 
paid  off  and  returned  to  duty.  When  night  came  three  of  the 

1     W.  R.  R.   104-948.  2    3  and  4   Gleason's   Diary. 


732  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

companies  and  the  field  and  staff  were  still  unpaid.  The  wagon 
train  of  the  brigade  was  ordered  to  move  iiext  morning. 

June  15,  payment  of  the  regiment  was  resumed  at  an 
early  hour,  but  the  progress  was  so  slow  that  it  was  not  com 
pleted  until  after  noon.  The  state  agent  was  on  hand  to 
take  charge  of  surplus  money  which  the  men  wished  to  send 
home.  The  sutler,  in  violation  of  orders,  sold  liquor  to  the 
men  so  indiscriminately  that  Colonel  Askew  called  a  council 
of  administration,  which  assessed  a  heavy  tax  on  that  indi 
vidual  and  compelled  him  to  pay  it,  and  he  was  then  dismissed 
and  ordered  out  of  the  camp.  As  a  result  of  his  indiscriminate 
sale  of  liquors,  there  were  a  number  of  cases  of  "drunk  and 
disorderly."1  That  evening  we  received  an  unexpected  order 
to  have  reveille  at  2  :30  a.  m.  next  morning,  and  to  be  ready  to 
move  at  4  a.  m.  The  morning  of  June  16,  about  daylight,  the 
regiment  marched  to  the  Mill  Creek  siding  and  took  cars  for 
Johnsonville,  Tenn. 

When  Captain  Charles  A.  Booth,  who  had  been  General 
Willich's  adjutant  general  at  Cincinnati,  arrived  at  brigade 
headquarters  a  few  days  before  the  command  moved  to  John 
sonville,  Captain  Cope  asked  to  be  relieved  as  assistant  adju 
tant  general  of  the  brigade  and  to  be  permitted  to  return  to 
his  regiment  and  take  command  of  his  company.  General 
Willich  declined  the  request.  Very  much  to  Captain  Cope's  sur 
prise,  the  general  sent  Captain  Booth  to  General  Kneffler's 
brigade  and  retained  him  in  his  old  position.  It  therefore 
became  his  duty  to  issue  the  orders  for  and  superintend  the 
loading  of  the  brigade,  its  equipment,  horses,  etc.,  on  the 
cars.  Assisted  by  the  efficient  young  officers  of  the  brigade 
staff,  the  movement  of  the  troops  and  the  loading  of  them  and 
their  equipment  and  horses  on  the  cars,  was  done  in  such 
orderly,  prompt  and  efficient  manner,  as  to  evoke  warm 
praise  from  General  Willich.  The  memory  of  such  praise 
is  still  sweet  and  the  writer  hopes  he  may  be  pardoned  for 
recalling  such  personal  incidents  in  this  history. 

We  made  a  short  stop  at  Nashville,  where  a  number  of 
our  officers  and  men  who  were  in  the  city  and  had  not  heard 
of  the  orders  to  move,  rejoined  the  command.  Owing  to 
delays  caused  by  meeting  other  trains  we  did  not  reach  John 
sonville  until  sunset,  when  we  left  the  cars  and  at  once 
marched  to  the  river  and  embarked  on  the  steamer  Peytona. 
We  were  off  for  a  long  voyage  by  water  and  were  entering  a 
new  and  unusual  campaign,  in  which  we  were  to  have  many 
novel  and  some  trying  experiences. 

1     Glenson's  Diary. 


CHAPTER  XXXIV. 

THE  TEXAS  CAMPAIGN. — CONDITIONS  IN  TEXAS  AND  MOVEMENT 
FROM  NASHVILLE  TO  NEW  ORLEANS. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  in  the  instructions  given  by 
General  Grant  to  General  Sheridan  May  17,  when  the  latter 
was  assigned  to  the  general  command  of  the  territory  west 
of  the  Mississippi  River,  he  was,  in  general  terms,  "to  restore 
Texas  and  that  part  of  Louisiana  held  by  the  enemy,  to  the 
Union  in  the  shortest  practicable  time."  The  large  number 
of  troops  placed  at  his  command  and  the  directions  for  their 
disposition,  however,  suggested  other  purposes  than  those 
specified.  Sheridan  in  his  Memoirs1  says,  that  on  receipt  of 
such  instructions  he  called  on  General  Grant  to  see  if  they 
were  so  pressing  as  to  preclude  his  remaining  in  Washington 
until  after  the  Grand  Review,  which  was  to  take  place  May 
23  and  24,  for  he  naturally  had  a  strong  desire  to  lead  his 
command  on  that  great  occasion  ;  that  Grant  told  him  it  was 
absolutely  necessary  for  him  to  go  at  once  "to  enforce  the 
surrender  of  the  Confederates  under  Kirby  Smith."  He 
further  says:  "at  the  same  interview  he  (Grant)  informed 
me  that  there  was  an  additional  motive  in  sending  me  to  the 
new  command — a  motive  not  explained  by  the  instructions 
themselves,"  and  went  on  to  say  that,  "as  a  matter  of  fact, 
he  looked  upon  the  invasion  of  Mexico  by  Maximilian  as  a 
part  of  the  rebellion  itself,  because  of  the  encouragement  that 
invasion  had  received  from  the  Confederacy,  and  that  our 
success  in  putting  down  secession  would  never  be  complete 
till  the  French  and  Austrian  invaders  were  compelled  to  quit 
the  territory  of  our  sister  republic." 

General  Grant  in  his  Memoirs  confirms  this  testimony  of 
Sheridan,  and  says  he  regarded  the  invasion  of  Mexico  "as  a 
direct  act  of  war  against  the  United  States  by  the  powers 
engaged,  and  supposed  as  a  matter  of  course,  that  the  United 
States  would  treat  it  as  such  when  their  hands  were  free  to 
strike,"  and  that  he  "sent  Sheridan  with 'a  corps  to  the  Rio 
Grande  to  have  him  where  he  might  aid  Juarez  in  expelling 
the  French  from  Mexico."2  This  was  perhaps  the  controlling 
reason  for  sending  our  corps  and  a  large  body  of  other  vet 
eran  troops  to  Texas.  In  fact,  as  will  be  seen  later,  when  we 
started  to  Texas,  Kirby  Smith  had  surrended,  or  had  under- 

1     Sheridan's  Memoirs,  Vol.  2-209-210. 
•2.     Grant's  Memoirs,  Vol.   2-">4r>-r>46. 


734  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

taken  to  surrender,  all  the  Confederate  troops  in  the  Trans- 
Mississippi  department. 

But  aside  from  the  desire  on  the  part  of  General  Grant  to 
compel  the  French  and  Austrians  "to  quit  the  territory  of  our 
sister  republic,"  the  conditions  then  existing  in  Texas  and  West 
Louisiana  were  so  serious  as  to  demand  the  presence  there 
of  a  large  military  force. 

These  conditions  were  so  remarkable  as  to  warrant  a 
brief  review  of  them  before  taking  up  the  story  of  our  long 
voyage  from  Johnsonville  to  New  Orleans  and  thence  to 
Texas. 

It  is  not  improbable  that  during  the  closing  months  of 
the  war,  the  leaders  of  the  Confederacy  thought  of  the  Trans- 
Mississippi  country  as  the  place  where  the  final  struggle 
would  take  place,  and  as  a  land  of  refuge  where  the  beaten 
officers  and  men  of  their  armies  could  find  safe  asylum.  It 
was  a  vast  country,  much  of  it  fertile  and  productive.  They 
had  possession  of  the  important  sea  ports  on  the  long  coast 
line  between  the  mouths  of  the  Mississippi  and  Rio  Grande, 
including  Galveston,  which  afforded  a  safe  shelter  for  block 
ade  runners.  Beyond  the  Rio  Grande  was  the  imperial  gov 
ernment  of  Mexico,  which  was  naturally  in  sympathy  with 
them.  To  the  north  was  a  vast  region  stretching  from  Cali 
fornia  to  the  Mississippi  River,  including  parts  of  the  territories 
of  Arizona,  New  Mexico,  the  Indian  Territory,  and  of  the 
states  of  Missouri,  Arkansas  and  Louisiana,  in  which  were 
tribes  of  semi-civilized  Indians,  such  as  the  Chickasaws,  Choc- 
taws,  Caddos,  Seminoles,  Creeks  and  Osages,1  who  were  con 
tributing  both  men  and  supplies  to  their  armies,  and  savage 
tribes,  such  as  the  Commanches  and  other  prairie  tribes,  which 
were  actively  hostile  to  the  United  States. 

Over  this  vast  region  President  Davis  had  placed  Lieu 
tenant  General  E.  Kirby  Smith  in  supreme  command,  aided 
by  such  experienced  Major  Generals  as  J.  B.  Magruder,  J.  G. 
Walker,  S.  B.  Buckner  and  others,  with  an  army  estimated  at 
70,000  men. 

When  it  was  seen  that  the  military  power  of  the  Con 
federacy  in  the  states  east  of  the  Mississippi  River  was 
crumbling,  the  leaders  in  the  Trans-Mississippi  department, 
in  consultation  with  Jefferson  Davis  and  his  cabinet,  began 
to  prepare  for  eventualities. 

General  E.  Kirby  Smith  seems  to  have  early  been  im 
pressed  with  the  critical  nature  of  the  situation  of  the  Con 
federacy  and  to  have  commenced  overtures  to  the  imperial 

1     W.  R.  R.  102-1266-1271. 


MOVEMENT  FROM  NASHVILLE  TO  NEW  ORLEANS  735 

government  of  Mexico  looking  to  the  employment  of  himself 
in  high  command  and  the  taking  over  by  such  government  of  such 
portion  of  his  forces  as  he  could  control.  February  1,  1865, 
he  granted  to  the  Hon.  Robert  Rose,  who  had  formerly  held 
a  diplomatic  position  under  the  United  States  government, 
permission  to  cross  the  lines  into  Mexico,  and  authorized  him 
to  make  known  to  "His  Majesty  the  Emperor,"  that  in  case 
of  unexampled  catastrophe  to  the  eastern  armies  and  the  final 
overthrow  of  the  Confederacy,  it  was  his  fixed  purpose  to  seek 
an  asylum  in  Mexico,  and  that  being  bred  to  the  profession  of 
arms  he  wished  to  still  continue  in  the  exercise  of  his  pro 
fession.  That  he  had  some  knowledge  of  the  French  and 
Spanish  languages ;  had  once  been  on  duty  on  the  Mexican 
frontier  and  that  in  case  of  the  contingency  above  alluded 
to,  his  humble  services  and  such  influence  as  he  could  exert 
might  be  available  to  His  Majesty's  government.  He  also 
instructed  Mr.  Rose  to  say  to  "His  Majesty  the  Emperor," 
"That  the  national  antipathy  that  would  exist  in  the  minds 
of  many  citizens  of  the  Confederate  States  to  those  of  the 
North,  *  *  might  in  contemplation  of  possible  collision 

between  the  imperial  government  and  the  United  States  of 
the  North,  render  very  desirable  such  a  corps  of  Southern 
soldiers  as  might  be  induced  by  the  offer  of  liberal  terms  to 
colonize  the  Empire,"  and  added,  that  if  Mr.  Rose  should 
think  that  the  above  offer  and  views  were  not  inappropriate, 
he  should  "tender  his  services  to  the  Emperor  and  assure  him 
of  his  heartfelt  wish  for  the  eminent  success  of  his  reign,  and 
the  honor,  welfare  and  happiness  of  his  people."1 

It  is  probable  that  this  overture  of  General  Smith  was  not 
known  to  any  of  his  subordinate  commanders,  who  seem  to 
have  been  more  occupied  with  schemes  for  strengthening  their 
military  power  so  as  to  prolong  the  struggle. 

February  18,  1865,  Brigadier  General  Daniel  Ruggles  sent 
a  communication  to  General  S.  Cooper,  Adjutant  and  In 
spector  General  of  the  Confederacy,  suggesting  a  combination 
of  the  "in  a  measure  undeveloped  elements  of  strength  in  our 
Trans-Mississippi  domains"  and  proposed: 

"First.  That  prompt  and  energetic  measures  be  taken 
to  bring  into  the  field  such  warriors  as  the  civilized  and  semi- 
barbarous  Indian  nations,  viz. :  The  Cherokees,  Creeks,  Choc- 
taws,  Chickasaws  and  Seminoles,  may  still  be  enabled  to 
furnish  *  *  thus,  adding  a  probable  contingent  of  be 

tween  15,000  and  20,000  warriors  to  our  armies." 

"Second.     That  measures  be  promptly  taken  to  employ 

1     W.  R.  R.  101-13o9. 


736  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

the  Commanche  Nation  and  other  cognate  tribes,  viz. :  The 
Sioux,  Black  Feet,  Pawnees,  etc.,  now  hostile  to  the  Federal 
power,  as  an  appropriate  and  energetic  contingent,  number 
ing  probably  some  20,000  warriors,  who,  when  stimulated  by 
adroit  emmissaries,  would  carry  terror  throughout  the 
western  border."  *  *  * 

'Third.  That  measures  be  immediately  taken  to  organize 
and  take  into  the  field  one-fifth  of  the  effective  slave  popula 
tion  of  that  department,  changing  the  terms  of  their  service 
from  slavery  to  peonage,  thus  protecting  the  slave  and  in 
dustrial  interests  and  meeting  the  existing  military  necessity 
of  the  country."  •*  *  *  And  adds: 

"Thus  may  we  combine  the  reserve  corps  of  those  states, 
the  slave  force,  the  Indian  force  (semi-civilized  and  savage), 
the  Mexicans  and  Mormons,  in  strength  sufficient  to  retain 
complete  military  possession  of  that  department."1  These 
suggestions  were  referred  to  the  Confederate  secretary  of 
war  and  doubtless  were  approved  by  that  officer  and  by  the 
Confederate  States  Government.  A  large  number  of  warriors 
of  the  semi-civilized  tribes  above  named  evidently  joined  the 
Confederate  armies  in  Texas,  for  we  read  of  the  "Choctaw 
Brigade,"  and  the  "Chickasaw  Regiment."2  On  April  8,  1865, 
General  E.  Kirby  Smith  appointed  Hon.  Albert  Pike  of 
Arkansas,  to  act  with  General  J.  W.  Throckmorton  and 
Colonel  W.  D.  Reagan  of  Texas,  as  a  commission  to  negotiate 
an  alliance  with  the  Commanches  and  other  savage  Indian 
tribes  on  the  borders  of  Texas.3 

The  suggestion  putting  one-fifth  of  the  slave  population 
into  the  field  was  so  far  adopted  that  orders  were  issued  April 
5,  1865,  for  the  impressment  "of  able-bodied  negroes  on  plan 
tations  belonging  to  owners  within  the  Federal  lines  and  all 
others  not  usefully  employed,  in  localities  exposed  to  the 
enemy's  raids"4 

The  negotiations  proposing  an  alliance  with  the  im 
perialist  government  in  Mexico,  wrere  undertaken  and  were 
pending  both  before  and  after  the  surrender  of  Generals  Lee 
and  Johnston. 

May  2,  1865,  General  E.  Kirby  Smith  again  sent  the  Hon. 
Robert  Rose  to  Mexico  to  present  to  His  Majesty  the  Em 
peror  certain  views  as  to  the  future  interests  of  the  Confed 
erate  States  and  the  Emperor  of  Mexico,  with  authority  to 
"give  assurance  that  there  is  every  probability  that  our  gov 
ernment  will  be  willing  to  enter  into  a  liberal  agreement  with 

1  W.   R.  R.   101-1393-4.  3     W.    -1.   R.    102-1266-1272. 

2  W.  R.   R.   102-1303.  4     W.   R.    R.    102-1264. 


MOYEMENT   FROM    NASHVILLE   TO    NEW    ORLEANS  737 

the  authorities  of  the  Mexican  Empire,  based  upon  the  prin 
ciple  of  mutual  protection  from  their  common  enemy."  Mr. 
Rose  was  directed  to  say  to  His  Majesty,  the  Emperor,  among 
other  things,  "that  from  the  solemn  action  of  their  Houses 
of  Congress,  from  the  public  expressions  of  their  eminent  pub 
lic  men,  from  the  tone  of  their  public  press  it  was  plain  that 
further  schemes  of  ambition  and  territorial  aggrandizement 
were  being  nursed  and  matured  by  the  United  States,  and 
that  they  looked  with  jealous  eyes  upon  the  neighboring  Em 
pire  of  Mexico  and  meditated  a  blow  aimed  for  its  destruc 
tion."  Under  these  circumstances  Mr.  Rose  was  instructed 
to  say  that  it  would  not  "fail  to  strike  his  Imperial  Highness  that 
in  the  Confederate  States  and  more  especially  in  the  depart 
ment  adjoining  his  dominions,  and  over  which  I  have  the 
honor  to  preside  as  military  chief,  that  there  are  many  trained 
soldiers  inured  to  the  hardships  of  the  field,  and  inspired 
with  a  bitter  hatred  of  the  Federals,  whose  services  might  be 
tendered  to  him  against  the  North.  There  is  under  my  com 
mand  an  army  of  60,000  men.  *  *  *  These  men  are  com 
manded  by  veteran  officers,  who  have  repeatedly  led  them  in 
action  and  who  thoroughly  understand  them  and  could  control 
them  without  difficulty.  If  I  am  not  mistaken  in  my  con 
clusions  as  to  the  future  policy  of  the  United  States,  the  pro 
priety  of  an  understanding  between  the  Emperor  and  the 
Confederate  States  Government  for  their  mutual  defense  will 
be  apparent  to  His  Majesty.  The  services  of  our  troops 
would  be  of  inestimable  value  to  him.  You  will  ascertain, 
if  possible,  the  views  of  the  Emperor  on  these  subjects,  and 
should  the  occasion  seem  favorable,  inform  yourself  fully  as 
to  the  probable  terms  and  conditions  upon  which  an  agree 
ment  for  mutual  protection  could  be  determined  upon."1 

These  facts  were  not  known  to  the  authorities  at  Wash 
ington  at  the  time,  but  General  Grant's  sure  instincts  satis 
fied  him  that  there  was  a  near,  if  not  actual  alliance  between 
the  Confederacy  and  the  Imperial  Government  of  Mexico, 
which  could  only  be  destroyed  by  an  actual  demonstration  of 
a  superior  military  force. 

The  nature  of  General  E.  Kirby  Smith's  independent  com 
mand  in  the  Trans-Mississippi  country  and  his  independent 
character  wrere  well  known  in  Washington.  It  was  probably 
also  known  that  he  was  to  some  extent  a  soldier  of  fortune, 
and  it  was  thought  that  he  might  be  open  to  overtures  look 
ing  to  his  separation  from  the  Confederate  Government  at 
Richmond.  With  this  in  view,  in  March,  1865,  General  Lew 

1     W.   R.  R.   102-1293 


738  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS   AND  CAMPAIGNS 

Wallace  went  to  Point  Isabel,  near  Galveston,  under  a  flag 
of  truce,  to  try  to  get  into  communication  with  him  and  see  if 
terms  could  not  be  made  for  ending  the  war  in  the  Trans- 
Mississippi  department.  The  terms  proposed  by  General 
Wallace  to  Kirby  Smith,  though  the  former  stated  that  they 
were  not  final  and  that  the  United  States  authorities  had  not 
authorized  him  to  present  terms  or  make  overtures  of  any 
kind  to  anybody,  were  much  more  liberal  than  those  granted 
afterwards  to  Lee  and  Johnston,  and  were  favorably  regarded 
by  General  Slaughter,  through  whom  General  Wallace  hoped 
to  reach  General  Smith.  Unfortunately,  perhaps,  the  letter 
from  Wallace  to  E.  Kirby  Smith  fell  into  the  hands  of  Major 
General  Walker,  one  of  Smith's  district  commanders,  who 
promptly  rejected  the  overtures.1 

A  short  time  afterwards  General  Smith  sent  copies  of 
the  letters  of  General  Wallace  to  Richmond,  and  to  Hon. 
John  Slidell,  Confederate  States  Commissioner  at  Paris,  to  be 
laid  before  the  French  government.2 

April  21,  1865,  after  Lee's  surrender,  General  E.  Kirby 
Smith,  General  Magruder  and  others  of  his  subordinate 
commanders  issued  orders  appealing  to  the  soldiers  of  their 
commands  to  stand  by  their  colors, — General  Smith  stating  that 
they  possessed  means  of  long  resisting  invasion  and  had  hopes 
of  succor  from  abroad,3  and  on  May  4,  General  Magruder 
issued  an  address  "To  the  People  and  Army  of  Texas,"  mak 
ing  the  same  appeal  and  saying,  "We  are  not  whipped,  and 
no  matter  what  events  may  transpire  elesewhere,  recollect 
Orleans  that  Kirby  Smith  would  not  surrender.4  But  reports 

At  this  time  it  was  evidently  the  intention  of  the  Confeder 
ate  leaders  in  Texas  to  reject  all  overtures  for  peace  and  fight  on, 
hoping  to  yet  form  an  alliance  with  the  French  and  Austrians  in 
Mexico.  As  late  as  May  20,  it  was  reported  from  New 
Orleans  that  Kirby  Smith  would  not  surrender.3  But  reports 
of  severe  demoralization  among  the  Confederate  troops 
changed  the  aspect  of  affairs.  May  16,  General  Magruder 
reported  to  General  Smith  that  May  14,  400  troops  forming 
part  of  the  garrison  at  Galveston  attempted  to  desert  the  post 
with  arms  in  their  hands ;  that  General  Maxey  reported  that 
notwithstanding  all  his  efforts  he  could  not  produce  such  a 
state  of  feeling  in  the  troops  in  his  division  as  would  justify 
him  in  depending  on  them,  and  that  he  had  seen  letters  from 
intelligent  officers  in  Walker's  division  who  stated  that  their 
troops  would  fight  no  longer.  General  Walker  indorsed  his 

1  W.  R.  R.  101-1275-1282.  3     W.  R.  R.  102-1284. 

2  W.  R.  R.  102-1277.  4     W.  R.  R.  102-516. 


MOVEMENT  FROM  NASHVILLE  TO  NEW  ORLEANS  739 

concurrence  in  the  foregoing  and  added  that  he  was  con 
vinced  that  the  troops  in  that  district  could  not  be  relied  upon ; 
that  they  would  lay  down  their  arms  at  the  first  appearance  of 
the  enemy,  and  that  this  was  the  unanimous  opinion  of  all 
the  brigade  and  regimental  commanders  of  Forney's  division. 
The  same  report  came  from  Generals  Slaughter,  Brent  and 
D.  H.  Cooper.1  From  these  reports  it  is  apparent  that  the 
troops  were  preparing  not  to  surrender  but  to  disband,  divide 
up  the  stores  and  go  to  their  homes  or  wherever  else  they  chose, 
chose. 

May  2o,  General  Canby  reported  to  General  Grant  that 
he  was  informed  that  commissioners  on  the  part  of  Kirby 
Smith  had  arrived  at  Baton  Rouge,  authorized  to  treat  for  the 
surrender  of  the  forces  in  the  Trans-Mississippi  department.2 

These  commissioners  met  at  Baton  Rouge  and  it  seems 
agreed  that  General  Osterhaus,  representing  General  Canby, 
and  General  S.  B.  Buckner,  representing  General  E.  Kirby 
Smith,  should  arrange  terms  for  the  surrender  by  the  latter 
of  all  the  Confederate  armies  west  of  the  Mississippi.  These 
officers  agreed  upon  terms  which  were  the  same  given  to 
Generals  Lee  and  Johnston.  They  were  approved  by  General 
Canby,  but  General  Smith  who  signed  the  agreement  June 
2,  added  to  his  approval  of  the  same,  that  his  approval  was 
"with  the  understanding  that  Confederate  States  officers 
observing  their  paroles  *  *  *  should  be  permitted  to  make 
their  homes  either  in  or  out  of  the  United  States." 

To  this  General  Canby  could  not  agree.3  General  John 
Pope,  commanding  the  Military  Division  of  Missouri,  in  April 
had  opened  negotiations  with  General  Smith  for  the  surrender 
of  his  forces  on  the  same  terms  accorded  to  Generals  Lee  and 
Johnston.  Such  negotiations  were  continued  with  out  result.4 
On  May  30,  General  Smith,  who  was  then  at  Houston,  Texas, 
addressed  a  letter  to  Colonel  J.  T.  Sprague,  U.  S.  A.,  General 
Pope's  representative,  saying: 

"When  I  gave  you  at  Shreveport,  a  memorandum  which 
I  hoped  might  be  the  basis  of  negotiations  with  the  United 
States  Government,  I  commanded  an  army  of  over  50,000  men 
and  a  department  rich  in  resources.  I  am  now  without  either. 
The  army  in  Texas  disbanded  before  my  arrival  here.  From 
one  extremity  of  the  department  to  the  other  the  troops  with 
unexampled  unanimity  of  action  have  dissolved  all  military 
organization,  seized  the  public  property,  and  scattered  to  their 
homes.  Abandoned  and  mortified,  left  without  either  men  or 

1     W.  R.  R.  102-1308-m3.  3     W.  R.  R.   102-600-601. 

1!     W.  R.  R.  102-558.  4     W.  R.  R.  101-180-194. 


740  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS   AND  CAMPAIGNS 

material,  1  feel  powerless  to  do  good  for  my  country  and 
humiliated  by  the  acts  of  a  people  I  was  striving  to  benefit. 
The  department  is  now  open  to  occupation  by  your  govern 
ment.  The  citizens  and  soldiers  alike,  weary  of  wrar,  are  ready 
to  accept  the  authority  and  yield  obedience  to  the  laws  of  the 
United  States.  A  conciliatory  policy,  dictated  by  wisdom  and 
administered  with  patient  moderation,  will  insure  peace  and 
secure  quiet ;  an  opposite  course  wrill  rekindle  the  flames  of 
civil  war  with  a  fierceness  and  intensity  unknown  even  in  this 
sad  and  unfortunate  struggle.  I  myself  shall  go  abroad  until 
the  future  policy  of  the  United  States  Government  toward  the 
South  is  announced,  and  wrill  return  to  my  family  only  when 
I  can  do  so  with  security  to  my  life  and  person."  *  *  *  * 
"P.  S. — Since  writing  the  above  I  have  information  that 
the  Missouri  and  a  portion  of  the  Arkansas  troops  still  retain 
their  organization."1 

It  will  be  noticed  that  three  days  after  writing  this  letter 
General  Smith  gave  his  qualified  approval  to  the  articles  of 
the  surrender  of  all  armies  west  of  the  Mississippi  River. 

It  is  evident  that  General  Grant  and  the  authorities  at 
Washington  suspected  the  good  faith  of  General  Smith  and 
his  subordinates,,  and  some  believed  that  the  breaking  up  of 
their  armies  was  planned  to  prevent  their  surrender,  and  in 
order  that  they  might  be  reassembled  across  the  Rio  Grande,, 
to  aid  the  French  and  Austrians  in  a  possible  war  with  the 
United  States.  May  27,  General  Sheridan,  who  was  then  in 
St.  Louis,  telegraphed  to  General  Grant  that  he  had  read  the 
correspondence  between  General  Kirby  Smith  and  Colonel 
Sprague ;  that  there  wras  nothing  definite  in  it,  and  that  it 
''created  the  impression  in  his  mind  that  a  portion  of  the  rebels 
meant  to  move  toward  Mexico,"  and  adds :  "If  the  enemy  ga 
toward  Mexico,  would  it  not  be  best  to  take  the  Fourth  Corps 
to  the  Rio  Grande?"2  On  the  same  day  General  Dodge  tele 
graphed  from  Fort  Leavenworth  that  reports  from  Red  River 
say  Kirby  Smith  intends  to  fight ;  that  he  cannot  get  his  gen 
erals  to  agree  to  surrender.3  The  28th,  General  Grant  tele 
graphed  to  Sheridan  that  Generals  Buckner  and  Price,  per 
Kirby  Smith,  had  surrendered  to  General  Canby  all  forces 
west  of  the  Mississippi ;  that  he  had  directed  Canby  to  push 
troops  to  the  Rio  Grande,  without  waiting  for  the  Twenty-fifth 
Corps,  and  that  he,  Sheridan,  "had  better  push  down  the 
river  at  once  and  proceed  to  carry  out  the  conventiqn,  and  garri 
son  Texas  and  Louisiana  as  soon  as  it  can  be  done."4  Later,  the 


1  W.  R    R.  101-194-5.  3     W.  R.  R.  102-632. 

2  W.  R.  R.   102-625-6.  4     W.  R.  R.  102-639. 


MOVEMENT  FROM  NASHVILLE  TO  NEW  ORLEANS  741 

same  day.  General  Grant  again  telegraphed  to  Sheridan  that 
a  portion  of  the  Twenty-fifth  Corps  was  on  its  way  to  the 
Rio  Grande  and  would  touch  at  Mobile,  if  he  wished  to  send 
orders  ;  that  he  could  send  the  troops  placed  at  his  disposal 
whenever  he  thought  proper,  and  that  if  he  needed  more 
troops  for  the  Rio  Grande  than  had  already  been  ordered 
there  to  send  them. 

May  "29,  Sheridan  telegraphed  General  Grant  from  Cairo, 
that  he  would  send  one  of  General  Reynold's  divisions  to 
Shreveport ;  would  have  Canby  send  a  garrison  to  Alexandria, 
and  that  he  thought  it  best  to  send  the  Fourth  Corps  to 
Texas ;  that  it  was  a  compact  corps  and  all  at  Nashville  ; 
that  the  Twenty-fifth  Corps  would  be  needed  along  the  gulf 
coast,  and  that  the  Fourth  Corps  and  the  troops  from  General 
Canby  could  be  put  at  points  further  from  the  coast,  where  it 
was  healthier,  and  adds :  "Texas  has  not  yet  suffered  from 
the  war  and  will  require  some  intimidation,  and  Mexican 
matters  are  unsettled.  Furthermore,  I  am  satisfied  that  many 
of  the  rebels  will  leave  the  United  States  for  Mexico."  He 
therefore  requests  that  the  Fourth  Corps  be  at  once  ordered 
to  embark  for  New  Orleans,  for  which  point  he  was  just 
starting."1 

May  30,  it  was  reported  that  at  Shreveport  large  amounts 
of  Confederate  cotton  and  sugar  were  being  moved  into  the 
interior  and  secreted  for  the  purpose  of  defrauding  the  United 
States,  and  that  Confederate  generals  were  directing  these 
operations ;  that  a  few  days  before,  General  Buckner  had 
made  a  speech  to  the  Missouri  troops  near  Shreveport  urging 
them  to  go  with  him  to  Mexico,  stating  that  they  (the  Con 
federates)  had  a  large  amount  of  government  property  to 
transport  over  land  to  Mexico,  and  that  if  they  would  accom 
pany  him,  he  would  in  a  short  time  pay  them  a  good  round 
sum  in  specie ;  that  General  Price  followed  General  Buck 
ner,  and  said  they  were  now  free  from  the  army  and  could 
do  what  they  pleased.2 

June  3,  General  Grant,  who  was  doubtless  wrell  informed 
of  conditions  in  Texas  and  deeply  impressed  by  them,  tele 
graphed  General  Sheridan  that  probably  a  large  force  of 
cavalry  would  be  needed  in  Texas ;  that  the  whole  state 
should  be  scoured  to  pick  up  Kirby  Smith's  men  and  the 
arms  carried  away  with  them,  and  that  if  sufficient  cavalry 
could  not  be  obtained  in  the  west  he  would  order  all  that 
was  required  from  the  east.":{ 

1     W.  K.  R.   102-fi47. 
•2     W.   II,  R.   102-673-4. 
3     W.   K.  R.   102-743. 


742  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

June  4,  General  Sheridan  reported  to  General  Grant  that 
nearly  all  the  Texas  soldiers  had  disbanded  before  Kirby 
Smith's  pretended  surrender ;  that  they  had  broken  into  the 
magazines,  supplied  themselves  with  powder,  destroyed  most  all  of 
the  Confederate  government  property,  and  had  then  gone  to 
their  homes.  This,  he  said,  was,  in  his  opinion,  done  to  avoid 
surrender  and  parole.  He  also  reported  that  there  was  much 
discussion  among  them  on  the  subject  of  going  to  Mexico, 
and  that  there  was  an  undoubted  intention  on  the  part  of 
many  to  go ;  that  in  view  of  the  foregoing,  and  of  the  fact 
that  he,  Sheridan,  had  always  believed  that  Maximilian's 
advent  into  Mexico  was  a  part  of  the  rebellion,  he  would 
advise  that  a  strong  force  be  put  into  Texas,  and  would  order 
the  Fourth  Corps  there  as  soon  as  sea  transportation  could 
be  prepared.  He  also  reported  that  the  Imperialists  were 
strengthening  at  Matamoras,  and  that  it  was  reported  that  the 
Confederate  property  at  Brownsville,  including  fourteen  pieces  of 
artillery,  had  been  taken  across  the  river  to  that  place.1 

Sheridan,  on  his  arrival  at  New  Orleans,  June  2,  had  at 
once,  with  characteristic  energy,  set  about  getting  the  troops 
sent  to  him  into  Texas  and  distributed  at  points  where  they 
could  be  used  in  an  emergency.  He  chafed  at  delays  and  had 
the  whole  quartermaster's  department  stirred  up  by  his 
immediate  and  urgent  demands  for  transportation.  June  8, 
he  telegraphed  to  General  Grant  that  he  did  not  need  any 
cavalry  from  the  east ;  that  he  had  already  organized  "two 
columns  of  superb  cavalry  of  4000  men  each" ;  that  one  was 
then  en  route  to  Shreveport  and  would  march  through  Austin 
to  San  Antonio,  and  that  the  other  would  march  in  a  few 
days  from  Shreveport  to  Houston.2 

Sheridan,  on  June  9,  reported  to  General  Grant  that  Gen 
eral  E.  B.  Brown,  commanding  the  advance  United  States 
forces,  had  just  reported  that  he  had  occupied  Brownsville 
on  May  30.  That  the  rebels  had  evacuated  the  place  on  his 
approach  from  Brazos  Santiago,  having  first  delivered  six 
pieces  of  artillery,  battery  wagons,  forge  and  transporta 
tion  wagons  to  the  Imperialist  Mexican  commander  at 
Matamoras.3 

This  report  was  not  received  at  Washington  until  10:30 
p.  m.,  June  10.  General  Grant  was  then  in  Chicago,  but  it 
must  have  been  at  once  forwarded  to  him,  for,  at  11 :30  p.  m., 
he  wrote  the  following  dispatch  to  General  Sheridan  and  sent 
it  to  his  chief  of  staff,  General  Rawlins,  to  be  shown  to  the 
Secretary  of  War,  and  forwarded,  if  approved  by  that  officer: 

1  W.  R.  R.  102-767.  3     W.  R.  R.  102-827. 

2  W.  R.  R.  102-813 


MOTEMENT   FROM    NASHVILLE   TO   NEW    ORLEANS  743 

"Major  General  Sheridan, 
New  Orleans,  La. 

If  the  rebels  moved  their  artillery  and  public  property  to  Mata- 
moras  after  Smith's  surrender,  demand  its  return  to  you. .  If  the  de 
mand  is  not  complied  with  go  and  take  it,  and  all  those  engaged  in 
its  transfer. 

U.  S.  Grant, 
Lieutenant   General.1 

No  one  would  attribute  to  General  Grant  the  quality  of 
rashness,  but  the  above  dispatch  savors  of  it,  and  one  can 
only  imagine  what  might  have  been  the  consequences,  if  an 
after-thought  had  not  suggested  its  being  shown  to  the  Sec 
retary  of  War,  before  actually  sending  it.  At  that  officer's 
suggestion  it  was  modified  so  that  Sheridan  was  directed  to 
make  demand  for  the  return  of  the  property;  that  he  need  not 
resort  to  hostilities  to  obtain  it,  but  report  reply  for  further 
instructions.2 

June  10,  General  Steele  telegraphed  General  Sheridan 
from  Brazos  Santiago,  that  it  was  said  by  Texas  people  that 
General  Walker's  division  of  rebels  was  at  Piedras  Negras 
and  that  it  was  going  to  Sonora,  Mexico.3 

June  12,  Sheridan  complained  to  General  Rawlins,  Gen 
eral  Grant's  chief  of  staff,  about  delay  in  getting  necessary 
transportation.  In  the  same  note  he  said  there  was  "nothing 
practical  in  Kirby  Smith's  surrender"  ;  that  "it  looked  more 
like  a  move  than  anything  else,"  and  that  the  rebel  General 
Slaughter  "had  sold  his  artillery  to  the  Imperialists."4 

We  have  already  alluded  to  the  manner  in  which  Sheri 
dan  had  stirred  up  the  whole  quartermaster's  department  by  his 
demands  for  transportation,  even  complaining  to  General 
Rawlins  about  delays  in  furnishing  it.  This  complaint  was 
probably  referred  to  General  M.  C.  Meigs,  Quartermaster 
General,  for  that  officer  sent  a  characteristic  dispatch  to 
Sheridan  detailing  what  had  been  done  to  meet  his  demands, 
and  concluded  his  dispatch  by  saying: 

"This  department  when  Weitzel  (the  Twenty-fifth 
Corps)  sailed,  had  more  than  33,000  soldiers  afloat  in  ocean 
steamships,  besides  Steele's  corps  (7000  men.)  No  great 
nation  ever  before  put  such  a  transport  fleet  on  the  ocean.  It 
has  been  a  great  and  costly  effort."5 

General  Grant  was  intent  on  sending  to  Sheridan  a  force 
large  enough  to  not  only  take  care  of  Kirby  Smith's  army  of 
70,000  men,  and  to  occupy  all  important  points  in  Texas,  but 

1  W.  R.  R.  102-840.  4     W.  R.  R.  102-8K8. 

2  W.  R.  R.  102-889.  5     W.  R.  R.  102-908. 

3  W.  R.  R.  102-842. 


744  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS   AND  CAMPAIGNS 

also  to  provide  for  any  contingency  which  might  arise  grow 
ing  out  of  the  occupation  of  Mexico  by  the  French  and 
Austrians.  He  frankly  states  in  his  Memoirs  that  he  wanted 
Sheridan  and  his  army  where  he  could  aid  the  liberal  Mexi 
cans  in  driving  the  French  and  Austrians  out  of  their  country. 
Sheridan  soon  realized  that  he  had  a  large  and  increasing- 
army.  June  1.3,  he  reported  to  General  Grant  the  number  of 
troops  he  then  had,  and  stated  that  the  support  of  so  large  an 
army  in  Texas  would  be  very  expensive,  and,  therefore,  sug 
gested  that  the  order  sending  the  Fourth  Corps  be  counter 
manded,  "unless  our  affairs  are  liable  to  become  complicated 
with  the  Imperial  Government  of  Mexico."1 

To  this  suggestion  General  Grant,  June  15,  sent  the  fol 
lowing  dispatch : 

"The  Fourth  Army  Corps  is  under  orders  for  Texas  and 
the  orders  will  not  be  changed."2 

When  this  dispatch  was  received  by  General  Sheridan 
the  Fourth  Corps  had  already  begun  its  embarkation  at  John- 
sonville,  Tennessee,  and  on  June  16,  our  regiment  was  safely 
aboard  the  steamer  Peytona,  ready  for  the  long  voyage. 

The  Second  Division  had  orders  to  leave  at  daylight  on 
the  morning  of  June  17,  on  the  following  boats,  which  were 
to  move  in  the  order  following:  Nicholas  Longworth,  In 
diana,  Clara  Dunning,  National,  and  Irene.3  They  evidently 
got  started  on  time  and  were  well  under  way  before  our 
brigade  got  started. 

June  17,  an  order  from  General  Wood  directed  General 
Willich  to  move  as  soon  as  he  was  ready,  in  command  of  the 
following  boats:  The  Jewess,  J.  H.  Baldwin,  W.  T.  Curtis 
and  Anna,  on  which  were  all  the  regiments  of  our  brigade, 
except  the  Fifteenth  Ohio,  which,  as  before  stated,  was  on  the 
Peytona.  General  Willich's  flagship  was  the  Anna  and  on  it 
were  the  brigade  staff  and  headquarters  equipment  and  the 
Forty-ninth  Ohio  and  Eighth  Kansas.  We  saw  them  move 
out  leaving  us  at  the  landing.  The  Peytona  was  kept  back, 
waiting  for  General  Wood  and  staff.  They  were  late  in 
arriving,  and  it  was  night  before  their  horses  and  equipment 
were  loaded.  Some  time  in  the  night  the  boat  pulled  out  and 
steamed  down  the  river.  It  reached  Paducah  next  morning, 
where  it  joined  the  brigade.  Strong  guards  were  placed 
around  the  boat  and  also  on  the  shore  to  prevent  the  men 
from  leaving  it,  but  notwithstanding  these  precautions,  some 
of  the  men  got  ashore  and  got  whisky  and  became  intoxi- 

1  W.  R.  R.   102-865-6. 

2  W.   R.  R.   102-889. 

3  W.  R.  R.  104-1001. 


MOTEMENT   FROM    NASHVILLE   TO    NEW    ORLEANS  745 

cated.1  General  Willich,  in  command  of  the  fleet  carrying 
the  other  regiments  of  the  brigade,  on  his  way  to  Paducah, 
found  difficulty  in  having  the  boats  preserve  proper  order  in  sail 
ing  and  proper  distances.  So  on  arrival  at  Paducah  he  directed 
his  adjutant  general  to  get  the  captains  of  the  boats  together 
and  arrange  a  set  of  signals  to  be  used  in  our  further  voyage, 
which  was  clone.  When  the  Peytona  arrived  at  Paducah 
General  Wood  adopted  the  signals  for  the  entire  division.  Gen 
eral  Wood's  orders  for  our  voyage  from  Paducah  to  New 
Orleans  are  so  important  that  they  are  given  in  full. 

"Headquarters  Third  Division  Fourth  Army  Corps, 
Steamer  Peytona,  June  18,  1865. 
"General  Orders  No.  52. 

I.  The  following  arrangements  and  orders   of  procedure  of  the 
boats,  and  also  of  the  interior  economy  of  the  flotilla  of  the   Third 
Divisin  Fourth  Army  Corps,  will  be  observed  in  the  movement  from 
Paducah  to  New  Orleans,  First,  Peytona,  headquarters  Third  Division; 
Second,    Anna,    headquarters    First    Brigade;    Third,    J.    H.    Baldwin; 
Fourth,  Jewess;    Fifth,  W.  T.  Curtis;    Sixth,  Sallie  List,  headquarters 
Second  Brigade;  Seventh,  Echo;  Eighth,  Silver  Lake;  Ninth,  Armenia; 
Tenth,  Kate  Robinson;  Eleventh,  Columbia.     The  above  order  in  sail 
ing  will  be  preserved  as  nearly  as  possible.     The  boats  will  keep  as 
near  together   as   possible   without   endangering   each   other.     At   all 
events,  each  boat  will  keep  in  sight  of  the  one  preceding  it. 

II.  The  signal  for  landing  will  be  three  whistles  from  the  flag 
ship,  and  will  be  transmitted  by  each  boat  in  succession  and  the  boats 
will  come  in  and  land  as  near  the  flag  ship  as  practicable.     The  signal 
for  sounding  will  be  one  long  whistle,  then  two  short  ones,  and  then 
a  long  whistle  from  the  flag  ship.     On  receiving  this  signal  the  boats 
will  all  check  their  headway,  and  no  boat  will  attempt  to  pass  another 
in  the  fleet.     The  signal  of  distress  will  be  one  long  whistle  then  four 
short  ones   in   quick  succession,   accompanied   by  the   ringing   of  the 
bell.     Whenever  this  signal  is  given  by  a  boat  it  will  be  taken  up  by 
the  boat  preceding  it  and  passed  on  to  the  flag  ship.     Upon  hearing 
this  signal  the  whole  fleet  will  be  checked,  and  the  boats  nearest  the 
boat  giving  the  signal  will  proceed  at  once  to  its  assistance. 

III.  The  senior  officer  of  each  boat  will  have  the  boat  thoroughly 
policed  each  morning,  the  blankets  all  shaken  out  and  will  maintain 
good  sanitary  regulations  on  the  boat  for  preserving  the  health  of  the 
men.     The  great  danger  from  fire  and  the  accompanying  loss  of  life 
with  so  many  troops  on  board  renders  it  imperatively  necessary  that 
there  should  be  no  cooking  by  the  troops  on  the  boats,  and  the  same 
is  strictly  forbidden.    The  fleet  will  be  stopped  and  the  men  allowed  to 
land  and  cook  meat  enough  to  do  them  at  least  three  days.     Food  is 
furnished  to  the  men  cooked.     Hot  water   can   be   obtained   from   the 
boilers  or  cook  gallery  for  making  coffee,  and  the  senior  officer  on 
each  boat  will  make  arrangements  to  this  effect. 

IV.  The  senior  officer  on  each  boat  will  keep  constantly  posted 
a  sufficient  number  of  sentinels  to  preserve  order  and  decorum,  as  well 
as  to  prevent  the  men  from   going  ashore  when  the  fleet   lands  for 
any  other  purpose  than  cooking.     It  is  strictly  forbidden  for  the  men 

1     Oleason's  Diary. 


746  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

to  be  allowed  to  leave  the  boats  for  any  other  purpose  than  for  cook 
ing  at  the  regular  landings  for  that  purpose,  and  this  will  always  be 
done  away  from  any  town  or  place  that  will  afford  inducements  to 
the  men  to  straggle. 

V.  The  commanding  officer  of  each  boat  will  not  allow  any  liquor 
to  be  sold  or  brought  aboard  his  boat.  Each  brigade  commander  will 
furnish  a  copy  of  this  order  immediately  to  the  senior  officer  of  each 
boat  in  his  command. 

By  command  of  General  Wood. 

M.  P.  Bestow, 
Assistant  Adjutant  General."1 

Commanding  officers  of  the  troops  of  the  several  boats, 
appreciating  the  great  dangers  of  a  voyage  such  as  we  were 
embarked  on,  added  to  these  regulations  other  precautions, 
and  unusually  strict  rules  as  to  guards,  etc.,  were  issued  and 
rigidly  enforced.  Many  of  the  men  were  in  ugly  temper 
because  they  were  being  taken  to  the  far  south  in  midsum 
mer,  and  every  additional  regulation  looking  to  their  closer 
confinement  to  the  boats  was  resented.  The  boats  were 
crowded  and  the  men  slept  on  the  floors  of  the  decks,  and 
in  such  parts  of  the  cabins  as  were  not  occupied  by  the 
officers.  On  some  of  the  boats  orders  were  issued  prohibit 
ing  the  men  from  smoking — orders  which  were  very  difficult 
to  enforce,  and  which  were  very  irksome  to  many  of  the  men. 
It  was  a  necessary  precaution,  for  a  carelessly  lighted  match 
might  imperil  the  lives  of  hundreds  of  men  on  the  boats.  The 
boats  were  dry  as  tinder  and  easily  ignited,  and  a  fire  once 
started  could  not  easily  be  controlled.  Many  of  the  officers, 
owing  to  these  conditions,  kept  awake  all  night  and  slept  only 
in  the  daytime,  so  fearful  were  they  of  the  boat  taking  fire. 
There  was  a  regular  officer  of  the  day  and  guards  patrolled 
the  decks  all  night. 

The  fleet  of  our  division  was  all  assembled  at  Paducah 
and  left  that  evening,  steaming  down  the  Ohio  in  the  order 
above  directed.  We  sailed  all  night  and  a  little  before  day 
light,  those  who  were  awake  heard  three  whistles  from  the 
flagship,  which  were  repeated  by  the  other  boats,  and  was 
the  signal  for  landing.  Shortly  after  this,  they  heard  one 
long  whistle,  then  four  short  ones  in  quick  succession,  accom 
panied  by  the  ringing  of  a  bell.  It  was  the  signal  of  distress. 
The  whole  fleet  was  at  once  checked,  and  it  was  soon  learned 
that  the  Echo,  one  of  the  boats  of  General  Beatty's  fleet,  on 
which  was  the  Forty-first  Ohio,  was  the  one  in  distress.  As 
the  Anna  was  near  her,  that  boat  immediately  went  to  her 
relief.  It  was  seen  that  the  Echo  had  struck  a  small 
monitor  which  was  anchored  in  the  river,  and  was  fast  sink- 

1     W.  R.  R.   104-1009 


MOVEMENT  FROM  NASHVILLE  TO  NEW  ORLEANS  747 

ing.  The  men  on  board  were  in  quite  a  panic,  and  were 
crowding  to  the  side  of  the  boat  ready  to  jump  aboard  the 
Anna  as  soon  as  she  got  near  enough  for  them  to  do  so.  The 
officers  on  board  the  Anna,  hastily  got  the  men  on  their  boat 
all  on  the  upper  deck,  so  as  to  make  room  for  the  men  on  the 
Echo,  but  there  were  so  many  of  them  they  feared  their  own 
boat  would  be  swamped  unless  the  Forty-first  men  could  be 
taken  aboard  slowly.  They,  therefore,  stopped  a  short  dis 
tance  away  from  the  sinking  vessel  until  another  boat  came 
nearer,  and  the  Forty-first  men  were  then,  in  orderly  manner, 
taken  aboard  the  two  boats.  Shortly  after  the  men  were  all 
taken  off  the  Echo,  it  went  down,  carrying  with  it  the  arms 
and  equipment  of  the  Forty-first  Ohio  and  all  their  horses  and 
mules,  save  a  few  that  got  loose  and  swam  ashore.  Two  lives 
were  lost,  it  was  reported.1  It  was  said  at  the  time  that  the 
Echo  was  crowded  out  of  her  course  by  the  Sallie  List,  Gen 
eral  Beatty's  flagboat.  Gleason  says  the  Forty-first  men 
blamed  the  pilot  of  the  Echo  for  the  accident  and  came  near 
killing  him.2 

The  Peytona  touched  at  Cairo  to  coal  and  then  dropped 
down  below  the  mouth  of  the  Ohio  River  and  landed  on  the 
Kentucky  shore  where  our  men  cooked  rations.  She  then 
steamed  up  to  the  city  to  get  a  supply  of  ice.  Orderly  More- 
head  of  Company  H,  received  a  furlough  and  left  the  boat  to 
take  a  train  home.3  At  5  p.  m.  the  fleet  got  under  way  again 
and  steamed  down  the  broad  Mississippi,  the  Peytona  leading. 

The  Cairo  newspapers  gave  an  account  of  an  attempted 
mutiny  on  board  two  of  the  steamers  carrying  the  Second 
Division — the  Nicholas  Longworth  and  the  Indiana — in  which 
several  men  succeeded  in  breaking  through  the  guards  and 
escaping  to  the  shore.  With  the  exception  of  two  or  three 
men,  who  got  drunk  and  were  placed  in  the  guard  house,  all 
was  quiet  on  the  Peytona. 4  We  passed  Columbus,  Kentucky, 
before  dark,  the  Peytona  slowing  up  to  allow  the  other  boats 
to  close  up.  We  also  passed  Island  No.  10  and  New  Madrid. 

The  morning  of  June  20  found  us  steaming  down  the 
muddy  river  between  low  banks  fringed  with  cottonwood 
trees.  The  weather  was  hot,  but  there  was  a  light  breeze, 
which,  with  the  motion  of  the  boat,  tempered  the  heat.  When 
we  came  to  Memphis  a  yawl  was  sent  ashore  with  the  mail 
and  returned  with  newspapers.  The  newspapers  contained  a 
report  of  a  mutiny  on  the  Nicholas  Longworth,  and  another 
item  stating  that  the  Second  Division  had  preceded  us  down 
the  river.5  After  leaving  Memphis  there  was  little  to  break 

1     Wm.  McConnell's  Diary. 

2,    3,  4  and  5     Gleason 's  Diary. 


748  FIFTEENTH   OHIO  VOLUNTEERS   AND  CAMPAIGNS 

the  monotony  of  our  journey.  In  the  evening  the  Gleasons. 
Colonel  McClenahan,  Major  Dawson,  Doctor  Norton  and 
Captain  Geiger  got  together  in  the  cabin  and  sang  several 
glees,  but  the  weather  was  too  hot  to  get  much  enjoyment 
out  of  it.1 

The  morning  of  June  21,  our  fleet  was  steaming  steadily 
on  at  the  usual  rate  of  speed.  We  passed  the  mouths  of  the 
White  and  Arkansas  rivers  and  noticed  a  military  post  above 
the  former.  About  noon  General  Willich  came  from  his  flag 
ship,  the  Anna,  in  a  yawl  and  the  Peytona  slowed  up  to  take 
him  on  board.  Immediately  after  his  coming  the  Peytona 
and  other  boats  of  the  fleet  headed  for  the  shore,  where  we 
tied  up  for  two  or  three  hours  to  cook  rations.  General  Wil 
lich  brought  word  that  the  Sallie  List,  General  Beatty's  flag- 
boat,  was  disabled  on  the  Mississippi  shore.2  It  was  proba 
bly  to  give  time  to  repair  this  boat  that  we  landed  at  this 
time.  After  the  men  had  cooked  rations  we  got  under  way  again, 
and  saw  the  first  cypress  trees  along  the  river  banks.  Just  after 
dark  we  passed  four  gunboats.3 

The  morning  of  June  22,  at  8  o'clock,  we  reached  Vicks- 
burg.  It  was  announced  that  the  fleet  would  stop  there  a 
short  time,  during  which  the  troops  would  be  landed  on  the 
Louisana  side  of  the  river  and  the  boats  would  cross  to  the 
city  for  supplies.  After  the  troops  were  put  ashore  the  order 
was  changed  so  that  three  officers  and  thirty  men  from  each 
regiment  were  permitted  to  cross  over  to  the  city  to  make 
purchases  for  the  men.  The  men  put  in  the  time  as  best  they 
could  and  a  great  many  went  bathing  in  the  river.  It  was 
reported  that  a  man  belonging  to  the  Third  Michigan  was 
drowned.4 

When  the  Anna  landed  at  the  city  General  Willich  and 
staff  took  their  horses  ashore  and  spent  a  couple  of  hours 
riding  about  the  city  and  inspecting  the  fortifications,  which 
still  were  about  in  the  same  condition  as  they  were  July  4, 
1863,  when  Pemberton  surrendered  the  city  to  General  Grant. 
At  2  p.  m.,  the  regiment  was  again  on  board  the  Peytona 
which  moved  out,  followed  by  the  other  boats  of  the  fleet. 
As  we  steamed  down  the  river  we  first  noticed  the  Spanish  moss, 
clinging  to  live  oaks  along  the  shores — a  pretty  sight  which, 
Gleason  says,  varied  the  monotony  of  the  low  green  banks. 
We  passed  Grand  Gulf  and  other  points  of  interest.  Just  at 
dark  the  signal  of  distress  sounded  from  one  of  the  boats  fol 
lowing  us.  We  stopped  and  steamed  back  to  offer  our 

1,    2  and  ?,     McOonnell's  Diary. 
4     Gleason's  Diary. 


MOVEMENT  FKOM  NASHVILLE  TO  NEW  ORLEANS  749 

assistance  but  soon  found  that  it  was  not  needed  and  resumed 
our  course.  At  midnight  we  passed  the  city  of  Natchez. 

The  morning  of  June  23,  was  very  warm  and  sultry. 
When  we  awoke  Port  Hudson  was  in  view  and  we  passed  it 
about  8  o'clock.  Gleason  says  there  was  little  of  the  town  or 
fortifications  left  and  that  if  it  had  not  been  for  its  historical 
importance  it  would  not  have  attracted  attention.  After  we 
had  passed  it,  the  Anna  came  along  side  and  General  Willich 
reported  that  for  some  reason  four  boats  of  our  fleet  had 
been  stopped  at  Port  Hudson.  It  was  said  that  the  rear 
boats  had  been  fired  on  at  that  place  to  stop  them  in  order 
that  some  negro  troops  might  be  taken  aboard.1 

The  Peytona  at  once  turned  and  started  back,  but  soon 
received  the  signal  "all  right,"  and  again  turned  her  prow 
down  stream.  We  passed  the  mouth  of  Red  River  during 
the  forenoon.  As  we  approached  New  Orleans  we  noticed  that 
the  land  wras  lower  than  the  surface  of  the  river  and  was  pro 
tected  by  levees.  A  little  after  noon  we  passed  Baton  Rouge 
and  noted  the  ruins  of  the  state  capitol,  which  seemed  to 
have  been  quite  a  pretentious  building  in  ante-war  days.  We 
stopped  at  Baton  Rouge  to  put  off  two  passengers  and  then 
proceeded  on  our  way,  passing  two  or  three  small  towns  on 
the  right  bank  of  the  river  and  many  sugar  plantations  sadly 
out  of  repair.  About  the  middle  of  the  afternoon  the  fleet  tied 
up  on  the  left  bank  of  the  river  and  the  men  were  allowed  to 
go  ashore  to  take  needed  exercise  and  await  the  approach  of 
nightfall,  as  we  did  not  wish  to  reach  New  Orleans  before 
daylight  next  morning.  The  horses  were  also  taken  ashore 
and  exercised  and  some  races  were  pulled  off  which  afforded  much 
amusement.  An  overseer  of  one  of  the  plantations  was  brought 
down  to  the  Peytona  by  a  crowd  of  men,  who  reported  that 
he  had  very  cruelly  treated  some  of  his  negroes.  He  wras 
very  much  frightened  and  was  kept  under  guard  until  the 
boat  was  ready  to  leave,  when  he  was  put  ashore  and  cau 
tioned  to  treat  his  former  slaves  with  more  clemency.  As 
darkness  fell  the  Peytona  blew  a  warning  whistle  and  the 
fleet  was  soon  again  under  way,  every  one  feeling  refreshed 
by  our  short  stay  on  shore. 

At  6  o'clock  the  morning  of  June  24.,  we  saw  the  city  of 
New  Orleans,  about  five  miles  away.  By  the  time  the  men 
had  breakfast  we  had  reached  it  and  were  slowly  steaming 
by  its  wharves,  which  were  crowded  with  ocean  steamers  and 
boats  of  every  description.  A  yawl  was  launched  from  the 
Peytona  and  Major  Dubois  went  ashore  to  report  the  arrival 

1     McPonnell's  Diary. 


750  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

of  our  fleet.  He  soon  returned  and  reported  that  we  were  to 
land  seven  miles  below  the  city  on  the  same  side  of  the  river, 
and  we  proceeded  on  down  the  stream  to  the  point  selected 
for  our  landing.  Pushing  as  near  the  levee  as  the  soft  mud 
would  permit,  we  tied  up  and  commenced  unloading.  The 
spot  selected  for  our  camp  was  a  mile  and  a  half  from  the 
landing,  and  when  we  reached  it  we  found  it  without  shade 
to  shelter  us  from  the  intense  heat  of  the  sun.  Only  the 
levee  was  between  us  and  the  river.  The  ground  we  camped 
on  seemed  to  be  filled  with  vermin,  and  as  we  had  no  material 
to  build  cots  or  bunks  with,  we  had  to  sleep  on  it  and  take 
the  annoyance  and  risks. 

We  lay  in  this  hot  camp  on  the  Chalmette  bottoms  until 
July  5,  awaiting  the  boats  which  were  to  take  us  to  Texas. 
It  added  somewhat  to  the  interest  of  our  camp  to  be  told  that 
it  was  on  the  battlefield  where  General  Andrew  Jackson  de 
feated  the  British  General  Packenham  in  the  war  of  1812, 
but  nothing  to  its  comfort.  Some  of  the  old  earthworks 
occupied  by  General  Jackson's  troops  were  pointed  out,  which 
we  examined  with  curious  interest.  The  discomforts  of  the 
camp,  placed,  as  it  was,  on  the  flat  bottom  land  in  the  hot 
sun,  with  no  shade,  did  not  improve  the  temper  of  the  men, 
which  had  been  sorely  tried  by  the  long  hot  voyage,  and  there 
was  a  good  deal  of  insubordination.  Strong  guards  were 
placed  about  all  the  camps  writh  strict  orders  to  permit  no 
one  to  go  outside  the  lines  without  a  pass,  but  many  men 
broke  guard,  probably  in  some  instances  with  the  guards' 
connivance,  and  went  into  the  city.  The  city  military  authorities 
had  orders  to  arrest  all  men  found  there  without  passes,  and 
soon  it  was  reported  that  a  number  of  our  men  had  been 
arrested  and  were  in  the  city  prison.  They  were  soon  brought 
back  to  camp  and  placed  on  extra  duty,  or  required  to  pace 
a  beat  and  carry  a  rail,  as  a  punishment.  The  latter  method 
of  punishment,  though  common,  was  much  opposed  by  Gen 
eral  Willich.  One  night  when  he  and  his  adjutant  general 
returned  from  the  city,  he  saw  a  man  pacing  a  beat  just 
behind  the  brigade  headquarters,  carrying  something  on  his 
shoulder.  He  at  once  went  up  to  him  and  said:  "My  bo>, 
what  for  you  carry  that  log  of  wood  for?"  The  soldier  frankly 
stated  that  he  had  gone  out  of  camp  without  a  pass  and  that 
the  provost  guard  had  ordered  him  to  carry  a  rail  for  it.  The 
General  at  once  said :  "Throw  down  that  log  of  wood  and 
go  to  your  quarters."  He  then  aroused  the  provost  marshal 
and  directed  him  thereafter  to  punish  such  offenses  in  some 
other  way.  Turning  to  the  adjutant  general  he  said:  "Cap- 


MOVEMENT  FROM  NASHVILLE  TO  NEW  ORLEANS  751 

tain  Cope,  such  punishment  for  slight  offenses  is  degrading; 
it  tends  to  destroy  the  manhood  of  a  soldier  to  compel  him  to 
do  a  useless  thing  like  that ;  the  provost  marshal  should 
have  required  him  to  dig  a  sink,  police  the  camp,  or  do  some 
other  necessary  extra  duty."  This  incident  was  soon  bruited 
about  the  camp  and  there  were  no  more  men  compelled  to 
carry  rails  in  our  brigade  while  General  Willich  was  in 
command. 

While  we  were  in  camp  on  the  Chalmette  bottoms  it  was 
the  great  pleasure  of  the  adjutant  general  of  the  brigade 
to  accompany  General  Willich  in  numerous  rides  about 
the  city.  He  spoke  French  and  Italian,  as  well  as 
English  and  German,  and  was  much  interested  in  talking  with 
what  he  called  "the  common  people."  Riding  along  one  of 
the  streets  he  would  suddenly  stop  at  some  little  shop,  alight 
from  his  horse,  send  for  a  liter  of  wine  and  seating  himself  on  a 
bench  or  a  chair,  engage  the  shopkeeper  and  his  family  ill- 
conversation.  He  would  ask  how  they  got  along  before  and 
during  the  war,  and  particularly  how  it  was  when  General 
Butler  was  in  command  of  the  city.  All,  without  exception, 
said  that  the  city  was  never  so  clean  nor  so  orderly  as  when 
General  Butler  was  in  command.  One  very  intelligent  shop 
keeper  said  that  when  General  Butler  was  in  command,  a 
woman,  unattended,  could  walk  the  streets  at  midnight  with 
out  fear  of  molestation.  The  evidences  of  the  general  clean 
ing  up  of  the  city  which  General  Butler  had  ordered  were 
still  apparent.  The  paved  streets  were  clean  as  a  floor.  Gen 
eral  Willich  was  much  interested  in  seeing  the  monuments 
in  the  city,  which  it  was  said  General  Butler  had  defaced,  and 
we  rode  to  see  them.  We  could  not  see  that  they  had  been 
marred  in  any  respect,  but  on  the  base  of  the  equestrian 
statue  of  General  Andrew  Jackson,  we  saw  carved  in  deep 
letters  on  its  base  the  words:  "The  Federal  Union  By  the 
Eternal,  It  Must  and  Shall  Be  Preserved''  and  on  the  base  of 
the  monument  to  Henry  Clay,  carved  in  letters  as  deep,  and 
plain,  we  read  the  following  words  from  one  of  Mr.  Clay's 
speeches : 

"//  /  could  be  instrumental  in  erasing  this  deepest  stain, 
slavery,  from  the  character  of  our  country,  I  would  not  exchange 
the  proud  satisfaction  which  I  should  enjoy  for  the  honor  of 
all  the  conquests  ever  decreed  to  the  most  successful  conqueror.3' 

The  number  of  arrests  of  men  of  the  corps  became  so 
great  that  June  28,  General  Stanley  issued  an  order  abso 
lutely  prohibiting  enlisted  men  from  going  into  the  city,  and 
another  order  directing  the  detail  of  "an  officer  and  twenty- 


752  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS   AND  CAMPAIGNS 

five  steady  men"  to  report  at  corps  headquarters  at  once  for 
duty  on  the  small  steamer  "Alpha,"  which  plied  between  the 
camp  and  the  city.  Even  these  precautions,  however,  did  not 
wholly  prevent  a  daily  and  nightly  exodus  of  men  from  the 
camp  to  the  city,  and  a  daily  round  of  extra  duty  for  the 
offenders. 

We  had  our  regular  bi-monthly  inspection  and  muster 
on  June  30,  which  was  soon  over,  as  the  weather  was  too  hot 
to  unnecessarily  prolong  it.  Colonel  Askew  was  detailed  as 
a  member  of  a  commission  to  investigate  charges  against 
one  John  S.  Williams,  the  pilot  who  was  thought  to  be 
responsible  for  the  sinking  of  the  Echo  at  Cairo.  July  1,  com 
missions  as  first  lieutenant  came  for  Second  Lieutenants  Vincent 
T.  Trego  and  Samuel  C.  McKiraham  and  as  second  lieutenant 
for  Sergeant  Alex  C.  Moore.  Trego  was  assigned  to  Company 
H.  The  two  last  named  were  absent  and  there  were  no  vacan 
cies  to  which  to  assign  them.1 

There  was  a  report,  brought  by  Colonel  Askew,  that  we 
were  to  go  to  San  Antonio,  Texas.  July  3,  an  order  came 
to  send  all  the  sick  who  were  not  able  to  travel  to  the  hospitals. 
Gleason  says  this  was  "welcome  news,  as  we  were  anxious 
to  leave  the  place  where  sickness  was  daily  on  the  increase." 
Colonel  Askew  was  at  brigade  headquarters  in  the  evening 
and  brought  word  that  he  would  move  at  G  o'clock  a.  m.,  July 
5,  our  destination  being  Indianola,  Texas.1 

July  4,  a  salute  was  fired  by  one  of  our  batteries  in  honor 
of  Independence  Day.  There  was  quite  a  celebration  in  the 
city  and  General  Banks  delivered  an  oration  at  the  Custom 
House.  In  the  evening  the  display  of  fireworks  in  the  city 
could  be  seen  from  our  camp.  A  few  rockets  and  Roman 
candles  were  sent  up  from  our  camp,  some  of  the  regiments 
illuminated  their  tents  and  the  men  indulged  in  firing  "squibs" 
on  the  sly.1  Late  that  evening  General  Wood  issued  orders 
directing  the  division  to  hold  itself  in  readiness  to  move  at  a 
signal  to  be  given  from  his  headquarters  early  next  morning. 
The  order  prescribed  that  the  division  should  move  as  a  fleet, 
that  our  brigade  should  move  first  and  that  the  Second  Brigade 
should  immediately  follow.  The  men  were  to  have  three 
days'  cooked  rations  in  their  haversacks,  and  the  same  precau 
tions  against  fire  were  urged  as  in  the  orders  for  our  move 
ment  from  Paducah  to  New  Orleans.1 

The  signal  above  mentioned  must  have  been  given  very 
early,  for  at  4  a.  m.,  we  were  out  of  our  tents  and  bushy 
engaged  in  packing  up.  An  order  from  General  Wood  to 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


MOTEMENT   FROM    NASHVILLE   TO    NEW    ORLEANS  753 

General  Willich  directed  him  to  sail  for  Indianola  as  soon  as 
his  command  was  loaded.  The  order  also  directed  him  to 
have  the  boats  rendezvous  at  the  mouth  of  the  river  and  sail 
as  a  fleet  from  there  to  Indianola.  Arriving  at  that  port,  the 
troops  were  to  be  disembarked  promptly  and  placed  in  camp 
on  the  Victoria  road,  at  the  first  place  where  wood  and  water 
could  be  found.1  Neither  of  the  orders  above  mentioned 
named  the  steamers  on  which  the  troops  should  embark,  but 
as  soon  as  our  tents  and  other  camp  equipment  were  packed 
and  loaded  on  the  wagons,  they  were  dispatched  to  the  "Daniel 
Webster."-  From  McConnell's  diary  we  learn  that  another 
of  the  boats  in  our  brigade  fleet  was  the  "Marta,"  and  that 
General  Wood's  flagboat  was  the  "Wilmington."3 

Our  regiment  was  the  last  to  leave  camp,  which  we  did 
not  do  until  3  p.  m.,  and  then  we  had  to  wait  two  or  three 
hours  before  we  got  aboard.  The  boat  was  an  old  one,  with 
inferior  accommodations,  but  we  had  no  choice.  We  were 
to  some  extent  reconciled  when  we  found  that  General  Wil 
lich  was  aboard  and  that  it  was  to  be  the  flagboat  of  our 
brigade  fleet.  It  was  night  when  we  finally  got  started  and 
steamed  down  the  river  toward  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  distant 
eighty-five  miles. 

1  W.  R.  R.   102-1050. 

2  Gleason's  Diary. 

3  McDonnell's   Diary. 


CHAPTER   XXXV. 

THE  TEXAS  CAMPAIGN  —  FROM   NEW  ORLEANS  TO  INDIANOLA 

CAMP  AT  GREEN  LAKE  AND  THE  MARCH  TO  SAN  ANTONIO. 

When  we  awoke  the  morning  of  July  6,  1865,  we  were 
approaching  the  delta  of  the  Mississippi,  and  were  about  eight 
miles  from  the  South  West  Pass.  Arriving  at  the  little  town 
of  Balize  we  found  the  rest  of  the  fleet  at  anchor.  We  also 
anchored  and  sent'  a  boat  to  the  town  for  a  pilot  who  soon 
came  aboard.  The  men  were  ordered  to  fill  their  canteens  and 
all  other  vessels  available  with  water  from  the  river,  before 
we  weighed  anchor,  in  order  to  be  sure  of  a  supply  of  fresh 
water  for  the  voyage.  The  adjutant  general  by  the  direction 
of  General  Willich  descended  the  side  of  the  Daniel  Webster 
and  was  lifted  from  the  ladder  by  two  stout  sailors  who  rowed 
him  to  each  of  the  other  vessels  of  the  fleet,  where  he  gave 
to  the  captain  and  the  senior  officer  in  command  of  the  troops 
the  sailing  orders  of  the  voyage.  He  does  not  remember  what 
they  were,  but  they  were  doubtless  much  like  those  pub 
lished  by  General  W^ood  when  we  started  on  the  voyage  down 
the  Mississippi.  He  recalls  vividly,  however,  how  the  light 
boat  tossed  like  an  egg  shell  in  the  waves  and  what  a  glori 
ously  exhilirating  experience  it  was. 

Soon  after  the  orders  were  delivered,  the  signal  was  given 
to  weigh  anchor  and  the  fleet  promptly  got  under  way.  As 
we  passed  out  into  the  gulf  a  school  of  porpoises  attracted 
much  attention  by  their  grotesque  antics,  being  the  first  salt 
water  fish  ever  seen  alive  by  most  of  the  men.  Most  of  us 
were  landsmen  and  had  never  seen  the  sea,  and  the  prospect, 
as  we  looked  out  over  the  broad  choppy  waters  of  the  gulf, 
was  novel  and  inspiring.  In  about  two  hours  we  were  out 
of  sight  of  land  and  this,  too,  was  a  novel  experience.  The 
next  novelty  was  a  distant  waterspout  which  we  were  told 
had  been  seldom  seen,  even  by  the  old  seamen.  It  was  noticed 
shortly  after  noon,  and  lasted  only  a.  few  minutes,  when  it 
gradually  disappeared,  leaving  a  lasting  impression  on  those 
who  beheld  it.  We  saw  a  number  of  vessels  headed  for  the 
Pass,  but  they  were  not  near  enough  to  hail.  With  the 
exception  of  another  school  of  porpoises,  which  General  Wil 
lich  at  first  called  "sharks,"1  there  was  no  other  incident 
during  the  day  to  break  the  monotony  of  life  at  sea.  The 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


FROM  NEW  ORLEANS  TO  INDIANOLO,  TEXAS  755 

officers  and  men  when  tired  of  looking  at  the  choppy  blue 
waters  and  the  phosphorescent  waves  at  the  vessel's  prow, 
read  books  or  played  games  as  wre  steamed  along.  The  day 
had  been  warm,  with  mutterings  of  distant  thunder.  That 
night  some  of  the  officers,  among  them  Colonel  McClenahan, 
had  their  cots  carried  on  deck  where  it  was  cooler.  They 
were  awakened  by  a  heavy  dash  of  rain  and  had  to  skurry 
below. 

It  rained  early  on  the  morning  of  July  7,  and  cooled  the 
decks  to  some  extent.  But  the  sun  came  out  hot  and  fiery 
and  the  men  suffered  from  thirst,  which  the  tepid  water  in 
their  canteens  did  not  wholly  quench.  Just  before  leaving 
New  Orleans  some  one  told  General  Willich  that  the  water 
in  Texas  was  very  bad — not  fit  to  drink,  in  fact — whereupon 
he  directed  Captain  Adams  of  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio,  who  was 
acting  as  brigade  quartermaster  and  purveyor,  to  procure 
several  boxes  of  Rhine  wine,  a  barrel  of  claret,  a  box  of  brandy 
and  a  hogshead  of  ice  for  the  brigade  staff.  The  supply  was 
intended  to  last  until  we  reached  a  camp  in  Texas,  but  the 
boys  soon  began  to  feign  sickness  and  General  Willich,  to 
relieve  them,  gave  so  many  orders  against  the  stock,  that  by 
the  time  we  reached  Indianola  it  was  nearly  all  gone.  Gleason 
complained  of  the  water  and  longed  for  the  cool  springs  of 
Tennessee  and  Alabama.1 

The  other  vessels  of  the  fleet  had  kept  well  to  our  left 
and  rear,  but  towards  evening,  having  hoisted  sails,  seemed 
to  be  gaining  on  us.  After  dark  we  passed  a  lighthouse  with 
a  revolving  light,  said  to  be  twenty-five  miles  from  shore. 
Some  of  the  officers  and  men  were  seasick,  among  them  Cap 
tain  Dorneck,  officer  of  the  day,  who  was  quite  helpless.1 

At  9  a.  m.,  July  8,  we  came  in  sight  of  land,  and  did  not 
lose  sight  of  it  again  during  the  voyage.  A  little  before  noon 
we  anchored  off  the  bar  at  Matagorda  Bay.  After  dinner 
General  Willich  and  some  of  his  staff  went  ashore  to  make 
arrangements  for  getting  over  the  bar.  Our  boat  was  of  too 
great  draught  to  pass  over  it,  and  we  had  to  trans-ship  in 
lighter  vessels.  While  these  vessels  were  being  secured  the 
men  amused  themselves  fishing  and  swimming,  regardless  of 
a  real  danger  from  sharks,  which  were  said  to  be  quite  numer 
ous  in  these  waters.  Towards  evening  there  was  a  stiff  breeze 
and  the  waters  became  quite  choppy.  No  lighters  appeared, 
and  after  enjoying  a  delightfully  cool  evening  on  deck,  all 
retired  for  a  good  night's  rest. 

When  we  awoke  the  morning  of  July  9,  wre  learned  that 

1     Glea  son's  Diarv. 


756  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

a  lighter  had  come  out  from  Indianola  and  was  taking  the 
Forty-ninth  Ohio  off  the  "Prometheus."  At  8  o'clock  another 
lighter,  the  "Matagorda,"  with  General  Willich  aboard,  came 
alongside  and  we  began  to  transfer  our  baggage  and  equip 
ment  to  it  as  rapidly  as  possible — the  entire  regiment  assisting 
in  the  work.  Another  boat,  more  conventiontly  arranged  for 
carrying  animals,  took  off  the  horses.  It  was  quite  interesting 
and  amusing  to  watch  the  horses  being  transferred  to  the 
lighter.  This  was  done  by  means  of  a  breadth  of  stout  duck 
with  ropes  attached  which  was  passed  under  the  animals' 
belly.  In  this  they  were  hoisted  and  lowered  over  our  vessel's 
side.  Some  of  the  horses  kicked  viciously  when  the  swing 
was  being  adjusted  and  afterwards,  but  once  ahoist  the  kick 
ing  was  harmless.  One  of  General  Willich's  horses,  a  dun, 
which  his  men  had  captured  during  the  fight  with  the  Texas 
Rangers  at  Rowlett's  Station  in  1862,  kicked  and  struggled 
until  the  general  became  alarmed,  fearing  it  would 
be  injured.  But  Captain  Adams  of  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio,  who 
was  superintending  the  work,  assured  him  his  horse  was  in 
no  danger.  One  of  the  men,  John  Schuster  of  Company  F, 
was  severely  kicked  by  it  while  adjusting  the  swing.3  We 
started  up  the  bay  on  the  Matagorda  at  10  o'clock.  There 
was  no  wharf  at  Indianola  and  the  Matagorda  could  not  get 
to  the  shore.  So  other  lighter  boats  had  to  be  employed  to  land 
us.  One  of  them,  the  "Lizzie  Lake,"  took  off  must  of  the 
regiment,  and  the  rest  were  taken  ashore  in  small  sail  boats. 
The  men  of  the  regiment  were  gathered  together  at  the  land 
ing  waiting  for  orders,  and  many  of  them  went  swimming  in 
a  pool  near  by.  Dennis  Conroy  of  Company  D,  got  beyond 
his  depth  and  was  drowning  in  plain  sight  of  the  onlookers. 
Everyone  at  once  thought  of  Hiram  K.  Brooks  of  Company 
E — "Pug"  Brooks,  he  was  called — who  was  the  most  expert 
swimmer  in  the  regiment  and  had  already  saved  the  lives  of 
a  number  of  men  who  were  drowning.  The  adjutant  general 
of  the  brigade  who  was  standing  near,  was  one  of  the 
first  to  see  Brooks,  who  was  some  distance  off,  and 
called  to  him  to  save  the  drowning  man.  He  came  at  once 
kicking  off  his  shoes  and  throwing  off  his  clothing  as  he  ran. 
He  plunged  into  the  \vater,  swam  \vith  great  speed  to  the 
spot  where  Dennis  had  gone  down  the  third  time,  dived  down 
into  the  water  and  soon  came  up,  holding  the  head  of  the 
drowning  man  above  the  water,  and  swam  ashore  with  him. 
Poor  Dennis  was  apparently  lifeless.  But  we  poured  the  water 
out  of  him,  rolled  him  on  a  barrel,  and  finally  he  came  to.  It  was 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


FROM  NEW  ORLEANS  TO  INDIANOLO.  TEXAS  757 

a  narrow  escape  for  Dennis,  and  if  it  had  not  been  for  "Pug" 
Brooks  he  certainly  would  have  drowned. 

The  water  at  Indianola,  except  a  small  supply  of  rain 
water  in  cisterns  barely  sufficient  for  the  inhabitants  of  the 
place,  was  unfit  to  drink.  The  men  had  been  cautioned  to 
fill  their  canteens  from  tanks  on  the  boats  before  leaving 
them,  so  as  to  have  a  sufficient  supply  to  last  until  we  got  to 
camp  at  Green  Lake,  said  to  be  eighteen  miles  distant,  and 
to  which  point  we  were  to  march  as  soon  as  our  horses  were 
got  ashore.  We  were  saved  the  trouble  of  transferring  the 
horses  to  lighter  boats,  as  they  were  dropped  into  the  water 
and  swarm  ashore  and  were  caught  and  corralled.  As  soon 
as  they  were  landed  the  brigade  moved  to  the  outskirts  of  the 
town  and  there  halted  until  General  Willich  and  staff  came 
up  with  a  guide.  We  then  moved  off  in  a  southwesterly 
direction,  skirting  the  bay  a  mile  or  so,  and  then  struck  out 
across  the  almost  trackless  prairie  for  Green  Lake.  That 
night  march  was  one  of  the  most  trying  we  had  ever  ex 
perienced.  The  men  had  overloaded  their  knapsacks  and 
did  not  march  with  their  usual  vigor.  All  night  long  we  fol 
lowed  our  guide  over  the  arid  plain,  which  was  wholly  without 
water  of  any  kind.  The  men  gave  out  rapidly  and  straggled, 
or  dropped  asleep  during  the  halts,  to  be  left  behind  in  the 
darkness.  No  tree,  or  shrub,  or  habitation,  was  visible  during 
the  long  march.  Gleason  says  he  longed  for  a  sight  of  timber 
as  he  never  had  before.  To  add  to  our  discomfort,  as  soon  as 
we  struck  the  prairie  myriads  of  mosquitos  rose  up  out  of  the 
ground  and  viciously  attacked  both  men  and  horses.  The 
horses  suffered  terribly  from  them.  Gleason  says  that  he 
frequently  scraped  them  off  his  horse's  neck,  head  and  flanks. 
Some  officers  of  the  brigade  staff  had  bought  in  New  Orelans 
broad  brimmed  sombreros  to  protect  them  from  the  hot  sun. 
One  of  them  pulled  his  sombrero  brim  down  over  his  neck 
and  face,  tied  it  around  his  neck  with  his  handkerchief,  leav 
ing  only  sufficient  opening  to  breathe  through,  and  kept  the 
mosquitos  away  from  this  opening  by  a  bunch  of  weeds  he 
pulled  from  the  prairie.  He  pulled  his  coat  sleeves  over  his 
buckskin  gauntlets  and  shaking  his  bridle  reins  to  keep  the 
pests  off  his  hands,  for  they  actually  bit  through  his  gloves, 
and  fighting  them  away  from  his  nose  with  the  bunch  of 
weeds,  he  rode  silently  along  in  the  darkness.  Each  enlisted 
man  had  been  given  a  mosquito  net  before  we  left  New 
Orleans,  and  some  of  them  protected  themselves  by  wrapping 
the  nets  about  their  heads.  The  men  still  had  on  their  sea 
legs.  The  prairie  was  broken  by  innumerable  gopher  hills 


758  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

until  it  looked  like  the  sea  and  seemed  to  roll  like  it,  and  added 
to  the  toilsomeness  of  the  march.  A  little  before  sunrise  the 
word  was  passed  along  the  line  that  we  were  ''only  two  miles 
from  the  lake,"  but  after  going  three  miles  the  lake  was  ap 
parently  as  far  off  as  ever.  The  sun  came  up  red  and  fiery 
hot,  and  there  was  not  a  breath  of  air  stirring.  Every  one 
was  seized  by  an  intolerable  thirst  which  the  warm  water  in 
the  canteens  did  not  assuage.  Some  had  neglected  to  fill 
their  canteens  with  water  on  board  ship,  as  had  been  ordered, 
and  suffered  intensely.  Many  fell  down  from  sheer  exhaus 
tion.  Some  fixed  bayonets  and  sticking  the  bayonet  ends  of 
their  guns  in  the  ground,  hung  their  pieces  of  shelter  tents 
on  them  and  crouched  or  lay  in  the  little  shade  they  afforded. 
The  column  kept  doggedly  on,  the  head  of  it  reaching  the  lake 
about  8  a.  m.,  when  the  men  waded  into  it  up  to  their  waists  and 
drank  the  water  like  thirsty  cattle.  Nearly  one-third  the 
brigade  were  scattered  out  over  the  prairie  for  three  or  four 
miles  back,  and  it  was  a  problem  how  to  relieve  them,  as  we 
had  no  wagons.  All  the  canteens  of  the  men  who  had  arrived 
were  filled  from  the  lake,  some  empty  barrels  and  tubs  and 
a  team  of  horses  or  two  were  found  around  the  lake  and 
requisitioned,  the  vessels  were  also  filled  from  the  lake  and 
relief  parties  were  started  back  along  the  line  of  march  to 
relieve  the  suffering  men  and  get  them  into  camp.  All 
the  mounted  brigade  and  regimental  officers  and  some  who 
were  not  mounted  engaged  in  the  work,  but  it  was  late  in  the 
evening  before  all  the  stragglers  were  brought  in.  The  dis 
tance  from  Indianola  had  been  reported  to  be  eighteen  miles, 
but  it  was  much  longer.  Gregory  says  it  was  thirty  miles,1 
but  the  writer's  recollection  is  that  it  was  twenty-five  miles. 

After  it  was  reported  that  all  the  men  had  been  gathered 
in,  there  was  a  conference  at  brigade  headquarters,  at  which 
it  was  disclosed  that  we  were  about  out  of  rations.  General 
Willich  said  that  some  one  must  go  at  once  to  Indianola  to 
bring  up  a  supply,  and  to  inform  the  commander  of  the 
brigade  immediately  following  us  of  our  experience,  and 
caution  him  not  to  undertake  the  march  without  wagons  and 
ambulances  and  a  sufficient  supply  of  water.  It  was  really 
Captain  Crawford's  place  to  go,  as  he  was  chief  commissary 
of  the  brigade,  but  he  pleaded  exhaustion  from  the  all  night 
march  and  the  exertions  of  the  day,  and  it  fell  to  the  adju 
tant  general  of  the  brigade  to  perform  this  duty.  He  had 
his  horses  well  fed  and  watered  and  about  sunset  started 
back  over  the  wide  prairie,  accompanied  only  by  his  orderly, 

1     Gregory's  Diary. 


FROM  NEW  ORLEANS  TO  INDIANOLO,  TEXAS  759 

Rufus  Keilholtz  of  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio.  It  was  a  toilsome 
ride,  but  both  the  horses  were  sure  footed  and  accustomed  to 
their  riders,  and  both  he  and  his  orderly  got  snatches  of 
sleep  as  they  rode  along,  in  spite  of  the  mosquitos.  At  day 
light  they  reached  Indianola  and  while  Rufus  took  care  of  the 
horses,  the  adjutant  general  went  out  over  the  bar  in  a  small  boat, 
had  an  interview  with  Colonel  Hall,  commanding  the  brigade 
immediately  following  ours,  gave  him  General  Willich's  mes 
sage  and  then  returned  to  Indianola.  He  then  hunted  up 
some  wagons,  had  them  loaded  with  rations  and  started  with 
them  to  Green  Lake  where  they  arrived  in  the  evening.  It 
was  the  severest  service  the  adjutant  general  had  undergone 
When  he  reached  his  tent  he  found  that  his  faithful  colored 
servant,  Charles  Anderson,  had  prepared  his  cot  and  had  a 
mosquito  bar  over  it.  He  crept  into  the  cot,  the  faithful 
Charles  tucked  in  the  mosquito  bar  closely  all  around  and  he 
slept  the  sleep  of  a  tired  man. 

We  remained  in  camp  at  Green  Lake  just  one  month. 
Aside  from  the  intense  heat  and  the  mosquitos,  it  was  a 
pleasant  camp.  At  times  the  heat  was  tempered  by  a  stiff 
breeze,  which  sometimes  increased  to  a  gale  and  blew  down 
tents  and  tent  flys.  Around  the  shores  of  the  lake  luscious 
wild  grapes  abounded,  and  from  the  haciendas  scattered 
about  on  the  prairie  within  a  radius  of  ten  miles,  we  got  an 
occasional  chicken  and  sometimes  delicious  watermelons. 
When  we  wanted  beef  the  brigade  commissary  with  a  squad 
of  men  went  out  on  the  prairie,  rounded  up  two  or  three 
line  steers,  and  shot  them,  keeping  a  record  of  the  brands,  so 
as  to  settle  with  the  owners.  Some  of  the  men  who  wanted 
milk,  built  a  pen,  in  which  they  put  calves  which  they  had 
run  down  and  captured.  The  mothers  of  the  calves  remained 
about  the  pens,  and  when  milk  was  wanted  the  cows  were 
let  into  the  pens  and  the  calves  turned  outside.  The  cows 
were  then  caught  and  held  until  they  were  milked.  The 
calves  were  then  returned  to  the  pens  and  the  cows  turned 
outside.  Alligators  were  numerous  in  the  lake,  and  the  men 
had  rare  sport  shooting  them.  Some  of  them  were  quite  large, 
measuring  eleven  and  twelve  feet  in  length.  At  Espirito 
Santo  Bay,  a  few  miles  from  our  camp,  there  were  hard- 
shelled  crabs  to  be  caught,  and  both  men  and  officers  tried 
their  hands  in  taking  them.  Even  General  Willich  joined  one 
expedition  to  the  bay  to  fish  for  them.  The  sunsets  were  un 
usually  brilliant.  There  was  an  indescribable  charm  in  the 
broad  lake  and  broader  prairie,  canopied  by  the  still  broader 
firmament,  studded  at  night  by  myriads  of  stars.  During  the 


760  FIFTEKNTII   OHIO  VOLUNTEERS   AND  CAMPAIGNS 

day  the  mosquitoes  seemed  to  drop  into  the  prairie  grass  and 
almost  wholly  disappear.  Also  during  the  day  the  cattle, 
horses  and  mules  which  ran  free  on  the  prairie,  almost 
wholly  disappeared.  But  at  sunset  far  away  on  the 
horizon  we  would  see  here  and  there  the  advance  strag 
glers  of  great  herds  moving  towards  us.  Their  numbers 
increased  until  finally  the  whole  prairie  would  be  covered  with 
them,  moving  down  to  the  lake  to  drink.  It  was  wonderful  to 
watch  the  cattle  moving  and  to  hear  their  long  horns  clashing  as 
they  crowded  each  other  in  their  haste  to  reach  the  water.  There 
were  other  interesting  features  of  the  life  at  Green  Lake,  but 
their  novelty  did  not  wholly  serve  to  make  the  men  contented. 
They  had  been  disheartened  and  discouraged  by  the  first  dread 
ful  march  on  Texas  soil.  They  did  not  know  why  they  were 
required  to  endure  such  hardships,  after  the  war  was  over.  There 
was  no  enemy  anywhere  that  they  knew  of  and  it  was  generally 
believed  that  Kirby  Smith's  army  had  surrendered.  The  real 
object  of  the  campaign  was  not  disclosed  to  them,  nor  to  the  sub 
ordinate  officers.  As  a  result  the  insubordinate  and  mutinous 
spirit  which  had  been  repressed  at  Nashville  was  revived.  Some 
houses  in  the  neighborhood  were  looted  and  some  cattle  were 
wantonly  slaughtered  on  the  prairie.  On  the  morning  of  July 
23,  the  regiments  were  formed  without  arms  and  marched  to 
brigade  headquarters,  where  General  Willich  denounced  the 
"reskills"  who  had  committed  these  depredations.  To  prevent 
their  repetition  be  issued  orders  that  the  arms  should  all  be  care 
fully  cleaned  and  an  account  taken  of  the  ammunition  on  hand. 
The  arms  of  each  regiment  were  then  to  be  stacked  "in  double 
column  closed  in  mass"  and  a  guard  was  to  be  placed  over  them. 
After  three  days  the  guns  might  be  removed  and  parties  in  charge 
of  a  commissioned  officer  would  be  allowed  to  hunt  and  shoot 
alligators.  That  evening  Colonel  Askew  was  so  impressed  by  the 
prevailing  discontent  that  he  wrote  a  letter  to  Captain  Danford 
urging  him  to  use  his  influence  to  have  the  regiment  mustered 
out.1  The  same  evening  Lieutenant  Colonel  McClenahan  learned 
that  a  number  of  men  were  plotting  to  desert  during  the  night, — 
first  taking  all  the  horses  they  could  lay  hands  on.  This  was  at 
once  reported  to  brigade  headquarters  and  reliable  men  were 
placed  to  guard  the  horses  at  all  the  headquarters.  On  the 
morning  of  July  13,  Captain  Pickering  reported  that  five  men 
of  Company  I  had  deserted  the  night  before.  The  morning  of 
July  16,  nine  more  desertions  were  reported  from  Companies  A 
and  B,  and  among  them  were  some  of  the  most  reliable  soldiers 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


FROM  NEW  ORLEANS  TO  INDIANOLO,  TEXAS  761 

in  these  companies.    It  was  also  reported  that  several  men  of  the 
Eighth  Kansas  had  deserted. 

General  Willich  decided  that  it  was  better  for  the  command 
to  keep  every  one  busy  and  ordered  daily  regimental  drills  and 
dress  parades  and  brigade  drill  in  the  evenings.  He  was  ex 
tremely  solicitous  regarding  the  comfort  of  the  men  and  tried  to 
keep  in  constant  touch  with  them.  He  would  ride  into  company 
quarters,  talk  with  the  men,  taste  the  soup  which  was  being  pre 
pared,  and  then  say,  "Poys,  I  will  come  back  and  take  a  plate  of 
soup  mit  you."  He  never  forgot  to  keep  these  engagements,  and 
one  frequently  saw  him  seated  with  the  men  and  sharing  their 
noon  day  or  evening  meal.  He  could  do  this  without  any  loss 
of  dignity.  Every  one  loved  and  respected  him.  But  all  his 
efforts  and  the  efforts  of  other  officers  of  the  brigade  could  not 
allay  the  general  feeling  of  discontent. 

General  Wood  had  arrived  July  13,  and  July  17,  issued 
orders  requiring  camps  to  be  policed  and  daily  drill  in  all  the 
regiments.  General  Willich  also  issued  an  order  directing  regi 
mental  commanders  to  report  every  morning  the  changes  which 
had  occurred  in  their  regiments  during  the  previous  day  and 
night.  The  morning  of  July  18,  nine  desertions  were  reported 
from  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  the  night  before.1 

July  20,  the  regimental  camp  was  moved  about  one-fourth 
mile  nearer  the  lake  where  there  were  some  fig  trees  with  fruit 
bginning  to  ripen.1  That  evening  Colonel  Askew  returned  from 
brigade  headquarters  and  reported  that  five  deserters  from  the 
Fifty-first  Indiana  had  returned,  and  it  was  hoped  that  some  of 
our  men  who  had  deserted  would  do  the  same.  Indeed  this  was 
expected,  for  the  hardships  and  dangers  of  trying  to  get  across 
to  the  Mississippi  river  over  land  would  be  greater  than  those 
suffered  by  the  men  who  remained  with  the  command.  July  23, 
Gleason  records  that  he  spent  some  time  with  Doctor  Clark,  our 
surgeon,  who  had  a  day  or  two  before  returned  from  a  leave  of 
absence,  writing  down  the  music  of  ''Tramp,  Tramp,  Tramp!'' 
That  he  had  recognized  the  air  as  one  which  the  author,  Mr.  Geo. 
F.  Root,  had  submitted  to  his  class,  of  which  Gleason  \vas  a  mem 
ber,  in  Chicago  in  IS  GO,  asking  their  opinion  whether  it  had  the 
qualities  which  would  make  it  popular.  The  class  having  ex 
pressed  a  favorable  opinion  of  it,  Mr.  Root  said  he  might  print 
it  some  day.  Gleason  adds,  "How  little  I  then  dreamed  of  the 
subject  to  which  his  melody  would  be  wedded  in  the  future,  or 
when  it  would  reach  me  again."  That  evening,  the  Gleasons  and 
Colonel  McClenahan  were  again  heard  singing  in  the  camp. 

1     Gleason's  Diary.  Sig-.    2f» 


762  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

July  25,  Lieutenants  Alex  C.  Moore  and  John  W.  Wilson 
arrived  from  Indianola  and  reported  that  the  work  of  unloading 
the  troops  of  the  Fourth  Corps  was  not  yet  completed,  owing  to 
heavy  seas,  which  prevented  the  transfer  to  the  lighters,  and 
that  one  vessel  had  gone  to  Galveston  to  transfer  her  load  to  a 
coaster  which  could  get  over  the  bar.1.  By  July  28,  General 
Stanley  had  arrived  at  Green  Lake  and  was  temporarily  located 
at  division  headquarters.  That  evening  Win.  McConnell  reports 
that  "he,  (General  Stanley)  was  evidently  in  very  good  humor 
for  he  sat  on  the  porch  and  sang."2 

The  last  entry  in  William  McConnell's  diary,  from  which  we 
have  often  quoted  is  dated  August  2,  1865.  It  shows  him  to  have 
been  very  busy  with  his  duties  as  clerk  of  the  mustering  officer 
at  division  headquarters,  where  he  had  been  employed  since 
August  14,  1864.  That  night  he  died  suddenly,  having  been  sick 
only  an  hour.  He  had  enlisted  September  16,  1861,  and  had  been 
wounded  and  taken  prisoner  at  the  battle  of  Stone  River.  After 
his  exchange  he  returned  to  the  regiment  and  re-enlisted  as  a 
veteran  at  Strawberry  Plains  in  January,  1864.  He  was  well 
known  and  beloved  by  many  in  the  command  and  his  sudden 
death  was  a  great  shock  to  all  who  knew  him.  He  was  buried 
at  Green  Lake,  August  3,  at  2  p.  m.  and  when  the  regiment  was 
mustered  out  in  November  afterwards,  some  of  his  comrades  of 
Company  I,  had  his  body  taken  up,  enclosed  in  a  metallic  coffin, 
and  took  it  home  with  them.  He  was  re-buried  at  his  home  in 
Auburn  Township,  Crawford  County,  Ohio. 

August  7,  there  were  rumors  that  the  regiment  was  to  be 
mustered  out  which  were  generally  believed,  until  an  order  came 
to  send  all  sick  to  the  hospital  in  Victoria.  This  indicated  that 
we  were  to  march  further  into  the  interior  of  the  state.3  Next 
day  rumors  of  a  move  were  confirmed.  At  brigade  drill  in  the 
evening,  General  Willich  read  some  orders  in  regard  to  the  con 
templated  march  which  he  said  was  soon  to  take  place.  That 
evening  it  was  reported  that  several  desertions  were  being 
planned,  but  as  no  names  were  given,  no  steps  were  taken  to 
prevent  them.3  The  next  morning  August  9,  five  desertions 
were  reported  from  Company  D  and  it  was  said  a  large  number 
had  gone  from  other  regiments  of  the  brigade.  There  was  bri 
gade  drill  in  the  evening  and  after  dark  Gleason  learned  that  a 
paper  was  being  circulated  and  numerously  signed  by  men  of 
the  regiment,  protesting  against  orders  to  march  and  refusing 
to  obey  them.  Colonel  Askew  had  gone  to  brigade  headquarters 
to  play  whist  with  General  Willich,  his  adjutant  general  and 

1  Gleason's  Diary.  3     Gleasou's  Diary. 

2  McConnell's  Diary. 


FROM  NEW  ORLEANS  TO  INDIANOLO,  TEXAS  763 

Captain  Adams,  and  was  not  informed  of  it  until  next  morn 
ing.  As  orders  had  been  received  to  march  at  3  p.  m.,  he  de 
cided  to  take  prompt  action.  The  adjutant  was  directed  to  have 
the  companies  turn  out  without  arms  at  12  :30  p.  m.,  when  they 
were  formed  in  a  hollow  square,  Colonel  Askew  being  in  the 
center.  He  had  a  copy  of  the  "protest,"  as  it  was  called,  and 
read  it  and  tried  to  show  the  men  how  reprehensible  and  foolish 
it  was:  He  then  formed  the  regiment  in  line  and  asked  all  the 
men  who  were  willing  to  obey  orders  until  regularly  mustered 
out  to  step  ten  paces  to  the  front.  Much  to  his  surprise  less  than 
one-half  the  regiment  stepped  out,  the  rest  remaining  sullenly  in 
line.  He  then  directed  the  adjutant  to  get  the  names  of  those 
who  refused  to  step  to  the  front.  He  afterwards  asked  all  who 
would  obey  the  present  order  to  march,  to  express  their  willing 
ness  to  do  so.  Only  sixteen  men,  all  of  Company  A  were  re 
ported  as  not  being  willing,  and  General  Willich  who  had  come 
upon  the  scene,  gave  them  a  sound  lecture  and  they  were  then 
dismissed  and  sent  to  quarters.  Gleason  says  "To  the  honor  of 
my  own  Company  (H),  not  a  man  of  it  refused  to  respond  to 
the  call  of  duty  when  the  crucial  test  came,  and  it  was  the  only 
company  whose  ranks  were  solid.1  General  Willich  announced 
that  the  assembly  would  be  sounded  from  brigade  headquarters 
at  2  p.  m.  During  the  two  hours  between  the  incidents  just  re 
lated  and  the  time  when  the  bugler  should  sound  the  "assembly," 
the  minds  of  General  Willich  and  his  staff  and  the  regimental 
commanders  were  filled  with  anxiety.  But  at  the  appointed  hour 
the  clear  bugle  note  from  brigade  headquarters  sounded  over 
the  prairie,  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  fell  into  line,  every  man  in  the 
ranks,  and  moved  off  in  perfect  order,  taking  the  road  to  Vic 
toria.  It  was  thought  that  the  rebellious  spirit  in  the  command 
was  again  repressed, and  it  did  seem  so  at  first.  There  was  a 
fine  breeze  when  the  column  moved  out  which  tempered  the  heat 
and  made  the  marching  not  unpleasant.  But  we  soon  came  to  a 
portion  of  road  where  the  sand  was  deep  and  the  marching  hard. 
The  water  in  the  canteens  had  become  heated  in  the  evening  sun, 
that  carried  in  the  wagons  was  eaqually  hot,  and  many  of  the 
men  became  sullen  and  mad  and  began  firing  off  their  guns. 
Scores  of  men  in  the  brigade,  broke  their  guns  and  threw  them 
by  the  road  side.  Many  were  exhausted  by  heat  and  thirst  and 
began  to  straggle  and  fall  out.  At  last,  at  9  p.  m.,  we  reached 
water  in  a  little  bayou  and  went  into  camp  pitching  our  tents  in 
the  darkness.  We  had  marched  fifteen  miles. 

The  next  morning,  August  11,  Gleason,  adjutant  of  the  regi- 
ment,  reported  that  eleven  men  of  the  regiment  had  disappeared 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


764  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

during  the  march  of  the  day  before,  or  during  the  night,  and  that 
thirty-four  guns  had  been  broken  up  or  thrown  away,  besides 
accouterments.1  It  was  proposed  to  replace  the  guns  and  ac- 
couterments  when  we  reached  Victoria,  charging  their  cost  to  the 
men  who  had  broken  or  thrown  them  away.  August  11  at  3  p.  m., 
the  brigade  resumed  its  march  and  at  9  p.  m.,  reached  Victoria. 
We  marched  through  the  town  without  halting  and  forded  the 
shallow  Guadaloupe  River  to  a  wooded  island  where  we  en 
camped  for  the  night.  The  distance  marched  was  nine  miles. 

August  12,  we  did  not  march  until  4  p.  m.  By  that  time  the 
heat  was  not  so  intense  and  there  was  a  light  breeze.  Before 
starting  General  Willich  called  the  regimental  commanders  to 
his  headquarters  for  consultation.  It  was  sixteen  miles  to  the 
nearest  water  on  the  route  we  were  expected  to  take.  There 
was,  howrever,  said  to  be  a  water  hole  eight  miles  distant,  but  it 
would  not  furnish  sufficient  water  for  the  entire  brigade.  It  was 
therefore  decided  to  haul  a  supply  in  the  wagons,  and  also  as 
many  of  the  mens  blankets  and  knapsacks  as  possible.  Requisition 
was  made  for  guns  to  replace  those  broken  and  thrown  away  by 
the  men,  but  only  eleven  C.  S.  muskets,  without  accoutrements, 
could  be  obtained.  After  a  march  of  an  hour  we  left  the  river 
bottom  and  struck  out  across  the  prairie  in  a  northwesterly  di 
rection,  paying  little  attention  to  travelled  roads.  Under  the  di 
rection  of  our  guide  we  took  another  route,  and  after  marching 
twelve  miles  came  to  Coleto  Creek,  which  we  crossed  and  went 
into  camp. 

On  the  13th,  we  resumed  our  march  at  3  :30  p.  m.  The  sun 
was  extremely  hot,  but  after  marching  a  mile  or  so  we  struck  the 
open  prairie  and  a  fine  breeze,  which  made  the  marching  less 
unpleasant.  Major  Dubois  and  Captain  Davis  rode  ahead  to  se 
lect  a  suitable  camping  ground,  and  when  we  were  within  three 
or  four  miles  of  camp  an  orderly  sent  by  them  came  to  guide  us 
to  it.  General  Willich,  however,  chose  to  rely  on  our  guide,  an 
old  Mexican,  who  said  he  could  lead  us  by  a  nearer  route  to 
water.  So  we  left  the  route,  bearing  off  to  the  left,  and  after 
going  two  or  three  miles  came  to  the  bed  of  the  creek  the  guide 
had  recommended  as  a  good  place  to  camp.  It  was  dry  as  a  bone, 
with  not  a  sign  of  water.  After  marching  some  distance  further 
in  the  darkness,  the  brigade  was  halted  and  aides  and  orderlies 
were  sent  out  in  every  direction  to  search  for  water,  or  for  the 
camp  which  had  been  selected  by  Dubois  and  Davis.  Finally  a 

1     Glenson's  Diary. 


FROM  NEW  ORLEANS  TO  INDIAXOLO,  TEXAS  765 

light  was  seen  about  two  miles  off,  which  proved  to  be  the  camp. 
In  the  mean  time  the  bugles  were  blowing  to  get  the  men  to 
gether  and  our  drummer  rolled  his  drum,  executing  what  General 
Willich  called  a  "warble."1  Our  camp  had  been  located  on 
Perdido  Creek,  and  when  we  reached  it  we  found  no  running 
water.  A  small  stream  trickled  from  one  sand  spit  to  another, 
but  the  water  was  so  impregnated  with  animal  deposits  that  we 
could  taste  the  filth,  even  in  the  blackest  coffee.1  It  was  all  the 
water  we  had  and  we  had  to  make  the  best  of  it.  The  day's 
march  was  fourteen  miles.  The  morning  of  the  14th,  Colonel 
Askew  made  an  unexpected  discovery.  Going  to  his  saddle  bags 
for  a  towel,  he  found  a  snake  coiled  inside.  He  at  once  offered 
it  to  the  chaplain  to  add  to  his  collection  of  horned  toads,  centi 
pedes,  alligator  teeth,  etc.,  but  the  offer  was  declined.  Wild 
grapes  were  abundant  along  the  creek  and  many  were  brought 
into  camp.  Quartermaster  Welker  found  that  by  sinking  holes 
in  the  sand  of  the  creek  bed,  much  better  water  could  be  ob 
tained.  Holes  were  therefore  dug  in  which  cracker  boxes  were 
sunk,  and  in  this  way  the  men  got  palatable  water  with  which 
to  fill  their  canteens  for  the  next  march.  We  started  at  3:30 
p.  m.,  and  marched  thirteen  miles  to  Manahuila  Creek,  where  we 
found  fairly  good  water  in  pools  along  its  bed. 

August  15,  General  Willich  decided  to  send  the  teams  ahead 
with  the  cooks  and  all  the  camp  equipage,  under  charge  of  an 
officer.  Other  officers  went  ahead  to  select  the  camps  and  see  that 
the  cooks  had  supper  prepared  by  the  time  the  brigade  arrived. 
The  wagons  were  loaded  and  started  at  1  p.  m.  The  bugles 
sounded  at  3  :30  p.  m.  and  we  began  the  day's  march.  The  heat 
was  the  most  trying  we  had  yet  experienced.  It  seemed  too  hot 
for  endurance.  We  were  now  on  a  rolling  table  land  broken 
with  gullies,  where  torrents  had  roared  in  wet  weather  but  which 
were  now  dry.  After  marching  six  miles  we  came  to  a  creek, 
containing  some  water  in  pools,  and  the  men  filled  their  canteens. 
A  group  of  houses  near  by  bore  the  name  of  "Pole  cat"  which 
gave  rise  to  many  amusing  remarks.  A  little  after  dark  we  saw 
the  lights  of  our  camp  fires  and  the  men  quickened  their  paces. 
We  reached  camp  about  9 :  30  p.  m.  and  found  tents  up  and 
supper  ready.  We  had  marched  about  twelve  miles. 

The  next  morning  we  found  that  our  camp  was  located,  as 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


766  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

on  previous  days,  along  a  small  stream  in  which  water  was  found 
in  pools. 

August  16,  the  wagons  started  ahead  at  2  p.  m.  and  the  bri 
gade  afterwards  followed  at  the  usual  time.  The  heat  was  so 
intense  that  after  marching  an  hour  the  brigade  was  halted  in  a 
grove  until  it  became  cooler,  as  it  did  late  in  the  evening.  Some 
time  after  dark  we  saw  the  lights  of  our  camp  fires,  which  we 
were  a  long  time  reaching,  but  when  we  did  reach  them  we  found 
tents  up  and  supper  waiting.  We  had  marched  eleven  miles  and 
had  reached  Helena  on  the  Rio  San  Antonio,  where  we  found 
water  sufficient  not  only  for  drinking  but  for  bathing.  For  this 
we  were  devoutly  thankful. 

August  17,  the  orders  were  to  march  as  near  3  p.  m.  as  the 
temperature  would  permit,  the  wagons  to  start  at  2  p.  m.  The 
regiment  started  at  the  usual  time,  the  air  being  unusually  humid 
and  the  heat  intense.  Passing  by  a  wretched  little  hamlet  some 
young  ladies  sent  a  request  to  Colonel  Askew  to  have  the  band 
play.  That  officer  curtly  sent  word  that  the  band  was  "played 
out,"1  which  was  near  the  truth.  The  rumbling  of  thunder  and 
a  black  cloud  on  the  horizon  gave  hope  of  a  shower.  The  hope 
was  soon  realized  for  suddenly  we  were  in  the  midst  of  a  tropical 
storm,  which  drenched  all  who  were  not  protected  by  ponchos  or 
coats.  The  storm  ceased  almost  as  suddenly  as  it  began,  the  sun 
shown  out  bright  and  hot,  and  a  beautiful  rainbow  appeared 
just  before  us.  From  a  point  in  rear  of  the  head  of  the 
column,  General  Willich,  on  his  big  gray  horse,  seemed  to  be 
leading  the  brigade  directly  under  the  center  of  the  glorious  arch. 
He  had  just  before  been  telling  his  adjutant  general  that  he 
"would  like  to  take  the  old  First  Brigade  and  land  on  the  shore 
of  Northern  Germany  and  declare  a  republic."  The  two  inci 
dents  had  no  relation  to  each  other,  but  are  recalled  together. 
The  officers  charged  with  the  duty  of  selecting  a  suitable  camping 
place  had  preceded  the  wagons,  and  the  officer  in  charge  of  the 
train  had  by  mistake  not  followed  them  but  had  taken  another 
road.  The  brigade  followed  the  train  and  at  night  fall  came  to 
the  attractive  little  Polish  village  of  Palo  Maria.  The  vesper 
bells  were  ringing  and  the  air  was  sweet  and  cool.  It  was  a 
pleasant  experience,  but  there  was  no  time  to  indulge  in  senti 
ment  for  it  was  found  we  were  on  the  wrong  road  and  did  not 
know  how  to  get  to  camp  without  retracing  our  steps.  The  ad- 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


FROM  NEW  ORLEANS  TO  INDIANOLO,  TEXAS  767 

jutant  general  of  the  brigade  finally  secured  a  guide  at  the  vil 
lage,  who  undertook  to  lead  us  across  the  country  to  our  camp. 
It  was  a  weary  night  march  and  at  one  or  two  places  the  banks 
of  dry  streams  had  to  be  cut  down  by  the  pioneers  before  the 
wagons  could  be  got  over  them.  There  was  much  grumbling 
and  some  swearing,  but  we  finally  reached  camp  at  11  p.  m., 
having  marched  about  fifteen  miles.  Our  camp  was  on  Cibolo 
(Buffalo)  River.1 

The  morning  of  August  18,  the  men  found  occupation  in 
gathering  wild  grapes  which  were  abundant  and  the  finest  we 
had  yet  seen.  A  number  of  the  officers  and  men  went  fishing  in 
the  river  and  found  many  fish  to  large  to  be  taken  with  the 
ordinary  tackle.  Some  very  large  ones  were  caught.1  The 
wagons  started  at  1  p.  m.  and  as  the  sky  was  overcast  the  troops 
marched  at  2  p.  m.  In  the  afternoon  we  had  another  tropical 
storm,  more  severe  than  that  of  the  day  before.  The  distance  to 
l>e  marched  was  said  to  be  thirteen  miles  but  on  account  of  in 
sufficient  water  we  pushed  on  four  miles  farther  to  a  Mexican 
ranch  on  the  San  Antonio  River,  which  we  reached  at  9  :30  p.  m. 
We  were  now  said  to  be  thirty-two  miles  from  our  destination. 

August  19,  we  marched  ten  miles,  starting  the  wagons  at 
1  :30  p.  m.  and  following  them  in  about  an  hour.  We  reached 
camp  on  Calaveras  Creek  at  7  :30  p.  m.,  it  being  the  first  time 
we  had  got  into  camp  before  dark.  Water  melons  were  abundant 
along  the  road  and  almost  every  man  was  provided  with  one  be 
fore  camp  was  reached.1 

Sunday,  August  20,  found  us  short  of  rations,  but  Captain 
Crawford,  brigade  commissary,  had  gone  to  San  Antonio  and  it 
was  said  he  would  meet  us  at  our  next  stopping  place  with  a 
fresh  supply.  In  the  meantime  details  were  sent  out  after  beef, 
but  returned  too  late  for  some  of  the  men  to  get  it  cooked  before 
marching.  A  detail  of  pioneers  was  set  to  work  to  fix  the  cross 
ing  of  the  creek,  so  teams  could  cross  over  it,  and  in  the  afternoon 
we  resumed  our  march,  our  regiment  being  in  the  advance.  After 
marching  an  hour  General  Willich  concluded  it  was  too  hot  for 
the  men  and  halted  the  brigade  in  a  shady  place  for  nearly  ar 
hour.  The  country  was  more  hilly  than  any  we  had  traversed  in 
Texas  and  apparently  more  productive.  It  was  also  less  sparsely 
settled.  The  inhabitants  were  mostly  Mexicans,  and  horse 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


768  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

racing  seemed  to  be  the  chief  Sunday  amusement.  We  reached 
camp  quite  unexpectedly  at  6  :30  p.  m.,  after  a  march  of  eight 
miles  and  had  supper  before  sunset.  Safeguards  were  placed 
at  all  the  houses  in  the  neighborhood  and  for  four  miles  back. 
The  supply  train  had  arrived  from  San  Antonio  with  rations  and 
a  company  of  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  was  detailed  to  escort  it  back 
to  the  city. 

August  21,  we  resumed  our  march  at  the  usual  hour.  The 
heat  was  so  great  that  some  of  the  men  gave  out,  but  the  most 
of  them  stood  it  remarkably  well.  Only  two  houses  were  passed 
during  the  day  and  they  were  so  far  from  the  road  that  there 
was  no  inducement  for  the  men  to  straggle.  We  iinally  reached 
the  Salado,  a  stream  five  miles  from  San  Antonio,  crossed  it  and 
found  our  tents  already  pitched  in  a  densely  wooded  bottom 
land  on  its  bank.  Our  long  trying  and  dangerous  march  was 
over,  and  although  we  did  not  know  it,  we  were  to  remain  here 
until  the  Mexican  situation  had  become  such  that  we  could  with 
safety  be  mustered  out. 


CHAPTER  XXXVI. 

THE  TEXAS   CAMPAIGN. — CONDITIONS  IN   MEXICO  AND  ALONG 

THE  Rio  GRANDE. — THREE  MONTHS  IN  SAN  ANTONIA 

AND  MUSTER  OUT  OF  REGIMENT. 

While  we  were  enroute  from  Johnsonville,  Term,  and  under 
going  the  trials  and  hardships  related  in  the  two  preceding  chap 
ters,  unknown  to  us,  other  troops  were  undergoing  perhaps  even 
greater  hardships,  with  the  view  of  restoring  order  in  Texas, 
gathering  up  the  guns  and  stores  carried  off  by  Kirby  Smith's 
men  after  their  disbandment  and  irregular  surrender,  and  inter 
posing  a  force  sufficiently  strong  on  the  Rio  Grande  to  prevent 
any  organized  Confederate  force  from  going  into  Mexico  to  join 
Maximilian,  and  at  the  same  time  to  warn  the  Imperialists  that 
their  occupation  of  Mexico  was  regarded  as  an  act  hostile  to  the 
United  States. 

In  fact  a  leading  object  in  sending  such  a  large  force  to 
Texas,  was  as  General  Grant  plainly  stated,  to  force  the  French 
and  Austrians  to  quit  the  soil  of  our  sister  republic. 

About  June  29,  Sheridan  had  started  Merritt's  column  of 
cavalry,  5500  strong,  "said  to  be  the  finest  which  had  marched 
during  the  war,"  from  Shreveport,  La.,  to  San  Antonia,  by  way 
of  Austin,  and  Custer's  column,  equally  strong,  was  to  start  soon 
from  Alexandria,  La.  and  march  across  the  state  by  way  of 
Houston.1 

July  1,  General  Grant  by  telegraph  ordered  General  Sheri 
dan  to  get  his  troops  on  the  Rio  Grande  in  readiness  for  active 
service  should  the  emergency  arise,  and  to  demand  the  return 
of  all  public  property  carried  to  the  south  side  of  the  Rio  Grande 
since  Kirby  Smith's  surrender.2 

General  Sheridan  on  the  same  day  telegraphed  to  General 
Grant  that  he  had  had  issued  orders  declaring  all  slaves  free,  and 
directing  all  arms  to  be  given  up  and  all  public  property  returned, 
that  he  had  directed  General  Steele,  who  was  in  command  of 
the  forces  on  the  Rio  Grande,  to  make  demand  on  the  French 
authorities  for  the  steamer  Lucy  Gwin,  which  had  been  a  Con 
federate  boat,  and  if  not  given  up,  to  get  her  the  best  way  he 
could,  that  as  soon  as  Generals  Merritt  and  Custer  got  to  the  Rio 
Grande,  the  other  public  property  would  be  taken  where  ever 
found,  and  added: 


1     W    ft.  R.   102-1026. 
1.*     W.  R.  R.  102-1  03f». 


770  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

"The  rascality  of  the  Rio  Grande  frontier  is  beyond  solu 
tion  on  intermediate  grounds,  where  there  is  no  government  and 
a  questionable  protectorate.  It  is  due  to  the  history  of  our  coun 
try  that  this  portion  of  the  late  rebellion  should  be  crushed  out 
in  a  manly  way  and  with  the  powers  of  a  great  nation,  as  a  con 
trast  to  this  French  subterfuge  to  assist  in  the  attempt  to  ruin 
the  country."1 

July  3,  General  Steele  reported  that  he  had  made  demand 
on  the  Imperialist  commander  at  Matamoras,  General  Thomas 
Mejia,  for  the  return  of  all  property  delivered  by  the  Confed 
erates  to  the  Imperialist  Government  after  Kirby  Smith's  sur 
render  and  that  the  demand  had  been  referred  to  His  Majesty, 
Emperor  Maximilian.2 

July  3,  Sheridan  reported  to  General  Grant  that  a  division 
of  the  Fourth  Corps  would  leave  New  Orleans  for  Indianola 
July  5,  and  that  the  whole  corps  would  be  put  on  the  line  from 
Victoria  to  San  Antonia,  Texas.3  July  6,  he  further  reported  to 
General  Grant  that  affairs  on  the  Rio  Grande  were  getting  beau 
tifully  mixed  up,  that  Cortinas  had  arrived,  then  had  his  head 
quarters  six  miles  from  Matamoras  and  had  driven  in  Mejia's 
pickets;  that  he  had  also  captured  the  steamer  Senorita,  had 
taken  her  over  to  the  other  side  of  the  river  for  safety  and  that 
she  was  taken  down  the  river  to  Rio  Grande  City,  where  she 
was  seized  by  General  Brown  of  our  forces.  General  Sheridan 
in  the  same  dispatch  also  reported  that  General  Steele  said  the 
French  officers  and  soldiers  were  very  bitter  against  our  people, 
that  a  grandson  of  Marshal  Ney  with  2000  French  cavalry  was 
approaching  Matamoras  and  declared  he  was  going  to  invade 
Texas,  that  the  feeling  in  the  interior  of  Mexico  was  very  bitter 
and  that  natives,  soldiers  and  all,  were  said  to  be  with  our  gov 
ernment  and  wanted  to  get  rid  of  French  rule.4 

July  10,  General  Sheridan  again  reported  to  General  Grant 
that  his  scouts  had  informed  him  that  the  French  authorities  at 
Matamoras  were  very  much  embarrassed,  that  Cortinas  was 
driving  in  Mejia's  pickets  at  pleasure,  that  the  arrival  of  our 
heavy  forces  on  the  Rio  Grande  and  the  little  irritations  he, 
Sheridan,  had  encouraged  along  the  river,  had  alarmed  them  so 
much  that  there  was  a  perfect  exodus  from  Matamoras.  Sheri 
dan  also  reported  that  many  of  the  rebels  who  had  crossed  near 
Matamoras  had  returned  in  disgust,  that  Confederate  General 
Shelby's  command  had  crossed  the  Rio  Grande  high  up  the  river, 
that  he  had  not  found  out  where  they  went,  but  was  on  their 

1  W.  R.  R.  102-1035-36.  3     W.  R.  R.  102-1042. 

2  W.  R.  R.  102-1037.  4     \V.  R.  R.  102-1053. 


THREE  MONTHS  IN  SAN  ANTONIA,  TEXAS  771 

track.1  Later  the  same  day  he  reported  to  General  Grant  that 
General  Steele  had  informed  him  that  the  Franco-Mexicans  on 
the  Rio  Grande  appeared  to  be  anxious  to  bring  on  difficulties 
with  the  United  States  and  were  very  bitter;  that  Cortinas  held 
all  the  roads  around  Matamoras,  and  said  he  could  take  the  place 
if  he  had  ammunition;  that  Cortinas  as  Governor  of  Tamaulipas 
under  the  Liberal  Government  had  given  permission  for  our 
forces  to  enter  Mexico ;  that  Governor  Murrah  of  Texas,  and 
Generals  Walker,  Shelby  and  others  were  at  Monterey  with  con 
siderable  numbers ;  that  Shelby  took  over  an  organized  force ; 
that  nothing  was  yet  known  of  their  intentions,  but  that  they 
were  with  the  Imperialists  without  doubt ;  that  a  Matamoras 
paper  represented  them  as  10,000  strong,  but  that  was  doubtless 
an  exaggeration.2  Conditions  on  the  Rio  Grande  were  becoming 
so  critical  that  on  July  13,  General  Grant  telegraphed  to  Sheri 
dan  to  go  there  in  person  for  a  few  days  and  manage  affairs  along 
the  river  according  to  his  own  judgment,  adding,  "what  you  have 
done  seems  so  well  that  I  desire  to  change  nothing."3 

July  14,  General  Sheridan  again  reported  to  General  Grant 
that  Maximilian  had  directed  General  Mejia  to  give  up  the  bat 
tery  of  artillery,  ammunition,  wagons,  and  animals,  which  had 
been  turned  over  to  the  Imperialists  by  the  Confederates ;  that 
Camargo  on  the  Rio  Grande,  had  been  evacuated,  that  its  gar 
rison  had  marched  down  to  Matamoras  with  large  cotton  trains, 
the  cotton  being  U.  S.  cotton,  stolen  under  the  auspices  of  the 
French  commandment,  that  the  command  of  General  Shelby, 
which  escorted  the  cotton  agent  of  Texas,  Governors  Murrah, 
Clark  and  Allen,  Generals  Kirby  Smith,  Magruder  and  others 
had  with  it  three  pieces  of  artillery,  forty  wagon  loads  of  Enfield 
rifles  and  a  large  wagon  train.  General  Sheridan  also  reported 
that  Cortinas,  the  Liberal  general,  had  made  application  for  his 
artillery,  and  that  he  had  directed  it  to  be  quietly  turned  over 
to  him.4 

General  Grant  was  so  intent  on  carrying  out  his  purpose  in 
regard  to  Mexico,  that  on  July  15,  the  Secretary  of  War  being 
absent  from  his  office,  he  addressed  a  letter  to  President  Andrew 
Johnson,  saying  in  substance,  that  he  looked  upon  the  French 
occupation  of  Mexico  as  part  and  parcel  of  the  late  rebellion  and 
a  necessary  part  of  it  to  suppress,  before  entire  peace  could  be 
assured,  and,  therefore  recommended  that  a  general  officer  be 
given  a  leave  of  absence  to  go  to  Mexico  to  probably  take  service 
under  the  Liberal  Government  there,  but  in  any  event  to  give 
such  aid  as  he  could  to  "insure  the  restoration  of  the  Liberal  or 


1  W.  R.  R.  102-1067.  3     W.  R.  R.  102-1075 

2  W.  R.  R.  102-1068.  4     W.  R.  R.  102-1077. 


772  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

Republican  Government."  He  also  said  that  Mexico  had  men 
enough  if  she  had  arms  to  defend  herself,  and  that  he  did  not 
see,  therefore,  why  we  should  not  sell  her  arms  from  our  sur 
plus.1 

What  heed  was  paid  by  the  President  to  these  recommenda 
tions  is  not  disclosed  in  the  records  at  hand,  but  from  what  took 
place  afterwards  it  is  quite  probable  that  the  authorities  at  Wash 
ington  did  not  wholly  disapprove  them.  Sheridan  in  his 
"Memoirs"  says  that  the  Mexican  Liberals  were  largely  supplied 
with  arms  and  ammunition,  which  were  left  at  convenient  places 
along  the  Rio  Grande  to  fall  into  their  hands.2 

July  17,  Sheridan  reported  to  General  Grant,  on  authority 
of  parties  who  came  to  Galveston  from  Vera  Cruz,  that  French 
and  Austrian  troops  were  arriving  in  considerable  numbers,  that 
another  considerable  body  was  being  organized  in  France  and 
Austria  and  that  the  troops  arriving  at  Vera  Cruz  were  to  be 
sent  to  Matamoras.  The  same  day  he  also  wired  to  General 
Grant  a  singular  suggestion;  ''that  it  was  possible  that  Mejia 
could  be  quietly  carried  out  of  Matamoras  and  turned  over  to 
Cortinas,  that  this  would  complicate  affairs  very  much,  and  that 
he  had  sent  over  to  make  a  reconnoissance".3  Whether  Sheridan 
really  intended  to  carry  out  this  scheme  is  not  disclosed.  It  is 
only  another  incident  which  shows  how  near  we  came  to  actual 
hostilities  with  the  Imperialists  in  Mexico,  and  what  would  have 
necessarily  followed,  a  breach  with  the  European  powers  that 
were  sustaining  them. 

July  20,  General  Sheridan  got  off  to  the  Rio  Grande  in  obedi 
ence  to  General  Grant's  orders  of  July  13,  and  on  August  1,  re 
ported  to  General  Grant  that  the  French  and  Austrian  troops  had 
been  withdrawn  from  Matamoras  and  that  the  entire  Rio  Grande 
frontier  except  Matamoras  was  in  possession  of  the  Liberals: 
that  Maximilian  held  but  little  in  Mexico  except  the  towns  oc 
cupied  by  Franco-Mexican  troops,  and  in  some  of  these  towns  only 
the  ground  his  troops  were  encamped  upon,  and  that  all  the 
troops  France  could  send  to  Mexico  would  not  restore  the  ground 
they  had  lost.  He  also  reported  that  he  "was  happy  to  state  that 
the  rebels  who  went  into  Mexico  had  been  defeated  in  their  cal 
culations,  and  had  been  forced  to  join  the  losing  side."4  In  his 
previous  visit  to  the  Rio  Grande  Sheridan  had  informed  the 
Liberals  that  he  believed  it  was  the  intention  of  the  Con 
federates  to  join  them  against  Maximilian,  so  that  when 
he  was  overthrown  they  would  be  able  to  control  the 
new  government  which  would  be  hostile  to  the  United 

1     W.  R.  R.  102-1080.  :>     W.  R.  R.  102-1092. 

•2     Sheridan's  Memoirs,  Vol.  2-216.  4     W.  R.  R.  102-1147-8. 


THREE  MONTHS  IN  SAN  ANTONIA,  TEXAS  773 

States.  The  result  of  this  was  that  the  Liberals  turned 
against  the  Confederates,  and  the  Governor  of  Nueva- 
Leon  arrested  Generals  Kirby  Smith,  Shelby  and  others,  dis 
armed  them  and  rejected  their  overtures.  All  this  was  reported 
to  General  Grant  August  I1  and  it  must  have  been  gratifying  to 
him  to  know  that  his  efforts  to  compel  the  foreign  invaders  "to 
quit  the  soil  of  our  sister  republic"  were  meeting  with  such 
marked  success.  But  it  was  getting  difficult  to  hold  Sheridan  in 
check  and  at  the  same  time  preserve  the  position  of  neutrality 
which  our  government  through  Mr.  Seward's  cautious  diplomacy 
had  assumed.  In  the  same  report  above  quoted  from  Sheridan 
stated  that  General  Shelby  with  400  Missourians,  had  taken  ser 
vice  with  the  Imperialists  and  was  to  operate  against  the  Liberals 
on  the  Rio  Grande :  that  it  was  reported  that  two  more  rebel  regi 
ments  were  being  organized  at  Monterey,  and  that  he  thought 
"we  ought  to  go  after  Shelby  and  his  command;"  that  he  felt 
certain  that  with  6000  or  8000  cavalry  he  could  stir  up  the  whole 
of  Northern  Mexico,  and  that  if  he  was  not  permitted  to  go  after 
Shelby,  he  believed  that  by  going  up  to  Eagle  Pass  on  the  Rio 
Grande  and  moving  Merritt's  column  to  that  point  he  could  in 
fuse  much  enthusiasm  into  the  Liberals.2 

The  same  day,  in  another  dispatch  to  General  Grant,  Sheri 
dan  reported  a  list  of  prominent  Confederates  who  had  gone  to 
Mexico  through  San  Anotnia,  which  included  Governors  Allen 
and  Moore  of  Louisiana,  Governors  Clark  and  Murrah  of  Texas, 
Governor  Harris  of  Tennessee,  J.  P.  Benjamin,  late  secretary 
of  state  and  Breckenridge,  late  secretary  of  war  of  the  Con 
federacy,  Harris,  Jeff  Davis'  private  secretary  and  Generals 
Kirby  Smith,  Magruder,  Price,  Shelby,  Wilcox  and  Harris  and 
about  a  score  of  officers  of  lesser  rank,  and  that  they  had  taken 
with  them  fourteen  pieces  of  artillery,  which  all  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  Liberals.3 

August  8,  Sheridan  reported  that  a  band  of  between  600 
and  700  armed  Confederates  under  command  of  Colonel  Terry 
had  crossed  the  upper  Rio  Grande^a  short  time  before  and  were 
captured  by  Cortinas,  who  disarmed  them  and  seized  their  trans 
portation.  They  afterwards  made  their  way  to  Monterey.4  The 
Colonel  Terry  mentioned  in  the  dispatch  was  the  notorious  Judge 
Terry  of  California,  who  had  killed  Senator  Broderick  in  a  duel 
in  1859.5 

The  campaign  seemed  progressing  so  favorably  that  orders 
had  been  issued  to  muster  out  some  of  the  cavalry  troops  in 

1  W.  R.  R.  102-1148.  4     W.  R.  R.  102-1174. 

2  W.  R.  R.  102-1148.  5     W.  R.  R.  102-1192 

3  W.  R.  R.  102-1149. 


774  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

Texas,  but  August  15,  General  Grant  telegraphed  to  Sheridan 
that  the  order  was  made  with  the  view  of  avoiding  the  necessity 
of  sending  more  cavalry  horses  to  Texas,  and  not  with  any  idea 
that  the  forces  there  should  be  reduced  to  the  smallest  needs  for 
keeping  Texas  in  the  traces,  and  added  these  significant  words. 
"The  Imperialist  troops  in  Mexico  still  require  watching,  and 
before  all  the  seed  of  the  rebellion  can  be  regarded  as  crushed  out 
they  must  go  back  to  their  homes.  We  must  hold  ourselves 
ready  to  demand  this."1 

August  15,  it  was  reported  that  a  column  of  French  troops 
was  marching  on  Chihuahua  where  President  Juarez  was,  and 
that  he  and  the  small  numbers  of  troops  with  him  would  probably 
be  compelled  to  retreat  and  would  soon  be  on  the  borders  of  New 
Mexico,  that  Juarez  would  probably  go  to  El  Paso,  that  the  French 
would  follow  him  to  the  Rio  Grande  and  he  would  be  obliged 
to  seek  refuge  on  our  side.  General  Carleton,  the  officer  in  com 
mand,  wished  under  these  circumstances,  to  lend  him  a  helping 
hand  and  asked  for  instructions.2 

August  18,  General  Sheridan  telegraphed  to  General  Grant 
that  he  would  be  obliged  to  go  to  San  Antonio  the  next  week  to 
fix  up  the  cavalry  columns  and  move  thence  to  Laredo  and  Fort 
Duncan,  and  that  he  would  probably  see  Juarez.3 

On  the  same  day  he  also  reported  that  Kirby  Smith  had 
probably  come  secretly  to  New  Orleans  on  the  Thursday  before ; 
that  Beauregard  came  on  the  Saturday  following,  and  that  Sun 
day  night  there  was  a  meeting  at  Beauregard's  house ;  that  quite 
a  collection  of  Confederate  generals  had  been  at  New  Orleans 
in  the  past  few  days,  and  that  he  felt  quite  certain  they  were 
engaged  in  a  Mexican  colonization  scheme.  He  also  reported 
that  an  offer  of  10,000  men  had  been  made  not  long  before  to 
Maximilian  through  the  Imperial  General  Mejia,  but  that  the 
latter  was  getting  "shaky"  and  had  rejected  the  offer,  and  that  if 
our  government  did  not  watch  these  rebels  closely  there  would 
be  a  Franco-Mexican  rebel  league.4 

It  was  probably  to  break  up  this  proposed  organization  that 
General  Sheridan  August  21,  issued  an  order,  which  was  ap 
proved  by  Secretary  Stanton,  directing  the  arrest  of  all  Confed 
erate  officers  who  had  violated  the  terms  of  their  surrender  by 
leaving  the  United  States  and  entering  Mexico,  and  their  trial  by 
a  military  commission.5 

It  is  apparent  from  the  foregoing  that  General  Sheridan's 
activities  in  the  direction  of  scaring  the  French  and  Austrians 

1  W.  R.  R.  102-1180.  4     W.  R.  R.   102-1192. 

2  W.   R.  R.   102-1183.  5     W.  R.  R.  102-1196. 

3  W.  R.  R.  102-1192. 


THREE  MONTHS  IN  SAN  ANTONIA,  TEXAS  775 

out  of  Mexico  were  producing  results.  But  they  were  not  suf 
ficient  to  satisfy  General  Grant's  ardor.  They  were  doubtless 
well  known  to  the  authorities  at  Washington  and  acquiesed  in, 
but  were,  in  some  respects,  held  in  check  by  Secretary  Seward's 
over  cautious  diplomacy.  General  Grant  evidently  wished  to 
proceed  still  more  vigorously. 

September  1,  he  again  addressed  a  letter  to  President  John 
son,  which  so  clearly  presents  the  views  and  convictions  which 
had  animated  him  in  initiating  and  carrying  forward  the  Texas 
Campaign,  that  it  is  reproduced  in  full : 

Galena,  Ills.,  September  1,  1865. 
His  Excellency  A.  Johnson,  President. 

Seven  weeks  absence  from  Washington  and  free  intercourse  with 
all  parties  and  classes  of  people  has  convinced  me  that  there  is  but 
one  opinion  as  to  the  duty  of  the  United  States  toward  Mexico,  or 
rather  the  usurpers  'of  that  country.  All  agree,  that  besides  a  yielding 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  non-intervention  in  Mexican  affairs  will  lead 
to  an  expensive  and  bloody  war  hereafter  or  a  yielding  of  territory 
now  possessed  by  us.  To  let  the  empire  of  Maximilian  be  established 
on  our  frontier  is  to  permit  an  enemy  to  establish  himself,  who  will  re 
quire  a  large  army  to  watch.  Military  stations  will  be  at  points  re 
mote  from  our  supplies  and,  therefore,  expensive  to  keep.  The  trade 
of  an  Empire  will  be  lost  to  our  commerce,  and  Americans,  instead 
of  being  the  most  favored  people  of  the  world  throughout  the  length 
and  breadth  of  this  continent,  will  be  scoffed  and  laughed  at  by  their 
adjoining  neighbors,  both  north  and  south — the  people  of  the  British 
Provinces  and  Mexico.  Previous  communications  have  given  my 
views  on  our  duty  in  the  matter  here  spoken  of,  so  that  it  is  not  nec 
essary  I  should  treat  the  subject  at  any  length  now.  .  Conversations 
with  you  have  convinced  me  that  you  think  about  it  as  I  do,  otherwise 
I  should  never  have  taken  the  liberty  of  writing  in  this  manner.  I 
have  had  the  opportunity  of  mingling  more  intimately  with  all  classes 
of  community  than  the  Executive  can  possibly  have,  and  my  object 
is  to  give  you  the  benefit  of  what  I  have  heard  expressed.  I  would 
have  no  hesitation  in  recommending  that  notice  be  given  the  French 
that  Foreign  troops  must  be  withdrawn  from  the  continent,  and  the 
people  left  free  to  govern  themselves  in  their  own  way.  I  would 
openly  sell  on  credit  to  the  Government  of  Mexico  all  the  ammunition 
and  clothing  they  want,  and  aid  them  with  officers  to  command  troops. 
In  fine,  I  would  take  such  measures  as  would  secure  the  supremacy 
of  the  republican  government  in  Mexico.  I  hope  you  will  excuse  me  for 
the  free  manner  in  which  I  address  you.  I  but  speak  my  honest  con 
victions,  and  these  with  the  full  belief  that  a  terrible  strife  in  this 
country  is  to  be  averted  by  prompt  action  in  this  matter  wih  Mexico. 

U.  S.  Grant, 
Lieutenant  General."1 

September  21,  Sheridan  reported  to  Grant  his  arrival  at 
New  Orleans  from  the  Rio  Grande  and  Fort  Duncan,  after  an 
extended  trip  in  that  region.2  In  his  Memoirs,  Sheridan  says  of 

1  w.  R.  R.  102-1221. 

2  W.    R.    R.    102-1235. 


776  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

this  trip,  "As  the  summer  wore  away  Maximilian  under  Mr. 
Seward's  policy,  gained  in  strength  till  finally  all  the  accessible 
sections  of  Mexico  were  in  his  possession  and  the  Republic  under 
President  Juarez  almost  succumbed.  Growing  impatient  at  this, 
in  the  latter  part  of  September  I  decided  to  try  again  what  virtue 
there  might  be  in  a  hostile  demonstration  and  selected  the  upper 
Rio  Grande  for  the  scene  of  my  attempt.  Merritt's  cavalry  and 
the  Fourth  Corps  still  being  at  San  Antonia,  I  went  to  the  place 
and  reviewed  these  troops  and  having  prepared  them  with  some 
ostentation  for  a  campaign,  of  course  it  was  bruited  that  we  were 
going  to  invade  Mexico.  Then,  escorted  by  a  regiment  of  horse 
I  proceeded  hastily  to  Fort  Duncan  on  the  Rio  Grande  just  oppo 
site  the  Mexican  town  of  Piedras  Negras.  Here  I  opened  com 
munication  with  President  Juarez  through  one  of  his  staff,  taking 
care  not  to  do  this  in  the  dark,  and  the  news  spreading  like  wild 
fire,  the  greatest  significance  was  ascribed  to  my  action,  it  being 
reported  most  positively,  and  with  many  specific  details,  that  I 
was  only  awaiting  the  arrival  of  the  troops,  then  under  marching 
orders  at  San  Antonio,  to  cross  the  Rio  Grande  in  behalf  of  the 
Liberal  cause.  Ample  corroboration  of  the  reports  then  cir 
culated  was  found  in  my  enquiries  regarding  the  quantity  of  for 
age  we  could  depend  upon  getting  in  Mexico,  our  arrangements 
for  its  purchase  and  my  sending  a  pontoon  train  to  Brownsville, 
together  with  which  was  cited  the  renewed  activity  of  the  troops 
along  the  lower  Rio  Grande.  These  reports  and  demonstrations 
resulted  in  alarming  the  Imperialists  so  much  that  they  withdrew 
the  French  and  Austrian  soldiers  from  Matamoras  and  practic 
ally  abandoned  the  whole  of  northern  Mexico  as  far  down  as 
Monterey,  with  the  exception  of  Matamoras,  where  General 
Mejia  continued  to  hang  on  with  a  garrison  of  renegade  Mexi 
cans.  The  abandonment  of  so  much  territory  in  northern  Mexico 
encouraged  General  Escobedo  and  other  Liberal  leaders  to  such 
a  degree  that  they  collected  a  considerable  army  of  their  followers 
at  Camargo,  Mier,  and  other  points.  At  the  same  time  Cortinas 
suspended  his  free  booting  for  the  nonce,  and  stoutly  harrassing 
Matamoras,  succeeded  in  keeping  its  Imperial  garrison  within 
the  fortifications.  Thus  countenanced  and  stimulated,  and  large 
ly  supplied  with  arms  and  ammunition,  which  we  left  at  conven 
ient  places  on  our  side  of  the  river  to  fall  into  their  hands,  the 
Liberals  under  General  Escobedo — a  man  of  much  force  of  char 
acter — were  enabled  in  northern  Mexico  to  place  the  affairs  of 
the  Republic  on  a  substantial  basis."1 

As  might  have  been  expected  this  open  demonstration  on 
the  part  of  General  Sheridan  was  duly  reported  to  the  French 

1     Sheridan's  Memoirs,  Vol.   2-215-217. 


THREE  MONTHS  IN  SAX  AXTONIA,  TEXAS  777 

Government  and  on  October  12,  the  French  Minister  at  Wash 
ington,  "Montholon,"  in  a  note  to  Secretary  Seward  complained 
of  these  and  other  alleged  violations  of  the  neutrality,  which  Mr. 
Seward  had  assured  him  would  be  observed  in  the  events  taking 
place  in  Mexico,  and  asked  that  orders  be  given  to  prevent  their 
renewal.1 

This  note  was  referred  to  General  Grant,  who  on  November 
6,  wrote  a  cautious  reply  and  said  the  same  would  be  referred  to 
General  Sheridan  for  investigation  and  report.2 

Sheridan  says  that  the  "Montholon"  note  above  mentioned, 
without  any  investigation  whatever  by  our  state  department  was 
transmitted  to  him,  accompanied  by  orders  to  preserve  a  strict 
neutrality,  and  that  he  was  again  debarred  from  anything  like 
active  sympathy  for  the  Mexican  Liberals.3 

Notwithstanding  this  order,  however,  the  covert  aid  to  the 
Liberals  was  continued,  and  during  the  winter  of  1865  and  spring 
of  1866  as  many  as  30,000  muskets  were  sent  to  them  from  Baton 
Rouge  arsenal  alone,4  -and  by  midsummer  of  the  latter  year  the 
Empire  of  Maximilian  was  tottering  to  its  fall.  How  he  was 
deserted  by  Louis  Napoleon  and  left  to  his  cruel  fate  is  a  sad 
chapter  of  history,  with  which  all  are  familiar. 

It  has  seemed  necessary  to  recount  the  incidents  narrated  in 
the  preceding  pages  of  this  chapter  in  order  to  show  why  we  were 
sent  to  Texas  and  retained  there  so  long.  The  more  so  because 
we  were  kept  in  blissful  ignorance  of  it  all.  Singular  to  state, 
there  is  not  one  line  in  Gleason's  diary,  nor  in  any  other  diary 
quoted  from  in  this  history,  which  refers  directly  or  indirectly  to 
the  Mexican  situation,  or  our  relations  to  it.  But  we  were  a  part 
of  the  great  army  which  had  a  great  purpose  in  view, — the  libera 
tion  of  a  sister  republic  from  the  despotic  rule  of  a  foreign 
usurper, — made  possible  by  the  war  of  the  rebellion  and  encour 
aged  by  its  leaders,  and  we  unconsciously  did  our  part  in  bring 
ing  about  the  desired  result. 

Our  camp  on  the  Salado  was  suggestive  of  snakes,  and  dur 
ing  the  first  night  there,  one  of  the  men  aroused  the  whole  camp 
by  jumping  up  in  his  sleep  and  yelling  that  the  snakes  were  after 
him.5  But  the  next  day;  August  22,  the  brigade  staff  selected 
another  camping  place,  about  a  mile  further  up  the  creek  and  on 
the  opposite  side  of  it,  where  there  were  some  springs,  which 
were  thought  to  be  sufficient  to  supply  the  brigade.  That  evening 
Major  Dubois  received  a  letter  from  Captain  Bestow,  saying  that 
General  Wood  had  been  ordered  to  Little  Rock,  Arkansas. 

1  W.  R.  R.  102-1 241.  4     Sheridan's  Memoirs,  Vol.   2-224. 

2  W.  R.  R.   102-1253.  r,     Gleason's  Diary. 

3  Sheridan'?  Jljemoii's,  Vol.   2-217. 


778  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS   AND  CAMPAIGNS 

August  23,  the  brigade  removed  to  the  new  camp  and  were 
busy  all  day  laying  out  streets,  pitching  tents  and  putting  the 
ground  in  order.  It  was  a  pleasant  camp  and  we  found  the  cli 
mate  delightful.  In  fact  our  corps  had  been  ordered  here  from 
Green  Lake  for  two  purposes,  one  of  which  was  the  climate,  and 
the  other,  which  we  did  not  then  know,  was  that  we  might  be  at 
a  point  to  be  quickly  thrown  to  the  Rio  Grande  in  case  of  serious 
trouble  with  the  Imperialists  in  Mexico.  We  remained  in  the 
camp  until  October  20,  engaged  in  the  usual  routine  of  camp 
duties. 

August  26,  General  Willich  succeeded  General  Wood  in 
command  of  the  division  and  Brevet  Brigadier  General  H.  K. 
McConnell  of  the  Seventy-first  Ohio,  by  virtue  of  his  rank,  suc 
ceeded  to  the  command  of  the  brigade. 

Gleason  in  his  diary  of  August  27,  says  that  an  order  was 
received  dissolving  the  corps  organization  (an  order  of  the  War 
Department  had  discontinued  it  after  August  I)1  and  requiring 
all  general  officers  not  in  command  of  colored  troops,  or  on  staff 
duty  and  not  otherwise  assigned,  to  report  by  letter  to  the  adju 
tant  general  of  the  army.  The  order  was  the  cause  of  much  dis 
cussion,  as  it  would  take  away  from  us  General  Willich  and  all 
the  other  brigade  and  division  commanders.  All  concluded  that 
it  meant  our  early  muster  out  and  Colonel  McClenahan  offered 
to  bet  a  keg  of  beer  that  we  would  be  on  our  way  back  to  Pow^der 
Horn  (Indianola)  in  ten  days.2 

The  report  of  the  order  must  have  been  misunderstood  or 
it  must  have  been  intended  for  some  other  corps  than  ours,  as  the 
sequel  will  show. 

August  31,  there  was  a  muster  and  inspection  of  the  regi 
ment  by  Captain  Davis,  brigade  inspector,  and  it  was  found  that 
the  arms  broken  up  or  abandoned  by  the  men  on  our  first  days 
march  from  Green  Lake  were  to  be  charged  against  them  on  the 
company  rolls.8 

The  evening  of  September  1,  Colonel  McClenahan  came  from 
the  city  and  reported  that  he  had  seen  General  Sheridan  at  the 
Menger  Hotel,  and  we  were  notified  that  General  Wright  of 
Sheridan's  staff  would  be  out  next  day.  to  make  us  a  visit,  and 
that  everything  must  be  in  order.4 

The  next  day  General  Wright  came  into  our  camp  so  quietly 
that  no  one  knew  of  it  until  it  was  announced  that  he  was  at 
brigade  headquarters  and  wished  to  see  the  regimental  field  offi 
cers.  In  the  afternoon,  at  his  suggestion,  these  officers  accom 
panied  him  to  San  Antonio  to  call  on  General  Sheridan. 

1  W.  R.  R.  104-1094. 

2  3  and  4     Gleasons'  Diary. 


THREE  MONTHS  IN  SAN  ANTONIA,  TEXAS  779 

September  3,  General  McConnell  and  the  regimental  com 
manders  of  the  brigade  went  to  the  city  to  try  to  induce  General 
Sheridan  to  order  a  larger  number  of  the  Fourth  Corps  mustered 
out.1  General  Sheridan  on  August  21  had  written  to  General 
Rawlins  that  the  muster  out  of  the  armies  of  the  Potomac  and 
Tennessee  had  given  his  troops  such  good  grounds  to  ask  for  the 
same  that  it  was  astonishing  how  quietly  they  had  behaved,  and 
that  when  he  went  to  Texas  he  would  at  least  muster  out  two 
regiments  of  the  Fourth  Corps.2  August  23,  he  had  written  to 
the  adjutant  general  of  the  army  that  he  hoped  to  be  able  to 
muster  out  about  3000  troops  in  Texas  after  he  reached  San 
Antonio.3  Colonel  Askew  presented  to  General  Sheridan  an 
application  for  the  speedy  muster  out  of  our  regiment,  and  the 
general  promised  to  give  it  consideration.  But  conditions  along 
the  Rio  Grande  were  then,  and  for  some  time  afterward  con 
tinued  to  be  so  critical  that  it  was  not  regarded  as  safe  or  wise  to 
too  much  reduce  our  righting  force. 

Seotember  4-  orders  were  issued  prescribing  daily  drills, 
dress  parade  and  other  regulations  looking  to  the  health  of  the 
command. 

September  6,  General  Willich's  farewell  address  to  the  bri 
gade  was  received,  and  was  read  at  dress  parade  next  day.  The 
march  from  Green  Lake  and  the  trials  incident  to  it,  had  pros 
trated  him.  On  that  march  the  men  of  the  brigade  had  revolted 
at  the  necessary  strict  discipline  he  had  found  it  necessary  to  en 
force,  and  one  evening  when  we  had  lost  our  way,  turned  against 
and  derided  him,  using  opprobrious  epithets.  It  almost  broke 
his  heart,  and  soon  after  we  reached  San  Antonio  he  was  taken 
seriously  ill  with  a  slow  fever.  He  was  well  known  in  San  An 
tonio  where  a  great  many  Germans  who  had  fled  their  country 
after  the  revolution  of  1848  had  settled.  Hearing  of  his  illness, 
some  of  them  came  to  brigade  headquarters  and  took  him  to 
a  pleasant  house  in  the  city,  where  he  lay  for  several  weeks, 
tenderly  cared  for  by  a  noted  German  nurse.  It  was  the  height 
of  his  desires  to  lead  his  old  brigade  back  home,  but  this  was 
denied  him. 

September  11,  General  Sheridan  returned  from  a  trip  he  had 
made  to  Eagle  Pass.  It  was  thought  he  would  review  our  bri 
gade,  but  instead  he  went  to  Austin.  It  was  eighty  miles  away, 
but  he  expected  to  travel  the  distance  in  one  day.  Besides  his 
horses,  he  had  an  ambulance  drawn  by  two  very  large  dun  mules, 
which  he  said  could  travel  ten  miles  an  hour  with  ease,  and  when 
he  got  tired  of  horseback  riding,  he  rode  in  the  ambulance.4 

1  Treason's  Diary.  3     W.  R.  R.  102-1205. 

2  W.  R.  R.  102-1198.  4     Author's  personal  recollections. 


780  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  A.ND  CAMPAIGNS 

September  12,  orders  were  published  directing  the  muster  out 
of  seven  regiments  of  the  corps,  all  but  two  of  them  belonging 
to  the  first  and  second  divisions  and  none  of  them  to  our  brigade. 

September  14,  a  delegation  of  the  Fifty-ninth  Illinois  called 
on  General  Post  demanding  to  know  why  that  regiment,  which 
claimed  to  be  the  oldest  in  the  service,  was  not  included  in  the 
list  of  those  ordered  to  be  mustered  out.  The  General  told  the 
delegation  that  he  knew  as  little  about  it  as  they  did. 

Gleason  notes  that  on  that  day  Colonel  McClenahan  and  Sur 
geon  Clark  went  squirrel  hunting,  lost  their  way  and  finally  got 
to  camp  utterly  tired  out,  and  without  any  squirrels.1 

September  15,  a  committee  of  members  of  the  regiment  called 
on  Colonel  Askew  to  ask  his  consent  to  the  preparation  of  reso 
lutions  asking  that  the  regiment  be  mustered  out,  which  General 
Willich  had  promised  to  take  to  Washington  when  he  went 
home.2 

September  16,  some  of  the  officers  went  to  San  Antonio 
Springs,  about  four  miles  north  of  the  city,  and  while  there  were 
shown  the  former  residence  of  Governor  Charles  Anderson  of 
Ohio,  from  which  he  was  compelled  to  flee  when  the  war  broke 
out8 

September  22,  the  Second  Brigade  of  our  division  arrived 
and  went  into  a  temporary  camp  just  below  us  on  the  creek. 

September  27,  two  rumors  much  disturbed  the  monotony  of 
camp  life,  one  was  that  the  regiment  was  to  move  into  the  city 
to  act  as  provost  guards,  in  place  of  the  cavalry  who  were  doing 
this  duty  and  were  to  move  away.  The  other  was  that  the  Fif 
teenth  and  Forty-ninth  Ohio  were  to  march  to  Eagle  Pass. 

September  2y,  orders  were  published  designating  Wood's 
division  as  the  Third  Division  Central  District  of  Texas.4 

On  the  5th  Colonel  Askew  came  from  brigade  headquarters 
with  an  order  announcing  a  new  brigade  staff  and  publishing 
some  new  camp  regulations.  Captain  Alexis  Cope  was  made  in 
spector  and  Captain  Thos.  C.  Davis  ordnance  officer.  Lieutenant 
Grimes  received  a  commission  as  captain.5 

The  afternoon  of  October  6,  the  brigade  was  reviewed  by 
General  Willich.  This  review  was  planned  by  members  of  the 
brigade  staff  to  give  its  old  commander  an  opportunity  to  meet 
the  men  again.  They  received  him  with  the  same  manifestations 
of  affection  as  in  former  days.  After  the  review  he  made  a 
speech  in  his  usual  strain  of  broken  but  eloquent  English,  which 
warmed  the  hearts  of  all.  Many  ladies  and  gentlemen  of  San 

1,    2  and  3     Gleason's  Diary. 

4  Greory's  Diary. 

5  Gleason's  Diary. 


THREE  MONTHS  IN  SAN  ANTONIA,  TEXAS  781 

Antonio,  friends  of  the  general,  were  present  to  witness  the  cere 
mony.  After  it  was  over  the  brigade  staff  served  a  luncheon  to 
the  general  and  his  friends,  as  a  parting  tribute  of  respect  for 
him. 

Sunday,  October  8,  many  of  the  mounted  officers  of  the 
brigade  went  to  the  city,  some  to  attend  church  and  others  to 
witness  the  cock  fighting, — the  usual  Sunday  amusement  in  the 
city.  There  was  a  drove  of  fifty  camels  that  years  before  had 
been  imported  for  service  on  the  plains,  which  attracted  a  good 
deal  of  attention.1 

October  10,  was  election  day.  The  polls  were  regularly 
opened,  but  the  men  did  not  take  much  interest  in  it.  Gleason 
says  many  of  the  men  did  not  vote  at  all.  They  were  opposed  to 
General  J.  D.  Cox,  the  Republican  candidate  for  governor  of 
Ohio,  because  he  favored  negro  suffrage,  and  were  offended  at 
the  general  government  for  keeping  them  in  the  service  so  long. 
Gleason  notes  that  General  Willich,  Major  Dubois,  and  Captains 
Geiger,  Cope  and  Davis,  who  were  then  in  the  city,  came  out  to 
vote,  and  that  only  125,  not  half  the  voting  strength  of  the  regi 
ment,  voted  at  all.  The  result  on  Governor  was  100  votes  for 
General  J.  D.  Cox,  15  for  General  Geo.  W.  Morgan  and  1  for 
John  Brough.1 

October  16,  an  order  came  conferring  on  Colonel  Askew  the 
rank  of  brevet  brigadier  general.  About  this  time  Colonel  Askew 
received  a  request  from  army  head  quarters  asking  him  to  send 
forward  names  of  officers  of  the  regiment  worthy  of  brevet  ap 
pointments.  The  colonel  did  not  value  such  appointments  very 
highly  and  declined  to  make  any  recommendations,  saying  that 
where  all  had  discharged  their  duties  so  well  he  would  not  dis 
criminate  between  them.  So  no  brevet  appointments  were  re 
ceived  by  officers  of  the  regiment,  except  a  few  who  were  on 
detached  duty. 

October  19,  General  McConnell  left  for  home  on  leave  of 
absence  and  the  command  of  the  camp  devolved  on  General 
Askew.  Soon  afterward,  however,  an  order  came  assigning  Gen 
eral  Philip  Sidney  Post  to  the  command  of  the  Western  Sub- 
district  of  Texas,  and  this  placed  Colonel  Askew  again  in  com 
mand  of  the  brigade.1 

October  20,  our  good  Chaplain  Randall  Ross  was  summoned 
to  appear  before  General  Stanley  to  answer  for  some  objection 
able  statements  he  had  made  in  a  report  to  the  War  Department.1 

In  the  afternoon  General  Askew  received  an  order  to  report 
in  person  at  sub-district  headquarters  in  San  Antonio,  and  to 

1     Gleason's  Diarv. 


782  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

direct  his  regiment  to  follow,  eight  wagons  being  sent  to  haul 
the  regimental  baggage  and  equipment.  The  regiment  started 
at  2  :30  p.  m.  and  after  having  marched  two  miles  was  met  by  an 
orderly  with  orders  to  remain  where  we  were.  By  this  time 
General  Askew  had  returned  from  sub-district  headquarters,  de 
cided  that  we  should  not  turn  back,  but  go  forward  and  encamp 
in  the  suburbs  of  the  city.  This  action  was  reported  to  head 
quarters  and  approved  and  we  marched  on  to  the  city  and  en 
camped  near  it  on  ground  covered  by  mesquite  bushes  and  chap 
arral,  so  thick  we  could  with  difficulty  pitch  our  tents.  Our  camp 
was  only  a  temporary  one,  as  General  Askew  had  been  appointed 
commander  of  the  post  and  we  expected  to  move  into  the  city 
as  provost  guard  as  soon  as  the  cavalry  moved  out. 

October  21,  the  cavalry  marched  out  and  we  occupied  its 
camp.  Captain  J.  Alonzo  Gleason  was  detailed  on  the  staff  of 
the  post  commander  as  assistant  provost  marshal  and  Lieu 
tenant  Jasper  N.  Welch  as  assistant  adjutant  general. 

Sunday,  October  22,  a  great  many  officers  and  men  of  the 
regiment  attended  the  M.  E.  Church  in  the  city.  Sergeant  Major 
Samuel  C.  McKirahan  having  been  mustered  in  as  second  lieu 
tenant,  Sergeant  Alex  C.  Moore  was  appointed  to  his  place.  Ser 
geant  George  W.  Chessell  was  appointed  quartermaster  sergeant 
and  Sergeant  Henry  M.  Leidy,  commissary  sergeant.  Doctor 
Young  was  responsible  for  a  report  that  General  Stanley  would 
soon  order  the  muster  out  of  thirteen  more  regiments  of  the  com 
mand. 

October  19,  General  Sheridan,  who  was  then  at  New  Orleans 
informed  General  Grant  that  he  had  ordered  the  muster  out  of 
all  the  regiments  of  the  Fourth  Corps  except  three,1  but  such 
order  had  not  reached  San  Antonio. 

October  23,  the  Eighth  Kansas  moved  into  the  city  and  en 
camped  on  our  right,  and  it  was  reported  that  the  detachment  of 
the  Thirty-second  Indiana  would  soon  follow. 

October  27,  the  entire  regiment  was  excited  over  a  report 
that  General  Stanley  had  been  ordered  to  muster  out  all  but  three 
of  the  volunteer  regiments.  It  turned  out  to  be  only  a  newspaper 
report,  but  every  one  believed  such  an  order  was  on  its  way  and 
there  was  great  joy  over  the  good  news.  The  order  had  actually 
been  issued  as  before  stated,  but  before  it  reached  General  Stanley 
new  troubles  or  complications  had  arisen  along  and  across  the 
Rio  Grande,  and  on  October  28,  General  Grant  telegraphed  Gen 
eral  Sheridan  to  discontinue  the  mustering  out  of  troops  in 
Texas.1  Fortunately  for  the  peace  of  the  camp  it  was  not  known 

1     W.  R.  R.  102-1248. 


THREE  MONTHS  IN  SAN  ANTONIA,  TEXAS  783 

that  the  order  had  been  received  and  that  General  Grant  had 
countermanded  it. 

It  was  the  impression  throughout  our  camp  that  we  would 
soon  be  mustered  out  and  October  30,  Captain  David  A.  Geiger, 
division  mustering  officer,  called  at  regimental  headquarters  and 
said  it  was  his  opinion  that  the  regiment  which  first  got  its  muster 
out  rolls  ready  would  be  mustered  out  first.  It  was  therefore 
decided  to  begin  work  on  such  rolls  at  once.1 

The  weather  was  getting  cold  and  some  of  the  officers,  and 
men  set  about  putting  up  chimneys,  so  as  to  be  able  to  warm  their 
tents.  There  was  frost  the  morning  of  Nov.  4.  From  this  time 
until  November  11,  we  were  occupied  with  the  daily  round  of 
guard  and  police  duties.  There  were  frequent  rumors  that  we 
were  soon  to  be  mustered  out,  but  nothing  definite,  and  work  on 
the  muster  out  rolls  was  suspended.  But  November  11,  Captain 
Geiger  came  to  tell  us  to  resume  work  on  them,  as  General  Stanley 
had  authorized  him  to  muster  out  the  first  regiment  that  was 
ready.  Printed  instructions  for  making  out  the  rolls  were  dis 
tributed  to  the  companies,  and  some  of  the  company  commanders 
began  work  on  them  at  once.1 

The  muster  out  rolls  were  completed  November  20,  and  we 
were  informed  by  Captain  Geiger  that  the  regiment  would  be 
mustered  out  the  next  day.  That  evening  Colonel  McClenahan, 
Surgeon  Clark  and  the  Gleasons  met  for  the  last  time  during  the 
active  service  of  the  regiment  and  sang.  Their  voices  had  been 
heard  in  our  regimental  camps  on  many  a  tented  field  and  had 
mingled  with  the  roar  of  many  waters, — the  Ohio,  the  Cumber 
land,  the  Tennessee,  the  Holston,  the  Mississippi  and  many 
lesser  streams,  on  whose  banks  we  had  pitched  our  tents.  Moun 
tain,  valley  and  prairie  in  more  than  one  half  the  states  of  the 
Confederacy  had  heard  them.  In  the  lonely  evenings  in  camp, 
often  in  the  immediate  presence  of  the  enemy,  they  sang  songs 
of  home  which  rose  like  a  benediction,  and  many  a  home  sick 
soldier  heard  them  and  was  comforted.  All  thanks  and  praise 
to  the  regimental  quartette.  The  memory  of  their  songs  is  sweet 
to  their  surviving  comrades,  who  hold  the  singers  in  grateful 
remembrance  for  the  comfort  and  cheer  they  gave  in  many  a 
lonely  hour  of  camp  life. 

The  mustering  officer  found  some  mistakes  in  the  muster  out 
rolls,  which  took  some  time  to  correct,  and  although  the  rolls 
were  dated  November  21,  the  actual  muster  out  of  the  regiment 
did  not  take  place  until  November  22.  That  morning  the  regi 
ment  was  still  on  duty,  but  General  Stanley  promised  to  relieve 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


784  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

it  in  the  afternoon.  The  muster  out  took  place  at  1  p.  m.,  each 
company  being  called  in  its  order,  and  after  it  was  over,  all  began 
packing  up  for  the  trip  to  Columbus,  Ohio.  Just  after  supper 
every  one  was  shocked  by  the  report  that  one  of  our  best  soldiers, 
Benjamin  Chance  of  Company  B,  had  been  murdered  by  a  Mex 
ican  only  a  short  distance  from  our  camp.  There  were  many 
conflicting  accounts  of  the  incident,  but  the  most  plausible  was, 
that  Chance  while  on  duty  the  day  before  had  ejected  the  Mex 
ican  from  a  house  where  he  was  creating  a  disturbance  and  the 
latter  had  sought  revenge.  He  attacked  Chance  with  a  knife,  the 
latter  being  unarmed,  and  stabbed  him  in  the  heart.  Chance  was 
a  powerful  man,  and  it  was  said  that  after  he  received  his  death 
wound  he  knocked  the  Mexican  down  with  a  stone.  The  mur 
derer  was  arrested  and  jailed  just  in  time  to  save  him  from  a 
mob  of  infuriated  soldiers,  who  clamored  for  summary  ven 
geance.  It  was  only  by  great  efforts  that  General  Askew,  Colonel 
Conover  of  the  Eighth  Kansas  and  other  officers  were  able  to 
restrain  them  from  breaking  down  the  jail  doors.  In  this  they 
were  greatly  aided  by  Sergeant  Washington  J.  Vance,  who  was  in 
command  of  the  prison.  He  was  a  strong,  cool  headed  soldier 
and  during  the  riot  showed  remarkable  coolness  and  courage.  But 
for  him  the  prisoner  would  doubtless  have  been  torn  to  pieces  by 
the  mob.  He  placed  the  prisoner  in  a  cell  and  guarded  him  from 
the  mob  without,  and  from  other  prisoners  within  the  jail,  who 
also  wanted  to  kill  him.  The  mob  were  finally  persuaded  to  leave 
the  jail,  but  attacked  all  Mexicans  on  the  street  and  compelled 
them  to  flee  in  all  directions  to  save  themselves  from  violence. 
General  Askew  and  other  officers  addressed  the  mob,  and  a  prom 
ise  to  try  the  murderer  next  morning  by  a  military  commission 
allayed  the  excitement  and  the  mob  finally  dispersed. 

November  23,  every  one  was  busy  packing  up  preparatory 
to  our  leaving  for  home.  The  trial  of  the  Mexican  for  killing 
Benjamin  Chance  was  proceeding  but  was  not  concluded.  One  of 
our  men,  William  J.  Porterfield  of  Company  E,  who  was  on 
guard  duty,  shot  and  killed  a  soldier  of  the  Nineteenth  Illinois 
cavalry,  who  was  attempting  to  escape  from  prison.  An  investi 
gation  showed  that  the  shooting  was  justified  but  Porterfield  felt 
very  badly  about  it.1 

The  morning  of  November  24,  1865,  was  quite  foggy,  but  the 
fog  soon  lifted  and  the  after  part  of  the  day  was  clear  and  warm. 
By  noon  every  thing  was  packed  up  and  we  waited  for  the  wag 
ons  in  which  to  pack  our  belongings.  Gleason  went  to  sub- 
district  headquarters  to  report  that  we  were  ready  to  leave.  The 

1     Gregory's  Diary. 


THREE  MONTHS  IN  SAN  ANTONIA,  TEXAS  785 

wagons  were  late  and  did  not  arrive  until  3  p.  m.  As  soon  as 
they  came  the  regimental  bugler  sounded  the  "assembly",  and  the 
men  cheered  loud  and  long. 

General  Askew  was  one  of  the  military  commission  which 
was  trying  the  slayer  of  Benjamin  Chance.  The  trial  was  not 
yet  concluded  and  he  was  compelled  to  remain  behind,  but  said 
he  hoped  to  overtake  us  at  Victoria.  When  the  regiment  was 
formed,  Colonel  McClenahan  gave  the  command  "forward 
march",  the  band  played  "Tramp !  Tramp !  The  Boys  are  March 
ing",1  and  we  turned  our  faces  homeward  with  happy  hearts. 

Our  three  months  at  San  Antonio  were  not  unpleasant.  The 
weather  during  the  fall  months  was  delightful,  the  air  was  dry 
and  invigorating,  the  camps  were  well  located  and  well  policed 
and  the  men  who  took  care  of  themselves  were  in  good  health. 
There  were  many  places  of  interest  in  and  about  the  city,  among 
them,  the  old  church  on  the  "plazo",  or  square,  the  "Alamo"; 
where  "Davy  Crockett"  met  his  death  at  the  hands  of  the  Mex 
icans,  the  old  San  Juan  and  San  Jose  Missions  down  the  river, 
San  Pedro  and  San  Antonio  Springs  up  the  river,  and  many 
other  places  of  interest.  There  were  services  on  Sunday  in  a 
number  of  churches  in  the  city  which  many  of  the  men  attended, 
while  others  attended  the  weekly  ball  given  on  the  same  evening 
at  San  Pedro  Springs,  or  looked  in  on  the  cockfights,  which  were 
a  regular  Sunday  amusement  of  the  Mexican  portion  of  the  popu 
lation.  There  was  a  fine  casino  with  a  fine  music  hall  for  theat 
ricals  and  concerts,  with  siderooms  where  General  Willich's  Ger 
man  friends  dispensed  a  genuine  German  hospitality.  Along  the 
Salado  and  other  streams  in  the  vicinity  were  wooded  stretches 
where  one  could  shoot  squirrels.  There  was  fairly  good  fishing 
in  the  streams,  and  late  in  the  fall  there  was  an  occasional  wild 
duck  to  reward  the  sportsman.  Both  officers  and  men  engaged 
in  these  sports.  Pecan  trees  were  quite  numerous  along  the 
stream  and  the  nuts  were  much  sought  after  by  the  men.  They 
were  so  eager  to  obtain  them  that  they  began  to  cut  down  the  trees 
to  get  them,  and  would  possibly  have  destroyed  the  most  of  them 
if  orders  had  not  been  issued  prohibiting  the  practice.1 

There  was  a  large  German  population  in  San  Antonio  which 
had  been  loyal  to  the  Union  from  the  beginning  of  the  struggle, 
and  whose  manifestations  of  attachment  to  the  country  of  their 
adoption  had  been  repressed  with  a  bloody  hand.  They  and  many 
citizens  of  American  birth,  who  were  also  loyal,  gave  the  soldiers 
of  the  United  States  a  warm  welcome  and  did  much  to  make  our 
stay  in  the  city  pleasant.  Among  the  Germans  who  were  fore- 

1     Gregory's  Diary. 


786  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

most  in  tendering  to  us  a  generous  hospitality  was  Edward 
Degener,  who,  after  the  war,  represented  the  San  Antonio  dis 
trict  in  the  Congress  of  the  United  States.  Among  the  Ameri 
cans  was  John  Twohig,  "Johnie  Twohig",  a  successful  banker, 
who  had  a  fine  place  in  the  suburbs  of  the  city  and  delighted  to 
royally  entertain  both  officers  and  men.  He  had  lived  in  San 
Antonio  a  long  time  and  was  well  known  to  nearly  all  the  officers 
of  the  old  army.  More  than  once  our  regimental  band  was  in 
vited  to  his  house  and  his  hospitality  was  so  generous,  it  was 
said  that  even  the  horns  became  hilarious. 

But  amid  all  these  opportunities  for  enjoyment  there  was 
an  under  current  of  discontent  among  the  men,  who  felt  that  they 
had  been  unfairly  dealt  with  by  their  government.  This  discon 
tentment  showed  itself  at  times  in  disrespect  to  their  officers. 
One  evening  the  latter  part  of  September,  the  men  in  our  camp 
captured  a  stray,  worn  out  mule,  rigged  up  and  placed  on  it  a  fig 
ure  to  represent  a  drunken  officer,  and  drove  it  through  the  camp, 
followed  by  a  crowd  of  jeering  soldiers.1 

The  writer  witnessed  and  recalls  that  one  afternoon  Gen 
eral  Stanley  was  driving  along  one  of  the  streets  when  a  drunken 
soldier  cursed  and  applied  vile  epithets  to  him.  There  was  no 
guard  in  sight,  and  the  general,  who  did  not  lack  physical  cour 
age,  alighted  from  his  ambulance  and  arrested  the  man,  put  him 
in  the  ambulance  and  took  him  to  the  guard  house. 

We  get  a  good  insight  into  the  real  feelings  of  the  men  from 
Gregory's  diary.  He  was  an  orderly  sergeant,  was  in  close  touch 
with  the  men  and  to  some  extent  shared  their  feelings.  In  many 
entries  in  his  diary  he  gives  expression  to  the  general  feeling  of 
discontent.  All  wanted  to  go  home  and  some  were  afflicted  with 
that  terrible  camp  malady,  home  sickness.  Every  rumor  of  a  near 
muster  out  was  greeted  with  joy  and  when,  as  was  mostly  the  case, 
the  rumor  was  false,  there  was  a  corresponding  grief.  In  fact 
Gregory's  diary  during  the  three  months  at  San  Antonio  is  almost 
one  continuous  jeremiad.  October  2,  he  writes,  "Times  are  ex 
ceedingly  dry.  I  think  a  history  of  our  adventures  through  Texas 
will  not  be  interesting".  October  12,  he  says  ironically,  "Many 
reports  going  through  camp."  "If  they  are  not  careful  we  will 
yet  get  home  before  New  Years".  October  27,  of  a  rumor  that 
the  regiment  was  soon  to  be  mustered  out,  he  says,  "I  hope  it  is 
true,  we  may  get  out  of  this  before  cold  weather  comes,  I  am 
tired  of  this  place  sure,"  and  on  November  9,  he  writes,  "Still 
disgusted  about  having  to  stay  in  the  service." 

Occasionally  he  seems  to  have  been  compelled  to  write  that 

1     Gregory's  Diary. 


THREE  MONTHS  IN  SAN  ANTONIA,  TEXAS  787 

he  was  having  some  good  times.  Like  many  others  in  the  com 
mand  he  spent  much  time  in  reading  novels  and  other  light  liter 
ature,  and  some  times  tackled  heavier  mental  pabulum.  One 
entry  in  his  diary  states  that  he  "had  commenced  reading,  'Combe 
on  the  Constitution  of  Man',  but  not  yet  interested  in  it."  One 
who  in  his  youth  tried  to  read  this  book,  is  not  surprised  at  the 
statement.  There  is,  however,  an  occasional  light  in  the  gloom 
which  seems  to  have  possessed  Gregory.  More  than  once  he 
writes  "We  are  having  such  lovely  nights",  and  again,  "The 
health  of  the  company  and  regiment  is  splendid,"  and  again,  he 
tells  of  some  pretty  girls  who  came  through  the  camp. 

The  men  had  good  reasons  to  feel  sore  and  discontented  over 
being  ordered  on  this  remarkably  trying  expedition  in  the  deadly 
heat  of  a  Southern  summer,  after  they  thought  they  had  good 
right  to  be  discharged  under  their  contract  of  enlistment.  Under 
the  circumstances,  the  wonder  is  that  they  were  so  patient  through 
it  all.  This  is  the  testimony  of  General  Sheridan.1  Those  who 
were  patient  and  obedient  to  the  end  have  the  proud  satisfaction 
of  knowing  that  they  did  their  full  share  in  the  last  great  cam 
paign  of  the  civil  war,  which  drove  a  foreign  invader  from 
American  soil  and  made  possible  the  re-establishment  of  a  friend 
ly  republic  on  our  borders. 

The  government  is  sometimes  exacting,  but  is  also  just,  and 
in  closing  this  chapter  it  is  gratifying  to  state  that  most,  if  not 
all,  the  men  who  absented  themselves  without  leave  at  Green 
Lake  and  on  the  march  thence  to  San  Antonio  and  were  marked 
on  the  rolls  as  "deserters",  have  had  this  charge  removed  and  have 
been  honorably  discharged  from  the  service. 

1     Page ante. 


CHAPTER  XXXVII. 

THE  JOURNEY  FROM  SAN  ANTONIO,  TEXAS,  HOMEWARD  AND 
FINAL  DISCHARGE. 

When  the  regiment  left  San  Antonio,  November  24,  1865,  as 
stated  in  the  preceding  chapter,  it  was  3  :45  p.  m.  The  afternoon 
was  clear  and  warm  and  the  men  moved  at  a  brisk  pace.  We 
took  the  Yorktown  road  and  marched  nine  miles  to  Roscio  Creek, 
where  we  found  good  water  and  pitched  our  tents  for  the  night. 
Our  troubles,  we  thought,  were  now  all  over  and  each  hour 
brought  us  nearer  home.  After  a  good  supper  all  turned  in 
and  enjoyed  a  good  night's  rest.  Next  morning,  November  25, 
the  cooks  were  up  early,  and  we  had  breakfast  and  were  ready 
to  resume  our  march  by  eight  o'clock.  The  men  started  off  at  a 
lively  pace.  There  was  no  straggling  and  the  only  trouble  we  had 
was  to  keep  the  men  from  running  ahead.  Water  was  scarce  and 
Adjutant  Gleason  and  Quartermaster  Welker  rode  ahead  to  pros 
pect  for  it. 

After  a  ride  of  four  or  five  miles  they  found  a  well  where 
we  stopped  for  dinner.  It  was  the  intention  to  march  to  Sulphur 
Springs,  but  we  decided  it  was  too  far  to  march  without  too  great 
fatigue.  Hearing  of  a  place  where  there  was  good  water  six 
miles  nearer,  Surgeon  Clark  and  Adjutant  Gleason  went  forward 
to  investigate.  They  found  water  at  Cibolo  Creek,  sixteen  miles 
from  our  last  camp,  and  at  3  :30  p.  m.  we  pitched  our  tents  on  a 
site  they  had  selected.  Shortly  after  we  arrived  Surgeon  Clark 
borrowed  a  gun  from  one  of  the  men,  went  to  a  pond  not  far 
away  and  soon  returned  with  a  fine  wild  duck.  This  started 
others  to  duck  hunting,  but  it  soon  grew  too  dark  to  shoot.  Glea 
son  had  the  good  luck  to  land  one.  A  liberal  allowance  of  whisky 
punch  was  served  to  the  regiment  by  Regan,  the  sutler.1 

Sunday,  November  26,  reveille  sounded  before  daylight, 
and  after  breakfast  we  resumed  our  march.  We  marched  ten 
miles  and  pitched  our  tents  in  a  grove  of  live  oaks  on  the  same 
(Cibolo)  creek  we  camped  on  the  night  before.  Some  of  the 
men  were  given  permission  to  hunt  squirrels  in  the  evening  and 
were  quite  successful.1  Gleason  and  Surgeon  Clark  in  the  morn 
ing,  had  gone  ahead  of  the  regiment  with  their  guns,  resolved  to 
have  a  good  hunt  before  the  approach  of  the  column  drove  the 
game  to  cover.  They  arrived  in  camp  with  one  small  frog.  No 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


JOURNEY  HOMEWARD  AND  FINAL  DISCHARGE  789 

wonder  Gleason  notes  in  his  diary  that  he  "closed  one  of  the 
most  unprofitable  Sundays  he  ever  spent." 

November  27,  just  before  we  started  on  our  day's  march, 
Colonel  McClenahan  sent  the  adjutant  to  round  up  some  of  the 
men  who  had  straggled  ahead.  The  two  preceding  days  our  route 
had  taken  us  over  a  rolling  sandy  country,  thinly  covered  with 
post  oaks.  This  morning,  however,  we  soon  came  out  on  a  wide 
grassy  plain,  on  which  large  herds  of  cattle  and  horses  were  graz 
ing.  The  roads  were  much  better  and  the  men  made  better  time. 
After  a  march  of  fourteen  miles  we  crossed  a  stream,  called  Credo 
Creek,  and  a  mile  beyond  it  went  into  camp.  Surgeon  Clark  and 
the  chaplain  had  remained  behind  to  hunt  and  in  the  evening 
came  into  camp  with  a  fine  lot  of  squirrels.  That  evening  the 
regimental  quartette  sang  some  of  the  old  songs,  which  were 
heard  with  very  different  felings  than  in  the  days  agone.  There 
was  not  the  hopeless  longing  for  home  which  they  had  awakened 
in  the  early  days  of  our  service.  The  longing  for  home  had  given 
place  to  an  eager  desire  to  get  there  just  as  soon  as  possible. 

November  28,  every  one  was  so  eager  to  get  along  that  the 
cooks  had  breakfast  before  reveille  sounded.  We  resumed  our 
inarch  at  7  o'clock.  We  traversed  another  oak  barren  and  then 
ciirne  to  another  wide  green  prairie  upon  which  also  great  herds 
were  roaming.  We  stopped  for  dinner  at  Salt  Creek  and,  after 
dinner  and  a  good  rest,  pushed  on  to  Yorktown  and  went  into 
camp  near  that  place.  The  days  march  was  twenty-one  miles, 
but  there  was  no  grumbling  and  the  only  stragglers  were  those 
who  straggled  ahead.  Some  of  these  stragglers  were  called  up 
before  the  Lieutenant  Colonel  for  disobedience  of  orders  and 
were  given  a  mild  lecture.  That  evening  the  regimental  band  had  a 
slight  difficulty  which  was  sttled  by  a  game  of  fisticuffs  between 
"Paddy"  Brown  (R.  B.  Brown  of  Company  A),  and  Davis  Grum- 
mon,  in  which  the  latter  came  off  second  best."1 

November  29,  we  again  started  at  7  a.  m.  and  at  11  a.  m. 
reached  a  steam  saw  and  grist  mill  where  there  was  sufficient 
water  for  cooking,  and  halted  an  hour  for  dinner.  After  dinner 
the  march  was  resumed.  The  men  marched  with  swinging  strides 
which  soon  brought  us  to  Coleto  Creek,  which  we  crossed,  and 
observed  that  it  was  larger  than  when  we  had  crossed  it  on  our 
hard  march  from  Green  Lake  to  San  Antonio.  Beyond  the 
creek  we  pitched  our  tents  for  the  night,  having  marched  eigh 
teen  miles.  We  now  began  to  feel  the  sea  breeze  blowing  soft 
and  cool  from  the  gulf  of  Mexico. 

November  30,  we  started  early  for  Victoria,  said  to  be  fif- 

1      Gleason's  Diary. 


790  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

teen  miles  distant.  We  followed  the  course  of  the  creek  for 
some  distance,  and  then  leaving  it  threaded  our  way  through 
another  oak  barrens  for  several  miles.  We  finally  emerged  into 
a  vast  prairie  beyond  which  a  line  of  timber  marked  the  winding 
course  of  the  Guadaloupe  river.  We  soon  reached  Victoria  and 
halted  near  the  place  where  we  encamped  on  our  march  to  San 
Antonio.  While  we  were  waiting  for  further  orders  a  note  was 
received  from  Captain  Nichols,  district  mustering  officer,  saying 
that  there  were  several  errors  in  our  muster  out  rolls  that  must 
be  corrected  before  \ve  could  proceed  further.  The  errors  were 
not  serious  and  were  soon  corrected.  In  the  meantime  Colonel 
McClenahan  had  not  been  idle,  and  had  secured  transportation 
by  rail  for  the  men  of  the  command  as  far  towards  Port  Lavaca 
as  the  railroad  was  finished — nineteen  miles.  This  would  take 
us  to  within  eight  miles  from  this  port,  where  the  Colonel  hoped 
to  get  light  boats  to  carry  the  regiment  to  Indianola.  We  learned 
that  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  had  left  Victoria  the  night  before  and 
were  eager  to  overtake  them  at  Indianola.  The  wagons  were 
placed  in  charge  of  the  quartermaster  with  directions  to  follow 
us  at  4  o'clock  next  morning.  We  had  only  six  cars,  four  box 
cars  and  two  flats,  and  it  took  close  packing  to  get  our  350  men 
into  and  on  them.1  The  train  did  not  start  until  7  p.  m.  and  as 
the  track  was  new  our  progress  was  slow.  About  twelve  miles 
out  we  passed  the  Sixty-fourth  and  Sixty-fifth  Ohio,  which 
were  in  camp  beside  the  track.  We  reached  the  end  of  the  rail 
road  at  9  p.  m.  and  disembarked  on  the  open  prairie.  We  had 
no  tents  with  us,  and  those  who  had  cots  put  them  up  and  slept 
on  them  in  the  open  air.  The  men  spread  their  rubber  blankets 
on  the  prairie  and  as  the  weather  was  mild,  all  enjoyed  a  good 
rest.  The  night  was  clear  and  there  was  a  heavy  dew. 

The  next  morning,  December  1,  Colonel  McClenahan  went  to 
Port  Lavaca  to  see  if  lighters  could  be  had  to  take  us  to  Indian 
ola.  While  he  was  gone  the  wagons  came  up  and  we  marched 
six  miles  to  a  place  called  the  "Junction",  and  went  into  camp 
for  the  night.  The  Colonel  returned  at  supper  time  and  reported 
that  there  were  no  boats  to  be  had  at  Port  Lavaca  and  we  would 
have  to  march  to  Indianola.  We  hoped  we  would  get  there  in 
time  to  take  passage  on  the  Hudson  with  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio. 

The  morning  of  December  2,  reveille  was  sounded  at  5  :30 
o'clock  and  by  day  light  we  were  on  our  way  to  Indianola,  distant 
sixteen  miles.  The  men  marched  rapidly  and  we  were  soon  in 
sight  of  the  town.  As  it  came  into  view  the  men  marched  still 
more  rapidly  in  their  eagerness  to  get  to  the  coast  again.  As 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


JOURNEY  HOMEWARD  AND  FINAL  DISCHARGE  791 

we  approached  the  place  we  met  Lieutenant  Trego,  who  guided 
us  to  the  place  selected  for  our  camp.  We  learned  that  the  Forty- 
ninth  Ohio  had  embarked  on  the  Hudson,  but  owing  to  rough 
waters  she  had  not  left  the  bay.  Later  in  the  evening  it  was 
rumored  that  she  would  return  and  take  us  aboard  in  the  morn 
ing.  Our  tents  were  pitched  and  many  officers  and  men  went 
bathing  along  the  fine  beach.  The  fine  weather  which  we  had 
enjoyed  all  the  way  from  San  Antonio  seemed  about  over.  The 
clouds  began  to  gather  and  there  was  a  high  wind,  which  gave 
warning  of  a  coming  storm. 

December  3,  we  remained  in  camp  while  Colonel  McClena- 
han  was  trying  to  get  transportation  to  New  Orleans.  The  Hud 
son  had  not  been  heard  from  and  it  was  believed  she  had  gone 
out  over  the  bar.  During  the  day  we  witnessed  a  fine  dress  parade 
by  the  Seventh  U.  S.  colored  regiment.  Some  of  the  officers  of 
that  regiment  called  at  our  regimental  headquarters  to  get  some 
of  our  band  music.1  They  had  heard  our  band  play  and  were 
much  impressed  by  it.  Doubtless  "Johnie"  Sarchet,  our  efficient 
band  leader,  gave  them  some  of  the  pieces  he  had  arranged.  It 
was  quite  a  compliment  to  him.  In  the  evening  the  Sixty-fourth 
Ohio  arrived  and  went  into  camp  near  us.  There  was  a  light 
rain  during  the  day  and  it  was  hazy  and  warm. 

December  4,  we  were  still  in  camp  at  Indianola,  with  no  im7 
mediate  prospect  of  getting  away.  The  men  began  to  tire  of  the 
monotony  and  grew  very  impatient.  There  was  a  light  rain  in 
the  afternoon  and  the  regiment  was  marched  down  to  the  court 
house  for  better  shelter.  Shortly  after  it  got  inside  the  building 
a  genuine  "norther"  arrived,  which  lowered  the  temperature  very 
rapidly.  In  the  evening  the  Thirteenth  Wisconsin  arrived  from 
San  Antonio, — which  made  three  regiments  awaiting  transpor 
tation. 

The  evening  of  December  5,  was  quite  cold  and  the  wind  was 
still  blowing  hard,  but  towards  afternoon  it  grew  warmer  and 
there  were  frequent  showers.  In  the  evening,  hearing  that  two 
vessels  were  coming  up  the  bay,  Colonel  McClenahan  and  some 
of  his  staff  went  down  to  the  wharf  and  learned  that  they  were 
the  "Beaufort"  and  "Reindeer".  The  Beaufort  was  the  larger 
of  the  two  and  could  carry  TOO  men.  They  were  informed  that 
if  the  men  of  the  regiment  would  help  unload  the  Beaufort's 
cargo,  we  might  expect  to  get  off  on  her  the  day  after  tomorrow. 
It  was  decided  that  this  was  the  best  chance  we  had  of  getting 
away  soon,  and  orders  were  given  accordingly. 

Next   morning,    December    6,    we    saw    a    large    vessel,    the 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


792  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

"Austin"  of  the  Morgan  line,  coming  in.  We  thought  we  might 
possibly  get  away  on  her,  but  she  did  not  carry  government 
freight  or  troops.  Our  only  hope,  therefore,  was  in  the  "Beau 
fort".  That  vessel  had  met  with  an  accident  and. lay  some  dis 
tance  from  shore  stuck  fast  in  the  mud,  with  a  hole  in  her  side. 
She  could  not  even  begin  to  discharge  her  cargo  and  we  put  in 
another  monotonous  day  at  Indianola.  It  was  quite  cold  and  we 
had  little  fire. 

The  morning  of  December  7,  was  the  coldest  of  the  season. 
There  was  a  keen  biting  wind  and  little  comfort  any  where. 
Going  down  to  the  wharf  we  were  told  that  if  we  would  make 
a  detail  to  help  unload  the  Beaufort's  cargo  we  might  get  off  that 
afternoon.  The  detail  was  promptly  furnished,  but  when  it  ar 
rived  at  the  wharf  the  Beaufort  was  anchored  out  in  the  bay  and 
the  water  was  too  rough  to  risk  sending  boats  out  to  her.  The 
detail  returned,  and  in  the  evening  another  detail  was  sent  down 
to  the  wharf  with  the  same  result. 

The  next  day  another  detail  was  furnished  and  as  the  bay 
was  smoother,  they  soon  got  to  wort:,  and  by  evening  the  cargo 
of  the  Beaufort  was  all  got  ashore.  But  the  vessel  had  then  to 
take  on  a  supply  of  coal,  which  took  two  or  three  hours,  and  we 
were  compelled  to  pass  another  disagreeable  night  at  Indianola. 

The  morning  of  December  9,  another  detail  wras  furnished  to 
prepare  the  Beaufort  for  her  voyage.  Colonel  McClenahan  had 
gone  aboard  her  and  sent  word  to  have  the  regiment  at  the 
wharf  ready  to  embark  just  after  dinner.  We  were  late  getting 
the  wagons  to  the  wharf,  there  was  delay  in  getting  rations  and 
forage,  and  it  was  late  in  the  afternoon  before  we  were  all  aboard. 
It  was  18  miles  to  the  bar,  which  the  boat  could  not  cross  safely 
at  night,  so  it  anchored  where  it  was  until  next  morning.  The 
boat  was  a  freighter,  had  meager  accommodations  for  passengers, 
and  both  officers  and  men  slept  whereever  they  could  find  places 
to  spread  their  blankets.  At  daylight  the  Beaufort  weighed  an 
chor  and  was  soon  under  way.  After  going  a  short  distance  we 
took  a  pilot  on  board,  who  guided  us  safely  across  the  bar,  and 
we  were  soon  rapidly  leaving  the  Texas  shore.  The  waters  of 
the  gulf  were  quite  choppy  and  there  were  some  cases  of  sea-sick 
ness. 

December  11,  was  cloudy  and  cold.  There  had  been  rain 
during  the  night,  the  sea  was  much  rougher,  and  many  were  sea 
sick.  Those  who  were  not  sea  sick  put  in  the  time  reading,  play 
ing  cards,  or  wandering  aimlessly  about  the  boat.  No  unusual 
incident  occurred  during  the  day.  The  boat  tossed  so  much 
during  the  night  that  some  got  very  little  sleep. 


JOURNEY  HOMEWARD  AND  FINAL  DISCHARGE  793 

The  morning  of  December  12,  was  fair  and  warmer.  When 
we  got  out  on  deck  there  was  nothing  visible  but  sea  and  sky, 
but  at  9  o'clock  we  came  in  sight  of  land.  At  11  o'clock,  having 
secured  a  pilot,  we  crossed  the  bar  into  the  Mississippi.  Passing 
up  the  river  the  men  amused  themselves  by  shooting  at  wild 
fowl.  We  had  a  good  view  of  Forts  Jackson  and  St.  Philip, 
made  famous  in  the  early  days  of  the  war.  We  noticed  that  they 
were  garrisoned  by  colored  troops.  We  also  passed  a  number 
of  orange  groves  laden  with  golden  fruit,  and  some  sugar  plan 
tations,  all  being  flecked  with  snow  from  a  recent  snow  squall. 
At  sunset  a  dense  fog  settled  on  the  river  and  our  boat  was  com 
pelled  to  tie  up  at  the  shore.  We  learned  that  we  had  passed  the 
Hudson  carrying  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio.  It  had  not  passed  the  bar 
at  South  West  Pass  when  we  crossed  it. 

The  morning  of  December  13,  before  daylight,  the  men  on 
deck  were  driven  below  by  a  cold  drenching  rain.  The  boat  had 
got  underway  about  1  a.  m.  and  was  steaming  rapidly  up  the 
river.  A  bitter  cold  wind  was  blowing  and  there  was  little  com 
fort  anywhere.  About  noon  we  passed  New  Orleans,  having 
orders  to  land  at  Carrollton,  six  miles  above.  When  we  arrived 
at  that  place  it  took  about  two  hours  to  get  the  vessel  to  the 
shore  and  tied  up.  There  was  no  wharf  and  we  had  difficulty  in 
landing  the  regimental  baggage  and  equipment.  Lieutenant  Col 
onel  McClenahan  at  once  went  into  New  Orleans  to  see  about 
transportation  up  the  river.  He  returned  in  the  evening  having 
failed  in  his  mission,  and  the  men  disembarked  and  went  into 
camp  a  short  distance  from  the  landing  place.  Colonel  McClena 
han  thought  we  could  get  a  boat  next  day.  In  the  meantime  an 
order  of  General  Sheridan  directed  us  to  turn  over  our  camp 
equipage  and  animals, — as  the  latter  could  not  be  carried  further 
at  government  expense.  The  night  was  cold  and  both  officers  and 
men  slept  under  wet  blankets. 

The  morning  of  December  14,  was  freezing  cold.  Adjutant 
Gleason  made  out  a  report  of  men  "present  for  duty"  and  took 
it  to  General  Sheridan's  headquarters  in  New  Orleans.  While 
there,  he  learned  that  we  were  to  embark  on  the  steamer  Cor 
nelia  at  5  p.  m.  Colonel  McClenahan  had  also  gone  into  the 
city  and  did  not  return  to  the  regiment.  Later  it  was  learned 
that  he  had  gone  aboard  the  Cornelia.  The  regiment  waited  in 
vain  for  the  promised  boat.  The  men  suffered  so  from  the  cold 
wind  that  Captain  Dorneck,  the  senior  officer  present,  moved  it 
over  to  a  new  camping  place  near  the  levee.  Even  there  the 
wind  was  so  piercing  that  many  of  the  men  lay  on  the  ground 
to  shelter  themselves  from  it.  There  was  little  fuel  to  be  had 

Sis.   26 


794  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

and,  finally,  the  men  "appropriated"  the  wood  along  the  levee 
and  made  fires  by  which  to  keep  warm.  No  boat  appearing,  all 
turned  in,  or  down,  for  the  night. 

When  the  morning  of  December  15  came  there  was  still  no 
word  from  the  Cornelia.  It  was  still  freezing  cold  and  every  one 
was  very  uncomfortable.  The  Forty-ninth  and  Sixty-fifth  Ohio, 
and  the  Thirteenth  Wisconsin  had  arrived  the  evening  before  and 
were  in  camp  not  far  from  us.  Lieutenant  Vanderburg  of  the 
Forty-ninth  Ohio  was  an  early  morning  visitor  at  our  camp. 
It  was  afternoon  when  the  Cornelia  finally  came,  when  the  regi 
ment  embarked  as  rapidly  as  possible.  The  boat  was  a  good  deal 
crowded,  as  the  Sixty-fifth  Ohio  was  also  taken  aboard.  At 
3  :30  p.  m.  the  boat  swung  off  and  turned  her  prow  up  the  river. 
The  boat  was  new  and  quite  comfortable  and  all  were  happy 
that  we  were  again  headed  for  home. 

From  December  16  to  December  21,  we  were  steaming  up 
the  Mississippi  amid  fog  and  rain,  with  only  an  occasional 
glimpse  of  the  sun.  Officers  and  men  whiled  away  the  time 
playing  games  and  reading  the  paper  backed  novels  and  other 
literature,  which  were  to  be  had  everywhere. 

One  day  the  monotony  was  broken  by  a  court  martial  which 
tried  a  man  in  Company  K  for  stealing  an  overcoat.  Sunday, 
December  17,  our  good  chaplain  held  religious  services  in  the 
cabin,  but  the  boat  was  so  noisy  that  it  was  difficult  to  hear  him. 
That  evening  the  quartette  sang  a  number  of  selections.  W^e 
reached  Memphis  at  4  p.  m.,  December  20,  and  Colonel  Me  Clen- 
ahan  sent  a  dispatch  to  the  master  of  transportation  at  Cairo, 
advising  him  of  our  coming. 

The  morning  of  December  22,  we  were  in  sight  of  Cairo. 
The  river  was  full  of  floating  ice,  which  so  impeded  our  progress 
that  we  did  not  reach  the  landing  until  8  o'clock.  The  men  were 
soon  ashore,  and  we  waited  until  Colonel  McClenahan  saw  about 
a  train  to  take  us  onward.  He  soon  reported  that  the  trans 
portation  agent  could  not  tell  when  a  train  would  be  ready.  The 
regiment  was  therefore  marched  to  the  Soldiers'  Home  for  din 
ner  and  some  of  the  men  behaved  badly.1  After  dinner  officers 
and  men  wandered  about  the  city  and  put  in  the  time  as  best 
they  could.  Finally,  about  sunset,  a  train  was  made  up  on  the 
Illinois  Central  Railroad,  consisting  of  box  cars  and  a  caboose, 
and  by  crowding  36  men  into  a  car  and  the  22  officers  in  the  ca 
boose,  all  were  got  on  board  and  the  train  pulled  out.  The 
weather  was  very  cold,  but  the  floors  of  the  car  were  covered 
with  straw,  and  the  men  did  not  complain.  All  were  so  eager  to 
get  home  that  they  would  have  borne  almost  any  inconvenience 

1     Gleason's  Diary. 


JOURNEY  HOMEWARD  AND  FINAJL  DISCHARGE  795 

or  hardship  to  get  there.  The  officers  in  the  caboose  were  even 
more  uncomfortable  than  the  men.  Fortunately,  14  miles  out  we 
met  a  train  going  south  and  from  it  got  a  passenger  coach  in 
which  they  made  themselves  more  comfortable. 

The  morning  of  December  23,  our  train  was  stopped  for 
several  hours  in  a  narrow  cove.  At  1 1  a.  m.  we  reached  Mattoon, 
where  we  were  transferred  to  another  train  consisting  of  7 
coaches  and  three  box  cars.  We  were  to  share  it  with  the  Sixty- 
fifth  Ohio,  and  it  was  the  misfortune  of  some  of  our  officers  and 
men  to  be  obliged  to  ride  in  the  box  cars.  Those  who  did  so 
voted  it  the  coldest  ride  of  their  lives. 

The  morning  of  December  24,  we  reached  Terre  Haute, 
where  four  more  coaches  were  added  to  our  train,  and  at  8  a.  m. 
we  were  oft"  for  Indianapolis.  We  arrived  at  that  place  at  11 
a.  m.,  and  while  a  train  was  being  made  up  to  take  us  to  Colum 
bus,  Ohio,  the  regiment  was  marched  to  the  Soldiers'  Home  for 
dinner.  At  2  :30  p.  m.  we  took  the  train  for  Columbus.  We  had 
such  a  poor  engine  that  at  a  number  of  heavy  grades  the  men 
had  to  get  out  of  the  cars  and  help  the  train  over  them.  We 
arrived  in  the  outskirts  of  Columbus  about  daylight,  December 
25,  where  the  train  was  stopped  at  a  siding,  and  Colonel  Mc- 
Clenahan  went  into  the  city  for  orders.  When  he  returned  we  got 
off  the  cars  and  marched  to  Camp  Chase.  When  we  arrived  at 
that  place  we  found  nearly  every  one  still  asleep.  However, 
when  the  officers  at  camp  headquarters  were  aroused  they  at 
once  directed  us  to  a  camping  place  and  showed  us  every  atten 
tion.  There  was  no  public  reception  for  us  at  the  capital  city 
of  our  state.  That  honor  had  been  granted  to  a  detachment  of 
drafted  men  and  substitutes,  thought  to  be  the  regiment,  nearly 
six  months  before.1  We  had  no  camp  equipment  and  were  out 
of  rations.  Axes  and  camp  kettles  were  borrowed  from  the 
camp  quarter-master,  rations  were  drawn  and  the  men  made 
themselves  as  comfortable  as  they  could  under  the  circumstances. 
Before  noon  the  wagons  came  with  our  baggage  and  our  muster 
out  rolls  prepared  at  San  Antonio  were  delivered  to  the  local 
mustering  officer.  He  delivered  them  to  the  company  command 
ers  to  be  signed  by  the  men  and  returned  to  him.  No  word  had 
been  received  from  General  Askew,  Major  Dubois  and  Captains 
Davis  and  Cope,  who  were  with  him,  and  it  seemed  doubtful  if 
they  would  arrive  before  the  regiment  was  disbanded. 

Some  Hebrew  clothing  men  followed  the  regiment  into  camp 
and  offered  to  pay  the  fare  to  the  city  of  men  who  wished  to  see 
their  stock  of  cheap  clothing.  This  tempting  offer  took  a  number 
of  the  men  away,  and  delayed  the  signing  of  the  muster  out  rolls. 

1     See  page  —  ante. 


796  FIFTEENTH  OHIO  VOLUNTEERS  AND  CAMPAIGNS 

They  were  not  completed  in  the  evening  and  we  spent  the  night 
in  Camp  Chase.  There  was  a  good  deal  to  be  done  in  correcting 
the  muster  rolls,  making  out  reports,  etc.  During  the  day  a  great 
many  of  the  officers  and  men  went  into  the  city,  but  returned  to 
camp  at  night.  An  agent  who  was  preparing  a  "Roster  of  the 
Field  and  Staff",  visited  the  camp  and  Gleason  assisted  him  in 
completing  it.  It  rained  at  intervals  all  day. 

December  27,  1865,  was  cloudy  and  cold.  Sometime  during 
the  evening  it  was  announced  that  the  regiment  would  be  paid 
off  in  the  afternoon  and  the  officers  were  busy  getting  the  rolls 
ready.  The  accoutrements  and  ammunition  were  turned  over  to 
a  local  ordnance  officer,  and  the  camp  equipment  to  the  post 
quartermaster.  The  paymaster  did  not  get  out  to  the  camp  until 
nearly  dark,  but  at  once  commenced  paying  the  men.  During 
the  evening  he  paid  all  but  the  non-commissioned  staff  and  a  few 
stragglers.  Some  of  the  men  who  had  been  paid  started  into 
the  city  to  get  the  first  train  to  their  homes,  but  many  remained  in 
camp  during  the  night.  The  officers  had  yet  to  be  paid  and 
could  not  get  their  pay  until  their  accounts  were  made  out  and 
examined  to  see  if  they  had  properly  accounted  for  all  public 
property  in  their  hands.  They  were  promised  their  pay  early 
next  morning,  but  when  morning  came,  there  was  such  a  crowd 
of  men  who  had  not  been  paid  off  the  day  before,  that  their  ac 
counts  were  not  examined  until  late  in  the  afternoon.  They  were 
promised  their  pay  that  evening  or  early  the  next  morning.  One 
of  the  pleasant  incidents  of  December  28,  was  meeting  our  old 
quartermaster,  Joseph  Goldsmith.  He  was  in  the  clothing  busi 
ness  in  Columbus,  and  some  of  the  officers  bought  citizens  cloth 
ing  of  him.1 

December  29,  the  officers  were  paid,  but  too  late  for  many 
of  them  to  get  early  trains  home.  A  number  of  the  men  were 
at  the  Union  Station  in  the  afternoon  when  the  Cincinnati  train 
came  in,  and  saw  General  Askew  and  the  officers  who  had  re 
mained  behind  with  him  alight  from  it.  There  was  barely  time  to 
exchange  greetings  and  say  good  bye,  when  out  going  trains  were 
called  and  they  separated, — each  going  his  own  way  to  the  home 
fireside,  to  resume  the  pleasures  and  duties  of  civil  life.  Like 
the  many  other  regiments  which  had  preceded  it  to  the  soil  of 
Ohio  after  muster  out  of  the  service,  the  Fifteenth  Ohio  Volun 
teers  melted  quickly  into  the  civic  population  of  the  state.  It 
had  performed  its  part  in  the  great  war  to  preserve  our  national 
life,  and  the  story  of  its  service  has  been  told  in  the  preceding 
pages  of  this  book.  Whether  it  performed  its  part  well  or  ill, 
posterity  must  judge. 

1     Gleason 's  Diary. 


CORRECTIONS. 

On  page  57  in  line  6  from  top  read  "four"  instead  of  "six"  months. 

On  page  73  in  line  14  from  top  read  O.  M.  instead  of  O.  W.  Mitchell. 

On  page  136  in  line  26  from  top  after  word  "army",  and  before 
word  "would"  insert  the  words  "might  have  been  captured  and  he". 

On  page  165  in  line  21  from  top  for  word  "not"  substitute  word 
"only." 

On  page  175  in  line  18  from  top  read  "vice"  instead  of  "Vice". 

On  page  197  in  line  20  from  top  read  "Munfordville"  instead  of 
"Mumfordsville". 

On  page  442  in  line  25  from  top  read  "Oothkaloga"  for  "Oath- 
kaloga". 

On  page  470  in  line  36  from  top  for  word  "enemy"  substitute 
word  "army'.. 

On  page  507  in  lines  31  and  32  strike  out  words  "But  the  battle  of 
Kenesaw  May  27  at  Pickett's  Mills". 

On  page  738  strike  out  line  28  and  in  lieu  thereof  insert  the  words 
"that  we  never  will  be  whipped". 


14  DAY  USE 

'»FT"BN  T^  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 


